The Second PART OF Modern Reports BEING A COLLECTION Of Several SPECIAL CASES Most of them ADJUDGED in the COURT OF Common Pleas In the 26 27 28 29 30th Years of the Reign OF King Charles II. When Sir Fra. North was Chief Justice of the said Court. To which are added Several select CASES in the Courts of Chancery Kings-Bench and Exchequer in the said Years Carefully Collected by a Learned Hand LONDON Printed by the Assigns of Rich. and Edw. Atkins Esquires for Charles Harper at the Flower de Luce over against St. Dunstans Church in Fleetstreet 1698. TO THE Right Honourable JOHN Lord SOMERS Baron of Evesham Lord High Chancellor OF ENGLAND My Lord WHEN both the Favour and Severity of the Laws were by partial and unusual Methods applyed to the Persons and not to the Cases of the accused when the Life and Honour of an unfortunate Man depended on the Arbitrary Dictates of some Men in Authority and when the Sentence pronounced was more Criminal than the Offence of which the Party was too easily convicted then was your Lordship as far from any Advancement to a judicial Office as your Judgment and Inclinations were from the Approbation of such Proceedings But no sooner were places of Honour and Profit in the Law made the unsought Rewards of good and learned Men but your Lordships Merits entituled you to both whose Moderation and Temper will make your Administration just and easie in that honourable Court to which Fortune had no share in your Promotion and whose natural Abilities are so improved by a continued and inflexible Study that your Knowledge is not alone confined to the municipal Laws of this Nation but is generally extensive to all humane Learning What Services may not a Prince expect from the Wisdom and Vigilancy of such a Counsellor And what Benefit may not a divided People find by your equal Dispensation of Justice who if they can be united in any thing it must be in the general Satisfaction which all have in your Promotion because they know those Causes which come before your Lordship will receive a due Hearing and Attention without Passion or Prejudice to Persons such Emotions being as much beneath the Greatness of your Lordships Mind as they are beyond the Duty of Justice and fit only for such who will neither be guided by the Rules of Equity or Reason so true is that Saying Utitur animi motu qui uti ratione non potest The Respect which is due to the Office of Magistrates challengeth an universal Obedience but that particular Affection and Esteem which we have for their Persons is due only to their Vertues and Merits And such is that which I have and all Men especially those of my Profession ought to have for your Lordship and the present Judges in Westminster-Hall whose Learning and Integrity in judicial Determinations may bring the Laws nearer to Perfection and whose Examples are the just Commendation of the present and I hope will be the Imitation of succeeding Ages I could never understand the right meaning of that Sentence Boni Judicis est ampliare Jurisdictionem for if that be true then to what purpose were those Arguments at the Bar of the House of Peers against some late Judges for retaining Bills in Equity the subject Matter whereof was only tryable at the Common Law Such Complaints are now no more because your Lordship will not only support the Honour and Dignity of that Court wherein you preside in the Beauty of Order but will not enjoyn any other from exercising its proper Jurisdiction Thus will the Credit of the Laws of England be revived and Men will acquiesce under the legal Determinations of each Court very few Writs of Error will be brought for Error in Law because of the Justice and Stability of the Judgment in that Court wherein it was given and very few Appeals because your Lordship knows so well how to temper Equity with Justice that he must be a very angry Man who goes away dissatisfied with your Lordships Decree But since the Actions of Men in great Places are subject to the various Censures of Mankind if any prejudiced Person should revive those Disputes or quarrel at your Lordships Administration such Complaints would leave no other Impression upon the Minds of impartial Men than to convince them of the Wrong done to your Lordship and the Folly of such Misapprehensions My Lord I have prefixed your Lordships Name to this mean Performance taking this occasion to shew that great Honour and Respect which I have for your Lordship not that I am so vain to think any thing herein to be worthy of your Lordships Leisure neither do I think it Manners to beg your Lordships Patronage because a good Book will protect it self at all times and a bad one deserves no Protection I know few Books are either praised or perused but what are warranted by the common Repute and Esteem of the Writer which must be imputed to the Prejudice and Partiality of Men and which argues a Diffidence of our natural Parts as if we did not dare to make a right use of our own Judgments For this Reason I have concealed my Name that a Judgment may not be made of the Book by the Repute of the Writer But I hope your Lordship will not condemn my Ambition when I say I am not altogether unknown to your Lordship who am Your Lordships Most humble Servant J. W. Middle-Temple June 22. 1693. A TABLE OF THE NAMES OF THE CASES A. ABbot versus Rugely 307 Abraham versus Cunningham 146 Adams versus Adams 169 Addison versus Otway Mil 233 Alford versus Tatnel 49 Arris and Arris versus Stukley 260 After versus Mazeen 311 Astry versus Ballard 193 312 Atkins versus Bayles 267 Attorny General versus Read Mil 299 ........ versus Turner Mil 106 ....... versus Alston 247 Anonymus 7 17 62 94 100 100 167 199 206 279 293 306 314 316 317 B. BAilies Joan Case 315 Ballard versus Oddey 307 Barker versus Keat 249 Barker versus Warren 270 Barker versus Basket 200 Basset versus Salter 136 Beaver versus Lane 217 Bell versus Knight 182 Benson versus Idle 37 Beaumont versus ...... 140 Bill versus Nichol 246 Birch versus Wilson 274 Birch versus Lingen 316 Blackbourn versus Conset 304 Bridges versus Beddingfield 27 Brittam versus Charnock 286 Brook versus Turner Mil ' 170 Brown versus Johnson 145 Brown versus Waite 130 C. CAlthrop versus Phillips 217 Calthrop versus Heyton 54 Chapter of Southwel versus the Bishop of Lincoln 56 Cockram versus Welby 212 Columbel versus Columbel 77 Cook and others versus Herle 138 Cooper versus Hawkeswel 58 Crosier versus Tomlinson Executor 71 Crossman versus Churchil Mil ' 97 Crowder versus Goodwin 58 Curtio versus Bourn 61 Curtis versus Davenant 8 D. DAshwood versus Cooper 283 Dawes versus Sir Paul Pindar 45 Daws versus Harrison 65 Dorchester's Marquess of Case 215 Dunning
concluded that he had not paid it and therefore they would not admit him to wage his Law without bringing sufficient Compurgators to swear that they believed he swore Truth but such not appearing the Defendant defecit de Lege and Iudgment had been given against him but he offered to bring the Mony recovered and the Costs into the Court and to go to a new Tryal it being a very hard Case upon him at the former Trial where the Demand was of a Quit-Rent of 18 d. per annum the Defendant promised that if the Plaintiff would shew his Title and satisfie him that he had a Right to demand it he would pay him the Rent and at the Tryal express Oath was made of a Promise to pay upon which the Verdict was obtained whereas it was then urged that the Freehold would come in question upon that Promise and so the inferior Court could have no Iurisdiction And afterwards the Chief Iustice said that it hath béen adjudged in the Kings Bench that an inferior Court cannot hold Plea on a quantum meruit for Work done out of the Iurisdiction though the Promise be made within and that he knew where a Person of Quality intending a Marriage with a Lady presented her with a Iewel and the Marriage not taking effect he brought an Action of Detinue against her and she taking it to be a Gift offered to wage her Law but the Court was of Opinion that the property was not changed by this Gift being to a specifical intent and therefore would not admit her to do it Quod nota Styleman versus Patrick AN Action on the Case was brought by the Plaintiff against the Defendant for eating of his Grass with his Sheep Costs allowed so that he could not in tam amplo modo enjoy his Common there was a Verdict for the Plaintiff and it was now moved that he should have no more Costs than Damages because this was a Trespass in its own nature and the Iudge of Assise had not certified that the Title of any Land was in question Bur the Court were all of Opinion Curia that this Case was not within the Statute For it was not a frivolous Action because a little damage done to one Commoner and so to twenty may in the whole make it a great Wrong if the Cause were frivolous the Iudge of Assize may mark it to be such by vertue of the Statute of 43 Eliz. cap. 6. and then there shall be no more Costs than Damages and though in this Case the Plaintiff hath in his Declaration set out a Title to his Common yet the Title of the Land cannot possibly come in question and therefore not to be certified as in Cases of Trespas neither is there any need of a Certificate if it appears by the Pleading that the Title of the Land is in question The Court being against the Defendant as to the Costs his Council then moved in Arrest of Iudgment because the Plaintiff sets forth his Right to the Common only by way of Recital with a cumque etiam Postea c. that he had a Right to Common in such a place sed non allocatur for 't is affirmative enough and afterwards he is charged with doing the Plaintiff damage and so the Case is not like to an Action of Trespas quare cum he did a Trespass for there the sense is imperfect DE Term. Sancti Hill Anno 28 29 Car. II. in Communi Banco James versus Johnson IN Trespass Que Estate where 't is pleadable Mod Rep. 231. the Defendant justified by a Prescription to have Toll and Issue being joyned thereupon the Iury found a special Verdict in which the Case upon the Pleadings was viz. Before the dissolution of Priories the Mannor now in the possession of the Defendant was parcel of the Priory of B. which came to the Crown by the said dissolution and the King made a Grant thereof to Sir Jervas Clifton in Fee together with the said Toll adeo plene as the Prior had it and the Defendant having brought down a Title by several mesne Assignments claims by vertue of a Lease from Sir Jervas for seven years then in being alledging that the said Sir Jervas and all those whose Estate he had might take Toll and whether this Pleading by a Que Estate to have Right of Toll was good in Law the Iury doubted Baldwin Serjeant for the Plaintiff Ex parte Quer. argued that the Iustification was not good because there are two sorts of Toll viz. Toll through and Toll traverse and is in the Kings High Way and the other in a Man 's own Soil and it doth not appear for which the Defendant hath justified If it be for the first then he ought to shew that he did make a Causeway or some other thing that might be an advantage to the Passengers to entitle himself to a Prescription but if it be for the other then he must also shew it was for passing upon his Soil which implies a Consideration 22 Assize Kelw. 148. Pl. Com. 236. Lord Berkley's Case 1 Cro. 710. Smith versus Sheppard by which Cases it appears that the justification ought to be certain Then as to the point in Question he said that Toll cannot be appurtenant to a Mannor and so the Pleading by a Que estate is not good but if that should be admitted yet the Mannor being vested in the Crown by the dissolution the Toll then became in gross and could never after be united to the Mannor or appurtenant thereunto But it was argued for the Defendant by Maynard Serjeant and the whole Court were clear of Opinion that the Issue was upon a particular point and the Title was admitted and that nothing remained in question but the Point in pleading And as to what had been objected That Toll cannot belong to a Mannor 't is quite otherwise for an Advowson a Rent a Toll or any Profit apprender may be appurtenant to it T is true a Man cannot prescribe by a Que Estate of a Rent Advowson Toll c. but he may of a Mannor to which these are appendant 't is likewise true that if the Defendant had said this was Toll for passing the Highway he must shew some cause to entitle himself to the taking of it as by doing something of publick advantage But this general way of pleading is the most usual and so are the Presidents and it ought to come on the other side and to be alledged that the Defendant prescribed for Toll in the High-way and in this Case though the Mannor came to the Crown the Toll remained appurtenant still and so it continued when it was granted out The difference is between a thing which was originally a Flower of the Crown and other things which are not as Catalla Felonum c. if such come again to the King they are merged in the Crown but 't is otherwise in cases of a Leet Park Warren
special Verdict He who sues in an Inferior Court is bound at his peril to take notice of the Bounds and Limits of that Iurisdiction and if the Party after a Verdict below prays a Prohibition and alledges that the Court had no Iurisdiction a Prohibition shall be granted and 't is no Estoppel that he did not take advantage of it before 1 Roll. Abr. 545. But Iustice Atkins and Scroggs were of another Opinion they agreed that if an Action be brought in an Inferior Court if it be not said to be infra Jurisdictionem Curiae they would never presume it to be so but rather to be without if not alledged to be within the Iurisdiction and here in the Plea 't is not shewn at all so that as the Case stands upon the Plea the Proceédings are coram non Judice and there is no legal Authority to warrant them and by consequence the Officer is no more to be excused than the Party because also 't is in the Case of a particular Iurisdiction And so it hath béen adjudged upon an Escape brought against an Officer of an Inferior Court wherein the Plaintiff declared that he had brought an Action upon a Bond against S. in the Court of Kingston and that he had Iudgment and Execution and the Defendant suffered him to escape this Declaration did not charge the Defendan because the Bond was not alledged to be made infra Jurisdictionem Curiae for though such an Action is transitory in its nature yet the Proceedings in an inferior Court upon it are coram non Judice if it doth not appear to be infra Jurisdictionem 1 Roll. Abr. 809. though in the Case of a general Iurisdiction it might be otherwise But here the Rejoynder doth help the Plea for the Plaintiff having replied that the Trespass was committed out of the Iurisdiction and the Defendant having rejoyned that he had alledged in his Declaration below that the Trespass was done within the Iurisdiction 't is now all one Plea and the Plaintiff hath confessed it by his Demurrer so that in regard it was alledged below and admitted there 't is a good Plea both for Officer and Party and the Plaintiff cannot now take advantage of it but is concluded by his former admittance and it shall not be enquired now whether true or false And as to the taliter processum fuit they all held it well enough and that there was no necessity of setting out all the Proceedings here as in a Writ of Error And as to the last Exception 't is said that the Burrough of Warwick is antiquus Burgus and that the Court is held there secundum consuetudinem which is well enough Jones's Case Common Pleas cannot grant Habeas Corpus in Criminal Cases IT was moved for a Habeas Corpus for one Jones who was committed to New Prison by Warrant from a Iustice of Peace for refusing to discover who intrusted him with the keeping of the Keys of a Conventicle and for that he had been instrumental to the Escape of the Preacher he was asked by the Iustice to give Security for his Good Behaviour which he also refused and thereupon was committed The Chief Iustice doubted that a Habeas Corpus could not be granted in this Case because it was in a criminal Cause of which the Court of Common Pleas hath no Iurisdiction and that seemed to be the Opinion of my Lord Coke Vaugh. 157. 2 Inst 53. 2 Inst 55. where he saith it lies for any Officer or priviledged Person of the Court. There are three sorts of Habeas Corpus in this Court one is ad respondendum Mod. Rep. 235. which is for the Plaintiff who is a Suitor here against any Man in Prison who is to be brought thereupon to the Barr and remanded if he cannot give Sureties There is another Habeas Corpus for the Defendant ad faciend ' recipiend ' as to this the same Iurisdiction is here as in the Court of Kings Bench if a person be near the Town by the course of the Court he may be brought hither to be charged and then the Habeas Corpus is returnable immediate but if he be remote it must then be returnable in the Court at a certain day these are the Habeas Corpus's which concern the Iurisdiction of this Court and are incident thereunto There is another which concerns Priviledge when the Party comes and subjects himself to the Court to be either bailed or discharged as the Crime is for which he stands charged and if he be priviledged this Court may examine the Case and do him right if a private man be committed for a criminal Cause we can examine the Matter and send him back again Before King James's Reign there was no Habeas Corpus but recited a Priviledge as in the Case of Priviledge for an Attorny so that if this Court cannot remedy what the Party complains 't is in vain for the Subject to be put to the trouble when he must be sent back again neither can there be any failure of Iustice because he may apply himself to a proper Court and of the same Opinion were Wyndham and Scroggs But Iustice Atkins was of another Opinion for he could see no Reason why there should not be a Right to come to this Court as well as to the Kings Bench. And that Vaughan Wild and Archer Iustices were of Opinion that this Court may grant a Habeas Corpus in other Cases besides those of Priviledge Afterwards the Prisoner was brought to the Court upon this Habeas Corpus but was remanded because this Court would not take Sureties for his Good Behavior The Chief Iustice said that when he was not on the Bench he would take Sureties as a Iustice of Peace And Monday late Secondary informed him that Iustice Wild when he sate in this Court did once take such Sureties as a Iustice of Peace Anonymus IT was the Opinion of the Chief Iustice North In Replevin both are Actors that in a Replevin both Parties are Actors for the one sues for Damages and the other to have the Cattle and there the place is material for if the Plaintiff alledges the taking at A. and they were taken at B. the Defendant may plead Non cepit modo forma but then he can have no Return for if he would have a Retorn ' Habend ' he must deny the taking where the Plaintiff hath laid it and alledge another place in his Avowry Sir Osborn Rands versus Tripp THE Plaintiff was a Tobacconist and lived near Guild-Hall London he married the Daughter of the Defendant New Trial granted who was an Alderman in Hull and had 400 l. Portion with her after the Marriage the Defendant spoke merrily before thrée Witnesses That if his Son-in-Law would procure himself to be Knighted so that his Daughter might be a Lady he would then give him 2000 l. more and would pay 1000 l. part thereof presently upon such Knighthood and the
there hath put down these feigned Attachers for Examples sake from whence the Sheriff in this Case might inferr that they need not be real persons as in truth they ought both upon the Summons Pone and Distress and he cited a Case lately adjudged where the like Return was made upon the Grand Cape and the Iudgment set aside and of this Opinion was the whole Court and said Where the Process is so fatal the Party ought to be duly served and that the Sheriff ought to have gone to the Church and to have seised the Profits and if there be nothing to return a Nihil and though the Iudgment was given before the Term or long since yet when 't is Irregular 't is to be set aside and so it was now and being moved again the Court continued of their former Opinion The like Case was moved in Michaelmas-Term following between Fleming and Lee where the Patron Defendant was thus summoned and never appeared and the Incumbent did cast an Essoign and a Case was cited betwéen Vivian and the Bishop of London Mich. 23 Car. 2. in C. B. where the like Iudgment was set aside But on the other side it was objected that leaving due notice upon the Summons was as much as was required for the other Writs are only to give the Defendant time to plead and therefore 't is not necessary that notice should be given upon every one of the Writs for if once served 't is enough 11 H. 6. 3 4. 36 H. 6. 23. 8 H. 6. 8. Long 5 to E. 4. 26. 29 E. 3. 42 43. Doctor and Stud. 125 126. 21 H. 6. 56. But the Court were of Opinion that the Defendant having not appeared nor cast an Essoign and Iudgment final being given Curia it was reason that all the Process should be served really of which there had been no occasion if he had either appeared or essoined and therefore the Process not being duly served Iudgment was set aside Rast Ent. 217. And they held that the Essoign of the other Defendant was no wise binding to the Patron Defendant because they may sever in Pleading and so that Iudgment was likewise set aside DE Term. Sancti Mich. Anno 29 Car. II. in Communi Banco Sir John Otway versus Holdips Executor c. Bond to pay 40 l. when an Accompt shall be stated 't is a Covenant and not a Solvendum DEBT upon Bond brought by the Plaintiff against the Defendant as Executor wherein the Testator did acknowledge himself to be indebted to the Plaintiff in 40 l. which he thereby did covenant to pay when such a Bill of Costs should be stated by two Attornies indifferently to be chosen between them and sets forth in his Declaration that he named one Attorny and desired the now Defendant to name another which he refused and so intitles himself to this Action The Defendant pleads Non detinet to which the Plaintiff demurred But the Plea was not offered to be maintained because the Executor cannot plead Non detinet but where the Testator himself might plead Nil debet which in this Case he could not do But it was insisted that the Declaration is not good because the Mony was to be paid upon an accompt stated which not being done by the Plaintiffs own shewing 't is not yet due and this ought to be taken as penned viz. Solvendum and not an express Covenant But on the contrary it was held not to be a Solvendum but a Covenant to pay the Mony the Debt and the Duty being in the first place ascertained but if it be a Solvendum and repugnant to the Obligatory Clause 't is void 21 Ed. 4.36 As the Defendant would have it expounded it would be in his power totally to defeat the Bond either way for if he would never chuse an Attorny there could be never any thing due The whole Court were of Opinion that it was not a Solvendum but a Covenant which did not take away the Duty ascertained by the Obligation and if it should not be a Covenant but an entire Bond then it would be in the Power of the Obligor whether ever it shall be payable but be it either the one or the other the Plaintiff having named an Attorny ought to recover and Iudgment was accordingly given for him Dunning versus Lascomb DEBT on a Bond the Condition was to pay Mony when a Ship should go from A. to C. and from thence to Bristol and should arrive there or at any other Port of discharge in England the Ship going from A. to C. took in Provisions at Bristol but not to be discharged there but proceeded in her Voiage to Cales and was cast away And by the Opinion of the Court the Mony was not payable but if he had never intended to perform the Voyage it might have been otherwise 1 Roll. Abr. 142. 39 H. 6.10 Iudgment for the Defendant nisi Atkins versus Bayles AN Information was exhibited against the Defendant Outlary pleaded to an Information good being a Iustice of the Peace for refusing to grant his Warrant to suppress a Conventicle The Defendant pleads an Outlary in disability and the Plantiff demurred 1. 3 Inst 194. This Plea is not good because the King is interested qui tam c. and therefore where the Informer dies the Attorny General may proceed 2. The Statute gives power to any person to inform c. by which general Words the Disability of this person is removed But the Court held that there was no colour in either of these Objections 3. 'T is not pleaded sub pede sigilli sed non allocatur for it need not be so pleaded being in the same Court 4. 'T is not averred that the Plaintiff was the same person who was outlawed but it was answered that the praedictus makes that certain and that though the King be interessed yet the Informer only is Plaintiff and intituled to the benefit and that though he was disabled yet he might sue for the King Moor 541. Dyer 227. b. Cro. Eliz. 583. but not for himself and therefore Iudgment was given that the Plea was good Harwood Bincks versus Hilliard c. Notice where 't is agreed to be in writing must be so pleaded BY an Agreement between the Plaintiffs and the Testator of the Defendant a parcel of Lands was to be sold for 400 l. but if it did not arise to so much then they covenanted with each other to repay proportionable to the Abatement and the Defendant's Testator covenanted for himself and his Executors to pay his proportion to the Plaintiffs so as the Plaintiffs gave him notice in writing of the said Sale by the space of ten days but doth not say that such notice was to be given to his Executors or Administrators And now the Plaintiffs averred that they gave notice accordingly to the Defendant who was Executor and the breach assigned was that he hath not paid c. The
reason the Iury might find for him 'T is true he might have pleaded Plene computavit which is the general Plea But it may as well be presumed that the Verdict was against the Plaintiff because the Action would not lye and the Matter being in dubio the Court will intend it against the Pleader he not having averred to the contrary and so they held the Plea to be ill DE Termino Paschae Anno 30 Car. II. in Communi Banco Osborn versus Wright ACtion on the Case for words Viz. The Plaintiff declares that she was unmarried but about to marry one J. S. and that the Defendant to hinder her Marriage spoke these Words of her Viz. She is a Whore a Common Whore and N's Whore per quod maritagium amisit The Iury found the Defendant guilty of speaking the Words but that she did not lose her Marriage thereby and it was moved in arrest of Iudgment that these Words are not actionable being only Scolding and of that Opinion was all the Court and Iudgment was arrested Hambleton versus Justice Scroggs alios In Camera Scaccarii common- Serjeant at Law whether Priviledge to be Sued only in the Common-Pleas AN Assault and Battery was brought against the Defendants in the Kings-Bench to which one of them pleaded that he was a Serjeant at Law and so ought to have his Priviledge to be sued by Bill in the Common Pleas and in no other Court To this Plea the Plaintiff demurred and Iudgment was given in my Lord Chief Iustice Hales's time by the Opinion of him and the whole Court of Kings-Bench That a Serjeant at Law might be sued there and was not suable in the Court of common-Common-Pleas only 2. That in this Action the Defendant should not have his Priviledge because it was brought against him and another And afterwards a Writ of Error was brought upon this Iudgment returnable before the Lord Chancellor and Chief Iustices of the Kings-Bench and common-Common-Pleas and the Errors were argued before the two Chief Iustices at Serjeants-Inn in Chancery Lane Mr. Holt for the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error Ex parte Quer. That a Serjeant at Law is to be sued only in the Court of common-Common-Pleas and not elsewhere because there is an absolute necessity of his Attendance there He is sworn and no other person can plead at that Bar and therefore if he should be sued in any other Court Vaugh. 155. it would be an Impediment to the Business of that Court where not only the Officers but their Servants have Priviledge In the 11th of E. 4. 2. There was some discourse about the Priviledge of Serjeants at Law where it was held that he is not to be sued in that Court by Bill but by Original but either way he is to have his Priviledge So the Servant of an Officer is not to be sued by Bill Cro. Car. 84. but he is still to have the Priviledge of the Court and so had Serjeant Hedley's Clerk in the Reign of King Charles the first The Serjeants receive a kind of Induction to the Bar and have a place assigned them and that they ought to have Priviledge the very Words of the Writ are observable Viz. mentioning a Serjeant at Law ex officio incumbit in Curia illa And though it hath been said and given as an answer to that Case in Cro. Car. That where the Serjeants Clerk was Arrested in an Inferior Court as in that Case he was there he shall have Priviledge but not against the other great Courts in Westminster-Hall this is a difference never yet taken notice of in any Book nor doth the Writ warrant this distinction 2. He shall have his Priviledge though he be joyned with another because the Action is joynt and several and the one may be found guilty and the other acquitted and it would be an easie way to oust a Man of his Priviledge if it might be done by joyning him with another who hath none 14 H. 4. 21. But the Person with whom the Serjeant is joyned may be sued in the Common-Pleas likewise so that he shall not hinder him from having Priviledge who of right ought to have it 10 E. 4. 15. Offley contra As to the first point Ex parte Def. the Court of Kings-Bench agreed that a Serjeant at Law shall always have the Priviledge of the Court of Common-Pleas against all Inferiour Courts but not against the other Courts in Westminster Hall for he may be sued in any of them A Serjeant is not like the Common Officers of the Court for they are to be attendant there and no where else but a Serjeant at Law is not confined to that Court alone he may be assigned of Council in any other Court and doth usually put his hand to Pleas both in the Kings-Bench and the Exchequer but a Philazer or Attorny of that Court cannot practise in his own Name in any other All Cases of Priviledge ought to be taken strictly And that which was cited concerning the Priviledge of a Serjeants Clerk is not like this because the Arrest was in an Inferiour Court In the 11 E. 4. 2. b. The Chief Iustice of the Kings-Bench came to the common-Common-Pleas Bar and told a Serjeant who he had assigned for a Pauper That if he would not come into that Court and plead for his Clyent he would forejudge him so that if he could be fetch'd out of the Common Pleas and carried to the Kings-Bench he is not confined to that Court alone In the 5 H. 5. nu 10. Complaint was made that the Subjects of the King were not well served in his Courts the Parliament thereupon Ordered that one Martin and others should take upon them the Dignity of Serjeants at Law so that it appears that their Business lies in other Courts as well as in that of the Common-Pleas 2. As to the second Point Here is a joynt Action for any thing that appears to the contrary 2 Rol. Abr. 275. pl. 4. and the Plaintiff may proceed against one in the Kings-Bench and therefore the other shall be ousted of his Priviledge if he have any in the Common-Pleas Moor 556. 20 H. 6. 32. North Chief Iustice said That he always took it to be an uncontroverted point That a Serjeant at Law should be sued only in the Court of common-Common-Pleas by Bill he is bound by Oath to be there and when he brings a Writ of Priviledge 't is always out of that Court and no other Curia advisare vult The Attorny General versus Sir John Read In Scaccario INformation A special Verdict was found Disability by a Statute ought to be removed by the Party to enable himself to execute an Office The Case was thus Viz. Sir John Read 1 Apr. 24 Car. 2. was by Sentence in the Spiritual Court divorced a Mensa Thoro and for Non payment of Alimony was excommunicated Afterwards it was Enacted by the Statute of 25 Car. 2.
a Scandalum Magnatum 216 Where it shall be intended though not laid in the pleading 304 Victuals Justification of a Trespass for that they were corrupt 56 Vnity of Possession Where it doth not destroy a Right of Common 277 Vsage Where it shall not intend a Right it may be Evidence of a Right 278 Vse Where a Man shall take by way of springing Use 208 Uses not favoured in the Law 210 How they came first into Conveyances 251 Use may be raised by the reservation of a Pepper Corn to make a Tenant to the Praecipe 249 250 Where the Statute of 27 H. 8. creates an Use till a future Use cometh in esse 208 Vsury The Contract it self must be Usurious to make the Security void 307 W. Wales EXecution shall go thither upon a Judgment obtained in the Courts at Westminster 11 Wager of Law Where Compurgators shall be required 140 141 Ward Cannot be where the Infant is in by Purchase and not by a Descent 176 177 Warden of the Fleet. How far his Limits extend 221 Warranty Where it shall descend and bar the Issue 109 110 c. Where a Fine sur concessit shall displace an Estate and turn it to a Right and the Collateral Warranty bar the Heir 110 Voucher and Rebutter are incident to it 14 Waste Brought by one Tenant in Common alone and good 61 62 Will. Judgment given upon the Construction of the words therein 223 224 Where the Republication makes it a new Will 313 Ecclesiastical Court the proper place for the determination when a person is capable of making a Will 315 Words Of doubtful signification shall not be construed to work a wrong 116 Where the Pronoun illa doth restrain former words 106 107 Vsque is exclusive in Pleading 280 Words are to be taken in a common and ordinary understanding 183 187 Words where they are made actionable by averment of Damages 150 Words in an Act of Parliament are to be taken in a common meaning 183 187 Wrong No construction shall be made to work a wrong 80 BOOKS Printed for and Sold by CHARLES HARPER at the Flower de Luce over against St. Dunstans Church in Fleetstreet LAW-BOOKS THE Reports of Sir Payton Ventris Knight late one of the Justices of the Common Pleas in Two Parts The first Part containing Select Cases Adjudged in the Kings Bench in the Reign of King Charles the II. 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pleaded Debt for Escape lies against the Warden of the Fleet as superior the Grantee for life being insufficient Jones 60. 1 Vent 314. the Iury found a special Verdict upon which the Case was this Viz. That Sir Jeremy Whitchot was seised in Fee of the Office of Warden of the Fleet and of several Mesuages thereunto belonging and being so seised did make a Grant thereof to one Duckenfield for life and for the lives of three more Duckenfield by Rule of Court was admitted into the said Office being approved by the Court and esteemed a Man of an Estate He suffers a Prisoner afterwards to Escape and being not able to make the Plaintiff satisfaction this Action was brought against Sir Jeremy Whitchot the now Defendant and whether he was chargeable or not with this Action was the Question Wallop who argued for the Plaintiff said Ex parte Quer. That he would not take up any of their time to make a Narrative of Imprisonment for Debt or what remedy there was for Escapes at Common Law and what remedy by the Statute but supposing an Action of Debt will lye whether it be by the Statute of Westm 2. cap. 11. for at the Common Law before the making of that Act Sid. 306 397. an Action of Debt would not lye against the Goaler for an Escape but a special Action on the Case grounded on a Trespass or whether this Action lay against the Defendant by the Statute of 1 R. 2. 2 Inst 382. cap. 12. which gives it against the Warden of the Fleet who in this case had not the actual Free-hold in possession but the inheritance and not the immediate Estate but the Reversion is in Question The Office of the Warden of the Fleet may be taken in two capacities either as an Estate or common Hereditament wherein a Man may have an Inheritance and which may be transferred from one to another or as a publick Office wherein the King and the People may have a special Interest As 't is an Inheritance transferrable 't is subject to the Rules of Law in point of Descent and is demisable for Life in Fee Tayl Possession or Reversion and in many things is common and runs parallel with other Estates of Inheritance 'T is true he cannot grant this Office for years not for any disability in the Grantor but in respect of the matter and nature of the thing granted it being an Office of Trust and Personal for otherwise it would go to the Executor which is inconvenient 9 Co. 96. Sir George Reynell's Case To enquire what superiority the reversioner hath over the particular Estate is not to the point in Question but there is such an intimacy and privity between them that in Iudgment of Law they are accounted as one Estate And therefore Littleton Sect. 452 453 saith that a Release made to a Reversioner shall aid and benefit him who hath the particular Estate and likewise a Release made to the Tenant of the Freehold shall enure to him in Reversion because they are privies in Estate so that these two Estates in the Case at Bar make but one Office This is a publick Office of great Trust and concerns the Administration of Iustice and therefore 't is but reasonable to admit the Rule of Respondeat Superior lest the Party should be without remedy and the rather because Execution is the life of the Law 39 H. 6. 33. He who is in the Office as Superiour whether it be by droit or tort is accountable to the King and his People and this brings him within the Statute of Westm 2. cap. 11. or 1 R. 2. If the Defendant had granted the Office in Fee to Duckenfeild before any Escape had been and the Grantee had been admitted the Defendant then had been discharged or if he dye before or after the Action brought and before Iudgment moritur actio cum persona for if he had not reserved something he could not be charged and if he had parted with the Inheritance the privity had been gon but by reserving that he hath made himself liable for now he is Superiour he may exact Homage and Fealty and the particular Tenant is said to be attendant upon the Reversion and these are marks of Superiority And this Rule of respondeat superior holds not only between the principal Officer and his Deputy and between the Master and his Servant but in many other Cases one is to be answerable for another as 1. Where a Man has power to elect an Officer he is chargeable so the County hath power to elect Coroners and if they fail in their Duty the County shall be charged for by reason of the power they had to elect they are esteemed Superiours 4 Inst 314. 2 Inst 175. 2. Where one Man recommends another to an Office concerning the Kings Revenue the person who recommends is liable if the other prove insufficient and for this there is a notable Case 30 E. 3. 6. 'T is Porter's Case cited in the Case of the Earl of Devonshire 11 Co. 92. b. Where Porter being Master of the Mint covenanted with the King to deliver him Mony within 8 days for all the Bullion delivered ad Cambium Regis to Coyn which he did not perform Et quia Walwyn Picard duxerunt praesentaverunt the said Porter ideo consideratum est quod onerentur versus Dominum Regem 4 Inst 466. And why not the Defendant in this Case who praesentavit the said Duckenfeild to the Court tanquam sufficientem the reason being the same and the King is as much concerned in the ordering this Court of Iustice as in the ordering of his Coffers for as the Treasure is Nervus Belli so the execution of the Law is Nervus Pacis 3. In the Case of a dependant Officer though he is a proper Officer and no Deputy the person who hath the Reversion shall answer as in 32 H. 6. 34. 2 Inst 382. 9 Rep. 98. Dyer 278. b. The Duke of Norfolk who had the Inheritance of the Marshalsea was charged for an Escape suffered by one Brandon who was Tenant for Life in possession of the said Office and there is great reason it should be so for when a principal Officer may make an inferiour Officer who afterwards commits a Forfeiture the superiour shall take advantage of this Forfeiture and 't is as reasonable he should he answerable for his Miscarriage Cro. Eliz. 384. Poph. 119 The Earl of Pembrook against Sir Henry Berkley And therefore admitting the Defendant is out of the Statute yet he is within the Maxim of Respondeat Superior which is not grounded upon any Act of Parliament as appears in the Case of the Coroner and the Statute of Westm 2. And all other Acts which inculcate this Rule are but in affirmance of the Common Law and this is not only a Rule of the Common but also of the Civil Law which is served with the Equity of this Maxim in
to shew that the Proceedings of that Court did not alter but interpret the Law But admitting the Case of the Duke of Norkfolk to be Law yet it concerns not this because the Sub Marshal there was taken as a Deputy but there is no such Officer as a Sub-Warden for Duckenfield had it for Life And then a Deputy being a person removable at pleasure will not be so considered in Law as one who hath a more fixed Estate for having nothing to lose it cannot be intended that he will be so careful in the execution of his Office as the other and therefore 't is reasonable in such Case that the Superiour should answer But he who hath a Freehold for Life hath an Estate of some value in the Law which he cannot be supposed easily to forfeit and therefore 't is reasonable that he alone should be lyable for his own Miscarriages for if the Defendant should be charged by the same reason the Grantee of the Reversion may be charged who is altogether an innocent person and so may be liable to a vast Sum for the Fault of another for which Reasons he prayed Iudgment for the Defendant The Court delivered no Opinion this Term Judgment but took time to advise and afterwards in Easter Term following Rainsford Chief Iustice delivered the Opinions of Twisden Wild and Jones Iustices who said they were all agreéing in the main Point but thought the Verdict imperfect and not to warrant the Plaintiffs Case for he declared that at the time when the Grant was made to Duckenfield when the Commitment was and when the Escape was suffered and ever since that Duckenfield was insufficient and not able to answer the Plaintiff but the Iury in the Special Verdict do not find the insufficiency at that time when this Action was brought But as to the main Question they were of Opinion that the Defendant was Superior and that he is chargeable for this insufficiency of Duckenfield but if he had béen sufficient when the Plaintiff brought this Action it might have been otherwise but his Inability being fully averred in the Declaration and the Defendant denying it and the Iury having found nothing against it but there being strong Suspicions of the truth of the Fact the Court would not make an intendment to the contrary The Iury have found expresly that Duckenfield was insufficient at the time of the Escape which was within six Weeks of the time when the Action was commenced so that having once found him disabled unless it appear that he was of Ability afterwards the Court will not intend him so but rather that he was insufficient at the time of the Action brought for there being strong surmises of it and there being no ground within the Record to intend him sufficient a Fact may be collected that is not found in the Verdict Fulwoods Case 4 Co. The King versus Moor. Difference between a prohibitory Clause and a Clause which gives a Penalty in a Statute AN Information was brought upon the Statute of the 4th 5th of Philip and Mary cap. 8. which Enacts That if any Person c. above the Age of 14 shall after the first day of April next after the making the Statute unlawfully take a Maid or Woman unmarried being within the Age of 16 years c. the Party shall suffer two years Imprisonment or pay such Fine as shall be assessed in the Star Chamber and that the Defendant existens supra aetatem quatuordecim annorum did take a young Maid away unmarried and kept her three days contra formam Statuti upon which he was found Guilty and now moved in Arrest of Iudgment 1. It was said for the Defendant that this Court could not Fine him upon this Statute because when the Informer entitles himself by a Statute he must take the remedy therein prescribed and so 't is not like an Information at the Common Law for in such case this Court might Fine the Plaintiff 2. It is not averred that the party offending was above the age of 14 years at the time of taking but only that he being above the age of 14 such a day did take Where there are not Negative Words the Court of Kings Bench is not restrained Mod. Rep. 34. Sid. 359. Sir William Jones contra If the first Objection hath any weight in it 't is to bring the Party to an Imprisonment for the space of two years which is a punishment directed by that Statute but the Fine is limited to the Star Chamber and those Offences which were punishable there are likewise to be punished here because there are no Negative words in this Statute to abridge the authority of this Court which is never restrained but when the Statute directs before whom the Offence shall be Tried and not elsewhere It was the Opinion of my Lord Chief Iustice Hales That where there is a prohibitory Clause in a Statute and another Clause which gives a Penalty if the Party will go upon the prohibitory Clause Postea he is not confined to the manner expressed in the Statute but if he will go upon the Penalty he must then pursue what the Statute directs The first part of this Statute is but a Declaration of the Common Law the second Clause is introductive of a new Law as to the Court of Star Chamber but is not a restriction as to this Court which might have punished the Defendant if there had been no such Law The first Clause is prohibitory viz. That it shall not be lawful for any person to take away a Maid unmarried and upon this Clause this Information is brought The second Clause is distinct and directs the punishment viz. Upon Conviction to suffer Imprisonment for two years Now by taking away the Court of Star Chamber this prohibitory Clause is not repealed upon which a Man may be Indicted without demanding the Penalty and the Statute having directed that the Offence shall be heard and determined before the Kings Council in the Star Chamber or before the Iudge of Assise and no Negative words to restrain this Court therefore the Chief Iustice who is the Iudge of * Cro. Car. 463. Assise in the County of Middlesex may hear and determine this Offence and by consequence Fine the Party if he be found Guilty As to the second Objection That it is not averred that the Party offending was above the age of 14 years at the time of the taking it had been better if it had been said tunc existen ' supra aetatem quatuordecim annorum but notwithstanding 't is well enough for 't is said that being above the age of 14 years such a day he did take c. so that it cannot be otherwise but that he was of such an age at the time when the Maid was taken and the Iury found him Guilty contra formam Statuti which may likewise be an Answer to the first Objection for he being found Guilty contra formam
Assurances c. of Land not being the Lands of the late King Queen Prince c. and not being Land sold for any pretended Delinquency since the first of June 1641. and all Statutes and Judgments suffered by the Offenders from being impeached from which it appears that the Parliament lookt upon entailed Lands as forfeited for if Estates made to others upon a valuable consideration had need of a Proviso to save them from Forfeiture à fortiori the Estates out of which those are derived have need of such a saving and therefore must be forfeit by the Act for which Reasons these Lands are forfeited As to the great Objection which hath been made and insisted on the other side and which is Trudgeons Case 22 Eliz. 1 Inst 130. Where Tenant in Tail was attainted in a Praemunire and it was adjudged that he should forfeit his Land but during his Life for though the Statue of 16 R. 2. cap. cap. 5. Enacts That in such Case their Lands Tenements Goods and Chattels shall be forfeited to the King yet that must be understood of such an Estate as he may lawfully forfeit and that is during his own life and therefore being general Words they do not take away the force of the Statute de donis so that his Lands in Fee-simple for life c. shall be forfeited but the Land entailed shall not during his life But the Answer is plain For in the Reign of R. 2. when the Statute of Praemunire was made Estates Tail were under a Perpetuity by the said Statute de donis which Statute is now much weakened in the Point of Alienation and the Law is quite altered since that time and 't is apparent by multitude of Presidents that such strict Constructions have not been made since that time to preserve Estates Tail from Forfeitures without special and particular Words 4 Co. 164. and therefore in the Case of Adams and Lambert which is a Case in Point the Iudges there construed Estates Tail to be forfeit for want of special Words in the Statute of 1 E. 6. cap. 14. to save it and that was only a Law made for suppressing of superstitious Vses upon a politick consideration but this is a much greater Offence intended to be punished by this Act in which there are demonstrations both from the Words and intent of the Law-makers to make this Estate forfeited to the Crown than in that Case so much relied on And Iudgment was given accordingly Wyld died before Iudgment was given but Iustice Twisden said he was of that Opinion and Jones Iustice concurred Basset versus Salter After an Escape the Plaintiff may have a Ca. Sa. or Sci. Fa. against the Sheriff IN an Action for an Escape the Question was whether the Plaintiff may take out a Ca. Sa. or have a Fi. Fa. against the Defendant after the Sheriff or Gaoler voluntarily suffer him to escape but the Court would not suffer it to be argued because it had been lately settled that it was at the Election of the Plaintiff to do either and upon a Writ of Error brought in the Exchequer-Chamber the Iudges there were of the same Opinion But in the Lord Chief Iustice Vaughan's time the Court of Common Pleas were divided but 't is since settled 1 Roll. Abridg. 901 902. If there be an Escape by the Plaintiffs consent though he did not intend it the Law is hard that the Debt should be thereby discharged as where one was in execution in the Kings Bench and some Proposals were made to the Plaintiff in behalf of the Prisoner who seeing there was some likelyhood of an Accomodation consented to a Meeting in London and desired the Prisoner might be there who came accordingly and this was held to be an Escape with the * If it had been by the consent of the Sheriff he could never take him again but the Plaintiff might Sid. 330. consent of the Plaintiff and he could never after be in Execution at his Suit for the same Matter Peck versus Hill In Communi Banco Bond good given in discharge of another Mod. Rep. 221. DEBT upon a Bond brought against the Defendant as Administrator who pleads that he gave another Bond in his own Name in discharge of the first Bond and upon Issue joined it was found for the Defendant and it was moved that Iudgment might not be entred hereupon because it was a bad Plea But North Chief Iustice and Wyndham and Scroggs Iustices were of Opinion that it was a good Plea because there was other Security given than what the Plaintiff had before for upon the first Bond he was only lyable de bonis Intestatoris but now he might be charged in his own Right Co. Lit. 122. b. which may be well said to be in full satisfaction of the first Obligation for where the Condition is for payment of Mony to the Party himself there if he accept any collateral thing in satisfaction 't is good If a Security be given by a Stranger it may discharge a former Bond and this in effect is given by such And 't is not like the Case in Hobert where a Bond was given by the same Party upon that very day a former Bond was payable and adjudged not a good discharge for the Obligee was in no better condition than he was before Iustice Atkins doubted but inclined that one Bond cannot be discharged by giving another though the Discharge be applied to the Condition of the Bond and for this he cited Cro. Car. 85. Cro. Eliz. 716 727. which was a Case adjudged so in Point and therefore this Plea upon Demurrer should have been over-ruled yet since Issue was taken upon it and a Verdict for the Defendant the Plea is helped by the Statute of Jeofails 32 H. 8. here being a direct Affirmative and Negative But as to that the Chief Iustice and Scroggs Iustice replied that an immaterial Issue no ways arising from the Matter is not helped as an Action of Debt upon a Bond laid to be made in London and the Defendant saith that it was made in Middlesex and this is tried 't is not aided by the Statute but there must be a Repleader But because it was sworn that the Obligor who was the intestate was alive four years after the time that the second Bond was given and for that reason it could not be given upon the accompt of the Defendants being liable as Administrator but must be intended a Bond to secure a Debt of his own therefore a new Trial was granted Cook and others versus Herle Covenant will lie in the personalty tho' the Grant be executed by the Statute of Uses which makes a Distress the proper remedy Mod. Rep. 223. IN Covenant the Case was this Charles Cook made a Iointure to Mary his Wife for life and died without Issue the Land descended to Thomas Cook his Brother and Heir who grants an Annuity or Rent Charge of 200 l. per
Case of * Sid. 233. the Marquess of Dorchester He is no more to be valued than the Black Dog which lies there which were Words of disesteem and only the Opinion of the Defendant in which Case Iudgment was affirmed in a Writ of Error Object If it be objected to what purpose this Statute was made if no Action lies upon it but what lay at the Common Law Answ The Plaintiff now upon the Statute must prosecute tam pro Domino Rege quam pro seipso which he could not do at the Common Law And it has beén held in the Starr-Chamber that if a Scandalum Magnatum be brought upon this Statute the Defendant cannot justifie because 't is brought qui tam c. and the King is concerned but the Defendant may explain the Words and tell the occasion of speaking of them if they are true they must not be published because the Statute was to prevent Discords Object These Words carry in them no disesteem Answ According to a Common Vnderstanding they are Words of disrespect and of great disesteem for 't is as much as to say that the Plaintiff is a Man of no Honour he is one who lives after his own Will and so is not fit to be employed under the King if any precedent discourse had qualified the speaking these Words it ought to have been shewn by the Defendant which is not done and therefore he concluded that the Words notwithstanding what was objected were actionable and so by the Opinion of him Wyndham and Scroggs Iustices Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Atkins Iustice of a contrary Opinion Anonymus AN Action of Assault Battery Amendment after a Demurrer joyned and before Judgment given good Wounding and false Imprisonment for an hour was brought against the Defendant who pleads quoad venire vi armis Not-Guilty and as to the Imprisonment he justified as Servant to the Sheriff attending upon him at the time of the Assize from whom he received a Command to bring the Plaintiff being another of the Sheriffs Servants from the Conventicle where finding of him he to wit the Defendant did molliter manus imponere upon the Plaintiff and brought him before his Master quae est eadem transgressio To this the Plaintiff demurred and shewed for Cause 1. That the Substance of the Iustification is not good 2 Cro. 360. because the Servant could not thus justifie though his Master might for the Lord may beat his Villain without a Cause but if he command another to do it an Action of Battery lies against him 2 H. 4. 4. But though this might have been good if well pleaded yet 't is not good as pleaded here for 2. The Defendant saith quoad venire vi armis Not-Guilty Harding and Ferne Postea but saith nothing of the wounding which cannot be justified and therefore this Plea is not good for which reason it was clearly resolved that the Plea was ill but the Court inclined that the Substance of the Plea was well enough The Chief Iustice and Iustice Scroggs were of Opinion that a Man may as well send for his Servant from a Conventicle as from an Alehouse and may keep him from going to either of those places And the Chief Iustice said that he once knew it to be part of a Marriage Agreement that the Wife should have leave to go to a Conventicle But in this Case Leave was given to amend the Plea Sid. 107. and put in quoad vulnerationem Not-Guilty and it was held that though the Parties had joined in Demurrer yet the Defendant might have Liberty to amend before Iudgment given Singleton versus Bawtree Executor Traverse must be where the Charge in the Declaration is not fully answered ASsumpsit against the Defendant as Executor who pleads the Testator made one J. S. Executor who proved the Will and took upon him the Execution thereof and administred the Goods and Chattels of the Testator and so concludes in Abatement Et petit Judicium de Brevi with an Averment that J. S. Superstes in plena vita existit To this Plea the Plaintiff demurred because the Defendant ought to have traversed absque hoc that he was Executor or administred as Executor and so are all the Pleadings 9 H. 6. 7. 4 H. 7. 13. 7 H. 6. 13. But Serjeant Pemberton for the Defendant said that there is a difference when Letters of Administration are granted in case the Party die intestate and when a Man makes a Will and therein appoints an Executor for in that Case the Executor comes in immediately from the death of the Testator but when a Man dies intestate the Ordinary hath an Interest in the Goods and therefore he who takes them is Executor de son tort and may be charged as such but 't is otherwise generally where there is a Will and a rightful Executor who proveth the same for he may bring a Trover against the Party for taking of the Testators Goods though he never had the actual possession of them and therefore the taking in such case will not make a Man Executor de son tort because there is another lawful Executor but 't is true that if there be a special Administration 't is otherwise as if a Stranger doth take upon him to pay Debts or Legacies or to use the Intestates Goods such an express Administration will make him Executor de son tort and liable as in Read's Case 5 Co. So in this Case the Defendant pleads that J. S. was Executor which prima facie discharges him for to make him chargeable the Plaintiff ought in his Replication to set forth the special Administration that though there was an Executor yet before he assumed the Execution or proved the Will the Defendant first took the Goods by which he became Executor of his own Wrong and so to have brought himself within this distinction which was the truth of this Case and that would have put the matter out of dispute which not being done he held the Plea to be good and so prayed Iudgment for the Defendant The Court were of Opinion that prima facie this was a good Plea for where a Man * 2 Sand. 28. confesses and avoids he need not traverse and here the Defendant had avoided his being chargeable as Executor de son tort by saying that there was a rightful Executor who had administred the Testators whole Estate but the Surmise of the Plaintiff and the Plea of the Defendant being both in the * 2 Cro. 579. pl. 9. Sid. 341. 1 Sand. 338. affirmative no Issue can be joined thereon and therefore the Defendant ought to have traversed that he was Executor or ever administred as Executor the rather because his Plea gives no full Answer to the Charge in the Declaration being charged as Executor who pleads that another was Executor and both these matters might be true and yet the Defendant liable as Executor de son tort which
quo and 't is in nature of a Contract raised by Law By the Words of the Capias ad satisfaciend ' it doth appear that the design of the Writ is to enforce the Payment of the the debt by the Imprisonment of the Defendant The Sheriff thereupon returns that he hath taken the Body and that the Defendant hath paid the Mony to him for which reason he discharged him and for this Return he was amerced not because he discharged the Party but because he had not brought the Mony into the Court for the Law never intended that a Man should be kept in Prison after he had paid the debt In this Case the Defendant can have no remedy to recover it again of the Marshal because it was not a bare Payment to him but to pay it over again to the Plaintiff and likewise in consideration that he should be discharged from his Imprisonment If it should be objected by the Marshal that the Plaintiff hath an Action of Escape against him and likewise by the Plaintiff that he did not make the Gaoler his Steward or Bayliff to receive his Mony Answ The Gaoler is made his Bayliff to keep the Party in Execution and it would be very hard that when the Prisoner will lay down his Mony in discharge of the Debt that the Gaoler should not have full power to discharge him If he had come in Michaelmas-Term after the long Vacation and informed the Court that he had offered to pay the Execution Mony to the Marshal and that he would not take it and that the Plaintiff could not be found the Court would have made a Rule to help him Mr. Holt contra If the Payment had béen good to the Sheriff or Marshal yet 't is not pleadable to the second Execution because 't is matter in fact That which hath been objected that the Party shall plead to a second Execution that his Goods were taken by a former Fieri Facias cannot be for no such Plea can be good because by that Writ the Sheriff hath express Authority to levy the Mony and the Plea is not Payment to the Sheriff but that the Mony was levyed by him by virtue of the Writ which ought to be brought into the Court and an Audita Querela lies against the Plaintiff and then the Defendant is to be bailed 1 Leon. 141. Askew versus the Earl of Lincoln Jones and Rainsford were of Opinion that the Defendant might have remedy against the Marshal to recover his Mony again and that the Payment to him was no discharge to the Plaintiff at whose Suit he was in Execution But Iustice Wyld was of another Opinion Quaere The Lord Marquess of Dorchester's Case In Communi Banco IN a Scandalum Magnatum Visne not changed in a Scandalum Magnatum Serjeant Pemberton moved to have good Bail which the Court denied and said that in such Case Bail was not requirable but notwithstanding the Defendant consented to put in 50 l. Bail And then upon the usual Affidavit moved to change the Visne the Action being laid in London which was opposed by the Serjeant who desired that it might be tried where it was laid but he said in this Case that the Visne could not be changed 1. Because the King is a Party to the Suit for 't is tam pro Domino Rege quam pro seipso 2. The Plaintiff is a Lord of Parliament which is adjourned and will meet and therefore it would be inconvenient to try the Cause in the Country since the Service of the King and Kingdom both require his Attendance here and he said that upon the like Motion in B. R. between the Lord Stamford and Needham the Court would not change the Visne North Chief Iustice said that he always took it as a current Opinion that in a Scandalum Magnatum the Visne could not be changed for since it was in the nature of an Information it being tam quam 't was advisable whether it was not within the Statute of 21 Jac. which doth appoint Informations to be tried in their proper Counties But Iustice Atkins inclined that the Visne might be changed for though by the Wisdom of the Law a Iury of the Neighbourhood are to try the Cause yet in point of Iustice the Court may change the Visne to which it was objected that then there would be no difference between local and transitory Actions Actions of Debt and Accompt shall be brought in their proper Counties 6 R. 2. and it was agreed that an Attorney is sworn to bring Actions no where else But the Court not agréeing at last the Defendant was willing that the Cause should be tried in London if the Plaintiff would consent not to try it before the first Setting in the next Term. And as to that reason offered why the Visne should not be changed because the Plaintiff was a Lord of Parliament Iustice Atkins said that did not satisfie him it might be a good ground to move for a Trial at the Barr to which it was answered that in the Case of the Earl of Shaftsbury the Court would not grant a Tryal at the Barr without the Consent of the Defendant The Visne was not changed Beaver versus Lane COvenant made to Baron and Feme Covenant to Baron and Feme the Baron alone may bring the Action the Husband alone brings the Action quod teneat ei conventionem secundum formam effectum cujusdam Indenturae inter Querentem ex una parte Defendentem ex altera parte confect ' and this was for not repairing his House After Verdict for the Plaintiff it was moved in Arrest of Iudgment because of this variance But the Court Ordered that the Plaintiff should have his Iudgment for the Indenture being by Baron and Feme it was therefore true that it was by the Baron and the Action being brought upon a Covenant concerning his Houses and going with them though it be made to him and his Wife yet he may refuse quoad her and bring the Action alone And the Chief Iustice said that he remembred an Authority in an old Book that if a Bond be given to Baron and Feme the Husband shall bring the Action alone which shall be looked upon to be his refusal as to her Calthrop versus Phillips THE Question was Supersedeas must be delivered by the old Sheriff to the new one Mod. Rep. 222. in regard a Supersedeas is not returnable in the Court whether the old Sheriff is bound to deliver it over to the new one or no and it was urged that it ought not because the old Sheriff is to keép it for his indempnity and he may have occasion to plead it But on the other side it was insisted by Serjeant George Strode that it ought to be delivered to the new Sheriff and that there was a Writ in the Register which proved it fol. 295. and if it should be otherwise these inconveniences would follow 1. It would be
inconvenient that the Capias against the Defendant should be delivered to the new Sheriff and not the Supersedeas which was to admit the Charge and not the Discharge Westby's Case 3 Co. 73. And it was the constant practice not only to deliver the Supersedeas but the very Book in which 't is allowed and this he said appeared by the Certificates of many Vnder-Sheriffs which he had in his hand 2. If the Sheriff hath an Exigent against B. who appears and brings a Supersedeas to the old Sheriff and then a new Sheriff is made if he hath not the Supersedeas he may return him outlawed by vertue of the Exigent so in the Case of a Iudgment set aside for Fraud or Practice and a Supersedeas granted and the like in the case of an Estrepment which is never returned and it would be an endless work upon the coming in of every Sheriff to renew this Writ As to the Objection that the old Sheriff may have occasion to plead it As often as such occasion happens he may have recourse to it in the Office of the new Sheriff and he can have no Title to it by the direction of the Writ for that is Vicecomiti Berks and not to him by express Christian and Sirname and of that Opinion was all the Court and Iudgment was given accordingly nisi causa c. Hamond versus Howel Recorder of London An Action will not lie against a Judge for what he doth judicially tho' erroniously Mod. Rep. 184. FAlse Imprisonment The Defendant pleads specially the Substance of which was that there was a Commission of Oyer and Terminer directed to him amongst others c. and that before him and the other Commissioners Mr. Penn and Mr. Mead two Preachers were indicted for being at a Conventicle to which Indictment they pleaded Not-Guilty and this was to be tried by a Iury whereof the Plaintiff was one and that after the Witnesses were sworn and examined in the Cause he and his Fellows found the Prisoners Penn and Mead Not-Guilty whereby they were acquitted quia the Plaintiff male se gesserit in acquitting them both against the direction of the Court in Matter of Law and against plain Evidence the Defendant and the other Commissioners then on the Bench fined the Iury 40 Marks a-piece and for Non-payment committed them to New-gate c. The Plaintiff replies de injuria sua propria absque hoc that he and his Fellows acquitted Penn and Mead against Evidence and to this the Defendant demurred Serjeant Goodfellow who would have argued for the Defendant said that he would not offer to speak to that Point whether a Iudge can fine a Iury for giving a Verdict contrary to Evidence since the Case was so lately and solemnly resolved by all the Iudges of England in * Vaugh. 146. Bushel's Case that he could not fine a Iury for so doing But admit a Iudge cannot fine a Iury yet if he doth no Action will lie against him for so doing because 't is done as a Iudge 12 H. 4. 3. 27 Ass pl. 12. 1 Roll. Abr. 92. Liter Q. pl. 1. But the Court told him that he neéd not to labour that Point but desired to hear the Argument on the other side what could be said for the Plaintiff Serjeant Newdigate argued that this Action would lie 1. It must be admitted that the Imprisonment of the Iury was unlawful and then the consequence will be that all that was done at that time by the Commissioners or Iudges was both against Magna Charta and other Acts of Parliament the Petition of Right c. and therefore their Proceedings were void or at least very irregular to imprison a Iury-man without Presentment or due Process in Law and consequently the party injured shall have an Action for his false Imprisonment In 10 H. 6. f. 17. In an Action brought for false Imprisonment the Defendant justifies the Commitment to be for Suspicion of Felony but because he did not shew the ground of such Suspicion the Iustification was not good The Trial of Penn and Mead and all incidents thereunto as swearing the Iury examining of the Witnesses taking of the Verdict and acquitting the Prisoner were all within the Commission but the fining of the Iury and the imprisoning of them for Non-payment thereof was not justifiable by their Commission and therefore what was done therein was not as Commissioners or Iudges If this Action will not lie then the Party has a Wrong done for which he can have no remedy for the order for paying of the Fine was made at the Old-Bayly upon which no Writ of Error will lie and though the Objection that no Action will lie against a Iudge of Record for what he doth quatenus a Iudge be great the Reason of which is because the King himself is de jure to do Iustice to his Subjects and because he cannot distribute it himself to all persons he doth therefore delegate his Power to his Iudges and if they misbehave themselves the King himself shall call them to account and no other person 12 Co. 24 25. But that concerns not this Case because what was done here was not warranted by the Commission and therefore the Defendant did not act as a Iudge and this difference hath beén taken and allowed that in the Case of an Officer if the Court hath Iurisdiction of the Cause no Action will lie against him for doing what is contrary to his Duty but if all the Proceédings are coram non Judice and so void an Action doth lie 10 Co. 77. So in the Case of a Iustice of the Peace or Constable where he excéeds his particular Iurisdiction so if a Iudge of Nisi Prius doth any thing not warranted by his Commission 't is void And that the Commissioners here had no power to impose this Fine he argued from the very nature of the pretended Offence which was neither a Crime or in any wise punishable because what the Plaintiff did was upon his Oath and for that reason it hath béen adjudged in the Case * Bridgman 131. Agard and Wild that an Action would not lie against one of the Grand Iury after an acquittal for procuring one to be indicted for Barretry because he is upon his Oath and it cannot be presumed that what he did was in Malice The Habeas Corpus gives the Party Liberty but no Recompence for his Imprisonment that must be by an Action of False Imprisonment if otherwise there would be a failure of Iustice and it might encourage the Iudges to act ad libitum especially in inferior Courts where Mayors and Bayliffs might punish Iuries at their pleasures which would not only be a grievance to the Subject but a prejudice to the King himself because no Iuries would appear where they are subject to such arbitrary Procéedings An Action on the Case lies against a Iustice of the Peace for refusing to take an Oath of a Robbery committed 1 Leon. 323.
the space of 14 days after complaint made then the Sub-Commissioners of the Excise are to determine the same from whom no Appeal doth lye to the Justices of the Peace at their next Sessions which Commissioners of Excise Justices of the Peace and Sub-Commissioners amongst other things are inabled by the said Act to Issue out Warrants under their Hands c. to levie the Forfeitures and so justified the Entry under a Warrant from the Sub-Commissioners three Iustices having refused to hear and determine this Offence To this Plea the Plaintiffs demurred and had Iudgment in the Court of Kings-Bench and a Writ of Inquiry of Damages was Executed and 750 l. Damages given and it was alledged that the Defendant could not move to set aside the Iudgment in that Term it was given because the Writ of Inquiry was executed the last day of the Term and the Court did immediatly rise and that he could not move the next Term because the Iudgment was given the Term before the Writ of Error was brought The Attorny General therefore said that this was a hard Case and desired a Note of the Exceptions to the Plea which he would endeavour to maintain which Mr. Pollexfen gave him and then he desired time to answer them The Exception to the Plea upon which the Iudgment was given was this Viz. The Act giveth no power to the Sub-Commissioners to hear and determine the Offences and so to issue out Warrants for the Forfeitures but where the Iustices or any two of them refuse And though it was said by the Defendant that three refused yet it was not said that two did refuse for there is a great difference between the allegation of a thing in the Affirmative and in the Negative for if I affirm that A. B. C. did such a thing that affirmation goes to all of them but negatively it will not hold for if I say A. B. C. did not such a thing there I must add nec eorum aliquis So if an Action be brought against several Men and a Nolle prosequi is entred as to one and a Writ of Enquiry awarded against the rest which recites That the Plaintiff did by Bill implead naming those only against whom the Inquiry was awarded and leaves out him who got the Nolle prosequi this is a variance for it should have been brought against them all 'T is true where a Iudgment is recited 't is enough to mention those only against whom it is had but the Declaration must be against all so in a Writ of Error if one is dead he must be named and so the Iustices ought all to be named in this Case viz. that the three next Iustices did not hear and determine this Offence nec eorum aliquis Wells versus Wright In Communi Banco DEBT upon Bond conditioned Bond with an insensible Condition good that if the Obligée shall pay 20 l. in manner and form following that is to say 5 l. upon four several days therein named but if default shall be made in any of the Payments then the said Obligation shall be void or otherwise to stand in full force and vertue The Defendant pleads that tali die c. non solvit 5 l. c. and upon this the Plaintiff demurred Barrel Serjeant The first part of the Condition is good which is to pay the Mony and the other is surplusage void and insensible but if it be not void it may be good by transsposing thus viz. If he do pay then the Obligation shall be void if default shall be made in Payment then it shall be good and for Authority in the Point the Case of Vernon and Alsop was cited Sid. 105. 1 Sand. 66. 2 Sand. 79. Hill 14 Car. 2. Rot. 1786. in B. R. Where the Condition was that if the Obligée pay 2 s. per Week until the Sum of 7 l. 10 s. be paid viz. on every Saturday and if he fail in Payment at any one day that the Bond shall be void and upon the like Plea and Demurrer as here it was adjudged that the Obligation was single and the Condition repugnant The Court were all of Opinion that Iudgment should be given for the Plaintiff and the Chief Iustice said that he doubted whether the Case of 39 H. 6. 9 10. was Law Brittam versus Charnock Where the the Heir takes by the Will with a Charge he is a Purchaser and the Lands shall not be Assets DEBT upon Bond against the Defendant as Heir Vpon Riens per discent pleaded the Iury found a Special Verdict in which the Case was viz. The Father was seized of a Messuage and thrée Acres of Land in Fee and devised the same to his eldest Son the Defendant and his Heirs within four years after his decease provided the Son pay 20 l. to the Executrix towards the Payment of the Testators Debts and then he deviseth his other Lands to be sold for payment of Debts c. The Father dies the Son pays the 20 l. and if this Messuage c. was Assets in the Hands of the Defendant was the Question Cro. Car. 161. Cro. Eliz. 431. 833. Vaugh. 271. That it was not Assets it was said because the Heir shall not take by descent but by Purchase for the Word Paying is no Condition if it should the Heir is to enter for the breach and that is the Defendant himself and for that reason it shall be a Limitation Southcot and Stowel Antea 'T is true where there is no alteration of the Estate the Heir must take by descent but in this Case there is an alteration of the Estate from what is directed by the Law viz. the manner how he shall come by the Estate for no Fee passeth to him during the four years But this was denyed by Serjeant Pemberton for he said if a Devise be of Land to one and his Heirs within four years it is a present Devise and if such be made to the Heir 't is a descent in the mean time and those Words within four years are void so that the Question will be whether the Word Paying will make the Heir a Purchaser and he held it would not He agreed that it was usual to make that a Word of Limitation and not a Condition when the Devise is to the Heir and therefore in a Devise to the Heir at Law in Fée he shall take by descent Styles Rep. 148. But if this be neither a Condition or Limitation 't is a Charge upon the Land and such a Charge as the Heir cannot avoid in Equity North Chief Iustice and Atkins Where the Heir takes by a Will with a Charge as in this Case he doth not take by Descent but by Purchase and therfore this is no Assets Moor versus Pit SPecial Verdict in Ejectment The Case was this Surrender of a Copyhold to a Disseisor whether good to extinguish the Right viz. A Copyholder for Life the Remainder for Life he in
Anno 30 Car. II. in Communi Banco The Case of one Randal and his Wife an Administrator c. Judgment may be avoided without a Writ of Error by a Plea where the Party is a Stranger to it DEBT upon a Bond against the Defendant as Administrator They plead a Iudgment recovered against the Intestate in Hillary Term 26 27 Car. 2. and that they had not Assets ultra The Plaintiff replies that there was an Action against the Intestate but that he dyed before Iudgment and that after his death Iudgment was obtained and kept on foot per fraudem The Defendant traversed the Fraud but did not answer the death of the Intestate and upon a Demurrer it was said for the Plaintiff that the Iudgment was ill and that he being a Stranger to it could neither bring a Writ of Error or Deceit and had no other way to avoid it but by Plea and that 't is put as a Rule That where Iudgment may be reversed by a Writ of Error the Party shall not be admitted to do it by Plea but a Stranger to it must avoid it by Plea because he is no Party to the Iudgment as if a Scire Facias be brought against the Bail 't is a good Plea for them to say that the Principal was dead before Iudgment given by way of excusing themselves to bring in the Body but 't is not good to avoid the Iudgment because 't is against the Record Cro. Eliz. 199. which must be avoided by Writ of Error 1 Roll. Abr. 449 742. The Court were of Opinion that the Plaintiff might avoid the Iudgment without a Writ of Error especially in this Case where 't is not only erroneous but void Hill versus Thorn IN an Arbitrament it was held by the Court Rules in an Award that if two things be awarded the one within and the other not within the Submission the later is void and the breach must be assigned only upon the first 2. If there be a Submission of a particular difference and there are other things in Controversie if in such Case a general Release is awarded 't is ill and it must be shewed on the other side to avoid the Award for that cause 3. If the Submission be of all differences till the 10th day of May 1 Sand. 33. and a Release awarded to be given of all differences till the 20th day of May if there be no differences between those two days the Award is good if any it must be shewed in Pleading 1 Roll. Abr. 257. otherwise the Court will never intend it 4. Smith and Shelbury Antea That reciprocal Covenants cannot be pleaded in barr of another and that in the assigning of a Breach of Covenant 't is not necessary to averr performance on the Plaintiffs side Staples versus Alden DEBT upon a Bond conditioned to deliver forty pair of Shooes within a Month at Holborn-Bridge to Henry Knight a Common Carrier to G. for the use of the Obligee Tender of Goods to the Man shall be a Tender to the Master The Defendant pleaded that in all that space of a Month Henry Knight did not come to London but that such a day at Holborn-Bridge he delivered forty pair of Shooes to A. G. the Carriers Porter To this Plea the Plaintiff demurred for that the Condition being to do something to a Stranger the Defendant at his peril ought to perform it 33 H. 6. 13. 4 H. 7. 4. like the Case where the Action of Debt was brought upon a Bond conditioned that the Defendant should give such a Release as the Iudge of the Prerogative Court should think fit the Defendant pleaded that the Iudge did not appoint any Release and it was adjudged no good Plea because the Obligation is on his part and he ought to tender a Release to the Iudge Cro. Eliz. 716. But on the other side it was said that a delivery to the Servant is a delivery to the Master himself and if parcels of Goods are delivered to the Porter and lost an Action lies against the Master Curia The Court absente North Chief Iustice held the Plea to be good and that such a Construction was to be made as was according to the intent of the Parties and that a delivery to the Man was a delivery to the Master whereupon Iudgment was given for the Defendant Gillmore versus Executor of Shooter In Banco Regis A new Act shall not take away an Action to which the Plaintiff was entituled at the Commencement of the Act. INdebitatus Assumpsit There was a Treaty of Marriage between the Plaintiff who was of kin to the Testator and the Daughter of one Harris with whom he afterwards had 2000 l. as the Marriage Portion and Mr. Shooter in his Life time promised to give the Plaintiff as much or to leave him worth so much by his Will This Promise was made before the 24th day of June before this Action brought the Marriage took effect Harris paid the 2000 l. and Shooter dyed in September following having made no payment of the Mony or any Provision for the Plaintiff by his Will This Action was commenced after Shooter's death and upon the Tryal a Special Verdict was found upon the Act of Frauds and Perjuries 29 Car. 2. c. 29 Car. 2. which Enacts That from and after the 24th day of June in the year 1677. no Action shall be brought to charge any person upon any Agreement made in consideration of Marriage c. unless such Agreement be in Writing c. And that this was a bare Promise without Writing And by Wyld and Jones absente Twisden Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff for it could not be presumed that the Act had a retrospect to take away an Action to which the Plaintiff was then intituled For if a Will had been made before the 24th day of June and the Testator had dyed afterwards yet the Will had been good though it had not been in pursuance of the Statute Aster versus Mazeen In C. B. IN Covenant Breach assigned did relate to three Covenants the Declaration concludes sic fregit Conventionem and good the Plaintiff declared upon an Indenture in which the Defendant had covenanted that he was seised in Fee c. and would free the Premisses from all Incumbrances in which there was also another Covenant for quiet Enjoyment and the Breach assigned was upon an Entry and Eviction by another and concludes sic Coventionem suam praedictam fregit in the singular Number And upon a Demurrer to the Declaration Maynard Serjeant said That the Breach did relate to all the three Covenants and therefore the Conclusion was ill because he did not shew what Covenant in particular and if he should obtain a Iudgment upon such a Declaration the Recovery could not be pleaed in Barr to another Action brought upon one of the other Covenants But Conyers for the Plaintiff said that Conventio is
Heir enters and claims generally it shall be intended as Heir and the words that he shall not molest by Suit or otherwise are to be intended occasione praemissorum 3dly There is no néed of Entry to avoid an Estate in case of a Limitation because thereby the Estate is determined without Entry or Claim and the Law casts it upon the Party to whom it is limited and in whom it vests till he disagrées to it A. devises Land to B. and his Heirs and dies 't is in the Devisee immediately but indeed till Entry he cannot bring a possessory Action as Trespass c. Pl. Com. 412 413. 10 Co. 40. b. where a Possession vests without Entry a Reversion will vest without Claim Nota. Curtis versus Davenant Prohibition A Bishop cannot appoint Commissioners to tax the Parish for building or repairing a Church IN a Prohibition the Question was whether if a Church be out of repair or being so much out of order that it must be re-edified whether the Bishop of the Diocess may direct a Commission to impower Commissioners to tax and rate every Parishioner for the re-edifying thereof The Court did unanimously agree such Commissions were against Law and therefore granted a Prohibition to the Spiritual Court to stop a Suit there commenced against some of the Parishioners of White-Chappel for not paying the Tax according to their proportions It was agréed that the Spiritual Court hath power to compel the Parish to repair the Church by their Ecclesiastical Censures but they cannot appoint what Sums are to be paid for that purpose because the Churchwardens by the consent of the Parish are to settle that As if a Bridge be out of repair the Iustices of Peace cannot set Rates upon the persons that are to repair it but they must consent to it themselves These Parishioners here who contribute to the charge of repairing the Church may be spared but as for those who are obstinate and refuse to do it the Spiritual Court may proceed to Excommunication against them but there may be a Libel to pay the Rates set by the Church-wardens Nurse versus Yearworth in Cancellaria Bill in Cancellaria for the Assignment of a Term. RIchard Yearworth being seised of Lands in Fee makes a Lease to the Defendant Christopher Yearworth for 99 years to such use as by his last Will he should direct Afterward he makes his Will in writing having then no Issue but his Wife grossement enseint and thereby devises the same Land to the Heirs of his Body on the Body of his Wife begotten and for want of such Issue to the said Christopher the Defendant and his Heirs Richard dies and about a month after a Son is born the Son by vertue of this Devise enjoys the Land but when he attains his full age of one and twenty years he suffers a Common Recovery and afterwards devises the Land to the Complainant Nurse and dies The Complainant exhibits a Bill against the Defendant to have the Lease for 99 years assigned to him and whether he should have it assigned or not was the Question 1. It was pretended that an Estate in Fée being limited by the Will to Christopher who was Lessee for 99 years the Term is thereby drowned 2. It was objected that the Devise by Richard to the Infant in ventre la mere was void and then the Complainant who claimed by a Devise from the Posthumus could have no Title but that the Defendant to whom an Estate was limited by the Will of Richard in Remainder should take presently But notwithstanding what was objected the Lord Keeper Finch decréed that the Lease which was in Trust should be assigned to the Complainant Nurse He said that at the Common Law without all question a Devise to an Infant in ventre sa mere of Lands devisable by Custom was good so that the doubt arises upon the Statute of H. 8. Roll. Abr. tit Devise 609. lit H. pl. 2. Godb. 385. 11 H 6. 13. dubitatur which enacts That it shall be lawful for a Man by his Will in writing to devise his Lands to any person or persons for in this Case the Devisée not being in rerum naturâ in strictness of spéech is no person and therefore it hath beén taken that such a Devise is void Moor's Rep. and 't is left as a Quaere in the Lord Dyer 304. But in two Cases in the Common Pleas one in the time when the Lord Chief Iustice Hale was Iudge there the other in the Lord Chief Iustice Bridgman's time it hath been resolved that if there were sufficient and apt words to describe the Infant though in ventre sa mere the Devise might be good But in the King's Bench the Iudges since have been divided upon this Point that as the Law stands now adjudged this Devise in our Case seems not to be good But should the Case come now in question he said he was not sure that the Law would be so adjudged for 't is hard to disinherit an Heir for want of apt Words to describe him and 't is all the reason in the World that a Mans intent lying in extremis when most commonly he is destitute of Council should be favoured Whitrong versus Blaney Process into Wales THIS Term the Court delivered their Opinions in this Case North Chief Iustice who had heard no Arguments herein being absent The Case was this The Plaintiff upon a Iudgment in this Court sues out a Scire facias against the Heir and the Ter-tenants which was directed to a Sheriff of Wales the Defendant is returned Tertenant but he comes in and pleads Non tenure generally and traverses the Return the Plaintiff demurs Two Points were spoke to in the Case 1. Whether the Defendant can traverse the Sheriffs Return And all the three Iustices agreéd that he cannot 2. Whether a Scir̄ Fac̄ Ca. Sa. Fi. Fa. c. would lie into Wales on a Iudgment here at Westminster And they agréed it would well lie An Indictment may be removed 2 Cro. 484. Ellis Iustice agreéd If Iudgment be given in Wales it could not be removed into the Chancery by Certiorari and sent hither by Mittimus and then Execution taken out upon that Iudgment here because such Iudgments are to be executed in their proper Iurisdictions and such was the Resolution of the Iustices and Barons Cro. Car. 34. But on a Iudgment obtained here Execution may go into Wales No Execution can go into the Isle of Man because 't is no part of England but Wales is united to England by the Statute of 27 H. 8. c. 26. And therefore in Bedo and Piper's Case 2 Bulstr 156. it was held that such a * Het 20. 2 Cro. 484. The Opinion of Dodderidge Roll. 395. 2 Sand. 194. Twisden denied it Writ of Execution goes legally into Wales He said he had a Report of a Case in 11 Car. 2. where a Motion was made to quash an Elegit into Wales
but it was denied for the Court agréed the Writ well issued Some have made a difference between the King's Bench and the Common Pleas as if an Execution might go into Wales upon a Iudgment obtained in the King's Bench but aliter if in the Common-Pleas But the Law is the same in both Courts Mich. 1653. betwéen Wyn and Griffith this very Case came in question and there it was held that Execution goes into Wales as well as into any part of England upon a Iudgment in the Courts of Westminster In 2 Bulstr 54. Hall versus Rotheram it was held that a Ca. sa shall go into Wales against the Bail upon a Iudgment recovered in the Kings-Bench here against the Principal Of the same Opinion was Iustice Atkins and that the Defendant cannot averr against the Sheriffs Return nor a Bishops Certificate and the true reason is given by my Lord Coke in 2 Inst 452. for the Sheriff is but an Officer and hath no day in Court to justifie his Return In special Cases Exception may be made to the Sheriffs Return but this is by reason of the special provision that is made for the doing of it by the Statute of W. 2. cap. 39. as in case too small Issues be returned or that the Sheriff return a Rescous the Party in his Averment must alledge of what value the Issues are 2dly That notwithstanding the common saying Breve Domini Regis non currit in Walliam yet a Fi. Fa. Ca. Sa. or any Execution whatsoever may issue into Wales upon a Iudgment obtained here And to prove this he considered 1. How Wales formerly stood in relation to England 2. How it stood before it was united by the Statute of H. 8. 3. How it now stands since the Vnion 1. And as to the first of these England and Wales were once but one Nation they used the same Language Laws and Religion and so continued till the time of the Roman Conquest before which they were both comprehended under one name viz. The Isle of Great Britain But when the Romans came those Britains who would not submit to their yoak betook themselves to such places where they thought themselves most secure which were the Mountains in Wales and from whence they came again soon after the Romans were drove away by their dissentions here and then these Britains enjoyed their ancient Rights as before After this came the Saxons and gave them another disturbance and then the Kingdom was divided into an Heptarchy and then also and not till then began the Welsh to be distinguished from the English but yet at that time they had great Possessions in England viz. Gloucester part of Worcester Hereford Shrewsbury which they kept till King Offa drove them out of the plaine Countries and made them fly for shelter into those Mountainous parts in Wales where they now continue Cambden 15. And 't is observable that though Wales had Kings and Princes yet the King of England had Superiority over them for to him they were Homagers Cambden 67. The Word Princeps implying a Subordinate Dignity Selden's Titles of Honor 593. 2dly During the time of the Separation Wales had distinct Laws and Customs from those in England whence that saying took its effect viz. Breve Domini Regis non currit in Walliam yet the Parliament of England before that time made Laws to bind Wales As the Act of 25 Edw. 1. for confirmation of the old great Charter of the Liberties of England and of the Forests which enacts That certain Duties shall be paid for every Sack of Wool c. exported out of Wales 2 Inst 531. So the Statute 3 Edw. 1. cap. 17. which gives remedy if a Distress be taken and detained in a Castle and upon deliverance demanded by the Sheriff if the Lord of the Castle should refuse he might raise the Posse Comitatus and beat down the Castle and if such detainer or refusal be in the Marches of Wales the King as the Statute saith is Soveraign Lord of all and shall do right upon complaint and the Conquest was not made till 9 E. 1. so that at that time likewise though Wales had Princes of its own Vaugh. 400. yet the Kings of England were Sovereigns to those Princes and though they had Laws of their own yet were they bound by those that were made here and though their Princes had ordinary remedial Writs yet in Cases extraordinary the Kings Writs here run into Wales and it was not for want of power but because there was no need for that it went so seldom and when the Kings Writ did issue it was necessary to direct it to the Sheriff of an English County for Wales was not then divided into Shires but afterwards by the Act called Statutum Walliae 12 Edw. 1. * 2 Inst 195. 4 Inst 239. it was divided into six Counties and then again by the Act of 27 H. 8. cap. 26. it was divided into the other six Counties But during this time there were frequent Hostilities between England and Wales until by the Conquest in Edw. 1. time they were united 'T is pretended that H. 3. Father to Edw. 1. was the Conqueror and 't is probable something considerable might be done in his time yet the absolute Conquest of the whole Dominion was made by Edw. 1. in whose time the aforesaid Statutum Walliae was made Vaugh. 414 415. and after that the Statute of 27 H. 8. to compleat the Vnion the end of which is declared to bring the Subjects of both to an entire Vnity and that it may be done with effect 't is enacted That the Laws of England be executed there ◠Bulst 54. for which reason it is held in 5 Co. Rep. Vaughan's Case fol. 49. that the Statutes of Jeofails do extend to Wales and in 2 Bulstr 156. * This was a Resolution upon no Debate the Sheriff of Radnor upon a Scire Fac̄ directed to him returned Breve Domini Regis non currit c. and was amerced 10 l. for his false Return Vide 19 H 6. 20. Fitzherb Trial pl. 40. tit Jurisdiction 13 E. 3. 23 24 34. idem Brief 621. Assize 382. It was objected That by express provision in 1 E. 6. cap. 10. Exigent and Proclamations shall be awarded out of the Courts of Westminster into Wales which if they might before this Law was then needless 'T is true the Opinion of the Parliament seems to be that had it not beén for this particular provision such Proclamations might not have issued for by 6 H. 8. cap. 4. Vaugh. 414. such Proclamations went but to the next County but they do not declare so and perhaps they might ground themselves upon that vulgar Error Breve Domini Regis non currit in Walliam which is not true unless the Clause be limited to original Writs only Objection That the Statute of 5 El. cap. 23. which enacts that the Excommunicato Capiendo shall be returned in the Kings-Bench
and takes notice that this Writ is not returnable into that Court from Wales and therefore orders that the Significavit shall be sent by Mittimus out of the Chancery to the Chief Iustice there and gives them power to make Process to inferior Officers returnable before them at their Sessions for the due Execution of this Writ all which had beén in vain if the Capias might go into Wales before the making this Act. Answ But that is an original Writ and so comes not up to this Case Wyndham Iustice agreed in omnibus and said that the Statute of 1 Ed. 6. was very needful for if a Man should be outlawed if the Process should be sent to the Sheriff of the next adjoining County in England he could not have any notice that he was outlawed and so could not tell when oulawed or at whose Suit Vaughan late Lord Chief Iustice held strongly Vaugh. 395. 2 Saund. 194. that no Execucution would go into Wales when this Case was argued before him and of the same Opinion was Iustice Twisden Williamson versus Hancock Collateral Warranty Mod. Rep. 192. A Special Verdict was found in an Ejectment where the Case was Richard Lock the Father was Tenant for Life with Remainder in Tail to Richard his Son Remainder to the right Heirs of the Father who levies a Fine with Warranty to the use of Susan and Hannah Prinn in Feé they by Bargain and Sale convey their Estate to the Defendant The Son in his Fathers life time before the Warranty attached comes of full age the Father dies The Question was whether the Sons Entry was barred by this collateral Warranty thus discended And the thrée Iustices absente North Chief Iustice were clear of Opinion that the collateral Waranty was a barr to the Son and so Iudgment was given for the Defendant Ellis Iustice held that his Entry is taken away for in every Warranty two things are implied a Voucher and Rebutter he that comes in by Voucher calleth the person into Court who is bound in the Warranty to defend his Right or yield him other Land in recompence and must come in by Privity but if a Man have the Estate though he comes in the Post he may rebut that is he may repel the Action of the Heir by the Warranty of his Ancestor without shewing how the Estate came to him Fitzh Nat. Br. 135. In a Formedon in the Discender to say the Ancestor enfeoffed J.S. with Warranty without shewing how J. S. came by his Estate is good Object It was objected by Serjeant Maynard that no person can take advantage of a Warranty who comes in by way of use as in this Case Answ But 't is expresly resolved otherwise in Lincoln Colledge Case 3 Co. 62. b. and the Prinns in this Case came in by Limitation and Act of the Party and the Defendant who hath the Reversion likewise by Limitation of Vse though he be in the Post shall take benefit of the Warranty as Assignee within the Statute of 32 H. 8. Mod. Rep. 181. c. 34. and so it was resolved in Fowl and Dobles Case in this Court that he who comes in by way of use may rebut and Iustice Jones in his Report fol. 199. affirms the fourth resolution in Lincoln Colledge Case to be Law It was formerly objected by the Lord Chief Iustice Vaughan that this Warranty goes only to the Heirs not to the Assigns and here the Estate was conveyed by the two Prinns before the Warranty attached Answ But when the Estate passeth the Warranty and Covenant followeth and the Assignée shall have the benefit thereof though not named and so is the Authority of 38 E. 3. 26. if a Warranty be made to a Man and his Heirs the Assigneé though not named shall Rebutt but he cannot Vouch. So if A. enfeoff B. with Warranty and B. enfeoff C. without Déed C. shall vouch A. as Assigneé of the Land of B. for the Warranty cannot be assigned In this Case though the Warranty did not attach before the Estate in the Land was transferred yet if it attach afterwards 't is well enough and he who hath the Possession shall Rebutt the Demandant without shewing how he came by the Possession If a Warranty be to one and his Heirs without the word Assigns the Assignée indeéd cannot Vouch but he may * 1 Inst 265. a 384. Rebutt for Rebutter is so incident to a Warranty that a Condition not to Rebutt is void in Law But 't is otherwise of a Condition not to Vouch for in such case you may Rebutt 'T is true it hath béen an Opinion that he who claimeth above the Warranty if it be not attached cannot take benefit of it by way of Voucher or Rebbutter as if Tenant in Dower maketh a Feoffment to a Villain with Warranty and the Lord entreth upon him before the descent of the Warranty the Villain can never take advantage of this Warranty by way of Rebutter because the Lords Title is paramount the Warranty and he cometh not under his Estate to whom the Warranty was made If Land be given to two Brothers in Feé with Warranty to the eldest and his Heirs the eldest dies without Issue the Survivor shall not take benefit by this Warranty for the reason aforesaid But in the Case at Barr the Warranty being collateral and annexed to the Land goeth with the Estate and whilst that continues the Party may Vouch or Rebutt so here the Defendant though he be only Tenant at Will for the Estate is in the Bargainors and their Heirs there being no Execucution of it either by Livery or Enrolment yet he may Rebutt Iustice Atkins was of the same Opinion that by this collateral Warranty the Entry of the Lessor of the Plaintiff was taken away for 't is the nature of a collateral Warranty to be a Barr a * Jones Rep. 199 200. 1 Inst 366 385. 25 H. 6. 63. Bro. Gar. 4. Right is bound by it it extinguishes a Right 't is annexed to the Land and runs with it If then a collateral Warranty be of this nature 't is against all reason that he who is thus bound should make any Title to the Land but 't is very reasonable that he who comes in quasi by that Estate should defend his Title The Opinions of Iustice Jones and Iustice Crook in the Case of * Cro. Car. 368. Spirt and Bence has occasioned this doubt The Case was shortly thus Cann being seised in Fée had thrée Sons Thomas Francis and Henry and devised Lands to the two eldest in Tail and to Henry the Meadow called Warhay which was the Land in question but doth not limit what Estate he should have in it then he adds these Words viz. Also I will that he shall enjoy all Bargains I had of Webb to him and his Heirs and for want of Heirs of his * Notwithstanding the word Body he had but an Estate for Life in Warhay for that
of the Rent and the third part of the Reversion and therefore to acquit himself thereof he may well plead as here for which there is a President in Hern's Pleader 335. Then he said That the Traverse was ill for the principal Point in the Plea which he ought to have traversed was the continuance of the Term and 't is not material who granted the Reversion or to whom it was granted for if there is a Lease in being the Demandant cannot have Execution The Court were all of Opinion That the substance of the Plea was good because there was a privity in the Grantee and it was for his benefit to avoid the Demandants Seisin he being thereby entituled to the Rent and he may plead this Plea to save himself from Damages given by the Statute of Merton But as to the Traverse North Chief Iustice and Wyndham Iustice inclined That the Traverse was well taken for if a Disseisor pleads the like Plea as here 't is not good and therefore when the Tenant alledges a Grant of the Reversion the Demandant may well traverse it But Iustice Ellis and Atkyns were of Opinion That the Traverse was immaterial for it was the Lease and not the Grant that was traversable But because it was alledged by the Demandants who offered to refer it to the Council on the other side that this Lease so pleaded was an old Mortgage long since satisfied it was referred accordingly Wilson versus Drake Prohibition Feme Sole hath Debts due by Specialty she marries and dies the Husband shall have Administration Quaere whether he may make distribution to her Kindred A Prohibition being granted upon the late Statute for disposing of Intestates Estates The Defendant demurred and the Case was no more than this Whether the Husband being Adminstrator of the Wives Estate be compellable to make distribution amongst her Kindred or not This Case was argued by Serjeant Seys for the Defendant and by Serjeant Jones for the Plaintiff The circumstances of the Case were A Feme sole had divers Debts owing to her by Specialty she marries the Plainiff and died the Bonds being not put in suit during the Coverture the Plaintiff administers and her Brother sues to have a distribution and it was insisted for him that a Consultation ought to go because the * 22 23 Car. 2. c. 10. Statute extendeth to all persons and therefore the Husband though not named shall make distribution like the Statute de Donis which only mentions some Estates Tail but it has been held that there are several other Estates Tail besides those particular instances there mentioned The Title of this Act is general and there is no Preamble to reduce it to particulars the enacting and provisional Clause speaks in threé places of all persons dying intestate within which general words a Feme Covert as well as others is contained Ex parte Quer. But on the other side it was said that this Case is not instanced in that Act which provides only where the Husband dies intestate As to what was objected that this Act is a general provision and extends to all Cases of the like nature the Title of it also being general For setling of Intestates Estates to that it was said that before the making this Act there were many doubts in those Cases against which a Provision was thereby made and therefore it well became the Prudence of that Parliament to take away all Scruples and to settle those things which were so apt to be questioned But no doubt was ever made before this Statute to whom Administration of the Wives Estate should be committed for by the Statute of 31 Ed. 3. cap. 11. Power was given to the Ordinary to commit Administration to the best Friend of the Intestate and therefore it has beén agréed that the * 4 Co. 51. Ognel's Case Cro. Car. 106. Johns versus Row Husband as being the best Friend of the Wife was intituled to the †Quaere For Administration is not granted to the Husband de jure the Ordinary may grant it to whom he please Administration And 't is agréed on all sides that no Distribution is to be made by an Administrator for if any Suit had been commenced in the Spiritual Court to that purposes a Prohibition was presently granted What need was there to settle this Matter by Act of Parliament which was so clear before And 't is the more unlikely that the Estates of Feme Coverts should be intended to be disposed by this Act when 't is considered that all their Estates consist only in things in Action which the Husband might release during the Coverture for all the Goods in possession are by Law vested in the Husband by the intermarriage and therefore such inconsiderable things may be well intended not worthy the care and provision of a Parliament Besides the Husband and Wife are but one person in Law and this Act provides for the settling Intestates Estates now the Wife cannot be said to die intestate when her Husband the better part survives Before the making those Acts of 31 Ed. 3. cap. 11. and 21 H. 8. cap. 5. the Ordinary might have granted Administration to a Stranger but now by the first of those Laws he is restrained to the next Friend and by the other to the Widow or next of Kin so that the power which he had at the Common Law and which was too often by him abused being now restrained Administration must be granted as prescribed by this Law and no equitable construction can take it from the Husband for how can it be intended that the Parliament would take from him that Right which he had by those former Laws and prefer the Relations of his Wife before him But if the Wife shall be adjudged an Intestate within this Act then the Husband must lose all her Estate in Action and he will be then also within the rules of distribution so that he must be at all the labour and pains of Administration which must be granted to him to defend and get in the Estate and receive no benefit for he must only deduct his Expences out of the Profits and distribute the overplus He is intituled to the Administration within the Statute of Edw. 3. He is also intituled to it within the Clause of the Statute of H. 8. which Enacts That 't is to be granted to the Wife or next of Kin and it seems very unreasonable that he should have no profit for his labour Lastly A Feme Covert can never be intended to dye intestate within the meaning of this Act for that Clause which directs what Bond the Ordinary shall take of the Administrator is very remarkable to this purpose which provides That if it appear the deceased made any Will c. which a Feme Covert cannot do without her Husbands consent and therefore she is not a person dying intestate within the intent of this Law Curia advisare vult DE
could not possibly secure them in his own House without subjecting himself to an Action and an Award that one Man shall take the Goods of another is void But if the Plea is not good yet if the Vmpirage be naught Iudgment is to be given for the Defendant for the advantage is saved to him upon the Demurrer And as to that the Vmpirage is but of one side for the Plaintiff is to do nothing nor is the Defendant to be acquitted of all Suits To which it was answered by the Plaintiff's Council That the Vmpirage was of both sides for there being Suits depending 't is awarded that each shall bear his own Charges which is a benefit to the Defendant for otherwise seing the right was in the Plaintiff the Defendant should have paid the Plaintiffs Costs as well as his own for which he cannot now sue without forfeiting his Bond Curia advisare vult Squibb versus Hole THE Plaintiff brought an Action of Escape Escape Action of Escape the Process was upon Bond not made within the Jurisdiction of an Inferiour Court and therefore no Escape and declares That he prosecuted one J. S. in the court of Ely upon a Bond made infra Jurisdictionem of that Court upon which he was taken and the Defendant suffered him to Escape Vpon Not Guilty pleaded the Iury found a special Verdict to this effect viz. That there was such a Bond upon which there was such a prosecution and such an Escape as in the Declaration but they find farther that this Bond was not made infra Jurisdictionem Curiae Maynard Serjeant who Argued for the Plaintiff said that this Action was commenced in an Inferiour Court upon a Bond which the Plaintiff sets forth to be infra Jurisdictionem Curiae and that the Defendant was Arrested and suffered to Escape and whether if in truth the Bond was not made infra Jurisdictionem an Action of Escape would lye or whether all the proceédings are coram non Judice was the doubt He took a difference where an Inferiour Court hath an Original Iurisdiction of the Cause and hath conusance of such a Suit as is brought there for in such Cases the proceedings are not extra-judicial but if an Action is brought where properly no Action doth lye all the proceedings there are coram non Judice At the Common Law one who had a particular Iurisdiction to hold Pleas within a Liberty could not hold any Plea of a thing which did arise out of the Liberty for though it was transitory in its nature yet being alledged not within his Iurisdiction it was ill 2 Inst 231. But when the cause of Action arises infra Jurisdictionem that gives them Authority to proceed and therefore it would be hard that the Iudge and Officer should be punished by a construction to make all extra judicial when they have no possible way of finding whether in truth the Cause did arise within the * Post Crowder and Goodwin Iurisdiction of the Court or not But the Officer is bound to obey the Process of the Court if it appear as in this Case that they had conusance of it the Iudge is likewise bound to grant the Process otherwise he is subject to the Plantiffs Action for his refusal In some Cases the Plaintiff himself may not know where the Bond was made as if he be Executor of the Obligee c. Besides in this Case 't is set forth That in the Action below the Defendant pleaded non est factum and so had admitted the Iurisdiction or at least had waived it and it would be an insufferable mischief if after all this labour and charge the Defendant might avoid all again North Chief Iustice said That if this Cause had been tryed before him he would have Non-suited the Plaintiff because he had not proved the truth of what he laid down in his Declaration viz. That the Bond was made infra Jurisdictionem Curiae But as to the Matter as it stood upon the special Verdict he inclined that as to the Plaintiff who knew where the Bond was made all the proceedings were coram non Judice but as to the Officer it was otherwise for the Pleint and Process would be a good Excuse for him in an Action of false Imprisonment Judgment And afterwards by the Opinion of three Iudges viz. the Chief Justice Wyndham and Atkyns Iustices Iudgment was given for the Defendant That this was no Escape and that though the Party had admitted the Iurisdiction by his Plea of non est factum below yet that could not give the Court any Iurisdiction which had not any originally in the Cause and the Case of * Roll. Abt. tit Escape 809 pl. 45. Richardson versus Bernard was cited as an Authority in point where the Plaintiff in an Action brought against an Officer declared in Hull upon a Bond made at Hallifax and had Iudgment and Execution and the Defendant escaped And in an Action brought for this Escape the Declaration was held ill because it did not alledge the Bond to be made infra Jurisdictionem Curiae Ellis Iustice of a contrary Opinion in omnibus Sams versus Dangerfield THE Plaintiff being Collector of the Hearth-Mony Departure brought an Action of Debt upon a Bond against his Sub-Collector conditioned to pay such Sums as he should receive within 14 days after receipt at such a place in the City of Worcester as the Plaintiff should appoint The Defendant pleads payment The Plaintiff assigns a breach in non-payment of such a Sum received at a place by him appointed The Defendant rejoyns that the Plaintiff appointed no place and the Plaintiff demurr'd And after Argument for the Plaintiff by Jones Serjeant this was adjudged a departure because the Defendant ought to have pleaded first that he had paid all but such a Sum for which as yet the Plaintiff had appointed no place of payment and Iudgment was given accordingly Smith versus Hall IN an Action brought against the Defendant for false Imprisonment he justified by virtue of a Latitat False Imprisonment doth not lye but an Action on the Case against the Sheriff for refusing sufficient Bail which the Plaintiff agreed in his Replication but farther set forth that after the Arrest and before the Return of the Writ he tendered sufficient Bail which the Defendant refused and Issue was joyned upon the tender which was found for the Plaintiff Newdigate Serjeant moved in Arrest of Iudgment 1. Though it was an Offence in the Defendant who was the Sheriff's Bayliff to refuse good Bail when tendred yet 't is not an Offence within the Statute 23 H. 6. cap. 10. because a Sheriffs Bayliff is not an Officer intended in that Statute neither will this Offence make him a Trespasser ab initio because the taking was by lawfull Process Cro. Car. 196. * Roll. Abr. 2 part 561. pl. 9. Salmon versus Percival The Defendant as Bayliff to the Sheriff is not the proper Officer to
take Bail but the Sheriff himself must do it and therefore an Action on the Case must lye against the Bayliff for not carrying the Party before the Sheriff in order to put in Bail but an Action of false Imprisonment will not lye 2. The action is laid quare vi armis c. in ipsum the Plaintiff insultum fecit ipsum imprisonavit ut Prisonat à tali loco ad talem locum adducebat detinuit contra consuetudinem Angliae sine cause rationabili per spacium trium dierum The Defendant pleaded quoad venire vi armis necnon totam transgressionem praeter the taking and deteining him three days non Culp and as to that he pleaded the Latitat Warrant and Arrest ut supra but the Verdict being only against the Defendant upon the second Issue and nothing appearing to be done upon this and entire Damages given 't is for that reason ill North Chief Iustice If the Writ and Warrant were good then the refusing Bail is an Offence within the Statute of 23 H. 6. And as 't is an Oppression so 't is an Offence also at the Common Law but an Action on the Case and not of false Imprisonment lyeth against the Officer for it would be very unreasonable by the refusal of Bail to make the Arrest tortious ab initio A special Action on the Case had therefore been the proper remedy against the Sheriff but not against the Officer for an Escape will not lye against him but it must be brought against the Sheriff Kren versus Kirby Surrender by a Disseisor not good IN Ejectment the Lessor of the Plaintiff claimed under a Surrender made to him by William Kirby who had an Estate in the Land after the decrease of his Father but entred during his Life and thereby became a Disseisor and his Estate being now turned into a Right he made the Surrender to the Lessor of the Plaintiff all which was found by special Verdict at the Tryal and it was adjudged that the Surrender was void It was pretended at the Trial that the Father who was Tenant for Life had suffered a Common Recovery in the Lords Court and so his Estate was forfeited for which the Son might enter and then his Surrender is good But the Court answered that without a particular Custom for the purpose the suffering a Recovery would work no Forfeiture of the Estate but if it did 't is the Lord and none else who can enter And so Iudgment was given for the Defendant Duck versus Vincent DEBT upon Bond conditioned to perform Covenants Plea to debt upon bond not good one of which was for payment of so much Mony upon making such Assurances The Defendant pleaded he paid the Mony such a day but doth not mention when the Assurance was made that it might appear to the Court the Mony was immediately paid pursuant to the Condition and for that reason the Court were all of Opinion that the Plea was not good And Iudgement was given for the Plaintiff upon Demurrer Smith versus Shelberry IN Assumpsit the Plaintiff declared that he was possessed of a Term of 80 years Assumpsit upon a mutual promise and it was agreed between him and the Defendant that he should assign all his interest therein to the Defendant who proinde should pay 250 l. and that he promised that in consideration that the Plaintiff at his request had likewise promised to perform all on his part that he would also perform all on his part and then sets forth that the Defendant had paid a Guinea in part of the said 250 l. and that he viz. the Plaintiff obtulit se to assign the Premisses by Indenture to the Defendant which was written and sealed and woud have delivered it to him but he refused and assigns the breach in Non-payment of the Mony to which the Defendant demurred And it was said for him by Baldwin Serjeant Ex parte Def. that this was not a good Declaration because the Assignment ought to precede the Payment and that it was not a mutual promise neither was the obtulit se well set forth but this was a Condition precedent on the Plaintiffs side without the performance whereof no Action would lie against the Defendant Vide 7 Co. Ughtreds Case fol. 10. b. because it was apparent by the Plaintiffs own shewing that the Mony was not to be paid till the Assignment made for the Plaintiff is to assign and the Defendant proinde which is as much as to say pro assignatione is to pay the Mony Like the Case in Dyer 76. a. Assumpsit against the Defendant that he promised pro 20 Marks to deliver 400 Weight of Wax to the Plaintiff the Pronoun Pro makes the Contract conditional Ex parte Quer. But Pemberton Serjeant for the Plaintiff held the Declaration good and that it was a mutual promise and that the Plaintiff need not averr the performance Hill Thorn Postea for in such Cases each has remedy against the other and 't is as reasonable that the Plaintiff should have his Mony before he make the Assignment as that the Defendant should have the Term assigned before he paid the Mony And of that Opinion was the Court only Iustice Atkins doubted Ellis Iustice cited a Case adjudged in the King's Bench which was as he thought Stiles Rep. 186 Postea very hard viz. An Assignment was made between A. and B. that A. should raise Souldiers and that B. should transport them beyond Sea and reciprocal promises were made for the performance as in this Case that A. who never raised any Souldiers may yet bring his Action upon this promise against B. for not transporting them which is a far stronger Case than this at Barr. It was agréed here that the Tender and Refusal had it beén well pleaded would have amounted to and have been equivalent with a full performance but the Plaintiff hath not done as much as he might for he should have delivered the Indenture to the Defendants use and then have tendered it But Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Hays versus Bickerstaffe Covenant not conditional by the words paying and performing IN Covenant brought by the Lessee who declared that the Lessor covenanted with him that he paying the Rent and performing the Covenants on his part to be performed shall quietly enjoy The breach assigned was a disturbance by the Lessor who pleads that till such a time the Plaintiff did quietly enjoy the thing demised without disturbance but then he cut down Wood which was contrary to his Covenant and then and not before he entred and so by the Plaintiffs not performing his Covenant the Defendants Covenant ceases to oblige him whereunto the Plaintiff demurred The Question was Whether the Defendants Covenant was conditional or not For if it amount to a Condition then his Entry is lawful but if it be a Covenant 't is otherwise for then he
ought to bring his Action Pemberton Serjeant for the Plaintiff Ex parte Quer. That this Covenant is not conditional for the words paying and performing signifie no more than that he shall enjoy c. under the Rents and Covenants and 't is a Clause usually inserted in the Covenant for quiet Enjoyment Indeed the word paying in some Cases may amount to a Condition but that is where without such construction the party could have no remedy But here are express Covenants in the Lease and a direct reservation of the Rent to which the party concerned may have recourse when he hath occasion A liberty to take Pot-water paying so many Turns c. 't is a Condition The Words paying and yielding make no Condition Cook and Herle Postea Vaugh. 32. nor was it ever known that for such Words the Lessor entred for Non-payment of Rent and there is no difference between these Words and the Words paying and performing Bennet's Case in B. R. ruled no Condition Duncomb's Case Owen Rep. 54. Barrel Serjeant for the Defendant said Ex parte Def. that the Covenant is to be taken as the parties have agreéd and the Lessor is not to be sued if the Lessée first commit the breach Modus Conventio qualifie the general Words concerning quiet Enjoyment The Court took time to consider and afterwards in this Term Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Sid. 266 280. that the Covenant was not conditional Atkins Iustice doubted Simpson versus Ellis Debt by a Bailiff of a Liberty DEBT upon Bond by the Plaintiff who was chief Bailiff of the Liberty of Pontefract in Yorkshire but he did not declare as Capital Ballivus but yet by the whole Court it was held good for otherwise the Defendant might have craved Oyer and have it entred in haec verba and then have pleaded the Statute of 23 H. 6. that it was taken * Sand. 161. Sid. 383. Latch 143. colore Officii but now it shall be intended good upon the Demurrer to the Declaration And Ellis Iustice said that so it was lately resolved in this Court in the Case of one Conquest And Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Mason versus Stratton Executor c. Judgment kept on foot per Fraudem 2 Cro. 35 102. Vaugh. 103 104. DEBT upon Bond. The Defendant pleads two Iudgments had against his Testator and sets them forth and that he had but 40 s Assets towards satisfaction The Plaintiff replies that the Defendant paid but so much upon the first Iudgment and so much upon the second and yet kept them both on foot per Fraudem Covinam And the Defendant demurred specially 1 Roll. Abr. 802. 2 Cro. 626 Because the Replication is so complicated that no distinct Issue can be taken upon it for the Plea sets forth the Iudgments severally but the Plaintiff puts them both together when he alledges them to be kept per Fraudem But on the other side it was said that all the Presidents are as in this Case Sid. 333. 8 Co. Turner's Case 132. 9 Co. Meriel Tresham's Case 108 And of that Opinion was all the Court that the Replication was good And Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Suffeild versus Baskervil No Breach can be assigned upon a Promise DEBT upon Bond for performance of all Covenants Payments c. In an Indenture of Lease wherein the Defendant for and in consideration of 400 l. lent him by the Plaintiff granted the Land to him for 99 years if G. so long lived provided if he pay 60 l. per annum quarterly during the Life of G. or shall within two years after his death pay the said 400 l. to the Plaintiff then the Indenture to be void with a Clause of Reentry for Non-payment The Defendant pleads performance The Plaintiff assigns for breach that 30 l. for half a year was not paid at such a time during the Life of G. The Defendant demurrs For that the breach was not well assigned because there is no Covenant to pay the Mony only by a Clause Liberty is given to re-enter upon Non payment The Court inclined that this Action would not lie upon this Bond in which there was a Proviso and no express Covenant and therefore no Breach can be assigned Benson versus Idle AUdita Querela The Case upon Demurrer was Estoppel not well pleaded with a Traverse That before the Kings Restauration the now Defendant brought an Action of Trespass against the Plaintiff for taking his Cloath who then pleaded that he was a Souldier and compelled by his Fellow Souldiers who threatned to hang him as high as the Bells in the Belfry if he refused To this the Plaintiff then replied de injuriâ suâ propriâ c. And it was found for him and an Elegit was brought and the now Plaintiffs Lands extended Then comes the Act of * 12 Car. 2. cap. 11. Indempnity which pardons all Acts of Hostility done in the Times of Rebellion and from thenceforth discharges personal Actions for or by reason of any Trespas comitted in the Wars and all Iudgments and Executions thereon before the first day of May 1658. but doth not restore the party to any Sums of Mony mean Profits or Goods taken away by virtue of such Execution or direct the party to give any account for the same which Act made by the Convention was confirmed by 13 Car. 2. cap. 7. And upon these two Acts of Parliament the Plaintiff expresly averring in his Writ that the former Recovery against him was for an Act of Hostility now brought this Audita Querela The Defendant pleads the former Verdict by way of Estoppel and concludes with a Traverse absque hoc that the taking of his Goods was an Act of Hostility This was argued by Holloway Serejant for the Plaintiff and by Jones Serjeant for the Defendant who chiefly insisted That the Defendant having pleaded the substance of this Matter before and being found against him that he being now Plaintiff could not averr any thing against that Record But the Court were all of Opinion that Iudgment should be given for the Plaintiff for his remedy was very proper upon the Convention and without the Statute of Confirmation and here is no Estoppel in the Case for whether this was an act of Hostility or not is not material neither was it or could it be an Issue upon the former Tryal because all the Matter then in Question was concerning the Trespass which though found against the now Plaintiff yet it might be an act of Hostility but if it were an Estoppel 't is not well pleaded with a Traverse and the Court hath set it at large DE Term. Sanctae Trin. Anno 27 Caroli II. in Communi Banco Mayor and Cominalty of London versus Gatford IN an Action of Debt brought by the Plaintiffs Construction of an Act of Parliament for a Fine of 13 l. 6 s. 8 d. set upon the
by Serjeant Jones that they should not pass for though Lands would pass so by a Fine because it was the Agreement of the Parties yet in a Recovery 't is otherwise because more certainty is required therein But in Fines no such Certainty is required and therefore a Fine de Tenementis in Golden-Lane hath beén held good though neither Vill Parish or Hamlet is mentioned Cro Eliz. 693. Cro. Jac. 574. Addison and Ottoway Postea But there being a Vill called Walton in the Parish of Street and a Fine being levyed of Land in Street the Lands in Walton did not pass unless Walton had béen an Hamlet of Street and the Fine had beén levied of Lands in the Parish of Street And the reason of this difference is because in Fines there are Covenants which though they are real in respect of the Land yet 't is but a personal Action in which the Land is not demanded ex directo but in a Recovery greater preciseness is required that being a Praecipe quod reddat where the Land it self is demanded and the Defendant must make Answer to it Cro. Jac. 574 5 Co. 40. Dormer's Case The Word * Antea 41. Liberty properly signifies a Right Priviledge or Franchise but improperly the extent of a place Hill 22 23 Car. 2. Rot. 225. B. R. Waldron's Case Hutton 106. Baker and Johnson's Case Liberties in Iudgment of Law are incorporeal and therefore 't is absurd to say that Lands which are corporeal shall be therein contained They are not permanent having their existence by the Kings Letters Patents and may be destroyed by Act of Parliament they may also be extinguish'd abridged or increased and a Vinire fac of a * Rast Ent. 267. Liberty or Franchise is not good 't is an equivocal Word and of no signification that is plain and therefore is not to be used in real Writs Rast Entr. 382. There is no Praecipe in the Register to recover Lands within a Liberty neither is there any authority in all the Law Books for such a Recovery and therefore if such a thing should be allowed many inconveniences would follow for a good Tenant to the Praecipe would be wanting and the intent of the Parties could not supply that But Barton Serjeant said that this Recovery would pass the Lands in Cotton for as to that purpose there was no difference betweén a Fine and a Recovery Postea 2 Roll. Abr. 20 Godb. 440. they are both become Common Assurances and are to be guided by the agreément of the Parties Cro. Car. 270 276. 'T is true a Fine may be good of Lands in an Hamlet Lieu conus or Parish 1 H. 5. 9. Cro. Eliz. 692. Jones 301. Cro. Jac. 574. Monk versus Butler Yet in a * Godb. 440. contra Scire Fac̄ to have Execution of such Fine the Vill must be therein mentioned Bro. Brief 142. The demand must be of Lands in a Vill Hamlet or at farthest in a Parish Cro. Jac. 574. And of that Opinion was the whole Court absente Ellis who was also of the same Opinion at the Argument and accordingly in Michaelmas Term following Iudgment was given that by this Recovery the Lands in Cotton did well pass And North Chief Iustice denied the Case in Hutton 106. Postea to be Law where 't is said A Common Recovery of Lands in a Lieu conus is not good and said that it had béen long disputed whether a Fine of Lands in a Lieu conus was good and in King James his time the Law was settled in that Point that it was good and by the same reason a Recovery shall be good for they are both amicable Suits and Common Assurances and as they grew more in practice the Iudges have extended them farther A Common Recovery is held good of an Advowson and no Reasons are to be drawn from the Visne or the Execution of the Writ of Seisin because 't is not in the Case of adversary Procéedings but by Agréement of the Parties where 't is to be presumed each knows the others meaning Indeed the Cursitors are to blame to make the Writ of Entry thus and ought not to be suffered in such practice Where a Fine is levied to two the Fée is always fixed in the Heirs of one of them but if it be to them and their Heirs yet 't is good though incertain but a Liberty is in the nature of a Lieu conus and may be made certain by Averment The Iury in this Case have found Cotton to be a Vill in the Liberty of Shrewsbury and so 't is not incorporeal Alford versus Tatnel JVdgment against two who are both in Execution Mod. Rep. 170. and the Sheriff suffers one to escape the Plaintiff recovers against the Sheriff and hath satisfaction the other shall be discharged by an Audita Querela Osbaston versus Stanhope General Replication good DEBT upon Bond against an Heir who pleaded that his Ancestor was seised of such Lands in Fee and made a Settlement thereof to Trusteés by which he limited the Vses to himself for Life Remainder to the Heirs Males of his Body Remainder in Feé to his own right Heirs with power given to the Trusteés to make Leases for threé Lives or 99 years The Trustées made a Lease of these Lands for 99 years and that he had not Assets praeter the Reversion expectant upon the said Lease The Plaintiff replies protestando that the Settlement is fraudulent pro placito saith that he hath Assets by discent sufficient to pay him and the Defendant demurrs Ex parte Def. Newdigate Serjeant The Barr is good for the Plaintiff should not have replied generally that the Defendant hath Assets by discent but should have replyed to the praeter Hob. 104. Like the Case of Goddard and Thorlton Yelv. 170. where in Trespas the Defendant pleaded that Henry was seised in Fee who made a Lease to Saunders under whom he derived a Title and so justifies The Plaintiff replies and sets forth a long Title in another person and that Henry entred and intruded The Defendant rejoyns that Henry was seised in Fée and made a Lease ut prius absque hoc that intravit se sic intrusit and the Plaintiff having demurred because the Traverse ought to have been direct viz. absque hoc quod intrusit and not absque hoc that Henry intravit c. it was said the Replication was ill for the Defendant having alledged a Seisin in Fée in Henry which the Plaintiff in his Rejoynder had not avoided but only by supposing an intrusion which cannot be of an Estate in Fée but is properly after the death of Tenant for Life for that reason it was held ill Ex parte Quer. But Pemberton Serjeant for the Plaintiff held the Replication to be good The Defendants Plea is no more than Riens per descent for though he pleads a Reversion 't is not chargeable because 't is a Reversion after
de se by Inquisition and then comes an Act of Indempnity that shall not divest the King of his Right But where nothing Vests before the Office found a Pardon before the Inquisition extinguishes all Forfeitures as it was resolved in Tomb's Case So if the Pardon in this Case had come before the Presentation the Party had been restored Statu quo c. The King can do no more the Bishop is to do the rest neither is the Presentation revoked by this Act it might have been revoked by implication in some Cases as where there is a second Presentation but such a general revocation will not do it and Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff and a Writ of Error brought but the Cause was ended by Agreement Hill versus Pheasant Gaming at several meetings whether within the Statute AN Action of Debt was brought upon the Statute of 16 Car. 2. cap. 7. made against deceitful and disorderly Gaming which Enacts That if any person shall play at any Game other than for ready Mony and shall lose any Sum or other thing played for above the Sum of 100 l. at any one time or meeting upon Tick and shall not then pay the same that all Contracts and Securities made for the payment thereof shall be void and the person winning shall pay treble the Mony lost It happened that the Defendant won 80 l. at one meeting for whcih the Plaintiff gave Security and another meeting was appointed and the Defendant won 70 l. more of the Plaintiff being in all above 100 l. And if this was within the Statute was the Question The like Case was in the Kings-Bench Trin. 25 Car. 2. Rot. 1230. between Edgberry and Roseberry and in Michaelmas Term following this Case was argued and the Court was divided which the Plaintiff perceiving Anonymus Postea desired to discontinue his Action but the better Opinion was that it was not within the Statute though if it had been pleaded That the several meetings were purposely appointed to elude the Statute Sid. 394. in might be otherwise Calthorp versus Heyton Traverse not good viz. Absque hoc quod legitimo modo oneratus IN Replevin The Defendant avowed for that the King being seised in Fee of a Mannor and of a Grange which was parcel of the Mannor granted the Inheritance to a Bishop reserving 33 l. Rent to be yearly issuing out of the whole and alledges a Grant of the Grange from Sir W. W. who claimed under the Bishop to his Ancestors in Fee in which Grant there was this Clause Viz. If the Grantee or his Heirs shall be legally charged by Distress or with any Rent due to the King or his Successors upon account of the said Grange that then it should be lawful for them to enter into Blackacre and distrein till he or they be satisfied And afterwards the Grantee and his Heirs were upon a Bill Exhibited against them in the Exchequer decreed to pay the King 4 l. per Annum as their proportion out of the Grange for which he distreined and so justified the taking The Plaintiff pleads in barr to the Avowry and traverseth that the Defendant was lawfully charged with the said Rent and the Defendant demurred Baldwyn Serjeant maintained the Avowry to be good Ex parte Def. having alledged a legal charge and that the Barr was not good for the Plaintiff traverseth quod Defendens est ligitimo modo oneratus which being part matter of Law and part likewise matter of Fact is not good and therefore if the Decree be not a legal charge the Plaintiff should have demurred But on the other side it was argued by Seys Serjeant Ex parte Quer. That the Avowry is not good because the Defendant hath not set forth a legal charge according to the Grant which must be by Distress or some other lawful way and that must be intended by some execution at Common Law for the coactus fuit to pay is not enough a Suit in Equity is no legal disturbance Moor 559. The same Case is Reported in 1 Brownl 23. Selby versus Chute Besides the Defendant doth not shew any Process taken out or who were Parties to the Decree and a Que estate in the Case of a Bishop is not good for he must pass it by Deed. North and the whole Court A Rent in the Kings Case lies in Render and not in Demand and after the Rent day is past he is oneratus and the Decree is not material in this Case for the charge is not made thereby but by the Reservation for payment whereof the whole Grange is chargeable The King may distrain in any part of the Land he is not bound by the Decree to a particular place that is in favour only to the Purchasor that he should pay no more than his proportion As to the Que estate the Defendant hath admitted that by saying bene verum est that Sir W. W. was seised The Traverse is ill and Iudgment was given for the Avowant Vaughan versus Wood. Trespass justified for taking corrupt Victualls Mod. Rep. 202. TRespass for taking Beef The Defendant pleads a Custom to choose Supervisors of Victuals at a Court Leet That he was there chosen and having viewed the Plaintiffs Goods found the Beef to be corrupt which he took and burned The Plaintiff demurrs for that the Custom is unreasonable and when Meat is corrupt and sold there are proper remedies at Law by Action on the Case or presentment at a Leet 9 H. 6. 53. 11 Ed. 3. 4. 6. Vide Stat. 18 Eliz. cap. 3. But the Court held it a good Custom and Iudgment was given for the Defendant the Chief Iustice being not clear in it Chapter of Southwel versus Bishop of Lincoln Grant of next Avoidance not bind the Successor Mod. Rep. 204. IN a Quare Impedit the Question upon pleading was Whether the Grant of the next Avoidance by the Chapter was good or not to bind the Successor The doubt did arise upon the Statute of 13 Eliz. cap. 10. which was objected not to be a publick * Yelv. 106. Act because it extends only to those who are Ecclesiastical persons or if it should be adjudged a publick Law yet this is not a good Grant to bind the Successor for though the Grant of an Avoidance is not a thing of which any profit can be made yet it is an * Cro. Eliz. 441. Hereditament within the meaning of that Statute by which among other things 't is Enacted That all Grants c. made by Dean and Chapter c. of any Lands Tythes Tenements or Hereditaments being parcel of the Possessions of the Chapter other than for the Term of 21 Years or 3 Lives from the time of the making the said Grant shall be void But it was agreed by the Court to be a general Law like the Statute of Non Residency which hath been so ruled and that this Presentment or Grant
of the next Avoidance was not good because it was made by those who were not Head of the Corporation and it must be void immediately or not at all and Iudgment was given accordingly Threadneedle versus Lynam THere being two Mannors usually let for 67 l. 1 s. 5 d. by the year Lease by a Bishop and more than the old Rent reserved good Mod. Rep. 203. a Bishop lets one of them for 21 years reserving the whole Rent and whether this was a good Lease within the Statute of 1 Eliz. cap. 19. was the Question which depended upon the construction of the Words therein viz. All Leases to be void upon which the old accustomed Rent is not reserved and here is more than the old Rent reserved and this being a private Act is to be taken literally North Chief Iustice agreed that private Acts which go to one particular thing are to be interpreted literally but this Statute extends to all Bishops and so may be taken according to Equity and therefore he and Wyndham and Atkins Iustices held the Lease to be good But this Case was argued when Vaughan was Chief Iustice and he and Iustice Ellis were of another Opinion DE Term. Sancti Mich. Anno 27 Car. II. in Communi Banco Thorp versus Fowle No more Costs than Damages NOTA. In this Case the Court said that since the Statute which gives no more Costs than Damage 't is usual to turn Trespass into Case Cooper versus Hawkeswel Words IN an Action upon the Case for these Words I dealt not so unkindly with you when you stole a Stack of my Corn Per Curiam the Action lies Escourt versus Cole Words IN an Action on the Case for Words laid two ways the last Count was Cumque etiam which is but a recital and dubitatur whether good Sharp versus Hubbard Six Months for proving of a Suggestion THE six Months in which the Suggestion is to be proved must be reckoned according to the Calendar Months and 't is so computed in the Ecclesiastical Court Crowder versus Goodwin Justification by Process out of inferiour Court IN Assault and Battery and false Imprisonment as to the Assault c. the Defendant pleads Not-Guilty and as to the Imprisonment he justifies by a Process out an inferiour Court and upon Demurrer these Exceptions were taken to his Plea 1. The Defendant hath set forth a Precept directed Servienti ad Claven and 't is not said Ministro Curiae 2. 1 Rol. 484. Cro. Car. 254. Dyer 262. b. It was to take the Plaintiff and have him ad proximam Curiam which is not good for it should have beén on a day certain like Adams and Flythe's Case * Cro. Jac. 571. Mod. Rep. 81. where a Writ of Error was brought upon a Iudgment in Debt by Nil dicit in an inferiour Court and the Error assigned was That after Imparlance a day was given to the Parties till the next Court and this was held to be a Discontinuance not being a day certain 3. 'T is not said ad respondend ' alicui 4. Nor that the Action arose infra Burgum 5. The Precept is not alledged to be returned by the Officer To all which it was answered That a Pleint is but a Remembrance and must be short Rast 321. and when 't is entred the Officer is excused for he cannot tell whether 't is infra * Squibb versus Hole antea 29. Jurisdictionem or not And as to the first Exception a Precept may be directed to a private person and therefore Servienti ad Clavem is well enough Then as to the next Exception 't is likewise well set forth to have the Plaintiff ad proximam Curiam for how can it be on a day certain when the Iudge may adjourn the Court de die in diem Then ad respondendum though 't is not said alicui 'tis good though not so formal and 't is no Tort in the Officer but t is to be intended that he is to answer the Plaintiff in the Plaint As to the fourth Exception the Defendant sets forth that he did enter his Plaint secundum consuetudinem Curiae Burgi and when the Plaintiff declared there he shewed that the Cause did arise infra Jurisdictionem And as to the last The Officer is not punishable though he do not return the Writ The end of the Law is that the Defendant should be present at the day and if the Cause should be agreed or the Plaintiff give a Release when the Defendant is in custody no Action lies against the Officer if he be detained afterwards But the Chief Iustice doubted that for the second Exception the Plea was ill for it ought to be on a day certain and likewise it ought to be alledged infra Jurisdictionem But the other threé Iustices held the Plea to be good in omnibus and said that the inferior Court had a Iurisdiction to issue out a Writ and the Officer is excusable though the cause of Action did not arise within the Iurisdiction which ought to be shewn on the other side And so Iudgment was given for the Defendant Snow and others versus Wiseman Traverse necessary where omitted is substance TRespass for taking of his Horse The Defendant pleads that he was seised of such Lands and intitles himself to an Herriot The Plaintiff replies that another person was jointly seised with the Defendant Et hoc paratus est verificare The Defendant demurs generally because the Plaintiff should have traversed the sole Seisin But it was said for him that the sole Seisin néed not be traversed Sid. 300. because the matter alledged by him avoids the Barr without a Traverse In a Suggestion upon a Prohibition for Tythes the Plaintiff entituled himself by Prescription under an Abbot and shews the Vnity of Possession by the Statute of 31 H. 8. by which the Lands were discharged of Tythes Yelv. 231. Pl. Com. 230. 231. The Defendant pleads that the Abbey was founded within time of Memory and confesseth the Vnity afterwards and the Plea was held good for he néed not traverse the Prescription because he had set forth the Foundation of the Abbey to be within time of Memory which was a sufficient avoiding the Plaintiffs Title Yelv. 31. The Plaintiff therefore having said enough in this Case to avoid the Barr if he had traversed it also it would have made his Replication naught Cro. Jac. 221. like the Case of * Bedel and Lull where in an Ejectment upon a Lease made by Elizabeth the Defendant pleads that before Elizabeth had any thing in the Lands James was seised thereof in Fee and that it descended to his Son and so derives a Title under him and that Elizabeth was seised by Abatement The Plaintiff confesses the Seisin of James but that he devised it to Elizabeth in Fee and makes a Title under her absque hoc that she was seised by Abatement and upon a Demurrer the
after the Partition 2. The Rejoynder is a departure from the Plea which is that the Plaintiff never had any thing but joyntly with others and the Rejoynder is that at the time of the conversion he was joyntly possessed which is a manifest difference in point of time and such as will make a Departure 33 H. 14. Bro. Departure 28. 13. Ex parte Def. It was argued by Serjeant Hopkins for the Defendant that the Replication was not good for the Plaintiff therein had alledged a Partition by Deed and doth not say hic in Curia prolat̄ And in all Cases where a Man pleads a Deed by which he makes himself either party or privy he must produce it in Court As where the Defendant justifies in Trespass that before the Plaintiff had any thing One Purfrey was seised in Fee of the place where c. And by Indenture c. demised it to Corbet excepting the Wood c. Habendum for the Life of Ann and covenanted quod licitum foret for the said Corbet to take House-boot c. That he assigned his Interest to Ann and that the Defendant as her Servant took the Trees and upon Demurrer the Plea was held naught because though a Servant having justified by force of a Covenant he did not shew the Indenture 2 Cro. 291. Purfrey versus Grimes 6 Rep. Bellamy's Case 1 Leon. 309. Rol. Rep. 20. If a thing will pass without a Deed yet if the Party pleads a Deed and makes a Title thereby he must come with a * profert hic in Curia As to the Objection That there was a Departure he argued to the contrary For the Defendant in his Rejoynder insists only on that which was most material and the Plaintiff in his Replication had given him occasion thus to Rejoyn and though he had left out some of the time mentioned in the Bar yet the would hurt the Pleadings because a fair Issue was tendred for if at the time of the conversion he was joyntly seised he could not be entituled to the Action alone Judgment And afterwards in Trinity-Term following the Chief Iustice delivered the Opinion of the Court That the Plea was good in Barr though pleaded in Abatement and the Defendant hath election to plead either in Barr or Abatement the nature of a Plea in Abatement is to intitle the Plaintiff to a better Writ but here the Defendant shews that the Plaintiff hath no cause of Action and so it shall be taken to be in Barr And it hath been expressly resolved That where the Plea is in Abatement if it be of necessity that the Defendant must disclose matter of barr he shall have his election to take it either by way of Barr or Abatement 2 Roll. Rep. 64. Salkil versus Shilton So where Waste was brought in the tenet the Tenant pleads a Surrender to the Lessor and demands Iudgment if he should be charged in the tenet because it should have been in the tenuit and this was held a good Plea 10 H. 7.11 Whereupon Iudgment was given for the Defendant the Chief Iustice at first doubting about the Departure and advised the Plaintiff to wave his Demurrer and to take issue upon payment of Costs Daws versus Harrison THE Plaintiff intitles himself as Administrator to Daws Administration pleaded and not loci istius ordinarius good and shews that Administration was granted to him by the Official of the Bishop of Carlisle but did not alledge him to be loci istius Ordinarius And Jones Serjeant demurred to the Declaration because it did not appear that the Official had any Iurisdiction Pl. Com. 277. a. 31. H. 6. 13. Fitz. Judg. 35. 22 H. 6. 52. 36 H. 6. 32 33. Sed non allocatur For the whole Court were of Opinion That the Declaration was good and that he shall be intended to have Iurisdiction but if it had been in the Case of a Peculiar Cro Jac. 556. Palm 97. Sid. 322. it cannot be intended that they have any authority unless set forth And so Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Mason versus Caesar IN Trespass for pulling down of Hedges Commoner may abate Hedges made upon his Common the Defendant pleads that he had right of Common in the place where c. and the Hedges were made upon his Common so that he could not in ea parte enjoy his Common in tam amplo modo c. and so justifies the pulling them down And they were at issue whether the Defendant could enjoy the Common in tam amplo modo c. and there was a Verdict for the Defendant and Iudgment being staied 'till moved on the other side Scroggs Serjeant moved in Arrest of Iudgment because the Plea was ill and the Issue frivolous for 't is impossible that he should have Common where the Hedges are 5 Rep. 100. 9 Rep. 55. And therefore the Defendant ought to have brought an Action upon the Case or a quod permittat He cannot abate the Hedges though he might have pulled down so much as might have opened a Way to his Common 2 Cro. 195 229. The Lord hath an Interest in the Soil and a Commoner hath no authority to do any thing but to enter and put in his Beasts and not to throw down Quick-Set Hedges for that is a shelter to his Beasts But the Court were of Opinion That the Defendant might abate the Hedges for thereby he did not meddle with the Soil but only pulled down the erection and the Book of 29 E. 3. 6. was express in this point Vide 17 H. 7. 10. 16 H. 7. 8. 33 H. 6. 31. 2 Ass 12. And nothing was said concerning the Plea and so the Defendant had Iudgment Hocket and his Wife versus Stiddolph and his Wife Verdict cured a bad Declaration IN an Action of Assault and Battery brought by the Plaintiff and his Wife against the Defendant and his Wife the Iury found quoad the beating of the Plaintiffs Wife only that the Defendants are Guilty and quoad resid ' they find for the Defendants And it was moved in arrest of Iudgment by Scroggs Serjeant That the Declaration is not good because the Husband * Yelv. 106. Drury versus Dennis Sid. 376. joyns with the Wife which he ought not to do upon his own shewing for as to the Battery made upon him he ought to have brought his Action alone and the finding of the Iury will not help the Declaration which is ill in substance and thereupon Iudgment was staied but being moved again the next Term the Court were all of Opinion That the Declaration was cured by the Verdict and so Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Goodwin qui tam c. versus Butcher AN Information was brought upon the Statute of 32 H. 8. Buying a pretended Title cap. 9. made against buying pretended Titles which gives a Forfeiture of the value of the Land purchased unless the Seller was in possession within a
year before the Sale After Verdict for the Plaintiff it was moved in arrest of Iudgment by Serjeant Barrell because the Information had set forth the right of these Lands purchased to be in J. S. and that the Son of J. N. had conveyed them by general words 2 Anders 57. as descending from his Father which Title of the Son the Defendant bought whereas if in truth the Title was in J. S. then nothing descended from the Father to the Son and so the Defendant bought nothing Sed non allocatur for if such construction should be allowed there could be no buying of a pretended Title within the Statute unless it was a good Title but when 't is said as here that the Defendant entred and claimed colore of that Grant or Conveyance which was void yet 't is within the Statute so the Plaintiff had his Iudgment Wine versus Rider al. TRespass against five Quare clausum fregerunt Traverse immaterial and took Fish out of the Plaintiffs Several and Free-Fishery Four of them pleaded Not Guilty and the fifth justified for that one of the other Defendants is seised in Fee of a Close adjoyning to the Plaintiffs Close and that he and all those c. have had the sole and separate Fishing in the River which runs by the said Closes with liberty to enter into the Plaintiffs Close to beat the Water for the better carrying on of the Fishing and that he as Servant to the other Defendant and by his Command did enter and so justified the taking absque hoc that he is Guilty aliter vel alio modo The Plaintiff replies That he did enter de injuria sua propria absque hoc That the Defendants Master hath the Sole Fishing The Defendant demurs Ex parte Def. and Newdigate Serjeant argued for him That the Iustification is good for when he had made a local justification 2 Cro. 45 372. he must traverse both before and after as he has done in this Case 2. The Plaintiffs Replication is ill for he ought not to have waved the Defendants Traverse and force him to accept of another from him because the first is material to the Plaintiffs Title and he is bound up to it Hob. 104. 3. There was no occasion of a Traverse in the Replication for where a Servant is Defendant de injuria sua propria is good with a Traverse of the Command Ex parte Quer. But on the Plaintiffs side Serjeant Baldwin held the Defendants Traverse to be immaterial for having answered the Declaration fully in alledging a Right to the sole fishing and an Entry into the Plaintiffs Close 2 Cro. 372. 't is insignificant afterwards to traverse that he is guilty aliter vel alio modo Then the matter of the Plea is not good because the Defendant justifies by a Command from one of the other Defendants who have all pleaded Not-guilty and they must be guilty if they did command him for a Command will make a Man a Trespasser Curia The Court were all of Opinion that Iudgment should be given for the Plaintiff For as to the last thing mentioned which was the Matter of the Plea they held it to be well enough for the * Mires and Solebay Post Servant shall not be ousted of the advantage which the Law gives him by pleading his Masters Command Then as to the Replication 't is good and the Plea is naught with the Traverse for where the Iustification goes to a time and place not alledged by the Plaintiff there must be a Traverse of both In this Case the Defendant ought to have traversed the Plaintiffs free fishing as alledged by him in his Declaration which he having omitted the Plea for that reason also is ill and so Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff DE Termino Paschae Anno 28 Car. II. in Communi Banco Lee versus Brown IN a Special Verdict in Ejectment The Case was this Where reputed Lands shall pass under general words viz. There were Lands which re vera were not parcel of a Mannor and yet were reputed as parcel A Grant is made of the Mannor and of all Lands reputed parcel thereof and whether by this Grant and by these general Words those Lands would pass which were not parcel of the Mannor was the Question This Term the Lord Chief Iustice delivered the Opinion of the Court That those Lands would pass Postea Cro. Car. 308. and they grounded their Opinions upon two Authorities in Co. Entr. fol. 330 384. The King versus Imber Wilkins If the Iury had found that the Lands in question had beén reputed parcel of the Mannor it would not have passed had they found no more because the Reputation so found might be intended a Reputation for a small time so reputed by a few or by such as were ignorant and unskilful But in this Case 't is found that not only the Lands were reputed parcel but the reason why they were reputed parcel for the Iury have found that they were formerly parcel of the Mannor and after the division they were again united in the possession of him who had the Mannor which being also Copyhold have since béen demised by Copy of Court Roll togethet with the Mannor and these were all great marks of Reputation and therefore Iudgment was given that the Lands did well pass 2 Roll. Abr. 186. Dyer 350. Wakeman versus Blackwel Common Recoveries how to be pleaded QUare Impedit The Case was The Plaintiff entituled himself to an Advowson by a Recovery suffered by Tenant in Tail in pleading of which Recovery he alledges two to be Tenants to the Praecipe but doth not shew how they came to be so or what Conveyance was made to them by which it may appear that they were Tenants to the Praecipe and after search of Presidents as to the form of pleading of Common Recoveries the Court inclined that it was not well pleaded but delivered no Iudgment Searl versus Bunion Justification where good IN Trespass for taking of his Cattel The Defendant pleads that he was possessed of Blackacre pro termino diversorum annorum adtunc adhuc ventur̄ and being so possessed the Plaintiffs Cattle were doing damage and he distrained them Damage fesant ibidem and so justifies the taking c. The Plaintiff demurrs and assigns specially for cause that the Defendant did not set forth particularly the commencement of the Term of years but only that he was possessed of an Acre for a Term of years to come and regularly where a Man makes a Title to a particular Estate in pleading he must shew the particular time of the Commencement of his Title that the Plaintiff may replie to it Curia The Chief Iustice and the whole Court held that the Plea was good upon this difference where the Plaintiff brings an Action for the Land or doing of a Trespass upon the Land he is supposed to be in possession
but if he will justifie by vertue of any particular Estate he must shew the Commencement of that Estate and then such pleading as here will not be good But when the Matter is * Yelv. 75. Cro. Car. 138. collateral to the Title of the Land and for any thing which appears in the Declaration the Title may not come in question such a Iustification as this will be good In this Case no Man can tell what the Plaintiff will reply 't is like the Cases of Inducements to Actions which do not require such certainty as is necessary in other Cases So where an Action is brought for a Nusance and he intitles himself generally by saying he is possessionat ' pro termino annorum 't is well enough and he need not to set forth particularly the Commencement because he doth not make the Title his Case for which reason Iudgment was given for the Defendant Crosier versus Tomlinson Executor IN an Action on the Case Statute of Limitations of personal Actions extends to Indebitatus Assumpsit The Plaintiff declared that the Defendants Testator being in his Life time viz. such a day indebted to the Plaintiff in the Sum of 20 l. for so much Mony before that time to his use had and received did assume and promise to pay the same when he should be thereunto required and that the Testator did not in his Life time nor the Defendant since his death pay the Mony though he was thereunto required The Defendant pleads that the Testator did not at any time within six years make such promise The Plaintiff replies that he was an Infant at the time of the promise made and that he came not to full Age till the year 1672. and that within six years after he attained the Age of one and twenty years he brought this Action and so takes advantage of the promise in the Statute of * 21 Jac. c. 16. Limitations that the Plaintiff shall have six years after the disability by Infancy Coverture c. is removed And the Defendant demurred by Serjeant Rigby Ex parte Def. and the reason of his Demurrer was because in the said Proviso Actions on the Case on Assumpsit are omitted This Act was made for quieting of Estates and avoiding of Suits as appears by the Preamble and therefore shall be taken strictly there is an enumeration of several Actions in the Proviso and this is Casus omissus and so no benefit can be taken of the Proviso In a Writ of Error upon a Iudgment brought 4 Car. 1. in the Court of Windsor the Iudges held that an Action on the Case for * Cro. Car. 163 513 535. Debt upon Escape is out of the Statute 1 Sand 37. But an Action for Escape is not Sid. 305. So is Debt for not setting out of Tithes for these are not grounded upon any Contract Cro. Car. 513. Hut 109. slandering of a Mans Title is out of this Act because such an Action was rare and not brought without special damages But Hide Chief Iustice doubted 1 Cro. 141. The Law-makers could not omit this Case unadvisedly because 't is within those sorts of Actions enumerated by this Act. This Promise was made to the Plaintiff when he was but a day old and it would be very hard now after so many years to charge the Executor Ex parte Quer. But Turner Serjeant argued that though an Indebitat̄ assumpsit is not within the express words of the Proviso yet 't is within the intent and meaning thereof and so the Rule is taken in 10 Co. 101. in Bewfages Case quando verba statuti sunt specialia ratio autem generalis statutum intelligendum est generaliter And this is a Statute which gives a general remedy and the mischief to the Infant is as great in such Actions of Indebitatus assumpsit as other Actions and therefore 't is but reasonable to intend that the Parliament which hath saved their Rights in Debts Trovers c. intended likewise that they should not be barred in an Indebitatus Assumpsit In 2 Anders 55. Smith versus Colshil Debt was brought upon a Bond the Defendant there pleaded the Statute of the 5 E. 6. of selling of Offices the words of which are viz. That every Bond to be given for money or profit for any Office or Deputation of any Office mentioned in the Statute shall be void against the Maker In that case the Bond was given to procure a Grant of the Office and also to exercise the same now though this was not within the express words of the Statute yet the Bond was held void and if it should be otherwise the mischiefs which the Statute intended to remedy would still continue and therefore the intent of the Law-makers in such cases is to be regarded for which reason if Actions of Indebitatus Assumpsit are within the same mischief with other Actions therein mentioned 2 Anders 123 150. Cor. Car. 533. 19 H. 8. 11. such also ought to be construed to be within the same remedy But he took the Case of * Cro Car. 245. Swain versus Stephens to rule this Case at Bar in which Case this very Statute was pleaded to an Action of Trover and the Plaintiff replied that he was beyond Sea and upon a Demurrer to the Replication the Court held Trover to be within the Statute it being named in the Paragraph of Limitation of personal Actions which directs it to be brought within the time therein limited that is to say all Actions on the Case within six years and then enumerates several other Actions amongst which Trover is omitted yet the Court were then of Opinion that Trover is implied in those general words Curia And of that Opinion was the Chief Iustice and Wyndham and Atkyns Iustices That upon the whole frame of the Act it was strong against the Defendant for it would be very strange that the Plaintiff in this Case might bring an Action of Debt and not an Indebitatus Assumpsit When the Scope of an Act appears to be in a general sense the Law looks to the meaning and is to be extended to particular Cases within the same reason and therefore they were of Opinion That Actions of Trespass mentioned in the Statute are comprehensive of this Action because 't is a Trespass upon the Case and the words of the Proviso save the Infants Right in Actions of Trespass And therefore though there are not particular words in the enacting Clause which relate to this Action yet this Proviso restrains the severity of that Clause and restores the Common Law and so is to be taken favourably and this Action being within the same reason with other Actions therein mentioned ought also to be within the same remedy But Iustice Ellis doubted whether Actions of Trespass could comprehend Actions on the Case and that when the Parliament had enumerated Actions of Trespass Trover Case for Words c. If they had intended
is altogether incertain for it doth not appear what is due 28 H. 8. Dyer 28. 9 Ed. 4. 16. 12 H. 8. 6. a. Ex parte Def. But it was argued for the Defendant that he need not Traverse the Accompt As to the first Objection made that the Plea is not good because it doth not answer the Declaration the Rule as to that purpose is generally good but then the Plaintiff must tell all his Case which if he omits he must then give the Defendant leave to tell where his omission is Sometimes a thing which belongs properly to another may be pleaded in bar or discharge to avoid circuity of Actions as one Covenant may be pleaded to another 1 H. 7. 15. 20 H. 7. 4. So where the Lesseé is to be dispunishable of waste he may plead it to a Writ of waste The Books note a difference where the Covenant is one or two Sentences for in the first case one Covenant may be pleaded in discharge of another but not in the last Keilway 34. 'T is true if the second Covenant had been distinct and independent it could not have been thus pleaded but in this Case 't is not said that the Covenantor for himself his Executors and Administrators doth Covenant c. but ulterius agreat̄ provisum est so that as t is penned provisum est makes a Condition and then the sense is I will accompt if you will discompt and if you refuse to discompt I cannot be charged Dyer 6. 'T is inutilis labor to make up an accompt If the other will not allow what he ought if there be an Annuity pro consilio impenso c. and he will not pay the Mony the other is not to be compelled to give his advice Fitzh Annuity 27. 25 E. 2. Annuity 44. Curia The Chief Iustice and the whole Court were of Opinion that Iudgment should be given for the Plaintiff for Arbitrations Wills and Acts of Parliament are to be taken according to the meaning of the Parties and Damages are to be given according to the merit of the Case In this Case the Defendant is bound to accompt upon request and to pay what Mony is due upon the Accompt and 't is an impertinent question for the Defendant to ask him to make allowance for Parsons Dinners before they come to accompt 'T is as if a Bailiff should say to his Lord I have laid out so much Mony and I will not accompt with you unless you will allow it this is a Capitulation before-hand and is very insignificant by way of discharge They have each a remedy upon these mutual Covenants and the provisum agreat̄ est doth not amount to a Condition but is a Covenant and Iudgment was given accordingly Iustice Ellis said he had a Manuscript Report of the Case of Ware and Chappel which he said was adjudged upon great Debate Stoutfil's Case PRohibition Tythes not to be paid for Brick or Pidgeons It was agreed clearly that no Tythes ought to be paid for Brick because 't is part of the Soil and so it has been often adjudged And it was also said that Tythes shall not be paid for Pidgeons unless it be by special Custom Columbel versus Columbel THE Plaintiff brought an Action of Debt upon a Bond of 500 l. Award pleaded under Seal and not under Hand not good The Defendant demands Oyer of the Bond and Condition which was to observe an Award of A. B. Arbitrator indifferently chosen to determine all manner of Controversies Quarrels and Demands concerning the Title of certain Lands so as the said Award were made and put into writing under the Hand and Seal of the Arbitrator c. and then he pleads that the Arbitrator made no Award The Plaintiff replies an Award by which such things were to be done and sets it forth in haec verba under the Seal of the Arbitrator The Defendant rejoyns that the Arbitrator made no Award under his Hand and Seal according to the Condition of the Bond. The Plaintiff demurrs for that the Defendant ought to plead the Award under the Hand as well as the Seal of the Arbitrator for when he produces it in Court as he doth by a profert hic in Curia he must plead it formally as well as produce it and Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Norris versus Trist Livery secundum formam Chartae where good IN a Special Verdict in Ejectment The Case was A Deéd is made to threé Habendum to two for their Lives Remainder to the third for his Life and Livery and Seisin is made to all thrée secundum formam Chartae And whether the Livery so made as if they had all Estates in possession whereas in truth one of them had but an Estate in Remainder was good was the Question On the one side it was said by Serjeant Seys that possession in this Case was delivered according to the form of the Deéd within mentioned which must be to two for Life Remainder to the third person and Livery and Seisin being only to accomplish and perfect the Common Assurances of the Land ought to be taken favourably ut res magis valeat quam pereat and therefore if a Feoffment be made of two Acres and a Letter of Attorny to give Livery and the Attorny only enters into one Acre and gives Livery secundum formam Chartae both the Acres pass Dyer 131 40. Coke Litt. 52. a. But on the other side Serjeant Maynard said that there was something more in this Case than what had béen opened for there was a Letter of Attorney made to give Livery to two and instead of doing that he makes Livery to them all which is no good Execution of his Authority and therefore no Livery was made the Authority not being pursued As to the Case in the 1st Institutes my Lord Coke errs very much there in that discourse for in saying that if there be a Feoffment of two Acres and a Letter of Attorney to take possession of both and he maketh Livery of both but taketh possession but of one and that both pass 't is not Law but if the Authority be general as to make Livery and Seisin and he take possession of one and then makes Livery of more secundum formam Chartae that is good and this is the difference taken in the Books 5 Ed. 3. 65. 3 Ed. 3. 32. 43 Ed. 3. 32. 27 H. 8. 6. The Remainder Man in this Case is a méer Stranger to the Livery There is also a manifest difference betwéen a Matter of Interest and an Execution of an Authority for in the first Case it shall be construed according to the Interest which either hath but an Authority must be strictly pursued The Court were all of Opinion that the Livery in this Case was good to two for their Lives Remainder to the third person Curia And the Chief Iustice said that whatever the ancient Opinions were about pursuing
truth there is no Return made or if any 't is a very imperfect Return till the Body be in Court and this is the reason why the Court will not allow it but amerce the Sheriff till he make the Party appear 't is not like a compleat Return as a Non est inventus or the Return of Nulla Bona upon a Fi. Fa. The Case of * ◠Roll Abr. 93 pl. 17. Postea Bowls and Lassels is full in the Point where it was adjudged that this Action would not lie because the Sheriff had not done any thing unjustly but what he was commanded to do by the Statute and therefore he is to be amerced if the Defendant doth not appear Ex parte Quer. But for the Plaintiff it was said that unless this Action lye he is remediless and that for two Reasons 1. Because the Assignment of the Bail Bond is at the discretion of the Court and not demandable by the Plaintiff in foro 2. The Plaintiff hath no benefit by the Amerciaments because they go to the King and in some places are granted to Patenteés now 't is agreéd that the Sheriff may be amerced and certainly if an Action be brought against him he is but in the same Case for still he is to pay And if it be objected that the Amerciaments may be compounded cheaper then the Plaintiff hath not so good remedy nor is so likely to recover his Debt as if the Action would lie which would be a greater penalty upon him than the Amerciaments on the Sheriff Neither will it follow that because the Sheriff may be amerced therefore no Action will lie against him for in many Cases he may be amerced and yet an Action on the Case will lie against him at the Suit of the Party 41 Ass pl. 12. fol. 254. Latch 187. That this Action will not lie is against the very end of the Statute and the reasonable construction thereof in the last Clause which Enacts That if the Sheriff return a Cepi Corpus he shall be charged to have the Body at the Return as before the making of the Statute now before this Law he was lyable to an Action if after such a Return made the Party did not appear and therefore this Action being grounded upon the Common Law is still preserved since no alteration hereof hath beén made by this Statute 'T is true an Action of Escape is taken away but not an Action on the Case for a false Return and upon this difference are all the Authorities cited on the other side as Cro. Eliz. 416 621. Cro. Jac. 286. Moor 428. and the Case of Bowls and Lassels And for an Authority in Point is the Case of Franklin and Andrews 24 Car. 1. where Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff in an Action brought for a false Return of Cepi Corpus and the Statute pleaded as in this Case It has béen objected that Iudgment was there given upon the defect of Pleading because the Traverse was naught 't is true there was a Traverse absque hoc quod the Defendant retornavit aliter vel alio modo but that was held good because it answered the falso alledged in the Plaintiffs Declaration In this Case there is no Traverse but 't is confessed by the Demurrer that he did falsly and deceitfully return Cepi Corpus and so the Plaintiff is at apparent damage and hath no remedy without this Action and the Defendant is at no prejudice but hath his remedy over on the Bail Bond. North Chief Iustice Wyndham and Atkins Iustices Judgment held that the Action would not lie for when the Sheriff returns Cepi Corpus paratum habeo though he have him not in Court 't is no false Return for if he hath taken Bail he hath done what by Law he ought to do if he Arrest a Man in Yorkshire the Law will not compel him to bring the Party hither to the Bar because of the charge if he make an insufficient Return neither the Party or the Court are deluded because the common method in such cases must be pursued by which the Party will have remedy This Return is true and Iustice Atkyns held that the Sheriff was not obliged by the Statute to return only a Cepi Corpus paratum habeo but might return that he took Bail for the Statute provides that if he return a Cepi Corpus he shall be chargable as before but doth not enjoyn him to make such return the Case of Bowles and Lassels is full in this point and therefore Iudgment was given for the Defendant But Iustice Scroggs was of another Opinion says he this Action being brought because the Defendant said he had the Body ready when in truth he had not was an apparent injury to the Plaintiff of whom the Statute must have some consideration for it doth not require the Sheriff to say Cepi corpus paratum habeo but he must make his Return good or otherwise those words are very insignificant and if the Statute obliges him to let the party to Bail and nothing more is thereby intended for the benefit of the Plaintiff why doth the Court amerce the Sheriff and punish him for doing what the Statute directs Therefore if the Plaintiff brings a Habeas Corpus upon the Cepi and the Defendant doth not appear the Plaintiff is then well entituled to this Action Hollis versus Carre in Cancellaria Decree of the Execution of a Fine in specie THE Lord Chancellor Finch having called to his assistance Iustice Wild and Iustice Windham to give their Opinions what relief the Plaintiff was to have for the recovering of 6000 l. which was his Ladys Portion After those Iudges had spoken shortly to the matter he put the Case Viz. The Plaintiff by his Bill demands 6000 l. due to him for his Wives Portion with Interest for non-payment according to the purport of certain Articles of Agreement dated in August 1661. and mentioned to be made between old Sir Robert Carr the Defendants Father his Lady and Son the now Defendant and Lucy Carr his Daughter on the one part and my Lord Hollis and Sir Francis his Son the now Plaintiff on the other part The Articles mention an Agreement of a Marriage to be had between the said Sir Francis Hollis and Lucy Carr with Covenants on the Plaintiffs side to settle a Ioynture c. and on the other side to pay 6000 l. and 't is agreed in the Articles that a Fine was intended to be levied of such Lands c. for securing the payment of 6000 l. c. The Marriage takes effect but old Sir Robert Carr did never Seal these Articles the Lady Carr Seals before and the Defendant after Marriage Sir Francis had Issue on his Lady Lucy one Child since dead the Lady is likewise dead the Ioynture was not made nor the Portion paid Afterward viz. Anno 1664. an Act of Parliament was made for setling old Sir Robert Carr's Estate whereby the
enough and Iudgment was given accordingly When this Cause was tried at the Barr which was in Easter-Term last the Lord Mohun offered to give his Testimony for the Plaintiff but refused to be sworn offering to speak upon his Honour but Iustice Wyld told him in Causes between Party and Party he must be upon his Oath The Lord Mohun asked him whether he would answer it The Iudge replyed that he delivered it as his Opinion and because he knew not whether it might cause him to be questioned in another place he desired the rest of the Iudges to deliver their Opinions which they all did and said he ought to be sworn and so he was but with a salvo jure for he said there was an Order in the House of Peers That 't is against the Priviledge of the House for any Lord to be sworn Anonymus DEBT upon the Statute for not coming to Church and concludes Per quod Actio accrevit eidem Domino Regi quer̄ ad exigend ' habend ' The Exception after Iudgment was taken that it ought to have been only Actio accrevit eidem the Plaintiff qui tam c. and not exigend ' habend ' for the King and himself Sed non allocatur For upon search of Presidents the Court were all of Opinion that it was good either way Anonymus Factor where he cannot sell but for ready Mony IN Accompt Iudgment was given quod computet and the Defendant pleads before the Auditors that the Goods whereof he was to give a reasonable accompt were bona peritura and though he was carefull in the keeping of them yet they were much the worse that they remained in his hands for want of Buyers and were in danger of being worse and therefore he sold them upon Credit to a Man beyond Sea The Plaintiff demurred and after Argument by Barrel Serjeant for the Plaintiff and Baldwin Serjeant for the Defendant the whole Court were of Opinion that the Plea was not good Curia For if a Merchant deliver Goods to his Factor ad merchandizand ' he cannot sell them upon Credit but for ready Mony unless he hath a particular Commission from his Master so to do for if he can find no Buyers he is not answerable and if they are bona peritura and cannot be sold for Mony upon the delivery the Merchant must give him authority to sell upon Trust If they are burned or he is robbed without his own default he is not lyable and in this Case it was not pleaded that he could not sell the Goods for ready Mony and the Sale it self was made beyond Sea where the Buyer is not to be found like the Case of * 1 Bulst 103. Yelv. 202. Sadock and Burton where in Accompt against a Factor he pleads that he sold the Iewel to the King of Barbary for the Plaintiffs use and upon a Demurrer the Plea was held naught for when a Factor hath a bare Authorty to sell in such Case he hath no power to give a day of payment but must receive the Mony immediately upon the Sale Therefore in the Case at Barr if the Master is not bound by the Contract of the Servant without his Consent or at least the Goods coming to his use neither shall the Servant have Authority to sell without ready Mony unless he hath a particular Order for that purpose There was another thing moved in this Case for the Plaintiff that the Plea ought to be put in upon Oath for having pleaded that he could not sell without loss he ought to swear it Fitzh Accompt 47. But no Opinion was delivered herein only the Chief Iustice said that the Plaintiff ought to have required the Plea upon Oath for otherwise it was not necessary But for the substance of the Plea it was held ill and Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Harris's Case SErjeant Hopkins moved for a Prohibition The Case was Husband dies his Wife Executrix she dies before Probate Administration must be to the next of kin of the Husband 22 23 Car. 2. cap. 10. A Man makes a Will and appoints his Wife to be Executrix and devises a Shilling to his Daughter for a Legacy and dies the Executrix before Probate of the Will dies also intestate and whether the Goods shall be distributed by the Act for settling Intestates Estates amongst the next of kin to the Executrix or to the next of kin to the Testator her Husband was the Question Since she dying before Probate her Husband in Iudgment of Law died also intestate This Case seems to be out of the Statute the Husband having made a Will and the Act intermeddles only where no Will is made The Court delivered no Iudgment in it but seemed to incline that the Statute did extend to this very Case and that Administration must be committed to the next of kin of the Husband but if there should be no distribution it must then be according to the Will of the Testator Reder versus Bradley IT was moved to reverse a Iudgment given in an Honour Court upon a Writ of false Iudgment brought here Judgment reversed in an inferior Court where the damage was laid to 30 l. The Plaintiff declared in the Action below that there was a Communication between him and the Defendant concerning the Service of his Son and it was agreéd between them that in consideration the Plaintiff would permit his Son to serve him the Defendant promised to pay the Plaintiff 30 s. The Plaintiff avers that he did permit his Son to serve him and that the Defendant hath not paid him the 30 s. There was a Verdict for the Plaintiff and the Exceptions now taken were 1. 'T is not said that the Iurors were electi ad triand ' c. 2. He lays his damage to 30 l. of which a Court Baron cannot hold Plea for the difference taken by my Lord Coke is where Damages are laid under 40 s. Costs may make it amount to more but where 't is laid above in such Case all is coram non Judice for which reason Iudgment was reversed but in this Court the Iudge doth not pronounce the Reversal as 't is done in the Kings Bench. Lane versus Robinson Inferior Court TRespass for taking of his Cattel the Defendant justifies by vertue of an Execution in an Action of Trespass brought in a Hundred Court and the Plaintiff demurred Serjeant Pemberton took two Exceptions to the Plea 2 Cro. 443 526. Hob. 180. Sid. 348. 1. Because the inferior Court not being of Record cannot hold Plea of a Trespass quare vi armis contra pacem but it was not allowed for Trespasses are frequently brought there and the Plaintiff may declare either vi armis or contra pacem Postea 2. The Defendant reciting the Proceedings below saith taliter processum fuit whereas he ought particularly to set forth all that was done because not being in a Court
of Record the Proceedings may be denied and tryed by Iury. But the Court inclined that it was pleaded well enough and that it was the safest way to prevent mistakes but if the Plaintiff had replied de injuria sua propria absque tali causa that had traversed all the Proceedings Quaere whether such a Replication had been good because the Plaintiff must answer particularly that Authority which the Defendant pretended to have from the Court but no Iudgment was given Sherrard versus Smith TRespass Quare clausum fregit and for taking away his Goods the Defendant justifies the taking by the command of the Lord of the Mannor of which the Plaintiff held by Fealty and Rent and for non-payment thereof the Goods were taken nomine Districtionis The Plaintiff replies that the locus in quo est extra Hors de son Fee when to be pleaded absque hoc quod est infra feodum The Defendant demurrs specially because the Plaintiff pleading hors de son fee should have taken the Tenancy upon him 9 Co. Bucknal's Case 22 H. 6. 2 3. Keilway 73. 14 Ass pl. 13. 1 Inst 1. b. where this is given as a Rule by my Lord Cook Serjeant Pemberton on the other side agreed Ex parte Quer. 13 Assize 28. 28 Assise 41. that in all cases of Assize hors de son fee is no Plea without taking the Tenancy upon him 2 Ass placito 1. And in 5 E. 4. 2. 't is said that in Replevin the Party cannot plead this Plea because he may disclaim but Brook placito 15. tit hors de son fee saith this is not Law and so is 2 H. 6. 1. and many Cases afterwards were against that Book of Ed. 4. and that a Man might plead hors de son fee as if there be a Lord and Tenant holding by Fealty and Rent and he makes a Lease for years and the Lord distrains the Cattel of the Lessee though the Tenant hath paid the Rent and done Fealty there if the Lessee alledge that his Lessor was seised of the Tenancy in his demesn as of fee and held it of the Lord by Services c. of which Services the Lord was seised by the hands of his Lessor as by his true Tenant who hath leased the Lands to the Plaintiff and the Lord to charge him hath unjustly avowed upon him who hath nothing in the Tenancy 't is well enough 9 Co. Case of Avowries and the reason given in 5 Edw. 4. about disclaimer will not hold now for that course is quite altered and is taken away by the Statute of the 21 H. 8. cap. 19. which Enacts That Avowries shall be made by the Lord upon the Land without naming his Tenant But in case of Trespass there was never any such thing objected as here for what Tenancy can the Plaintiff take upon him in this case He cannot say tenen ' liberi tenementi for this is a bare Action of Trespass in which though the pleading is not so formal yet it will do no hourt for if it had been only extra feodum without the Traverse it had been good enough and of that Opinion was the Court in Hillary-Term following when Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff absente Scroggs And the Chief Iustice said That the Rule laid down by my Lord Coke in 1 Inst 1. b. that there is no pleading hors de son fee without taking the tenancy upon him is to be intended in cases of Assize and so are all the Cases he there cites for proof of that Opinion and therefore so he is to be understood but this is an Action of Trespas brought upon the Possession and not upon the Title In the Case of Avowry a Stranger may plead generally hors de son fee and so may Tenant for years and this being in the Case of a Trespass is much stronger and if the Plaintiff destroys the Defendants justification 't is well enough Sir William Hickman versus Thorne alios Prescription against another Prescription not good without a Traverse IN a Replevin The Defendant justifies the taking for that the locus in quo was his Freehold and that he took the Cattel there damage fesant The Plaintiff in bar to the Avowry replies that the locus in quo c. is parcel of such a Common Field and prescribes to have right of Common there as appendant to two Acres which he hath in another place The Defendant rejoyns that there is a Custom that every Free-holder who hath Lands lying together in the said Common Field may enclose against him who hath right of Common there and that he had Lands there and did enclose The Plaintiff demurs and Serjeant Newdigate took Exceptions to the Rejoynder Ex parte Quer. 1. For that he did not averr that the Lands which he enclosed did lye together and therefore had not brought his case within the Custom alledged Sed non allocatur because he could not enclose if the Lands had not laid together 2. He gives no answer to the Plaintiffs right of Common but by argument which he should have confessed with a bene verum est and then should have avoided it by alledging the Custom of Enclosure like the Case of * 2 Leon. 209. Russel and Broker where in Trespass for cutting Oaks the Defendant pleads that he was seised of a Messuage in Fee and prescribes to have rationabile estoverium ad libitum capiend ' in boscis the Plaintiff replies that the locus in quo was within the Forest and that the Defendant and all those c. habere consueverunt rationabile estoverium c. per liberationem Forestarii and upon a Demurrer the Replication was held naught because the Plaintiff ought to have pleaded the Law of the Forest viz. Lex Forestae talis est or to have traversed the Defendants Prescription and not to have set forth another Prescription in his Replication without a Traverse 3. The Defendant should have pleaded the Custom and then have traversed the Prescription of the Right of Common for he cannot plead a Custom against a Custom 9 Co. 58. Aldred's Case where one prescribes to have a Light the other cannot prescribe to stop it up Serjeant Pemberton contra Ex parte Def. He said that which he took to be the only Question in the Case was admitted viz. That such a Custom as this to enclose was good and so it has béen adjudged in Sir Miles Corbet's Case 7 Co. But as to the Objections which have been made the Defendant admits the Prescription for Right of Common but saith he may enclose against the Commoners by reason of a Custom which is a Barr to his very Right of Common and therefore need not confess it with a bene verum est neither could he traverse the Prescription because he hath admitted it 'T is true where one prescribes to have Lights in his House and another prescribes to stop them up this is not good because
one Prescription is directly contrary to the other and for that reason one must be traversed but here the Defendant hath confessed that the Plaintiff hath a Right of Common but t is not an absolute but a qualified Right against which the Defendant may Enclose and here being two Prescriptions pleaded and one of them not being confessed it must from thence necessarily follow that the other is the Issue to be tryed which in this Case is whether the Defendant can enclose or not The Chief Iustice and the whole Court were of Opinion Curia that where there are several Free-holders who have Right of Common in a Common Field that such a Custom as this of enclosing is good because the remedy is reciprocal for as one may enclose so may another But Iustice Atkyns doubted much of the Case at Bar because the Defendant had pleaded this Custom to Enclose in barr to a Freeholder who had no Land in the Common Field where he claimed Right of Common but prescribed to have such Right there as appendant to two Acres of Land he had alibi for which reason he prayed to amend upon payment of Costs Attorny General versus Sir Edward Turner in Scaccario Exposition of the Kings Grant INformation The Case was Viz. The King by Letters Patents granted several Lands in Lincolnshire by express words and then this Clause is added upon which the Question did arise Nec non totum illud fundum solum terras suas contigue adjacen ' to the Premisses quae sunt aqua cooperta vel quae in posterum de aqua possunt recuperari and afterwards a great quantity of Land was gained from the Sea and whether the King or the Patentee was intituled to those Lands was the Question Devise of a possibility good by a common person 2 Cro. 509. pl. 21. 1 Bulst 194. Sawyer for the King argued that he had a good Title because the Grant was void he having only a bare possibility in the thing granted at the time But Levins on the other side insisted that the Grant of those Lands was good because the King may Grant what he hath not in possession but only a possibility to have it But admitting that he could not make such a Grant yet in this Case there is such a certainty as the thing it self is capable to have and in which the King hath an Interest and it is hard to say that he hath an Interest in a thing and yet cannot by any means dispose of it If it should be objected that nothing is to pass but what is contigue adjacen ' to the Premisses granted and therefore an Inch or some such small matter must pass and no more certainly that was not the intention of the King whose Grants are to be construed favourably and very bountifully for his Honour and not to be taken by Inches Postea Company of Ironmongers and Naylor If there are two Marshes adjoyning which are the Kings and he grants one of them by a particular name and description and then he grants the other contigue adjacen ' ex parte australi certainly the whole Marsh will pass and 't is very usual in pleading to say a Man is seised of a House or Close and of another House c. contigue adjacen ' that is to be intended of the whole House In this Case the King intended to pass something when he granted totum fundum c. but if such construction should be made as insisted on then those words would be of no signification 'T is true the word illud is a Relative and restrains the general words and implies that which may be shewn as it were with a Finger and therefore in Doddington's Case 2 Co. 32. a Grant of omnia illa Mesuagia scituate in Wells and the Houses were not in Wells but elsewhere the Grant in that Case was held void because it was restrained to a certain Village and the Pronoun illa hath reference to the Town but in this Case there could be no such certainty because the Land at the time of the Grant made was under Water But if the Patent is not good by the very words of the Grant the non obstante makes it good which in this Case is so particular that it seems to be designed on purpose to answer those Objections of any mistake or incertainty in the value quantity or quality of the thing granted which also supplies the defects for want of right instruction given the King in all cases where he may lawfully make a Grant at the Common Law 4 Co. 34. Moor pl. 571. Bozuns Case And there is another very general Clause in the Patent viz. Damus praemissa adeo plene as they are or could be in the Kings hands by his Prerogative or otherwise * Ante Adeo plene are operative words Whistlers Case 10 Co. And there is also this Clause omnes terras nostras infra fluxum refluxum maris 'T is true Sid. 149. these words praemissis praed ' spectan ' do follow from whence it may be objected that they neither did or could belong to the Premisses and admitting it to be so yet the Law will reject those words rather than avoid the Grant in that part In the Case of the Abbot of * 9 Co. 27. b. Strata Marcella the King granted a Mannor Et bona catalla felonum dicto Manerio spectan ' now though such things could not be appendant to a Mannor yet it was there adjudged that they did pass Such things as these the King hath by his Prerogative and some things the Subject may have by Custom or Prescription as Wrecks c. and in this very Case 't is said that there is a Custom in Lincolnshire that the Lords of Mannors shall have derelict Lands and 't is a reasonable Custom for if the Sea wash away the Lands of the Subject he can have no recompence unless he should be entituled to what he gains from the Sea and for this there are some Authorities as Sir Henry Constable's Case 2 Roll. 168. 5 Co. Land between High-Water and Low-Water Mark may belong to a Mannor But no Iudgment was given Morris versus Philpot in B. R. Release by an Executor before Probate THE Plaintiff as Executor to T. brings an Action of Debt against the Defendant as Administrator to S. for a Debt due from the said intestate to the Plaintiffs Testator The Defendant pleads that the Plaintiff released to him all Brewing Vessels c. and all other the Estate of S. lately deceased this Release was before probate of the Will to which Plea the Plaintiff demurred and whether this Release was a good Barr to the Plaintiffs Action was the Question Ex parte Quer. It was said for the Plaintiff that it was not for if a Conusee release to the Cognisor all his right and title to the Lands of the Cognisor and afterwards sues out
Construction can be made of them but that an Estate in possession was thereby intended to pass 4. Object That this Fine and Grant must be construed to enure according to the intent of the Parties ut res magis valeat and they never intended to make a Forfeiture Answ Certainly no Man ever intended to make a Forfeiture of his own Estate those are generally the effects of Ignorance and not of the Will as the Case of Gimlet and Sands Cro. Car. * 1 Roll. Abr. 856. 391. where Tenant in Fee makes a Feoffment to two to the use of himself for Life then to the use of his Wife for Life Remainder in Tail to his Son and Heir Remainder to his own right Heirs and afterwards he made another Feoffment to Smith with Warranty the Mother and Son join in another Feoffment adjudged that this was a Forfeiture of her Estate for life though she had no notice of the Warranty made by her Husband for the Feoffment made by him was a publick Act upon the Land and she ought to have taken notice of it and though by her joining in the Feoffment with her Son she did not intend to forfeit her Estate yet the Law adjudges according to what is done But in the Case at Barr the intention of the Parties may be collected by the Act done and there is great reason to presume that the Parties thereby intended to displace the Reversion for the Husband joyning in the Fine and in the Warranty if it was no divesting the Warranty is of no use Another Objection has been only mentioned which is that admitting this should amount to a displacing if the Estate had been in possession yet in this Case it would not because it was prevented by the Lease for years in being But that cannot hinder the execution of this Fine 't is a Fine sur concessit which is executory in its nature and doth not pass any Estate or take any effect 'till executed and so is the Book 41 5. 3. 14. b. But in this Case the Fine was executed which may be by matter in pais as well as by Scire facias and as to this purpose may be executed by the entry of the Conusor 1 Rep. 106. Dyer 376. b. without suing out any Execution 38 Ed. 3. Brook tit Scire facias 199. If there had been a Fine executed there would have beén little doubt left in this Case and by the Attornment of the Lessee for years it must be admitted that this Fine was executed as 8 Ed. 3. f. 44. For a Fine of a Reversion may be executed to all purposes by the Attornment of the Lessee for years and if so when a Fine executory is once executed 't is as good as a Fine sur Conusance de droit come ceo to make a forfeiture of the particular Estate Where a Feoffment is made and a Lease for years is in being the Feoffment is not good because in such case there must be a present transposition of the Estate Postea Moor and Pitt which is hindred by the Lease But in case of a Fine which is a Feoffment upon Record a Lease for years is no impediment or displacing of the Reversion for if Tenant in Tayl expectant upon a Lease for years levy a Fine 't is a discontinuance of the Tayl and notwithstanding this Lease the Fine has such an operation upon the Free-hold that it displaces the Reversion in Fee Co. Lit. 332. And therefore if a Lease for years prevents not a Discontinuance it will much less hinder a displacing in this case But no Iudgment was given now in this Case another matter being debated whether the Plaintiff could have Iudgment because he was barred by the Statute of Limitations for it did not appear that he had been in possession for twenty years past and the Verdict hath not found any Claim or that the Plaintiff was within the Proviso of the Act. Waterfield versus the Bishop of Chichester Oath Ex Officio not to be administred A Prohibition was granted last Easter-Term to the Bishop of Chichester upon a Suggestion made by Waterfield that he being chosen Churchwarden of the Parish Church of Arundel in the County of Sussex the Bishop tendered him an Oath ex officio which was that he should Present every Parishioner who had done any Offence or neglected any Duty mentioned in certain Articles contained in a printed Book delivered to him some of which Articles concern the Church-warden himself and so in effect he was to swear against himself in case of any default which is expressly against the Statute of 13 Car. 2. Sid. 232 cap. 12. which prohibits any person having Ecclesiastical Iurisdiction to administer the Oath ex officio or any other Oath whereby the person to whom 't is administred may be charged to accuse himself of any criminal matter whereby he may be lyable to any Censure or punishment and because the Bishop had Excommunicated him for refusing such Oath he prayed a Prohibition which was granted quoad the compelling him to make any answer to the said Articles concerning himself and the Excommunication was discharged But now upon the motion of Serjeant Brampston a Consultation was awarded because it appeared by the Affidavit of the Commissary who tendred this Oath and likewise by the act of the Court that he was Excommunicated for refusing to take the Oath of a Church warden according to Law which was the only Oath tendred and therefore the ground of the Prohibition being false a Consultation was awarded In this Prohibition it was recited That the Bishop cannot give an Oath but in two cases viz. in matters Testamentary and Matrimonial whereas they have authority in many cases more 't is true also that until his Iurisdiction was increased by Act of Parliament he could hold Plea in none but those two causes 2 Inst 487 537. but by the Statute De circumspecte agatis and of Articuli Cleri he may now hold Plea in many other cases The Bishop informed the Lord Chief Iustice that the Plaintiff Waterfeild had caused 2000 of the Prohibitions to be printed in English and had dispersed them all over the Kingdom intituling them a true translated Copy of a Writ of Prohibition granted by the Lord Chief Iustice and other the Iustices of the Court of Common Pleas in Easter-Term 1676. against the Bishop of Chichester who had proceeded against and Excommunicated one Thomas Waterfield a Churchwarden for refusing to take the Oath usually tendred to persons in such Office by which Writ the Illegality of all such Oaths is declared and the said Bishop commanded to take off his Excommunication And this was declared by the Court to be a most seditious Libel and gave order to enquire after the Printer that he might be prosecuted Eleanor Plummer versus Sir Jeremy Whitchot Intr. Trin. 27 or 28 Car. 2. Rot. 301. in B. R. IN an Action of Debt for an Escape Vpon Nil debet
Statuti if there be any other Statute which prohibits and punishes a Riot this Information is as well grounded upon such as upon this Statute of Philip and Mary for 't is expresly said that the Defendant and others did unlawfully assemble themselves together and riotose routose made an Assault upon her so that it shall be intended to be grounded upon such a Law as shall be best for punishing the Offence The Court were of Opinion Curia That notwithstanding these Exceptions the Information was good and was not like the Case of an Indictment upon the Statute for a forceable Entry That such a day by force and arms the Defendant did Enter into such a House 2 Cro. 14610 639. existen ' liberum tenementum of J. N. and if he doth not say tunc existen ' the Indictment is naught because the Iury may enquire of a thing before it is done but here the existen being added to the person carries the sense to the time of the Offence committed The Statute of 1 R. 3. saith that all Grants made by Cestui que use being of full Age shall be good against him and his Heirs and 't is adjudged 16 H. 7. that he need not shew when and where but generally existen ' of full Age and upon the Evidence it must be so proved Where a thing relates to the Condition of a Man it shall be tryed in the County where the Action is laid and 't is not necessary to say in what County he is a Knight or an Esquire any Citizen and Freeman may devise his Land in Mortmain by the Custom of London 't is enough to say in Pleading existen ' a Citizen and Freeman without setting forth when and where If a Man be Indicted for not coming to Church 't is enough to say existen ' of the Age of 16 years he did not come to Church This is an Offence punishable at Common Law 't is malum in se But admitting 't was an Offence created by the Statute there being no Negative words to prohibit this Court hath a Iurisdiction to punish this Offence if the Star Chamber had not been taken away for the Party had his election to proceed in this Court upon the prohibitory Clause and the Iustices of Assise must be intended the Iustices of Oyer and Terminer Moor 564. Whereupon the Defendant was Fined 500 l. and bound to his good Behaviour for a Year Brown versus Waite Entailed Lands forfeited for Treason Jones 57. 1 Ventr 299. UPon a Special Verdict in Ejectment The Case was viz. Sir John Danvers the Father of the Lessor of the Plaintiff was in Anno Domini 1646. Tenant in Tail of the Lands now in Question and was afterwards instrumental in bringing the late King Charles to death and so was guilty of High Treason and dyed Afterwards the Act of Pains and Penalties made 13 Car. 2. cap. 15. Enacts That all the Lands Tenements and Hereditaments which Sir John Danvers had the 25th day of March in the year 1646. or at any time since shall be forfeited to the King And whether these entailed Lands shall be forfeited to the King by force of this Act was the Question Wallop who argued for the Plaintiff said that the entailed Lands were not forfeited his Reasons were 1. These Lands entailed are not expressly named in that Act. 2. Tenant in Tail hath but an Estate for Life in his Lands and therefore by these words All his Lands those which are entailed cannot be intended for if he grant totum statum suum only an Estate for Life passeth 3. These Lands are not forfeited by the Statute of 26 H. 8. cap. 13. which gives the forfeiture of entailed Lands in case of Treason hecause Sir John Danvers was not convicted of it by Process Presentment Confession Verdict or Outlawry which that Statute doth require for he dyed before any such Conviction Sir Francis Winnington the Kings Solicitor argued contra that entailed Lands are forfeited by the Act of Pains and Penalties and in speaking to this matter he considered 1. The words of that Act. 2. How Estates Tail were created and how forfeitable for Treason 1. This Act recites the Act of general Pardon which did not intend to discharge the Lands of Sir John Danvers and others from a Forfeiture 2. It recites that he was Guilty of High Treason 3. Then comes the enacting Clause Viz. That all the Lands Tenements Rights Interests Offices Annuities and all other Hereditaments Leases Chattels and other things of what nature soever of him the said Sir John Danvers and others which they had on the 25th of March 1646. or at any time since shall be forfeited to the King his Heirs and Successors 2. As to the creation of Intails there were no such Estates at the Common Law they were all Fee-simple Conditional and post prolem suscitatam the Condition was performed for three purposes Viz. To Alien Co. Lit. 19. a. 2 Inst 334. To Forfeit Or to charge with a Rent and thus the Law continued till 13 E. 1. and there having been frequent Warrs between King John and the Barons the great Men then obtained the Statute De donis to preserve their Estates lest the like occasion should happen again in which 't is only mentioned that the Tenant in Tail should not have power to alien but it was well known that if he could not alien he could not forfeit for before that Statute as he might alien post prolem suscitatam so the Iudges always construed that he might forfeit 5 Edw. 3.14 for forfeiture and alienation did always go hand in hand 1 Co. 175. Mildmay's Case And from the making of that Statute it always continued a setled and received Opinion That Tenant in Tail could not alien until by the 12th of Ed. 4. a Recovery came in by which the Estate Tail may be docked and which is now become a Common Assurance Then by the Statute of 4 H. 7. cap. 24. Tenant in Tail might bar his Issue by Fine and Proclamation and all this while it was not thought that such Lands could be forfeited for Treason which Opinion continued during all the Reign of H. 7. for though by his Marriage the Houses of York and Lancaster were united yet the Great Men in those days thought there might be some doubt about the Succession after the death of H. 7. if he should dye without Issue and thereby those differences might be again revived and therefore no endeavours were used to make any alteration in the Law till after the death of H. 7. And after his Son H. 8. had Issue those doubts were removed and being never likely to arise again then the Act of 26 H. 8. was made which gives a Forfeiture of entailed Lands in cases of Treason The inference from this will be that all the Cases put before the 26th year of H. 8. and so before entailed Lands were made forfeitable for Treason and where by the general Words
annum to the Plaintiffs in Trust for Mary and this was to be in discharge of the said Iointure Habendum to them their Heirs Executors Administrators and Assigns in Trust for the said Mary for Life with a Clause of Distress and a Covenant to pay the 200 l. per annum to the said Trustees for the use of the said Mary the Breach assigned was that the Defendant had not paid the Rent to them for the Use of Mary The Defendant demurred specially for that it appears by the Plaintiffs own shewing that here is a Grant of a Rent-Charge for life which is executed by the Statute of Vses and therefore there ought to have been a Distress for Non-payment which is the proper remedy given by the Statute and this Action will not lie in the personalty 2. 'T is said the Defendant did not pay it to the Plaintiffs for the use of Mary which is a Negative pregnant and implies that it was paid to them 3. 'T is not averred that the Mony was not paid to Mary and if 't is paid to her then the Breach is not well assigned Ex parte Quer. But Serjeant Baldwin for the Plaintiff replyed that it was not a Question in this Case whether this Rent Charge was executed by the Statute or not for quacunque via data an Action of Covenant will lie and that the Breach was assigned according to the Words of the Covenant and so prima facie 't is well enough for if the Defendant did pay the Mony to the Plaintiffs he may plead it and so he may likewise if he paid it to Mary Curia The Court were all of Opinion that this Rent-Charge was executed by the Statute of Vses by the express Words thereof which executes such Rents granted for Life upon Trust as this Case is and transfers all Rights and Remedies incident thereunto together with the possession to Cestuy que use so that though the power of distraining be limited to the Trustées by this Deéd yet by the Statute which transfers that power to Mary she may distrain also but this Covenant being collateral cannot be transferred The Clause of Distress by the express Words of the Act is given to the Cestuy que use but here is a double Remedy by Distress or Action for if the Lessée assign his Interest and the Rent is accepted of the Assignee yet a Covenant lies against the Lessée for Non-payment upon the express Covenant to * Hayes and Bickerstaff Hollis and Carr Antea pay so if a Rent be granted to S. and a Covenant to pay it to N. for his use 't is a good Covenant And it was agreed that the assignment of a Breach according to the Words of the Covenant is good enough and that if any thing be done which amounts to a performance the other side must plead it as in this Case the Defendant might have pleaded that the Mony was paid to Mary which is a performance in substance but it shall not be intended without pleading of it Whereupon Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Read versus Dawson DEBT upon Bond against the Defendant as Executor Repleader after an immaterial Issue Issue was joyned whether the Defendant had Assets or not on the thirtieth day of November which was the day on which he had the first notice of the Plaintiffs original Writ and it was found for the Defendant that then he had not Assets It was moved for a Repleader because it was said this was an immaterial Issue for though he had not Assets then yet if he had any afterwards he is liable to the Plaintiffs Action But Barrel Serjeant moved for Iudgment upon this Verdict by reason of the Statute of 32 H. 8. which helps in Cases of Mispleading or insufficient Pleading 'T is true there are many Cases which after Verdict are not aided by this Statute as if there are two Affirmatives which cannot make an Issue or when after a Traverse Issue is joyned with an hoc petit quod inquiratur per patriam this is no Issue 2 Anders 6 7. Yelv. 210. Hob. 126. So if there be no Plea at all as if an Action is brought against Baron and Feme and she pleads only 2 Cro. 288. So if the Party puts himself super patriam where it should be tried by Record or if the Plea be nothing to the purpose or lie not in the Mouth of the Parties such immaterial Issues as these cannot be good The difference in Moor 867. is if the Plea on which the Issue is joyned hath no colourable pretence in it to barr the Plaintiff or if it be against an express Rule in the Law there the Issue is immaterial and so as if there was no Issue and therefore 't is not aided by the Statute but if it hath the countenance of a legal Plea though it want necessary matter to make it sufficient there shall be no Repleader because 't is helped after Verdict Here the Parties only doubt whether there were Assets at the time of the notice and 't is found there were none and so Iudgment was to be given accordingly and of that Opinion was the whole Court But Iustice Atkins was clear of Opinion that if the Parties join in an immaterial Issue there shall be no Repleader because 't is helped after Verdict by these Words in the Statute viz. any Issue 'T is not said an Issue joined upon a material Point and the intent of the Statute was to prevent Repleaders and that if any other Construction should be made of that Act he was of Opinion that the Iudges sate there not to expound but to make a Law for by such an Interpretation much of the benefit intended by the Act to the Party who had a Verdict would be restrained Curia The other Iustices were all of Opinion that since the making of this Statute it had been always allowed and taken as a difference that when the Issue was perfectly material there should be no Repleader but that it was otherwise where the Issue was not material And Iustice Scroggs asked merrily If Debt be brought upon a Bond and the Defendant pleads Robin Hood dwelt in a Wood and the Plaintiff joyns Issue that he did not this is an immaterial Issue and shall there not be a Repleader in such Case after Verdict Ad quod non fuit responsum Beaumont versus ........ Wager of Law THE Plaintiff brings an Action of Debt upon a Iudgment obtained against the Defendant in a Court Baron having declared there in an Action on the Case upon an Assumpsit and recovered The Defendant came to wage his Law and was ready to swear that he owed the Plaintiff nothing Sid. 366. but the Court held that he was not well advised for by the Recovery in the inferior Court it became now a Debt and was owing and being asked whether he had paid the Mony he answered that he owed nothing Whereupon the Court
likewise addressed to my Lord as before making several Protestations of his Innocency But having once in a Passion said that he scorned to submit My Lord for that Reason would not remit the Damages it was therefore moved for a new Tryal upon these Reasons 1. Because the Witnesses who proved the Words were not Persons of Credit and that at the time when they were alledged to be spoken many Clergy-men were in Company with the Defendant and heard no such Words spoken 2. It was sworn that one of the Iury confessed that they gave such great damages to the Plaintiff not that he was damnified so much but that he might have the greater opportunity to shew himself noble in the remitting of them 3. And which was the principal Reason because the Damages were excessive Curia The Court delivered their Opinions seriatim and first The Chief Iustice North said In Cases of Fines for criminal Matters a Man is to be fined by Magna Charta with a salvo contenemento suo and no Fine is to be imposed greater than he is able to pay but in Civil Actions the Plaintiff is to recover by way of compensation for the damages he hath sustained and the Iury are the proper Iudges thereof This is a Civil Action brought by the Plaintiff for Words spoken of him which if they are in their own nature actionable the Iury ought to consider the damage which the Party may sustain but if a particular Averment of special damages makes them actionable then the Iury are only to consider such damages as are already sustained and not such as may happen in futuro because for such the Plaintiff may have a new Action He said that as a Iudge he could not tell what value to set upon the Honour of the Plaintiff the Iury have given 4000 l. and therefore he could neither lessen the Sum or grant a new Trial especially since by the Law the Iury are Iudges of the damages and it would be very inconvenient to examine upon what account they gave their Verdict they having found the Defendant guilty did believe the Witnesses and he could not now make a doubt of their Credibility Wyndham Iustice accorded in omnibus Atkins Iustice contra That a new Trial should be granted for 't is every days practice and he remembred the Case of Gouldston and Wood in the Kings Bench where the Plaintiff in an Action on the Case for Words for calling of him Bankrupt recovered 1500 l. and that Court granted a new Tryal because the damages were excessive The Iury in this Case ought to have respect only to the damage which the Plaintiff sustained and not to do an unaccountable thing that he might have an opportunity to shew himself generous and as the Court ought with one Eye to look upon the Verdict so with the other they ought to take notice what is contained in the Declaration and then to consider whether the Words and Damages bear any proportion if not then the Court ought to lay their hands upon the Verdict 'T is true they cannot lessen the damages but if they are too great the Court may grant a new Tryal Scroggs Iustice accorded with North and Wyndham that no new Tryal can be granted in this Cause He said that he was of Council with the Plaintiff before he was called to the Bench and might therefore be supposed to give Iudgment in favour of his former Client being prepossess'd in the Cause or else to shew himself more signally just might without considering the matter give Iudgment against him but that now he had forgot all former relation thereunto and therefore delivered his Opinion that if he had been of the Iury he should not have given such a Verdict and if he had been Plaintiff he would not take advantage of it but would overcome with Forgiveness such Follies and Indiscretions of which the Defendant had been guilty but that he did not sit there to give Advice but to do Iustice to the People He did agrèe that where an unequal Tryal was as such must be where there is any Practice with the Iury in such Case 't is good reason to grant a new Tryal but no such thing appearing to him in this Case a new Tryal could not be granted Suppose the Iury had given a scandalous Verdict for the Plaintiff as a Penny Damages he could not have obtained a new Trial in hopes to increase them neither shall the Defendant in hopes to lessen them and therefore by the Opinion of these three Iustices a new Tryal was not granted Afterwards in this Term Serjeant Maynard moved in Arrest of Iudgment and said that this Action was grounded upon the Statute of R. 2. Which consists of a Preamble reciting the Mischief and of the Enacting part in giving of a Remedy and that the Defendants Case was neither within the Mischief or the Remedy This Statute doth not create any Action by way of particular design and if the matter was now Res integra much might be said that an Action for Damages will not lye upon this Statute for the Statute of Westm 2. appoints that the Offender shall suffer imprisonment until he produces the Author of a false Report Ca. 33. and the Statute of 2 R. 2. which recites that of Westm 2. gives the same punishment and the Action is brought qui tam c. and yet the Plaintiff only recovers for himself It was usual to punish Offenders in this kind in the Star Chamber as in the * Earl of Northampton's Case where one Goodrick said of him That he wrote a Book against Garnet and a Letter to Bellarmine 12 Co. 132. intimating that what he wrote in the Book was not his Opinion but only ad captandum populum which was a great disgrace to him in those days being as much as to say he was a Papist Cro. Eliz. But the Serjeant would not insist upon that now since it hath been ruled that where a Statute prohibits the doing of a thing which if done might be prejudicial to another in such case he may have an Action upon that very Statute for his Damages But the ground on which he argued was that these words as spoken are not within the meaning of the Act for they are not actionable 1. Because they are no scandal and words which are actionable must import a great Scandal which no circumstance or occasion of speaking can excuse and if they are scandalous and capable of any mitigation by the precedent discourse the pleading of that matter will make them not actionable and for this the Lord * 4 Co. Cromwel's Case is a plain Authority the Words spoken of him were You like those that maintain Sedition against the King's Person the occasion of speaking of which was to give an account of his favouring the Puritan Preachers which was all that was intended by the former discourse for that Lord had approved a Sermon which was preached by a Parson
Party to Bail but 't is sub modo it must be upon good Bail and if the Sheriff be Iudge of the Security 't is an Argument that he is lyable for if he was not in danger he need not take Security But afterwards upon the second Argument the Chief Iustice and the whole Court were of Opinion that Iudgment should be given for the Defendant North Chief Iustice The Common Law was very rigorous as to the execution of Process the Capias was ita quod habeas the Body at the day of the Return and if the Sheriff had arrested one it had been an Escape to let him go Before the making of this Statute the Sheriff usually took Sureties for the appearance of the Prisoner and by this means used great Extortion and took great Sums of Mony to prevent which Mischiefs this Statute was made and so designed 1. For the ease of the Prisoner the Sheriff being now compellable to take Security which he was not obliged to do before 2. To prevent Extortion and therefore directs that a Bond shall be taken in such manner and with such conditions as is therein mentioned But the Plaintiff since the Statute is much in the same condition as before for he is to make the same Return of Cepi Corpus 'T is true he may now let him go upon Bail but as to the Creditor he is to have him in Court to answer his Suit as before and shall be amerced if he doth not appear at the Return of the Writ so that tho' this Statute be an ease to the Defendant yet 't is a burthen to the Sheriff who runs a greater hazard since the making of this Act than before because then he might keep him in prison till the Debt was satisfied but now he is obliged to let him at large upon Bail from whom he is directed to take a Bond which he may keep in his own hands to indempnifie himself The Court can only amerce him if the Defendant do not appear at the Return of the Process and 't is not material to the party whether the Sheriff take one or more Security that being in his discretion some he must take for otherwise 't is directly in opposition to the Statute neither is it material to the party whether they are such as are sufficient for if they are not and the Defendant is thereupon discharged this will not amount to an Escape because nothing is done but what is pursuant to the Statute and therefore he is no otherwise chargeable than by Amerciaments The Statute was made and intended for the benefit of the Debtor not of the Creditor and there might be some colour for the Action if the Sheriff might Return that he let him to Bail for then it might have been necessary to have alledged the sufficiency of them which might have been traversed but now he must pursue the substance of the Statute so far as to take Bail he is the proper Iudge of the sufficiency and when the Bail is taken he must return a Cepi Corpus so that he is only to be amerced till he bring in the Body but an Escape will not lie against him Long 's Case ONE Long was arrested in the Pallace-Yard Priviledge of an Attorny not far distant from the Hall Gate the Court being then sitting and being an Attorny of this Court he together with the Officer was brought into Court and the Officer was committed to the Fleet that he might learn to know his distance and because the Plaintiff was an Attorny of the Court of Kings-Bench who informed this Court that his cause of Action was for 200 l. therefore the Court ordered that another of the Sheriffs Bayliffs should take charge of the Prisoner and that Mr. Robinson the Chief Prothonotary should go along with him to the Court of Kings-Bench which was done and that Court being informed how the Case was discharged the Defendant upon filing of common Bail The Writ upon which this Long was arrested was an Attachment of Priviledge which the Court supposed to be made on purpose to oust him of his Priviledge for there was another Writ against him at the Sheriffs Office at the Suit of another person The Countess of Northumberland's Case Knights must be of the Jury where a Peer is concerned ADjudged that where a Péer is Party either Plaintiff or Defendant two or more Knights must be returned of the Iury and it was said that in Cumberland there was but one Free-holder who was a Knight besides Sir Richard Stote a Serjeant at Law and the Court were of Opinion that rather than there should be a failure of Iustice a Serjeant of Law ought to be returned a Iury-man for his Priviledge would not extend to a Case of necessity Bell versus Knight In Banco Regis Smiths Forges are chargeable with the Duty of Fire-hearth IN an Action of Trover Vpon Not Guilty pleaded the Iury found a special Verdict in which the Point was upon the Construction of the Statute of 14 Car. 2. c. 10. for the establishing of an additional Revenue upon the King his Heirs and Successors for the better support of his and their Crown and Dignity by which it is Enacted That for every Fire-Hearth and Stove in every House the yearly Sum of 2 s. shall be paid to the King other than such as in the said Act are exempted Then comes a Proviso which saith That this Act shall not extend to charge any Blowing House Stamp Furnace or Kilne c. And the Question now was whether a Smiths Forge shall be charged with this Duty Winnington Sollicitor General conceived that all Fire-Hearths are liable within the Body of the Act and there is nothing to exempt them but what is in the Exception and that a Smiths Forge cannot be called a Blowing House within the intent of the Act notwithstanding the Iury have found that Smiths use Bellows to blow their Forges For by Blowing Houses such Houses are meant as are in Staffordshire and Suffolk for the making of Iron these were the Blowing-Houses intended by the Parliament to be excepted and no other for if Smiths Forges had béen meant thereby those would have been inserted in the Proviso as well as the other things therein mentioned Words are to be taken in a common Vnderstanding for if a Traveller should enquire for a Blowing House no Body would send him to a Smiths Forge By the Opinion of the whole Court Curia it was adjudged upon the first Argument that Smiths Forges are liable to this Duty and so the Sollicitor said it had been lately adjudged in this Court by the Opinion of Twisden Wyld and Rainsford and that my Lord Chief Iustice Hale was of the same Opinion but Twisden said that neither the Chief Iustice or himself gave any Iudgment upon the Merits but upon a Point in Pleading Stroud versus the Bishop of Bath and Wells and Sir George Horner In Communi Banco IN a Quare Impedit
Profit it was answered That the Act took care that Men should not stop up their Chimnies when once made and that this Duty was paid for many Chimnies which were never used and what Profit can a Man have of a Chimny he never useth If there had been an Act that so much should be paid for every Window 't is all one whether it had been for profit or pleasure or whether the Window had been used or not and there is as much reason that a Man should pay for Houses never Inhabited as for such as have been Inhabited and are afterwards without Tenants This Act ought therefore to receive a favourable Construction the Preamble whereof mentions that it was for the encreasing of the Kings Revenue which is pro bono publico and which is for the Peace and Prosperity of the Nation and the protection of every single person therein and though a particular Inconvenience may follow the Party ought to submit When a Man builds a House he proposes a Profit and 't is not fit the Kings Duty should be contingent and depend till he has provided himself of a Tenant Object As to the other Objection that was much relied on viz. where the Act speaks of an Accompt to be given it mentions both Owner and Occupier but where it directs the Payment of the Duty the Occupier only is named by which it was inferred that he alone was chargeable Answ In 16 Car. 2. cap. 3. Owner Proprietor and Occupier are used promiscuously wherein it is provided that they shall not be charged unless within two years after the Duty accrued now if the Owner was not chargeable why is he mentioned there As to the second Point they conceived that the Duty being payeable to the King he had a remedy by distress before the Accompt was certified into the Exchequer for the Return was to inform the King what advantage he maketh of his Revenue and no Process issued upon it besides the Act vests the Duty in him from Lady-day 1662. And by reason of that he may distrain The King hath no benefit by returning of the Account that being only intended to prevent his being cheated so that 't is not to entitle but to inform him 't is only to return a just and true account not but that it may be levied and the King entitled before and 't is no inconvenience to the Subject if there be no such Account returned for if the Officer distrain for more Hearths than in truth there are the Subject has a proper remedy against him The King suffers when Returns are not made of such Duties as he ought to have for the support of his Dignity and because he is lyable to be defrauded in the managing of his Duty is it reasonable that he should lose all As to what was said of the Kings taking by matter of Record 't is true if he divest an Inheritance as in case of Attainder it must be by Record but here the very Duty is given to him by the Act it self which makes it a different Case If the King should be seised in Fee of a great Wast which happens to be improved by his Tenants and thereby Tythes become due it may be as well said that he shall have no Tythes without Record as to say he shall have no Hearth-Mony for Houses newly erected whereby his Revenue is increased For which Reasons Iudgment was prayed for the Defendant and upon the second Argument Iudgment was given accordingly for him Curia That empty Houses are subject and lyable to this Duty Astry versus Ballard IN an Action of Trover and Conversion for the taking of Coals upon Not-Guilty pleaded Grants must be taken according to common intendment Jones 71. the Iury found a special Verdict The Case was thus Viz. That one J. R. was seised in Fee of the Manor of Westerly and being so seised did demise all the Mesuages Lands Tenements and Hereditaments that he had in the said Manor for a Term of years to N. R. in which demise there was a recital of a Grant of the said Mannor Mesuages Lands Tenements Commons and Mines but in the Lease it self to R. the Word Mines was left out Afterwards the Reversion was sold to the Plaintiff Astry and his Heirs by Deed enrolled and at the time of this demise there were certain Mines of Coals open and others which were not then open and the Coals for which this Action of Trover was brought were digged by the Lessee in those Mines which were not open at the time of the Lease and whether he had power so to do was the Question It was said That when a Man is seised of Lands wherein there are Mines open and others not open and a Lease is made of these Lands in which the Mines are mentioned Antea 'T is no new Doctrine to say that the close Mines shall not pass Mens Grants must be taken according to usual and common intendment and when Words may be satisfied they shall not be strained farther than they are generally used for no violent Construction shall be made to prejudice a Mans Inheritance contrary to the plain meaning of the Words A Mine is not properly so called 'till it is opened 't is but a Vein of Coals before and this was the Opinion of my Lord Coke in point in his first Inst 54. b. Where he tells us 5 Co. 12. Sanders Case Roll. Abr. 2 part 816. that if a Man demises Lands and Mines some being opened and others not the Lessee may use the Mines opened but hath no power to dig the unopened Mines and of this Opinion was the whole Court and Iustice Twisden said That he knew no reason why my Lord Coke's single Opinion should not be as good an Authority as Fitzherbert in his Nat. Br. or the Doctor and Student Ipsley versus Turk IN a Writ of Error upon a Iudgment in an Inferiour Court What is admitted in pleading shall not be assigned for Error Jones 81. the Error assigned was That the Mayor who was Iudge of the Court did not receive the Sacrament at any Parish Church nor file any Certificate so that he was not Mayor and Iudgment being given against the Defendant before him it was therefore Coram non Judice like the Case of Hatch and Nichols Roll. Abr. 1 part tit Error 761. Where upon a Writ of Error brought upon a Iudgment in an Inferiour Court the Error assigned was that the Stile of the Court was Curia tent̄ coram J. S. Seneschallo who was not Steward and that was held to be an Error in fact But on the other side it was insisted that this was not Error because the Acts of the Mayor should not be void as to Strangers The Statute of 25 Car. 2. cap. 2. for preventing of dangers which may happen from Popish Recusants disables the Party who is not qualified according to the Act to hold an Office and if he execute the same afterwards
other 1000 l. within a year after it being intended when the Plaintiff should by his Trade get an Estate sufficient to qualifie him for the Dignity of a Knight The Son-in-Law without acquainting the Defendant did about nine Months afterwards procure himself to be Knighted and brought an Assumpsit for the 2000 l. which was tried before the Chief Iustice North at Guild-Hall and the Iury gave 1500 l. Damages And now Serjeant Maynard moved for a new Tryal upon the Affidavit of the Defendant that he had found out material Witnesses since the Trial and that such Witnesses as he had ready at the Trial could not get into Court because of the great Tumult and Disorder there with a Multitude of People by reason whereof his Council could not be heard from the noise and when they offered to speak were as often hissed The Chief Iustice thought it was a hard Verdict for he was not clearly satisfied that the Agreement was good it being only for Words which were spoken by the Old Man when he had but a weak Memory and thereupon a new Tryal was granted because the Chief Iustice thought it was fit so to be Basket versus Basket Disjunctive Condition one part is discharged by the Obligee the other part shall not be performed by the Obligor Mod. Rep. 264. DEBT upon a Bond with a Condition to make an Assurance of an Annuity of 20 l. per annum to the Plaintiff within six Months after the death of M. B. and if he refuse when requested by the Plaintiff then to pay 300 l. and if he fail in payment thereof the Bond to be forfeited The Defendant pleads that all the six Months he was a Prisoner at Morocco in Barbary and that after his Return he requested the Defendant and to this Replication the Defendant demurred And Serjeant George Strode maintained the Demurrer The Question was whether the Plaintiff by neglecting to tender a Grant of the Annuity to the Defendant hath not dispensed with the whole Condition and he held that it was dispensed withal and that no Request being made the Bond could not be sued at the Common Law and therefore the Replication was ill 'T is not so much a disjunctive Condition to do one thing or another but the last Clause is a Penalty to inforce the first for seeing the Annuity is to be but 20 l. per annum for a Life and yet that 300 l. is to be paid in case that be not granted this proves it to be only a Penalty because Annuities at the highest value are but at eight years purchase whereas this is fiftéen years purchase so that the 300 l. could never be intended as a Recompence for the Annuity neither could the Defendant possibly save the Condition because the same time is limited both for the Paymenr of the 300 l. and granting of the Annuity viz. within six Months and the Plaintiff hath to the utmost time to request the executing the Grant 1 Sand. 287. and therefore the other cannot pay the Mony before But taking the Case to be that this is a disjunctive Conditions yet since Conditions are always made in favour of the Obligor the power of Election even in such Cases is left wholly in him but according to such Constructions as would be made for the Plaintiff the Election is gone from the Defendant Wright and Bull Postea and left in the Obligée for if he do not request the Annuity then the 300 l. is to be paid and this is directly against the Rules of disjunctive Conditions and the Case of * Cor. Eliz. 396 539. 1 Roll. Abr. 447. Poph. 98. Goldsb 142. Greeningham and Ewre is express in Point where the Condition of a Bond was that if the Obligor delivered to the Plaintiff thrée Bonds by such a day or gave him such a Release of them as the Plaintiffs Council should advise before the said day that then c. The Defendant pleads nothing as to the delivery of the Bonds but saith that the Plaintiffs Council advised no Release and upon a Demurrer this was adjudged for the Defendant because in all Obligations with a Penalty the Election is always in the Obligor and this being a disjunctive Condition each part is likewise in his Election for if the Obligee should not tender the Release the other is not bound to deliver the Bonds and if he should tender it then the Obligor may either deliver the Bonds or execute the Release which he pleaseth 4 H. 7. 4. If a Man enter into Bond with Condition to marry Jane by such a day and the Obligee marry her before the day 1 Roll. Abr. 455. the Condition is saved but 't is otherwise if a Stranger had married her before that day The Act of God and the Act of the Obligée in many Cases dispense with Conditions as 5 Co. 21. b. if a Parson be bound in a Bond conditioned to resign his Church to A. in consideration of a certain Pension agreed on and the Parson refuses the Court was of Opinion that he need not resign till he was sure of his Pension by Deed which they held ought to be first tendred unto him So a Man covenants to grant such an Estate to his Wife or to leave her worth so much Mony if she survive him if she dies before him the Condition is not broken though he did not make such Grant In the Case of Warren and White it was lately adjudged in the Kings Bench that where Warren was indebted to Warner and White became bound with him to pay the Mony before the 25th day of December then next following but if he did not pay it that then Warren should appear the next Hillary Term following to Warner's Action Warren dies after the 25th of December but before the Term and it was held that the Bond was not forfeited 1 Rol. Abr. 451. because the Obligor had Election to do either the one or the other and the performance of the one becoming impossible by the Act of God the Obligation was saved Moor 645. If the Case of Moor and Moorcomb Cro. Eliz. 864. should be objected where the Condition of the Bond was that the Defendant should deliver to the Plaintiff a Ship before such a Feast or in default thereof pay at the same Feast such a Sum as a third person therein named should adjudge which third person appointed no Sum to be paid and yet there it was adjudged for the Plaintiff that it did not dispense with the whole Condition Which Case he agreed to be Law because there the valuation and worth of the Ship and the Mony to be paid was by the appointment of a Stranger and the Condition being for the benefit of the Defendant he is to procure the Stranger to make an appointment what Sum should be paid or to deliver the Goods otherwise the Bond is forfeited and he hath expresly agreed to do the one or the other But this
is not like the Case at the Barr where 't is not a Stranger but the Obligee himself that must procure the Conveyance for 't is to be advised by his Council and to be done at his Costs and therefore in * 5 Co. 23. Lamb's Case it was held that if a Man be bound to give such a Release before such a day as the Iudge of the Admiralty shall direct there 't is no Plea to say that he appointed none for the Iudge being a Stranger to the Condition 1 Roll. Abr. 452. lit L. placito 6. the Defendant is to apply himself to him having undertaken to perform it at his peril which is the same Resolution with Moor's Case in Crook So that he took it for a Rule in all Cases that where the Act of God or of the Obligée discharges the Obligor from one part of a disjunctive Obligation that the Law discharges him of the other and therefore prayed Iudgment for the Defendant Dyer 361. Ex parte Quer. Serjeant Pemberton contra It appears that one thing or the other was to be done in this Case for if the Plaintiff demanded and tendred an Annuity the Defendant was to seal it and if he did not tender it then likewise the Defendant was to do something viz. to pay 300 l. So that the Plaintiff was either to have the Annuity or the Mony He agreed that where the Obligor hath the Election if in such Case the Obligée shall wilfully determine it that the Bond is thereby discharged But if a Stranger take away the Election 't is no discharge for in such case the other part is to be performed In this case the Plaintiff hath done no wilful Act to determine the Defendants Election but all which is pretended is that he hath not done something necessary to be performed which is that he hath not made a request But by his omission thereof the Defendants Election is not taken away for though no request was made within the six Months yet the Defendant might have prepared a Grant of the Annuity himself and have offered it to the Plaintiff within the six Months upon the last part of the day and if he had thus set forth his case and alledged that the Plaintiff made no request nor tendered him a Grant of the Annuity to Seal this had been a good performance of the Condition for he had done that which was the substance which though it was to be done at the Plaintiffs charge yet the Defendant might have brought an Action for so much Mony by him laid to the use of the other and the Cases put in the principal Case in Moor 645. are expressly for the Plaintiff in this Case where the Iudgment was That if there be a Statute with a Defeazance to make such Conveyance as the Council of the Conusee shall direct the Cognisor must prepare the Conveyance if the other doth not and there is a Case put where a thing was to be done at the Costs of the Plaintiff yet the Defendant did it at his own Charge which he recovered of the other North Chief Iustice Judgment and the whole Court were of Opinion that the Plea was good because the Defendant had the benefit of Election and the Plantiff not making the request within the six Months had dispensed with one part of the Condition and the Law hath discharged the Defendant of the other part and they relied upon the Case of Grenningham and Ewre which they held to be good Law and an Authority express in the very point In this Case the Obligee was to do the first act Viz. To make the request Where the Condition is single concilium non dedit advisamentum is a good Plea to discharge the Defendant so here the Condition is but single as to the Defendant for though it be disjunctive yet the Plaintiff hath taken away the benefit of Election from the Obligor of doing the one and therefore he shall be excused from doing the other The Pleading as alledged by the Council of the Plaintiff would not have been a good performance of the Condition for if one be bound to Convey as the Council of the other shall advise and he makes the Conveyance himself this is not such a Deed as was intended by the Parties and so no performance of the Condition But however the Defendant need not plead it for he is not bound so to do Here if the Plaintiff had requested the Sealing of such a Grant of an Annuity even the Defendant had liberty either to execute it or to pay the 300 l. and where the Election is on the Obligors part neither the act or neglect of the Obligee shall take it away from him for it would be unreasonable that the Obligee should have his choice either to accept of the Annuity or the 300 l. when 't is a known Rule That all Conditions where there is a Penalty in the Bond are made in favour and for the benefit of the Obligor and the 300 l. in this case to be paid upon the refusal of the Defendant to make such Grant is in the nature of a Penalty to enforce him to do it The principal Case in Moor 645. was agreed to be Law but the Rule there put was denied as not adequate to the present Case which was that if by the Act of God or of the Party or through default of a Stranger it becomes impossible for the Obligor to do one thing in a disjunctive Condition he is notwithstanding bound to do the other This is true only as to the last Case but not to the two first and for an Authority * 5 Co Laughter's Case was full in the Point which is that when a Condition consists of two parts in the disjunctive and both are possible at the time of the Bond made and afterwards one becomes impossible by the Act of God or of the Party the Obligor is not bound to perform the other part And Iudgment was given for the Defendant Smith versus Tracy In Banco Regis Distribution shall be equally made amongst the Children of the whole and half Blood Mod. Rep. 209. Jones 93. 1 Ventris 307 IN a Prohibition The Case was A Man dies intestate having three Brothers of the whole Blood and a Brother and Sister of the half Blood and the Question was whether they shall be admitted to a distribution in an equal degreé Mr. Holt argued that they were all in aequali gradu because before the Act of Distribution the Ordinary had power to compel the Administrator to give and allot filial Portions to the Children of the deceased out of his Estate And by the Civil Law such provision is made for the Children of the Intestate that the Goods which either the Father or Mother brought to each other at the Marriage shall not remain to the Survivor but the use and occupation of them only during Life for the Property did belong to the Children
and yet it was objected that there he was a Iudge Quaere Brook 204. March 117. for which Reasons he prayed Iudgment for the Plaintiff Curia But the whole Court were of Opinion that the bringing of this Action was a greater Offence that fining of the Plaintiff and committing of him for Non-payment and that it was a bold attempt both against the Government and Iustice in general The Court at the Old-Bayly had Iurisdiction of the Cause and might try it and had power to punish a Misdemeanour in the Iury they thought it to be a Misdemeanour in the Iury to acquit the Prisoners which in truth was not so and therefore it was an Error in their Iudgments for which no Action will lie How often are Iudgments given in this Court reversed in the Kings Bench And because the Iudges have been mistaken in such Iudgments must that needs be against Magna Charta the Petition of Right and the Liberties of the Subject These are mighty words in sound but nothing to the Matter There hath not béen one Case put which carries any resemblance with this those of Iustices of the Peace and Mayors of Corporations are weak instances neither hath any Authority been urged of an Action brought against a Iudge of Record for doing any thing quatenus a Iudge That Offences in Iury-men may be punished without Presentment is no new Doctrin as if they should either eat or drink before they give their Verdict or for any contempt whatsoever but 't is a new Doctrin to say that if a Fine be set on a Iury-man at the Old-Bayly he hath no remedy but to pay it for a Certiorari may be brought to remove the Order by which it was imposed and it may be discharged if the Court think fit As to what hath been Objected concerning the Liberty of the Subject that is abundantly secured by the Law already a Iudge cannot impose upon a Iury for giving their Verdict contrary to Evidence if he doth any thing unjustly or corruptly complaint may be made to the King in whose Name Iudgments are given and the Iudges are by him delegated to do Iustice but if there be Error in their Iudgments as here 't is void and therefore the Barons of the Exchequer might refuse to issue Process upon it and there needs no Writ of Error for the very Estreats will be vacated Though the Defendants here acted erroneously yet the contrary Opinion carried great colour with it because it might be supposed very inconvenient for the Iury to have such liberty as to give what Verdicts they please so that though they were mistaken yet they acted judicially and for that Reason no Action will lie against the Defendant and Iudgment was given accordingly The Case of the Warden of the Fleet. COmplaint was made by Serjeant Turner on the part of the Parishioners of St. Brides London against the Warden of the Fleet and his Prisoners for that he suffered several of them to be without the Walls of his Prison in Taverns and other Houses adjoyning to the Prison and fronting Fleet-Ditch where they committed Disorders and when the Constable came to keep the Peace and to execute a Warrant under the Hand and Seal of a Iustice of Peace they came in a tumultuous manner and hindered the execution of Iustice and rescued the Offenders and often beat the Officers the Warden often letting out 20 or 30 of his Prisoners upon any such occasion to inflame the Disorder It was prayed therefore That this Court to which the Prison of the Fleet doth immediately relate might give such Directions to the Warden that these Mischiefs for the future might be prevented and that the Court would declare those Houses out of the Prison to be subject to the Civil Magistrate The Court were all of Opinion but Iustice Atkins Curia who doubted that nothing can properly be called the Prison of the Fleet which is not within the Walls of the Prison and that the Warden cannot pretend an exemption from the Authority of the Civil Magistrate in such places as are out of the Prison Walls though Houses may be built upon the Land belonging to the Fleet for the preservation of the Kings Peace is more to be valued than such a Private Right But Iustice Atkyns said if such places were within the Liberties of the Fleet he would not give the civil Magistrate a Iurisdiction in prejudice of the Warden but thought it might be fit for the Court to consider upon what reason it was that the Warden of the Fleet applied such Houses to any other uses than for the benefit of the Prisoners whereupon the Court appointed the Prothonotaries to go thither and give them an account of the matter and they would take farther Order in it St. Mary Magdalen Bermondsey Church in Southwark In Scaccario Rate for Building a Church shall be set by the Parishioners Jones 89. Mod. Rep. 236. IN a Prohibition it was the Opinion of the whole Court That if a Church be so much out of Repair that 't is necessary to pull it down and that it cannot be otherwise repaired that in such case upon a general warning or notice given to the Parishioners much more if there be notice given from House to House the major part of the Parishioners then present and meeting according to such notice may make a Rate for pulling down of the Church to the Ground and Building of it upon the old Foundation and for making of Vaults where they are necessary as they were in this Church by reason of the springing Water and though the Rate be higher than the Mony paid for doing all this yet 't is good and the Churchwardens are chargeable for the Overplus they not being able to compute to a Shilling That if any of the Parishioners refuse to pay their Proportion according to the Rate they may be Libelled against in the Spiritual Court and if the Libel alledge the Rate to be pro reparatione Ecclesiae generally though in strictness Ecclesia contains both the Body and Chancel of the Church yet by the Opinion both of the Court of Common Pleas and of the Exchequer It shall be intended that the Rate was only for the Body of the Church but in this Case it was made appear clearly that the Rate was only for the Body and that the Minister was at the charge of the Chancel And both Courts agreed That when a Prohibition is moved and desired on purpose to stop so good a Work as the Building a Church the Court will not compel the Parties to take Issue upon the Suggestion when upon examination they find it to be false and therefore will not grant a Prohibition for if the Rate be unduly imposed the Party grieved hath a Remedy in the Spiritual Court or may Appeal if there be a Sentence against him The Bishop or his Chancellor cannot set a Rate upon a Parish but it must be done by the Parishioners themselves
of a Bond was that the Defendant should shew the Plaintiff a sufficient discharge of an Annuity who pleaded that he tendered a good and sufficient discharge in general without setting it forth it was not good Mod. Rep. 67. 3. The Plea is that the Indenture had the usual Covenants but doth not set them forth and for that cause 't is also too general In 26 H. 8. 1. The Condition was for the performance of Covenants one whereof was that he should make such an Estate to the Plaintiff as his Council should advise The Defendant pleaded that he did make such Conveiance as the Council of the Plaintiff did advise and the Plea was held ill and too general because he shewed not the Nature of the Conveyance and yet performance was pleaded according to the Covenant But notwithstanding these Exceptions the whole Court were of Opinion that this Plea was good for if the Defendant had set forth the whole Deed verbatim yet because the Lands are in Jamaica and the Covenants are intended such as are usual there the Court cannot judge of them but they must be tried by the Iury. He hath set forth that the Conveyance was by a Deed of Bargain and Sale which is well enough and so it had been if by Grant because the Lands lying in Jamaica pass by Grant and no Livery and Seisin is necessary if any Covenants were unreasonable and not usual they are to be shewed on the other side And so Iudgment was given for the Defendant Spring versus Eve Verdict cures the misrecital of the time of the Session of Parliament DEBT upon the Statute of 29 Eliz. cap 4. by the Sheriff for his Fées for serving of an Execution After Verdict for the Plaintiff it was moved in an arrest of Iudgment by Serjeant Pemberton because the time of holding the Parliament was mis-recited being mistaken in both the Statute Books of Poulton and Keble as it appeared by the Parliament Roll whereupon Iudgment was staied till this Term and the Court had Copies out of the Rolls of the time when the Parliament was held and they were all clear of Opinion that the time was mistaken in the Declaration and so are all the Presidents for the Plaintiff here declared that this Statute was made at a Session of Parliament by Prorogation held at Westminster 15 Febr. 29 Eliz. and there continued till the dissolution of the same whereas in truth the Parliament began 29 Octob. and not on the 15th of February for it was adjourned from that time to the 15th of February and then continued till it was dissolved My Lord Coke in his 4th Institutes fol. 7. takes notice of this mistake in the printed Books But the Court were all of Opinion Curia that though it was mistaken and ought to have been otherwise yet being after * Dyer 95. Yelvert 127. 2 Cro. 111. pl. 9. Br. Abr. tit Parl. 87. Verdict 't is well enough and the rather because this is a particular Act of Parliament and so they are not bound to take notice of it and therefore if it be mistaken the Defendant ought to have pleaded Nul tiel Record but since he hath admitted it by Pleading they will intend that there is such a Statute as the Plaintiff hath alledged and they could not judicially take notice of the contrary The Serjeant perceiving the Opinion of the Court desired time to speak to it being a new Point and told the Court that they ought to take notice of the Commencement of private Acts which the whole Court denyed And the Chief Iustice said that they were not bound to take notice of the Commencement of a general Act for the Court was only to expound it and though this had not been in the Case of a particular Act where 't is clear the Defendant ought to plead Nul tiel record yet being after Verdict 't is well enough because the Party took no benefit of it upon the Demurrer and because of the multiplicity of Presidents which run that way So in the Case upon the Statute of Tythes though it be mistaken yet it hath often been held good as if an Action be brought upon that Statute for not setting out of Tythes declaring quod cum quarto die Novembris anno secundo Edw. 6. It was Enacted c. and the Parliament began 1 Ed. 6. and was continued by Prorogation until 4 Novembris yet this hath often been held good and Multitudo errantium tollit peccatum And though in this Case the Parliament was adjourned but in that upon the Statute of Ed. 6. it was prorogued yet the Chief Iustice said that as to this purpose there was but little difference between an Adjournment and a Prorogation for an Adjournment is properly where the House adjourn themselves and a Prorogation is when the King adjourns them But Iustice Atkins doubted whether the Court ought not to take notice of the Commencement of a general Act and could have wished that there had been no such resolution as there was in the Case of Partridge and Strange in Pl. Commentaries for that he was satisfied with the Argument of Serjeant Morgan in that Case who argued against that Iudgment and held that he who vouched a Record and varies either in the Year or Term hath failed of his Record But since there had been so many Authoritis since in confirmation of that Case he would say nothing against it But he held that there was a manifest difference betwéen an Adjournment and a Prorogation for an Adjournment makes a Session continue but after a Prorogation all must begin de novo and that an Adjournment is not always made by themselves for the Chancellor hath adjourned the House of Péers ex mandato Domini Regis and Queen Elizabeth adjourned the House of Commons by Commission under the Great Seal 4 Iust 7 Mires versus Solebay Servant shall not be charged in Trover for taking Goods by the Command of his Master IN a Special Verdict in Trover and Conversion the Case was this viz. H. being possessed of several Sheep sells them in a Market to Alston but did not deliver them to the Vendée and afterwards in that very Market they discharge each other of this Contract and a new Agreément was made between them which was that Alston should drive the Sheep home and depasture them till such a time and that during that time H. would pay him so much every Week for their Pasture and if at the end of that time then agreed between them Alston would pay H. so much for his Sheep being a price then also agreed on that then Alston should have them Before the time was expired H. sells the Sheep to the Plaintiff Mires and afterwards Alston sells them to one Marwood who brought a Replevin against the Plaintiff for taking of the Sheep and the Officers together with Solebay the Defendant who was Servant to Marwood did by his Order and in assistance
of the Officers drive the Sheep to Marwood's Grounds where they left them The Plaintiff demands the Sheep of Solebay and upon his refusal to deliver them brings this Action against the Servant and whether it would lye or not was the Question It was urged at the Barr that the Action would not lie against the Defendant because he had not the possession of the Goods at the time of the Action brought for he presently put them into his Masters Ground And it was said if A. find Goods and S. takes them away before the Action brought Trover will not lie against A. but 't is otherwise if he sell them In this Case it would have been a Breach of Trust in the Servant to have delivered the Goods belonging to his Master to another 'T is true if there be a Conversion though the possession be removed before the Action brought yet the Action will lie but that is because of the Conversion Many Cases were put where the Servant is not lyable to an Action for a thing done by the Command of his Master and where a Bayliff who is but a Servant to the Sheriff shall not be charged in a false Return made by his Master Cro. Eliz. 181. 1 Roll. Abr. 94 95. So if a Smiths Man prick an Horse the Action lies against the Master and not against the Servant The Court before they delivered any Iudgment in this Case premised these two things viz. 1. That 't is necessary in Trover to prove a Property in the Plaintiff and a Trover and Conversion in the Defendant And it was said by Iustice Atkins but denied by the Chief Iustice that though Goods are sold in a Market yet the property is not changed till the delivery for which he cited Keilway 59 77. But the Court held clearly in this Case that the first Sale to Alston was defeated by the Agreement of the Parties afterwards for when a Bargain is made and all the Parties consent to dissolve it and other Conditions are proposed the new Agreement destroys the former Bargain And the Chief Iustice said that if an Horse was bought in a Market for which the Vendeé is to pay 10 l. if the ready Mony be not paid the property is not altered but the Party may sell him to another 2. This new Agréement to have the Sheep if Alston would pay such a Sum of Mony at a future day will not amount to a Sale and the new property is changed and consequently the Sale by H. to the Plaintiff before the day is good and so the property of the Sheep is in him But by the Opinion of the whole Court the Action would not lie against the Defendant 1. The Defendant could be guilty of no Conversion unless the driving the Cattle by vertue of the Replevin would make him guilty but at that time the Sheep were in custodia Legis and the Law did then preserve them so that no property can be changed and if so then there could be no Conversion 2. The Action will not lie against the Servant for it being in Obedience to his Master's Command though he had no Title yet he shall be excused And this Rule Iustice Scroggs said would extend to all Cases where the Master's Command was not to do an apparent Wrong for if the Master's Case depended upon a Title be it true or not 't is enough to excuse the Servant for otherwise it would be a mischievous thing if the Servant upon all occasions must be satisfied with his Master's Title and Right before he obey his Commands and 't is very requisite that he should be satisfied if an Action should lie against him for what he doth in Obedience to his Master But it was said the * Wyne and Rider antea Servant cannot plead the Command of his Master in Barr of a Trespass and it was likewise said that in this Case the driving of the Cattle by the Servant to the Grounds of his Master or a Strangers helping to drive them without being requested is justifiable 3. Because what was done by the Defendant was done in Execution of the Process of the Law and he might as well justifie as the Officer for if he forbid the Defendant to have assisted him yet his assisting him afterwards would not have made him guilty because done in Execution of the Law 4. Because 't is not found that the Servant did convert the Sheep to his own use for the special Verdict only finds the Demand and the Refusal which is no Conversion and though 't is an Evidence of it to a Iury yet 't is not Matter upon which the Court can give Iudgment of a Conversion 10 Co. 57. And therefore the Iury should have found the Conversion as well as the Demand and Refusal 2 Bulstr 313. 1 Roll. Abr. 5. like the Case in 2 Roll. Abr. 693. In an Assise of Rent seek upon Nul tort pleaded the Iury found a Demand and Refusal sic disseisivit it was held to be no good Verdict for the Demand ought to have been found on the Land and shall not be so intended unless found The Plaintiff here hath set forth in his Declaration a Request to deliver then a Refusal and Conversion too which shews that they ought to be found because distinct things and the finding of the Demand and Refusal was only a presumptive not a conclusive proof of the conversion and if the Iury themselves know that there was no conversion yet the Plaintiff hath failed in his Action as if a Trover be brought for cutting Trees and carrying of them away and the Iury know that though the Defendant cut them down yet they still lay in the Plaintiffs Close this is no conversion And though it hath been strongly insisted at the Bar that the Court shall intend a conversion unless the contrary appeared and are to direct a Iury to find the demand and refusal to be a conversion and the Opinion of Dodridge and Croke in 1 Roll. Rep. 60. was much relied on where Adams recovered against Lewis 40 l. in the Court of Exon and three Butts of Sack were taken in Execution and the Plaintiff deposited 22 l in the Hands of the Defendent to prevent the Sale of the Sack which was to be a pledge to return it upon request if the Defendant was not paid before the next Court day the Iury found the Debt was not paid and that no request was made to return the Sack but that the Plaintiff requested the Defendant to return the Mony Yet it was held by those two Iustices That the Law would supply the proof of a * Bulstr 308. Cro. Eliz. 495. Golds 152. Moor 460. Stiles 361. conversion though it was not found for it shall be presumed that the Mony was denied to the Plaintiff and that the Defendant might use it himself and because no other proof could be made that very denial shall be a conversion in Law so a denial of a Rent
Seck after demand is a disseisin Pl. Com. 92. b. much more in personal Actions where the substance is found 't is well enough 1 Inst 282. a. But the Court said That notwithstanding this Authority they would not intend a Conversion unless the Iury had found it especially in this Case because they ought to have found it to make the Servant lyable for if the conversion was to the use of his Master there is no colour for this Action to be brought against the Defendant but it ought to be brought against the Master Whereupon a Ve. fa. de novo was prayed to help the Insufficiency of the Verdict the conversion not being found but the Court said it was to no purpose to grant a new Tryal unless the Plaintiff had a new Case and so Iudgment was given for the Defendant Bill versus Nicholl Variance between the Record pleaded and the Record it self IN an Action brought in the Court of Exchequer the Defendant pleaded another Action depending against him for the same matter in the Common Pleas and upon nul tiel Record replied by the Paintiff a Day was given to bring in the Record and when it was brought in it appeared that there was a variance between the Record in the Common Pleas as mentioned in the Defendants Plea and the Record it self for the Defendant in his Plea had alledged one Gerrard to be Attorny instead of Gardiner who was Attorny upon Record and whether this was a failure or not of the Record was the question It was said on the Defendants side that it was such a variance that it made it quite another Action and on the Plaintiffs side it was said that an immaterial variance will not prejudice where the substance is found 7 H. 4. 1. Bro. Failure pl. 2. 15. Curia advisare vult Forest qui tam c. versus Wire Action lyes in the Courts at Westminster upon the Statute of 5 Eliz. but not an Information 3 Cro. 316. DEBT upon the Statute of 5 Eliz. cap. 4. for using the Trade of a Silk Weaver in London not having been an Apprentice seven years the Action was brought in this Court and laid in London and tried by Nisi prius and a Verdict for the Defendant and now the Plaintiff to prevent the payment of Costs moved by Mr. Ward against his own Action and said that it will not lye upon this Statute in any of the Courts of Westminster for 't is not only to be laid as here in the proper County but 't is to be brought before the Iustices in their Sessions and this is by force of the Statute made 31 Eliz. cap. 4. and 21 Jac. cap. 4. Which Enacts That all Informations upon Penal Statutes must be brought before the Justices of the Peace in the County where the Fact was committed But the Court were clear of 2 Cro. 178. Stiles 383. By the Opinion of Rolls Cro. Car. 112. Opinion That the Action may be brought in any of the Courts of Westminster who have a concurring Iurisdiction with the Iustices and so they said it hath been often resolved Attorny General versus Alston AN Inquisition upon an Accompt stated went out to inquire what Lands one Havers had in the twentieth year of this King or at any time since Where the Kings Title is not precedent to that of the Ter-tenant the Lands of his Receiver shall not be liable by the Statute of the 13th Eliz. he being the Receiver General in the Counties of Norfolk and Huntingdon The Iury found that he was seised of such Lands c. whereupon an Extent goes out to seise them into the Kings Hands for payment of 1100 l. which he owed to the King Alston the Ter-tenant pleads that Havers was indebted to him and that he was seised of those Lands in 20 Car. 1. which was before the Debt contracted with him and that he became a Bankrupt likewise before he was indebted to the King and thereupon these Lands were conveyed to the Defendant by assignment from the Commissioners of Bankrupcy for the Debt due to him from Havers absque hoc that he was seised of these Lands at the time he became indebted to the King The Attorny General replies That he was seised of these Lands before the Commisson of Bankrupcy issued and before he became a Bankrupt and that at the time of his Seisin he was Receiver and accountable for the receipt to the King and being so seised in the 20the year of this present King he was found in Arrear 1100 l. for the payment whereof he was chargeable by the Statute of the 13 Eliz. cap. 4. Which subjects all the Lands of a Receiver which he hath or shall have in him during the time he remains accomptable and so prays that the Kings Hands may not be amoved To this the Defendant demurred And Sawyer for him held that the Replication was ill both in form and Substance 1. It doth not appear that the Defendant continued Receiver from the time he was first made as it ought to be or else that he was Receiver during his Life for if a Man is Receiver to the King and is not indebted but is clear and sells his Land and ceases to be Receiver and afterwards is appointed to be Receiver again and then a Debt is contracted with the King the former Sale is good 2. The Replication is a departure from the Inquisition which is the Kings Title for the Lands of which Inquiry was to be made were such which Havers had 20 Car. 2. And the Defendant shews that Havers was not then seised thereof but makes a good Title to himself by Indenture of Bargain and Sale made to him by the Commissioners of Bankrupcy and so the Attorny General cannot come again to set up a Title precedent to the Defendant for that is a departure 't is enough for the Defendant that he hath avoided the Kings Title as alledged and though Mr. Attorny is not bound to take Issue upon the Traverse yet he cannot avoid waveing both the Title of the Defendant and the King by insisting upon a new matter It was agreed That the King had two Titles and might either have brought his Inquisition grounded upon the Debt stated or upon the Statute of the 13th of Eliz. upon Havers his becoming Receiver but when he hath determined his Election by grounding it upon the Debt stated he cannot afterwards have recourse to the other matter and bring him to be liable from the time of his being Receiver as if an Inquisition goes to inquire what Lands the Debtor of the King had such a day when he entred into a Bond if there be an answer given to that Mr. Attorny cannot afterwards set up a precedent Bond because 't is a departure and the Statute it self vests no Estate in the King but makes the Receivers Lands lyable as if he had entred intred into a Statute Staple The Inquisition therefore should have been grounded
without any actual Entry 2 Cro. 604. and the Bargaineé thereby is capable of a Release though he cannot bring an Action of Trespass without Entry for when Mony is the Consideration of making the Bargain and Sale 't is executed by the Statute of Vses and so the Release upon it is good but if the Deed be not executed 't is otherwise But this being to support a Common Recovery Antea Addison and Otway was to be favoured and therefore the Court took time to consider till the next Term and then The Chief Iustice said That if a real Action be brought against A. who is not Tenant to the Praecipe and a Recovery be had against him the Sheriff can turn him out who is in possession but if he who is not in possession comes in by Voucher he is estopped to say afterwards that he was not party to the Writ so that he who is bound must be Tenant or Vouchee or claim under them Conveyances have been altered not so much by the Knowledge of the Learned as by the Ignorance of Vnskilful Men in their Profession The usual Conveyance at Common Law was by Feoffment to which Livery and Seisin were necessary the Possession being given thereby to the Feoffee Antea Lord Salisburies Case but if there was a Tenant in Possession and so Livery could not be made then the Reversion was granted and the particular Tenant always attorned and upon the same reason it was that afterwards a Lease and Release was held a good Conveyance to pass an Estate but at that time it was made no question but that the Lessee was to be in actual Possession before the Release Afterwards Vses came to be frequent and Settlements to Vses were very common by reason whereof many inconveniencies were introduced to prevent which the Statute of the 27th of H. 8. was made by which the Vse was united to the Possession for before that Statute Vses were to be executed according to the Rules of Equity but now they are reduced to the Common Law and are of more certainty and therefore are to be construed according to the Rules of Law At the Common Law when an Estate did not pass by Feffoment the Lessor or Vendor made a Lease for years and the Lessee actually entred and then the Lessor granted the Reversion to another and the Lessee attorned and this was good Afterwards when an Inheritance was to be granted then also was a Lease for years usually made and the Lessee entred as before and then the Lessor released to him and this was good But after the Statute of Vses it became an Opinion That if a Lease for years was made upon a valuable Consideration a Release might operate upon that without an actual Entry of the Lessee because the Statute did execute the Lease and raised an Vse presently to the Lessee Sir Francis Moor Serjeant at Law was the first who practised this way Nota. But because there were some Opinions that where Conveyances may enure two ways the Common Law shall be preferred unless it appear that the party intended it should pass by the Statute thereupon the usual course was to put the Words Bargain and Sale into the Lease for a Year to bring it within the Statute and to alledge that the Lease was made to the intent and purpose that by the Statute of Vses the Lessee might be capable of a Release but notwithstanding this Mr. Noy was of the Opinion That this Conveyance by Lease and Release could never be maintained without the actual Entry of the Lessee This Case goes farther than any that ever yet came into Iudgment for Mony is not mentioned here to be the Consideration or any thing which may amount to it unless the Pepper Corn which he held to be a good Consideration The Lease and Release are but in nature of one Deed and then the intent of the Parties is apparent that it should pass by the Satute and eo instanti that the Lease is executed the Reservation is in force The Case put by Littleton in Sect. 459. is put at the Common Law and not upon the Statute where he saith That if a Lease be made for years and the Lessor releaseth all his Right to the Lessee before Entry such Release is void because the Lessee had only a Right and not the Possession which my Lord Coke in his Comment upon it calls an interesse termini and that such Release shall not enure to enlarge the Estate without the Possession which is very true at the Common Law but not upon the Statute of Vses And therefore Iudgment was given by the whole Court Judgment that the Word Grant in the Lease will make the Land pass by way of Use that the Reservation of a Pepper Corn was a good consideration to raise an Vse to support a Common Recovery that this Lease being within the Statute of Vses there was no need of an actual Entry to make the Lessee capable of the Release for by vertue of the Statute he shall be adjudged to be in actual possession and so a good Tenant to the Praecipe and Iudgment was given accordingly in Michaelmas Term following Kendrick versus Bartland THE Plaintiff brought an Action on the Case for stopping the Water going to his Mill with a Continuando c. Continuando laid after a Nusance abated yet Damages shall be recovered for what was done before The Defendant pleads that the stopping was contra voluntatem and that tali die which was betwéen the first and the last day laid in the Continuando the Plaintiff himself had abated the Nusance and so he had no cause of Action To this Plea the Plaintiff demurred and Serjeant Baldwyn who argued to maintain the Plea did not relye upon that part of it where the Defendant saith that the stopping of the Water was involuntary because he doing the thing it could not be contra voluntatem but the Question would be whether the Plaintiff had any cause of Action to recover damages after the Abatement of the Nusance and he said that he had abated it before the Action brought and counted for damages after the Abatement for which he had no Cause of Action and this he had confessed by his Demurrer But the Court were of Opinion that it was not a good Plea and took this difference between a Quod permittat or an Assize for a Nusance and an Action on the Case for the same for the end of a Quod permittat or an Assise was to abate the Nusance 2 Cro. 207 618 but the end of an Action on the Case was to recover damages therefore though the Nusance was removed the Plaintiff is intituled to his damages that accrued before and 't is usual in Actions of this nature to lay the Sid. 319. Continuando for longer time than the Plaintiff can prove but he shall have damages for what he can prove and so here he shall recover the
Profits of a Parsonage as in the Case of a Sequestration upon a Iudgment obtained against a Spiritual Person where a Fi. Fa. is directed to the Sheriff upon that Iudgment and he returns Clericus beneficiatus non habens Laicum feodum for which reason he cannot meddle with the Profits of the Glebe but the Bishop doth it by a Sequestration to him directed He may likewise retain for the supply of the Cure and pay only the residue which hath been omitted on the other side As the Ordinary might dissolve a Vicaridge endowed where the Parsonage was in the Hands of a Dean so he may sequester an Appropriation in any Spiritual Person and there is no Statute which exempts an Impropriation from such a Sequestration because 't is onus reale at the Common Law and as the Lay Impropriator may sue for Tythes and receive them as before the making this Statute 't is as reasonable since he hath the same advantage that he should have the same Charge and the rather because the saving in the Statute of 31 H. 8. cap. 13. doth still continue the same Authority the Bishop had before though the possession was thereby given to the King The Words of which are viz. Saving to all and every person c. such Right which they might have had as if the Act had not been made which must be the Right of the Ordinary and of no other person An Impropriator pays Synodals and Procurations as well as an Appropriation in the Hands of Ecclesiastical Persons and it would be very inconvenient if a Sequestration should not lie which would quicken them more than an Excommunication and it was said that in England there were above 1000 Appropriations belonging to Corporations aggregate as Deans and Chapters which could not be excommunicated and if the Bishop could not sequester then there was no remedy to repair the Chancel For which Reasons Iudgment was prayed for the Defendant But the whole Court besides Iustice Atkins held that the Lay Impropriation was not to be sequestred for the Repairs of the Chancel And the Chief Iustice said that the Repair of the Chancel was an Ecclesiastical Cause but that the Rectory and Impropriator were Lay and not to be sequestred as the possessions in the Hands of Ecclesiastical Corporations may which he did agree could not be excommunicated but the persons who made up such Corporation might And as to the Sequestration upon a Iudgment it made nothing for the Matter to entitle the Ordinary to a Sequestration in this Case because what he doth in that is in the nature of a temporal Officer for the Sequestration is like the Fieri Facias and being directed to the Bishop he is in that Case if he may be so called an Ecclesiastical Sheriff and by virtue thereof may do as the Sheriff doth in other Cases that is he may seise Ecclesiastical things and sell them as the Sheriff doth Temporal things upon a Fieri Facias but 't is to be observed that he must return Fieri feci and not Sequestrari feci upon this Writ And as to the Saving in the Statute that doth not alter the Case for if any Right be thereby saved 't is that of the Parson for the Parishioners have no right to sit there indeed the Vicar may because he comes in under the Parson So that this Case is not to be put as at the Common Law but upon the Statute of Dissolutions by vertue whereof the Rectory being in the Hands of a Lay Person is become a Lay Fee and so cannot be subject to a Sequestration if it should the next step would be that the Bishop would increase Vicaridges as well in the Case of an Impropriation as Appropriation which would lessen the possessions of such as have purchased under the Act. But Iustice Atkins was of a contrary Opinion he said that it was agreed by all that an Impropriator is chargeable with the Repairs of the Chancel but the Charge was not personal but in regard of the profits of the Impropriation which are originally the Debtor according to the first Donation That the primary Rights of Rectories are the performance of Divine Service and the Repairs of the Chancel and that the Profits which are over and above must then go to the Imprpriator and are to be esteemed then a Lay Fée but that those Duties are the first Rights and therefore must be first discharged That this Right this duty of Repairing was certain and therefore shall not be taken away by Implication but by express Words in the Act which if wanting shall remain still and the Parties shall be compelled to repair under the same Penalties as before But admitting it should be taken away yet the saving in the Act extends to the Right of the Parishioners which is not to sit in the Chancel but to go thither when the Sacraments are administred of which they are deprived when 't is out of Repair nor can they have the use of the Church which properly belongs to them because when the Chancel is out of Repair it not only defaces the Church but makes it in a short time become ruinous He denied that a Sequestration in Chancery cannot be pleaded to barr a Trespass at the Common Law for if it be said that the Chancery have issued such Sequestrations it will be as binding as any other Process issuing according to the Rules of the Common Law And he also denied the Case put by the Chief Iustice that the Lands of the Parishioners might as well be sequestred for the repair of the Church as those of the Impropriator for repair of the Chancel because the Profits of the Rectory might originally be sequestred but the Lands of the Parishioner could not and so the Cases are quite different Judgment But in Easter Term following Iudgment was given against the Defendant upon the point of Pleading which the Court all agreed to be ill 1. The Defendants should have averred that the Chancel was out of repair 2. That no more was taken than what was sufficient for the repair thereof 3. For that the Plaintiff had declared for the taking of several sorts of Grain and the Defendant justifies the taking but of part and saith nothing of the residue and so 't is a Discontinuance and the general Words quoad residuum transgressionis will not help because he goes to particulars afterwards and doth not ennumerate all and thereupon Iudgment was given accordingly Edwards versus Weeks ASsumpsit Parol discharge good before breach of Promise but not afterwards Mod. Rep. 262. The Plaintiff declared that the Defendant in consideration that the Plaintiff at his Request had exchanged Horses with him promised to pay him 5 l. and he alledged a breach in the Non-performance The Defendant pleads that the Plaintiff before any Action brought discharged him of his Promise And upon a Demurrer the Question was whether after a breach of a Promise a parol discharge could be good The
here for want of * 2 H. 4. 12. Bro Accompt 24 65 89. privity and because there is no contract 't is only a tort a disseisin and the Plaintiff might have brought an Assise for this Office which lies at the Common Law and so it hath been adjudged in Jehu Webb's Case 1 Inst 212. 8 Co. 4. Which is also given by the Statute of Westm 2. cap. 25. for a profit apprender in alieno solo The Plaintiff might have brought an Action on the Case against the Defendant for disturbing of him in his Office and that had been good because it had been grounded on the wrong In this Case the Defendant takes the Profits against the will of the Plaintiff and so there is no Contract but if he had received them by the consent of the Plaintiff 6 H. 6.9 1 Roll. Abr. 597 pl. 5. yet this Action would not lie for want of privity 'T is true in the Case of the King where his Rents are wrongfully received the party may be charged to give an accompt as Bayliff so also may the Executors of his Accomptant because the Law createth a privity but 't is otherwise in the Case of a common person 10 Co. 114. b. 11 Co. 90. b. Because in all Actions of Debt there must be a Contract or quasi ex contractu and therefore where Iudgment was had and thereupon an Elegit and the Sheriff returned that he had apprised the Goods and extended such Lands which he delivered to the Plaintiff ubi revera he did not per quod actio accrevit which was an Action of Debt but it was adjudged that it would not lie because the Sheriff had not returned that he medled with the Goods or with the value of them and therefore for want of certainty how much to charge him with this Action would not lie but an Action on the Case for a false Return but if he had returned the Goods sold for so much Mony certain Godb. 276. 2 Sand. 344. 2 Cro. 566. which he had delivered then an Action of Debt would lie for though 't is not a Contract 't is quasi ex contractu Hob. 206. 3. Point The Iury find that the Defendant received the Profits for seven years and that the Plaintiff had his Patent but two years and do not shew what was received by the Defendant within those two years and then the Court cannot apply it But on the other side it was said by Sawyer Ex parte Quer. That this Non obstante was good for where an Act of Parliament comes to restrain the Kings power and prerogative it was always held so to be and he relied upon the Iudgment of 2 H. 7. f. 6. that the King might dispense with the Statute of 23 H. 6. Pl. Com. 502. b. Dyer 303. which he affirmed to be the constant Vsage ever since and that therefore the Law is so taken to be at this day As to the second Point both he and the Sollicitor General Winnington said That an indebitatus assumpsit would lie here for where one receives my Rent I may charge him as Bayliff or Receiver or if any one receive my Mony without my order though 't is a tort yet an indebitatus will lie because by the Receipt of the Mony the Law creates a promise and the Action is not grounded on the tort but on the receipt of the Profits in this Case As to the Objection about the finding they held that to be nugatory and idle for it cannot be intended that the Damages given were for the time the Defendant received the Profits before the Plaintiff had his Patent neither is there any thing found in the Verdict to that purpose In Michaelmas-Term following Judgment the Court gave Iudgment for the Plaintiffs 1. They held that the King might dispense with this Statute for the Subject had no interest nor was in any wise concerned in the Prohibition it was made only for the ease of the King Hob. 146. and by the like reason he might dispense with the Statute of 4 H. 4. 24. That a Man shall hold the Office of Dyer 203. Aulnager without a Bill from the Treasurer and with the Statute of 31 H. 6. 5. That no Customer or Comptroller shall have any Estate certain in his Office because these and such like Statutes were made for the ease of the Sovereign and not to abridge his Prerogative and that the general Clause of Non obstante aliquo alio Statuto was sufficient 2. 4 H. 7. 6. b. Moor 458 An Indebitatus Assumpsit will lye for Rent received by one who pretends a Title for in such case an Accompt will lye wherever the Plaintiff may have an Accompt an Indebitatus will lye As to the finding 't is well enough for the Iury assess Damages occasione praemissorum in narratione mentionat which must be for the time the Plaintiff had the Office and that a Patent would make a Man an Officer before admittance Steward Executor of Steward versus Allen. Demand must be made where an Interest is to be determined DEBT for a Rent reserved upon a Lease for years in which there was a Proviso That if the Rent be behind and unpaid by the space of a Month next after any or either of the Daies of payment then the Lease to be void The Plea was That the Rent was behind a Month after a day on which it was reserved to be paid and so the Lease is void to which Plea the Plaintiff demurred because the Defendant did not say that the Plaintiff demanded the Rent for though the Rent be due without demand yet the Interest shall not be determined without it which must be expressly laid in the Pleading and of that Opinion was the Court except Iustice Atkyns who doubted Searl versus Long. Quare Impedit real mainpernors must be returned upon the Summons Pone and Grand Cape 2 Inst 124. Mod. Rep. 248. IVdgment final was given in a Quare Impedit according to the Statute of Marlebridge cap. 12. Which Serjeant Pemberton moved to set aside He said that at the Common Law the Process in a Quare Impedit was Summons Pone and Distress infinite which being found mischievous in respect of a Lapse it was therefore provided by this Statute that if the disturbers do not appear upon the Summons then they shall be Attached to appear at another day c. Now here upon the Attachment the Sheriff hath returned Attachiatus fuit by John Doe and Richard Roe who are feigned persons and not mainpernors for the Defendant hath made Oath That he did not know any such persons neither was he ever Attached so that 't is not only a matter of Form for he ought to have that notice which the Law requires it being so penal upon him 'T is probable this Mistake might arise from Mr. Dalton who in his Book of the Office of Sheriffs in the Returns of Writs
gave him the Goods at London by force whereof he took them at London absque hoc that he took them at Coventry because by such Gift or Delivery he might justifie the taking any where as well as where the delivery was made 2. That the Declaration was ill for the Agreement was to deliver the Goods at London and the breach was that he left them at London and so but argumentative Aston pl. Red. 62. Herns Pleader 76. Brownl Pleadings 139. But the Court were of Opinion that the Declaration was good and the Plea was naught in substance but if it had been good the Traverse notwithstanding had been ill because the justification was not local 2 Cro. 45 372 though Iustice Scroggs was of a contrary Opinion And Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Nota Visne altered Propter necessiatem The Plaintiff had leave given by the Court to alter the Visne from London to Middlesex because all the Sittings in London were on a Saturday and his Witness was a Jew and would not appear that day Mendyke versus Stint PRohibition was prayed to the Sheriffs Court of London Prohibition to the Sheriffs Court after Verdict and Judgment comes too late The Suggestion was That the Plaintiff was sued in that Court in an Action on the Case and sets forth the Proceedings at large that there was a Verdict against him there and averred that the Contract upon which he was sued there revera was made in Middlesex and so the cause of Action did not arise within their Iurisdiction and upon Demurrer to the Prohibition Serjeant Pemberton argued 2 Inst 229 243 601. West 1. c. 35. F. N. B. 45. b. Hob. 106. 1. That a Prohibition doth lie to any Court as well Temporal as Spiritual where such Courts exceed their Bounds for both those Iurisdictions are united to the Imperial Crown it may be granted to the Dutchy Court if they hold Plea of Lands not parcel of the Dutchy 2. Though the Iury have here found that the Defendant assumpsit modo forma yet such finding as to time and place is not material nor is it any Estoppel in a new Action laid in another County to aver that it was for the same thing 'T is true both time and place may be made material by pleading and so it had been in this Case if the Iury had found the place precisely for it would have been an Estoppel The Verdict therefore is nothing and all they have done is coram non Judice The Case of * Antea Squib and Holt. Squib and Hole he cited as an Authority in point where it was adjudged no Escape in the Officer to let a Man at Liberty who was in Execution upon a Bond sued in an Inferior Court the Bond not being made within the Iurisdiction thereof Ex parte Def. But Maynard Dolben Goodfellow and Sympson Serjeants contra They agreed that where it appears by the Plaintiffs Libel that the Court had no Iurisdiction there a Prohibition lies at any time but if what is in the Declaration is laid infra jurisdictionem there the Party must plead extra jurisdictionem and if they refuse to plead to the Plea a Prohibition will lie after Sentence But here is an Action on the Case brought of which the Sheriffs Court can hold Plea and which is laid to be infra jurisdictionem and not denied by the Plaintiff in his Plea and therefore now after Verdict and Iudgment he comes too late for a Prohibition and upon this difference Prohibitions have been usually either granted or denied to the Spiritual Courts Though the Court hath not cognisance of the Cause yet the Proceedings are not coram non Judice for if it be alledged to be within the Iurisdiction and the Defendant takes no exception to it and then Sentence is given against him he hath there by admitted the Iurisdiction So where a Man sued for a Legacy in the Prerogative Court where the Will was proved Stiles 45. by the Opinion of Rolls C. J. 2 Roll. Abr. 318. and Sentence given and an Appeal to the Delegates and Sentence affirmed and then a Prohibition granted but without notice upon the Statute of 23 H. 8. cap. 9. for that the Parties lived in another Diocess but the Plaintiff having allowed the Iurisdiction in all the former proceedings though the Prohibition was granted the Court would not compel the Party to appear and plead but granted a Consultation Cro. Car. 97. Smith versus the Executors of Pondrel In Hillary-Term 1675. in B.R. between Spring and Vernon and in Michaelmas-Term in 22 Car. 2. B. R. Buxton's Case and in Hillary Term the 22 23 Car. 2. in the same Court between Cox and St. Albon Prohibitions were denied after the Iurisdiction adadmitted by Pleading Mod. Rep. 81. The Chief Iustice Wyndham and Atkyns upon the first Argument enclined that a Prohibition ought to be granted because the admittance of the Party cannot give a Iurisdiction where originally there was none but afterwards they were all of Opinion That the Prohibition should not go but said that the Plaintiff in the Inferiour Court ought to have been Non-suited if it appeared upon the Evidence that the Cause of Action did arise extra jurisdictionem In this Case these things were agreed by the Court. 1. Sid. 151. That if any matter appears in the Declaration which sheweth that the Cause of Action did not arise infra jurisdictionem there a Prohibition may be granted at any time 2. If the subject matter in the Declaration be not proper for the Iudgment and determination of such Court there also a Prohibition may be granted at any time 3. If the Defendant who intended to plead to the Iurisdiction is prevented by any Artifice as by giving a short day or by the Attornies refusing to plead it c. or if his Plea be not accepted or is over-ruled in all these Cases a Prohibition likewise will lie at any time And the Chief Iustice and Wyndham Iustices were of Opinion that after the Defendant had admitted the Iurisdiction by pleading to the Action especially if Verdict and Iudgment pass the Court will not examine whether the Cause of Action did arise out of the Iurisdiction or not But Atkyns and Scroggs Iustices said nothing to this last point but that many times an advantage given by the Law was lost by coming too late and instanced that a Visne may be changed in time but not if the Party come too late so if the time of the promise be laid above six years from the time of the Action brought if the Statute of Limitations be not pleaded the Defendant cannot take afterwards advantage of it Whereupon a Prohibition was denied and Iudgment was given for the Defendant Birch versus Wilson Plea tho' it amount to a general Issue if it doth disclose matter of Law besides it shall not be demurred unto IN an Action on the Case the Plaintiff declared
reason alone the Plaintiff had no cause of Demurrer for the Defendant may well disclose the matter of Law in Pleading which is a much cheaper way than to have a Special Verdict and that this is on the same reason of giving of colour but if the matter by which the Defendant justifies be all matter of Fact and proper for the Tryal of a Iury then the Dfendant ought to plead the General Issue And as to the Matter of the Plea the Chief Iustice and Wyndham Iustice held it to be good for the Common which was pleaded was a Common by Grant and not argumentatively pleaded for if the Defendant had pleaded an express Grant of Common in those two places and the Plaintiff had demanded Oyer of the Deed it would have appeared that there was no such Deed and this had been a good cause of Demurrer If this Plea should not be good it would be very mischievous to the Defendant for there being a perpetual Vnity as to the Freehold there can be no Prescription to the Common but there being a constant enjoyment thereof by the Tenants and so a perpetual Vsage and a Grant made referring to that Vsage 't is well enough And since whilst the Lands were in possession of the Lord the Commoners could not complain of a Surcharge why should they if he grant the Premisses the Granteé being in loco c. In the Case of the King a Grant of tot talia Libertates Privilegia quot qualia the Abbot lately had 9 Co. 23. Abbot de Strata Marcella was held good by such general Words Here the Lord Paget granted to the Defendant that which the Lessées had before viz. that Common which the Tenants had time out of mind and it cannot be conceived but that the Tenants had a Right for as a Tort cannot be presumed to be from time immemorial so neither shall it be intended that the Lord gave only a Licence and permitted his Tenants to enjoy this Common But Iustice Atkins was of Opinion that the Plea was not good he said he knew not by what Name to call this Common for it was no more than a Permission from the Lord that the Tenants might put their Cattle into his Freehold or a Connivance at them for so doing and if it be taken as a new Grant then nothing can pass but the Surplus for the Lord cannot derogate from his former Grant and the new Grantee shall not put in an equal proportion with him who hath the Prescription for if he may then such Prescription would be quite destroyed by such puisne Grant for as the Lord might grant to one so he might to twenty and then there would not be sufficient Common left for him who prescribes to the Right So that he conceived that the Defendant had no Right of Common or if he had any it would not be till after the Right of the Plaintiff was served and he said that Vsage shall not intend a Right but it may be an Evidence of it upon a Tryal But if there had been an Vsage 't is now lost by the Vnity of the Possession and shall not be revived by the new Grant like the Case of Massam and Hunter Yelv. 189. there was a Copyholder of a Messuage and two Acres in Feé which the Lord afterwards granted and confirmed to him in Fee cum pertinentiis it was adjudged that though the Tenant by Vsage had a Right to have Common in the Lord's Wast yet by this new Grant and Confirmation that Right was gone the Copyhold being thereby extinguished for the Common being by Vsage and now lost these Words cum pertinentiis in the new Grant will not revive it But notwithstanding Iudgment by the Opinion of the other three Iustices was given for the Defendant Week's Case A Prohibition was prayed to the Ecclesiastical Court at Bristol the Suggestion was that he was excommunicated for refusing to answer upon Oath to a Matter by which he might accuse himself viz. to be a Witness against another that he himself was present such a day and saw the other at a Conventicle which if he confessed they would have recorded his Confession of being present at a Meeting and so have proceeded against him The Court granted a Prohibition but ordered him to appear in the Ecclesiastical Court to be examined as to the other persons being there Anonymus A Man wins 100 l. of another at play Gaming not within the Statute where the Security is given to a third person the Winner owed Sharp 100 l. who demanded his Debt the Winner brought him to the other of whom he won the Mony at Play who aknowledged the Debt and gave Sharp a Bond for the payment of the 100 l. who not being privy to the Matter or knowing that it was won at Play accepted the said Bond and for default of payment puts it in Suit the Obligor pleads the Statute of Gaming The Plaintiff in his Replication discloseth the Matter aforesaid and saith that he had a just Debt due and owing to him form the Winner and that he was not privy to the Monies being won at Play c. and that he accepted of the said Bond as a Security for his Debt and the Defendant demurred And the Court were all of Opinion Hill and Phesant Antea that this Case was not within the Statute the Plaintiff not knowing of the Play and though it be pleaded that the Bond was taken pro Securitate and not for satisfaction of a just Debt it was held well enough like the Case of Warns and Ellis Yelv. 47. Warns owed Alder 100 l. upon an usurious Contract and Alder owed the Plaintiff Ellis 100 l. for which they were both bound and in an Action of Debt brought upon this Bond Warns pleads the Statute of Vsury between him and Alder and Ellis replyed as the Plaintiff here and upon a Demurrer it was adjudged for the Plaintiff by thrée Iudges because the Plaintiff had a real Debt owing him and was not privy to the Vsury And upon this Case the Court relyed and said the Reason of it governed this Case at the Barr whereupon Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Tissard versus Warcup INdebitatus Assumpsit for 750 l. laid out by the Plaintiff for the use of the Defendant Vpon Non assumpsit pleaded there was a Tryal at the Barr and the Evidence was that the Defendant and another now deceased farmed the Excise that the Mony was laid out by the Plaintiff on the behalf of the Defendant and his Partner and that the Defendant promised to repay the Mony out of the first Profits he received Curia And by the Opinion of the whole Court this Action would not lie 1. Two Partners being concerned the Action cannot be brought against one alone he ought in this Case to have set out the death of the other But if Iudgment be had against one the Goods in Partnership may be
taken in Execution 1 Cro. 239. Hob. 180. Rol. Rep. 233. 2. The Promise here was not to pay the Mony absolutely but sub modo so that the Evidence did not maintain the Action and the Plaintiff was Nonsuited Nichols versus Ramsel Release of all Demands usque 26 Apr. a Bond dated that day is not released TRespass done 24 Martii 26 Car. 2. usque 26 Augusti 28 Car. 2. diversis diebus vicibus c. The Defendant pleaded that on the 24th day of April in the 26th year of King Charles the Second he paid the Plaintiff 6 d. which he received in full satisfaction of all Trespasses usque ad the said 24th day of April absque hoc that he was guilty ad aliquod aliud tempus praeter praedictum 24 Aprilis anno 26 Car. 2. aut aliquo tempore postea but leaveth out the 24th day of April and for that Reason the Plaintiff demurred because the Defendant had not answered that day for the Word usque excludes it So where Debt was brought upon a Bond dated 9 Julii the Defendant pleaded a Release of all Actions Owen ' 50. 2 Rol. Abr. 521. c. the same day usque diem dati ejusdem scripti the Bond was not discharged because the Release excludes the 9th day on which it was made But Serjeant Weston contra Though generally in pleading the Word usque is exclusive yet in the Case of Contracts because of the intent of the Parties 't is inclusive and therefore in one Nichol's Case 20 Car. 2. in B. R. Rot. 21. the Term was not named a Lease was made Habendum from Lady-day usque Festum Sancti Michaelis 1665. paying the Rent reserved at Michaelmas during the Term the Rent shall be paid on Michaelmas-day 1665. and so the day shall not be excluded So where a Man prescribes to put Cattle from and immediately after Lady-day where they are to stay till Michaelmas-day the putting them in on Lady-day and driving them away on Michaelmas-day is not justifiable in strictness yet it hath been allowed good So in a Devise the Question was whether the Testator was of Age or not and the Evidence was that he was born the first day of January in the Afternoon of that day and died in the Morning on the last day of December And it was held by all the Iudges that he was of full Age for there shall be no fraction of a day North Chief Iustice said that prima facie this is to be intended good for a day is but Punctum temporis and so of no great consideration But the other three Iustices were of Opinion that the Word Usque was exclusive and that the Plaintiff should not be put to shew that there was a Trespass done on the 24th of April and said that in a Release of all Demands till the 26th of April a Bond dated that day is not released wherefore Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Trevil versus Ingram COvenant to pay an Herriot post mortem J. S. or 40 s. at the election of the Plaintiff Release of all Demands doth not barr a future Duty Mod. Rep. 216. and sets forth the death of J. S. and that afterwards he chose to have the 40 s. for which he brought this Action and assigns the Breach for Non payment The Defendant pleaded that the Plaintiff released to him all Actions and Demands c. But this Release was made in the Life time of J. S. and there was an Exception in it of Herriots The Plaintiff demurred and Serjeant George Strode argued that this Action was not discharged by that Release and cited Hoes Case 5 Co 70. where it was held that a Duty incertain at first which upon a Condition precedent was to be made certain afterwards was but a possibility which could not be released that the Duty in this Case was incertain because the Plaintiff could not make his Election till after the death of J. S. A Covenant to repair 2 Cro. 170. Roll. Abr. 407. But a Release of all Covenants in such an Indenture had been a Barr 5 Co. 71. a. and a Release pleaded to it within thrée days after the date of the Indenture And upon a Demurrer it was held that it being a future Covenant and not in demand at the time of the Release although it was of all Demands yet that Covenant was not thereby released So here neither the Herriot nor the 40 s. were either of them in demand at the time of the Release given and it plainly appears by the Exception in the Release that it was the intention of the Parties not to release the Herriots 2 Cro. 623. and of that Opinion was the whole Court whereupon Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff North Chief Iustice It is the Opinion of * Sect. 508 510. 2 Roll. Abr. 408. Sid. 141. Littleton That a Release of all Demands doth Release a Rent And of that Opinion was Iustice Twisden in the Argument of Hen and Hanson 's Case though it was resolved there that a Release of all Demands did not discharge a Rent reserved upon a Lease for years because such Rent is executory and incident to the Reversion 2 Cro. 486. and grows every year out of the Land but when it is severed from the Reversion as by assigning over the whole Term then it becomes a Sum in gross and is due upon the Contract and in that Case a Release of all Demands discharges a Rent afterwards due DE Term. Sancti Hill Annis 29 30 Car. II. in Communi Banco Shambrok versus Fettiplace PRohibition Prescription to have an Isle in a Church because of repairing no good cause for a Prohibition Hob. 69. The Question was whether a Prescription be good to an Isle in a Church which he and all those c. used to repair as belonging to a Mannor where he had no Dwelling House but only Land and Serjeant Geo. Croke argued that it was good and cited the Case of Boothby and Bayly where such a Prescription as this was held to be a good ground for a Prohibition Vide Moor Rep. 878. contra The Court inclined that it was not good but ordered the Prohibition to go and the Defendant to plead that it might come Iudicially before them to be argued Dashwood versus Cooper alios in Cammera Scaccarii ERror of a Iudgment in Trespass In a Negative Plea viz. That three did not such a thing it must be said nec eorum aliquis wherein Cooper and others brought an Action of Trespass against Dashwood for entring into a Brew-house and keeping of possession and taking away of 50 s. The Defendant pleaded That the Plaintiffs had committed an Offence against the Statute of 12 Car. 2. cap. 23. by which it is Enacted That all Offences thereby prohibited except in London shall be heard by two or more of the next Justices of Peace and in case of their neglect or refusal by
Plaintiff Blackbourn versus Conset Place where it shall be intended tho' not laid in the Pleading IN Replevin the Avowant pleads an Execution taken out and that a Term for years was extended and an Assignment thereof made by the Sheriff but alledges no place where the Assignment was made But upon Demurrer it was held good for it shall be intended to be assigned where the Land doth lie Hall versus Carter Bond to render himself a Prisoner good IN an Action of Debt upon a Bond the Defendant craves Oyer of the Condition which was That if another person who was arrested at the Suit of the Plaintiff and for whom the Defendant was now bound should give such Security as the Plaintiff should approve of for the payment of 90 l. to him Sid. 132. pl. 4. or should render his Body to Prison at the return of the Writ then the Obligation to be void The Defendant pleads the Statute of 23. H. 6. cap. 10. That this Bond was given pro easimento favore And this Case coming to be argued upon a Demurrer the question was whether such Bond be within the Statute or not And the Court were of Opinion that it was not If the Sheriff takes Bond in another Man's name to elude the Statute such Bond is void but the Plaintiff may give directions to the Officer to take such Bond as this to himself 't is only an expedient to prevent a new Arrest and the Agreement of the Plaintiff makes it good If a Capias be taken out against the Defendant and a third person gives the Plaintiff a Bond that the Defendant shall pay the Mony or render himself at the Return of the Writ 't is a good Bond and not within the Statute because 't is not by the direction of the Officer but by the agreement of the Plaintiff and there is no Law that makes the Agreement of the Parties void and if the Bond was not taken by such Agreement it might have been traversed But Iustice Atkyns doubted because a Bond to render himself a Prisoner is void Bewfages's Case 10 Co. But if it had been to pay the Mony or appear at the Return of the Writ it had been good But notwithstanding Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Shaxton versus Shaxton THE Condition of a Bond was Non damnificatus not a good Plea where the person and Lands are to be indempnified Antea That the Defendant should save harmless Thomas Shaxton and the Mortgaged Premisses and should pay the Interest for the prinicipal Sum. The Defendant pleads that Thomas Shaxton non fuit damnificatus for that the Defendant had paid the 120 l. principal mony with all the arrears of Interest due at such a day And upon a Demurrer this was held no good Plea because the first matter non damnificatus goes to the Person and not to the Premisses And so Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Anonymus After acquittal for a Common Trespass an Action on the Case will not lie Sid. 465 466. Antea THE Defendant was Indicted for a Common Trespass and Acquitted and now was Plaintiff in an Action on the Case against the Prosecutor And by the Opinion of the Chief Iustice the Action will lie for the Charges and Expences in defending the prosecution which the acquittal proves to be false and the Indicting him proves to be malicious for if he had intended any thing for his own benefit or recompence he might have brought a civil Action and then if he had been found Not Guilty he would have had his Costs allowed Though the prosecution be for a Trespass for which there is a probable cause yet after Acquittal it shall be accounted malicious the Difference only is where the Indictment is for a Criminal matter but where 't is for such a thing for which a Civil Action will lie the Party can have no reason to prosecute an Indictment it is only to put the Defendant to charges and make to him pay Fees to the Clerk of the Assises Penrice and Wynn's Case Habeas Corpus may be granted in Civil matters SErjeant Maynard moved for a Habeas Corpus for them being committed to the Poultry Compter by the Commissioners of Bankrupts for refusing to be examined and sworn touching their Knowledge of the Bankrups Estate The Process against them in this Court was an Attachment of Priviledge which was a Civil Plea and of which the Court had Iurisdiction and therefore the Habeas Corpus must be granted And the Chief Iustice said that it might be without motion because all the Habeas Corpus's in that Court were ad faciendum recipiend and they issue of course Antea but in the Kings-Bench they are ad subjiciendum which are in Criminal Causes and not to be granted without motion Then the Serjeant moved that the Sheriff might Return his Writ which was done and being filed he took Exceptions to the Return by which the ground of the Commitment appeared to be by virtue of a Warrant under the Hands and Seals of the Commissioners c. which he said was ill for want of an Averment of their refusal to come and be sworn for it did not appear that they did refuse and they ought not to be committed without refusing so that should have been positively averred viz. That they did refuse and still do for if they are willing at any time they ought to be discharged and so they were but were ordered to put in Bail upon the Attachment Abbot versus Rugeley THE Plaintiff declared in an Action of Assault and Battery to which the Defendant pleaded non cul Plea puis darrein continuance must be certified as part of the Record of Nisi prius and at the Assises a Plea was put in puis darrein continuance and a Demurrer thereunto The Court were clear of Opinion That if the Plea had been issuable it could not have been then tried neither could the Demurrer be there argued but must be certified up hither by the Iudge of Assise as part of the Record of Nisi prius Yelv. 180. Hawkins versus Moor. Ballard versus Oddey It was ruled in this Case The Contract it self must be Usurious to make it void 1 Sand. 295. Mod. Rep. 69. That to avoid a Security by reason of Vsury the Contract it self must be usurious for if the Party takes afterwards more than is allowed that will not make it so so that if the Agreement of the Parties be honest but made otherwise by the mistake of a Scrivener yet 't is not Vsury As if a Mortgage be for 100 l. with a Proviso to be void on payment of 106 l. at the end of one year and no Covenant for the Mortgagor to take the Profits till default be made in paiment so that in strictness the Mortgagee is intituled both to the Interest and the Profits yet if this was not express'd the Agreement is not Vsury DE Term. Sanctae Trin.
new Will and the Grandson should take by the Name of Son And Iustice Atkins relied on the Case of Brett and Rigden in the Commentaries where new purchased Lands passed by a Republication but a Writ of Error being brought upon this Iudgment in the Kings Bench it was reversed Anonymus In Banco Regis MR. Sanders moved for a Prohibition to the Spiritual Court in the Case of the Children of one Collet and Mary his Wife to stay Proceedings there upon a Libel against them that the said Collet had married Anne the Sister of the said Mary They both appear and confess the Matter upon which a Sentence of Divorce was to pass whereas in truth Collet was never married to Ann but it was a contrivance between him and his Wife to get themselves divorced and the Marriage declared void ab initio to defeat their Children of an Estate settled upon them in Marriage with Remainders over by bastardizing them after they had been married and lived together 16 years The Reason why a Prohibition was prayed was because Marriage or no Marriage was to be tried in pais for that the Inheritance and Freehold of Land were concerned in this Case The Court directed that they should suggest this Matter Curia and that it was a Contrivance to obtain a Sentence of Divorce to defeat them of their Estate entailed on them and then to move for a Prohibition Smallwood versus Brickhouse THE Suggestion was Spiritual Courts are proper to determine where a person is capable of making a Will Godolph 276. that B. being under the Age of sixteen years had made a Will and that the Prerogative Court proceeded to the proof of it whereas by the Common Law a person is not capable till 17 years and therefore a Prohibition was prayed And that the Common Law hath determined the time my Lord Coke's Comment upon Littleton was cited 1 Inst 89. b. where 't is said That at 18 years of Age he may make his Testament and constitute Executors and the Age of a person is triable also in pais But the Court said Curia that the Proof of Wills and the Validity of them doth belong to the Ecclesiastical Court and if they adjudge a person capable the Court will not intermeddle for 't is within their Iurisdiction to adjudge when a person is of Age to make a Will and sometimes they allow Wills made by persons of 14 years of Age and the Common Law hath appointed no time it depends wholly on the Spiritual Law and therefore a Prohibition was denied Joan Bailies Case NOTA. One Joan Bayly being in Execution Administration was committed to the Debtor in Execution the Plaintiff dyed intestate and the Right of Administration came to her and a Motion was made for a Habeas Corpus to bring her from the Compter into this Court for that having administred to her Creditor she might be discharged but it was denyed for she could not be thus discharged because non constat de persona neither can she give a Warrant of Attorny to acknowledge satisfaction therefore let her renounce the Administration and get it granted to another and then she may be discharged by a Letter of Attorny from such Administrator Anonymus Mandamus MAndamus to swear one who was elected to be one of the Eight Men of Ashburn Court it was denyed because it is incertain for it ought specially to be inserted what the Office is and what is the place of one of the Eight Men of Ashburn Court that it may appear to the Court to be such a place for which a Mandamus doth lye and though such a Writ hath been granted for one of the approved Men of Guilford yet it was specially set forth what his Office was Birch versus Lingen Trin. 34 Car. 2. in B. R. Discontinuance where amendable JVdgment was obtained upon a Bond 25 years since and in one of the Continuances from one Term to another there was a blank The Executors of the Defendant now brought a Writ of Error and the Plaintiff in the Action got a Rule to amend and insert the Continuance suggesting to the Court that it was a Iudgment of a few Terms and so aided by the Statute of 16 17 Car. 2. cap. 8. Hughes Abr. tit Costs 480. 2 Sand. 289. Moor 710. Cro. Eliz. 320 489 553 619. Cro. Jac. 211 353 528. Vpon this Rule the Plaintiff fills up the Blank and the Record was certified so filled up into the Exchequer-Chamber And Mr. Pollexfen moved for the Defendant that the Record might stand as it did at first and that the Rule was got by a trick and on a false Suggestion it being a Iudgment before the Restoration of this King and a Discontinuance not amendable for 't is the Act of the Court and for an Authority in the Point the Case of Friend and Baker was cited where after a Record certified Stiles 339. a Motion was made to amend it because day was given over to the Parties from Easter to Michaelmas-Term and so Trinity-Term left out where by the Opinion of Roll Chief Iustice that the giving of a day more than is necessary is no Discontinuance but where a day is wanting 't is otherwise But Sanders for the Plaintiff said that this was only a Misprision of the Clerk and no Discontinuance but amendable The Clerks commonly leave Blanks in the Venires and if they neglect to fill them up 't is only a Misprision and amendable by the Court and the Record being now filled up by the Rule of the Court ought not to be razed to make an Error The Chief Iustice was of Opinion That this was not a discontinuance but an insufficient continuance and an omission of the Clerk only who if he had filled up this Blank himself without Rule it could not afterwards be set aside But Iustice Jones was of another Opinion That it was such a misprision of the Clerk as was not amendable by the Statute of H. 6. since it was not the same Term and all the Proceedings being in the Breast of the Court only during the Term it ought not to be altered but left in Blank as it was for where Iudgment is entred for the Plaintiff the Court may upon just cause alter it the same Term for the Defendant but not of another Term the whole Term being but one day in Law And though the Writ of Error be returned into the Exchequer that will make no alteration for the Record it self remains still here and 't is only a Transcript that is removed thither Sed Adjornatur Anonymus TRespass for breaking of his Close The Defendants plead Power where 't is coupled with an Interest is assignable That the place where were c. the Lands of one Martin who made a Lease thereof to the Plaintiff and did thereby except the Trees growing on the same In which Lease the Plaintiff did Covenant with the said Martin his
and so North Chief Iustice said that it had been lately ruled in the Common Pleas. Afterwards the Court of Kings-Bench was moved for a Prohibition in this Case and it was denied so that in this Case there was the Opinion of all the three Courts This matter was so much laboured because twenty four Quakers were reported to be concerned in the Rate and they were unwilling to pay towards the Building of a Church Paget versus Vossius In B. R. A Trial at the Bar in Ejectione Firmae Judgment given upon the Construction of words in a Will Jones 73. 1 Ventris 325. in which the Iury found a special Verdict The Case was Viz. That Dr. Vossius the Defendant being an Alien and a Subject of the States of Holland falling into Disgrace there had his Pension taken from him by Publick Authority Afterwards he came into England and contracted a great Friendship with one Dr. Brown a Prebendary of Windsor Then a War broke out between England and Holland and the King issued forth his Proclamation declaring the said War and the Hollanders to be Alien Enemies Dr. Brown being seised of the Lands now in question being of the value of 200 l. per Ann. and upwards made his Will in these words in Writing Inter alia Viz. Item I give all my Mannour of S. with all my Freehold and Copyhold Lands c. to my dear Friend Dr. Isaac Vossius during his Exile from his own Native Country but if it please God to restore him to his Country or take him out of this Life then I give the same immediately after such restoration or death to Mrs. Abigal Hevenigham for ever A Peace was afterwards concluded between England and Holland whereby all Intercourses of Trade between the two Nations became lawful but Dr. Vossius was not sent for over by the States nor was there any offer of kindness to him but his Pension was disposed of and given to another That the Doctor might return into his own Country when he pleased but that he still continued in England And whether he or the Lessor of the Plaintiff Mrs. Heveningham had the better Title was the question Nota Dr. Vossius was enabled to take by Grant from the King Ex parte Quer. Pemberton Serjeant for the Lessor of the Plaintiff argued that the Estate limited to the Defendant is determined which depended upon the construction of this Devise He did agree that the Will was obscure and the intent of the Devisor must be collected from the circumstances of the Case and it is a Rule That according to the * 2 Cro. 62 371 416. intent of the Parties a Will is to be interpreted 'T is plain then that the Devisor never intended the Defendant an Estate for Life absolutely because it was to depend upon a Limitation and the Words are express to that purpose for he devises to him during his Exile c. Now the Question is not so much what is the genuine and proper sence and signification of those Words as what the Testator intended they should signifie 1. Therefore the most proper signification of the Word Exile is a penal Prohibiting a person from his Native Country and that is sometimes by Iudgment or Edict as in the case of an Act of Parliament and sometimes 't is chosen to escape a greater Punishment as in cases of Abjuration and Transportation c. But he did not think that the Testator took the Word Exile in this restrained sense for Dr. Vossius was never formally or solemnly Banished if that should be the sense of the Word then nothing would pass to the Doctor by this Will because the Limitation would be void and like to the Case of a Devise to a Married Woman durante viduitate and she dies in the life-time of her Husband or to a Woman Sole during her Coverture or of a Devise to A. the Remainder to the right Heis of B. and A. dies living B so that this could not be his meaning 2. The Word Exile in common parlance is taken only for absence from ones Native Country but this is a very improper signification of the Word and nothing but a Catachresis can justifie it and therefore the Testator could not intend it in this sense 't is too loose and inconsiderable an Interpretation of the Word for the Iudgment of the Court to depend on unless there were circumstantial Proofs amounting almost to a Demonstration that it was thus meant But it plainly appears by the following Words this was not the meaning of the Testator for 't is said If it please God to restore him to his Country which shews that there was some Providence or other which obstructed his return thither and so could not barely intend a voluntary absence for if so he might have expressed it viz. during his absence from his Country or till his return thither or whilst he should stay in England and not in such doubtful Words 3. By the Word Exile is meant a persons lying under the displeasure of the Government where he was born or of some great persons who have an Influence upon the Government or have an Authority over him which makes him think convenient considering such circumstances to withdraw himself and retire to some other place and this is a sense of the Word between both the former and even in the Common Law we are not strangers to the acceptation of the Word in that sense There is a Case omni exceptione major in the Writ of Waste which is fecit vastum de domibus venditionem de boscis exilium de hominibus 't is in the Register and in the Writ on the Statute of Marlebridge cap. 24. where by the exilium de hominibus is meant the hard usage of Tenants or the menacing of them whereby they flie from their Habitations 2 H. 6. 11. 'T is found in this Case that the Defendant was under the displeasure of his Governours the War broke out and therefore it might not then be safe for him to return and for that reason he might think it safe for himself to abide here and this Dr. Brown the Testator might know which might also be the reason of making the Will But now all acts of Hostility are past and so the Defendants recess is open and it hath pleased God to restore the Doctor but he is not pleased to restore himself for the Iury find he is not returned now if a Man hath an Estate under such a Limitation to do a thing which may be done when it pleaseth the party in such case if he neglect or refuse to do the thing the Estate is determined 15 H. 7. 1. If I grant a Man an Annuity till he be promoted to a Benefice and I provide a Presentation for him and he will not be Instituted and Inducted the Annuity ceases so shall the Estate in this Case because the Devisor seems to appoint it to the Defendant till he may return