Selected quad for the lemma: justice_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
justice_n	court_n	king_n	plea_n	3,508	5	9.7258	5	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A70879	Some few observations upon His Majesties late answer to the declaration or remonstance of the Lords and Commons of the 19 of May, 1642	Parker, Henry, 1604-1652.	1642 (1642)	Wing P424; ESTC R20105	11,346	16

supposition if the King in extraordinary danger will not yeeld to such a Posture as the Kingdome thinkes most safe whether the Parliament may not order that Posture of themselves so the Parliament puts it But the King puts it thus If the Parliament invades his power over the Militia causelesly whether they may not as well seize any Subiects estates That question then which must decide all is this whether that Posture which the Parliament chuses or that of the Kings be most safe for the Kingdome at this time and who shall iudge thereof most properly Till now that the ancient Pillars of Law and Policy were taken away and the State set upon a new basis no evill was to be presumed of the representative body of the Kingdome nor no Justice expected from a King deserting his grand Councell but now every man may arraign Parliaments they which understand no reason must have reason not authority to rely upon no King was ever yet so just but that Parliaments have in some things reduced them from error nor no Kings so unjust that Parliaments did seduce into errour yet Parliaments are now charged of being enemies to Religion laws liberties And the King to preserve these absents himselfe from Parliaments but since we must dispute for Parliaments first we say they must in probabilitie be more knowing then any other privadoes Secondly in regard of their publike interest they are more responsible then any other and lesse to be complayned of in case of errour Thirdly they have no private interest to deprave them nothing can square with the Common Councell but the common good and if 500. of the Nobilitie and Gentrey should ayme at an Aristocraticall usurpation or any other power of oppression they could never compasse their ends it were folly in them Some such objections have beene made against this Parliament but finding little credit at last some few of the Parliament are pitcht upon as if it were credible that all the kingdome in whose hands all reall naturall power consists would inslave themselves to 500. or those 500. voluntarily become slaves to five men good God the King is presum'd to have the hearts of the majority and to bee trampled upon by some few and yet the magicall incantation is so strong that neither the Kings Authoritie nor the justice of his cause nor the oppressed Commonaltie can prevaile against the Parliament or the Parliament it selfe against such an inconsiderable number in Parliament O that some Mercury would reconcile my understanding in this Court Logick or give me some clew of thread to disingage me out of this blind Labarinth but to come more particularly to the Militia it selfe now setled by the Parliament the King excepts against the Parliaments ordinance for two reasons first because it excludes him for the disposing of it and secondly from determining it at his pleasure but we must know that the Kingdome trusts the King with Armes as it doth with the Lawes and no otherwise and since the King in Person is not most fit alwayes nor can in all places be present to execute either military or judiciall offices therefore the maine execution in both is intrusted to substitutes the end of all Authority in substitutes is that the kingdom may be duely and safely served not that the Kings meere fancy may be satisfied and that end is more likely to be accomplished where the Kingdome then where the King chuses but whosoever chuses the substitutes the King is not excluded thereby for the King hath more cause to confide in men recommended by his highest Court then the people have in men preferred meerely by the King against the consent of his highest Court and if it were not so vet the confidence and assurance of the people in times of distractions is more requisite then the Kings but in this new Militia the King is not so much excluded from his generall superintendance and supreame influence as he is in subordinate Courts of Justice and yet even in the Kings Bench where the King in Pleas of the Crowne may not sit as Judge he may not bee said to be excluded neither is it any prejudice to the King in the second place that he cannot determine these new Commissions at his pleasure without publik consent except upon misdemeanour for though all men naturally desire absolute command and to be uncontroleable in things that are bad as well as things that are good yet this is but the exorbitant desire of corrupted nature and wise men doe not seeke alwayes to satisfie it but rather to suppresse it In case of misdemeanor no mans commission shall justifie him agains the King and where no misdemeanour is what would the meere power of determining the commission availe the King For wee see in divers Monarchies and free States some Princes which are limited from evill are not the more disabled from good and if they be sometimes that nation is perhaps happier which intrusts Princes too little then that which intrusts them two farre and yet neverthelesse I desire to see no innovation in our English Monarchy neither if this King shall upon this or that emergent occasion yeeld to some temporall restraint would I wish to see it perpetuall except in things onely tending to evill for example the King had a Prerogative to discontinue and dissolve Parliaments at pleasure and the abuse of this Prerogative was the cause of all our late sufferings but this Prerogative being restrayned what injury is likely to follow eyther to the King or State for in such restrictions wch are from greater evills but from lesse good the King ought not to be difficult and in such restrictions which may disable from good as well as evill the people ought not to be importunate but it is further obiected that by the same power Parliaments may disseise both the King and Subiects from their estates as they make ordinances for the Militia but in truth is not this a strange result the Parliament have power to doe good offices by the consent of the people therefore they may have power to doe ill offices against the consent both of King and People it is of dangerous consequence to suppose that Parliaments will do any iniustice it looseth one of the firmest ●inewes of Law to admit it but to conclude that Parliaments can doe such iniustice as may oppresse both King and People from whom all their power is derived is unnaturall and whereas the King claymes an interest in the Militia as legall and proper as ours are in our Lands or Tenements we must avoyd mistakes herein for in our goods and inheritances we have not so pure and unconditionall a right but that it is inconsistant with the common right also and in this respect the Kings possessions are not priviledged more then a subiect for the States proprietie cannot bee excluded out of eyther the same man also may have severall proprieties in severall things for that propriety which the