afterward the Husband suffers the wood to grow five and twenty yeers and afterwards hee dieth The question was Whether the Wife being Tenant for life might cut that Underwood And it was moved What shall be said seasonable Underwood that a Termor or Tenant for life might cut Dyer Chief Justice and all the other Justices held That a Termor or Tenant for life might cut all Underwood which had been usually cut within twenty yeers In 11. H. 6. 1. Issue was taken If they were of the age of twenty yeers or no. But in the Wood-Countries they may fell seasonable wood which is called Sylva caedua at six and twenty eight and twenty thirty years by the custome of the Country And so the Usage makes the Law in severall Countries And so it is holden in the books of 11. H. 6. and 4. E. 6. But they agreed That the cutting of Oakes of the age of eight yeers or ten years is Waste But by Meade Justice the cutting of Hornbeams Hasels Willows or Sallows of the age of forty yeares is no Waste because at no time they will be Timber Another question which was moved was That at the time of the Feoffment it was seasonable Wood and but of the growth of fourteen or fifteen yeers If this suffering of the Husband of it to grow to 25 years during the Coverture should bind the Wife so as she cannot cut the Woods Gaudy Serjeant said That it should not bind the Wife For if a Warranty descend upon a Feme Covert it shall not bind her So if a man seized of Land in the Right of his Wife be disseised and a Descent be cast during the Coverture it shall not bind the Wife but that she may enter after the death of the Husband But by Dyer Chief Justice and all the other Justices This Permission of the Husband shall bind the Wife notwithstanding the Coverture for that the time is limited by the Law which cannot be altered if it be not the custome of the Country As in the case of 17. E. 3. Where a man makes a Lease for years and grants that the Lessee shall have as great commoditie of the Land as hee might have Notwithstanding these words he cannot dig the land for a Mine of Cole or Stone because that the Law forbids him to dig the land So in the principall Case The Wife cannot fell the Wood notwithstanding that at the time of her estate she might and afterwards by the permission of the Husband during the coverture the time is incurred so as she cannot fell it because the Law doth appoint a time which if it be not felled before such time that it shall not be felled by a Termor or a Tenant for life but it shall be Waste Hill 23. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 7. A Man makes a Lease of a Garden containing three Roodes of Land and the Lessee is ousted and he brings an Ejectione firme and declares that he was ejected of three Roods of Land Rodes Serjeant moved That by this Declaration it shall be intended that he was ejected of the Garden of which the Lease was made and so the Ejectione firme would lie And it was holden by the Lord Chief Justice Dyer That a Garden is a thing which ought to be demanded by the same name in all Precipes as the Register and Fitz. N. Brevium is And this Action is greater then an Action of Trespasse because by Recovery in this Action he shall be put into Possession But Meade and Windham Justices contrary And they agreed that in all reall Actions a Garden shall be demanded by the name Gardinum otherwise not But this Action of Ejectione firme is in the nature of Trespasse and it is in the Election of the Party to declare as here he doth or for to declare of the Ejectment of a Garden for a Garden may be used at one time for a Garden and at another time be ploughed and sowed with Corn. But they conceived that the better order of pleading had been if he had declared that he was ejected of a Garden containing three Roodes of Land as in the Lease it is specified Hill 23. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 8. SErgeant Fenner moved this case That Land is given to the Wife in tail for her Joynture according to the Statute of 11. H. 7. The Husband dieth the Wife accepts a fine Sur conusans de droit come ceo c. of a Stranger And by the same fine grants and renders the Land to him for an Hundred years whether this acceptance of a Fine and Render by the Wife were a forfeiture of her estate so as he in the Reversion or Remainder might enter by the Statute Mead and Dyer Justices it is a forfeiture and Mead resembled it to the Case in 1 H. 7. 12. where it is holden That if Tenant for life do accept of a Fine Sur conusans de droit come ceo c. that it is a forfeiture and the Lessor may enter But Fenner asked their opinions what they thought of the principall case But haesitavernut because they said it was a dangerous case and is done to defraud the Statute of 11. H. 7. Pasch 23. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 9. A Man made a Feoffment in Fee to two to the use of himself and his wife for the term of their lives without impeachment of waste during the life of the Husband the remainder after their decease to the use of I. his son for the term of his life And further by the same Deed Vult concedit that after their three lives viz. of the Husband Wife and Son that I. S. and I. D. two other Feoffees shall be seized of the same Land to them and their heirs to the use of the right Heirs of the body of the Son begotten It was moved That by this deed the two later Feoffees should be seized to the use of the right Heirs of the body of the Son begotten after the death of the Husband Wife and the Son But it was holden by all the Justices That the second Feoffees had not the Fee because by the first part of the Deed the Fee-Simple was given to the first Feoffees and one Fee-Simple cannot depend upon another Fee-Simple Notwithstanding that after the determination of the former uses for life the Fee-Simple should be vested again in the Heires of the Feoffer and that the words That the second Feoffees should be seized should be void But Dyer Chief Justice and the other Justices were against that because there wanted apt words to raise the later use As if a man bargain and sell his Reversion of Tenant for Life by words of Bargain and Sale only and the Deed is not Enrolled within the six months but afterwards the Tenant for Life doth attorne yet notwithstanding that the Reversion shall not passe because Bargain and Sell are not apt words to make a Grant And that Case was so adjudged in the Common Pleas as the
Lord Dyer said So in the principall Case and therefore the later Use was utterly void and shall not be raised by intendment But otherwise it had been if it had been by devise Pasch 23. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 10. IT was holden by all the Justices of the Common Pleas That the Queen might be put out of her Possession of an Advowson by two Usurpations And she shall be put to her Writ of Right of Advowson as a common person shall be because it is a transitory thing and that the Grant of that Advowson made by the Queen after the two Usurpations should be void and that was so adjudged upon a demurrer in the point And so it is holden in 47 E. 3. 4. b. Psch 23. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 11. AN Indenture of Covenant was made betwixt I. S. and I. D. in which I. S. did Covenant to Enfeoffe I. D. of his Manor of D. In consideration of which I. D. by the same Indenture did Covenant with the said I. S. to pay him 100 li. The Question is If I. S. will not make the Feoffment whether I. D. be bound to pay the money It was holden by the Lord Dyer Chief Justice and Justice Mead That he is not because the money is Covenanted to be paid Executory to have the Feoffment made and therefore if he will not make the Feoffment he shall not have the money As if I Covenant with one That I will marry his Daughter and he Covenants with me That for the same cause he will make an Estate to me and his Daughter and to the Heirs of our two bodies begotten of his Manor of D he shall not make it untill we are married But if I Covenant with a man That I will marry his Daughter and he Covenants with me To make an Estate to me and his Daughter if I marry another woman or if the Daughter marryeth another man yet I shall have an Action of Covenant to compell him to make the Estate because in this later Case the Covenant was made for another Cause And this difference was so taken by the whole Court 15 H. 7. 10. So if A. grant to B. all the ancient Pale and for that B. grants That he will make a new Pale it is holden in 15. E. 4. 4. by Catesby and affirmed by Littleton That if B. cannot have the ancient Pale that he shall be excused from making the new Pale But if two things are given by two Persons one for the other there if one of them detain the one the other cannot detain the other as is 9 E. 4. 20. and 15 E. 4. 2. It is holden That if one grant Tithes in Fee by one Deed and by the same Deed for the same Grant the Grantee grant to the same Person an Annuity of 20 li That if the Grantor of the Tithes enter into the Tithes yet the Grantee cannot detaine the Annuity because the grant of the Tithes is executed in him and he may have an Action for them if the other enter upon them But in the principall Case The Covenant was but Executory for the other and then if one be not performed the other shall never be performed Windham and Periam Justices conceived the contrary and therefore the case was adjourned and a demurrer in law upon it Pasch 23 Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 12. TEnant in taile the Remainder in Fee the Tenant in taile makes a Lease for life according to the Statute of 32 H. 8. and afterwards dieth without issue and before any entrie he in the remainder grants his Remainder by Fine Whether the Conusee of the Fine may enter upon the Tenant for life and avoid his Lease was the question Fenner Serjeant Hee cannot because when a Free-hold is given by Livery it cannot be defeated without Entrie As If a Parson make a Lease for life rendring rent and dieth and his successor accept the rent the lease is affirmed as it is holden in 11. E. 3. and 18. E. 4. The Case was That a man made a Lease for life the remainder in Fee Tenant for life granted over his estate and then a Formedon was brought against the Grantee and then the first Tenant for life died And by all the Justices except Littleton and divers Serjeants the Writ shall not abate if he in the Remainder hath not entred So in the principall case When he had made a Lease for life and afterwards died without issue living the Tenant for life his estate is not defeated before entrie of him in the Remainder And then when before entrie he in the Remainder grants his Remainder the Grantee shall have it but as a Remainder for so is his grant and so the estate of Tenant for life which was but voidable is made good And so was it holden by Windham and Periam Justices but Meade and Dyer Chief Justice did conceive that by the death of Tenant in taile without issue his Lease made to him for life was void and not voidable because by the death of Tenant in tail his estate out of which the estate of the Tenant for life was derived is determined and therefore the estate for life is determined also Et cessante causâ cessat effectus And Meade compared it to the Case of 21. H. 7. 12 where it was holden That if a man do make a Lease for life upon condition that if he pay unto the Lessee ten pounds at such a day that his estate shall cease Now by the performance of the Condition the estate is determined without entrie Mich. 24. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 13. POLES Case THomas Pole one of the Clerks of the Chancery married a woman who was Executrix to her Husband and in an Action of Debt brought against them in the Common Pleas the said Pole brought a writ of Priviledg to have removed the said Action into the Chancery And by all the Justices the Writ was disallowed and the defendants ruled to answer there because the Wife was joyned in the Action with the Husband and she could not have the priviledg and therefore not the Husband And so it is adjudged by the whole Court 34. H. 6. 29. and 35. H. 6. 3. But see 27. H. 8. 20. where the case was That a man brought an Action in the Common Pleas against Husband and at the pluries returned he and his Wife were arrested into an inferiour Court veniendo to Westminster and because the Husband hath priviledg therefore his Wife shall be in the same condition But Dyer said That the reason there was because the Wife came in aid of her Husband to follow his suit And therefore it is not like the principall Case at the Bar. Mich. 24. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 14. IN Debt upon a Bond of Forty pound for the Payment of Twenty pound at a Day and Place certain The Defendant pleaded That he had paid the said Twenty pound according to the Condition upon which they are at Issue and at
the Nisi Prius the Defendant gave in Evidence That he had paid the Money to the Plaintiff before the day and that the Plaintiff had accepted of it all which Matter the Jury found specially and referred the same to the Justices And it was said by the whole Court That that payment before the day was a sufficient Discharge of the Bond but because the Defendant had not pleaded the same Specially but Generally that he had paid the Money according to the Condition the Opinion was That they must find against the Desendant for that the Speciall Matter would not prove the Issue and the Lord Dyer Chief Justice said That the Plaintiffs Councel might have demurred upon the Evidence Mich. 24. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 15 AN Action was brought upon the Statute of 1 2 Phil. Mar. And the Statute is That no Distresse shall be driven out of the Rape Hundred Wapentake or Laith where such distresse is or shall be taken except it be to the Pound Overt within the said County not exceeding three Miles distant from the place where the Distresse was taken and the Plaintiff declared of a Distresse taken in a Hundred in such a County and that he drove it six miles out of the County and because a Hundred may be in diverse Counties and the Statute is That the driving ought not be more then 3 miles out of the Hundred and that it might be that the driving was six miles from the place where the Distresse was taken in another County and yet not three miles from the Hundred where the taking was for that Cause it was not adjudged against the party And that was after Verdict in arrest of Judgment Pasch 24. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 16. A Feme sole seized of a Manor to which there were Copyholds One of the Copyholders did entermarry with the woman and afterwards he and his wife did suffer a Recovery of the Manor unto the use of themselves for their lives and afterwards to the use of the heires of the wife The Question was Whether the Copyhold were extinct And Anderson the Chief Justice said That if a Copyholder will joyn with his Lord in a Feoffment of the Mannor that thereby the Copy-hold is extinct The same Law is if a Copyholder do accept a Lease for years of his Copyhold which was agreed by the whole Court Pasc 24. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 17. I. N. Doth Covenant with I. S. by Indenture to pay him forty pounds yearly for one and twenty years and afterwards I. S. doth release to I. N. all Actions The Question was Whether the whole Covenant were discharged And it was holden by all the Justices that only the Arrerages were discharged because the Covenant is executory yearly to be executed during the Term of one and twenty years for he may have several Actions of Covenant for every time that it is behind and if it be behind the second year he may have a new Action for that and so of every year during the Term several Actions for nothing shall be discharged by the release of all Actions but that which was in Action or a Dutie at the time of the release made As in 5. E. 44. and L. 5. E. 4. 41. In debt for Arrerages of an Annuity the defendant pleaded a release of all Actions which bore date before any arrerages were behind And the opinion of the Justices was there That it was no Plea and so it was adjudged for it is not a thing in Action nor a Duty untill the day of paiment comes And it is there holden by Arden That if a man make a Lease for two years rendring Rent and that the Tenant shall forfeit twenty shillings nomine poenae for not paiment at the day there a release of all Actions personals made to the Tenant before the penalty be forfeited is no Bar for it is neither Duty nor thing in Action before the failer of paiment And in 42. E. 3. 33. A man did release to his Tenant for term of life all his Right for the Term of the life of the same Tenant for life And that he nor his heirs might any right demand nor challenge or claim for the life of the Tenant for life in the said Land and afterwards he died and the Tenant committed Waste and the heir brought an Action of Waste and the Tenant pleaded the same Release and it was holden no Plea for nothing was extinct by the same Release but that which was in Action at the time of the Release made and that the Waste was not Rhodes Serjant put a Case which he vouched to be adjudged 4. Eliz. which was That if a man Covenant with I. S. that if he will marry his daughter that then he will pay him twenty pounds If a Release were made by I. S. before the marriage the same will not determine the twenty pounds if he marry her afterwards because it was not a Duty before the marriage So in the principal Case notwithstanding that the Covenant was once broken for the non-paiment at the first day yet because a several Action of Covenant lieth for every day that it was arreare the Release shall extinguish but only that which was Arreare at the time of the Release made And so Note That a Release doth not discharge a Covenant which is not broken Pasch 24. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 18. UPon a special Verdict in an Action of Debt The Case was this I. S. and I. N. did submit themselves to the Award Order Rule and Judgemant of A. and B. for all Matters Quarrels and Debates and the Bond was made to perform the Award Order Rule and Judgement ment made by them And they Award Order Rule and Adjudge That I. S. shall pay to W. N. who was a Stranger twenty shillings The first Question was Whether the Award were good And it was holden by Anderson Chief Justice Meade and Periam Justices That the Award was void because it was out of their Submission for they cannot Award a man to do a thing which doth not lye in his power for in this Case W. N. to whom the money is to be paid is a Stranger and it is in his Election if he will accept of the money or not And so it is holden in 22. H. 6. 46. and 17. E. 4. 5. but vid. cont 5. H. 7. 2. Then if the Award be void The second Question was If yet the Bond to performe it be good or not And it was holden by the whole Court that it was void also against the Book of 22. H. 6. 46. because that the Condition was to performe that which was against the Law Quaere that Case for it seemes not to be Law at this day And it was then holden That Awards concerning Acts to be performed by them which have not submitted are void And in all Cases where each of the parties which submit have not some thing the Award is void Pasch
was adjudged against the Plaintiffe as in a Valore Maritagii if the Defendant will shew that hee tendered a mariage whereas it is not needfull for him so to do yet if the same be not true and issue be taken upon it Judgement shall be given against him wherefore hee concluded for the Plaintiffe The principall Case was adjourned Trinit 10 Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 270 GOODMAN and GORE 's Case GOodman brought an Assize against Gore and others for erecting of two houses at the West end of bis Wind-Mill per quod ventus impeditur c. And it was given in Evidence That the said houses were situate about eighty feet from the said Mill and that in height it did extend above the top of the Mill and in length it was twelve yards from the Mill and notwithstanding this neernesse the Court directed the Jury to find for the Defendant And in that Evidence it appeared by a Deed procured by the Plaintiff himself That his Wife was Joint-tenant with him and therefore it was holden by the Court That the Assize brought in his own name alone was not well brought And Cook Chief Justice also said That the Count was not good by reason of these words viz. Per quod ventus impeditur for he said That these were the words of an Action upon the Case and not of an Assize But the Clarks said That such was the usuall forme ad quod non fuit responsum and in that Case it was said obiter by Cook Chief Justice That if the Husband and Wife be Joint-tenants and the Husband sowes the Land and dieth and the Wife doth survive that she shall have the embleements Trinit 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 271 HARDINGHAM's Case IN an Action of Trespass Quare clausum fregit the Defendant did justifie That he did enter and distrain for an Amercement in the Sheriffs Torne which was imposed upon the Plaintiffe for enchroaching upon the Kings High-way without shewing that the same was presented before the Justices of Peace at their Sessions as the Statute of 1. E. 4. cap. 2. requireth Haughton Serjeant for stay of Judgement in this Case said That the Statute is That the Justices of Peace shall award Process against the person who is so indicted before the Sheriffe which was not done in this Case And he said That the Statute did not extend to Amercements only in Trespasses Quare vi armis but to every other Trespass for the Statute speaks of Trespasses and other things which shall be extended to all Trespasses Cook Chief Justice said That the Statute of 1. E. 4. cap. 2. did not extend to Trespasses which were not contra pacem as the encroachment in this Case is for otherwise the Lord of a Leet could not distrain for an amercement without such presentmennt before Justices of the Peace And although the Statute speaks of Felony Trespass c. the same is to be meant of other things of the same nature which is proved by the clause in the Statute viz. That they shall be imprisoned which cannot be in the principall Case at Bar. Warburton and Winch Justices agreed in opinion with Cook Chief Justice Trinit 10. Iacobi in the Common Pleas. 272 FRAUNCES and POWELL's Case IT was moved for a Prohibition to the Spirituall Court for citing the Plaintiffe out of his Diocess upon the Statute of 23. H. 8. and by the Libel it appeared That Powell the Defendant had complained against the Plaintiffe in the Court of Arches for scandalous words spoken in the Parish of Saint Sepulchers London Cook Chief Justice held That a Prohibition would lie unlesse the Bishop of London had given liberty to the Arch-Bishop of Canterbury to entermeddle with matters within London for he said that in the Statute of 23. H. 8. there is a clause of exception in case where such liberty is given by the inferior Diocesan and therefore a day was given by the Court to procure a certificate of the opinion of the Civilians whether such authority given by the Inferiour Ordinary to the Arch-Bishop were Warranted by there Law or not for the Statute of 23. H. 8. is so and then if the authority be lawfully granted no prohibition will lye And Cook said that the Statute of 23. H. 8. was made but in affirmance of the common Law as appears by the books of 8. H. 6. and 2. H. 4. For there it is said that if one be excomenge in a forrain Dioces that the same is void coram non judice and he said that the principal cause of making of the said Statute was to maintain the Jurisdiction of Inferiour Diocesses But it was holden that if the Plaintiff had defamed the Defendant within the Peculiar of the Arch-Bishop that in such case he might be punished there although that he did inhabit within any remote place out of the Peculiar of the Arch-Bishop and in this Case it was said that the Arch-Bishop had in thirteen Parishes in London Peculiar Jurisdiction It was adjorned Trinit 10. Jacobi in the Court of Wards 273 COTTONS Case SIR John Tirrel Tenant in Capite made a Lease unto Carrel for 1000. years and further covenanted with Carrel and his Heirs that upon payment of five Shillings that he and his heirs would stand seised of the same Lands unto the use of Carrel and his Heirs And in the Deed there were all the ordinary clauses of a conveyance bona fide viz. That the Lessee should enjoy the Lands discharged of all Incumbrances and that he would make further assurance c. Carrel assigned this Lease to Cotton who died in possession his Heir within age and in two Offices the Jury would not find a Tenure because it was but a Lease for years And in a que plura the matter came in question in the Court of Wards And Cook Chief Justice of the Common Pleas and Tanfeild Chief Baron of the Exchequer were called for Assistants to the Court of Wards and they were of opinion that because it was found by the Offices that Cotton died in possession that the same was sufficient to entitle the King to Wardship of the Lands But before the Judges delivered there opinions the Lessee was compelled to prove the Sealing of the Lease by witnesses which was dated 12. years before For if they have no sufficient witnesses to prove the Sealing of the Lease without all doubt there was sufficient matter found to entitle the King viz. that the party died in possession which shall be intended of an estate in Fee simple till the contrarie be proved But the two Justices moved the Attorney That he would not trouble himself with the proof of a matter in fact For they said It was confessed on all sides that there was such a Lease and that the Assignee of it died in possession of the Land and therefore they said that they were cleer of opinion that the Heir of such a Lessee who died in possession should be
man and his heirs such Seat and he and his heirs have used to repair the said Seat If another will libell against him in the Spirituall Court for the same Seat he shall have a Prohibition And he said That he had seen a Judgement in 6. E. 6. That if Executors lay a Grave Stone upon the Testator in the Church or set up his Coat-armour in the Church If the Parson or Vicar doth remove them or carry them away that they or the heir may have their Action upon the Case against the Parson or Vicar Note in the principall no Prohibition for the reasons before Trinit 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 287 The Archbishop of York Sedgwick's Case THe Archbishop of York and Doctor Ingram brought and exhibited a Bill in the Exchequer at York upon an Obligation of seven hundred pound and declared in their Bill in the nature of an Action of Debt brought at the common Law which matter being shewed unto the Court of Common Pleas by Sedgwick the Defendant there A Prohibition was awarded to the Archbishop and to the said Court at York And Cook chief Justice gave the reasons wherefore the Court granted the Prohibition 1. He said because the matter was meerly determinable at the common Law and therefore ought to be proceeded in according to the course of the common Law 2. Although the King hath granted to the Lord President and the Councel of York to hold pleas of all personall Actions yet he said they cannot alter the form of the proceedings For as 6. H. 7. 5. is The King by his Grant cannot make that inquirable in a Leet which was not inquirable there by the Law nor a Leet to be of other nature then it was at the common Law And in 11. H. 4. it is holden That the Pope nor any other person can change the common Law without a Parliament And Cook vouched a Record in 8. H. 4. That the King granted to both the Universities that they should hold plea of all Causes arising within the Universities according to the course of the Civil Law and all the Judges of England were then of opinion That that grant was not good because the King could not by his Grant alter the Law of the Land with which case agrees 37. H. 6. 26. 2. E. 4. 16. and 7. H. 7. But at this day by a speciall Act of Parliament made 13. Eliz. not printed The Universities have now power to proceed and judge according to the Civil Law 3. He said That the Oath of Judges is viz. You shall do and procure the profit of the King and his Crown in all things wherein you may reasonably effect and do the same And he said That upon every Judgement upon debt of forty pound the King was to have ten shillings paid to the Hamper and if the debt were more then more But he said by this manner of proceeding by English Bill the King should lose his Fine 4. He said That if it was against the Statute of Magna Charta viz. Nec super eum ibimus nec super eum mittemus nisi per legale judicium parium suorum vel per legem terrae And the Law of the Land is That matters of fact shall be tried by verdict of twelve men but by their proceedings by English Bill the partie should be examined upon his oath And it is a Rule in Law That Nemo tenetur seipsum prodere And also he said That upon their Judgement there no Writ of Error lyeth so as the Subject should by such means be deprived of his Birth-right 5. It was said by all the Justices with which the Justices of the King's Bench did agree That such proceedings were illegall And the Lord Chancellor of England would have cast such a Bill out of the Court of Chancery And they advised the Court of York so to do and a Prohibition was awarded accordingly Trinit 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 288 Doctor HUTCHINSON's Case DOctor Hutchinson libelled in the Spirituall Court against one of his Parishioners for Tithes The Defendant there shewed that the Doctor came to the Parsonage by Symony and Corruption And upon suggestion thereof made in the Common Pleas prayed a Prohibition Doctor Hutchinson alledged that he had his pardon and pleaded the same in the Spirituall Court And notwithstanding that the Court granted a Prohibition because the Pardon doth not make the Church to be plena but maketh the offence onely dispunishable But in such case If the King doth present his presentee shall have the Tithes Trinit 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 289 NOte by Cook Chief Justice that these words viz. Thou wouldest have taken my purse from me on the high way are not actionable But Thou hast taken my money and I will carry thee before a Justice lay felony to thy charge are actionable Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 290 HATCH and CAPEL's Case IN an Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit brought against the Defendant The Plaintiffe declared How that one Hallingworth who was the Defendants Husband was indebted unto the Plaintiffe eight pound ten shillings for beer and that he died and that after his death the Plaintiff demanded the said mony of the Defendant his wife and she in consideration that he would serve her withbeer promised that she would pay unto the said Plaintiff eight pound ten shillings and for the rest of the beer at such a day certain And the Plaintiffe did averr That he did sell and deliver to her Beer and gave her day for the payment of the other money as also for the Beer delivered unto her and that at the day she did not pay the Money Cook and all the other Justices agreed That the Action would well lie and that it was a good Assumpsit and a good consideration for they said That the forbearance of the money is a good consideration of it selfe and they said That in every Assumpsit he who makes the promise ought to have benefit thereby and the other is to sustain some losse And judgement was given for the Plaintiff Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 291 NORTON and LYSTERS Case IN the Case of a Prohibition the Case was this Queen Elizabeth was seised of the Manor of Nammington which did extend into four Parishes viz. Stangrave and three other And the Plaintiff shewed That he was seised of three Closes in Stangrave and prescribed That the said Queen and all those whose Estate he hath in the said Closes had a Modus decimandi for the said three Closes and for all the Demeanes of the said Manor in Stangrave And whether the Venire facias should be de parochia de Stangrave or of the Manor was the question And it was resolved by the whole Court That the Visne should be of the Parish of Stangrave and not of the Manor And the Difference was taken when one claimes any thing which goes unto the whole Manor and when only to
the case which implyed their opinions to be for the Universitie And 21. H. 7. was vouched That the Patronage was only matter of favour and was not a thing valuable And in this case Cook chief Justice said That Apertus haereticus melius est quam fictus Catholicus Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 310 BOND and GREEN's Case AN Action of Debt was brought against an Administrator the Defendant shewed how that there were divers Judgments had against him in 〈◊〉 Aâ—d â—â—so that there was another Debt due by the Testator which was assigned over unto the Kings Majesty and so pleaded That he had fully Administred Barker Serjeant took Exception to the pleading because it was not therein shewed that the King did assent to the Assignment and also because it was not shewed that the Assignment was enrolled The Court said nothing to the Exceptions But whereas he Defendant as Administrator did alledge a Retayner in his own hands for a debt due to himselfe The opinion of the whole Court was that the same was good and that an Administrator might retayne to satisfie a debt due to himselfe But it was agreed by the Court That an Excecutor of his own wrong should not Retayne to satisfie his own debt See to this purpose C. 5. part Coulters Case Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 311 STROWBRIDG and ARCHERS Case IN An Action of debt upon a Bond the Defendant was Outlawed And the Writ of Exigent was viz. Ita quod habeas corpus ejus hîc c. whereas it ought to be coram Justiciariis nostris apud Westminster And for that defect the utlagary was reversed and it was said that it was as much as if no Exigent had been awarded at all And upon the Reversall of the utlagary a Supersedeas was awarded and the party restored to his goods which were taken in Execution upon the Capias utlagatum It was also resolved in this Case That if the Sheriffe upon a Writ of Execution served doth deliver the mony or goods which are taken in Execution to the Plaintiffs Atturney it is as well as if he had delivered the same to the Plaintiff himself for the Receipt by his Atturney is in Law his own Receipt But if the Sheriff taketh goods in Execution if he keep them and do not deliver them to the paâ—â— at whose suit they are taken in Execution the party may have a new Execution as it was in the principal Case because the other was not an Execution with Satisfaction Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 312 CHAVVNER and BOVVES Case BOwes sold three Licences to sell Wine unto Chawner who Covenanted to give him ten pounds for them and Bowes Covenanted that the other should enjoy the Licences It was moved in this Case whether the one might have an Action of Covenant against the other in such Case And the opinion of Warburton and Nichols Justices was That if a Man Covenant to pay ten pound at a day certain That an action of Debt lyeth for the money and not an action of Covenant Barker Serjeant said he might have the one or the other But in the principall Case the said Justices delivered no opinion 313 Note That this Day Cooke Chief Justice of the Common Pleas was removed to the Kings Bench and made Lord Chief Justice of England And Sir Henry Hobart who was the Kings Aturney generall was the day following made Lord Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas. Sir Francis Bakon Knight who before was the Kings Solicitor was made Atturney Generall And Mr Henry Yelverton of Grays-Inn was made the Kings Solicitor and this was in October Term. Mich. 11 Jacobi 1613. Mich. 11. Jacobi In the Common Pleas. 314 THis Case was put by Mountague the Kings Serjeant unto the Lord Chief Justice Hobart when he took his place of Lord Chief Justice in the Common Pleas viz. Tenant in tail the Remainder in taile the Remainder in Fee Tenant in tail is attainted of Treason Offence is found The King by his Letters Patents granteth the lands to A who bargaineth and selleth the land by Deed unto B. B. suffers a common Recovery in which the Tenant in tail is vouched and afterwards thâ— Deed is enrolled And the question was Whether it was a good Bar of the Remainder And the Lord Chief Justice Hobart was of opinion That it was no barre of the Remainder because before enrollment nothing passed but only by way of conclusion And the Bargainee was no Lawfull Tenant to the Precipe Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 315 WHEELER's Case IT was moved for a Prohibition upon the Statute of 5. E. 6. for working upon Holy days and the Case was That a man was presented in the spirituall Court for working viz. carriage of Hay upon the feast day of Saint John the Baptist when the Minister preached and read divine service and it was holden by the whole Court of Common Pleas That the same was out of the Statute by the words of the Act it self because it was for necessity And the Book of 19 H. 6. was vouched That the Church hath authority to appoint Holy days and therefore if such days be broken in not keeping of them Holy that the Church may punish the breakers therof But yet the Court said That this day viz. the Feast day of Sr John the Baptist was a Holy day by Act of Parliament and therefore it doth belong unto the Judges of the Law whether the same be broken by doing of such work upon that day or not And a Prohibition was awarded Mich. 11 Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 316 REARSBY and CUFFER's Case IT was moved for a Prohibition to the Court of Requests because that a man sued there by English Bill for money which he had layd out for an Enfant within age for his Meat drink necessary apparel and set forth by his Bill that the Enfant being within age did promise him to pay the same And a Prohibition was awarded because as it was said he might have an action of Debt at the common Law upon the contract for the same because they were things for his necessary livelihood and maintenance And it was agreed by the Court That if an Infant be bounden in an Obligation for things necessary within age the same is not good but voidable Quaere for a difference is commonly taken When the Assumpsit is made within age and when he comes to full age For if he make a promise when he cometh of full age or enters into an Obligation for necessaries which he had when he was within age the Law is now taken to be that the same shall binde him But see 44. Eliz. Randals Case adjudged That an Obligation with a penaltie for money borrowed within age is absolutely void Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 317 SMITH's Case SMith one of the Officers of the Court of Admiralty was committed by the Court of Common Pleas to the prison of
expressly that he recover treble damages yet because it did amount to so much if the words of the sentence be joyned together It was directed that a special Prohibition in which the Statute and the whole matter is to be mentioned be awarded And in this case it was agreed by the whole Court That the Statute of 2 â— 6. for substraction of Tythes meerly doth not give any damages but if the Tythe be first set forth and then they are substracted there because the Parson had once an interest in them he shall recover treble damages And the principal Case was resembled by Warburton Justice to the case of Waste that if the Jury give damages 20l l there the Court shall treble the damages and make the same 60l and so it was done in the principal case Hill 11 Iacobi in the common-Common-Pleas 342. GIPPE's Case A Man Libelled for Tythes in the Spiritual Court the Defendant alleadged a Modus Decimandi and thereupon had a Prohibition and afterwards the Plaintiffe in the Prohibition did not prove his suggestion within six months and therefore the Court granted a Consultation because the Law hath appointed a certain time within which time the suggestion is to be proved Otherwise the Parson should be delayed and prejudiced in his Tythes and so it was adjudged in Parson Bugs case Mich. 8. Jacobi in this Court Hill 11 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 343. CROSSE and STANHOP's Case AN action of false Imprisonment was brought against the Defendant and two other Justices of Peace of the County of York The Defendants justified the Imprisonment by reason of the Statute of 1 M. cap. That it should not be lawful for any maliciously and contumeliously to molest or disquiet any person or persons which are Preachers or after should be Preachers And the Plaintiffe demurred upon the Plea in Bar generally and two Exceptions were taken to the Pleading 1. Because the words of the Statute were misrecited for the words of the Statute are in the disjunctive maliciously or contumeliously And the opinion of the Court was that when the precedent subsequent words disjunctive are all of one sense that the word Or is all one with the copulative but where they are of divers natures as by word or deed it is otherwise The second Exception was That where the words were by the greater part of the Justices the Recital was by the better part of the Justices But notwithstanding these Exceptions it was adjudged against the Plaintiffe Pasch 12 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 344. CARTWRIGHT's Case CArtwright prayed a Prohibition and the Case was this A. lying sick upon his bed made his Will and afterwards said unto his Executors named in the Will I will that B shall have twenty pounds more if you can spare it And the Executor answered and said Yes forsooth but no Codicil was made of the same Legacie And a Bill was preferred in the Spiritual Court for the Legacie whereupon the Executor prayed a Prohibition And it was holden by this Court that although this Court hath not power to hold plea of the thing Libelled for there in the Spiritual Court yet it hath power to limit the Jurisdictions of other Courts and if they abuse their authority to grant a Prohibition Vid. 2 H. 4. 10. But it was doubted whether the Spiritual Court as this case is might give remedy to the person for the Legacie For the same not being annexed to the Will by a Codicil it was but fidei commissum and so the doubt was Whether the Spiritual Court might hold plea of it For if they cannot hold plea of it then in this case a Prohibition may be lawfully granted although that this Court have not power nor jurisdiction of the thing it self The Court would be advised of it and therefore it was adjourned Pasch 12 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 345. Sir CHRISTOPHER HEYDON's Case GOdsall Shepard Smith brought an Assise of Novel disseisin against Sir Christopher Heydon which was tryed at the Assises in Norfolk before Sir Tho. Fleming Lord Chief Justice of England and Justice Dodderidge which was found for the Plaintiffs and Judgment was given for them in the Court of common-Common-Pleas And thereupon Sir Christopher Heydon brought a Writ of Error in the Kings Bench and assigned for Error That whereas the Judgment was given upon his own Confession the Judgment was entred That the Plaintiffs did recover per visum Recognitorum Assise predict And after argument in the Kings-Bench it was adjudged by the whole Court that the Judgment given in the Common-Pleas should be affirmed notwithstanding the Error assigned And now to reverse the Judgment given in the Kings Bench he brought another Writ of Error in Parliament Cook Chief Justice said That the Clarks of the Chancery ought not to make a Writ of Error to the Parliament unlesse they have the Kings licence so to do And it was agreed by the whole Court that a Writ of Error lieth in Parliament upon the Transcript of the Record without bringing of the Record it self in Parliament For the Parliament is holden at the Kings pleasure and may be dissolved before the Errors be discussed and so the Record it self cannot be brought here again because the Parliament which is a higher Court was once possessed of it 8 H. 5. Error 88. The same Law in Error upon a Judgment given in Ireland 5 E. 2. Error 89. where only the Transcript of the Judgment is removed For if the Record it self should be brought into England it might be that before it came hither it shall be drowned in the sea and it is dangerous to commit a Record to the mercy of the winds and sea And Error lieth to reverse a Fine upon the Tenor of the Record and it is not necessary to bring the Fine it self because there is not any Chirographer in this Court to examine it At another day the same Term George Crook and Noy took five Exceptions to the said Writ of Error the first was Because the Writ doth recite the Judgment to be in Assis capt coram Tho. Fleming Capital Justiciar ad Placita Johannem Dodderidge milit unum Justic ad Placit coram nobis tent And the Exception was because that this latter addition was not to them both Dodderidge Justice held that the same was no good Exception to abate the Writ of Error because the omission is only in the addition of Honour which is surplusage and the Person is certain and his power appears to take the Assise and that Exception is not in point of jurisdiction but of denoting of the person and therefore is like the Case in 19 Eliz. Dyer 356. which is a stronger Case and 6 E. 6. Dyer 77. Haughton and Cook contr But Crook Justice did agree with Dodderidge that the addition of the same was but surplusage and that the Writ had been well enough without it Cook Chief Justice held the contrary For then he varieth from their
it is not known whether he be guilty or not and in Cuddingtons Case it was a general Pardon and that was the cause that the Action did lie for that it is not known whether he committed the Felony or not But they conceived that if it had been a particular Pardon that then in that case the Action would not have been maintainable For the procuring of a special Pardon doth presuppose and it is a strong presumption that the party is guilty of the offence Note it did not appear in the Case of Fines the principal Case whether the Pardon by which Dr. Spicer was pardoned were a general Pardon or whether it were a particular and special Pardon Pasch 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 415. DAVER's Case IN Davers Case who was arraigned for the death of William Dutton Ley Chief Justice delivered it for Law That if two men voluntarily fight together and the one killeth the other if it be upon a sudden quarrel that the same is but Man-slaughter And if two men fight together and the one flieth as far as he can and he which flieth killeth him who doth pursue him the same is Se defendendo Also if one man assaulteth another upon the High-way and he who is assaulted killeth the other he shall forfeit neither life nor lands nor goods if he that killed the other fled so far as he could Quod nota Pasch 21 Jacobi â—n the Court of Wards 416. Sir EDWARD COKE's Case THis Case being of great consequence and concernment The Master of the Court of Wards was assisted by four of the Judges in the hearing and debating of it and after many Arguments at the Barr the said four Judges argued the same in Court viz. Dodderidge one of the Justices of the Kings Bench Tanfield Lord chief Baron of the Exchequer Hobart Lord Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas and Ley Lord Chief Justice of his Majesties Court of Kings Bench The Case in effect was this Queen Elizabeth by her Letters Patents did grant to Sir Christopher Hatton the Office of Remembrancer and Collector of the first Fruits for his life Habendum to him after the death or surrender of one Godfrey who held the said Office then in possession Sir Christopher Hatton being thus estated in the said Office in Reversion and being seised in Fee-simple of diverse Mannors Lands and Tenements did Covenant to stand seised of his said lands c. unto the use of himself for life and afterwards to the use of J. Hatton his son in tail and so to his other sons intail with the Remainder to the right heirs of J. Hatton in Fee with Proviso of Revocation at his pleasure during his life Godfrey the Officer in possession died and Sir Christopher Hatton became Officer and was possessed of the Office and afterwards he became indebted to the Queen by reason of his said Office And the Question in this great Case was Whether the Mannors and Lands which were so conveyed and setled by Sir Christopher Hatton might be extended for the said Debt due to the Queen by reason of the Proviso and Revocation in the said Conveyance of Assurance of the said Mannors and Lands the debt due to the Queen was assign'd over and the Lands extended and the Extent came to Sir Edward Coke and the heir of John Hatton sued in the Court of Wards to make void the Extent And it was agreed by the said four Justices and so it was afterwards decreed by Cranfield Master of the Court of Wards and the whole Court That the said Mannors and Lands were liable to the said Extent And Dodderidge Justice who argued first said that the Kings Majestie had sundry prerogatives for the Recovery of Debts and other Duties owing unto him First he had this prerogative ab origine legis That he might have the Lands the Goods and the Body of the Person his Debtor in Execution for his Debt But at the Common Law a common person a common person could not have taken the body of his debtor in execution for his debt but the same priviledg was given unto him by the Statute of 25. E. 3. cap. 17. At the Common Law he said that a common person Debtee might have had a Levari facias for the Recovery of his Debt by which Writ the Sheriffe was commanded Quod de terris Catallis ipsius the Debtor c. Levari faciat c. but in such Case the Debtee did not meddle with the Land but the Sheriffe did collect the Debt and pay the same over to the Debtor But by the Statute of West 2. cap 20. The Debtee might have an Elegit and so have the moyetie of the Lands of his Debtor in Execution for his Debt as it appeareth in C. 3. part 12. in Sir William Harberts Case Secondly He said That the King had another prerogative and that was to have his Debt paid before the Debt of any Subject as it appeareth 41. E. 3. Execution 38. and Pasc 3. Elizabeth Dyer 197. in the Lord Dacres and Lassels Case and in M. 3. E. 6. Dyer 67 Stringfellows Case For there the Sheriffe was amerced because the King ought to have his Debt first paid and ought to be preferred before a Subject vid. 328 Dyer There the words of the Writ of Priviledg shew that the King is to be preferred before other Creditors By the Statute of 33. H. 8. cap. 39. The Execution of the Subject shall be first served if his Judgment be before any Processe be awarded for the Kings debt In the Statute of 25. E. 3. Cap. 19. I find that by the Common Law the King might grant a Protection to his Debtor that no other might sue him before that the King was satisfied his debt See the Writ of Protection Register â— 81. B. the words of which are Et quia nolumus solutionem debitorum nostrorum caeteris omnibus prout ratione Perogativae nostrae totis temporibus retroactis usitatae c. But that grew such a Grievance to the Subject that the Statute of 25. E. 3. Cap. 19. was made And now by that Statute a common person may lawfully sue to Judgment but he cannot proceed to Execution and so the Kings Prerogative is saved unless the Plaintiffe who sueth will give security to pay first the Kings Debt For otherwise if the Paty doth take forth Execution upon his Judgment and doth levy the money the same money may be seized upon to satisfie the Kings Debt as appeareth in 45. E. 3. title Decies tantum 13. The third Prerogative which the King hath is That the King shall have the Debt of the Debtor to the Kings Debtor paid unto him v. 21 H. 7. 12. The Abbot of Ramseys Case The Prior of Ramsey was indebted to the King and another Prior was indebted to the Prior of Ramsey and then it was pleaded in Barr that he had paid the same Debt to the King and the Plea holden for a good Plea
puisne or the lesser Debt and although the Debtor be able and sufficient to pay both Debts viz. the Kings Debt and the Debt owing to the Subject yet the Kings Debt is to be first paid Now to apply these cases to the Case in question Here is a Subject who is indebted to the King And I say That the Lands which such a Debtor hath in his power and dispose although he hath not any Estate in the Lands shall be liable to pay the Debt to the King And I say That Sir Christopher Hatton had a Fee in the Mannors and Lands in this case And although he did convey them bona fide yet untill his death by reason of the Proviso of Revocation they were extendable Trin. 24. E. 3. Rot. 4. Walter de Chirton Customer who was indebted to the King for the Customs purchased Lands with the Kings monies and caused the Feoffor of the Lands to enfeoffe certain of his friends with an intent to defraud and deceive the King and notwithstanding he himself took the profits of the Lands to his own use And those Lands upon an Inquisition were found and the values of them and retorned into the Exchequer and there by Judgment given by the Court the Lands were seized into the Kings hands to remain there untill he was satisfied the Debt due unto him And yet the Estate of the Lands was never in him But because he had a power viz. by Subpena in Chancery to compell his Friends to settle the Estate of the Lands upon him therefore they were chargeable to the Debt You will say perhaps there was Covin in that Case But I say that neither Fraud Covin nor Collusion is mentioned in the Report in Dyer 160. C. 11. par 92. And that Case was a harder Case then our Case is For Walter de Chirton in that Case was never seised of the said lands But in our Case Sir Christopher Hatton himself had the lands And when he had the lands he was assured of the Office although he had not the possession of it For he was sure that no other could have it from him and no other could have it but himself And for another cause our Case is a stronger Case then the Case of Walter de Chirton For Chirton had no remedy in Law to have the lands but his remedy was only in a Court of Equity and a remedy in Consc ' onely But in our Case Sir Christopher Hatton had a time in which he might let the land to passe and yet he had a power to pull it back again at his pleasure So as he had the disposition of it but before the alteration of the uses he dyed And if he had been living being indebted to the King the King might have extended the lands because that then he had the possession of them There were two Considerations which moved Sir Christopher Hatton to Convey the Lands the first was honorable viz. For the payment of his Debts the second was natural viz. For the preferment of his Children Although the Conveyance of the Lands for payment of his Debts was but for years yet the same was too short like unto a Plaister which is too short for the sore For the Covenanters were not his Executors and so they were not liable to Debts And although he be now dead and cannot revoke the former uses yet he had the power to revoke the uses during his life And so he was chargeable for the Debt due to the King Tanfield Chief Baron agreed with Justice Dodderidge in all as before And he said That all powerful and speedy courses are given unto the King for the getting in of his Revenues and therefore he said he had the said Prerogatives as have been recited And in 25 E. 3. in libro rubro in the Exchequer there the Foundations of the said Prerogatives do appear If a common person arrest the body in Execution he shall not resort to the lands contr to Blumfields Case C. 5. par The course of the Exchequer makes a Law every where for the King If any Officer be indebted unto the King and dyeth the course of the Exchequer is For to call in his Executors or the Heir or the Terre-Tenants to answer the Debt and if he hath no lands then a Writ issueth out of the Exchequer to know what goods he had and to whose hands they be come All Inquisitions concerning Lands in the like Cases are Habuit vel seisitus and not that he was seised onely The word Habuit is a large word and in it is contained a disposing power But in this Case Sir Christopher Hatton had a power every day to revoke the uses And when he had once revoked them then was he again as before seisitus 7 H. 6. in the Exchequer the Kings Farmor had Feoffees to his use and dyed indebted to the King And upon an Inquisition it was found that Habuit for he had them in his power by compelling his Feoffees by Equity in Chancery and therefore it was adjudged that the King should have the Lands in the Feoffees hands in extent But in this case Sir Christopher Hatton might have had the Lands in him again without compulsion by a Court of Equity for that he had power to revoke the uses in the Conveyance at his pleasure Mich. 30. H. 6. rot in the Exchequer A Clark of the Court was assigned to receive monies for the King who had Feoffees of lands to his use And the lands were found and seised for the Kings monies by force of the word Habuit 32 H. 6. Philip Butler's Case who was Sheriffe of a County being indebted to the King his Feoffees were chargeable to the Kings debt by force of the word Habuit For habuit the lands in his power 6 E. 4. Bowes Case acc ' 34 H. 6. A widow being indebted to the King her Feoffees were chargeable to pay the Kings debt because she had power of the lands It being found by Inquisition that habuit 1 R. 3. the like Case And 24 Eliz. in Morgan's Case it was adjudged That lands purchased in the names of his Friends for his use were extended for a debt due by him to the King Hobart Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas argued to the same purpose and agreed with the other Justices and he said in this case it was not material whether the Inquisition find the Deed to be with power of Revocation For he said that the Land is extended and that the extent remains good untill it be avoided And he said that a revocable Conveyance is sufficient to bind the Parties themselves but not to bind the King but the Lands are lyable into whose hands soever they come When a man is said to forfeit his body it is not to be intended his life but the freedom of his body Imprisonment At the Common Law a Common person could neither take the bodie nor the Lands in Execution But yet at the Common Law
thing and shall he be bound by a Conveyance Anno. 16. H. 6. then in the time of Civil War Uses began and of Lands in use the Lord Chief Baron Tanfield in his Argument hath cited diverse cases where the lands in use were subject and lyable to the debt of Cestuy que use in the Kings Case and so was it untill the Statute of 27. H. 8. of Uses was made Babbington an Officer in the Exchequer had lands in the hands of Feoffees upon Trust and a Writ issued out and the lands were extended for the Debt of Babbington in the hands of his Feoffees Sir Robert Dudley having lands in other mens hands upon Trusts the lands were seized into the Kings hands for a contempt and not for debt or damages to the King And in this Case although that the â—nquisition do find the Conveyance but have not found it to be with power of Revocation yet the Land being extended it is well extended untill the contrary doth appear and untill the extent be avoided by matter of Record viz. by Plea as the Lord Chief Baron hath said before Ley Chief Justice of the Kings Bench argued the same day and his Argument in effect did agree with the other Justices in all things and therefore I have forborne to report the same at length And it was adjudged That the Extent was good and the Land well decreed accordingly Pasch 21 Jacobi in the Exchequer Chamber 417. The Lord SHEFFIELD and RATCLIFF'S Case IN a Writ of Error brought to reverse a Judgment given in a Monstrans de Droit in the Court of Pleas The Case was put by Glanvile who argued for Ratcliffe the Defendant to be this 2 E. 2. Malew being seised of the Mannor of Mulgrave in Fee gave the same to A. Bigot in tail which by divers discents came to Sir Ralph Bigot in tail Who 10 Jannarii 6 H. 8. made a Feoffment unto the use of â—is last Will and thereby after his Debts paid declared the use unto his right heirs in Fee and 9. H. 8. dyed The Will was performed Francis Bigot entred being Tenant in tail and 21 H. 8. made a Feoffment unto the use of himself and Katherine his wife and to the use of the heirs of their two bodies Then came the Statute of 26 H. 8. cap. 13. by which Tenant in tail for Treason is to forfeit the Land which he hath in tail Then the Statute of 27 H. 8. of Uses is made Then 28 H. 8. Francis Bigot did commit Treason And 29 H. 8. he was attainted and executed for the same Anno 31 H. 8. a private Act of Parliament was made which did confirm the Attaindor of Francis Bigot and that he should forfeit unto the King word for word as the Statute of 26 H. 8. is saving to all strangers except the Offendor and his heirs c. 3 E. 6. The heir of Francis Bigot is restored in blood Katherine entred into the Mannor and dyed seised 8 Eliz. their Issue entred and married with Francis Ratcliffe and had Issue Roger Ratcliffe who is heri in tail unto Ralph Bigot And they continue possession untill 33. Eliz. And then all is found by Office and the Land seised upon for the Queen who granted the same unto the Lord Sheffield Francis Bigot and Dorothy die And Roger Ratcliffe sued a Monstrans de Droit to remove the Kings hands from off the lands and a Scire facias issued forth against the Lord Sheffield as one of the Terre-Tenants who pleaded all this special matter and Judgment was thereupon given in the Court of Pleas for Roger Ratcliffe And then the Lord Sheffield brought a Writ of Error in the Exchequer-Chamber to reverse the said Judgment And Finch Serjeant argued for the Lord Sheffield that the Judgment ought to be reversed And now this Term Glanvile argued for Roger Ratcliffe that the Judgment given in the Court of Pleas ought to be affirmed There are two points The first If there were a Right remaining in Francis Bigot and if the same were given unto the King by the Attaindor and the Statute of 31 H. 8. Second If a Monstrans de Droit be a proper Action upon this matter which depends upon a Remitter for if it be a Remitter then is the Action a proper Action The Feoffment by Ralph Bigot 6 H. 8. was a Discontinuance and he had a new use in himself to the use of his Will and then to the use of his Heirs Then 9 H. 8. Ralph Bigot dyed And then Francis Bigot had a right to bring a Formedon in the Discendor to recover his estate tail 21 H 8. then the point ariseth Francis Bigot having a right of Formedon and an use by force of the Statute of 1 R. 3. cap. 1. before the Statute of 27 H. 8. by the Feoffment he had so setled it that he could not commit a forfeiture of the estate tail When a man maketh a Feoffment every Right Action c. is given away in the Livery and Seisin because every one who giveth Livery giveth all Circumstances which belongs to it For a Livery is of that force that it excludes the Feoffor not only of all present Rights but of all future Rights and Tytles v. C. 1. par 111. and there good Cases put to this purpose 9 H. 7. 1. By Livery the Husband who was in hope to be Tenant by Courtesie is as if he were never sised 39 H. 6. 43. The Son disseiseth his Father and makes a Feoffment of the lands the Father dyeth the hope of the heir is given away by the Livery It was objected by Serjeant Finch 1. Where a man hath a right of action to recover land in Fee or an estate for life which may be conveyed to another there a Livery doth give away such a Right and shall there bind him But an estate in tail cannot be transferred to another by any manner of Conveyance and therefore cannot be bound by such a Livery given I answer It is no good Rule That that which doth not passe by Livery doth remain in the person which giveth the Livery 19 H. 6. Tenant in tail is attainted Office is found The estate tail is not in the King is not in the person attainted but is in abeyance So it is no good Rule which hath been put When Tenant in tail maketh a Feoffment Non habet jus in re neque ad rem If he have a Right then it is a Right of Entre or Action but he cannot enter nor have any action against his own Feoffment 19 H. 8. 7. Dyer If Discontinuee of Tenant in tail levieth a Fine with proclamations and the five years passe and afterward Tenant in tail dyeth his issue shall have other five years and shall be helped by the Statute for he is the first to whom the right doth accrue after the Fine levied for Tenant in tail himself after his Fine with Proclamations hath not any right But if Tenant in tail be
the possession is bound by the Judgment of Attaindor and the Act of Parliament 5 H. 7. 31. 7 H. 7. 15. 16 H. 7. 8. A discent of land shall not make a title against the King or any other who hath the land by an Act of Parliament But then in our Case If there should be a Remitter yet the same is overreached by the Office 〈◊〉 part 10. before the Statute of 33 H. 8. cap. 20. there ought to have been an Office found in the Case of Attaindor of Treason Br. Cases 103. Brook Office Devant c. 17. I do not mean an Office of intitling but an Office declaratory of a conspicuous title C. 5. part 52. There are two manner of Offices One which vesteth the estate and possession of the land c. in the King Another which is an Office of Instruction and that is when the estate of the land is lawfully in the King but the particularity thereof doth not appear upon record And the Office of Instruction shall relate to the time of the Attaindor not to make Queen Elizabeth in our Case in by discent but to avoid all meâ—ne Incombrances And is not this Remitter an Incombrance And for that purpose the Office shall relate For in things of Continuance Nullum tempus occurrit Regi C. 7. part 28. For so the rule of Nullum tempus c. is to be understood of a thing of Continuance and not a thing unica vice v. Fitz. Entre Congeable 53. Trav. 40. where it is said Where the King hath cause to seise for the forfeiture of Tenant for life if the Tenant for life dyeth the Reversion may enter for in that case Tempus occurrit Regi and the King cannot seize after the death of the Tenant for life 35 H. 6. 57. There is no discent against the King and if there be no discent then there is no Remitter The consequence of all this is That the Office doth relate to the Right And that the Monstrans de Droit doth not lie And the want of Office found for all this time was the fault of the Kings Officers and shall not prejudice the King But if the Office should not relate then the Monstrans de Droit would lie because then the King was in but by one single matter of Record We shew in the Office 33 Eliz. That there issued forth a Commission directed to certain of the Privy-Councel to enquire of the Treason and if Francis Bigot upon the Treason were Indicted And in our Case we shew immediately another Commission was directed to the Lord Chancellor and the two Chief Justices c. to arraign Francis Bigot And all that is confessed by Ratcliffe himself viz. modo forma And therefore the Objection which Glanvile made was frivolous viz. That it did not appear that Francis Bigot was attainted by Verdict by Confession or by Outlawry And so he concluded That for these causes the Judgment given in the Court of common-Common-Pleas ought to be reversed George Crook argued for Ratcliffe and he prayed that the Judgment might be affirmed I will argue only these points following 1. That Francis Bigot had not so much as a right of Action at the time of his Attaindor for he had not any right at all 2. Admit that he had a right of Action If this right of Action be given to the King by the said Statutes of 26 31 H. 8. It was objected That the right being clothed with a possession that the same is given to the King But I will prove the contrary 3. When Francis Bigot being Tenant in tail and being attainted and executed for Treason and then Katherine his wife dyeth being one of the Donees in tail 21 H. 8. and the lands discend to Ratcliff If the Office afterwards found shall relate to take away the Remitter I say it doth not but that his Remitter doth remain to maintain his Monstrans de Droit and he is not put to his Petition The chief point is What right Francis Bigot had at the time of his Attaindor 1. When Ralph Bigot being Tenant in tail 6 H. 8. made a Feoffment in Fee what right remained in Francis his Son The right is in abeyance viz. in nubibus that is in custodia Legis And then Francis Bigot had no right of that entail 21 H. 8. when he made the Feoffment Com. 487. There Jus is divided viz. Jus recuperandi Jus in randi Jus habendi Jus retinendi Jus percipiendi Jus possedendi but here Francis Bigot had not any of these rights Com. 374. if the Discontinuee of Tenant in tail levieth a Fine with proclamations and five years passe and Tenant in tail dyeth the issue in tail shall have other five years because he is the first to the right 19 H. 8. 7. C. 7. part 81. If Donee in tail maketh a Feoffment in Fee in rei veritate the Donee hath not jus in re neque ad rem C. 3. part 29. Litt. 649. There it appeareth that the right to an estate tail may be in abeyance Com. 552. Walsinghams Case There the King gave land in tail to Wyat who made a Feoffment unto Walsingham Afterwards Wyat was attainted of Treason and there the estate tail of Wyat was forfeited but the cause there was because that the reversion was in the Crown and so no discontinuance by his Feoffment because that the reversion was in the Crown In our Case no right of the estate tail was in Francis Bigot after the Feoffment unto his own use but the right is in abeyance It was objected That the Writ of Formedon is Discendit jus and the Monstrans de Droit was so I answer It is so in point of form in the Writ but not in substance C. 7. part 14. Tenant in tail makes a Lease for life and Tenant for life dyeth Now he hath an ancient right and the Donor may avow upon the Tenant in tail notwithstanding his Feoffment but that is by reason of privity and not by reason of any right he hath Jus recuperandi did discend to the issue in tail viz. Francis Bigot 21 H. 8. He who hath a right of Action giveth the same away by his Livery and Feoffment as appeareth by the Cases put in C. 1. part 111. It was objected That Cestuy que use was an Attorney or Servant therefore he doth not passe his own right for he cannot make an Attorney to make Livery and 9 H. 7. 26. was cited to be adjudged so But it is adjudged to the contrary M. 25 H. 8. in the Kings Bench rot 71. betwixt the Bishop of London and Kellet as it appeareth in Dyer 283. and Bendloe's Reports and C. 9. part 75. For there it is expresse that Cestuy que use may make a Letter of Attorney to make Livery which proves that he makes not the Feoffment as a Servant but as Owner of the Land It was objected That Cuesty que use was as an Executor but that I deny 49
husband and therefore the prescription is not good that Potest ponere retes upon the land of another upon the Custome of the Sea for prescription must be in a thing done also by him the devise is not good according to the Custome for that is that she may devise and surrender and that ought to be all at one time and that in the presence of the Reeve and six other persons as well as the Surrenderer and the words of a Custome shall be so far performed as they may be Meade contrary And that these Witnesses shall be referred to the surrender onely for a devise may be without Witnesses And he said that sometimes the latter clause shall not refer to all the precedent matter but unto the latter onely as 7. H. 7. is Where a Praecipe was brought of lands in A. B. and C. in Insula de Ely the Clause in Insula de Ely is referred onely to C. And it was said That if in the principal Case the Will were good that then the husbands are Tenants in common and then the Action of Trespass is not maintainable Pasch 25. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 23. THis Case was moved by Serjant Gawdy Thomas Heigham had an hundred Acres of lands called Jacks usually occupied with a house and he leased the house and forty Acres parcel of the said hundred Acres to I. S. for life and reserved the other to himself and made his Will by which he doth devise the house and all his lands called Jacks now in the occupation of I. S. to his wife for life and that after her decease the remainder of that and all his other lands pertaining to Jacks to R. who was his second son Whether the wife shall have that of which her husband died seised for her life or whether the eldest son should have it and what estate he shall have in it Meade The wife shall not have it for because that he hath expressed his Will that the wife shall have part it shall not be taken by implication that she shall have the whole or the other part for then he would have devised the same to her And therefore it hath been adjudged in this Court betwixt Glover and Tracy That if Lands be devised to one and his heirs males and if he die without heirs of his body that then the land shall remain over that he had no greater estate then to him and his special heirs viz. heirs Males and the reason was because the Will took effect by the first words Anderson Chief Justice It was holden in the time of Brown That if lands were devised to one after the death of his wife that the wife should have for life but if a man seised of two Acres deviseth one unto his wife and that I. S. shall have the other after the death of the wife she takes nothing in that Acre for the Cause aforesaid For the second matter If the Reversion shall pass after the death of the wife to the second son we are to consider what shall be said land usually occupied with the other and that is the land leased with it But this land is not now leased with it and therefore it cannot pass Windham The second son shall have the Reversion for although it doth not pass by these words Usualy Occupied as Anderson held yet because the devise cannot take other effect and it appeareth that his intent was to pass the land the yonger son shall have it Anderson Jacks is the intire name of the house and lands And that word when it hath reference unto an intire thing called Jacks and is known by the name of Jacks shall pass to the second son for words are as we shall construe them And therefore If a man hath land called Mannor of Dale and he deviseth his Mannor of Dale to one the land shall pass although it be not a Mannor And if I be known by the name of Edward Williamson where my name is Edward Anderson and lands are given unto me by the name of Edward Williamson the same is a good name of purchase And the opinion of the Court was that the Reversion of the land should pass to the second son Pasc 25. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 24. The Lord MOUNTJOY and the Earle of HUNTINGTON'S Case NOte by Anderson Chief Justice and Periam Justice If a man seised of any entrie Franchises as to have goods of Felons within such a Hundred or Mannor or goods of Outlaws Waifes Strares c. which are causual There are not Inheritances deviseable by the Statute of 32. H. 8. for they are not of any yearly value and peradventure no profit shall be to the Lord for three or four years or perhaps for a longer time And such a thing which is deviseable ought to be of annual value as appeareth by the words of the Statute And also they agreed that the said Franchises could not be divided and therefore if they descend to two coparceners no partition can be made of them And the words of the Statute of 32. H. 8. are That it shall be lawful c. to divise two parts c. and then a thing which canot be divided is not diviseable And they said That if a man had three Manors and in each of the three such Liberties and every Manor is of equal value that yet he cannot devise one Mannor and the Liberties which he hath to it Causá quâ supra but by them an Advowson is deviseable because it may be of annual value But the Lord Chancellor smiling said That the Case of the three Manors may be doubted And there also it was agreed by the said two Justices upon Conference had with the other Justices That where the Lord Mountjoy by deed Indented and Inrolled did bargaine and sell the Manor of â—amford to Brown in Fee and in the Indenture this Clause is contained Provided alwayes And the said Brown Covenants and Grants to and with the Lord Mountjoy his Heirs and Assigns that the Lord Mountjoy his Heirs and Assigns may digg for Ore within the land in Camford which was a great Waste and also to digg Turffe there to make Allome and Coperess without any contradiction of the said Brown his Heirs and Assigns They agreed That the Lord Mountjoy could not devide the said Interest viz. to grant to one to digg within a parcel of the said Waste And they also agreed That notwithstanding that Grant That Brown his Heirs and Assigns owners of the Soile might digg there also like to the Case of Common Sans number The Case went further That the Lord Mountjoy had devised this Interest to one Laicott for one and twenty years and that Laicott assigned the same over to two other men And whether this Assignment were good or not was the Question forasmuch that if the Assignement might be good to them it might be to twenty and that might be a surcharge to the Tenant of the soile And as to that
contract was determined and not in esse at the time of promise But he said it was otherwise upon a consideration of Marriage for that is alwayes a present consideration and alwayes a consideration because the party is alwayes married Windham to the same intent and compared it to the Case of 5. H. 7. If one sell an horse to another and after at another day will warâ—ant him to be good and sound of limb and member it is void warranty for it ought to have been at the same time that the horse was â—old Periâ—m Justice contrary for he said This case is not like to any of the cases which have been put because there is a great difference betwixt Contracts and this Action For in Contracts the consideration and promise and sale ought to concur because a Contract is derived of con trahere which is a drawing together so as in Contracts every thing requisite ought to concur as the consideration of the one side and the promise or sale of the other side But to maintain an Assumpsit it is not requisite for it is sufficient if there be any moving cause or consideration precedent for which cause or consideration the promise was made and that is the common practice at this day For in Assumpsit the Declaration is That the Defendant for and in consideration of ten pounds to him paid postâ—a silicet a day or two after super se assumpsit c. and that is good and yet there the consideration is executed And he said that Hunt and Baker's case which see 10. Eliz. Dyer 272. would prove it The case was this The Apprentice of Hunt was arrested when Hunt was in the Country and Baker one of Hunts neighbours to keep the Apprentice out of the Counter became his Baile and paid the debt Afterwards Hunt returning out of the Country thanked Baker for his neighbourly part and promised him to repay him the said summ Upon which Baker brought an Action upon the Case upon the promise And it was adjudged that the Action would not lie not because the consideration was precedent to the promise but because it was executed and determined long before But there the Justices held That if Hunt had requested Baker to have been surety or to pay the debt and upon that request Baker paid the debt and afterwards Hunt promiseth for that consideration the same is good for the consideration precedes and was at the instance and request of the Defendant So here Sydenham became bail at the request of the Defendant and therefore it is reason that if he be at losse by his request that he ought to satitfie him And he conceived the Law to be cleer that it was a good consideration and that the request is a great help in the Case Rodes Justice agreed with Periam for the same reasons and denyed the Case put by Anderson And he said That if one serve me for a year and hath nothing for his service and afterwards at the end of the year I promise him ten pounds for his good and faithfull service ended he may maintain an Assumpsit for it is a good consideration But if the servant hath wages given him and the Master ex abundantia as he said promiseth him ten pounds after his service ended the same promise shall not maintain an Assumpsit for there is not any new cause or consideration preceding the Assumpsit And Periam agreed to that difference and it was not denyed by the other Justices but they said that the principall Case was a good case to be advised upon and at length after good advice and deliberation had of the cause they gave Judgment for the Plaintiff that the Action would lie And note That they very much relyed upon Hunt and Bakers Case before cited See Hunt and Baker's Case in 10. Eliz. Dyer 272. Pasc 27. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 41 CARTER and CROST's Case CArter brought an Action of Detinue of a chaine against Crosts and declared That Thomas Carter his brother was thereof possessed and died Intestate for which cause the Bishop of Cork granted him Letters of Administration and that the Chain came to the Defendants hands by Trover c. And declared also That he was as Administrator thereof possessed in London To which the Defendant Crosts pleaded the Generall Issue and the Jury gave a speciall Verdict and found that the Administration was committed to Carter in London by the Bishop of Cork in Ireland here and did not find that Carter was possessed of the chain in London And upon this special Verdict first it was moved That the Bishop of Cork in Ireland being in England might commit administration of things in Ireland And it was held cleerly by the Court That he might of things within his Diocesse in Ireland because it is an Authority Power or Matter that followes his Person and wheresoever his Person is there is his Authority As the Bishop of London may commit Administration being at York but it ought to be alwaies of things within his Diocesse and therefore they held That the Declaration was good in that point That the Bishop of Cork did commit Administration in London although there be no such Bishop of England The second point was If an Aministrator made by a Bishop of Ireland might bring an Action here as Administrator and it was holden That he could not because of the Letters of the Administration granted in Ireland there could be no triall here in England although that Rodes Justice said That Acts done in Spirituall Courts in Forrain places as at Rome or elsewhere the Law saith That a Jury may take notice of them because such Courts and the Spirituall Courts here make but one Court and he proved it by the Case of the Miscreancy in 5. R. 2. Tryall 54. where a Quare Impedit was brought by the King against the Clerk of a Church within the Bishopprick of Durham and counted that the Bishop who is dead presented his Clerk and that the Clerk died and the Chapter collated a Cardinall who for Miscreancy and Schisme was deprived the Temporalties being in the Kings hands Burgh He hath counted of an Avoidance for Miscreancy at the Court of Rome which thing is not tryable here Belknap Chief Justice I say for certain That this Court shall have Conusans of the Plea and that I will prove by Reason for all Spirituall Courts are but one Court and if a man in the Arches be deprived for a Crime and appeal to Rome and is also there deprived that Deprivavation is triable in the Kings Court in the Arches And if a man be adhering unto the Kings enemies in France his Lands are forfeitable and his adherence shall be tryed where his Land is as oftentimes it hath been for adherence to the Kings enemies in Scotland And so by my faith if one be Miscreant his Land is forfeitable and the Lord thereof shall have the Escheat and that is good reason For if a man
licence be to A. and B. or C. some conceived that A. or B. might alien but not C. Et èâ—converso Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 105 IT was agreed by the whole Court That a Partition made by word betwixt Joyntenants is not good See Dyer 29. Pl. 134. and 350. Pl 20. doth agree and see there the reason of it Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 105 IT was holden by the whole Court That if the Father do devise Lands unto his Son and Heir apparant and to a stranger that it is a good Devise and that they are Joyntenants for the benefit of the Stranger Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 106 FULLER'S Case A. Promises unto the eldest son that if he will give his consent that his Father shall make an Assurance unto him of his Lands that he will give him ten pounds If he give his assent although no assurance be made yet he shall maintain an Action upon the promise But at another day Periam Justice said that in that case the son ought to promise to give his assent or otherwise A. had nothing if his son would not give his consent And so where each hath remedy against the other it is a good Consideration In Hillary Term after Fenner spake in arrest of Judgment upon the speciall Verdict That because that the Assumpsit is but of one part and the other is at liberty whether he will give his consent or not that therefore although that hee do consent that hee shall not recover the ten pounds Also he said That the promise was that if hee would give consent that his Father should make assurance to him and here the assurance is made to A. to the use of the Defendant and his Wife in taile so as it varies from the first Communication and also it is in tail Shuttleworth contrary in as much as he hath performed it by the giving of consent then when he hath performed It is not to the purpose that he was not tyed by a crosse Assumpsit to do it but if he had not given his consent he should have nothing At length Judgment was given for the Plaintiff And Periam Justice said in this Case That if a covenant be to make an Estate to A. and it is made to B. to the use of A. that he doubted whether that were good or not Mich. 28 29 Eliz. In the Common Pleas. Intratur Hill 28. Eliz. Rot. 1742. 107 WISEMAN and WALLINGER'S Case A Man seised of two Closes called Bl. Acre makes a Lease of them rendring Ten Shillings rent The Lessee grants all his Estate in one of them to A. and in the other to B. The Lessor doth devise all his Land called Bl. Acre in the tenure of A. and dieth The Devisee brings an Action of Debt for the whole Rent against the first Lessee And the Opinion of the whole Court was That the Action would not lie because they conceived That but the Reversion of one Close passed and also that the rent should not be apportioned in that Case because a terme is out of the Statute and a Rent reserved upon a Lease for years shall not be apportioned by the act of the Lessor as where he takes a Surrender of part of it But otherwise by Act in Law as where the Tenant maketh a Feoffment in Fee of part of the Land and the Lessor entreth And at another day Anderson Chief Justice said That if the Lessor of two Acres granteth the Reversion of one Acre that the whole Rent is extinct Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas 108 A Lease for years is made of Land by Deed rendring Rent the Lessee binds himselfe in a Bond of Ten Pound to perform all Covenants and Agreements contained in the Deed the Rent is behind and the Lessor brings an Action of Debt upon the Bond for not payment of the Rent the Obligor pleads performance of all Covenants and Agreements the Lessor saie That the Rent is behind it was holden That it is no Plea for the Obligor to say That the Rent was never demanded But in this Bar he ought to have pleaded That he had performed all Covenants and Agreements except the payment of the Rents And as to that That he was alwayes ready to have paid it if any had come to demand it but as the first Plea is it was held not to be good And as to the demand of the Rent the Court was of opinion That it was to be demanded for the payment of the Rent is contained in the word Agreements and not in the word Covenants and then if he be not to performe the Agreements in other manner then is contained in the Deed of that agreement the Law saith That there shall be a demand of the Rent But if the Lessee be particularly expressed by covenant to pay the Rent there he is bound to do it without any Demand Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 109 HOLLENSHEAD against KING THomas Hollenshead brought Debt against Ralph King upon a Recovery in a Scire fâ—cias in London upon a Recognizance taken in the Inner or Ouster Chamber of London and doth not shew That it is a Court of Record and that they have used to take Recognisances and Exception was taken unto the Declaration and a Demurrer upon it and divers Cases put That although that the Judgement be void that yet the Execution shall be awarded by Scire facias and the party shall not plead the same in a Writ of Error But Periam Justice took this difference Where Execution is sued upon such a Judgement and where Debt is brought upon it for in Debt it behoves the Party that he have a good Warrant and ground for his Action otherwise he shall not recover but upon a voidable Judgement he shall recover before it be reversed Mich. 28 29 Eliz. In the Common Pleas. Intratur Trinit 28. Eliz. Rot. 507. 110 COSTARD and WINGFIELD'S Case IN a Replevin the Defendant did avow for Damage Feasans by the commandment of his Master the Lord Cromwell The Plaintiffe by way of Replication did justifie the putting in of his Cattell into the Land in which c. by reason that the Towne of N. is an ancient Town and that there hath been a usage time out of mind That every Inhabitant of the same Towne had had common for all his cattel Levant and Couchant in the same Town and so justified the putting in of his cattell The Defendant said That the house in which the Plaintiffe did inhabite in the same Towne and by reason of Residency in which house he claimed common was a new house built within 30 years and within that time there had not been any house there and upon that Plea the Plaintiffe did demurr in Law Shuttleworth Serdeant for the Plaintiffe That he shall have common for cause of Resiance in that new house and the Resiancy is the cause and not the Land nor
it is not shewed that he used any other rite or Ceremony c. for there ought to be some Positive thing 3. He doth not shew the Place or Parish where he persisted in it and that is materiall and issuable The fourth Exception was Because it was Inquisitio câ—pta coram Johanne Peter Waltero Mildmay and so named four of them by vertue of a Commission directed to them and to others and doth not shew what others nec quod illi fuerunt praesentes and then if the Commission were to them all jointly and two only were present then it was coram non judice and so void 5. The Statute saies That if any Parson or Vicar but doth not say being Minister Dei. The sixth was That it was at another Church c. Wray Chief Justice If this Evasion should be allowed the Statute were not to the purpose The seventh was That it doth not shew where the persisting was for that is a speciall thing and materiall and issuable Wray Chief Justice conceived That that only was a materiall Exception and that the other Exceptions were but frivolous and were not good Hill 29. Eliz. In the Kings Bench. 138 WARREN's Case ONE Warren demanded by a Writ of Debt in the Common Pleas Forty Pound and upon his Declaration did confess himselfe satisfied of Twenty Pound and thereupon Error was brought in the King's Bench And the Judgement reversed because by his Declaration he had abated his Writ and he ought to have Judgement according to his Writ and not according to his Declaration The Error assigned was in the Outlawry and it was holden by all the Justices That if the principall Record be reversed for Error that the Outlawry which is grounded upon it shall be reversed also Hill 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 139 ROOTE 's Case THE Case was in a Prohibition touching Tithes and the libell in the Spirituall Court was for Corn and Hay and other things and the Tenant of the land did prescribe to pay in one part of the land the third part of the tenth and in another part the moity of the tenth of Corn for all manner of Tithes And the Court did incline that the same was a good prescription And a Prohibition was granted to the Ecclesiasticall Court Hill 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 140 A Man was possessed for the terme of six years of a Tavern in London and leased the same unto another for three years and it was convenanted betwixt them that during the three years quolibet mense monthly the lessee should give an Account to the lessor of the Wine which he sold and should pay unto him for every Tun sold so much money And afterwards the lessor granted the three years which were remaining of the six years to another and he did request the lessee to account and he would not whereupon he brought an Action of Covenant and the Defendant pleaded That he had accounted to the Assignee of the three years and upon that there was a Demurrer joyned And the better opinion of the Court was that it was no Plea because it was not a Covenant which did go with the land or the Reversion but was a collaterall thing and did not pass by the assignment of the three years Hill 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 141 IT was adjudged That the bringing of a Writ of Error to reverse a Fine by an Infant during his nonage is not sufficient but the Fine by Judgement in the Writ of Error must be reversed during his Nonage Hill 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 142 WIDALL and Sr. JOHN ASHTON's Case A Writ of Error was brought by Widall against Sr. John Ashston because in the other action being an action of Wast The Plaintiff there did declare that he was seised and so seised demisit pro termino annorum c. and did not shew of what estate he was seised And yet he did suppose that it was ad exhaeredationem ejus c. And the same by Beamount was taken for an exception as 7. H. 6. A man pleaded a Feoffment to two haeredibus and doth not say suis it is uncertain And in the principal Case it shall be supposed that he hath but an estate for life for it shall not be intended that he hath an estate of Inheritance without expressing of words to carry an Inheritance As 7. Ass If I grant a Rent to I. S. and do not name what estate he shall have in it he shall have but an estate for life But he said that the Presidents are that if the word seised had been left out it had been good enough For by the Book of Entries a man may say demisit without saying that he was seised demisit But if a man will plead a thing which is not necessary to be pleaded and mistake it it shall make his Plea naught as in Patridges Case Where a suite was upon the Statute of Maintenance It is sufficent to say contra formam Statuti But if he will plead specially the day and place of the Statute and mis-plead it it makes all naught Suit Justice I conceive that that is a fault incurable But upon the other side it was argued that in 21. H. 7. It is holden that he might plead quod demisit without that that he was seised and demisit as there in an Action of Debt And therefore it is but surplusage in the principal Case Vide 15. E. 4. A good Case where surplusage shall not hurt because it is not traversable And he urged that by the Statute of 18. El. the Declaration doth not abate for matter of form And he said that Counts and Declarations shall be taken by Intendment and it shall be intended that if bringeth Wast that he hath such an estate that he may maintain such Action In Adams Case in the Commentaries One shewed that such an Abbot was seised and that the Land came unto the King by Dissolution and that the King being seised did grant the same and did not shew of what estate the King was seised and yet it was holden good See a good Case to this purpose 18. E. 3. Formedon 58. And he said that the Defendant had pleaded Nul wast fait and therefore he had by his Plea affirmed the Declaration to be good Beamount He ought to have said reversione inde sibi haeredibus c. Clenche Justice I conceive that the Statute of 18. El. helps that Suit Justice No truly It was adjourned Hill 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 143 AN Action of Covenant was brought by a Man against another who had been his Apprentize The Defendant pleaded that he was within age The plaintiff did maintain his Action by the Custome of London Where one by Covenant may binde himself within age And Exception was taken to it That that was a Departure Daniel It is no Departure for by 18. R. 2. an Infant brought an Action against Gardian in Socage and the
should not kill the Coneys He cannot take them damage feasants for he cannot impound them Nor doth a Replevin lye of them 19. E. 3. and F. N. B. If the Lord surcharge the Common the Commoner may have an Action against him but in this Case he can have no Action Gaudy Chief Justice He cannot kill the Coneys because he may have other remedie Suit Justice A Commoner cannot take or distrain the Cattel of a Freeholder damage feasants And therefore he cannot kill or destroy the Coneys and he hath a remedy for he may have an Action upon the Case or an Assize against him for putting in of the Coneys if he do not leave sufficient Common for the Commoner Judgment was afterwards given for the Plaintiff Hill 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 145 YARRAM and BRADSHAWE's Case YArram and Wilkenson Sheriffs of the City of Norwich brought an Action upon the Case against Bradshawe because that they being Sheriffs of N. A Capias ad satisfaciendum and shewed at whose Suit and in what action was awarded unto them And they 20. Feb. Anno 25. El. directed their Warrant in writing to three Sergeants of the same City to arrest him by force of which the Sergeants the 26. of Feb. in the same year did Arrest him in Execution and that he was rescued and escaped And that they had spent divers summs of Money in enquiring after him ad grave damnum eorum c. The Defendant pleaded Not Guilty And upon Tryal of the issue a special Verdict was found that about 20. Feb. Anno 25. such a Warrant was made by them unto the Sergeants but not 20. Feb. and that the Sergeans by force thereof about 26. Feb. did Arrest him but not the 26. of Feb. and upon the whole matter there was a demurrer in Law Tanfield for the Defendant and he said It was no Lawfull Arrest For by 8. E. 4. A Bailiff without a Warrant in writing may take goods in Execution and it is good if it be by commandment by word onely of the Sheriff but he cannot Arrest the body of a man without a Warrant in writing sigillo signatum which is not shewed here in the plaintiffs Declaration If one in debt declare per factum suum obligatorium and doth not say sigillo suo sigillatum it is not good Quaere of that for the Book of Entries is not so Secondly he said it must be a present loss or damage to the plaintiffs or else they cannot maintain the action They are chargeable but not charged for if the Sheriffs dye before he begin any Suit against them their Executors shall not be charged But if the plaintiffs have been Arrested then they are endamaged Thirdly as to the Verdict the foot and foundation of the action is the wrong and the wrong here is not found certain for it is supposed to be 26. Feb. And also that the Warrant was Circa 26. Feb. but not 26. Feb. and if it were any day before then the action is maintainable but not if it were any day after A man brings an action of Trespass supposing by his writ the same to be done 1. May If in truth the Trespass was before then it is good but if it were 2. May or at any time after 1. May then it is not good It was a great Case betwixt Vernon and Gray in an Ejectione firme The Ejectment was supposed 1. May and the Jury did finde the Ejectment to be Circa first May and adjudged not good If an Ejectione firme be brought upon a lease made 1. May and the Jury finde the Ejectment to be circa 1. May it is not good Also here they could not take him in Execution again although they had found him For if a man be once out of Execution by 14 H. 7. He shall not be taken again in Execution for the same cause The Court held it not material whether he shewed or not that the Warrant was sub sigillo sigillat ' and therefore thy did not speak to it Godfrey for the plaintiff What if they be not charged but chargeable yet they shall have their action upon the Case for the wrong done viz. The Rescous and the Escape because the Defendant shall not take advantage of his own wrong and so is the opinion of Frowick 13. H. 7. 1. Reporter Quaere For Frowick saith He shall have an action upon the Case or Trespas for breaking of prison against him and shall recover in damage as much as he lost by the escape and so he shall be helped and not by taking of him again And Fitzherbert in his Natura Brevium in the Writ of Ex parte talis holds that upon an Escape the Gaoler shall have a special Writ upon the Case against the Prisoner to answer for the Escape and the damages which the Gaoler shall sustain thereby and it was holden in a great Case viz. One Holts Case That it is not necessary to shew that there was a recovery against them Tanfeild but there it was after a Suit begun although before recovery Godfrey they have also put it in their Declaration that they have expended great sums of Money in looking for him therefore they have shewed that they were damnified Tanfeild it was foolish for them to spend their Money for they could not have taken him again although they had found him Godfrey A man shall have an action for fear of vexation or trouble or charge as one shall have a Warrantia Charta before he be impleaded A man shall have a Curia Claudenda before any breach of the enclosure As to the Verdict It is certain enough for it saith Quod tunc ibidem seipsum recussit and that cannot but be referred to a time certain before viz. 26. Feb. Tanfeild It shall be referred to circa and therefore ad tunc ibidem do remain uncertain Suit Justice Presently by the escape there was a wrong done therefore for that he may have an action Clenche Justice said That he had experience in a Case of Trespas And it was the opinion of almost all the Judges of England That if the Trespass should be done after the day wherein it is supposed to be done by the Writ Yet the Writ shall not abate and therefore he said That the difference of the Trespas done before and after the day supposed by the Writ is to no purpose Further he said that it standeth them upon to have their action before they be sued by the party at whose Suit he was in Execution for perhaps he who was in Execution might dye and other changes might happen so as they might lose all Tanfeild What damages shall the Sheriffs have here if they shall recover before any action be brought against them when as it is uncerrain whether ever they shall be sued or not and so uncertain how much they shall be damnified But notwithstanding all which was said by Tanfeild Judgment was given for the Plaintiffs Hill 29.
the Court was That it is a good grant of an Annuity by these words annualem redditum But whether the Husband shall have a Writ of Annuity after the death of the wife for an Annuity during the Coverture they were in some doubt because it is but a thing in Action as is an Obligation Otherwise were it of a Rent which she had for life Note in pleading for a Rent he shall plead That he was seised c. Mich. 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 152 WINKFEILD'S Case Winkfeild devised Land in Norfolk to one Winkfeild of London Goldsmith and to his heirs in Fee And afterwards he made a Deed of Feoffment thereof to divers persons unto the use of himselfe for life without impeachment of waste the Remainder unto the Devisee in fee. But before he sealed the Deed of Feoffment he asked one if it would be any prejudice to his Will who answered No. And the Devisor asked again if it would be any prejudice because he conceived that he should not live untill Livery was made And it was answered No. Then he said that he would seale it for his intent was that his Will should stand And afterwards Livery was executed upon part of the Land and the Devisor died Rodes and Periam Justices The Feoffment is no Countermand of the Will because it was to one person but perhaps it had been otherwise if it had been to the use of a stranger although it were not executed Anderson Chiefe Justice and others the Will is revoked in that part where the Livery is executed And he said It would have been a question if he had said nothing And all the Justices agreed That a man may revoke his Will in part and in other part not And he may revoke it by word and that a Will in writing may he revoked by word Periam said It is no revocation by the party himselfe but the Law doth revoke it to which Windham agreed But he said That if the party had said nothing when he sealed the Feoffment it had been a revocation of the party and not of the Law Periam If the Witnesses dye so as he cannot prove the words spoken at the sealing of the Feoffment the Feoffment will destroy the Will and so he spake to Anderson who did not deny it All this was delivered by the Justices upon an Evidence given to a Jury at the Barre Mich. 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 153 NOte That it was said by Anderson Chiefe Justice That if one intrude upon the possession of the King and another man entreth upon him that he shall not have an Action of Trespasse for he who is to have trespasse ought to have a possession and in this case he had not for that every Intruder shall answer the King for his time and therefore he shal not answer to the other party To which Walmesley and Fenner Serjeants agreed Periam doubted of it for he conceived That he had a possession against every stranger Snagg Serjeant conceived That he might maintain an Action of Trespasse but Windham and Rodes Justices were of opinion that he could not maintain Trespass Walmesley he cannot say in the Writ Quare clausam frâ—git c. Rodes vouched 19. E. 4. to maintain his opinion Mich. 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 154 NORRIS and SALISBURIE'S Case IN an Action of Debt upon a Bond the Case was this Norris was possessed of wools for which there was a contention betwixt the Defendant and one A. And Norris promised A. in consideration that the goods were his and also that he should serve processe upon Salisbury out of the Admiral Court that he would deliver the goods to A. And afterwards he delivered the goods to Salisbury the Defendant who gave him Bond with Condition to keep him harmlesse from all losses charges and hinderances concerning and touching the said wools Afterwards A. served processe upon him and he did not deliver to him the goods for which A. brought his Action upon the Case against Norris who pleaded That he made no such promise which was found against him And afterwards Norris brought an Action of Debt upon the Bond against Salisbury because he did not save him harmlesse in that Action upon the Case And the opinion of the whole Court was That the Action of Debt would not lie because that the Action upon the Case did not concern the wools directly for the Action is not brought but for breach of the promise And that is a thing of which the Defendant had not notice and it was a secret thing not concerning the wools but by circumstances and so out of the Condition Anderson Chiefe Justice said That if A. promise B. in Consideration that B. is owner of goods and hath them to deliver them to C. the same may be a good consideration yet he somewhat doubted of it But Walmesley did affirme it to be a good Consideration Mich. 29 Eliz in the Common Pleas. 155 IT was holden by the whole Court That in an Action of Trespasse It is a good plea in barre That the Plaintiffe was barred in an Assize brought by him against the Defendant and issue joyned upon the Title But otherwise if it were upon the generall issue viz. Nul tort nul disseisin For then it might be that the Plaintiffe was never ousted nor disseised and so no cause to recover In which case it was no reason to put him from his Writ of Right Mich. 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. Intratur Mich. 27. Rot. 1627. 156 BRAGG'S Case A Woman having cause to be endowed of a Manor in which are Copy-holders doth demand her Dower by the name of certain Messuages certain Acres of land and certain Rents and not by the name of the third part of the Manor and she doth recover and keeps Courts and grants Copy-holds It was holden by the whole Court that in such Case that the Grants were void for she hath not a Manor because she hath made her demand as of a thing in grosse Otherwise if the demand had been of the third part of the Manor for then she had a Manor and might have kept Courts and granted Copies And the pleading in that Case was That she did recover the third part of the Manor per nomen of certain Messuages and Acres and Rents which was holden to be no recovery of the third part of the Manor Hill 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 157 NOte it was holden for Law That the Justices may increase but not decrease damages because the party may have an Attaint and so is not without remedy But note contrary by Anderson and Periam Justices Hill 39. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 158 SErjeant Fenner moved this Case That the Lord of a Manor doth prescribe That if the Tenant do a Rescous or drive his Cattel off from the Land when the Lord comes to distrain that the Tenant shall be amerced by the Homage and that the Lord may distrain for the same Anderson
grant of the Reversion was not within the Statute for the Statute is that the grantee shall have such remedy as the said Lessors or Grantors themselves or their heirs or successors should have had so as the Statute shall be intended of a Reversion in Fee for the Statute doth not provide but in case where heirs or successors shall have Action and not in case where the Action doth belong to Executors For the second point he relyed upon Mallories Case where it is said that the Tenant is to have notice of the Assignement of the Reversion Cook Chief Justice I hold that the Assignee of the Reversion for years in this Case shall have an Action of Covenant by the Statute It was Leonards Case in the time of the Lord Dyer when I was a Reporter in this Court In Leonards Case Lessee for years leased over part of the Term upon condition which is so much as a Covenant and afterwards granted the Reversion and it was ruled that the grantee might enter for the condition broken and the reason as I remember was because that Executors are named in the Statute but I will not charge my memory with the reason but I am well assured that the Case was ruled as I have said Dodderidge It is so that within the Statute Executors are named but not the Executors of him who hath the Reversion but onely the Executors of the Lessee and therefore the naming of Executors in the Statute doth not make against us But the Lord Cook said What answer you to Leonards Case For the third point Cook Chief Justice and Foster Justice held that there needed not any notice in this Case because there is not any Penalty in the case as was in Mallories case For there was a condition Warbarton Justice I doubt the first point for he who bringeth the Action upon the Statute ought to have the whole Reversion and so is Winters case in Dyer 309. Cook and Foster said It needs not that he who is to take advantage by this Statute should have the whole Reversion for it hath been adjudged That if the Reversion be granted in tail that the grantee shall take advantage of this Statute and shall enter for the condition broken Pasch 8. Iacobi in the Common Pleas. 228 CANDICT and PLOMER's Case THe Parishoners had used time out of memory of man c. to chuse the Parish Clark of the Church of St. Austins in Canterbury and the old Clark being dead they chose a new Clark and the Parson by force of a new Canon chose another man for the Clark upon which the Clark chosen by the Parishoners was sued in the Spiritual Court and he had a Prohibition And afterwards he was sued again in the Spiritual Court for setting of the Bread upon the Communion Table and for singing in another Tune then the Parishoners and the other Clark did and was deprived by Sentence there Haughton Serjeant moved for a Prohibition and said that although the last Suit in the Spiritual Court was not directly for the using of the Office of Clark yet by the matters contained in the Libell it is drawn in question whether he were lawfull Clark or not and therefore prayed a Prohibition Cook You shall have a Prohibition for the Canon is against the common Law For particular customs are part of the common Law and said that the Canon Law would not endure Gun-shot And he said that by the Suit in the Spiritual Court they would examine whether he were a Lawfull Clark or not For if he be a Lawfull Clark then he hath good authority to set the Bread upon the Communion Table Haughton But what shall we do for we are deprived by Sentence given there Cook There is no question but that the Prohibition lyeth notwithstanding the Sentence there and for the Deprivation it is meerly void For the Clarkship is a Lay Office and may be executed by a Lay Man and therefore the Ordinary hath no power to deprive him But he may have an Action as Clark notwithstanding the Deprivation for so is the Book in 8. Ass 29. for an Hospital And I wish that an Information be drawn against them for holding plea of a thing which is a meer Lay thing as it was in temps H. 8. Br. Cases Walmesley Justice The Office is Lay and the Deprivation by the Ordinary is void For he cannot deprive him because he hath nothing to do in the Election and a Prohibition was granted At another day the Case was moved again and the Court was of the same opinion that the Clark could not be deprived because the Clarkship was a Lay Office And 3. E. tit Annuity 40. was cited and 18. F. 3. Where a Formedon was brought of the Office of Serjeancy of the Church of L. But Cook said the same day in another case which was moved in Court and gave it for a rule that after Sentence given in the Spiritual Court he would not grant a prohibition if there were not matter apparent within the proceedings For I will not allow that the party shall to have a Prohibition shew any thing not grounded on the Sentence to have a Prohibition because he hath admitted of the Jurisdiction and there is no reason for him to try if the spirituall Court will help him and afterwards at the common Law to sue forth a Prohibition All which was agreed by the whole Court Pasch 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 229 A Writ of Estrepment was granted in Waste because that for Waste done pendant the Writ the Plaintiffe cannot recover damages Per totam Curiam Pasch 8. Jacobi In the Common Pleas. 230 PITS and WARDAL's Case PIts the Butler of Lincolnes-Inne brought an Action of Debt against Wardall and declared upon a Bond with Condition indorsed for the performance of an Arbitrement The Defendant pleads in barre That the Arbitrators nullum fecerunt arbitramentum the Plaintiffe replied That they did make an Arbitrement viz. That the Defendant and one of the Arbitrators should enter into a Bond of eight pound to the Plaintiffe And that after the Bond entred into that the Plaintiffe and Defendant should release all Actions each to other and said That the Defendant and the Arbitrator did not enter the Bond to the Plaintiffe The Defendant did maintain his barre viz. quod nullum fecerunt arbitramentum upon which issue was joyned and it was found for the Plaintiffe Dodderidge for stay of judgement said That upon the Plaintiffes own shewing it appeareth That the Arbitrament is void for the Arbitrament is that a stranger viz. one of the Arbitrators should enter Bond and also that after the Bond entred into That the Plaintiffe should release all actions whereby the Bond should be released and therefore it was void and a void arbitrament is no arbitrament It was admitted by the Court that the arbitrament was void as to the Bond to be entred into by the Arbitrator and also that it was void as
And Warburton held that the heir should have the Rent as a Freehold descended and for that he cited 26. H. 6. Statham Recognizance But Foster said that he should not have the Rent at all Warburton and Walmesley doubted whether the Rent were devisable by the Statute and they said that although the heir should have it by descent yet it should not be in the nature of a descent of Inheritance for he should not have his Age. Cook and Daniel were absent Pasch 8. Iacobi in the Common Pleas. 239 HEYDON and SMITH's Case IN an Action of Trespass the Plaintiff declared of breaking of his Close and cutting down of a Tree viz. an Oak The Defendant pleaded that it was his Free-hold The plaintiff in his Replication shewed that he held of the Defendant by Coppy of Court Roll a Tenement whereof the place in question is parcell And that the Custome of the Manor is That all the Copy-holders within the Manor have used to take wood for house-bote hay-bote c. et pro ligno combustibili in dicto tenemento And said that he had alwayes preserved the wood and trees growing upon the said Tenement And that he had nourished and fostered the said Oake And that sufficient wood was not left upon the said Tenement for house-bote c. upon which the Defendant did demurre in Law Foster Justice Judgment ought to bee given for the plaintiff I hold that a Copy-holder of common right without any Custome shall have wood for Reparations and for fire-bote and so is 9. H. 4. Fitz. Wast 59. the opinion of Hall And I hold that the plaintiff hath an Interest in the Trees according to Palmers Case C. 5. part And 2. H. 4. 12. is That a Coppy-holder may bring An Action of Trespass for the Trees And I hold That without a Custome the Lord cannot fell the trees growing upon the Copy-hold no more then upon a Lease for years But in this Case by Implication of Custome the Lord may take the Trees if he leave sufficient for Reparations c. For the Custome is That a Copy-holder shall have sufficient for Reparations by which is implyed that he shall not have more and then the Rest the Lord shall have And I am of opinion that in this Case and in case where the trees are excepted upon a Lease that the Lord and the Lessor may enter and take the Trees although there be not any clause of ingresse or regresse But in the principall Case because there are not more Trees then are sufficient for Reparation the Lord cannot take them but Trespasse lieth against him Warburton Justice The matter of prescription is not materiall in this case for of common right a Copyholder ought to have Trees for Reparations and to that purpose he hath a speciall propertie But the onely question in this Case as I conceive is If one who hath a speciall property may bring an Action of Trespasse against him who hath the generall propertie And I conceive that he may well enough As if I lend my horse for a week and within the week I take him again Trespasse lieth Walmesley Justice For the substance I am of opinion for the Plaintiff but I doubt For I would not that Copyholders have so great libertie and he hath prescribed to take all trees and to take them ad libitum is too great a liberty And I hold that a Copyholder hath no greater property then one who ought to have Estovers And in this case hee ought to have said quando opus fuerit and he ought to have shewed that the houses were in decay for want of Reparations for which cause opus fuerat c. And so for the pleading I hold that it is not sufficient Cook chief Justice The Plaintiff ought to have Judgment For I hold cleerly That the Lord cannot take trees without leaving sufficient for Reparations no more then he can pull down or overthrow the house of the Copyholder For of common right without Custome or prescription the Trees do belong unto the Copyholder for Reparations and for that purpose hee may take them without any Custome and the Lord cannot take the Trees without leaving sufficient for the Copyholder if there be not a speciall Custome so to do But I hold that without any custome the Lord may take the Trees if he leave sufficient to the Copyholder for the Reparations Mich. 25. 26. Eliz Doylies Case A Copyholder who hath used to take Timber for Reparations brought an action of Trespasse Trinit 26. Eliz. An action of Trespasse was brought by a Copyholder against the Lord. Pasch 37. Eliz. the Case of Mutford Wood. Trinit 40. Eliz. Stebbings Case but there the action was an action upon the Case To the Exceptions taken by Justice Walmesley that the Plaintiff ought to have shewed that the houses wanted Reparations I hold as hee said That if the action had been brought against him and hee justifie the cutting hee ought to have shewed that the houses wanted Reparations But in our Case he brings the Action against another which lyeth although that the houses were not then in decay And for the signification of the word House-boot c. Bote is an ancient Saxon word which signifies in some case Recompence and in some case Reparatio For the manner of prescription That all the Tenants may take wood pro ligno combustibili in dicto Tenemento the same is no good prescription That all shall take to burn in that Tenement But for the reasons beforesaid Judgment was given for the Plaintiffe Pasch 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 240 NEWTON and RICHARD's Case IT was ruled by the whole Court in an Action of Trespasse Quare clausum fregit cuniculos suos vel ipsius A. c. cepit c. was good Pasch 8. Jacobi In the Common Pleas. 241 MEERES and KIDOUT's Case UPon an Evidence to a Jury in this Case it was Ruled by the whole Court That if there be Copyholder for life and the Lord leaseth for years and the Copy-holder commit a forfeiture that the Lessee may enter for the forfeiture And Cooke Cheife Justice said That if there be Tenant for life the Remainder for life If the Tenant for life committeth a forfeiture he in the Remainder for life may enter and that the Case 29. Ass 64. is not Law For the particular estate in possession is determined by the forfeiture And if hee in the Remainder could not enter then it should be at the will of the Lessor whether hee should ever have it The same Law is if the Remainder be for yeers Foster Justice The reason that is given for an Entrie for a forfeiture is because that the Reversion or Remainder is devested by the Feoffment But in this Case because it is but interesse termini nothing is devested For notwithstanding the Feoffment the Interesse termini may be granted to which Cook agreed But Foster said that hee did agree in opinion with Cook
because that the particular estate was determined The cause of forfeiture was because that the Copiholder had made a lease for life Pasch 8. Iacobi in the Common Pleas. 242 Dr. NEWMAN's Case IN this Case it was said by Cook Chief Justice That it had of late time been twice adjudged that if Timber trees be oftentimes topped and lopped for fuell yet the tops and lops are not Tithable for the body of the trees being by law discharged of Tithes so shall be the branches and therefore he that cutteth them may convert them to his own use if he please Pasch 8. Jacobi In the Exchequer Chamber 243 KERCHER's Case AN Action upon the Case was brought in the Common Pleas upon a simple contract made by the Testator which afterwards came into the Exchequer Chamber before all the Judges Cook in the Common Pleas was of opinion that the Action would lie Tanfield Chief Baron said That in these cases of Equitie it were most reason to enlarge and affirme the Authoritie of the Common law then to abridge it and the rather because the like Case had been oftentimes adjudged in the Kings Bench and there was no reason as he said that there should be a difference betwixt the Courts and that it would be a Scandall to the Common Law that they differed in opinion Afterwards at another day the Case was moved in this Court And Walmesley Justice doubted if as before But Foster held that the Action was maintainable And Cooke desired that Presidents might be searched And he said That he could not be perswaded but if the Executor be adverred to have Assetts in his hands sufficient to pay the specialties but that he should answer the debt Note the money demanded was for a Marriage portion promised by the Testator Pasch 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 244 ADAMS and WILSONS Case Note It was said That when a false Judgement passeth against the Defendant he may pray the Court that it be entred at a day peremtory so as he may have Attaint or a Writ of Error And Cook Chief Justice said That if Judgment in the principall Action be reversed the Judgment given upon the Scire facias shall also be reversed because the one doth depend upon the other Walmesley in this Case said That it had been the usual course of this Court That if one deliver a plea unto An Aturney of the Court as the Last Terme and it is not entred that now at another Terme the Defendant might give in a new plea if he would because the first is not upon Record Pasch 8. Iacobi in the Common Pleas. 245 CULLINGWORTH's Case IF one be bounden in an Obligation That he will give to J. S. all the Goods which were devised to him by his father in Debt brought upon such an Obligation the Defendant cannot plead that he had not any Goods devised unto him for the Bond shall conclude him to say the contrary Vide 3. Eliz. Dyer 196 Rainsford Case Pasch 8. Iacobi in the Common Pleas. 246 QUOD's Case QVod had Judgement in an Action upon the case at the Assizes and damages were given him to Thirty Pound Hutton Serjeant moved in Arrest of Judgement That the Venire facias was de duodecim and that one of them did not appear so as there was one taken de circumstantibus and the entry in the Roll was That the said Jurour exactos venit but the word Juratus was omitted And for that cause the Judgement was stayed Mich. 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 247 STONE 's Case STone an Atturney of the Court was in Execution in Norfolk for One thousand Pound and by practice procured himself to be removed by Habeas corpus before Cook Chief Justice at the Assizes in Lent and escaped to London and in Easter Terme the Bailiffe took him again and he brought an Action of false Imprisonment against the Bailiffe and it was holden by the Court That the fresh Suit had been good although he had not taken him in the end of the year if enquiry were made after him and so by consequence the Action was not maintainable Mich. 8. Jacobi in the Star-Chamber 248 MARRIOT's Case NOte It was agreed in this Case for Law That the Sheriffe cannot collect Fines or issues after a generall pardon by Parliament and therefore one Thorald the under Sheriffe of N. who did so was questioned and punished in the Star-Chamber Mich. 8 Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 249 JOLLY WOOLSEY's Case JOlly Woolsey of Norfolk brought an Action of Trespass against a Constable of Assault and Battery and Imprisonment the Defendant as to the Assault and Battery pleaded Not guilty and justified the imprisonment by reason of a Warrant directed unto him by a Justice of Peace for the taking and to imprison the Plaintiffe for the keeping of an Ale-house contrary to the Statute 12 Feb. 5. El. whereas the Statute was 12 Feb. 5. Ed. 6. and the matter was found by speciall Verdict And it was holden by all the Justices That the misrecitall of the Act was not materiall for it being a generall Act the Justices ought to take knowledge of it And Cook Chief Justice said That a man cannot plead Nul tiel Record against an Act of Parliament although that in truth the Record be imbezelled if the Act be generall because every man is privy to it Mich. 8. Iacobi In the Common Pleas. 250 NEWMAN and BABBINGTON's Case IT was resolved in this Case That if Debt be brought against an Executor who pleads that he hath fully administred and it is found that he hath Assets to 40l. whereas the Debt is 60l l that a Judgement shall be given for the 60l. against the Defendant and upon that Judgment if more Assets come after to the Executors hand the Plaintiffe may have a Scire facias Mich. 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 251 WALLER's Case NOte It was said by Cook Chief Justice That if the King present one to a Benefice and afterwards presenteth another who is admitted instituted and inducted the same is a good repeal of the first presentation And he said That if the Lord doth present his Villain to the Church the same is no enfranchisement of him for that presentation is but his commendation And if the King will present a French man or a Spaniard they shall not hold the Benefice within this Realm for that the same is contrary to a special Act of Parliament Mich. 9. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 252 NOte It was holden by all the Justices That Perjury cannot be commited in the Court of the Lord of Copy-holds or in any Court which is holden by Usurpation otherwise is it in a Court Leet or Court Baron which is holden by Title Trinit 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 253 BURY and TAYLOR's Case IN an Ejectione firme brought upon Not guilty pleaded by the Defendant it was given in Evidence to the Jury to this effect viz. That one J. S. who did
in Ward For Cook Chief Justice said that all Offices which are found to deceive the Crown of such an ancient flower of the Crown as Wardship should be void as to that purpose and most beneficial for the King And he cited the Case in 36. H. 8. Where the Kings Tenant made a Feoffment and took back an estate unto himself for life the Remainder to his Grand-child for 80. years and died that in that Case the Heir was in Ward and they said that in the case at Barre the Heir had power of the Inheritance upon payment of five Shillings and if the Lease for years be found and proved by witnesses yet it carrieth with it the badges of fraud And Tanfeild Chief Baron said that if a Lease for 100. years shall be accounted Mortmain à fortiori this Lease for 1000. years shall be taken to be made by fraud and collusion And Cook said that the Lord Chancellour of England would not relieve such a Lessee in Court of Equity because the begining and ground of it is apparant fraud Note the lands did lye in Springfield in Essex Trinit 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 274 MEADES Case AN Action of Debt was brought upon a Bond against Meade who pleaded that the Bond was upon condition that if he paid ten pound to him whom the Obligee should name by his last will that then c. and said that the Obligee made his Will and made Executors thereof but did not thereby name any person certain to take the ten pound Sherley Serjeant moved that the Executors should have the ten pound because they are Assignees in Law as it is holden in 27. H. 8. 2. But the whole Court was of opinion that the Executors were not named in the Will for such a purpose viz. to take the ten pound For they said It is requisite that there be an express naming who shall take the ten pound otherwise the Bond is saved and not forfeited And Cook put this Case If I be bounden to pay ten pound to the Assignee of the Obligee and his Assignee makes an Executor and dieth the Executor shall not have the ten pound But if I be bounden to pay ten pound to the Obligee or his Assignees there the Executor shall have it because it was a duty in the Obligee himself the same Law if I be bound to enfeoffe your Assignees c. Wherefore it it was adjudged for the Defendant Trinit 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 275 GREENWAY and BAKER's Case IT was moved and afterwards resolved in the Case of a Prohibition prayed to the Court of Admiralty That if a Pirat taketh goods upon the Sea and selleth them that the property of them is changed no more then if a theife upon the Land steales them and selleth them And in this Case it appeared by the Libell That bona piratica fuerint infra Portam Argier super altum mare And for that cause a Prohibition was denied because Argier being a forrain Port the Court could not take notice whether there were such a place of the Sea called the Port or whether it were within the Land or not Afterwards upon the mediation of the Justices the parties agreed to try the cause in the Guild-hall in London before the Lord Chiefe Justice Cook Trinit 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 276. Sir FRANCIS FORTESCUE and COAKE's Case UPon an Evidence in an Ejectione firme betwixt the Plaintiffe and Defendant The Court would not suffer Depositions of witnesses taken in the Court of Chancery or Exchequer to be given in Evidence unlesse affidavit be made that the witnesses who deposed were dead And Cook Chiefe Justice said nullo contradicente That it is a principall Challenge to a Jurour That he was an Arbitrator before in the same case because it is intended that he will incline to that partie to which he inclined before but contrary is it of a Commissioner because he is elected indifferent And it was also said in this Case That one who had been Solicitor in the Cause is not a fit person to be a Commissioner in the same Cause Trinit 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 277 BArker Serjeant in Arrest of Judgement moved That the Venire facias did vary from the Roll in the Plaintiffs name for the Roll was Peter Percy and the Venire facias John Percy and the postea was according to the Roll which was his true name The Court doubted whether it might be amended or whether it should be accounted as if no Venire facias had issued because it is betwixt other parties But it was holden That in case no Venire facias issueth the same is holpen by the Statute of Jeofailes and in this case it is in effect as if no Venire facias had issued forth and so it was adjudged And Cook Chiefe Justice said that if there be no Venire facias nor habeas Corpora yet if the Sheriffe do return a Jury the same is helped by the Statute of Jeofailes Warburton Justice contrary vide C. 5. part Bishops case And Harris Serjeant vouched Trinit 7. Jacobi Rot. 787. in the Exchequer Herenden and Taylors case to be adjudged as this Case is Trinit 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 278 BROWN's Case IT was holden by the whole Court in this case That if a man hath a Modus Decimandi for Hay in Black-acre and he soweth the said acre seven years together with corn that the same doth not destroy the Modus Decimandi but the same shall continue when it is again made into hay And when it is sowed with corn the Parson shall have tithe in kind and when the same is hay the Vicar shall have the tithe hay if he be endowed of hay Trinit 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 279 JAMES and RATCLIFF's Case IN Debt upon a Bond to perform such an agreement The Defendant pleaded Quod nulla fuit conclusio-sive agreeamentum The Plaintiff said Quod fuit talis conclusio agreeamentum de hoc ponit se super patriam The Court held the same was no good issue because a Negative and an Affirmative Trinit 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 280 WETHERELL and GREEN's Case IT was said by the Pronothories That if a Nihil dicit be entred in Trinity Term and a Writ of Enquiry of Damages issueth the same Term that there needs not any continuance but if it be in another Term it is otherwise The Court said If it were not the course of the Court they would not allow of it but they would not alter the course of the Court the words of continuance were Quia vicecomos non misit brev Trinit 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 281 PARROT and KEBLE's Case A Man levied a Fine unto the use of himself for life the remainder in tail c. with power reserved to the Conusor to make Leases for eighty years in Possession or Reversion if A. B. and C. did so long live reserving the ancient rent
practices should be suffered and go unpunished that no mans life was in safety but in continual jeopardy And therefore in this case it was said that pregnant presumption had been sufficient to have acquited the Plaintiff but here the case was very cleer because the matter was confessed by the parties Defendants themselves And in this case Cook Chief Justice and the Lord Chancellour said that a conspiracy ought not to be onely false but malitiose contrived otherwise it will not be a conspiracy and such malice ought to be proved For if a poor Man travelling upon the High-way be robbed by another Man and he knows not the party if afterwards he do accuse such a one of the Robbery and the party accused be found not Guilty he shall not have an Action of conspiracy against the accuser for although he was falsly accused yet he was not malitiously accused and it might be that he took him to be the Offender because he was like unto him who robbed him Secondly It was said by them that by the Law no Man may Begg the Lands or Goods of another man upon such an accusation until the party be convict of the fact and that for divers causes 1. Because before conviction the King hath not an Interest in them for the goods are not forfeit And 2. Because the party till his conviction ought to have his goods to maintain himself with them And 3. Because the goods cannot be seised upon for the Kings use before conviction although they may be put in salva custodia and therefore they said that this was a very great slander which the Defendants layed upon the Lord Viscount Rochester viz. that he had begged the Plaintiffs goods of the King before he was convicted and it was said that if such goods should be begged before conviction of the party that the same would be a main cause that the Jury will not find the Indictment against the party when they are sure his Lands goods and other estate shall be in anothers person and so by consequence should be a great cause that the King might be defrauded of the forfeiture of the goods of Fellons and further it would be a great cause of Rebellion if such Lands and goods should be seised upon and given away before conviction of the party accused And as the Lord Chancellour said the same was the cause of the great Rebellion in the time of King Henry the sixth because the goods of divers were given away to other men before the parties were convicted And Cook said that it appeareth that this was not onely a scandal of divers Gentlemen of Worship whom the Defendants had abused in this thing But even of the King himself And it was not onely scandalum Magnatum But scandalum Magistr Magnatum And he said that it appears in Britton that if a Rebel or base fellow do strike a Man of Dignity that he shall lose his right hand à fortiori in such case when they defame and scandalize them by such impudent practices that they be grievously punished And it should be a very unhappy estate to be a Rich-Man if such Offences should not severely be punished multi delicti propter inopiam The Sentence against the said Defendants was this Reignolds being an Attorney to be degraded cast over the Common Pleas Barre and both the Defendants to lose their Eares to be marked in the Face with a C. for Conspirators to stand upon the Pillory with Papers of there Offences to be Whipped and each of them fined to the King in 500. pound and according to this Sentence Reignolds the same Mich. Term was cast over the Common Pleas Barre by the Cryers of the Court and the other part of the Sentence executed on them both Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 294 COOKES Case IN a Writ Quare intrusit maritagio non satisfacto It was found for the Plaintiff but no damages were assessed by the Jury and the value of the Marriage was found to be 500. pound And now the question was whether the same might be supplied by a Writ of Enquire of Damages and the Court primâ facie seemed to doubt of the case For where the party may have an attaintment there no damages shall be assessed by the Court if the same be not found by the Jury and therefore the Court would be advised of it but afterwards in the same Term it was adjudged that no Writ of Enquire of damages should Issue But a venire facias de novo was granted to try the Issue again Vide 44. E. 3. the opinion of Thorpe acc Note this was the last Case that Cook Chief Justice did speak to in the Common Pleas for this day he was removed from that Court and made Chief Justice of the Kings Bench. Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 295 WEDLOCK and HARDING's Case THE Case was this a Man seised of a Messuage holden in Socage in Fee by his will in Writing devised the same to his Cosen by these words viz. I devise my Messuage where I dwell to my Cosen Harding and her Assignes for eight years And also my Cosen Harding shall have all my Inheritances if the Law will And it was adjudged by the whole Court without argument That this was a devise of the Messuage in Fee by these words and that all his other Inheritances passed by the said Will by those generall words Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 296 ROSSER against WELCH and KEMMIS IN an Action of Debt brought against the Defendants upon severall Praecipes one Judgement is given and the Plaintiffe takes forth a Capias against one of them and arrests his body and afterwards hee takes a Fieri facias against the others And the question was Whether the severall Executions should be allowed and the Court was of opinion they should not for that a man shall have but one satisfaction And therefore in the principall Case because that upon the Fieri facias twenty five pounds was levied if the other who is in prison upon the Execution will pay the other twenty five pound the whole Judgment being but fifty pound the Court awarded that the prisoner should be discharged and the Court was clear of opinion that the partie cannot have a Fieri facias against one and a Capias ad satisfaciendum against the other But it was agreed That he might have a Capias against them both As if a man hath one Judgement against seven persons he may take all their bodies in execution because the body is no satisfaction but onely a gage for the Debt and therewith agreeth 4. H. 7. 8. 5 E. 4. 4. and C. 5. part Bamfeild's Case Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 297 JENOAR and ALEXANDER's Case IT was moved for a Prohibition to the Court of Requests because that the Court held plea of an Attornment for the complaint there was to compel a man to attorn upon a Covenant to stand seised to uses
the Fleet because he had made Return of a Writ contrary to what he had said in the same Court the day before and 11. H. 6. was vouched by Warburton Justice That if the Sheriff do return that one is languidus in prisona whereas in truth he is not languidus the Sheriff shall be sued for his false Return which was agreed by the whole Court Quod nota Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 318 WArburton Justice asked the Pronothories this question If in Trespass the plaintiff might discontinue his action within the yeer To which the Pronothories answered That if it be before any plea be pleaded that he might But the Justices were of a contrary opinion that he could not because then costs which are given by the Statute should be lost Mich. 11. Jacobi In the Common Pleas. 319 LAISTON's Case IN Trespass for a Wâ—y the Defendant pleaded a plea in bar which was insufficient and afterwards the plaintiff was Non-suit yet it was resolved by the Court that the defendant should have his costs against the plaintiff But if a default be in the originall Writ and afterwards the plaintiff is Non-suit there the defendant shall not have costs because that when the Original is abated it is as if no suit had been And so was the opinion of the whole Court Mich. 11. Iacobi in the Common Pleas. 320 HILL and GRUBHAM's Case THe Case was this A Lease was made unto Grubham by a deed paroll Habendum to him his wife and his daughter successivè sicut scribuntur et nominantur in ordine Afterwards Grubham dyed and then his wife dyed And if it were a good estate in Remainder to his daughter was the Question Harris Serjeant The Remainder is void and not good by way of Remainder for the incertainty C. 1. part in Corbets case In all Contracts and bargains there ought to bee certainty And therefore 22. H. 6. is That if a Feoffment be made to two et haeredibus it is void although it be with warranty to them and their heirs Vide 9. H. 6 35. Where renunâ—iavit totam communiam doth not amount unto a Release because it is not shewed to whom the Release is and so in 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench in Windsmere Hulbards case Where an Indenture was to one Habendum to him and to his wife and to a third person Successive it was holden that it was void by way of Remainder to any of them And there it was Resolved 1. That they did not take presently 2. That they could not take by way of Remainder And 3. that They could not take as Occupants because that the intent of the Lessor was that they should take but as one estate But the Court was of opinion against Harris And Resolved That the daughter had a good estate in Remainder and that the same did not differ from the Case in Dyer Where a Lease was made by Indenture to one Habendum to him to another successivè sicut nominantur in Charta for that those words Sicut nominantur in Charta maketh the estate to be certain enough And so they said in this Case Sicut scribuntur et nominantur in Ordine is certain enough and shall be taken to be Sicut scribuntur et nominantur in eadem charta But they agreed according to the Case in Brooks Cases That a Lease to three Habendum 〈…〉 Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common-Pleas 321. TRAHERNS Case AN Assize of Nusans was brought against the Defendant because that Levavit quandam domum ad nocumentum c. And the Plaintiff shewed how that he had a Windmil and that the Defendant had built the said house so as it hindred his Mill And the Jury found that the Defendant levavit domum and that but two feet of it did hinder the Plaintiffs Mill and is ad nocumentum And how Judgment should be given was the question And the Court was of opinion That Judgment should be that but part of the house should be abated viz. That which was found to be ad nocumentum And it was said by some That the Assise is such a Writ which extends to the whole house and therefore that the whole house should be abated according to the Writ But a difference was taken betwixt the words Erexit and Levavit For Erexit is but when parcel of a house is set up ad nocumentum but Levavit is when an entire house is levied from the ground And it was said by Hobart Chief Justice That if the Defendant had not levied the house so high by two yards it had been no Nusans for the Jury find that the two yards only are ad nocumentum And therefore he conceived that the Writ was answered well enough and that but part of the house should be abated For the Writ is Quod levavit quandam domum c. And the Verdict is Quod levavit domum But that but two yards of it is ad nocumentum And therefore he said the Writ is answered well enough and that the Judgment should be given That that only should be abated which was ad nocumentum c. Quaere for the Case was not resolved And vid. Batten Sympsons Case C. par 9. to this purpose Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common-Pleas 322. BAGNALL and POTS Case IT was resolved by the Court in this Case That when an Issue is joyned upon Non concessit that the Issue shall be tryed where the Land is But if a Lease be in question and Non concessit be pleaded to it it shall be tryed where the Lease was made 2. It was resolved That if Copy-hold land be given to superstitious uses and the same cometh unto the King by the Statute That the Copyhold is destroyed and the Uses shall be accompted void But it was resolved That in such Case by the Statute which giveth this Land so given to superstitious uses to the King that the King hath not thereby gained the Freehold of the Copyhold but that the same remaineth in the Lord of the Mannor Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common-Pleas 324. JUCKS Sir CHARLS CAVENDISH's Case A Parson sued for the substraction of Predial Tythes upon the Statute of 2 E. 6. in the Spiritual Court The Defendant made his suggestion That for such a Farm upon which the Tythes did arise there was this custom That when the Tythes of the Lands were set forth that the Owners of the said Lands had used time out of mind to take back thirty sheafs of the Tythe-corn and shewed that he was the Owner of the said Farm and that according to the said custom after the Tythes were set forth that he did take back thirty sheafs thereof and thereupon prayed a Prohibition And in this Case it was said by the Court That it ought to be averred that the Farm was a great Farm for otherwise it should be the impoverishing of the Church and would take away a great part of the profit of the Parson
And it was further said by the Court That if there were but thirty Tythe-sheafs in all that the Owner should not have them for then the Custom should be unreasonable And Day was given to the other side to shew Cause why the Prohibition should not be awarded Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common-Pleas 325. GANDEN and SYMMON's Case NOte That where a Juror is not challenged by one party who had sufficient cause of challenge and afterwards is challenged by the other side and afterwards the party doth release his challenge in that case the first party cannot challenge the same Juror again because he did foreslow his time of challenge and he had admitted the party for to be indifferent at the first Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common-Pleas 326. The Bishop of CHICHESTER and STRODWICK's Case IN an Action of Trespass for taking away of Timber and the Boughs of Trees felled The Defendant as to the Timber pleaded Not guilty And as to the Boughs he made a special Justification That there is a Custom within the Mannor of Ashenhurst in the County of Sussex That when the Lord fels or sels Timber-trees that the Lord is to have only the Timber and that the poor Tenants in Coscagio parte Manerii time out of mind have used to have the Branches of the Trees for necessary Estovers to be burnt in necessario focali in terris tenementis And the Opinion of the Court was That the Custom was not well expressed to have Estovers to burn in terris tenementis for that Estovers cannot be appertaining to Lands but to Houses only And therefore whereas the Defendant in the Case did entitle himself to a house and lands and gave in Evidence that the Custom did extend to Lands it was holden that the Evidence did not maintain the Issue And the Custom was alleadged to be That the Lord should have Quicquid valeret ad maremium and that the Freeholders should have ramillos Which as Hobart Chief Justice said is to be meant all the Arms and Boughs for whatsoever is not maremium is ramillum 2. It was holden in this Case That the Non-use or Negligence in not taking of the Boughs did not extinguish nor take away the Custom as it hath been oftentimes resolved in the like case And note that in this Case to confirm the said Custom the Book-case was cited which is in 14. E. 3. Fitz. t' Bar. 277. and the same was given in and avowed for good Evidence where the Case was That the Bishop of C. which shall be intended the Bishop of Chichester brought an Action of Trespass for felling of Trees and carrying them away where the Defendant pleaded That he held a Messuage and a Verge of Land of the Bishop and that all the Tenants of the Bishop within the Manor of A. ought to have all the Windfals of Trees and all the Boughs and Branches c. Which Case as Harris Serjeant conceived was the Case of the very Mannor now in question and the Tenant there as in this Case made a special Justification and there it was holden that it was good and adjudged for the Defendant Also in that Case it was adjudged That the Lord should have Maremium and that the Tenants should have Residuum which shall be intended the Boughs and Branches And the Custom in the Case was adjudged good But because the Defendant alleadged the Custom to be to have the same as Estovers to be burned in terris and gave Evidence only to the Messuage it was found against the Defendant for that the Evidence did not maintain the Issue Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common-Pleas 327. VAUGHAN's Case IN a Formedon in the Discender the Tenant had been essoined upon the Summons and also upon the View And after was pleaded Ne dona pas the general issue and thereupon issue was joyned And if he might be essoined again after issue joyned was the Question And the Court was of opinion That in a real action the Tenant may be essioned after Issue joyned but not in a personal action by the Statute of Marlebridge And Hobart Chief Justice said That the Statute of Marlebridge gave not any Essoin but only did restrain Essoins and therefore in real Actions the same is left as it was at the Common Law and by the Common Law the Tenant might be Essoined after Issue joyned And note per totam Curiam That if an Essoin be not taken the first day it shall never after be taken Mich. 11. Iacobi in the Common-Pleas 328. CLAY and BARNETS Case IN an Ejectione Firme the Case was this Sir Godfrey Foliamb had issue James his son who had issue Francis And Sir Godfrey Foliamb was seized in Fee of divers Lands as well by purchase as by discent in sundry Towns viz. Chesterfield Brampton c. in the Tenures of A. B. C. c. and dyed James Foliamb his son 7 E. 6. made a Conveyance of divers Lands to Francis Foliamb being his younger son in haec verba viz. Omnia mea Mesuagia terras tentam in Chesterfield Brampton c. modo in tenuri of the said A. B. C. quae pater meus Galfrid Foliamb perquesivit from divers men whom he named in certain And also convey a House called the Hart to the same Francis which came to him by discent by the same Conveyance which was in the occupation of one Celie and not in the Tenures of the said A. B. C. And the great Question upon the whole Conveyance was Whether all the Lands which he had by Discent in the said Towns and in the Occupations and Tenures of the said A. B. C. did pass or only the purchased Lands And it was resolved by the whole Court That the Conveyance did pass only the Lands which he had by purchase except only the said House which was precisely named and conveyed and did not pass the Lands which he had by Discent For if all the Lands which he had by Discent should pass by the general words then the special words which passed the House which he had by Discent should be idle and frivolous and that was one reason ex visceribus causae that only the purchased Lands did pass 2. It was said by Justice Warburton That if a man giveth all his Lands in D. in the Tenures of A. B. and he hath Lands in D. but not in their Tenures that in that case all his Lands in D. passeth So if a man give all his Lands in D. which he had by Discent from his son there all his Lands whatsoever shall pass Hobart acc ' and said That if a man gives all his Lands in the County of Kent if he have Lands within the County they do pass And he said that in a Conveyance every restriction hath his proper operation and in the Conveyance in the principal case there were three restrictions 1. All his â—ands in such Towns viz. Chesterfield Brampton c. 2. All his lands in the
were these viz. Thou usest me now as thy Wife did when she stole my goods Mich. 11. Iacobi in the Common-Pleas 332. ROES and GLOVE 's Case AN action of Debt was brought upon a Bond in Mich. Term 9 Jac and in Hillary Term after the parties were at issue upon the Statute of Usurie and it was found against the Defendant Afterwards Ter. Trin. a Writ of Error was brought retornable Mich. 10. Jacobi in which Term no Errors were assigned And afterwards in Hillary Term following two Errors were assigned the one That there was no such Statute as the Statute of 37 H. 8. of Usurie which was against what he had before confessed by his Plea the second Error was That whereas J. S. of Exeter was retorned of the Jury it was assigned for Error that J. S. of another place was sworn upon the Inquest and in this Case the Court advised the Defendant in the Writ of Error to plead In nullo erratum est By which the Court did seem to incline that they were no Errors Mich. 11. Iacobi in the Common-Pleas 333. BRADLEY and JONES Case IN an action upon the Case the case was That the Defendant did exhibite Articles against the Plaintiff in the Chancery before Dr. Cary and there swore the Articles and afterwards he sued in the Kings Bench and had Process out of that Court upon the Articles sworn in Chancery and for this an action upon the Case was brought and it was adjudged that the action would lie The articles exhibited in the Chancery were That the Plaintiff being an Attorney at Law was a Mainteinor of Juries and Causes and a Barretor and the Defendant prayed the Peace against him in the Kings Bench. And in this Case it was resolved 1. That a man might pray the Peace or Good Behaviour of any other man in any of the Kings Courts but then it must be done in due form of Law and if he do it so no action upon the Case will lie as it was resolved 27 Eliz. in Cutler and Dixons case in the Kings Bench. But it was agreed that if a man sueth in a Court which hath not jurisdiction of the Cause an action upon the Cause will lie but not where the Court hath jurisdiction of the Cause 2. It was resolved That the action did lie in the Case at Bar because he did exhibite the articles in Chancery and did not pursue them there For when he had sworn the articles in the Chancery he could not have a Supplicavit out of the Kings Bench and the Oath and Affidavit in the Chancery doth remain as a Scandal upon Record And Hobart Chief Justice said That every Court ought to intermeddle with their own proper causes and that two Courts are not to joyn in one punishment for punishment is not to be by parcels And he said That if a man claimeth right to the Land of another he is not punishable for it but if he make title vnto a Stranger then he shall be punished for every one ought to meddle with his own business 3. It was resolved That when a thing doth concern the Commonwealth the same doth concern every one in particular And so it is lawful for any man to require the Good behaviour of another for the publique good Interest etenim reipublicae ut maleficia punientur 4. It was resolved that the action did lie because the Defendant made the articles in Chancery but a colour of the Good Behaviour and although that the Kings Bench might grant the Good Behaviour without any articles preferred yet when first they begin in another Court they ought to follow the cause there And Hobart the Chief Justice in this case said that an Attorney may not labour Jurors in the behalf of his Client for that is Imbracery Mich. 11. Iacobi in the common-Common-Pleas 334. FIAL and VARIER's Case IN an Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit the Case was this A man did promise to stand to the Arbitrement of J. S. J. D. if they made their Arbitrement and Award within ten dayes and if they do not make their Award within ten dayes that if they nominate an Umpier and he make an Award within the said ten dayes that then c. J. S. J. D. did not make any Award within ten dayes but the fourth day after the Submission they did nominate J. N. to be Umpier who made an Award within the said ten dayes and the Defendant would not perform the Award wherefore the Plaintiffe brought the action Sherley Serjeant It is repugnant For the first Arbitrators had the whole ten dayes to make their Award and then cannot the Umpier make an Award within the said ten dayes But the opinion of the whole Court was that the action would lie and that it should be construed thus viz. That if an arbitrement and award be made within ten dayes by the first Arbitrators or by the Umpier For the first Arbitrators may examine the matter for two or three dayes and if they cannot make any award then the Umpier shall have the rest of the ten dayes to make the award and so it was adjudged Mich. 11. Iacobi in the Common-Pleas 335. COLT and GILBERT's Case AN action upon the Case brought for these words He is a Thief and stole a Tree adjudged that the action would lie for the later words do not extenuate the former But Thou art a Thief for thou hast robbed my Orchard are not actionable v. C. 4 par Bretridges Case Mich. 11. Iacobi in the Common-Pleas 336. BROOK's Case AN action upon the Case was brought for words The Plaintiffe set forth in his Declaration That he was a Mercer by his trade and did sell wares and commodities in his shop and did keep divers Books of his trade and Debt-books and that the Defendant said unto Mr. Palmer being the Plaintiffs Father-in-law these words of the Plaintiffe viz. Your Son-in-Law Brooks deceived me in a Reckoning and he keepeth in his shop a false Debt-book And I will shame him in his Calling Nichols Justice and Hobart Chief Justice were of opinion that the action would not lie for those words 1. Because the words single of themselves are not any â—lander and when words will bear an action it ought to be out of the force and strength of the words themselves 2. The first words Thou hast deceived me in a Reckoning will bear no action because it is impossible but that Tradesmen and Merchants which keep Debt-books will sometimes mistake one Figure for another and so the same doth turn to the prejudice and damage of another against the will of the party himself And so the subsequent words He keepeth a false Debt-book are not actionable because it may be falsified by the Servants of the party and not by the Defendant himself and also it may be false written Et interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and it should be a cause of many Suits if such a nice construction
Commission which is their authority but if it had been left out in their Commission then the Writ had been good enough And he said that when a man meddles with a thing which is but surplusage which he needed not to do he must recite the same substantially otherwise his plea will be vitious C. 4 par Palmers case And when he maketh Tho. Fleming Capit. Justic ad Placita indefinitely he varieth from the truth for the stile is Tho. Fleming Capit. Justic ad Placita coram Rege tent Haughton Justice acc ' and he said that in every Writ of Error which is to remove a Record three things ought to be expressed 1. Mention is to be made before what person it was taken as the book is in 28 H. 6. 11. 2. It is to mention betwixt whom it was 9 H. 6. 4. 3. The manner of the caption is to be mentioned whether by Writ or without Writ 2 R. 3. 2 3. and this Writ faileth in the first of them therefore he concluded that the VVrit should abate Cook Chief Justice was of the same opinion and agreed that Misnosmer and variance are not to be favoured if they be not substantial and essential quae dant esse rebus and he said that the variance in this case is of such nature For in many Records yet extant and in the time of King H. 3. it is to be found that the Chief Justice of England did sit and give Judgment in the common-Common-Pleas and in the Exchequer and so then Capital Justic ad Placita is too general because he might sit and give Judgment in any of the said Courts The second Exception was because that the VVrit saith Assisa capta c. and doth not say per breve nor sine breve nor doth say secundum legem consuetudinem c. For in 43 Eliz. in the Case betwixt Cromwell and Andrews it was adjudged not good to say That such an Action came into the Common-Pleas out of the Country and doth not shew that it came by adjournment or by Certlorari or Mittimus To which it was answered by Damport Councellor for the Plaintiff that it is a strong intendment that the Assise was taken per breve and therefore it needed not to be expressed because it is a general and not a special Assise Crook Justice The Exception is good for it is so general that it cannot be intended which Assise it was For put case there were two Assises betwixt the same parties it cannot be known which Assise is intended And of the same opinion was Haughton Justice Dodderidge contrary and he said Notwithstanding the Exception the Record ought to be removed by the Writ For the Judges Conscience may be well satisfied which Record is to be removed And here the Record which is to be removed is so precisely shewed that no body can doubt of it which ought to be certified And there are Records removed by Writs of Error which are more dubious then this is v. 19 Eliz. Dyer 356. 20 E. 3. But in this case the Writ is much enforced by the words Sommon Capt. For in every Assise there are four Commands to the Sheriffe 1. Facere tenementum esse in pace to quiet the possession 2. Facere recognitionem or Recognit videre tentam 3. Summoneas 4. Ponas eos per vadios c. For which cause of necessity it must be meant an Assise per Breve The third Exception was because in the Writ it was not shewed who was Plaintiffe and who Defendant Dodderidge It is generally to be agreed That the Writ of Error ought to agree with the Record which Rule is taken in 3 H. 6. 26. C. 3. par the Marquess of Wincbesters Case But yet every Variance doth not abate this VVrit For if the variance be only in matter of circumstance as it is in this Case the VVrit shall not abate vid. 9 H. 6. 4. 4 5 Phil. Ma. Dyer 164. 2 Eliz. Dyer 173. 180. 28 H. 6. 11. 12. The fourth Exception was because it doth not shew the place of the Caption of this Assise but sayes generall in Com. Norfolk Haughton held that rather to be examinable in the Parliament then here The last Exception was because the VVrit is directed to Cook Chief Justice that he certifie the Record sub sigillo suo whereas it was said the Record it self was to come in Parliament and there a Transcript thereof is to be made and the Record to be remanded V. 22 E. 3. 23 Eliz. Dyer 357. 1 H. 7. 29. against the Book of Entries 302. To which it was answered That it is at the pleasure of the Parliament to have either the one or the other 22 E. 3. 3. 8 H. 5. Error 88. To which Cook agreed And note that upon this VVrit of Error a Supersedeas was fraudulently procured and a VVrit of Attachment issued forth against Bacon who procured it And the Supersedeas was disallowed because that another Supersedeas was granted in the first VVrit of Error And a man can have but one Supersedeas But the Question in this Case was Admitting that the VVrit of Error be good and not abateable If the same be a Supersedeas in it self And the Court doubted of that point For Cook Chief Justice said That he had viewed 26 or 27 VVrits of Error which were brought in Parliament where the first Judgment was disaffirmed and but one where the Judgment was affirmed and that is in 23 Eliz. Dyer 357. the Record of which cannot be found Et quod in praxi est inusitatum in jure est suspectum The Books where Error was brought in Parliament are 2 E. 3. 34 40 in the old print 22 E. 3. 3. 42 Ass pl. 22. 9 H. 5. 23. 1 H. 7. 29. 23 Eliz. Dyer 375. And it should be mischievous for delay for a Parliament is only to be summoned at the Kings pleasure Haughton Dodderidge and Crook held cleerly That this VVrit of Error was a Supersedeas in it self and that upon the Book of 8 E. 2. Error 88. 1 H. 7. 19. where it is said That the Justices did proceed to Execution after the Judgment affirmed in Parliament and therefore ex consequente sequitur not before And therefore the VVrit of Error is a Supersedeas that they cannot proceed But there is no President of it in the Register but a Scire facias fo 70. And the Court held That if a Supersedeas be once granted and determined in default of the party himself that he shall never have another Supersedeas but otherwise if it fail by not coming of the Justices Also Cook Chief Justice held That by this VVrit of Error in Parliament Sir Christopher Heydon could not have the effect of his suit because it is to reverse a Judgment coram Rege and so the Judgment given in the common-Common-Pleas stands firm and Sir Christopher Heydon is put to a new VVrit of Error in this Court for the Judgment
Execution the Defendant A secretè fraudulenter vendidit amovit disposuit of all the Testators goods For which cause the Sheriffe was constrained to retorn Nulla bona c. Ley Chief Justice said That the Action would well lie because the Sheriffe could not retorn a Devastavit because the goods were secretly conveyed away so as the Sheriffe could not tell whether he had sold or otherwise disposed of the said goods and also because the Plaintiffe is destitute of all remedy by any other Action To which Dodderidge Justice did agree But Haughton Justice was against it For he said That if one be to bring an action of Debt against the Heir if the Heir selleth the Land which he hath by discent from his ancestors before the action brought an action upon the Case will not lie against him for so doing Dodderidge said That the Case which was put by Haughton was not like to this Case For in this Case if the Sheriffe had or could have retorned a Devastavit the action upon the Case would not have lien But here the Sheriffe hath not retorned any Devastavit And the sale being secretly made the Sheriffe could not safely retorn a Devastavit for so perhaps he might be in danger of an action upon the Case to be brought against him for making of such a Retorn The Case was adjourned till another day Pasch 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 409. WILLIAMS and GIBB's Case NOte in this Case it was said by Ley Chief Justice That whatsoever is allowed for Divine service or whatsoever cometh in lieu of Tythes and Offerings the same is now become a thing Ecclesiastical And Dodderidge Justice also said That no Law doth appoint that the Vicar or Parson should read Divine Service in two several Parish-Churches but only the Ecclesiastical Law Pasch 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 410. STEWRY and STEWRY'S Case A Bill was exhibited into the Court of Chancery for the traversing of an Office who found one to be in Ward to the King and the parties were at issue super seperales exitus And a Venire facias was awarded out of the Chancery retornable in the Kings Bench directed to the Sheriffe Quod venire faciat 12 homines triare placita traversiae super seperales exitus And it was moved That the several Issues ought to be expressed in the Venire facias Dodderidge Justice It ought not to be Placita traversiae For it shall never be called Placitum but when it is at 〈◊〉 Kings suit And the opinion of the Court was That the Venire facias should be amended and that the several Issues should be expressed therein and Young's Case 20 Jacobi was cited for a President in the very point Pasch 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 411. ASTLEY and WEBB'S Case IN an Ejectione Firme the words vi armis were omitted out of the Plaintiffs Declaration And although this was the default of the Clark yet the same could not be amended but it made the Declaration not to be good Pasch 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 412. WHITE and EDWARD'S Case IN Trespasse Edwards the Defendant being a Clark of the Chancery after an Imparlance could not be suffered to plead his Priviledge It was moved in this Case That the Declaration was viginti opali vocatè Wythies And it was said it should have been anglicè and not vocatè But the opinion of the Court was that vocatè was as good as anglicè Then it was moved that the Declaration was That the Defendant had felled twenty Pearches of Hedging whereas it ought to have been that the Defendant had felled a Hedge containing twenty Pearches for a man cannot cut a Mathematical Pole But the Court said That the Declaration was good notwithstanding that and cited 17 E. 4. 1. where a man sells twenty Acres of Corn and there Exception was taken to it as it is here viz. That it ought to have been twenty Acres sowed with Corn but it was no good Exception there No more was it as the Court said in this Case for it is the common speech to say Twenty perches of hedging A pint of wine An acre of corn c. And therefore the Declaration was ruled to be good notwithstanding these Exceptions which were taken to it by Serjeant Headley Pasch 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 413. BRIDGES and MILL's Case AN action upon the Case was brought for speaking of these words viz. Thou inuendo the Plaintiffe hast ravished a woman twice And I will make thee stand in a white sheet for it Henden Serjeant moved in arrest of Judgment That the action would not lie for the words For he said That by the Common-Law Rape was not Felony but Trespass v. Stamford 23. 6. But now by the Statute of West 2. cap. 34. it is made Felony And he said That the later words viz. stand in a white sheet doth mitigate the former words by reason that in the former words the word Felonice was omitted as the Case is in C. 4. par 20. Barhams Case where the words Thou didst burn my Barn and did not say My Barn full of Corn nor that it was parcel of his Mansion-house and therefore the action would not lie For unlesse the Barn were full with corn or part of a dwelling-house it is not Felony Like unto Humfries Case adjudged in the Common-Pleas where an action upon the Case was brought for these words Thou hast pick'd my Pocket and taken away ten shillings And it was adjudged that the action would not lie For he did not say that he had stollen ten shillings But if he had said nothing but Thou hast pick'd my pocket then the action would have been maintainable Ley and Dodderidge Justices By the Common-Law Rape was Felony and in the said Statute the word Felony is not although it be used in the Indictment It was adjourned But the opinion of the Court seemed to be That the action would lie for the words Pasch 21 Iacobi in the Star-Chamber 414. Sir HENRY FINES Case IN the Case of Sir Henry Fines in the Star-Chamber Exception was taken to one of the Witnesses viz. to Dr. Spicer because that he stole Plate and had been pardoned for it But notwithstanding the Exception the Court did allow of the Testimony of the said Dr. Spicer And then Hobart Chief Justice of the common-Common-Pleas cited Cuddingtons Case Hill 13 Jacobi to be adjudged Cuddington brought an action upon the Case for calling him Thief The Defendant justified that such a day and year he stole a Horse The Plaintiffe replied That the King had given him a Pardon for all Felonies And it was adjudged that the Action did lie Afterwards at another day Jones and Dodderidge Justices put the Case more largely viz. Cuddington committed Felony 44 Eliz. and 1 Jacobi by the General Pardon he was pardoned And they said That he who procures a Pardon confesseth himself to be guilty of the offence But by the general Pardon
is in the wife but the cause thereof is because it was once coupled with a possession C. 7. part Nevils Case There was a question whether an Earldom might be entailed and forfeited for Treason which is a thing which he hath not in possession nor use but is inherent in the blood And there resolved that the same cannot be forfeited as to be transferred to the King but it is forfeited by way of discharge and exoneration 12 Eliz. Dyer the Bishop of Durhams Case There if it had not been for the saving the Regal Jurisdiction of the Bishop had been given to the King by the Statute of 26 H. 8. This Statute of 26 H. 8. was made for the dread of the Traitor For the times past saw how dangerous Traitors were who did not regard their lives so as their lands might discend to their issue It was then desperate for the King Prince and Subject For the time to come it was worse The Law doth not presume that a man would commit so horrid an act as Treason so it was cited by Mr. Crook who cited the case That the King cannot grant the goods and lands of one when he shall be attainted of Treason because the Law doth not presume that he will commit Treason If the Law will not presume it wherefore then were the Statutes made against it If the Land be forfeited by the Statute of 26 H. 8. much stronger is it by the Statute of 31 H. 8. But then admit there were a Remitter in the Case yet by the Office found the same is defeated Without Office the Right is in the King Com. 486. c. 5. part 52 where it is said There are two manner of Offices the one which vests the estate and possession of the Land c. in the King where he had but a Right as in the case of Attaindor the Right is in the King by the Act of Parliament and relates by the Office Com. 488. That an Office doth relate 38 E. 3. 31. The King shall have the mean profits The Office found was found in 33 Eliz. and the same is to put the King in by the force of the Attaindor which was 29 H. 8. and so the same devests the Remitter Tenant in tail levieth a Fine and disseiseth the Conusee and dyeth the issue is remitted then proclamations pass now the Fine doth devest the Remitter C. 1. part 47 Tenant in tail suffereth a common Recovery and dyeth before Execution the issue entreth and then Execution is sued the Estate tail is devested by the Execution and so here in our Case it is by the Office C. 7. part 8. Tenant in tail maketh a Lease and dyeth his wife priviment ensient without issue the Donor entreth the Lease is avoided afterwards a Son is born the Lease is revived Com. 488. Tenant in capite makes a Lease for life rendring rent and for non-payment a re-entry and dyeth the rent is behind the heir entreth for non-payment of the rent and afterwards Office is found of the dying seised and that the land is hoâ—den in capite and that the heir was within age In the case the Entry for the Condition broken was revived and the Estate for life revived 3 E. 4. 25. A Disseisor is attainted of Felony the Land is holden of the Crown the Disseisee entreth into the Land and afterwards Office is found that the Disseisor was seised the Remitter is taken out of the Disseisee which is a stronger case then our Case for there was a right of Entire and in our Case it is but a right of Action which is not so strong against the King And for these Causes he concluded That the Judgment given in the Court of Pleas ought to be reversed And so prayed Judgment for the Lord of Sheffield Plaintiffe in the Writ of Error This great Case came afterwards to be argued by all the Judges of England And upon the Argument of the Case the Court was divided in opinions as many having argued for the Defendant Ratcliffe as for the Plaintiffe But then one new Judge being made viz. Sir Henry Yelverton who was before the Kings Sollicitor his opinion and argument swayed the even ballance before and made the opinion the greater for his side which he argued for which was for the Plaintiffe the Lord Sheffield And thereupon Judgment was afterwards given That the Judgment given in the Court of Pleas should be reversed and was reversed accordingly And the Earl Lord Sheffield now Earl of Mulgrave holdeth the said Castle and Mannor of Mulgrave at this day according to the said Judgment Note I have not set here the Arguments of the Judges because they contained nothing almost but what was before in this Case said by the Councel who argued the Case at the Bar. Pasch 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 418. IT was the opinion of Ley Chief Justice Chamberlain and Dodderidge Justices That a Defendants Answer in an English Court is a good Evidence to be given to a Jury against the defendant himself but it is no good Evidence against other parties If an Action be brought against two and at the Assises the Plaintiffe proceeds only against one of them in that case he against whom the Plaintiffe did surcease his suit may be allowed a Witnesse in the Cause And the Judges said That if the Defendants Answer be read to the Jury it is not binding to the Jury and it may be read to them by assent of the parties And it was further said by the Court That if the party cannot find a Witnesse then he is as it were dead unto him And his Deposition in an English Court in a Cause betwixt the same parties Plaintiffe and Defendant may be allowed to be read to the Jury so as the party make oath that he did his endeavour to find his Witnesse but that he could not see him nor hear of him Pasch 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 419. THe Husband a wife seised of Lands in the right of the wife levied a Fine unto the use of themselves for their lives and afterwards to the use of the heirs of the wife Proviso that it shall and may be lawfull to and for the husband and wife at any time during their lives to make Leases for 21 years or 3 lives The wife being Covert made a Lease for 21 years And it was adjudged a good Lease against the husband although it was made when she was a Feme Covert and although it was made by her alone by reason of the Proviso Pasch 21 Jacobi in the Common-Pleas 420. NOte that Hobart Chief Justice said That it was adjudged Mich. 15 Jacobi in the common-Common-Pleas That in an Action of Debt brought upon a Contract the Defendant cannot wage his Law for part and confesse the Action for the other part And it was also said That so it was adjudged in Tart's Case upon a Shop-book And vide 24 H. 8. Br. Contract 35. A Contract cannot be divided
they devise the assurance for her jointure 2. Heer is no place named where the Notice was for it is issuable whether he gave Notice or not and then there being no certain place named no visne can be upon it 3. He doth not shew where the Lands are for it might be as in truth it was the Lands were out of England and by the Covenant they ought to be within England 4. He doth not shew that the Lands were of the value of 500l per annum over and above all Reprises as they ought to be by the Articles 5. He sheweth that they were his Freehold but doth not shew that the lands were his lands of Inheritance of which a Jointure might be made The opinion of the whole Court was that the Exceptions were good and that the Plea in bar was no good plea. Dodderidge If the word had been Such as his Councel shall devise then the Notice ought to have been given to the party himself and he is to inform his Councel of it 6 H. 7. 8. But here two Councellors were named in certain and therefore the Notice ought to be given to them for he hath appointed Councellors The whole Plea in bar is naught For if he hath an estate in tail then there ought to be a Fine in making of the Jointure and if there be a Remainder upon it then there ought to be a Recovery So because that Lane hath not informed the party what estate he had in the lands they could not make the Assurance Ley Chief Justice Where a man is bound to make such Assurance of lands as J. S. shall advise here he need not shew his Evidences but he ought to shew to the party what the land is and where it lieth and the Obligee is to seek out the estate at his peril And then J. S. may advise the Assurance conditionally viz. That if he hath Fee then to have such an assurance and if an Estate in tail then such an assurance and if there be a Remainder over then to devise a Recovery Curia All the Errors are material The Bail for Lane before any Judgment given against him brought Lane into Court and prayed that they might be discharged and Lane taken into custody Dodderidge Justice said There is a difference betwixt Manucaptors which are that the party shall appear at the day for there the Court will not excuse them to bring the party in Court before the day But in case of Bail there they may discharge themselves if they bring the body of the Defendant into Court at any time before the Retorn of the 2. Scire facias against the Defendant For when one goeth upon Bail it is intended that he notwithstanding that is in â—â—stodia Mariscalli For the Declarations are in custodia Mariscalli Marschalsiae Quod hota so is the difference Trin. 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 434. WHEELER and APPLETON'S Case AN Action upon the Case was brought for these scandalous words viz. Thou hast stollen my Peece and I will charge thee with suspition of Felony Which were found for the Plaintiffe It was moved for the staying of Judgment That the Action was not maintainable For the Declaration is A Peece innuendo a Gun And here the innuendo doth not do its part for it might be a peece of an Oak or a 225. peece of Gold which is commonly called a Peece and in this Case the words may be intended such a Peece 17. Jacobi in the Kings Bench betwixt Palmer and Râ—ve Thou hast the Pox and one may turn his finger in the holes of his legs Adjudged that for these words the Action would lie because it cannot be meant otherwise then of the French pox 41 Eliz. in the Kings Bench the Defendant said of the Plaintiffe Thou art forsworn and thou hast hanged an honester man then thy self the Action did lie For the first words Thou art forsworn no Action will lie C. 4. part 15. but the later words prove that it was in course of Justice and that he was perjured So in this Case admitting that the first words will not bear an action yet the later words make them actionable For the first words ought to be meant of a thing which is Felony Heck's Case C. 4. part 15. there it was adjudged for the Plaintiffe although the first words would not bear action yet the later words make them actionable I will charge thee with suspition or flat Felony an Action doth not lie Hecks Case proves it Another Councellor argued that the Action would not lie The first words are not actionable For so many things as there are in the world so many peeces there may be and here it might be a peece of a thing which could not be Felony Betwixt Roberts and Hill 3 Jacobi in the Kings Bench it was adjudged Roberts hath stollen my wood the words were not actionable for it might be wood standing and then to cut and take it away it is not Felony but Trespass Ley Chief Justice I charge thee with flat Felony If the words be spoken privately to a man no Action lieth for them but if they be spoken before an Officer as a Constable or in a Court which hath conusance of such Pleas then the Action will lie for the party by reason of such words may come into trouble But if a man charge one with flat Felony and chargeth the Constable with him then an Action will not lie because it is in the ordinary course of Justice C. 4. part 14. If a man maketh a Bargain with another to pay him twenty Peeces for such a thing it shall be taken by common intendment twenty 22s. peeces of gold which vulgarly are called Peeces But to endite a man for 20 Peeces is not certain and therefore such Indictment is not good and the Action in our Case will not lie for my Peece is an incertain word Dodderidge Thou hast stollen my Peece What is that For we call 22s. in gold a Peece You ought to tell it in certain And here the innuendo will not make the scandal but the words of scandal ought to proceed out of the parties own mouth and an Innuendo cannot make that certain which was uncertain in the words of the speaker And therefore the Action here will not lie Haughton Justice If the whole matter had been set forth in the Declaration as to have shewed that the parties before this speech had had speeches of a Gun then the Action in this case would have been maintainable but here the word Peece is incertain and the Action will not lie Chamberlain Justice If the speeches had been concerning a Gun lost then upon these words spoken the Action would have lien but not as they are here spoken For the two words there ought to have been matter subsequent as upon the charging with Felony to have delivered him to an Officer And so by the whole Court it was adjudged Quod querens nihil capiat per
lawfull arrest for no time is shewed nor no place nor how it was done Ley The Jury have found it to be debito modo and in this case the arrest is not in question by matter of Plea but by Declaration and the finding of the Jury hath made the same to be good Dodderidge Justice If A. be indebted to B. B may have either an Action upon the Case or an Action of Debt for the money but in an Action of Debt unless it be in London by the Custome Concessit solvere is no good Plea But in an Action upon the Case the Plaintiff may declare That whereas A. was indebted to him in a certain sum of money that Concessit solvere and there he needeth not to shew how he became indebted unto him as he ought to do in an Action of Debt Chamberlain Justice If a man be arrested upon a void arrest and another in consideration of setting him at liberty doth promise to pay the Debt there it is a thing Collateral and an Action will lie But if the arrest cometh in question then in that Case the Action will not lie but he may avoid it by special pleading for the arrest being unlawfull there is no consideration whereupon to ground the promise Yelverton If the Plaintiff had said in the Declaration That in consideration that he would forbear his Debt that he would pay c. there for not payment the Action would have been maintainable but in this case the consideration is the setting him at Liberty and so it is Collateral At another day Ley Chief Justice If I arrest a man generally and the party promise for the discharge of the arrest to give 20l. it is no good consideration if I do not shew that he had cause to arrest him For if the arrest be upon an ill ground the consideration is not good Haughton Justice To make it a lawfull arrest the partie ought to shew the Process the Letter of Attorney and the proceedings and an agreement afterwards made will not make the arrest good Legitimo debito modo arrestatus is too general for he ought to shew how he became indebted to him For if I be bounden to make unto I. S. a lawfull assurance or conveyance of such Lands it is too general for me to say that I have made him a lawfull assurance but I ought to shew what manner of assurance it is that the Court may judge whether it be a lawfull and good assurance or not In Mich. Term followinging 21 Jacobi It was adjudged That Judgment should be arrested Trin. 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. Intratur Mich. 19. Rot. 5â— 453 SEIGNIOR and WOLMER's Case IN an Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit the Declaration was general that the Defendant Assumpsit to the Plaintiff and the Jury found that the promise was made to I. N. who Seignior the Plaintif sent and appointed ad componendum agreandum the Debt of Wolmer the Defendant It was argued That the promise made to the Servant was a promise to the Master Vi. â— E. 4. Where the sale of the Servant is the sale of the Master 8 H. 5. in trespas The Defendant said that the Prior of c. was seised c. and that such a one his Steward made a Demise unto him there it was ruled that he ought to have pleaded that the Prior did demise V. 27 H. 8. Jorden and Tatams Case which is express in the point Jorden brought an Action upon the Case against Tatam and declared that he did assume to him as the words of the book are The Evidence was That Tatam came in the absence of Jorden the husband and assumed to the wife of Jorden and our Case is a stronger Case then that for there the husband gave no authority to the wife to take such Assumpsit but in our Case he did authorize I. N. and it was adjudged that the agreement of the husband afterwards made the Assumpsit to be good to the husband But in our Case I. N. had authority to take the Assumpsit viz. Seignior sent I. N. ad componendum agreandum the Debt and Wolmer assumed to pay the money c. and I. N gave notice thereof to Seignior and he agreed unto Dodderidge Justice An Assumpsit to the Servant for the Master is good to the Master and an Assumpsit by the appointment of the Master of the Servant shall bind the Master and is his Assumpsit 27 Ass If my Baily of my Mannor buy cattel to stock my grounds I shall be chargeable in an Action of Debt and if my Baily sell corn or cattel I shall have an Action of Debt for the money For whatsoever comes within the compass of the servants service I shall be chargeable with and likewise shall have advantage of the same If a Servant selleth a horse with Warranty it is the sale and contract of the Master but it is the Warranty of the Servant unless the Master giveth him authority to warrant it for a Warranty is void which is not made and annexed to the contract but there it is the Warranty of the Servant and the Contract of the Master But if the Master do agree unto it after it shall be said that he did agree to it ab initio As where a Servant doth a disseisin to the use of his Master the Master not knowing of it and then the Servant makes a Lease for years and then the Master agrees the Master shall not avoid the Lease for years for now he is in by reason of his agreement ab initio When the Servant promiseth for the Master that the Master shall forbear to sue c. and shall by such a day deliver to the Defendant the Obligation c. and the Defendant promiseth to pay the money at such a day and the Master having notice thereof agreeth to it it is now the promise of the Master ab initio for it is included in his authority that he should agree compound c. and he hath power to make a promise Judgment in the principal Case was given for the Plaintiff Trin. 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. Intratur Pasch 18. Rot. 139. 454. GLEEDE and WALLIS Case A Writ of Error was brought to Reverse a Judgment given in the Court of Northampton in an Action upon the Case upon a Promise The Error which was assigned was because that it appeareth that the Action was brought before the Plaintiff had made request The Case was a Contract was made betwixt Gleede and Wallis and Wallis was to pay to Gleede 10l when Gleede should require him Gleede brought an Action in the said Court 1 Martii 16 Jacobi and the Request is laid to be 7 Martii 16 Jacobi following Where a Contract is made and no time is expressed for payment of the money If the partie bring his Action before he make his request he shall not have damages but if he maketh an actual request and the Defendant doth not
Statute of West 2. First they said That Copyholds are not within the letter of the Statute which speaks onely de tenementis per chartam datis c. Secondly they are not within the meaning of it 1. Because they were not untill 7 E. 4. 19. of any accompt in Law because they were but Estates at will 2. The Statute of West 2. provides against those who might makeâ— a dissen heresin by Fine or Feoffment which Copyholders could not do 3. Because if Copyholders might give lands in tail by the Statute then the Reversion should be left in themselves which cannot be 4. The Makers of the Statute did not intend any thing to be within the Statute of Donis whereof a Fine could not be levied For the Statute provides Quod sinis ipso jure sit nullus 5. Great mischiefs would follow if Copyholds should be within the Statute of West 2. because there is no means to dock the estate and no customary conveyance can extend to a Copyhold created at this day 37 Eliz Lane and Hills case adjudged in the Common-Pleas was cited by Justice Harvey where a Surrender was unto the use of one in tail with divers remainders over in tail The first Surrenderee dyed without issue And first it was agreed and adjudged That it was no discontinuance 2. If it were a discontinuance yet a Formedon in the Remainder did not lie because there ought to be a Custom to warrant the Remainder as well as the first Estate tail For when a Copyholder in Fee maketh such a gift no Reversion is left in him but only a possibility And the Lord ought to avow upon the Donee and not upon the Donor And there is a difference when he maketh or giveth an estate of inheritance and when he maketh a Lease for life or years for in the one case he hath a Reversion in the other not 2. A Recovery shall not be without a special custom as it was agreed in the Case of the Mannor of Stepney because the Warrantie cannot be knit to such an Estate without a Custom And for express authority in the principal Case he cited Pits and Hockleâ—'s ase which was Ter Pasc 35 Eliz. rot 334. in the Common-Pleas where it was resolved That Copyholds were not within the Statute of Donis for the weakness and meanness of their estates For if they were within the Statute of West 2. the Lord could not enter for Felony but the Donor and the Services should be done to the Donor and not to the Lord of the Mannor And so and for these mischiefs he conceived That neither the meaning nor the words of the said Statute did extend to Copyholds Hill 34 Eliz. Rot. 292. in the Kings Bench Stanton and Barney's Case A Surrender was made of a Copyhold within the Mannor of Stiversden unto one and the heirs of his body and after issue he surrendred unto another And it was agreed by all the Justices That the issue was barred And Popham did not deny that Case but that it was a Fee conditional at the Common-Law and that post prolem suscitatam he might alien And so it was agreed in Decrew and Higdens case Trin. 36. Eliz. rot 54â— in the Kings Bench and in Erish and Ives case 41 42 Eliz. in the Common-Pleas in an Evidence for the Mannor of Istleworth That no Estate tail might be of Copyhold without a Custom to warrant it Mich. 36 37 Eliz. in the Kings Bench it was adjudged That a Copyholder could not suffer a common Recovery and the reason was because that the Recovery in value is by reason of the Warrantie annexed to the Estate at the Common-Law which could not be annexed to a Customary estate And another reason was given because that he who recovers in value shall be in by the Recovery and the Copy of the Court-Roll only should not be his Evidence as Littleton and other books say it ought to be And Crook said That the Statute of Donis was made in restraint of the Common-Law And it should be very disadvantagious to the Lord if Copyhold should be construed to be within that Statute And therefore he conceived that the said Statute did not extend to Copyholds by any equitable construction And such difference was taken by Popham Chief Justice 42 Eliz. in the Kings Bench rot 299. in Baspool and Long 's Case For he said That a Custom which did conduce to maintain Copyholds did extend to them But a Statute or a Custom which did deprave or destroy them did not As if one surrender to the use of one for life the Remainder in Fee where the Custom is to surrender in Fee the Custom doth not extend thereunto because a Custom which goes in destruction of a Copyhold shall be taken strictly But if a man be Copyholder in Fee he may grant a Fee conditional Harvey Justice put some Cases to prove the small account the Law had of Copyholds at the time of the making of that Statute as 40 E. 3. 28. 32 H. 6. br Copyhold 24. And he said That there is not any book in the Law but only Mancels case in Plow Comment That the Statute of West 2. doth extend to Copyholds Hill 2 Caroli rot 235 in the Kings Bench. 459. LITFIELD and his Wife against MELHERSE A Writ of Error was brought upon a Judgment given in an Action upon the Case brought by Husband and Wife in the Common-Pleas for words spoken of the Plaintiffs wife And the Judgment in the Common-Pleas was That the husband and wife should recover And that was assigned for Error in this Court because the Husband only is to have the damages and the Judgment ought to be That the Husband alone should recover But notwithstanding this Error assigned the Judgment was affirmed by the opinion of the whole Court Pasch 2 Caroli rot 362. in the Kings Bench. 460 HOLMES and WINGREEVE's Case A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a Judgment given in the Court at Lincoln in an Action of Trespass there brought for taking away a Box with Writings And four Errors were assigned 1. Because the Plaintiffe did not appear by Attorney or in person at the retorn of the Attachment against the Defendant so as there was a discontinuance for the Plaintiffe ought to appear de die in diem 2. Because in his Declaration there he saith That the Defendant took a Box with Writings and doth not make any title to the Box nor shews that the same was lockt nailed or sealed 2 H. 7. 6. a. The certainty of the writings ought to be shewed that a certain issue may be taken thereupon Com. 85. 22 H. 6. 16. 14 H. 6. 4. 21 E. 3. He ought to shew the certainty of the writings 18 H. 1. Charters in a Box sealed C. 9. part Bedingfields case C. 5. part Playters case The Declaration was insufficient because the Plaintiffe therein did not name the certain number of the Fishes 3. He pleaded That he made a
and the party be delivered out of Execution then he shall not be taken again in Execution But if he be taken in Execution upon an erronious Process if he be delivered out he may be taken again in Execution for the first Execution was erronious and is no Record being reversed Hyde Chief Justice If a man recover in Debt upon an Obligation and the Judgment be reversed by Error he is restored to his first Action and may plead Nul tiel record Dyer 59 60. Triwingards Case A man in Execution had a VVrit of Priviledg out of the Parliament upon which the Sheriff sets him at liberty by Law for a time yet he shall be in Execution again and the Law saves the others right Broome Secondarie of the Kings Bench If Error be brought after the year of the Judgment in the Common Pleas and the Judgment be affirmed here the partie may take forth a Capias within the year of the Judgment affirmed although in the Common Pleas he cannot have a Capias because the year is past For we are not to respect what process he ought to have in the Common Pleas but after the year of the Judgment affirmed here the partie is to have a Scire facias Jones Justice said That when he was a Reporter the Judges delivered their opinions in Garnons Case C. 5. part 88. That if after the year and day he bring Error and the Judgment be affirmed that he ought to have the like process here as in the Common Pleas And that was a Scire facias because that the year was past in the Common Pleas although it were within the year of the Judgement affirmed here Dodderidge Justice The Cases which Banks cited are Law but are not well applyed The whole Court was of opinion That if the Common Pleas award erronious process the Court cannot award a Supersedeas but the partie is put to his VVrit of Error here and upon that erroneous Process we cannot grant a Supersedeas but the partie is put to his new VVrit of Error And according to the opinion of the Court Sir William Fish brought a new VVrit of Error Mich. 2 Caroli Rot. 179 in the Kings Bench. 462. BELLAMY and BALTHORP's Case IN an Action of Trover and Conversion The Plaintiff did lay it that he was possessed of twenty Loads of Wheat and that he lost them and that they came to the Defendants hands who converted the same to his own use The Defendant did justifie and said That the Parish of O. is an ancient Parish in which there is a Rectorie impropriate c. and the Earl of Clare was seised of the Rectorie and made a Lease unto him of the Tythes of that Parish for one year by force of which he was possessed and that the Corn was set forth by the Parishoners and that one T. gathered the Tythe and delivered the same to the Plaintiff and that the Defendant his Servant took away the Tythe as it was lawfull for him to do Upon which the Plaintiff did demurr First because the Plea did amount to no more then the general issue viz. Not guilty and if the Plea do amount to no more then the general issue then it is no good plea but he ought to have taken the general issue 5 H. 7. 11. Ass For if in an Assise the Tenant saith that the Plaintiff did disseise him and that he entred upon him the plea is not good because it amounts but to the general issue viz. Nul lort nul disseisin and the other party may demurr upon it 22 E. 4. 40. In Trespass for Batterie it is no plea to say that he did not beat him because it is but Not guilty by Argument 34 H. 6 28. b. If I bring Trespass for breaking of my Close It is no good plea to say that I have no Close or if it be for carrying away my Goods to say that I had not any Goods but the Party ought to have pleaded Not guilty It may be objected That in this Case the Defendant makes Title to the Corn. To that we say He derives a Title to Tythes without a Deed which gives no title to them For Tythes do not pass by Demise alone without Deed but by the demise of the Rectorie without Deed they will pass So by a Feoffment of a Mannor without Deed the Services will pass but the Services alone will not pass without a Deed. 21 H. 7. 21. 19 H. 8. 12. A Warren may be demised without Deed. 9 E. 4. 47. But the profits of Courts will not pass without Deed. 22 H. 6. 34. b. By way of Contract a Demise may be of Tythes without Deed but in pleading it ought to be set forth that there was a Deed. C. 10. part 92. Where the Deed ought to be shewed which proves that there ought to be a Deed. In the Common-pleas in an Action of Trover and Conversion of certain Goods the Defendant said That A. was possessed of them and made him Executor c. And the Plaintiff did demurre and had Judgment because it amounted but to the generall Issue Dodderidge Justice The Parson may demise his Tythe to the Owner of the Land without Deed but he cannot grant them to a stranger without Deed. If the Defendant make Title from a stranger then it doth amount to the generall Issue but if both Plaintiff and Defendant make Title from one Person or Donor then the plea is a good plea. Otherwise per Curiam it doth amount to the generall Issue But the Opinion of the Court was because that the Defendant did make a title of Tythes without a Deed therefore Judgment in the principall Case was given for the Plaintiff Trin. 3 Caroli in the Kings Bench. 436. The Dean and Chapter of Carlisle's Case A Writ of Error was directed unto the City of Carlisle to remove the Record of a Judgment given there in Curia nostra whereas the Judgment was given tempore Jacobi And the Opinion of the Court was That it was not good nor the Record thereby well removed Dyâ—r 4. Eliz 206 b. There was a Certiorari to remove a Record cujusdam inquisitionis capt c. in Curia nostra Whereas in truth it was taken in the time of the predecessor of the King and so thereby the Record was not well removed Dodderidge Justice If a Writ of Error doth abate upon the Plea to the Writ and the Record be well removed the partie may have a new Writ of Error coram vobis residet c. but if the Record be not well removed as in this Case at Barr it is not then the partie shall not have a new Writ of Error here We do many times grant a Scire facias to sue forth Execution in the inferior Court which proves that the Record by an ill and insufficient Writ of Error is not removed but doth remain there still If there be variance betwixt the Record and the VVrit of Error the Record is not well
of Ely and divers Errors were assigned First that he did not shew in the stile of the Court how Ely hath power to hold plea either by Charter or by prescription Secondly because he said That at such a place in Ely he did promise but did not shew that it was within the Jurisdiction of Ely Thirdly that it was upon a Consideration to â—urâ—ease a Suit in the Chancery that the Defendant did promise but did not shew that at the time of the promise there was a Suit depending Fourthly it was said That the Defendant did promise to surrender certain Customary Lands and it is not shewn what the Lands were and so no certainty for the Jurie to give damages Jermyn argued for the Defendant in Writ of Error and said The Declaration is good in substance Diversas terras Customarias proxim adjacend lib. tenem ' of the Defendant and the Defendant pleaded that he had offered predict tenem ' Customaria and so no difference is betwixt them for that Tenement is sufficiently known and although it be not so certainly laid as it ought to be in a real Action yet it is certain enough in an Action upon the Case Dyer 355 356. Only who was Sollicitor to the Councel of D. did spend 1500l circa diversa secta negotia there the Declaration was sufficient by two Judges there the Lands are certain viz. proxim ' lib. tenem ' Secondly Ely is in the Margent which is as much as the County in the Margent and then when no County is named in the Declaration wherein the land doth lie it shall be intended to lie in the County which is in the Margent Hetley Our Case differs from Onlyes Case in Dyer 355. for there 1500l was received But if I bring an Action upon the Case pro diversis merchandisis the same is not good but if I bring the Action for 10â— pro diversis merchandisis then it is good Jones Justice Chester and Durham are generally known and therefore it is good to say Placita tent apud Chester c. and the party need not shew how Chester hath Jurisdiction but it is not so of Ely Whitlock Justice Ely hath Jura regalia and we read in our books that they have had Conusans of Pleas. Hyde Chief Justice In all particular and private Jurisdictions if they come to be certified here in a Writ of Error you must set out their power But if they have their power by a Statute as Wales then it need not be set forth A Writ of Error doth not lie upon a Judgment in London but when the Plea is before Commissioners Curia We cannot grant a new Certiorare to an inferior Court but only to the Common-Pleas or Wales The writ of Error to remove the Record out of the Court of Ely is directed Justiciario nostro which proves that this Court takes notice of him as the Kings Justice And in other Courts it is Senescallo Curiae and not Senescallo nostro Whitlock Justice It is since the Statute of 27 H. 8. that it is directed Justiciario nostro de Ely for before it was Justiciario Episc Hyde Chief Justice It is a Book-Case If Midd. be in the margent and you say apud D. and name no County D. shall be intended to be in Midd. The Judgment was reversed Pasch 3 Caroli in the Kings Bench 467. WATERMAN and CROPP's Case Intratur M. 2 Car. Rot. 419. AN Action of Trespass for Battery and Imprisonment The Defendant did justifie the Imprisonment c. If it be not a Court of Record they cannot fine and imprison but if it be a Court of Record then they may for it is Curia Domini Regis 468. IN a Writ of Error Error was assigned That an Action was laid in Lanceston and the Venire facias was awarded de vicineto de Lanceston And it was said That the neighbourhood might be of those of which the Maior and Bailiffs had no power over viz. those out of their juridiction And therefore Error was assigned in the mis-awarding of the Venire facias 10 Jacobi in the Common-Pleas Buckley's case There the Venire facias was de vicineto civitatis Eborum and well enough for vicineto shall imply those within the jurisdiction and not the neighbours 10 Jacobi Procter and Cliffords case adjudged contrary where it was That the Venire facias was de vicineto civitatis Coventry and adjudged not good for it ought to have been de civitate Coventry Dodderidge Vicineto goeth about the Precinct When I was a Councellor then I moved for Bristol and to maintain it good de vicinetâ— de Bristol but it was ruled not good but ought to be de civitate Bristol Pasch 3 Caroli in the Kings Bench. 469. TOLLYN and TAYLOR's Case AN Action upon the Case was brought in the Common-Pleas by an Enfant who declared by Attorney The Defendant brought a Writ of Error in the Kings Bench and assigned the same for Error For he ought to have declared per Prochyn amy and not by Attorney If an Action be brought and the Defendant plead that he is an Enfant the Enfancie is to be tryed where the Writ is brought Here he assigns the Error in fact that he was an Enfant and shewed no place where he was an Enfant and so no place set where to prove it To this Error the Plaintiffe pleaded That he was at full age And upon that they are at issue upon this matter in fact And it was tryed at Halsworth in Suffolk whereas it ought to have been in this Court where the Enfancie is pleaded because he names no place where he was of full age And notwithstanding that it was found that he was of full age yet the Trial was not good The first Action was brought before the Statute of 21 Jacobi cap. 13. Hitcham Serjeant Age or not age is not local and a place must be set down for formalitie sake and so it is no matter of substance And the Venire facias might be awarded from the place where the first Action was viz. at Halsworth in Suffolk For that is a matter dependant and pursuant the first Action and now since the Statute is helped Denny contrary It hath no dependance upon the first Action but is a new thing sprung up If any place had been set down and the Venire facias had been mistaken that is helped by the Statute and not where no place is set down at all Whitlock Justice Every Venire facias properly is to be from the place where the Writ is brought unless it be drawn away by Plea He ought to have alleadged a place For this is a new matter in this Court and not helped by the Statute of 21 Jacobi nor any other for the Venire facias is totally mistaken Dodderidge Justice The Statute of Jeofaites have ever been taken strictly according to the letter For if they had been taken by equity what need had there been of more Statutes to have been made
Jurisdiction It was adjourned Mich. 4. Caroli in the King 's Bench. 502 SHUTFORD and BOROUGH's Case IN an Action upon the Case upon a Promise the Case was this The Defendant had a dog which did kill five of the Plaintiff's sheep and the Defendant in consideration the Plaintiffe would not sue him for the said sheep and also in consideration that the Plaintiff would suffer the Defendant to do away the sheep promised to give him recompence for the said sheep upon request and the Plaintiffe alledged the promise to be made 18. Jacobi and that afterwards 2. Caroli he did request so much of the Defendant for the said sheep The Defendant pleaded in Bar the Statute of 21. Jacobi cap 16. of Limitation of Actions and alledged That the Action was not brought within six years after the cause of action accrued which was the promise And it was adjudged that the plea in Bar was not good for it was resolved That where a thing is to be done upon request that there untill request there is no cause of Action and the time and place of the request is issuable And so was resolved 1. Caroli in the Kings Bench in Peck's Case and Hill 16. Jacobi in the same Court in Hill and Wades Case and in the principall Case the request was 2. Caroli and that was within the time limited by the Statute of 21. Jacobi And the meaning of the Statute was but to barre the Plaintiffe but from the time that he had compleat cause of Action and that was not untill the request made And when divers things are to be done and performed before a man can have an Action there all these things ought to be compleated before the Action can be brought And therefore If a man promise to pay I. S. ten pound when he is married or when he is returned from Rome and ten years after the promise I. S. marrieth or returneth from Rome because the marriage or the Returne from Rome are the causes of the Action that the party shall have six years after his marriage or return to bring his Action although that the promise was made ten years before And in the principall Case the cause of Action is the breach and that cannot be untill after the Request made and where a Request is material it ought to be shewed in pleading And so it was resolved by the whole Court nemine contradicente that the Action was well brought and within the time limited by the Statute And Judgement was entred for the Plaintiffe Mich. 4. Caroli in the Star-Chamber 583 FLOYD and Sr THO. CANNON's Case IT was agreed by the Lord Keeper Coventry and the whole Court in this Case That if a man did exhibite a Bill against another for oppression and layeth in this Bill That the Defendant did oppress A. B. and C. particularly and an hundred men generally That the Plaintiffe by his witnesses must prove that the Defendant hath oppressed A. B. and C. particularly and shall not be allowed to proceed against the Defendant upon the oppression of the others layed generally before his particular oppression of A. B. and C. be proved But if the charge layed be generall and not particular as if the Plaintiffe in his Bill saith That the Defendant hath oppressed an hundred men generally there he may proceed and examine the oppression of any of them And Richardson Chief Justice of the Common Pleas said That if a man exhibiteth a Bill against another for extortion there the Sum certaine which he did extort must be laid particularly in the Bill And he cannot say that the Defendant did extort divers sums from divers men generally And so was it adjudged in Reignolds Case in this Court. Also in every oppression there ought to be a threatning of the party for the voluntary payment of a greater sum where a lesser is due cannot be said extortion And afterwards the Bill of Sir Thomas Cannon was dismissed for want of proofs ex parte Querentis Mich. 4. Caroli in the Star-Chamber 504 HUET and OVERIE's Case IN a Ryot for cutting of corn It was agreed by the whole Court That if a man hath title to corn although that he cometh with a great number to cut it with Sickles it is no Riot but if he hath not any title although that he doth not come with other Weapons then with Sickles and cutteth down the Corn it is a Riot And it was agreed by the whole Court in this Case That Witnesses which were Defendants and which are suppressed by order of the Court although that afterwards there he no proceedings against them yet they shall not be allowed of at the hearing of the Cause in that Court. And this was declared to be the constant rule of that Court. Trinit 5. Caroli in the Kings Bench. 505 The Earle of PEMBROKE and BOSTOCK's Case IN a Quare Impedit Judgment was given and the same Term a Writ of Error is delivered to the same Court before a Writ to the Bishop is awarded to admit the Clark It was holden by the whole Court That the Writ of Error ought to have been allowed without any other Supersedeas because a Writ of Error is a Supersedeas in it self Whitlock Justice If in this Writ of Error the Judgement be affirmed the Defendant in the Writ of Error shall have damage 506 The Bailiffs Aldermen Burgesses and Commonalty of Yarmouth and COWPER's Case IN a quo Warranto brought against the Bailiffs Aldermen c. they did appear by Warrant of Atturney and one of the Bailiffs named in the Warrant did not appear nor agree to it It was holden by the whole Court That the appearance of the major or greater part being recorded was sufficient And it was also holden per curiam that although the Warrant of Atturney was under another Seal then their common Seal yet being under Seal and recorded it cannot be annulled Vide 14. H. 4. If two Coroners be and one maketh a return the same is good but if the other doth deny it then it is void Mich. 8. Caroli in the Kings Bench. 507 LANCASTER's Case against KIGHTLEY and SINEWS JUdgement was given in a Scire facias against the Bail A Writ of Error was brought by the Defendant in the principall Action and the Bail And the opinion of the Court was That a Writ of Error would not lie hecause the Judgements against them were severall but they ought to have severall Writs of Error And the books of 3. H. 7. 14. 3. E. 4. 10. and 2. Eliz. Dyer 180. were vouched And so was it adjudged Hill 11. Jacobi Rot. 1377. in the Exchequer Chamber in Doctor Tennants Case Where a Writ of Error was brought by the Defendant and the Bail and it was adjudged that they could not joine in an Writ of Error but ought to have severall Writs Mich. 8. Caroli in the Kings Bench. 508 EVELEY and ESTON'S Case IN Trespass It was found That a man was Tenant in tail of
of the Justices was That the Fee was executed for a moitie Manwood If the Land be to one for life the Remainder for yeers the Remainder to the first Tenant for life in Fee there the Fee is executed so as if he lose by default he shall have a Writ of Right and not Quod ei deforceat for the term shall be no impediment that the Fee shall not be executed As a man may make a lease to begin after his death it is good and the Lessor hath Fee in possession and his wife shall be endowed after the Lease And I conceive in the principall case That the term shall not be extinct for that it is not a term but interesse termini which cannot be granted nor surrendred Mounson If he had had the term in his own right then by the purchase of the Fee the Term should be extinct But here he hath it in the right of another as Administrator Dyer If an Executor hath a term and purchaseth the Fee the term is determined So if a woman hath a term and takes an husband who purchaseth the Fee the term is extinct Manwood The Law may be so in such case because the Husband hath done an act which destroyes the term viz. the purchase But if the woman had entermarried with him in the Reversion there the term should not be extinguished for the Husband hath not done any act to destroy the term But the marriage is the act of Law Dyer That difference hath some colour But I conceive in the first case That they are Tenants in common of the Fee Manwood The Case is a good point in law But I conceive the opinion of Manwood was That if a Lease for yeares were to begin after the death surrender forfeiture or determination of the first lease for yeares that it shall not begin in that part for then perhaps the term in that part shall be ended before the other should begin Pasc 20. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 3. A Man seised of Copyhold land descendable to the youngest Son by Custome and of other Lands descendable to the eldest Son by the common Law leaseth both for yeers The Lessee covenanteth That if the Lessor his wife and his heirs will have back the land That then upon a yeers warning given by the Lessor his wife or his heirs that the Lease shall be void The Lessor dieth the Reversion of the customary Land descends to the younger son and the other to the eldest who granteth it to the younger and he gives a yeers warning according to the Covenant Fenner The interest of the term is not determined because a speciall heir as the youngest son is is not comprehended under the word Heir but the heir at common Law is the person who is to give the warning to avoid the estate by the meaning of the Covenant But Manwood and Mounson Justices were cleer of opinion That the interest of the term for a moity is avoyded for the Condition although it be an entire thing by the Descent which is the act of Law is divided and apportioned and the warning of any of them shall defeat the estate for a moity because to him the moity of the Condition doth belong But for the other moity he shall not take advantage by the warning because that the warning is by the words of the Condition appointed to be done by the Lessor his wife or his heirs And in that clause of the Deed the Assignee is not contained And they agreed That if a Feoffment of lands in Borough-English be made upon condition That the heir at common Law shall take advantage of it And Manwood said that hee would put another question Whether the younger son should enter upon him or not But all Actions in right of the Land the younger son should have as a Writ of Error to reverse a Judgment Attaint and the like quod nota Pasc 22. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 4 IT was holden by Meade and Windham Justices of the Common Pleas That a Parsonage may be a Mannor As if before the Statute of Quia emptores terrarum the Parson with the Patron and Ordinary grant parcel of the Glebe to divers persons to hold of the Parson by divers Services the same makes the Parsonage a Manor Also they held That a Rent-Charge by prescription might be parcel of a Manor and shall passe without the words cum pertinentiis As if two Coparceners be of a Manor and other Lands and they make partition by which the eldest sister hath the Manor and the other hath the other Lands and she who hath the Lands grants a Rent-charge to her sister who hath the Manor for equality of partition Anderson and Fenner Srjeants were against it Hill 23 Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 5. THis Case was moved by Serjeant Periam That if a Parson hath Common appendant to his Parsonage out of the lands of an Abby and afterwards the Abbot hath the Parsonage appropriated to him and his Successors Whether the Common be extinct Dyer That it is Because he hath as high an estate in the Common as he hath in the Land As in the case of 2 H. 4. 19. where it is holden That if a Prior hath an Annuity out of a Parsonage and afterwards purchaseth the Advowson and then obtains an Appropriation thereof that the Annuity is extinct But Windham and Meade Justices conceived That the Abbot hath not as perdurable estate in the one as in the other for the Parsonage may be disappropriated and then the Parson shall have the Common again As if a man hath a Seignorie in fee and afterwards Lands descend to him on the part of the Mother in that case the Seignory is not extinguished but suspended For if the Lord to whom the Land descends dies without issue the Seignorie shall go to the heir on the part of the Father and the Tenancy to the heir on the part of the Mother And yet the Father had as high an estate in the Tenancy as in the Seignory And in 21 E. 3. 2. Where an Assize of Nusance was brought for straightning of a way which the plaintif ought to have to his Mill The defendant did alledg unity of possession of the Land and of the Mill in W. and demanded Judgment if c. The plaintif said that after that W. had two daughters and died seised and the Mill was allotted to one of them in partition and the Land to the other and the way was reserved to her who had the Mill And the Assize was awarded And so by the partition the way was revived and appendant as it was before and yet W. the Father had as high an estate in the Land as he had in the Way Hill 23 Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 6. A Man makes a Feoffment in Fee of a Manor to the use of himself and his Wife and his heirs In which Manor there are Underwoods usually to be cut every one and twenty yeers and
24. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 19. IN an Action upon the Case upon a Promise The consideration was Where I. S. had granted a Term to I. D. That afterwards upon the request of I. S. I. D. did make to W. an Estate for four years upon which W. brought his Action And after Verdict it was moved in stay of Judgement that there was no good consideration and a difference taken where the Promise was upon the Grant and where afterwards If it were before then the Condition was good but if it were afterwards it was not good And it was adjudged That the Plaintiffe Nihil capiat per billam Pasch 24. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 20. AN Action upon the Case upon a Promise was The Consideration was That in consideration that the Plaintiffe Daret diâ—m solutionis the Defendant Super se assumpsit and because he doth not say in facto that he had given day It was adjudged that no sufficient Consideration was alledged But if the Consideration were Quod cum indebitatus c. the same had been a good Consideration without any more for that implies a Consideration in it self Pasch 24. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 21. IT was said by Cooke That the Chancellor or any Judge of any of the Courts of Record at Westminster may bring a Record one to another without a Writ of Certiorare because one Judge is sufficiently known one to the other as 5. H. 7. 31. where a Certificate was by the Chancellor alone and to this purpose is 11. H. 4. But that other Judges of base Courts cannot do nor Justices of the Peace as 3. H. 6. where the certificate by Suitors was held void Pasch 25. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 22. SKIPWITH'S Case IT was found upon a speciall verdict in an Action of Trespass that the place where c. was Copy-hold land And that the Custome is That quaelibet foemina viro cooperta poterit devise lands whereof she is seised in Fee according to the custome of the Manor to her Husband and surrender it in the presence of the Reeve and six other persons And that I. S. was seised of the land where c. and had issue two Daughters and died and that they married husbands and that one of them devised her part to her husband by Will in writing in the presence of the Reeve and six other persons and afterwards at another day shee surrendred to the Husband and he was admitted and she died and her Husband continued the possession And the Husband of the other Daughter brought an Action of Trespasse Rodes Serjeant The Custome is not good neither for the Surrender nor for the Will for two causes One for the uncertainty of what estate shee might make a Devise and because it is against reason that the Wife should surrender to the Husband Where the Custome shall not be good if it be uncertain he vouched 13. E. 3. Fitz. Dum fuit infra aetatem 3. The Tenant saith that the lands are in Dorset where the Custome is that an Enfant may make a Grant or Feoffment when he can number twelve pence And it was holden that because it is uncertain when he can so do the Custome is not good 19. E. 2. in a Ravishment of Ward the defendant pleaded that the custome is that when the Enfant can measure an ell of cloth or tell twelve pence as before that he should be out of Ward and it is holden no good custom for the cause aforesaid 22. H. 6. 51. a. there a man prescribed That the Lord of D. had used to have Common for him and all his Tenants And because it is not shewed what Lord whether the Lord mediate or immediate it is adjudged no good custome And as to the Surrender it is against reason that the Wife should give to the Husband for a Wife hath not any Will but the Will of her Husband For if the Husband seised in the right of his Wife make a Feoffment in Fee and the Wife being upon the land doth disagree unto it saying that shee will never depart with it during her life yet the Feoffment is good and shall binde during the life of the Husband as it is holden in 21. E. 3. And therefore it is holden in 3. E. 3. Tit. Devise Br. 43. That a Feme covert cannot devise to her Husband for that should be the Act of the Husband to convey the land to himself And in the old Natura Brevium in the Additions of Ex gravi quaerela it is holden so accordingly And the Case in 29. E. 3. differs much from this Case For there a woman seised of lands devisable took an Husband and had issue and devised the lands to the Husband for his life and died and a Writ of Waste was brought against him as Tenant by the Courtesie and it was holden that it did lie and that he is not in by the Devise for the reason there is because he was in before by the Courtesie But as I conceive that Case will disprove the Surrender for in as much as he had it in the Right of his wife he could not take it in his own Right Also he took another Exception in the principal Case because that the wife was not examined upon the Surrender but none of the Justices spake to that Exception but when the Record was viewed it appeared that it was so pleaded Further He said That the devise was void by the Statute of 34. H. 8. Cap. 5. where it is said It is enacted That Wills and Testaments made of any Lands Tenements c. by women Coverts or c. shall not be taken to be good or effectual in Law And he said That this Statute doth extend to customary Lands And as to that all the Justices did agree That it is not within the Statute And as to the Statute of Limitations Andâ—rson chief Justice said That if a Lease for years which perhaps will not indure sixty years shall be taken strong this shall Anderson moved That if the Lord Lease Copyhold land by Word Whether the Lessee might maintain an Ejectione firme and he conceived not for in an Ejectione firmâ— there ought to be a Right in Fact And although it be by conclusion it is not sufficient for that the Jury or Judge are not estopped or concluded And he conceived That if Tenant at Will make a Lease for years that it is no good lease betwixt him and the Lessor but that he may well plead that he had nothing in the land Meade contrary but they both agreed That the Book of 14. E. 4. which saith That if Tenant at Will make a lease for years that he shall be a Disseisor is not Law Anderson said That the prescription in the principal Case was not good for it is Quod quaelibet foemina viro cooperta poterit c. and it ought to be that feme Coverts possunt and by the Custome have used to devise to the
the Justices did agree that the assignement was good but that the two assignees could not work severally but together with one stock or such workmen as belonged to them both And Cook who reported the opinions of the Justices was of Counsel with the Lord Mountjoy And note in that case it was said That Proviso being coupled with other words of covenant and grant doth not create a Condition but shall be of the same nature as the other words with which it is coupled Pasch 25. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 25. WEBBE and POTTER'S Case In an Ejectione firme the Case was this JOhn Harris gave Land in Frankmarriage to one White And the words of the Deed were Dedi concessi I. W. in liberum maritagium Joannae filiae suae Habendum eidem J. W. haeredibus suis in perpetuum tenendum de Capitalibus Dominis fâ—odi c. with warranty to the Husband and his heirs Periam Justice although the usuall words of gift in Frankmarriage are not observed yet the Frankmarriage shall not be destroyed for the usuall words are In liberum maritagium cum Joanna filia mea in the ablative case And it was holden by all the Justices that notwithstanding that the Frankmarriage was good Also a gift in Frankmarriage after the espousals is good as it was holden by all the Justices And see Fitz. Tit. Taile 4. E. 3. and 2. H. 3. Dower 199. And he said That a gift in Frankmarriage before the Stat. of Donis c. was a Feesimple but now it is but a special tail and if it should not be in law a gift in Frankmarriage then the Husband and Wife have an estate but for their lives for they cannot have an estate taile for that there are not words of limitation of such estate in the gift And hee cited 4. E. 3. and 45. E. 3. 20. to prove his opinion and hee much relyed upon the intent of the Donor which ought to be observed in construction of such Gifts according to the Statute And because the Habendum is repugnant to the premisses and would destroy the Frank-marriage it is void and the premisses shall stand good and to prove that he cited 9. E. 3. 13. E. 1. 32. E. 1. Tit. Taile 25. 3. H. 4. by Hill And he took this difference Where a Remainder is limited upon a Gift in Frankmarriage to a stranger and where it is limited to one of the Donees for in the first case the Remainder is good for the benefit of the stranger but in the second case it is void And he said that if a Rent be reserved upon such a Gift that it should be void during the four degrees but afterwards the Reservation should be good And if the Donor grant the Reversion over and the Donee in Frank-marriage attourn now he shall pay rent to the Grantee for by Littleton he hath lost the Priviledg of Frankmarriage viz. the Aquitall and no privitie is betwixt the Grantee and the Donees 10. Ass 26. 4. H. 6. That it is not any taile if it be not Frankmarriage Windham Justice Although it be no estate in Frankmarriage yet is it an estate taile and he cited 8. E. 3. although there want the word Heirs Also if a man give lands to another semini suo it is good 45. E. 3 Statham taile If it be not Frankmarriage yet it is a good estate in taile 19. Ass Land was given to Husband and Wife in Frank-marriage infra annos nubiles and afterwards they are divorced the Wife hath an estate in taile Meade Justice did agree with Windham and said That although there be not any Tenure nor any Aquitall yet it may be a good Frankmarriage as if a Rent Common or Reversion be given in Frankmarriage it is good and yet there is not any Tenure nor aquitall Dyer Chief Justice conceived That it is not Frankmarriage because that the usuall words in such Gifts are not observed for he said that the gift ought to be in liberum Maritagium and not Joannae filiae suae for that is not the usuall form of the words And he said That if the word Liberum be omitted that it is not Frankmarriage for that he said is as it were a Maxime and therefore the usuall words ought to be observed And by the same reason such a Gift cannot be with a man but ought to be with a woman also such a Gift ought to be with one of the blood of the Donor who by possibilitie might be his Heir Also there ought to be a Tenure betwixt the Donor and Donee and also an Aquitall And if these grounds and ceremonies be not observed it is not Frankmarriage Also if it once take effect as a Frankmarriage and afterwards the Donor granteth the Reversion over or if the Reversion doth descend to the Donees yet it shall not be utterly destroyed but shall remaine as an estate taile and not as an estate for life because it once took effect in the Donees and their issues as a Frankmarriage 31. E. 1. taile 116. If a man give lands in Frankmarriage the remainder to the Donees and the heirs of their bodies yet it is a good Frankmarriage And if a man give Lands in Frankmarriage the Remainder to another in taile it shall not destroy the Frankmarriage because that the Donor hath the Reversion in Fee in himself and the Donees shall hold of him and not of him in the Remainder in taile but if the Remainder had been limited to another in Fee simple then it had been otherwise Also if the Donor grant the Services of the Donees in Frankmarriage reserving the Reversion to himself it is no good Grant although that the Donees attourne for that the Services are incident to the Reversion but if he grant the Reversion then they do passe And he concluded That the Husband had the whole and that the Wife had nothing for she was no purchaser of the premisses because that the Gift did not take effect as a gift in Frankmariage And he said that he doth not construe it so by the intent of the Gift for here is an expresse limitation of the Fee to the Husband and his heirs which shall not be contradicted by any intendment for an Intendment ought to give way to an expresse Limitation as a consideration implyed ought to give place to a consideration expressed And afterwards this yeer it was adjudged that it was not a Frankmarriage nor a Gift in taile but that it was a Fee simple And the Justices said that although the old books are That where it takes not effect as a Frankmarriage that yet it shall take effect as an estate taile those Books are against Law But they agreed That where once the Gift doth take effect as a Frankmarriage that by matter ex post facto it might be turned to an estate in taile Pasch 26. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 26. MEade and Windham the other Justices being absent were of opinion That a
for by this Act done it is plaine from the beginning to be unlawfull for the Sale is only a Declaration of his ill intent and a means that his meaning was by felling of the trees to benefit himself by the hurt and injury of another But in the Principall Case because he ought to digge the Land and that was lawfull for him to do the Act subsequent cannot be unlawfull And so it was adjudged 27. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 38. MACROWE's Case MAcrowe brought Debt upon a Bond which was endorced upon Condition to pay a lesse sum The Defendant pleaded the Statute of 13. Eliz. That all Covenants Contracts and Bonds made for the enjoying of Leases made of Spirituall Livings by Parsons c. were void And averred that that Bond was made for enjoying of such a Lease But because the Condition expressed of the Bond was for payment of monie The Justices held it cleer for Law That the Bond was good and out of the Statute And so it was adjudged 27. Eliz. in the Common Pleas 39. KITTLEY's Case AN Action of Debt was brought against Eustace Kittley and Charls Kittley Executors of the Will of Francis Kittley The Defendants pleaded That they had fully Administred and upon a speciall Verdict the Case was this Francis Kittley made the Defendats his Executors who being within age Administration was committed unto another untill they came of full age and after they were of full age the Jury found That in the hands of the Administrator Fuerunt boâ—a debita Testatoris to the value of 4000.li. To which Administrator the Defendants Executors did release at their full age all Demands the which Release whether it were Assets in the hands of the Executors or not the Jurours prayed the Opinion of the Court Puckering the Queens Sergeant It is not Assets for a Release of a thing which is not Assets in the hand of an Executor cannot be said Assets and things in Action before they come in Possession cannot be said Assets But a Gift of Goods in Posssession is Assets and a Devastavit of the Goods of the dead Also there is a difference betwixt a certain thing released and a thing uncertain of a certain it is Assets for by such means he hath given such a thing which is Assets but contrary of an uncertain Aâ—â— this Difference is proved by 13. E. 3. Execut. 91. where it is holden That if Executors release to the Debtor he shall account for such Sum before the Ordinary by Parne But Trew He shall not account But the whole Court was against Puckering And first Anderson It is a cleer Case That this Release is Assets for he hath thereby given away that which might have been Assets And the Law doth intend That when he releaseâ— that he hath Recompence and Satisfaction from the Party to whom the release is made And he denyed the Difference of certain and uncertain put by Puckering and be it in Account or Trespasse a Release is Assets And it is not requisite that every Assets be a thing in Possession or in the hands of the Testator for a thing may be Assets which never was in the Testators hands if those things 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉 of the thing which was in the hands of the Testaor as Money for Land or other Goods soâ—d Or if they came by reason of another thing which was in the hands of the Testator as increase of Goods by the Executors in their hands by Merchandizing with the Goods of the Testator or Goods purchased by the Villain of the Testator after his death shall be Assets So money received by the Executor of the 〈◊〉 of the Testator after his death shall be said Assets Windham Justice So it is if the Testator have Sheep Swine or Cowes and dieth and they have young Lambs Pigs or Calves they are Assets for the reason aforesaid And he agreed that the Release is Assets and he said It had been so here adjudged and he denyed also the difference taken by Puckering Periam agreed with the rest in all and also denyed the difference And by him Things in Action or Possession certain or uncertain if they be released they are Assets And he said That the uncertainty must be such that the same cannot be proved to the Court or unto a Jury that the thing released might not by Possibility have been Assets For if Trespasse be done to the Testaâ—â—â— by taking his goods and he dieth and the Executors release all Actions the same is Assets because 〈◊〉 might be proved to the Jury That had they not released but had brought their Action of Trespasse De bontâ— asportatis in vita testatoris c. that they might have recovered Damages which would have satisfied the Debts or Legaces of the Testator and therefore it shall be Assets And yet the thing recovered was not in the Testator or a thing in Possession or certain in the hands of the Executors with whom Rodes agreed And Periam conceived That such Administrators made Durante minori aetate of the Executor could not by our Law neither Sue nor be Sued For as he conceived the Infant was the Executor and an Infant Executor may either Sue or be Sued and may release if there be a sufficient Consideration given him and therefore Administration for such defect is but idle Wherefore he said That if an Infant doth release where he hath no cause nor good consideration he shall be answerable of his own goods when he cometh of full age for the wasting of the estate and such Release shall be Assets And it was holden That a Release before probate of the Will is good and it is Assets also And the same Term Judgment was given that the Release of the Enfant Executor was Assets 27. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 40. SYDENHAM and WORLINGTON's Case SYdenham brought an Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsâ—t against Worlington for 30 li and alledged for Consideration that he at the request of the Defendant was Surety and Bail for J. S. who was arrested into the Kings Bench upon an Action of 30 li and that afterwards for the default of J. S. he was constrained to pay the said 30 pounds After which the Defendant meeting with the Plaintiff promised him for the same consideration that he would repay that 30 pound upon which promise and consideration the Plaintiff brought this Action Walmesley This Consideration will not maintain this Action because the consideration and the promise did not concur and go together for the consideration was long before executed so as now it cannot be intended that the promise was for the same consideration As if one give to me an Horse and a month after I promise him for the said Horse ten pounds for that he shall neither have Debt nor Assumpsit for it is neither a Contract nor a sufficient Consideration because it is executed Anderson The Action will not lie for it is but nudum paâ—â—â—â— because the supposed
same to Cropp the Lessor And the same Margery at one or two dayes before the payment of the said Rent had received the Rent in the like manner and had paid it to Cropp and he had accepted of it But now he refused to receive it of her but at the last day of the Month he went to the Land and there demanded the Rent and because it was not paid he entred Laiton argued for the Lessor That his entry was lawfull for he said That the Tender made by Margery Briggs to the Lessor was not sufficient 1. Because the Servant of the Lessee had Authority to deliver it to the Lessor therefore when he delivers it to another he hath not pursued his Authority 19. H. 8. 27. H. 8. Letter of Atturney made to diverse to give livery of Seisin If one make Livery alone it is void 34. H. 6. If a Capias be to many Coroners and one execute it it is void 18. E. 4. If one hath a Letter of Atturney to make Livery he cannot transfer this Authority to another to make Livery for him Also if in this Case a Stranger had tendered the Rent the Lessor was not bound to receive it as upon a Mortgage if a Stranger tender the Money the Mortgagee is not bound to accept of it 21. E. 4. In case of Corporall Service as Homage or Fealty the demand is to be made of the person but of Rent the demand is to be made upon the Land because the Land is the Debtor Clenche Justice conceived That if the Lessee himselfe had delivered the Rent to Margery Briggs that it had been good but it is a doubt if good made by the servant for he could not transfer his Authority to another Wray Chief Justice If it were upon a Bond the Obligee was not bound to accept of it before the day so if it were payable at Mich. only there the Lessor is not bound to accept of it before the day but in as much as 't is after the day the Month is a Liberty and Benefit for the Lessee and it was due at Mich. therefore I conceive That being tendred to him within any part of the Month that he is bound to accept of it And as to that That his servant cannot transfer his Authority over and therefore Margery Briggs is but a stranger in that act that is not so for now she is a servant in that to the Lessor himself and therefore there is privity enough also she hath received the Rent for him before What then said Laiton We can prove a speciall commandment for the time before that she received it At another day the Case was moved again and it was ruled against Cropp the Lessor because the rent was due at Mich. and the month after was given because of the penalty of Re-entry and the Tender and Refusall after the Rent was due and within the month saves the penalty and also Lawes ought to be expounded Secundùm â—quum bonum and good conscience and the Lessor was at no prejudice if he had accepted of it when his Daughter in Law tendred it unto him and therefore it was conceived That he had an intent to defraud the Lessee of his Lease and the Law doth not favour Frauds and therefore it was adjudged against Cropp the Lessor Hill 28 Eliz. In the King 's Bench. 44 PRIDEAUX's Case IN this Case it was moved Where a man marrieth a woman who is an Administratrix so as the Suit is to be in both their names Whether they shall be named in the Writ Administrators or not Wray Chief Justice They shall be for by the Entermarriage the Husband hath Authority to entermeddle with the Goods as well as the Wife but in the Declaration all the speciall matter ought to be set forth and so some said is the Book of Entries That both of them shall be named Administrators Hill 28. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 45. AN Action upon the Case was brought for these words viz. Thou art a Cozener and a Bankrupt and hast an Occupation to deceive men by the words were spoken of a Gentleman who had One hundred Pound land per annum to live upon and therefore although he used to buy and sell Iron yet because he was not a Merchant nor did not live by his Trade the better Opinion of the Court was That the words were not actionable and so adjudged Hill 28. Eliz in the King 's Bench. 46 HARWOOD and HIGHAM's Case ONE had Houses and Lands which had been in the tenures of those which had the Houses and he devised his Houses with the Appurtenances and it was holden and so adjudged by the whole Court That the Lands did passe by the words With the Appurtenances For it was in a Will in which the intent of the Devisor shall be observed Trinit 28. Eliz. Rot. 1130. in the Common Pleas. 47 The QUEEN and SAVACRE's Case IN a Quare Impedit by the Queen against Savacre Clerk the Case was this The Queen presented to a Parsonage which was void by the taking of another Benefice by the said Savacre and the said Savacre for to enable him to have two Benefices pleaded That he was the Chaplain of Sir James a Crosts Controller of the Queens House who by the Statute of 21. H. 8. cap. 13. might have two Chaplains and might qualifie them to take two Benefices to which it was replied That the said Sir James a Crost had two other Chaplains which are qualified to have two Benefices and have also two Benefices by reason of that qualification and also are alive so as he is a third Chaplain who could not be qualified by that Statute To which it was answered That one of those two Chaplains is removed and discharged by the said Sir James a Crost to be his Domesticall Chaplain scil Capellanum familiarem as it was pleaded and so he hath now but two Chaplains of which the Defendant was one upon which there was demurrer joyned Three Points were in the Case 1. If the qualification Sub sigillo be sufficient within the Statute without the Signature or name of Sir James a Crost 2. When two Chaplains are qualified and one is removed out of service if he might qualifie another by the Statute the party being alive who was qualified 3. Whether he remain his Chaplain notwithstanding such removall during his life Upon which Points after perusall of the Statute it was agreed by the whole Court That the Queen ought to have Judgement and so they gave Judgement presently And the reasons of their Judgement were for the first Point Because that the Defendant Sâ—vâ—cre was not qualified Sub Signo Sigillo praedict Jacobi a Crost but only Sub Sigillo and the words of the Statute are viz. Under the Sign and Seal of the King or other their Lord or Master c. Which words Or other their Lord or Master shall be referred to Sign and Seal which is limited to the
Bench. 70 GILE'S Case A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a Judgement given in an Action upon the Case The Action upon the Case was brought against one Quare exaltavit stagnum per quod suum pratum fuit inundatum and he pleaded Not guilty and the Jury found Quod erexit stagnum and if Errectio be Exaltatio then the Jury find that the Defendant is guilty and thereupon Judgement was given for the Plaintiffe Glanvile alledged the generall Error That Judgement was given for the Plaintiffe where it ought to have been given for the Defendant And he said That erigere stagnum est de novo facere Exaltare est erectum majoris altitudinis facere Deexaltare is ad pristinam altitudinem adducere prosternere stagnum est penitus tollere And the precise and apt word according to his Case in an Action upon the Case ought to be observed that he may have Judgement according to his damage and his complaint viz. either Deexaltare or Posternere c. 7. E. 3. 56. An Assize of Nusans Quare exaltavit stagnum ad nocumentum liberi tenementi sui The Defendant pleaded That he had not inhaunced it after it was first levyed And by Trew There is not any other Writ in the Chancery but Quare exaltavit stagnum Herle said That he might have a Writ Quare levavit stagnum and there by that book Levare stagnum exaltare stagnum do differ And therefore he conceived That the Writ should abate for using one word for another 8. E. 3. 21. Nusans 5. by Chauntrell In a Writ of Nusans Quare levavit if it be found that it was tortiously levied the whole shall be destroyed But in a Writ Quare exaltavit nothing shall be pulled down if it be found for the Plaintiffe but the inhauncing shall be abated only So 8. Ass 9. Br. Nusans 17. the same Case and difference is put and 16. E. 3. Fitz. Nusans 11. If the Nusans be found in any other forme then the Plaintiffe hath supposed he shall not recover And in 48. E. 3. 27. Br. Nusans 9. The Writ was Quare divertit cursum aquae c. and shewed that he had put Piles and such things in the water by which the course of the water was streitned wherefore because he might have had a Writ Quare coarctavit cursum qquae the Writ was holden not to be good Cook took another Exception viz. That the Assize of Nusans ought to be against the Tenant of the Free-hold and therefore it cannot be as it was here brought against the Workmen and it is not shewed here that the Defendant was Tenant of the Soil for 33. H. 6. 26. by Moile If a way be streitned and impaired an Action upon the Case lieth but if it be altogether stop'd an Assize of Nusans lieth But Prisoit said If the stopping be by the Terr-Tenant an Assize of Nusans lieth but if it be by a Stranger then an Action upon the Case but for common Nusanses no Action lieth but they ought to be presented in the Leet or Turne Drew We have shewed That he who brought the Assize of Nusans hath a Free-hold in the Land and if the Tenant be named it is sufficient although it be not shewed that he is Tenant of the Free-hold And to that all the Justices seemed to incline But then it was shewed to the Court that one of the Plaintiffes in the Writ of Error had released And if that should bar his Companions was another question And it was holden That the Writ of Error shall follow the nature of the first Action and that Summons and Severance lieth in an Assize of Nusans and therefore it was holden that it did the like in this Action therefore the Release of the one was the Release of the other But then it was asked by Glanvile What should become of the Damages which were entire Note Pasch 29. Eliz. the Case was moved again and Drew held exaltare and erigere all one and that erigere is not de novo facere for that is Levare But the Justices were against him who all held That erigere is de novo facere and exaltare is in majorem altitudinem attollere and at length the Judgment was affirmed That Erectio and Exaltatio were all one For the Chief Justice had turned all his Companions when he came to be of Opinion that it was all one And so the Case passed against Glanviles Client Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 71 THE Lady Gresham was indicted for stopping the High-way and the Indictment was not laid to be contra pacem And Cook said That for a mis-feasance it ought to be contra pacem but for a non-feasance of a thing it was otherwise and the Indictment was for setting up a gate in Osterly Park And Exception also was taken to the Indictment for want of Addition for Vidus was no Addition of the Lady Gresham and also Vi armis was left out of the Indictment And for these causes she was discharged and the Indictment quashed Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 72. IN an Ejectione firme Exception was taken because the Plaintiffe in his Declaration did not say Extratenet For in every Case where a man is to recover a possession he ought to say extra tenet And in Debt he ought to say Debet dâ—tinet And in a Replevin Averia cepit injustè detinet But all the Justices agreed That in an Ejectione firme those words were not materiall For if the Defendant do put out the Plaintiff it is sufficient to maintain this Action And Kempe Secondary said that so were all the ancient Presidents although of late times it hath been used to say in the Declaration Extra tenet and the Declaration was holden to be good without those words Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 73 IN a Case for Tithes the Defendant did prescribe to pay but ob q for the Tithes of all Willows cut down by him in such a Parish Cooke It is no good prescription for thereby if he cut down all the Willows of other men also but ob q. should be paid for them all But he ought to have prescribed for all Willows cut down upon his own land and then it had been good But as the prescription is it is unreasonable and of that opinion was the whole Court Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 74 DEIGHTON and CLARK'S Case IN an Action of Debt upon a Bond the Condition of the Bond was That whereas the Plaintiff was in possession of such Lands If I. S. nor I. D. nor I. G. did disturb him by any indirect means but by due course of Law that then c. The Defendant pleaded That nec I S. nec I. D. nec I. G. did disturb him by any indirect means but by due course of Law Godfrey The plea in Bar is not good for it is a Negative pregnans viz. such a Negative
which implyes an Affirmative which yet seems to be repugnant to a Negative as in 21. H. 6. 19. In a Writ of Entrie the Defendant pleaded the deed of the Demandant after the darrein Continuance The Demandant said It was not his deed after the darrein Continuance And that was holden a Negative pregnans wherefore he was compelled to plead and say he made it by dures before the darrein Continuance such a day absque hoc that he made it after the darrein continuance and then Issue was taken upon it The same Case is in 5. H 7. 7. But there it is said That in Debt upon a Bond to perform an Arbitrement Non fecerunt Arbitrementum per diem is no Negative pregnans The same Law that non deliberavit arbitrium in Script 38. H 6. in Formedon Ne dona pas in taile is a Negative pregnans Vide 39 H. 6. The Case of the Dean and Chapter The second Exception was That he hath pleaded neque such nor such nor such had disturbed him by any indirect means but onely by due course of Law And that cannot be tryed neither by Jury nor by the Judges Not by the Jury because it is not to be put to them whether they had disturbed him by indirect means or by due course of Law for they shall not take upon them the construction What is an indirect means and what is the due course of Law for it appertaineth to the Justices to adjudg that Not by the Judges because hee hath not put it certain that it was a due course of Law by which he disturbed him As 22. E. 4. 40. In Debt upon a Bond the Defendant saith that it is upon condition That if the Defendant or any for him came to Bristow such a day and there shewed to the Plaintiff or his Councell a sufficient Discharge of an Annuity of forty shillings per annum which the Plaintiff claims out of two Messuages of the Defendant in D that then c. The Defendant said that A. and B. by the assignement of the Defendant came the same day to Bristow and tendered to shew to N and W. of the Plaintiffs Councell a sufficient Discharge of the Annuity and that they did refuse to see it and demanded judgment of the Action The Plaintiff did demur upon the Plea And after a long argument it was adjudged by all the Justices to be no Plea c. because it lay in the judgment of the Court to judg of it and he did not shew in certain what discharge he tendered as a Release Unitie of possession c. If a man be bound to plead a sufficient plea before such a day in Debt upon such a Bond it is no plea to say That he hath pleaded a sufficient plea before the day but hee ought to shew what plea he hath pleaded For the Court cannot tell whether it be a sufficient plea or not if it do not appear what manner of plea it is 35 H. 6. 19. The Condition of a Bond was That where the Plaintiff was indebted to J. S. in one hundred pounds If the Defendant acquit and discharge the Plaintiffe that then c. The Defendant pleaded That hee had discharged him c. and the Plaintiffe did demurre upon the plea because hee did not shew how and it was holden no good plea. So 38. H. 8. Br. Condition 16. per curiam in the Kings Bench where a man pleaded That he had saved him harmlesse it was no Plea without shewing how because he pleaded in the Affirmative contrary if he had pleaded in the Negative as Non damnificatus est Suit and Clenche Justices said That if he had pleaded That he was not disturbed by any indirect means it had been good enough Gaudy If he had said That he was not disturbed contra formam conditionis praedict ' it had been good as upon a pleading of a Statute Ne entra pas contra formam Statuti Clench If I be bound to suffer I. S. to have my house but not I. D. I ought to answer That I have suffered the one and not the other to have it Suit Justice They are both severall issues and one shall not be repugnant to the other Mich. 28 29 Eliz. In the Kings Bench. 75 STURGIE'S Case A Case was moved upon the Statute of 5. Eliz. Cap. 14. The Case as I conceive was thus Grandfather Father and Daughter Land descended from the Grandfather to the Father who made a Lease for one hundred years the Father died and the Daughter forged a Will of the Grandfather by which he gave the Land to the Father for life the Remainder to the Daughter in Fee and the same was forged to have avoided an Execution of a Statute Staple the Lease being defeated and if it were within the Statute of 5. Eliz. was the question Solicitor That it was within the statute and within the first Branch viz. If any shall forge any deed c. to the intent that the Estate of Free-hold or Inheritance of any person c. in or to any Lands Tenements or Hereditaments Freehold or Copyhold or the right Title or Interest of any c. of in or to the same or any of them shall or may be molested c. Lessee for years hath a Title hath an Interest hath a right therefore within the words of the Statute and those words shall be referred to the words Lands Tenements c. But Cook said They shall be referred to the words precedent viz. Estate of Freehold or Inheritance and then a Lease for years is not within them Also by the Solicitor A Testament in writing is within the words of the Statute and therefore he recited a clause in the end of the Statute viz. and if any person plead publish or shew forth c. to the intent to have or claime thereby any Estate of Inheritance Freehold or Lease for years And also he said a Statute Staple is an estate for years although it be not a Lease for years because it is not certain Cook If she should be within both branches then she should be twice punished which Law will not suffer And the Statute is whereby any Estate for years shall be claimed and she would not claim but defeat an Estate for years and a Statute Staple is not a Lease for years and the Statute is not to be taken by Equity because it is a Penall Law Solicitor When the Statute is extended then it is an Estate for years although it be uncertain If a man forge a Lease for years it is directly within the Statute But if a man have a Lease and another is forged to defeat it it is a question whether it be within the Statute And all the doubt of this Case is upon the reference of these words Right Title Interest And it was adjourned Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 76 THE Vicar of Pancras Case was argued again by Godfrey And he said That no Plea shall be
allowed in the Ecclesiasticall Court which tends in discharge of Tithes And to prove that he cited 8. E. 4. 14. Br. Tithes 11. And a Case in 6. 7. E. 6. Dier 79. d. But admit the Plea should be allowed in the Ecclesiasticall Court as many of the Doctors have certified the Justices yet because the Modus decimandi is a thing pertaining to the common Law the Prohibition will lie By Fitz. Herb. and the Register If a Parson grant to one of his Parishoners That he shall be discharged of Tithes he may peradventure plead the same in the Spirituall Court yet there is good cause that a Prohibition do lie So 22. E. 4. 20. Br. Prohibition 14. The Abbot of Saint Albans kept the wife of I. S. in his house two houres against her will to have made her his Harlot and the Husband spake of it for which cause the Abbot sued him for slander in the Spirituall Court and because the husband for that act might have a false imprisonment therefore a Prohibition was granted So if I swear to pay I. S. 10â— and he sues for it in the Spirituall Court a Prohibition lieth for hee may have an Action of Debt in the common Law for it for where the common Law may have Jurisdiction there the Spirituall Court shall not intermeddle with the matter So if an Abbot rob I. S. and he speaks of it and the Abbot sues him in the Spirituall Court a Prohibtion will lie He said further That the Case was betwixt the Vicar and a Parishoner and therefore one of them a Temporall person If the Suit be betwixt the Farmer of the Parson and another a Prohibition shall be granted Also he said The right of the Tithes doth not come in question but only the Modus dicimandi Câ—â—k The Modus decimandi doth not come in question there therfore it cannot be traversed for if it be due to the Parson that is the question as in 40. E. 3 4. In a Replevin the Defendant saith That the place where c. is Ancient Demesne and pleads to the Jurisdiction Char l' that is a Trespasse and Personall Action and therefore it is no plea and yet it was agreed by the Court to be a good plea for by the Avowry the realty might come in debate in the Replevin Atkins If there be contention de Jure Decimarum Originum habens de jurâ— Patronatus tunc spectat ac Legem Civilem And in this case it was said That de mero jure The Parson is to have all the tythes if there be not any Endowment of the Vicarage Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 77. MEGOD'S Case THe Case was That a Feoffment was made unto another man ad eam intentionem that he should convey the same to such a one to whom he sold it and he sold the same to another and did refuse to convey it and therefore the other brought an Action upon the Case And Gaudy Justice held that the Action would lie But Suit Justice held the contrary Wray Chiefe Justice did agree with Gaudy for he said It was a Trust that he should assure it to another And it is a good consideration in the Chancery the conveyance of a Trust and thereupon an Action upon the Case will lie Mich. 28 29 Eliz. In the Kings Bench. 78. ALtham of Grays-Inne took many Exceptions to an Indictment of Murder The first was because the Indictment said Quod capta fuit inquisitio coram Coronatore in Comitatu c. and doth not say de Comitatu And a Crowner in a County is a Crowner in every County in England as it is holden 9. H. 5. 24. b. Also de and in do much differ as in 15. E. 4. 15. Where a Scire facias was brought against the Master and Scholers Beatae Mariae Sancti Nicholai in Cantabrigia where the foundation was de Cantabrigia and not in Cantabriâ—gia And the Writ was abated For there is a difference betwixt in and de For a thing may be in and not of as Saint Sepulchres is in London but not of London A second Exception was because it said Inquisitio capta per Sacramentum c. and did not say Jurati and therefore the partie is not charged upon it and by 13. E. 4. If Jury be charged upon one and they find another felon it is void because they were not charged upon him And 1. R. 3. 4. by Hassey If in Assize the Record be such viz. Quod jurati exacti comperuerunt quorum 12. supra Sacramentum suum dicunt And give their verdict If it doth not say Quorum 12. Electi jurati it is errour For it doth not say in facto that they were sworn and yet it is implyed by the words Sacramentum suum that they were sworn The third Exception was That it doth not say That he was in pace Dei dict' Dominae Reginae for it might be that the partie was a Traitour and that he was flying and in such case he might justifie the killing of him and perhaps also it was se defendendo therefore those words are very necessary An other Exception was because the Indictment is percussiâ— and it is not said ex malitia praecogitata for so an Indictment of Murder ought to be as in 2. E. 4. The Indictment was quod Cepit abduxit felâ—nicè where it ought to have said Felonicè cepit abduxit and therefore it did abate A fifth Exception was because it saith â—t dedit ei plagam mortalem and doth not say cum gladio pâ—aedicto And in the Statute de Coronatore there is a charge given him That hee finde what weapon it was which gave the stroke See the Statute of 4. E. 1. Rastall Coroners 2. The sixth Exception was That the Indictment was That the pan of the knee was cut out and it doth not shew the length depth and breadth of the wound he granted that if one single member be cut off it is not necessary to shew the breadth c. but here was no amputation of any member nor a cutting off but the cutting of the pan of the knee Saâ—g to the same purpose and he finds there is a great difference betwixt cut off and cut out And he said That as to that which the Solicitour hath answered unto to the difference of in and de viz. that it is all one as if I grant a thing percipiena ' de Manâ—rio or in Maneriâ— that is all one To that he answered that that cannot be and in Wâ—mbishâ—s case in Plo. Coâ— 75. the same Exception was taken in a Writ But in our Case he said It is an Indictment which is favoured because the life is in question And he took another Exception because that the Indictment saies Tempore feloniae murdredi praedict ' and there is no such word murdredum To that the Sollicitour said That it was in equall degree murdum and murdredum for none of them are
not shew what trees nor how many he might cut and that he hath cut down more then he ought and also he doth not shew when the cutting of them was Vide 6. E. 4. By prescription they may prescribe to hold a Court before the Steward but if there be no custome or Prescription to warrant it then as 4. H. 6. is it is coram Senescalio Sectatoribus Gaudy Every Court Baron is to be holden before the Suitors if there be no Prescription to the contrary But a Leet alwayes before the Steward The Action of Debt was upon the Presentment and the Error is brought upon the defects in the Presentment for if that be not good all is naught Notwithstanding it was said by one at the Bar That the forme of pleading in the book of Entries is That the Court was holden before the Steward if the Action be for debt or Trespass for Amercements or such personall things But if the Action be brought for reall things then it is before the Suitors But notwithstanding that the Judgement for the Causes aforesaid was reversed Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 84 BARKER and FLETWEL'S Case BArker of Ipswich brought an Action of Covenant against the Assignee of his Lessee for years one Fletwell And set forth That whereas he had made a Lease for years reserving Rent with re-entry for non-payment of the Rent and that the Lessee did covenant to build a house upon the Land within the first ten years and that he assigned over his terme And he brought the Action against the Assignee who pleaded That the Lessor did enter and had the Possession for part of the ninth year and if thereby the Covenant were discharged was the demurrer in Law Godfrey Who argued for the Lessor said That by this entrie of the Lessor the Covenant was not suspended As 20. E. 4. 12 BY. Extinguishment 34. The Abbot of D. did grant to W. S. a Corrodie viz. so much bread c. for the term of his life faciend ' talia servitia prout J. N. alii usi sunt focere The Grantee leased back again the Corrodie unto the Abbot for 10. years rendring 3â— rent per annum and he brought Debt for the rent and the Abbot said That he did not the Services and the Grantee said That he was not bound to do them for that by the Lease the Corrodie was suspended And it was holden that it was not suspended Godfâ—â—y held the reason to be because that the service is a Collaterall thing And therefore he said He ought to do it notwithstanding that the Abbot had the Corrodie So in 8. H. 7. 7. Br. Conditions 134. Where Tenant in taile makes a Feoffment in Fee and takes back an estate in Fee and afterwards was bounden in a statute Merchant and then made a Feoffment in Fee upon Condition and died his Issue within age who enters for the Condition broken he was remitted notwithstanding that execution upon the statute was sued against the Father in his life So if Lease be made of a Manor except Herriots Fines and Amercements and that the Lessee shall collect them during the Term although that the Lessor entreth yet the Lessee ought to collect them during the term Also he pleades here That Barker did enter and that generall pleading is doubtfull and the Plea shall be taken strictly against him that pleadeth it and it may be that he entred by wrong and so it may be that he entred by right viz. for not payment of the Rent as in truth his entry was And if Barker did enter lawfully then it was no suspension or extinguishment of the Covenant As 19. R. 2. If Lessee for life commit waste and afterwards alieneth and the Lessor entreth for the Alienation yet after his entry he shall have an Action of Waste against the Lessee So 8. H. 6. 10. Waste 8. but with this difference If the Lessor enter wrongfully there although Waste be done before he shall not have Waste to punish it but otherwise if he enter for the Forfeiture done by the Tenant Also if the Covenant was suspended it was only for the time that the Lessor had the Possession and the Party hath not answered for the time before or after As 16. H. 7. If one be bound to find a Chaplain to say Divine Service within such a Chappel and the Chappel fall down it is a good excuse for the time but if it be built again he must find a Chaplain there Clarke contrary If Lessee for years covenanteth to repair the houses I grant that the same shall charge his Assignee But a Collateral thing as if the Lessee covenant to pay such a sum in gross or to enfeoffe him of the Manor of D the same shall not charge the Assignee no more shall a Covenant to build a new house But here it was said That he had time to build it both before and after the entry of the Lessor Barker To that he answered Not so for if he once disturbed the Covenant is destroyed Godfrey This Case was this Terme in the Common Pleas. Lessee for five years covenanted to build a Mill within the terme and because he had not done it the Lessor brought an Action of Covenant and the Defendant pleaded That within the last three years the Lessor forcibly held him out c. so as he could not build it and by the Opinion of all the Justices he ought to plead That the Lessor with force held him out otherwise it would be no Plea Cook As amicus curiae vouched 35. H. 6. Tit. Barr. If one be bounden to enfeoffe me of such land before Michaelmas there the Obliger in Debt brought upon the Bond pleaded That the Obligee before the day had entred with force into the land so as he could not enfeoffe him and there it was holden That he ought to prove that he was holden out by force Gaudy In the principall Case he ought to have shewed That he would not suffer him to build And the other Justices seemed to be of the same Opinion but yet they said That they would advise upon the Case Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 85 OWen took Exception to a Declaration in an Ejectione firme because it was à Possessione sua ejecit where it ought to be according to the supposal of the Writ Quod à firma sua ejecit Also it was of three closes naming them with a Videlicet containing by estimation 30. Acres and that he said did contain no certainty where he ought to have alledged in Fact that they did contain so many Acres But it was holden by all the Justices That although he doth not put in the Declaration the certainty of the Acres if he give a certain name to them as Green-Close c. that it is good And as to the other Exception viz. Ejecit à Possessione inde that the word inde had relation to the Farme and shall be as much as
not recited in the Statute So here our Case is within the Mischiefe of the Statute of 21. H. 8. Cap. 4. although it be not within the Example So the Statute of West 1. is That if the Gardien or Lessee for years maketh a Feoffment in Fee Tam Feofator quam feofatus habeantur pro disseisoribus yet 22. Ass is That if Tenant by Elegit make a Feoffment it is within the Statute Also it may be a doubt Whether Land devisable onely by custome bee intended in the Statute of 21. H. 8. Cap. 4. And whether Land devisable by the Statute of 32. H. 8. be within it or not viz. If a Statute of a puâ—sne time shall be taken by Equity within a more Ancient Statute and I conceive it may as 12. H. 7. the Statue of 4. H. 7. which sayes that the heire of Cestuy que use shall be in Ward shall extend to the Statute of Praerogativa Regis for if he be in Ward to the King he shall have Prerogative in the Lands to have other Lands by reason thereof Gaudy Justice did rely very much upon the word Devisees viz. that they have an Interest and that the Sale was not good Suit Justice They are both Executors and Devisees of the Lands Devisees of the Lands and Executors to performe the Will Cook he who refused to sell cannot waive the Freehold which is in him by a refusall in pars as 7. H. 2. and 7. E. 4. but ought to waive it in a Court of Record therefore he hath an Interest remaining in him Clenche Justice What if he had devised the Lands to four and made one of them his Executors and willed that he should sell could not he sell All the Court agreed that he might Cook When a man deviseth that his Executors shall sell the Fee descends to the heir yet they may sell that which is in another but the same is not like to our Case It was adjourned Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 93. A Judgement was given upon a Bond for four thousand pound And the Scire facias was sued for three thousand pound and he did not acknowledge satisfaction of the other thousand pound Haughton moved That the Scire facias should abate As if a man brings Debt upon a Bond of twenty pound and shews a Bond for forty pound and doth not acknowledge satisfaction for 20l l it is not good The Justices would advise of it And at another day it was moved againe Whether the Scire facias was good because it doth recite Quod cum nuper such a one recuperasset four thousand pound and doth not shew in what Action or at what day the Judgment was given or the Recovery had Piggot That is not material for such is the Form in an Audita querela or Redisseisin As to the other That he doth not acknowledge satisfaction as in the Case before cited by Haughton which Case is in 1. H. 5. That is not like to an Execution for an Execution is joint or severall at the will of him who sues it forth as in 19. R. 2. Execution 163. hee may have part of his Execution against one in his life time and if he dieth other part against his Heir or Executor Note the Execution was of the whole but because the Defendant had not so much he had but part against him who had no more and therefore of the residue he had Execution against the Heir Gawdy Justice I conceive that he cannot have an Execution unlesse he acknowledge Satisfaction There is no difference as to that betwixt the Action of Debt upon a Bond and a Scire facias and the intendment viz. that it shall be intended that he was paid because he sued but for Three thousand Pound will not help him Piggot as to that vouched a Case out of 4 5. Mary in Dyer which I cannot find Suit Justice said That if the Defendant in the Scire facias say nothing by such a day that Judgement should be entred for the Plaintiffe Quod executio fiet Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 94 JUdgement was given against an Infant by default in a reall Action of Land And a Writ of Error was thereupon brought and it was argued That it is not error for in many cases an Infant shall be bound by a Judicious act as 3. E. 3. Infant 14. Where an Infant and a Feme Covert bring a Formedon and the woman was summoned and severed And it was pleaded That where the Writ doth suppose the woman was Sole she was Covert and Judgment was demanded of the Writ and that the Infant could not gainsay it but confessed it this Confession of the Plea which abated his Writ was taken And 3. H. 6. 10. Br. Saver Default 51. An Infant shall not save his default for he shall not wage his Law See there that the Default shall not be taken against him therefore that book seems rather against it then for it Vide 6. H. 8. Br. Saver Default 50. That Error lieth upon a Recovery by default against an Infant otherwise if it be upon an Action tried so is 2 Mar. Br. Judgment 147. It was said That a generall Act of Parliament shall bind an Infant if he be not excepted The Justices did seem to incline That if Judgement be given by default that it shall bind an Infant but there was no rule given in the Case Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 95 A Clark of the King's Bench sued an Officer of the Common Pleas and he of the Common Pleas claimed his Priviledge and could not have it granted to him for it is a generall rule That where each of the persons is a person able to have Priviledge he who first claimes it viz. the Plaintiffe shall have it and not the Defendant As if an Atturney of the Common Pleas sueth one of the Clarks of the Kings Bench yet he of the Kings Bench shall not have Priviledge although the Kings Bench be a more high Court because the other is Plaintiffe and first claimeth it Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 96 AM Action upon the Case upon a Promise was brought but the Case was so long that I could not take it But in that Case Tanfield who argued for the Defendant said That it is not lawfull for any man to meddle in the cause of another if he have not an Interest in the thing for otherwise it will be Maintenance But if a Custome be in question betwixt the Lord of the Manor and Copy-holder all the other Copy-holders of the Manor may expend their money in maintenance of the other and the Custome and the Master may expend the money of the servant in maintenance of the servant So he in the Remainder may maintain him who hath the particular Estate Maintenance is an odious thing in the Law for it doth encrease troubles and Suites He argued also How that Bonds Obligations and Specialties might be
the Person and to that purpose he cited 15 E. 4. 29. And he agreed the Case That if the Lord improve part of the Common that he shall not have common for the Residue because of the same Land newly improved for he cannot prescribe for that which is improved by 5. Ass 2. But here he doth prescribe not in the person or in or for a new thing but that the usage of the Towne hath been That the Inhabitants shall have common and that common is not appendent nor appertinent nor in grosse by Needham 37 H. 6. 34. b. Besides he said That if the house of a Freeholder who hath used to have such common fall down and he build it up again in another place of the Land that he shall have common as before And he put a difference betwixt the case of Estovers and this Case where a new Chimney is set up for that makes a new matter of charge and he much stood upon the manner of the Prescription Gaudy Serjeant contrary and he took Exception to the Prescription for he saith that it is antiqua villa and doth not say time out of mind and such is the Prescription in 15. E. 4. 29. a. and if it be not a Town time out of mind c. he cannot prescribe that he hath used time out of mind c. And he said That if it should be Law that every one who builds a new house should have common it should be prejudiciall to the Ancient Tenants or impaire the common And so one who hath but a little land might build 20 houses and so an infinite number and every house should have common which were not reason Anderson chief Justice He who builds a new house cannot prescribe in common for then a prescription might begin at this day which cannot be and he insisted upon the generall loss to the ancient Tenants Pâ—riam Justice If it should be Law that he should have common then the benefit of improvement which the Statute giveth to the Lord shall be taken away by this means by such new buildings which is not reason So as all the Justices were of opinion That he should not have common but Judgement was respited untill they had copies of the Record And Hillary Term following the Case was moved again and Anderson and Periam were of Opinion as they were before and for the same reasons But Windham Justice did incline to the contrary But they did all allow That he who new bulids an old Chimney shall have Estovers so a house common So if a house fall down and the Tenant build it up again in another place Periam If a man hath a Mill and a Watercourse time out of mind which he hath used to cleanse if the Mill fall down and he set up a new Mill he shall have the liberty to cleanse the Watercourse as he had before And that Terme Judgement was given for the Defendant to which Windham agreed Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 111 IN a Replevin the parties were at Issue upon the Property and it was found for the Plaintiff and Damages intire were assessed and not for the taking by it self and for the value of the Cattell by themselves for the Judgement upon that is absolute and not conditionall and also if the Plaintiffe had the Cattell the Defendant might have given the same in Evidence to the Jury and then they would have assessed Damages accordingly viz. but for the taking Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 112 A. bargaines with B. for twenty Loads of Wood and B. promises to deliver them at D. if he fail an Action upon the Case lieth But Periam Justice said That upon a simple contract for wood upon an implicative promise an Action upon the Case doth not lie Rodes Justice If by failer of performance the Plaintiff be damnified to such a sum this Action lieth Mich. 28 29 Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 113 A Lease of Lands is made excepting Timber-Woods and Under-woods And the question was Whether Trees Sparsim growing in Hedge rowes and Pastures did passe And difference was taken betwixt Timber-wood being one Wood and Timber Woods being severall Words although it bee Arbor dum crescit lignum dum crescere nescit yet in common speech that is said Timber which is fit to make Timber Then it was moved Who should have the Lops and Fruits of them and the Soile after the cutting of them downe and also the Soile after the Under Woods and as to that a difference was taken where the words are generally All woods and where they are his woods growing And in speaking of that case another case was moved viz. If a stranger cut down woods in a Forrest and there is no fraud or collusion betwixt him and the owner of the Land Whether the King should have them or the owner of the Soile And it was holden That the owner of the Soile should have them and yet the owner could not cut them downe but is to take them by the Livery of one appointed by the Statute Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 114. A. makes a Lease of Lands to B. for ten years rendring rent And B. covenants to repaire c. Afterwards A. by his Will deviseth that B. shall have the Lands for thirty years after the ten years under the like Covenants as are comprised in the Lease Fenner moved it as a question If by the Devise those which were Covenants in the first Lease should be Conditions in the second for they cannot bee Covenants for want of a Deed And if they should not be Conditions the heir of the Lessor were without remedie if they were not performed A Devise for years paying ten pounds to a stranger is a Condition because the stranger hath no other remedy Gaudy Justice By the Devise to him to do such things as he was to do by the Lease makes it to be a Condition which was in a manner agreed by all the other Justices Yet Periam and Rodes Justices said That the first Lease was not defeisable for not performance of the Covenants nor was it the intent of the Devisor that the second should be so notwithstanding that his meaning was that he should do the same things Periam The Covenant is in the third person viz. Conventum Aggreatum est And see 28. H. 8. Dyer where the words Non licet to the Lessee to assigne make a Condition Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 115. BARBER and TOPESFEILD'S Case A. being Tenant in taile of certain Lands exchanged the same with B. B. entred and being seised in Fee of other Lands devised severall parcels thereof to others and amongst the rest a particular estate unto his heir Proviso That he do not re-enter nor claim any of his other Lands in the destruction of his Will And if he do that then the estate in the Lands devised to him to cease A. dieth his issue entreth into the Lands in
taile and waives the Lands taken in Exchange and before any other entry the heir of B. enters upon the Land which was given in Exchange and the opinion of the whole Court was That it was no breach of the Condition because that was not the Land of the Devifor at the time of the devise therefore it was out of the Condition Mich. 28 29. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 116. PLYMPTON'S Case AN Action of Debt was brought by one Plympton and his wife Executors of one Dorrington upon a Bond with Condition to perform Covenants of an Indenture of Lease whereof one Covenant was That he should pay forty shillings yearly at the Feast of the Annunciation or within fourteen days after And the breach assigned was for not payment at such a Feast in such a year The Defendant said That hee paid it at the Feast upon which they were at issue And upon evidence given to the Jury it appeared That the same was not paid at the Feast but in eight dayes after it was paid And the opinion of the Court was That by his pleading that hee had paid it at such a day certain and tendring that for a speciall issue That hee had made the day part of the issue and then the Defendant ought to have proved the payment upon the very day But if the Defendant had pleaded That hee paid it within the fourteen dayes viz. the eighth day c. that had not made the day parcell of the issue but then hee might have given evidence that he paid it at another day within the fourteene dayes Then for the Defendant it was moved That the Plaintiffe had not well assigned the breach in saying that he had not paid it at the Feast without saying Nor within the fourteen dayes But the Court said That the Jury was sworn at the Barre and bid the Councell proceed and give in their evidence for the time to take exception was past Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 117. IT was the opinion of Anderson Chiefe Justice and so entred by the Court That if a Copie-holder doth surrender to him who hath a Lease for years of the Mannor to the use of the same Lessee That the Copie-hold estate is extinct For the estate in the Copie-hold is not of right but an estate at will although that custome and prescription had fortified it And Wray said That it had been resolved by good opinion That if a Copie-holder accept a Lease for years of the Mannor that the Copie-hold estate is extinct for ever Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 118. Anderson Chiefe Justice and Periam Justice being absent in a Commission upon the Queen of Scots Shuttleworth moved this case to the Court. If the Queen give Lands in taile to hold in Capite And afterwards granteth the Reversion how the Donee shall hold Windham Justice and Fenner Serjant The tenure in this case is not incident to the Reversion and the Donee shall hold of the Queen as in grosse and so two Tenures in Capite for one and the same Land And thereupon Windham Justice cited 30. H. 8. Dyer 45 46. That the Queen by no way can sever the tenure in chiefe from the Crown And therefore if the Queen do release to her Tenant in Capite to hold by a penny and not in Capite it is a void Release for the same is meerly incident to the Person and Crown of the Queen But Rodes Justice held the contrary viz. That the Tenure in Capite doth not remain But it was said by Windham That if the Queen had reserved a Rent upon the gift in tail the Grantee of the Reversion should have it Also he said That the Queen might have made the Tenure in such manner viz. to hold of the Mannor or of the Honor of D. Shuttleworth If Lands holden of the Mannor of D. come to the King may he give them to be holden of the Mannor of S that should be hard Windham I did not say That Lands holden of one Mannor may be given to be holden of another Mannor perhaps that may not bee but Lands which is parcell of any Mannor may be given Vt supra Mich. 28 29 Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 119 SErjeant Fenner moved Case If Lands be given to the Husband and Wife and to the heirs of their two bodies and the Husband dieth leaving Issue by his Wife and the Wife makes a Lease of the lands according to the Statute of 32. H. 8. If the Lease be good by the Statute Windham and Rodes Justices conceived that it is a good Lease Fenner The Statute saith that such Lease shall be good against the Lessor and his Heirs and the Issue doth not claim as Heir to the Wife onely but it ought to be Heir to them both and he cited the case That the Statute of R. 3. makes Feoffments good against no heirs but those which claim onely as Heirs to the same Feoffors c. So here Rodes Justice There the word only is a word efficacy And Windham agreed cleerly That the Lease should binde the issue by the said Statute of 32. H. 8. Mich. 28 29. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 120 WAlmesley Serjeant moved this Case If a man deviseth Lands in taile with divers Remainders over upon condition that if any of them alien or c. that then he who is next heir to him to whom the land ought to come after his decease if the said alienation had not been made might enter and enjoy the land as if he had been dead But Ady of the Temple said That the words of the Devise are viz. That if any of them alien or c. that then his estate to cease and hee in the next Remainder to enter and retain the land untill the aliener were dead Rodes Justice The Devise is good and an estate may cease in such manner so as it shall not be determined for ever but that his Heir after him shall have it And he put the case of Scholastica Plow Com. 408. where Weston fo 4. 14. was in some doubt that if the Tenant in talle had had Issue if the Issue should be excluded from the land or whether hee should have the land by the intent of the Devisor And therefore if it were necessary to shew that the Tenant in taile had not Tssue But Dyer said that the words of the Will were that such person and his Heirs who alien or c. should be excluded presently so as the estate by expresse words is to be determined for ever But it is otherwise in this Case Windham doubted of the Devise Fenner cited the Case 22. E. 3. 19. Where a Rent was granted and that it should ceâ—se during the Nonage of the Heir of the Grantee and it was good Windham When a thing is newly created he who creates it may limit it in such manner as he pleaseth Fenner 30. E. 3. 7. Det. 10. A Feoffment was made rendring Rent upon
Condition that if the Rent be behinde the Feoffor might enter and retain quousque there the estate shall be determined pro tempore and afterwards revived again Windham There the Feoffor shall have the land as a distress and the Free-hold is not out of the Feoffee Fenner The Book proves the contrary for the Feoffor had an Action of Debt for the Rent Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 121 IN a Formedon the Tenant pleaded a Fine with proclamations The Plaintiff replyed No such Record It was moved that the Record of the Fine which remained with the Chyrographer did warrant the Plea and the Record which did remain with the Custos Brevium did not warrant the Plea and both the Records were shewed in Court and to which the Court should hold was the question Shuttleworth To that which was shewed by the Custos Brevium and he cited the Case of Fish and Brocket where the Proclamations were reversed because that it appeared by the Record which was shewed by the Custos Brevium that the third proclamation was alledged to be made the seventh day of June which seventh day of June was the Sunday and yet hee said It appeared by the Record certified by the Chyrographer that it was well done and yet the Judgment reversed Rodes Justice There is no such matter in the same case And 26. El. by all the Justices and Barons of the Exchequer in such case the Record which remains with the Custos Brevium shall be amended and made according as it is in the Record of the Office of Chyrographer Windham agreed And afterwards the said President was shewed in which all the matter and order of proceedings was shewed and contained and all the names of the Justices who made the Order And by the command of the Justices it was appointed that the said President should be written out and should remain in perpetuam rei memoriam And the reason of the said Order is there given because the Note which remains with the Chyrographer is principale Recordum Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 122. AN Infant was made Executor and Administration was committed unto another durante minore aetate of the Executor and that Administrator brought an Action of Debt for money due to the Testator and recovered and had the Defendant in Execution and now the Executour is come of full age Fenner moved that the Defendant might be discharged out of Execution because the Authority of the Administrator is now determined and he cannot acknowledge satisfaction nor make Acquittances c. Windham Justice Although the Authority of the Plaintiffe bee determined yet the Recovery and the Judgement do remaine in force But perhaps you may have an Audita querela But I conceive That such an Administrator cannot have an Action for he is rather as a Bayliff to the Infant Executor then an Administrator Rodes agreed with him and he said I have seen such a Case before this time viz. Where one was bound to such a one to pay a certaine sum of money to him his Heirs Executors or Assignes And the Obligee made an Infant his Executor and administration was committed during his minority and the Obligor paid the money to that Administrator And it was a doubt whether the same was sufficient and should excuse him or not And whether he ought not to have tendred the money to them both Fenner That is a stronger Case then our Case One who is Executor of his own wrong may pay Legacies and receive Debts but he cannot bring an Action Windham Doth it appear by the Record when the Infant was made Executor and that Administration was committed as before Fenner No truely Windham Then you may have an Audita querela upon it Fenner said So we will Note Hil. 33. Eliz. in the Exchequer Miller and Gores Case An Infant pleaded in a Scire facias upon an Assignement of Bonds to the Queen That Saint-Johns and Eley were Administrators during his minority And it was holden by the Court to be no plea. But he ruled to answer as Executor Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 123 SUggestion was made that a Coroner had not sufficient Lands within the Hundred for which a Writ issued forth to choose another and one was chosen It was moved by Serjeant Snag If theâ—eby the first Coroner did cease to be Coroner presently untill he be discharged by Writ Rodes and Windham Justices He ceases presently for otherwise there should be two Officers of one Coronership which cannot be Also the Writ is Quod loco I. S. eligi facias c. unum Coronatorem and he cannot be in place of the first if the first do not cease to be Coroner So if any be made Commissioners and afterwards others are made Commissioners in the same cause the first Commission is determined Snagg said That in the Chancery they are of the same Opinion but Fitz. Nat. Brevium 163. N. is That hee ought to be discharged by Writ Mich. 28 29 Eliz in the Common Pleas. 124 IN an Action of Debt brought against Lessee for years for rent he pleaded That the Plaintiff had granted to him the reversion in Fee which was found against him Walmesley Serjeant moved Whether by that Plea he had forfeited his terme or not Rodes and Windham Justices He shall not forfeit his Term and Rodes cited 33. E. 3. Judgement 255. Where in a Writ of Waste the Tenant claimed Fee and it was found against him that he had but an Estate for life and yet it was no Forfeiture Fenner and Windham It is a strong Case for there the Land it selfe is in demand but not so in our Case Rodes The Tenant shall not forfeit his Estate in any Action by claiming of the Fee-Simple but in a Quid juris clamat Walmesley and Fennèr Where he claimes in Fee generally and it is found against him there perhaps hee shall forfeit his Estate but where he shewes a speciall conveyance which rests doubtfull in Law it is no reason that his Estate thereby should bee forfeited although it be found against him Rodes 6. R. 2. Quid juris clamat 20. The Tenant claimed by speciall conveyance and yet it was a forfeiture But in the principall Case at Bar he and Windham did agree cleerly That it was no forfeiture Mich. 28 29 Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 125 AN Action upon the Case was brought because that the Defendant had spoken these words viz. That the Plaintiffe hath said many a Masse to J. S. c. Anderson Chief Justice Primâ facie did seem to incline That no Action would lie for the words although that a Penalty is given by the Statute against such Masse-Mongers For he said That no Action lieth for saying That one hath transgressed against a Penall Law Periam Justice contrary Anderson If I say to one That he is a disobedient Subject no Action lieth for the words Windham Justice That is by reason of the generality Puckering
No Action lieth for the slandering of one in a thing which is but malum prohibitum Periam The saying of Masse is Malum in se Puckering If I say to one That he hath eaten flesh on Fridayes an Action doth not lie for that Periam Is that like this Case Note the Declaration was uncertaine viz. The places where the Masses were said c. were not alledged nor the day when they were said c. And therefore Periam said that the Action did not lie for it might be that the Masses were celebrated in France or some other place out of the Kingdom And the Statute doth not appoint any penalty If they be not indicted thereof within the year and a day c. Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 126 An Act of Common Councell according to the Custome of the City of London was By which it was Decreed That none should bring any Sand nor sell nor use any within the City or Suburbs of London but that only which was taken out of the River of Thames c. And that if any did the contrary that he should forfeit for the first fault five Pound and for the second fault Ten Pound to be recovered in an Action of Debt wherein no Essoine Protection or Wager of Law should be allowed And such a Plaint for the forfeiture of One hundred and twenty Pound was removed out of London into the Common Pleas by a Writ of Priviledge and it was debated amongst the Justices and Serjeants Whether the Plaint should be remanded or not Anderson Chief Justice Windham and Periam Justices did greatly speak against the said Act not only for the matter and substance of the Act but also for the forme of it 1. They were informed by Snagg Serjeant That the said Thames Sand was a great deal worse then the Land Sand and yet the price of the same was greater and the measure of it lesse For of the Thames Sand there were but eleven Bushels to make a Load and of the other Sand there were eighteen Bushels which he said was a very great Deceit and Mischief And 2. they said That is against reason that any Freeman should be so restrained from Merchandizing and selling And also it might concerne the Inheritances of some who might have Sand in their Lands Also the said Justices said That they were very presumptuous in making Acts so Parliament-like viz. That no Essoine Protection or Wager of Law should be allowed c. and that they did arrogate to themselves too high Authority And they stirred up the Plaintiffe at the next Parliament to exhibite a Bill against them for it and to sue them in the King's Bench for their presumption and insolency in that their dealing and said That it would shake their Liberties and grow to a greater matter then they thought or were aware of And thereupon Anderson cited the Case 22. H. 8. Where Sir Edward Knightly Executor of Sir William Spencer made certain Proclamations in certain Townes That Creditors coming in and proving their Debts that they should be paid and for that Presumption hee was committed to the Fleet and was fined Five hundred Marks And hee said That such were the Misdemeanors of Empson and Dudlâ—y Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 127 BOXE and MOUNSLOWE'S Case THomas Boxe brought an Action upon the Case against John Mounslowe That the Defendant had slandred him in saying That the said Thomas Boxe is a Perjured Knave and that he would prove That he the said Thomas Boxe had forsworne himselfe in the Exchequer c. and supposed the said words to be spoken in London 4. Feb. 28. El. Et praedict ' John Mounslowe per Johannem Lutrich atturnat ' suum venit defendit vim injuriam quando c. Et dicit quod praedict ' Thomas Boxe actionem suam versus cum habere non debet quia dicit quod praedict ' Thomas Boxe being one of the Collectors of the Subsidies before the speaking of the said words viz. M. 27. and 28. Eliz. in Curia Scaccarii apud Westminst ' did exhibit a Bill against the said John Mounslow containing That the said John being assessed in ten pounds in goods The said Thomas Boxe came to him and demanded sixteen shillings eight pence which the said John Monuslow did refuse to pay c. And that demand and refusall was supposed to be in London in Breadstreet Et pro verificatione praemissorum ad tunc ibidem Sacrament ' corporale per Barones praefat ' Thomas Boxe praestito The said Thomas Boxe swore the said Bill in substance was true ubi revera the said John Mounslow did not refuse c. per quod the said John Mounslow postea viz. praedicto tempore quo c. dixit de praefato Thoma Boxe praedicta verba c. prout ei bene licuit The Plaintiffe replied that the Defendant spake the words de injuria sua propria absque Causa per praefat ' Johannem Mounslow superius allegata c. Et hoc petit quod inquiratur per Curiam praedict ' defendens similiter And a Venire facias was awarded to the Sheriffe of London and it was found for the Plaintiffe and damages four hundred pound And now it was moved in arrest of judgement that there was no good triall nor the issue well joyned for the issue doth consist upon two points tryable in severall Counties viz. the Oath which was in the Exchequer and that ought to have been tried in Middlesex and the matter which he affirmed by his oath to be viz. the demand and refusall to pay the Subsidie c. and that was alledged to be in London and therefore is there is to be tried And the issue viz. de injuria sua propria absque tali causa goeth to both for the ubi revera will not mend the case as Periam Justice said and both are materiall for the Defendant ought to prove that the Plaintiffe made such oath and also that the substance and matter of the oath was not true for otherwise the Plaintiffe cannot be proved perjured And therefore the Counties here if they might should have joyned in the triall And the opinion of the Court was against the Plaintiffe for Anderson and Windham said That if this issue could have been tried by any one of the Counties without the other It should be most properly and naturally tried in Middlesex where the oath was made for the perjury if any were was in the Exchequer But they said that the issue here was ill joyned because it did arise upon two points triable in severall Countries which could not joyne whereas the Plaintiffe might have taken issue upon one of them well enough for each of them did go to the whole and if any of them were found for the Plaintiffe that he had sufficient cause to recover Gaudy moved that it should be helped by the Statute of Jeofailes which speakes of mis-joyning of issues Anderson the issue
here is not mis-joyned for if the Counties could joyne the issue were good but because that the Counties cannot joyne it cannot be well tried But the issue it selfe is well enough Windham and Rodes were of the same opinion that it was not helped by the Statute but Periam doubted it Anderson said That if an issue triable in one Countie be tried in another and judgement given upon it it is errour And afterwards Lutrich the Atturney said That it was awarded that they should re-plead Nota quia mirum for 1. The Statute of 32. H. 8. Cap. 30. speaks of mis-joyning of processe and mis-joyning of issues and admit that this case is not within any of those clauses each of them being considered by it selfe yet I conceive it is contained within the substance and effect of them being considered together Also I conceive That it is within the meaning of both Statutes viz. 32. H. 8. Cap. 30. and 18. Eliz. Cap. 14. for I conceive the meaning of both the Statutes was to oust delayes circuits of actions and molestations and that the partie might have his judgement notwithstanding any defect if it were so that notwithstanding that defect sufficient title and cause did appeare to the Court. And here the Plaintiffe hath sufficient cause to recover If any of the points of the issue be found for him For if it bee found that the matter and substance of the oath be found true which might be tried well enough by those in London the Plaintiffe hath cause to recover Wherefore I conceive that the verdict in London is good enough and effectuall And note That Rodes said that hee was of Councell in suh a case in the Kings Bench betwixt Nevell and Dent. Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 128 IN an Action of Trespasse the Defendant pleaded that at another time before the Trespasse he did recover against the same Plaintiffe in an Ejectione firme and demanded judgement And the opinion of the whole Court was That it is a good plea primâ faciâ— and that the possession is bound by it for otherwise the recovery should be in vaine and uneffectuall And Anderson chiefe justice said That if two claime one and the same Land by severall Leases and the one recovereth in an Ejectione firme against the other that if afterwards the other bring an Ejectione firme of the same Land the first recovery shall be a barre against him Rodes said That hee can shew authority that a recovery in an Ad terminum quem praeteriit shall bind the possession Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 129 IN Trespasse the Defendant did justifie as Bailiffe unto another The Plaintiffe replied that he took his cattell of his own wrong without that that he was his Bailiffe Anderson chiefe Justice If one have cause to distreine my goods and a stranger of his own wrong without any warrant or authority given him by the other take my goods not as Bailiff or servant to the other And I bring an Action of trespasse against him can he excuse himself by saying that he did it as my Bailiffe or Servant Can he so father his mis-demeanours upon another He cannot for once he was a trespasser and his intent was manifest But if one distrein as Bailiffe although in truth he is not Bailiffe if after he in whose right he doth it doth assent to it he shall not be punished as a trespassour for that assent shall have relation unto the time of the distresse taken and so is the book of 7. H. 4. And all that was agreed by Periam Shuttleworth What if hee distraine generally not shewing his intent nor the cause wherefore he distrained c. ad hoc non fuit responsum Rodes came to Anderson and said unto him If I having cause to distrain come to the Land and distraine and another ask the cause why I do so if I assigne a cause not true or insufficient yet when an Action is brought against me I may avow or justifie and assigne any other cause Anderson That is another case but in the principall case clearly the taking is not good to which Rodes agreed Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 130 HOODIE and WINSCOMB'S Case IN an Attaint brought by Hoodie against Winscombe c. One of the Grand Jury was challenged because he was a Captain and one of the Petie Jury was his Lieutenant And it was holden by the whole Court that that was no principall challenge Windham It hath been holden no principall challenge notwithstanding that one of the Jurours was Master of the Game and one of the Petit Jury was Keeper of his Park And in that case it was holden by all the Justices That if a man make a Lease rendring rent upon condition that if the rent be behind and no sufficient distresse upon the Land that then the Lessor may re-enter If the Rent be behind and there be a piece of lead or other thing hidden in the Land and no other thing there to be distrained the Lessor may re-enter for the distresse ought to be open and to be come by for if it should be otherwise said a sufficient distresse one might inclose money or other things within a wall and thereby the Lessor should be excluded of his re-entry Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 131 IN a Quare Impedit the Plaintiffe counted That the Defendant being Parson of the Church in question was presented to another Benefice and inducted 15 Aprilis and that the other Church became void c. The Defendant said That he was qualified at such a day which was after 15 Aprilis without that that he was inducted 15 Aprilis And the Court was of opinion Anderson being absent that it was no good Traverse for he ought to have said generally without that that he was inducted before the day in which he is alledged to be qualified As if one declare in Trespasse done 1 Aprilis and the Defendant plead a Release 1. Feb. he ought to traverse without that that the Trespasse was done before the Release by Periam Justice Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 132 HALES and HOME'S Case IN an Avowry for Damage feasance one pleaded a Lease made unto him by I. S. the other said that before the Lease â— S. did enfeoff him the other replied and maintained the said Lease absque hoc quod J. S. seiâ—itus feoffavit Gawdy The Traverse is not formall for the word seisitus is idle and ought to be left out for he cannot enfeoff if that he were not seised and it hath never been seen that the seisin in such Case hath been traversed but generally in Pleading the Traverse hath been absque hoc that Feoffavit without speaking of seisin which is superfluous And so was the opinion of the whole Court Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 133 THE Queen granted Lands unto the Earle of Leicester by her Letters Patents the Patentee made a Lease of
common law yet it is otherwise at this day For when the Statute sayes That the Lessor shall recover damages for the Wast that proves sufficiently that the property of the trees is in him as the Statute of Merton Cap. 4. enacts That if the Lessor do approve part of the Wast leaving sufficient for the Commoners and they notwithstanding that bring an Assize they shall be barred in that Case and the Lord may have an Action of Trespass against them if they break the Hedges by force of that Statute as it hath been adjudged for the intent of the Statute was to settle the Inheritance of the Land approved without interruption of the Commoners And so in this case But Note that by the Statute of Marlebridge the Lessor shall recover damages for the houses c. which are wasted c. and yet a man cannot inferre thereupon that therefore the Lessee hath no Interest or property in them and such interest hath he in the trees notwithstanding the words of the Statute which is contrary to this meaning as it seems And therefore Quaere If there be any difference betwixt them and what shall be meant by this word Property But the damages are given by the Statute in respect of the property which the Lessor is to have in reversion after the Lease determined Anderson Chiefe Justice The Lessor hath no greater property in the trees then the Commoner hath in the soile Walmesley 2. H. 7. 14. and 10. H. 7. 2. The Lessor may give leave to the Lessee to cut the trees and the same shall be a good plea in an Action of Wast and the reason of both the books is because the property of them is in the Lessor and to this purpose the difference is taken in 2. H. 7. betwixt Gravell and trees 42. H. 3. If a Prior licence the Lessee to cut trees the same shall discharge him in Wast brought by the Successour But if the Lessee cutteth down the trees and then the Prior doth release unto him the same shall not barre the Successour and so is 21. H. 6. Also he cited Culpepers case 2 Eliz. and 44. E. 3. Statham and 40. Ass 22. to prove that the Lessor shall have the Wind-falls If a stranger cutteth down trees and the Lessee bringeth an Action of Trespasse he shall recover but according to his losse viz. for lopping and topping As to that which was said That if the Lessee cut down trees that the Lessor cannot take them away that is true for that there is a contract of the Law that if the Lessee doth cut them down that he shall have the trees and the Lessor shall have treble damages for them Also he said That the trees are no part of the thing demised but are as servants and shall be for reparations As if one hath a Piscarie in the land of another man the land adjoyning is as it were a servant viz. to drie the Nets So if one have conduit-pipes lying in the land of ather he may dig the land for to mend the pipes and yet he hath no Interest nor Free-hold To that which was said That by the excepting of the trees the land upon which they stood is excepted It is true as a servant to the trees for their nourishment but not otherwise for if the Lessor selleth the trees he afterwards shall not meddle with the land but it shall be wholly in the Lessee quia sublata causa tollitur effâ—ctus And if the Lessee tieth a horse upon the land where the trees stood the Lessor may distraine the same for his rent and avow as upon land within his distress and Fee and holden of him And he said that the lessor may grant the trees but so cannot the lessee and therefore he said That the property is in the lessor and not in the lessee Also if the lessor granteth them they passe without Atturnment But contrary if the lessor had but a Reversion in them Also if the lessor cutteth them down his Rent shall not be apportioned and therefore they are no part of the thing demised For 16. H. 7. and temps E. 1. Fitz. Waste in two or three places it is holden That if the Waste be done Sparsim in a Close or Grove the lessor shall recover the whole Then admit that the trees excepted are cut down sparsim if the Exception shall be good how shall the thing wasted be recovered and against whom quod nota Anderson Chief Justice did conceive that the Exception was void and that the Action was well brought and he said It was a Knavish and Foolish demise and if it should be good many mischiefs would follow which he would not remember Windham Justice was of the same opinion and he said The lessor might have excepted them and so take from the lessee his fire wood and Plough bote c. But the lessee could not grant his estate excepting the trees because he had but a speciall interest in them viz. for his fire-bote c. which shall go with the land Periam Justice agreed That as to such a speciall property none can have it but such a one who hath the land and therefore the exception of the Wood by the lessee was void But as to the other things perhaps if they were Apple trees or other Fruit-Trees the exception had been good Also although the trees are not let directly yet they are after a sort by a mean as annexed to the land and if the Action be brought against him who made the exception he cannot plead that they were let unto him and therefore he doubted of the exception Rodes Justice also said That he doubted of the Exception And he said That the Book of 44 E. 3. is That the lessee should have the Wind-falls and he did not much regard the Opinion of Statham But Anderson Chief Justice was of opinion that the lessor should have the Wind-falls Note the Case was not adjudged at this time Hill 29. Eliz. in the King's Bench 137 EXceptions were taken by Fuller to an Indictment upon the Statute of 1. Eliz. cap. 2. for the omitting of the Crossing of a Child in Baptising of him The Case was That a Minister out of his Cure at another Church viz. at Chelmesford in Essex did Baptize a Child without the Sign of the Crosse for which he was indicted The first Exception was That the Statute speaks of Ministers which do not use the administring of the Sacrament in such Cathedrall Churches or Parish Churches as he should use to administer the same that this was not the Parish Church in which he should use the same Suit Justice was of opinion That it was good notwithstanding that for otherwise the Statute might be greatly defrauded The words of the Statute are farther Or shall wilfully or obstinately standing in the same use any other Rule Ceremony Order Forme c. 2. He took another Exception upon those words For the omitting of the Crossing only is put and
Gardian pleaded that the plaintiff was within age And the plaintiff did maintain his Declaration that by the Custome of such a place An Insant of 18. yeares might bring an Action of Account against his Gardian in Socage and it was there holden to be no Departure I conceive that an Infant cannot have an Account against his Gardian before his full age But I conceive that they held that it was by Statute That an Infant should not have an Account against Gardian in Socage until he was of the age of 21. yeares Wray Chief Justice was of opinion that it was no Departure For he said it should be frivolous to shew the whole in his Declaration viz. That he was an Infant And that by Custome he might make a Covenant which should beinde him But quaere of his opinion for that many doubt of it Vide the Case 118. R. 2. Hill 29 Eliz. in the King's Bench 144 CONEY's Case AN Action of Trespass was brought against John Coney for digging of the plaintiffs Close and killing of 18. Coneys there The Defendant Pleaded as to all the Trespas but killing of two Coneys Not Guilty And as to them he said that the place where c. the Trespass is supposed is a Heath in which he hath common of pasture and that he found them eating of the Grass and that he killed them and carried them away as it was Lawfull for him to do c. Cook The Point is Whether a commoner having common of pasture may kill the Coneys which are upon the ground and he said hemight not And first he said it is to be considered what interest he who hath the Freehold may have in such things as are ferae Naturae Secondly What authority a commoner hath in the ground in which he hath common To the first he said that although such Beasts are ferae Naturae yet they are reduced to such propertie when they are in my ground by reason of my possession which I then have in them that I may have an action of Trespass against him who takes them as 42. E. 3. 24. If one have Deer in his Park another taketh them away he may have an action of Trespas forthe taking 12. H. 8. If a Forrester follow a Buck which is chased out of the Park or Forrest although that he who hunteth him killeth him in his own ground yet the Forrester or Keeper may enter into his ground retake the Deer for the propertie and possession which he hath in it by the pursuit 7. H. 6. 38. It is holden that if a wilde Beast go out of the Park then the owner of the ground hath lost the propertie in it Brook thereupon collects that he had a propertie in it whilest it was in his Park 18. E. 4. 14. It is doubted whether a man can have propertie in things which are ferae Naturae But 10. H. 7. 6. It is holden that an Account lieth for things ferae Naturae Vide 14. H. 8. 1. The Bishop of Londons Case and 22. H. 6. 59. as long as they are in his ground they are in his possession and he shall have an Action of Trespass for the taking of them and the Writ shall be damas suas by Newton And in the Register 102. It is Quare ducent's cuniculos suos precij c. cepit But it is said that he hath common there What then Yet he cannot meddle with the Wood Sand Grass but by taking of the same with the mouthes of his Cattel If he who hath the Freehold bring an action against the Commoner for entring into his Land If he plead Not guilty he cannot give in Evidence that he hath Common there 22 Ass A Commoner cannot put in Cattel to Agist So is 12. H. 8. And of late it was holden in this Court That where the Commoners did prescribe that the Lord had used to put but so many of his Cattel upon the Lands That it was a void prescription Godfrey Contrary That it is Lawfull for the Commoner to kill them And he agreed the Cases which were put by Cook And he said that the owner of the ground had not the very propertie but a kind of propertie in them 3. H. 6. and F. N. B. If the Writ of Trespass be Quare cuniculos suos c. The Writ shall abate And yet he hath a propertie in them or rather a possession of them I grant that against a stranger he might have this Action of Trespas but not against the Commoner for he hath a wrong done unto him by their being upon the Land and therefore he may kill them although he may not meddle with the Land because he hath not an Interest in it and yet he may meddle with the profit of it as 15. H. 7. A Commoner may distrain damage feasant 43. E. 3. Coneys dig the Ground and eate the Grass of the Commoner c. I grant that it is not lawfull for the Tenant for life for to kill the Coneys of him who hath a free Warren in the ground For if a man bring an Action of Trespas Quare Warranem suum intravit cuniculos suos cepit c. It is no Plea that it is his Free-hold L. 5. E. 4. In Trespass Quare clausum fregit cuniculos cepit The Defendant said that the plaintiff made a lease at will unto such a man of the Land and he as his Servant did kill the Coneys and it was holden no Plea and yet it is there said that by the grant of the Land the Coneys doth not pass but the reason as I conceive is because it tends to his damage and therefore that he may kill them And so in this Case 2. H. 7. and 4. E. 4. If I have Common of pasture in Land and the Tenant plougheth the Land I shall have my Action upon the Case in the Nature of a quod permittat 9. E. 4. If one hath Land adjoyning to my Land and levy a Nusans I may enter upon his Land and abate the Nusans So if a man take my goods and carrie them into his own Land I may enter thereupon and retake my goods So if a Tenant of the Freehold plough the Land and sow the same with Corn the Commoner may put in his Cattel and there whit eate the Corn growing upon the Land and may justifie the same because the wrong first begins by the Tenant So if a man do falsly imprison me and put me in his house I may break his house to get forth 21. H. 6. in Trespass All the Inhabitants of such a Town do prescribe to have Common in such a field every year after harvest And one froward fellow amongst the rest will not gather in his Corn within convenient time If the Townsmen put in their Cattel and they eate the Corn he hath no remedie for it And he asked what remedie the Commoner should have for the eating of the Grass which his Cattel is to have if he
yet in the interim during the life of Brenne and his wife it is one entire Manor For if Blackborow had levied a Fine thereof before entry his Interest in the Land had not passed And if a Fine be levied of the Manor and the Conusee render back part to one for life and another part to another for life the remainder of the whole to a third until the Two enter it is one entire Manor in the hands of the Conusee If I devise that my Executors shall sell such Lands which are parcell of a Manor and dye untill they sell it remains parcell of the Manor So if the heir selleth the Manor that Land shall passe for it is but executory and remains parcell untill it be executed Wherefore in the principall Case here the Copy-hold is good The reason of the Case 33. H. 8. Dyer 48. is because before the grant the advowson was not appendant to that acre onely but to the whole Manor and to that acre as parcell of it Also he said that the Copy-hold shall be good against the Lessee being granted before execution of his term when as the Manor was entire For he who hath a Manor but for one year may grant Copies and the grant shall be good to bind him in the Reversion And if one recovereth an acre parcell of a Manor before execution it is parcell of the Manor and by grant of the Manor shall passe Periam Justice But yet now being executed by the death of the Lessor and his wife it is no part of the Manor if they be severall Leases Walmesley But the Defendant is in by Custome by one who is Dominus pro tempore Anderson Chief Justice The Case of 48. E. 3. is like our Case And I conceive clearly here is no severance but if there had been any severance it had been otherwise but I doubt of the other point Periam Justice In 13. H. 4. the difference is taken betwixt a grant of a Manor una cum advocatione and a grant of a Manor et ulterius a grant of the Advowson In 14. Eliz. Dyer 311. in the Case of the Lord Cromwell and Andrews it is moved If a man bargain and sell give and grant a Manor and Advowson to one and afterwards levieth a Fine or inrolleth the Deed Dyer held that the Advowson shall passe by the Bargain and Sale as in gross before that the Deed be enrolled But I conceive that it cannot pass if the Deed be not enrolled and then it shall pass as appendant by reason of the intent of the parties and so in this Case And for the last matter I conceive very strongly that when the Lease which is executory takes effect that it shall avoid the Copy-hold for although at once viz. during the expectancy of the said Lease to begin at a day to come the Copy-hold be not extinct yet now he may say That all times as in respect to him the Copy-hold Custome was broken I hold That a Tenant in Dower shall not avoid a Copy-hold made during the Coverture and so it hath been adjudged in the Kings Bench. But I conceive there is a difference betwixt that Case and the Case in question for in that Case the title of the wife to have Dower is not consummate till the death of the Husband Anderson Chief Justice I can shew you an Authority That if I grant unto you such Land and the Manor of D. there the Land shall pass as parcell of the Manor Periam True there for it doth enforce the first grant But here the intent of the parties doth appear and the same is to be respected Anderson But their intent ought to be according to the Law as in 19. H. 8. it is holden it shall be in a Devise Anderson upon the Argument of this Case said That if a Warranty be to a whole Manor and also to an Advowson the party cannot have Two Warrantia Chartae Periam If he had further said in the Deed That his intent was that it should be severall the same had altered the Case Anderson No truely because his intent did not stand with the rule of Law As if a man devise that his Lands shall be sold and doth not say by whom it is void and yet the intent is expressed If the Lease had been by severall Deeds Periam said The Copy-hold had beene severed Windham denied that If both the Deeds bee delivered at one time It was adjourned Hill 29. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 148 AN Information was upon the Statute of 5. 6. E. 6. for buying of seed Corn having sufficient of his own and not bringing so much unto the Market of his own corn and a generall issue was found upon it And it was delivered for Law to the Jury by the Justices That a Contract in Market for corn not in the Market or which was not there that day is not within the Branch of the Statute But if corn or graine be in the Market although that the Contract be made in a house out of the Market and delivered to the Vendee out of the Market yet it is within the Statute And in the Argument of that Case Anderson said That the Market shall be said The place in the Town where it hath used to be kept and not every place of the Town And a Sale in Market overt in London ought to be in a Shop which is open to the street and not in Chambers or inward rooms otherwise the property is not altered And so it is of all Statutes in open Markets And the Recorder of London said That such was their Custome in London Hill 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 149 It was holden by Anderson chiefe Justice That if one deviseth Lands to the heirs of I. S. and the Clerk writes it to I. S. and his heirs that the same may be holpen by averrment because the intent of the Devisor is written and more And it shall be naught for that which is against his intent and against his will and good for the residue But if a Devise be to I. S. and his heirs and it is written but to the heirs of I. S. there an averrment shall not make it good to I. S. because it is not in writing which the Statute requires anâ— so an averrment to take away surplusage is good but not to encrease that which is defective in the Will of the Testator Mich. 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 150 A Feoffment was made unto A. unto the use of him and his wife dis-punishable of Wast during their lives one died and the Survivor committed Wast It was the opinion of the whole Court that an Action of Wast would not lie by him in the Reversion for it is a Priviledge which is annexed to the Estate which shall continue as long as the Estate doth continue Mich. 29 Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 151 A. grants annualem redditum out of Lands in which he hath nothing The opinion of
Chief Justice did conceive it might be a good custome and so also was the opinion of Rodes Justice and he vouched 11 H. 7. where the Lord had Three Pound for Pound-breach Fenner It is extortion if the amercement be not for a thing which is a common Nusans and cited 11 H. 4. to prove it Periam Justice said That hee said well Pasch 28 Eliz. In the Common Pleas. Rot. 1962. 159 GILE'S and NEWTON'S Case THE Case was That the Queen seised of the Manor of Gascoigne and of the Graunge called Gascoigne Graunge in D. did grant all her Lands Tenements and Hereditaments in D. and it was adjudged by the whole Court that the Manor did not pass And so Anderson Chief Justice said it is if it were in the Case of a common person but an Advowson shall passe by the Feoffment of the Manor without Deed without the words cum pertinentiis for that is parcell of the Manor which the whole Court granted Pasch 23. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 160 J. S. was arrested by force of a Latitat out of the King's Bench at the Suit of J. D. and the Sheriffe took an Obligation of him with two Sureties upon condition that he appear such a day in the King's Bench and also that ad tunc ibidem he answer the said J. D. in a Plea of Trespass It was moved by Rodes Serjeant That the Obligation was void by the Statute of 23. H. 6. by which Statute no Obligation shall be said to be good if not for appearance only and this Obligation is for appearance and also that he shall answer to J. D. which is another thing then is contained in the Statute and therefore it is void But all the Justices were of opinion That the Obligation was good notwithstanding that because that the words of the Writ directed to the Sheriffe are Quod capias such a man It a quod habeas corpus ejus hîc such a day ad respondendum tali in a Plea of Trespasse and so nothing is contained in the Bond which is not comprised within the Writ directed unto him but if any other collaterall thing be put into the Obligation then the Bond shall be void for the whole 31. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 161 BUCKHURST'S Case LEssee for ten years granted a rent charge unto his Lessor for the years Afterwards the Lessor granted the Remainder in Fee to the Lessee It was the opinion of the whole Court that the rent was gone and extinct because the Lessor who had the rent is a party to the Destruction of the Lease which is the ground of the Rent 29. Eliz. In the King 's Bench. 162 ALLEN and PATSHALL'S Case A Copy-holder doth surrender unto the use of a Stranger for ever and the Lord admits the Surrendree to have and to hold to him and his Heirs It was adjudged in this Case That if it were upon a devise that such a one should have the Copyhold in Fee and afterwards a surrender is made unto the Lord to grant the Copy-hold according to the Will and he grants it in Fee to him and his Heirs that the Grant is good But quaere in the first Case for it was there but a bare Surrender only Mich. 27 28. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 163 STRANGDEN and BARNELL'S Case AN Action of Trover and Conversion was brought of Goods in Ipswich the Defendant pleaded That the Goods came to his hand in Dunwich in the same County and that the Plaintiffe gave unto him the goods which came to his hands in Dunwich absque hoc that he is guilty of any Trover and Conversion of Goods in Ipswich And by the opinion of the Court the same is a good manner of Pleading by reason of the speciall Justification Vide 27. H. 6. But when the Justification is generall the County is not traversable at this day Vide 19. H. 6. 6 7. Mich. 27. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 164 BARTON and EDMOND'S Case AN Infant and another were bounden in a Bond for the Debt of the Infant The Infant at his full age did assume to save the other man harmelesse against the said Bond afterwards the Infant died It was resolved by the whole Court that upon this Assumpsit an Action upon the Case would lie against the Executors of the Infant But if a Feme Covert and another at her request had been bounden in such a Bond and after the death of her Husband she had assumed to have saved the other harmelesse against such Bond such Assumpsit should not have bound the Wife Trinit 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 165 ZOUCH and BAMPORT'S Case THis Case was moved When the Defendant pleads in Bar to the Action and the Plaintiffe replies and the Defendant doth demur specially upon the Replication and the Bar is insufficient Whether the Justices shall give Judgment upon the Replication or shall resort unto the insufficient Bar the Replication being also insufficient And the opinion of the Court was That when the Action is of such a nature that the Writ and the Count doth comprehend the Title as in a Formedon and the like then because there is a sufficient title for the demandant by the Writ and the Count so as the Judges may safely proceed to Judgement for the Plaintiffe there they shall resort to the Barr. Contrary in Cases where the Title doth commence only by the Replication as in Assize Trespass and the like 40. Eliz. in the Exchequer 166 NOte it was said by Sir Francis Bacon the King's Solicitor That it was adjudged 40. Eliz. in the Exchequer That where the King had made a Lease for life who was ousted by a Stranger that the same should be said a Disseisin of the particular estate against the common ground which is That a man cannot be disseised of lesse estate then of a Fee-Simple 40. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 167 IT was holden and adjudged by Popham Chief Justice of the Kings Bench That where a Lease was made unto the Husband and Wife for their lives the remainder to the Heirs of the Survivor that the same was a good remainder notwithstanding the uncertainty and that in that Case the Husband after the death of the Wife should have Judgement to recover the Land 33. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 168 PROCTER'S Case IT was adjudged in this Case That the Lachess of the Clark in not entring of the Kings Silver shall not prejudice the King or the Crowne 30 Eliz. In the Kings Bench. 169 HARDING'S Case IT was holden by the whole Court of Kings Bench as it was reported by Sir Robert Hitcham Knight That if a man make a Lease of Copy-hold land and of Free-hold land rendring Rent and the Copy-hold descends to one and the Free-hold to another that the rent shall be apportioned Trinit 25. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. Rot. 1702. 170 LEONARD and STEPHEN'S Case IN Trespass the issue joyned was Whether it were a Feoffment or not and
did admit a Copy-holder in Remainder for life That the same was a good admittance according to the Custome And that he was a sufficient Dominus pro tempore as to this purpose Although it was objected by Walmesley That the Gardian is but Servus and not Dominus But because it was agreed that he had a lawfull Interest the admittance was good and so it was adjudged 33. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 178 SHIPWITH and SHEFFIELD'S Case THe Custome of a Copy-hold Manor was That a feme Covert might give Lands to her Husband And if it were a good Custome or not was the Question Fleetwood The Custom is good and vouched 12. E 3. That in York there is such a custome That the Husband might give the Land of his own purchase to his wife during the Coverture and it is a good Custome That an Infant at the age of fifteen years may make a Feoffment 29. E. 3. and the same is good at the Common Law and yet the same all began by custome But the Court was of opinion That the Custome is unreasonable because it cannot have a lawfull Commencement And Anderson Chiefe Justice said That a Custome that an Infant at the age of seven years might make a Feoffment is no good custome because he is not of age of discretion And in this case at Barre It shall be intended that the wife being sub potestate viri did it by the Coherison of her Husband The same Law is of a Custome That the wife may lease to her Husband Fleetwood urged That the custome might be good because the wife was to be examined by the Steward of the Court as the manner is upon a Fine to be examined by a Judge To which the Court said nothing 31. Eliz. in the King's Bench 179 AN Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit was brought And the Plaintiff layed his Action That such a one did promise him in respect of his labour in another Realme c. to pay him his contentment And he said That Twenty five Pound is his contentment and that he had required the same of the Defendant Cook moved in arrest of Judgement it being found for the Plaintiffe upon Non Assumpsit pleaded that no place was alledged where the contentment was shewed And the opinion of the Court was against him for Gawdy and Wray were of opinion that he might shew his contentment in any Action and so it is where it is to have so much as he can prove he might prove it in the same Action Cook said That it had been moved in stay of Judgement in this Court upon an Assumpsit because the request was not certain And that case was agreed by the Justices because the request is parcell of the Assumpsit and the entire Assumpsit together in such case is the cause of the Action but in this case that he should content him is not the cause of the Assumpsit but only a circumstance of the matter and it was resembled to the Case of 39. H. 6. where a Writ of Annuity was brought for Arrerages against an Abbot pro consilio c. And the Plaintiffe declared that the Councel was ad proficuum Domus and was not alledged in certain and it was holden that the same was not materiall although it were uncertain because it was but an induction and necessary circumstance to the Action And so the Plaintiffe recovered and had Judgement Mich. 29 Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 180 THE Statute of 23. Eliz. cap. 25. is Quod non licuit alicui to engrosse Barley c. and in the Statute there is a Proviso That he may so do so as he convert it into Malt. The question was If in an Information upon that Statute That the Defendant had converted it to Malt he might plead the generall Issue Not guilty and give in Evidence the speciall matter or whether he ought to plead the speciall matter Clench Justice He may plead Not guilty c. for the Proviso is parcel and within the body of the Statute as 27. H. 8. 2. where upon an Information upon the Statute of Farmors it is holden by Fitzherbert That the Vicar may plead Non habuit seu tenuit ad firmam contra formam Statuti c. and yet the Statute in the premises of it restrains every Spirituall Person to take in Farme any Lands c. and afterwards by a Proviso gives him liberty to take Lands for the maintenance of his house c. As upon the Statute of R. 2. If he do plead That he did not enter contra formam Statuti he may give in Evidence that he entred by Title as that his father was seised and died and the same is not like unto the condition of a Bond for that is a severall thing But the Proviso and the Statute is but one Act. Mich. 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 181 NOte It was said by Master Kemp Secondary of the King's Bench That there is a Court within the Tower of London but he said That it was but a Court Baron and said That he can shew a Judgement That no Writ of Error lieth of a Judgement given there And it was a question Whether Process might be awarded to the Lieutenant of the Tower for Execution upon a Judgment given in the Kings Bench because the Defendant was removed and dwelt within the Liberty of the Tower And it was said It could not but the Writ ought to be awarded to the Sheriffs of London and if they returne the Liberties of the Tower then a Non omittas shall be awarded But some Counsellors said That although a Non omittas be awarded yet the Sheriffs durst not go unto the Liberties of the Tower to serve the Process 2 Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 182 The Lady STOWELL'S Case IT was adjudged in this Case That the wife who is divorced causa adulterii shall have her Dower 3. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 183 WARNER'S Cafe LEssee for twenty years doth surrender rendring rent during the term It was adjudged a good rent for so many years as the term might have continued 3. Jacobi in the King 's Bench. 184 WHITLOCK and HARTWELL'S Case TWO Joint-Tenants for life the one demised and granted the moyty unto his companion for certain years to begin after his death Adjudged void because it is but a possibility And so is it of a Covenant to stand seised to the use c. as it was adjudged in Barton and Harvey's Case 37. Eliz. 3. Jacobi In the Kings Bench. 185 PINDER'S Case A. devised lands in Fee to his son and many other lands in tail And afterwards he said I will that if my son die without issue within age that the lands in Fee shall go to such a one Item I will that the other lands in tail shall go to others and doth not say in the second Item if the son dieth without issue within age It was adjudged That the second Item should be without
condition 3 Jacobi in the Star-Chamber 186 RUSWELL'S Case A Man took away Corne in the night time to which he had a right and was punished for a Riot in the Star-Chamber because of his company only Hillar 3. Jacobi 187 KINGSTON and HILL'S Case AN Action upon the Case was brought for saying these words viz. Thou art an arrant Papist and it were no matter if such were hanged and thou and such as thou would pull the King out of his Seat if they durst Adjudged that the words were not actionable Et quod querens nihil capiat per Billam Pasch 3 Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 188 NOte It was holden by the Court That if a Fierifacias go to the Sheriffe to do Execution and he levieth the money and delivereth the same to the party yet if it be not paid here in the Court the party may have a new Execution and it shall not be any Plea to say That he hath paid the same to the party for it is not of Record without bringing of the money in Court Vide 11. H. 4. 50. ar Pasch 3. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 189 DUKE and SMITH'S Case NOte That if he in the reversion suffer a recovery to divers uses his Heirs cannot plead That his father had nothing in the Land at the time of the recovery for he is estopped to say That he was not Tenant to the Praecipe And it was agreed â—That it was a good recovery against him by estoppel Quaere this case Mich. 3. Jacobi in the King's Bench 190 BIRRY'S Case BIrry was committed by the High Commissioners and removed by Habeas corpus into the Kings Bench They returned the Writ with a Certificate That they did commit him for certain causes Ecclesiasticall which generall cause the Court did not allow of They certified at another time That it was for unreverent Carriage and sawcie Speeches to Doctor Newman The Court also disallowed of that cause Birry put in Bail to appear de die in diem and was discharged It was holden That if Birry did not put off his Hat to him or not give him the wall the same were not sufficient causes for them to commit him And it was agreed by the whole Court That whereas the said Commissioners took Bonds of such as they cited to appear before them to answer unto Articles before that the party had seen the Articles that such Bonds were void Bonds Mich. 3. Jacobi in the King 's Bench. 191 ANN MANNOCK'S Case ANN Mannock was indicted in Suffolk upon the Statute of 1. El. cap. 2. for not coming to Church twelve Sundayes together which Indictment was removed into the Kings Bench and Exceptions taken unto it 1. That the Statute is That all Inhabitants within the Realme c. and it is not averred in facto that she did inhabit within the Realme and the Exception was disallowed for if it were otherwise it ought to be shewed on the Defendants part The second Exception That by a Proviso of the Statute of 28. Eliz. cap. 6. it is ordained That none shall be impeached for such offence if he be not indicted at the next Sessions and it appears by the Indictment That the Offence was almost a year before the Indictment and in the mean time many Sessions were or debuerunt to have been And that Exception was also disallowed for perhaps the truth is That there was not any Sessions in the mean time although there ought to have been The third Exception That the Indictment was That she was indicted Coram A. B. sociis Justices of Peace and it doth not name them particularly The Exception was disallowed for that it doth not appear that there were any other Justices there and what was their names And therefore it was said That it differs from the Case of 1. H. 7. of a Fine levied Câ—raâ— A. B. â—â—â—iis suis The fourth Exception was That the words of the Statute are Ought to abide in the Church till the end of Common Prayer Preaching or other Service of God in the Disjunctive and the Indictment was in the Conjunctive The Exception was disallowed for although the words are in the disjunctive yet a man cannot depart so soon as the Service is ended if there be preaching but he ought to continue there for the whole time Pasch 4. Jacobi in the King 's Bench. 192 AN Enfant did acknowledge a Statute and during his Nonage brought an Audita querela to avoid the Statute and had judgment The Conusee at the fall age of the Enfant brought a Writ of Error and reversed the judgment given in the Audita querela and the Enfant the Conusor prayed a new Audita querela but it was denyed by the whole Court Mich. 4. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 193 PETO and CHITTIE'S Case IT was adjudged in the Court of Common Pleas in this Case That concord with satisfaction is a good plea in Barre in an Ejectione firme Mich. 5. Jacobi in the King 's Bench. 194 TWo Men were bound joyntly in a Bond one as principal and the other as surety the principal dyed Intestate the surety took Administration of his goods and the principal having forfeited the Bond the surety made an agreement with the Creditor and took upon him to discharge the Debt In Debt brought by another Creditor the question was upon fully administred pleaded by the Administrator If by shewing of the Bond and that he had contented it with his own proper Mony whether he might retain so much of the Intestates estate and it was adjudged that he might not For Flemming Chief Justice said that by joyning in the Bond with the principal it became his own Debt Pasch 5. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 195 TAYLOR and JAME'S Case IN a Replevin by John Taylor against Richard James for taking of a Mare and a Colt in Long Sutton in a place called H. in the County of Somerset The Defendant did avow the taking and shewed That Sir John Spencer was seised of the Manor of Long Sutton whereof the place where c. is parcel and that he and all those whose estate he hath in the said Manor c. have had all Estrayes within in the said Manor and shewed that the Bailiff of Sir John Spencer seised the said Mare and Colt as an Estray and proclaimed them in the three next Market Towns and afterwards the Baiâ—iff did deliver them to the Defendant to keep in the place where c. And if any came and challenged them and could prove that the same did belong to him and pay him for their meate that he should deliver them unto him and then shewed how that the Plaintiff came and claimed them for his own and because he would not prove that they did belong unto him nor pay him for their meate c. he would not deliver them upon which plea there was a Demurrer in Law After argument by the Serjeants Cook Chief Justice said that it was a
commit his house to his servants and the one doth assent to the Livery and departeth the house if the other do continue there and Livery be made it is no good Livery of Seisin Mich. 6. Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 216 IT was holden for Law in this Court That if a man do offend against any Penal Law the Informer ought to begin his Suit within one year after the Offence done otherwise he shall not have the moity of the Penalty And if the Informer hath put in his Information although that the party be not served with Process to answer it yet the same doth appropriate the Penalty unto him Hill 6. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 217 PEREPOYNT'S Case PErepoynt procured one to convey the daughter of a Gentleman and to marry her to a Ploughman in the night and procured a Priest to marry them and was there present for which matter he was excommunicate by the Ordinary of the Diocess and after absolution he was for the same committed to Prison by the High Commissioners It was holden by the Court That matters concerning Tithes Marriage or Testaments are not examinable before them yet because that he had suffered imprisonment for such things and that neither the Statute of 23. H. 8. nor the Cannon doth extend to the High Commissioners it was resolved That if upon submission to the Commissioners they would not set him at liberty that this Court would do it Mich 6. Jacobi in the Star-Chamber 218 IT was resolved by the whole Court of Star-Chamber That if a man doth assist one who is a Plaintiffe in that Court that it is not maintenance because that it is for the benefit and advantage of the King But if a man do assist an Informer in another Court in an Information upon a Penall Law the same is such a Maintenance for which he may be punished in this Court 6. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 219 IT was adjudged in this Court That if Land which was sowed be leased to one for life the Remainder to another for 〈◊〉 That if the Tenant for life dieth before the severance of the Corn 〈…〉 in the Remainder shall have the Corn. Mich. 6. Jacobi in the King 's Bench. 220 THE Lessee of a Copy-holder was distrained for rent behind in the time of his Lessor and the Lessee did assume and promise That he would satisfie the Lord his rent if he would surcease the suing of him It was adjudged by the whole Court That it was a good Assumpsit and a good consideration Mich. 7. Jacobi in the King 's Bench. 221 PIGGOT and GODDEN's Case NOte It was in this Case agreed by the whole Court and so adjudged That in an Ejectione firme a man shall not give colour because the Plaintiffe shall be adjudged in by title Mich. 7. Jacobi in the King 's Bench. 222 TWo Tenants in Common brought an Action upon the Case for stopping of a water course against a Stranger whereby the profits of their Lands were lost and it was shewed in pleading that the water had run time out of minde ante diem Obstructionis and Judgment was given for the Plaintiffs And two Exceptions were taken by Coventry First that Tenants in Common ought to have several Actions and not have joyned Secondly that the Custom ought to have been pleaded to continue ante usque die Obstructionis and both the Exceptions were dissallowed by the Court and it is not like the Case of Falsefails in which Action they must join because the same is in the Realty Mich. 7. Jacobi In the King 's Bench. 223 CROSSE and CASON's Case AN Action of Debt was brought upon due Obligation the condition of which was that the Obligee the 18. of August anno 4. Jacobi should go from Algate in London to the Parish Church of Stow-Market in Suffolk within 24. hours and the Obligee shewed that he went from Algate to the said place and because he did not shew in his Declaration in what Ward Algate was It was holden not to be good Mich. 7. Jacobi in the King 's Bench. 224 NOte That it was adjudged to be Law by the whole Court that if a man bail goods to another at such a day to rebail and before the day the Bailee doth sell the goods in market overt Yet at the day the Baylor may seise the goods for that the property of the goods was alwaies in him and not altered by the Sale in market overt Mich. 7. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 225 ZOUCH and MICHIL's Case AN Enfant Tenant in tail did suffer a Recovery by his Gardian It was holden by the Court that the same should binde him because he might have remedy over against the Gardian by Action upon the Case But otherwise if he suffer a Recovery by Attorney for that is void because he hath not any remedy over against him as it was adjudged 4. Jacobi in Holland and Lees Case Pasch 8. Jacobi In the Common Pleas. 226 WILSON and WORMAL's Case IN an Evidence given to a Jury it was admitted without Contradiction that if judgment in an action of Debt be given against Lessee for years and afterwards the Lessee alieneth his Term and after the year the Plaintiff sueth forth a Scire facias and hath Execution That the Terme is not lyable to the Execution if the Assignement were made bona fide Also in that Cook Chief Justice said that if Lessee for years assignee over his Terme by fraud to defeat the Execution And the Assignee assigneth the same over unto another bona fide that in the hands of the second Assignee it is not lyable to Execution Also in this Case it was said for Law That if a Man who hath goods but of the value of 30. pound be endebted unto two Men viz. to one in 20. pound and to another in 10. pound and the Debtor assignes to him who is in his debt 10. pound all the goods which are worth 30. pound to the intent that for the residue above the 10. pound debt he shall be favourable unto him This Assignement is altogether void because it is fraudulent in part But Foster Justice said that it shall not be void for the whole but onely for the surplusage as Twynes Case C. 3. part 81. Quaere Pasch 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 227 BRISTOW and BRISTOWE's Case IN an Action of Covenant the Case was this Lessee for 90. years made an Assignement for part of the Term viz. for 10. years and the Assignee covenated to repair c. The first Lessee devised the Reversion of the Term and dyed the Devisee of the Reversion brought an Action of Covenant against the Assignee for 10. years and the question was If the Devisee of the Reversion being but a Termor were within the Statute of 32. H. 8 of Conditions Secondly whether the Action would lye because no notice was given of the grant of the Reversion Dodderidge Serjeant to the first point said that this
to the extinguishment of the Bond by the release of all Actions But the Court conceived That the Arbibitrament did consist of two matters which were distinct and might be severed For although that the Arbitrament be void as to one matter yet it shall stand good and shall be a good Arbitrament for the other matter And Foster Justice said That in that case the Award to make the Release might be severed viz. That it should be good for all Actions except the Bond. Cook contrary And said That it is so entire that it cannot be divided But the Court conceived That the Arbitrament was good as to the Bond to be made by the Defendant although it were void as to the Arbitrator At another day Dodderidge said That the Plaintiffe had not alledged any Breach of the Arbitrament for he hath put it That the Defendant and the Arbitrator had not entred into the Bond and although they two joyntly had not entred into the Bond yet it might be that the Defendant alone had entred into the Bond and it needed not that the Arbitrator enter the Bond for as to him the Arbitrament was void And that Exception was allowed as a good Exception by the whole Court. For they said That the Plaintiffe ought for to shew and alledge a breach according to the Book of L. 5. E. 4. 108. And they said That although it be after verdict yet it is not remedied by the Statute Pasch 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 231 FOLIAMBES Case IN a Writ of Dower brought by the Lady Foliambe It was agreed by the whole Court That if the Husband maketh a Lease for years rendring rent and dieth the wife shall recover her Dower and shall have present Execution of the Land and thereby she shall have the third part of the Reversion and of the Rent and execution shall not cease And all the Justices said That the Sheriffe should serve execution of the Land as if there were not any Lease for years for it may be that the Lease for years is void And although it be shewed in pleading that there is a Lease for years the wife cannot answer to it and it may be there is not any Lease and therefore the Execution shall be generall And he who claimes the Lease for years may re-enter into the Land notwithstanding the Recovery and the Execution of the Dower And if he be ousted he shall have his Action Nichols Serjeant who was of Councell against the Demandant said That he would agree that the Case in Perkins 67. was not Law But the Justices said That there is a difference betwixt the Case of Perkins and this Case for in the Case in Perkins the Husband had but an estate in Remainder so as no rent or attendancy was due so as the wife during that Term could not have any benefit Also in this case it was agreed by the Court That after judgement for part the Demandant might be Non-suit for the residue and yet have execution of that part for which he had judgment Pasch 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 232 RAPLEY and CHAPLEIN's Case IT was ruled by the whole Court That if a Custome be alledged That the eldest daughter shall solely inherit that the eldest sister shall not inherit by force of that Custome So if the Custome be That the eldest daughter and the eldest sister shall inherit the eldest Aunt shall not inherit by that Custome And so if the Custome be that the youngest son shall inherit the youngest brother shall not inherit by the Custome And Foster Justice said That so it was adjudged in one Denton's Case Pasch 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 233 SEAMAN's Case BArker Serjeant prayed the opinion of the Court in this Case Lessee for an hundred years made a Lease for forty years to Thomas Seaman if he should live so long and afterwards he leased the same to John his son Habendum after the Term of Thomas for 23. years to be accounted from the date of these presents The Question is If the Lease to John shall be said to begin presently or after the Term of Thomas And the Justices were cleer of opinion That the Lease to John shall not be accounted from the time of the date but from the end of the Term of Thomas because that when by the first words of the Limitation it is a good Lease to begin after the Term of Thomas it shall not be made void by any subsequent words And Cook Chiefe Justice said That this is no new reason for there is the same reason given in 2. E. 2. Grants And he put the Case in Dyer 9. Eliz. 261. and said That if the Limitation be not certain when the Term shall begin it shall be taken most beneficiall for the Lessee Pasch 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 234 WARD and POOL's Case AN Action upon the Case was brought for speaking these words Thou mayest well be richer then I am for thou hast coined thirty Shillings in a day thou art a Coiner of money c. I will justifie it It was moved in arrest of Judgment That the words were not Actionable because he might have a good Authority to coine Money for men who work in the Mint are said to coine Money and are called Coiners of Money And so it was adjudged Quod Querens nihil capiat per Billam Pasch 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 235 CHALK and PETER's Case CHalk brought a Replevin against Peter the Defendant did avow the taking as Bailiff of Sir Francis Barrington in sixteen Acres of wood in Hatfield Chase and shewed that an Arbitrament was made by the Lord Burghley late Lord Treasurer betwixt the Lord Rich and the Ancestors of Sir Francis by which it was awarded That the said Ancestors of the said Sir Francis Barrington and his Heirs should have the herbage of a certain number of Acres within the said Chase and also that he should have to him and his Heirs the Trees and Bushes of the said number of Acres within the said Chase and that he might fell and cut sixteen Acres every year of the said Acres and that he should enclose them according to the Laws and Statutes of the Realm and that Assurance was made by the Lord Rich accordingly and that the same was confirmed by a speciall Act of Parliament with a saving of the right and interest of all strangers and said That Sir Francis Barrington did inclose and cut down sixteen Acres and did enclose the same and there took the Defendants cattel Damage feasants upon which the Defendant did demurr in Law The Question in the case was If by the Statute of 22. E. 4. cap. 7. or the Statute of 35. H. 8. câ—p 17. which give Authority to make inclosures of Woods the Commoner shall be excluded Harris Serjeant I conceive That the Commoner shall be excluded by the Statute of 22. E. 4. cap. 7. which gives Authority to inclose and exclude all Beasts and
Statute to enclose For the Statute is When any man fels trees in his proper soile so that he not being owner of the ground he is not within the Statute and that was the effect of his argument And as to the other point he did not speak at all Cook chief Justice I hold that the plaintiffe ought to have judgment all the matter doth consist upon the Statute of 22. E. 4. which is to be considered And first is to be considered what was the common Law before that Statute and that was That one who had a Wood within a Forrest might fell it as it appeareth by the Statute de Forresta and the Statnte of 1 E. 3. 2. by licence and also he might enclose it for three yeers as it appeareth by the Statute of 22. E. 4. but the enclosure was to be cum parvo fossato haia bassa as it appeareth by the Register in the Writ of Ad quod damnum so as before that Statute there was an enclosure But the Law is cleer That before that Statute by the enclosure the Commoner shall not be excluded Then wee are to consider of the Statute And first Of the persons to whom the Statute doth extend and that appeareth by the preamble to be betwixt the King and other owners of Forrests and Chases and the owners of the Soil so as a Commoner is not any person within the meaning of the Statute And for the body of the Statute you ought to intend that the sentence is continued and not perfected untill the end of the Statute and the words Without licence c. prove That no persons were meant to be bounden by the statute but the Owners of the Forrests and Chases and not the Commoners Like the case in Dyer And although you will expound the words of the bodie of the Statute generally yet they shall be taken according to the intent of the preamble and therefore the Case of 21. H. 7. 1. of the Prior of Castleacre although it be not adjudged in the Book yet Judgment is entred upon the Roll which Case is Pasch 18. H. 7. Rot. 460. By which case it appeareth that although that a Statute be made which giveth Lands to the King yet by that statute the Annuity of a stranger shall not be extinguished And the Case which hath been put by Justice Foster upon the Statute of 18. Eliz. was the case of Boswel for the Parsonage of Bridgwater That although that one who hath a lease for years of the King which was void for misrecitall might by the said Statute hold it against the King yet the Patentee in Fee shall not be prejudiced by the said Statute So I conclude That the Commoner is not a person within this Statute of 22. E. 4 Secondly It is to be considered if a Wood in which any one hath Common be within the Statute and I hold it is not but onely severall Woods For as I have said the Wood which before the Statute might be enclosed for three years was onely a severall Wood and not such a Wood in which any one had common And the statute of 22. E. 4. doth extend onely to such Woods which might be felled and enclosed for three yeers and I conceive contrary to my Brother Warburton That the Deer of the Forrest shall well enough be said to be beasts and cattell And whereas by the common Law before this statute the enclosure was onely to be as I have said cum parvo fossato haia bassa by which the Deer were not excluded now by this statute I hold that they may make great hedges to exclude aswell the Deer as other beasts And I agree with Justice Foster that if he will take advantage of the Statute that hee ought to have pleaded that first hee felled and afterwards enclosed and è contrà upon the Statute of 35. H. 8. scil that hee ought first to divide and afterwards to fell c. And also I agree with him that in that point the Statute of 35. H. 8. being contrary doth repeal the Statute of 22. E. 4. if by that Statute the Commoner shall be excluded But I am of opinion with my Brother Warburton cleerly That hee is a Vendee of the Trees and so within the Statute for it is not neeessary that in the Grant there be the word Sell or that money by given nor that it be a contract for a time onely and not to have cantinuance as it is in our case But he who hath the Trees to him and his heirs shall be said to be a Vendee well enough As to the other matter which hath been moved Whether the Statute of 22. E. 4 be a generall law or not I hold cleerly that we are to take knowledg of it although it be not pleaded because it concerneth the King for it is made for the Kings Forrests and of all the Acts made between the King and his subjects wee ought to take knowledg for so was Stowel's Case And also it was adjudged that wee ought to take knowledg of the act concerning the Creation of the Prince because it concerneth the King And Cook in his argument said That if there had not been a speciall proviosin for the Commoner in the Statute of 35. H. 8. the Commoner had not been excluded by that Statute And afterwards Judgment was entred for the plaintiffe Pasch 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 236 NOte That it was holden by three of the Justices viz. Walmâ—sley Warburton and Foster Cook and Daniel being abâ—ent for law cleerly That a Tenant at will cannot by any custome make a Lease for life by licence of the Lord and that there cannot be any such custome for a lease for life as there is for a lease for years Pasch 8. Jacobi In the Common Pleas. 237 BERRY's Case NOte That upon an Evidence given to a Jury in a Case betwixt Berry and New Colledg in Oxford it was ruled by Walmesley Warburton Foster Justices in an Action of Trespass If it appear upon the Evidence that the plaintiff hath nothing in the land but in common with a stranger yet the Jury ought to finde with the Plaintiff and if the Defendant will have advantage of the Tenancy in common in the plaintiff he ought to have pleaded it Nichols Serjeant was very earnest to the contrary and took a difference where the Plaintiffe and Defendant are Tenants in common and where the Plaintiff is tenant in common with a stranger But he was over-ruled the action was an action of Trespass Quare clausum fregit c. Cook and Daniel were absent Pasch 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 238 IT was holden by Walmesley Warburton and Foster Justices That if a Rent be granted to one and his heirs for the life of another man and the grantee dieth that his heir shall not be an occupant of the Rent And Foster said that the reason was because he cannot plead a Que estate of a Rent
intend to entermarry with Alice S. by Indenture did covenant with J. D that he would marry the said Alice being then of the age of seventeen years and that after the marriage had betwixt them that they would levy a Fine of divers Lands which said Fine should bee unto the use of the said J. D. and his Heirs and accordingly after the entermarriage the said J. S. and Alice his Wife did levy a Fine unto the said J. D. and his Heirs without any other use implied or expressed but what was contained in the said Indenture before marriage and according to the said Fine the Conusee continued the possession of the said Lands for a long time viz. for thirty years Cook Chiefe Justice said That this continuance of possession was a strong proofe and could not otherwise be intended but that the Conusee came to the possession of the said Lands by the said Fine which was so levied to him and his heirs And he said That it was adjudged in this Court in the Case betwixt Claypoole and Whestone That in a Recovery the Covenant did not lead the use of the Recovery for that it was but an evidence that such was the intent of the parties And in this Case it was agreed by the whole Court and was so said to be resolved in Clogat and Blythes case 30. Eliz. That when no use is expressed or implyed by Indenture or other agreement that it shall be to the ancient use viz. to the use of the Conusor As if Husband and wife be seised of one moytie of the Land in the right of the wife and the Husband of the other moytie by himselfe and they joyne in a Fine generally the Conusee shall be seised to the former uses as it is agreed in Beckwiths case C. 2. part And so it was agreed That if the Husband doth declare the use and the wife doth not disagree or vary from it that the declaration of the Husband shall bind the wife And Cook said That it is not alwayes necessary that the wives name be set to the Indenture which doth declare an use And further Cook said That if a Fine be levied of Lands yet the uses may be declared by subsequent Indentures And it was said Obiter in this Case That if a man for valuable consideration doth purchase a Lease for years and hee nameth two of his servants as joynt-purchasers with him in the Deed and afterwards the Master would sell the Lands alone and the servants do interrupt the sale or will not joyne with him that he hath no remedy to compell them to do it but by a Bill of Chancery Trinit 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 254 A Vicar was endowed in the time of King Henry the 3d. of divers Tithes and afterwards he libelled for those Tithes in the spirituall Court The Defendant alledged a Mâ—dus Decimandi and prayed a Prohibition and day was given to the party to shew cause why the same should not be granted and at the day the Deed of Endowment was produced and shewed in Court By which it did appear That the Vicar was endowed of Hay viz. of the tenth part of it and so of the remnant of the Tithes for which he libelled whereupon the Court refused to award a Prohibition Quaere Causam For as I conceive a Modus Decimandi may accrue after the Endowment Trinit 9. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 255 Sir W. DETHICK and STOKE's Case STokes libelled against Sir William Dethick in the spirituall Court for calling of him Bald Priest Rascally Priest and for striking of him and for those offences he was fined by the spirituall Court an hundred pound and imprisoned And the opinion of the whole Court was That neither the Fine nor Imprisonment were justifiable because the Statute of Articuli Cleri is Non imponant poenam pecuniariam nisi propter redemptionem c. And Cook said They might onely excommunicate and thereupon a Writ de Excommunicatâ— capiendo might be awarded and that is their onely course and then the Party may have his Cautione admittenda And the Court said That if the spirituall Court would not enlarge the party upon sufficient Caution offered them that then the Sheriffe should deliver him Trinit 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 256 IT was the opinion of the whole Court That if a man have a Judgment against two men upon a joynt Bond That he cannot have severall Executions viz. a Capias ad satisfaciendum against the one and an Elegit against the other for he ought to have but unicam satisfactionem although he sue them by severall Actions And if he sue forth severall Executions an Audita Querela will lye Mich. 9. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 257 CARLE'S Case NOte it was adjudged in this Case That if a man say of another that he hath killed a man an Action upon the case will not lie for those words for he may do it as Executioner of the Law or se defâ—ndeâ—do So if one say of another That he is a Cutpurse an Action will not lie for that a Glover doth and a man may cut his own purse and the same Term it was holden in the Kings Bench That an Action will not lie for calling one Witch Mich. 9. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 258 IT was holden by the whole Court That a Commoner cannot generally justifie the cutting and taking away of Bushes off from the Common but by a speciall prescription he may justifie the same So he may say That the Commoners have used time out of mind to dig the Land to let out the water that he may the better take his Common with his cattell and it was agreed That if the Lord of the Waste doth surcharge the Common that the Commoner cannot drive his cattell off the Common or distraine them damage feasance as he may the cattell of a stranger But the remedy against the Lord is either an Assize or an Action upon the Case Mich. 9. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 259 IT was agreed by the whole Court That if a man deviseth unto his daughter an hundred pound when she shall marry or to his son when he shall be of full age and they die before the time appointed that their Executors shall not have the money otherwise if the devise were to them to be paid at their full ages and they die before that time and make Executors there the Executors may recover the Legacy in the spirituall Court Hill 9. Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 260 ROYLEY and DORMER's Case TWo Boyes did contend and fight near unto their houses and the one stroke the other so as he did bleed who went and complained to his father who having a rod with him came to the other boy and beat him upon which he died And the opinion of the whole Court was That it was not murder Mich. 9. Jacobi in the King 's Bench. 261 EDWARDS and DENTON's Case UPon a special Verdict the Case was
that a Man was seised of the Manor of D. and of a house called W. in D. and also of a Lease for years in D. and he did bargain and sell unto another his Manor of D. and all other his Lands and Tenements in Dale and in the indenture did covenant that he was seised of the premisses in Fee which was left out of the Verdict and if the Lease for years should pass by the general words was the question Quaere of the case because Trinit 10. Jacobi the Court was divided in opinion in this Case Mich. 9. Iacobi In the King 's Bench. 262 HUGHES and KEENE's Case THe Plaintiff declared that whereas he was possessed of a Messuage for years which had ancient lights and the Defendant possessed of another House adjoyning and a Yard that the Defendant upon the said Yard had built a House and stopped his lights The Defendant pleaded that the custom of London was that every man might build upon his old Foundation and if there be not any agreement might stop up the Windows of his Neighbour upon which the Plaintiff did demurre in Law and it was adjudged for the Plaintiff because that the Defendant did not answer the Plaintiffs charge that he had built upon the new and not upon the old Foundation And it was holden by the whole Court in this Case that a man may build upon an old Foundation by such a custom and stop up the lights of his Neighbour which are adjoyning unto him and if he make new Windows higher the other may build up his house higher to destroy those new Windows But a man cannot build a House upon a place where there was none before as in a Yard and so stop his Neighbours lights And so it was adjudged in the time of Queen Elizabeth in Althans Case upon such a custom in the City of York And it was said by Cook Chief Justice That one prescription may be pleaded against another where the one may stand with the other as it was adjudged in Wright and Wrights Case That a Copy-holder of a Bishop did prescribe that all Copy-holders within the Manor have been discharged of Tithes But not where one prescription is contrary to the other whereas one prescribes to have lights and the other prescribes to stop the same lights Quaere Hill 9. Iacobi in the King 's Bench. 263 SAMFORD and HAVEL's Case IN an Action of Trespass for 30. Hares and 300. Coneys hunted in his Warren taken and carried away which Trespass was layd with a continuando from such a time till such a time the Defendant justified because he had common in the place where c. to a Messuage six Yard Lands for 240. Sheep and that he and all those whose estate he hath time out of mind have used at such time as the Common was surcharged with Coneys to hunt them kill and carry them as to his Messuage appertaining upon which the Plaintiff did demurre in Law because a man cannot make such a prescription in the Free-Warren and Free-hold of another Man And secondly because a man cannot so prescribe to hunt kill and carry away his Coneys as pertaining to his Messuage But a Man may prescribe to have so many Coneys to spend in his House and for these causes in the principal case the prescription was holden for a void prescription and Judgment was given for the Plaintiff Hill 9. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 264 COX and GRAY's Case IT was adjudged upon a Writ of Error brought upon a Judgment given in the Marshalsey in an Action of trover and conversion of goods That if none of the parties be of the Kings houshold and judgment be given there that the same is Error and for that cause the Judgment was reversed Hill 9. Iacobi in the Common Pleas. 265 MORRIS's Case IN an Action upon the case for putting of cattel upon the common it was adjudged that if the cattel of a Stranger escape into the common the Commoner may distrain them damage feasance as wel as where the cattel are put into the common by the stranger Pasch 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 266 The Lord MOUNTEAGLE and PENRUDDOCK's Case IT was holden by the whole Court in this case and agreed by all the Serjeants at the Barre That if two men submit themselves to the arbitrament of I. S. And the Arbitrator doth award that one of them shall pay ten pound and that the other shall make a release unto him that the same is a void Award if the submission be not by Deed and hee to whom the Release is to be made by the Award may have remedy for it for otherwise the one should have the ten pound and the other without remedy for the Release And it was resolved That upon submission and arbitrament that the party may have an Action upon the Case for not making of the Release And Cook chief Justice said That it was wisely done by Manwood chiefe Baron when he made such award That a Lease or such like Collaterall thing should be done To make his Award that he should make the Release or pay such a sum of money for which the party might have a remedy I conceive that the reason is That no Action upon the case upon an Arbitrament lieth because it is in the Nature of a Judgement At another day the opinion of the Court was with Cook and 20. H. 6. and 8. E. 4 5. cited to the purpose that there ought to be reciprocall remedy It was also said in this Case That by the Statute of 5. H. 5. A man cannot be Nonsuit after verdict Pasch 10. Jacobi In the Common Pleas. 267 COOK and FISHER's Case IN a Replevin the Defendant did avow for rent granted to him by a private Act of Parliament The Plaintiffe did demand Oyer of the Act and the opinion of the Court was that he ought to have Oyer for they held that the Oyer of no Record shall be denied to any person in case he will demurre And the Record of the Act shall be entred in haec verba Pasch 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 268 The Bakers Case of Gray's-Inne against Occould AN Action of Debt was brought in London against Occould late Steward of Gray's-Inne upon a generall indebitatas assumpsit without shewing the particulars which plea was removed into the Common Pleas. And it was holden by the Court That the Action as it was brought would not lie for the inconvenience which might follow For the Defendant should be driven to be ready to give an answer to the Plaintiffe to the generality And therefore the Plaintiffe ought to bring a speciall Action for the particular things The like Case was in the Marshalsey and because they did not declare in a speciall manner Exception was taken to it and adjudged the Action upon a generall Indebitatas assumpsit did not lie Quaere Trinit 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 269 READ and HAWE's Case IN a Replevin Trinit
10. Jacobi Râ—t 2504. The Plaintiff counted that the Defendant Cepit avena of the Plaintiff apud Occould and doth not say In quodam loco c. upon which the Defendant did demurre in Law Hutton Serjeant argued for the Plaintiffe and said That notwithstanding the many presidents which had been shewed that yet the Declaration was well enough For he said That the presidents did not prove that it was necessary that it should be therein shewed in quodam loco vocat ' because the Defendant upon the matter is the Actor and therefore he best knows the place where he took the Cattel And in 9. E. 4. In a Homine replegiando the Towne onely was named and it is not there debated whether the same were good without mentioning in quodam loco 49. E. 3. 14. and 24. 9. H. 6. and 3. H. 6. There the traverse was of the taking at Dale sans ceo c. that the same was at Sale and in quodam loco is not expressed Cook Chief Justice said That there is no book which taketh this Exception and said That notwithstanding the Presidents cited that it was well enough For hee said There is a difference betwixt Presidents which are the Inventions of Clarks and of judiciall Presidents And the effect of the Suit in this case is not the shewing of the place but the having of the Cattel and it is on the part of the Defendant to shew where hee took the Cattel for perhaps the Plaintiffe doth not know where he took them and if he did know the place where they were taken yet perhaps hee hath not witnesses to prove the same and so by this means the Plaintiffe should be at a great mischiefe and delayed in his Suit Whereas a Replevin is festinum remedium to have his Cattel again which perhaps are his plough Cattel Warburton Justice said That there is a difference betwixt Actions brought in the King's Bench and in this Court For there in an Action of Trespasse the same may be abutted because it is no Originall Writ as it is here and hee said That there although the place bee not certainly abutted yet it may be good And he compared the Case at barre to the pleading of a Joynt-tenancy for he said In case it bee pleaded of the part of the Tenant himselfe hee is to shew how the Joynt-tenancy came because it lyeth in his knowledge but contrary if it were on the Plaintiffs part And in this Case he who best knowes when the taking was ought to shew it and that is the Avowant for it is no reason that the Plaintiffe for missing of the place not being the substance should be triced Cook If one in the night drive my Cattel into his Land and afterwards doth distrein them it is no lawfull distresse At another day Cook said That in the Book Nov. Narration ' it is said That the Town place and collour of the beasts ought to bee shewed by the Plaintiffe in the Replevin and he said If the Colour had been left out he would have given credit to the Book but because it is clear that the Colour is not needfull to be shewed therefore he did not approve of the Authority for the place And he cited 4. E. 3. 13. where the Defendant said it was in the Hamlet And 18. E. 3. 10. E. 3. and 49 E. 3. 14. where the Towns only are mentioned And it was said That in an Ejectione firme brought in the Kings's Bench the usuall course is to abutt the Land yet he said It might be omitted in Trespasse although the same be the usuall forme of that Court and it may be generall but if a place be alledged then the same is materiall and the Plaintiffe doth thereby give an advantage unto his Adversary At another day Haughton Serjeant argued for the Defendant That the expressing of the place where the taking was is materiall in the Declaration and he said That as the Register is the rule for Originall Writs from which forme a man may not vary so he said The Book of Entries and Presidents of the Courts were rules for pleadings from which there ought to be no variance and therefore he cited 33. H. 6. 14. Where in a Writ of Entry in the nature of an Assize the Demandant counted How that A. gave Lands unto J. S. his Cosen whose Heir he is in tail and shewed the descent And Exception was taken unto the Count because it was not the forme of the Pleading in that Court wherefore it was awarded That he should count that ipse fuit seisitus ut de libero tenemento which is not repugnant although that he had an Estate in tail because the same was the Ancient form used in the Court So he said in the principall Case the ancient used forme of the Court ought to bee observed which was to expresse in the Count the place in which the taking was and hee cited 35. H. 6. 40. Where Exception was taken by the Defendant because the Plaintiff in the Replevin did not alledge the place where the taking was and therefore per curiam the Plaintiffe took nothing by his Writ and he denyed the opinion of 9. E. 4. 41. and said That in reason the place ought to be shewed because if the Defendant would plead any matter to the Jurisdiction of the Court the place must be shewed and he said That those Records which were shewed on the other side were but of later times and the Point in question in none of those Cases came in debate judicially wherefore he concluded for the Defendant Hutton Serjeant argued again and said That the Formes of Originall Writs are certain from which a man is not to vary but he said That Counts and Declarations are to be according to the matter And in the principall Case he conceived That it was not necessary that the place where the taking was be shewed and hee cited 4. Ed. 3. 13. in a Replevin the Plaintiff declared of the taking of his Cattel in Holme without saying In quodam loco vocat ' c. and it was holden good because the Towne or Hamlet is sufficient certain and 21. H. 7. 22. a. in a Replevin the Plaintiffe declared of a taking at D. the Defendant said That he took them at S. and not at D. and avowed and no Exception was taken thereunto for want of expressing the place in quo c. And he said That in 9. Ed. 4. 41. and 25. it is said That in a Replevin the use is to declare in a certain place but if the place be omitted yet it is good enough and that Book is after 33. H. 6. 40. and hee said That the cause of the Judgement in 33. H. 6. might be because there were Blanks left for the place and the Plaintiff had begun to alledge the certain place for the Record is In quodam loco vocat ' without expressing the place but Blank which he could not affirme and therefore it
afterwards he granted the Reversion for eighty years reserving the ancient rent The question was Whether he had pursued his Authority because by the meaning of the Proviso a Power was That the Conusor should have the rent presently or when the Term did begin But the opinion of the Court was That he had done lesse then by the Proviso he might have done for this Grant of the Reversion doth expire with the particular estates for life But if he had made a Lease to begin after the death of the Tenants for life the same had been more then this grant of the Reversion And Cook chief Justice said That the Grantor may presently have an Action of debt against the Grantee of the Reversion for the rent But because it was not averred that any of the Cestuy que viei were alive at the time when the Grantor did distrain for the rent Judgement in the principall case was respited Trinit 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 282 UPon the Statute of Bankrupts this Case was moved to the Court If a Bankrupt be endebted unto one in Twenty Pounds and to another in Ten Pounds and he hath a Debt due to him by Bond of Twenty Pounds Whether the Commissioners may assigne this Bond to the two Creditors jointly or whether they must divide it and assigne Twenty Marks to the one and Twenty Marks to the other And the Court was of opinion That it was so to be divided as the words of the Statute are viz to every Creditor a portion rate and rate like c. And then it was moved How they might sue the Bond whether they might joine in the Suit or not ad quod non fuit responsum by Cook Warburton Justice said That when part of the Bond is assigned to one and part to another that now the Act of Parliament doth operate upon it and therefore they shall sue severally for he said That by the custome of London part of a debt might be attached And therefore he conceived part might be sued for Trinit 10. Jacobi In the Common Pleas. 283 SPRAT and NICHOLSON's Case SPrat Sub-Deacon of Exeter did libel in the Spiritual Court against Nicholson Parson of A. pro annuali pensione of Thirty Pound issuing out of the Parsonage of A. and in his Libel shewed How that tam per realem compositionem quam per antiquam laudabilem consuetudinem ipse predecessores sui habuerunt habere consueverunt praedictam annualem penfionem out of his Parsonage of A. Dodderidge Serjeant moved for a Prohibition in this Case because he demands the said Pension upon Temporall grounds viz. prescription and reall composition But Cook Chief Justice and the other Justices were of opinion That in this Case no Prohibition should be granted for they said That the party had Election to sue for the same in the Spirituall Court or at the common Law because both the parties were Spirituall persons but if the Parson had been made a party to the Suit then a Prohibition should have been granted Vide Fitz. Nat. Brev. 51. b. acc And they further said That if the party sueth once at the common Law for the said Pension that if he afterwards sue in the Spirituall Court for the same that a Prohibition will lie because by the first Suit he hath determined his Election And Cook cited 22. E. 4. 24. where the Parson brought an Action of Trespass against the Vicar for taking of Under-Woods and each of them claimed the Tithes of the Under-Woods by prescription to belong unto him and in that Case because the right of the Tithes came in question and the persons were both of them Spirituall persons and capable to sue in the Spirituall Court the Temporal Court was ousted of Jurisdiction But he said That if an issue be joined whether a Chappel be Donative or Presentative the same shall be tryed by a Jury at the common Law And in this case it was said by the Justices That the Statute of 34. H. 8. doth authorize Spiritual persons to sue Lay-men for Pensions in the Spiritual Courts but yet they said That it was resolved by all the Judges in Sir Anthony Ropers case That such Spiritual persons could not sue before the High Commissioners for such Pensions for that Suits there must be for enormious Offences only And in the principall case the Prohibition was denyed Trinit 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 284 Sir BAPTIST HIX and FLEETWOOD and GOT's Case FLeetwood and Gots by Deed indented did bargain and sell Weston Park being three hundred Acres of Lands unto Sir Baptist Hix at Eleven Pound for every Acre which did amount in the whole to Two thousand five hundred and thirty Pounds and in the beginning of the Indenture of Bargain and Sale it was agreed betwixt the parties That the said Park being much of it Wood-land should be measured by a Pole of eighteen foot and a halfe And further it was covenanted That Fleetwood and Gots should appoint one Measurer and Sir Baptist Hixe another who should measure the said Park and if upon the measuring it did exceed the number of Acres mentioned in the Indenture of Sale that then S. Baptist Hixe should pay to them acording to the proportion of 11l. for every Acre and if it wanted of the Acres in the deed that then Fleet ' and Gots should pay back to S. Baptist the surplusage of the mony according to the proportion of 11. l. for every Acre And upon this Indenture Sir Baptist Hixe brought an Action of Covenant against Fleetwood and Gots and assigned a Breach that upon the measuring of it it wanted of the Acres mentioned in the Deed 70 Acres And upon the Declaration the Defendants did demurre in Law and the cause of the Demurrer was because the Plaintiff did not shew by what measure it was measured And therefore Sherley Serjeant who was of Councel with the Defendants said that although it was agreed in the beginning of the Deed that the measure should be made by a Pole of 18 feet and a half Yet when they come to the covenants there it is not spoken of any measure at all and therefore he said it shall be taken to be such a measure which the Statute concerning the measuring of Lands speaks of viz. a measure of sixteen foot and a half to the Pole and he said that by such measure there did not want any of the said three hundred Acres mentioned in the Deed. Dodderidge Serjeant contrary for the Plaintiff and he layed this for a ground That if a certainty doth once appeare in a Deed afterwards in the same Deed it is spoken indefinitely the same shall be referred to the first certainty and to that purpose he vouched the case in Dyer Lands were given by a Deed to a man haeredibus masculis and afterwards in the same Indenture it appeared that it was haeredibus masculis de Corpore and therefore it was holden but an estate in
tail because the first words were indefinite and the later words were certain by which his intent did appeare to pass but an estate in tail He also cited 4. E. 4. 29. B. The words of an Obligation were Noverint universi per praesentes me I. S. teneri c. W. B. in ten pound solvendum eidem I. And it was holden by the whole Court that the same did not make the Bond to be void because it appeared by the promises of the Bond to whom the mony was in Law to be paid and the intent so appearing the Plaintiff might declare of a solvendum to himself and the word I should be surplusage And 22. E. 4. 9. A. B. The Abbot of Selbyes case Where the Abbot of Selby did grant annualem pensionem to B. ad rogatum I. E. illam scilicet quam I. E. habuit ad terminum vitae suae solvendum quousque sibi c. de beneficio provisum fuerit and it was holden by the whole Court in a Writ of annuity brought that sibi did referre to B. the grantee and not to I. E. And Cook Chief Justice said that the original Contract doth leade the measure in this Case and to that purpose he cited Kiddwellies case in the Commentaries where a Lease was made rendring Rent at Mich. at D. and if it were behind by a month after demand that the Lessor might reenter the demand must be at the first place which is in that case alledged to be certain viz. at D. The case was adjorned Trinit 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 285 Sir Henry Lea and Henry Leas Case SIR Henry Lea was committed to the Fleet for the disobeying of a Decree made in the Court of Requests and having Suits depending in the Court of Common Pleas he prayed a Writ of habâ—as Corpus which was granted and upon the return of the Writ the cause of his Commitment appeared to be for a contempt for not performing of the said Decree and no other cause appeared in the return and the Court were of opinion that they could not deliver him because that no cause appeared in the return to warrant their delivery of him And the Court said that if the return be false yet they cannot deliver the party But the party may have his Action of false Imprisonment if the Imprisonment be not Lawfull But then it was shewed by Mountague Serjeant to the Court that the Decree was made in the Court of Requests upon a Bill containing this matter viz. That Henry Lea pretending Title unto Lands which Sir Henry Lea held by descent from his Unkle Sir Henry Lea shewed his Title to the Kings Majestie and thereupon the King upon the Petition of Henry Lea sends for Sir Henry Lea and had speech with him that he would give unto the said Henry Lea some recompence for his Title which he pretended to have to the said Lands And that thereupon the said Sir Henry Lea at the instance of the Kings Majestie did promise the King that if the said Henry Lea would not molest him for any of the said Lands which he had by descent from his said Unkle that then he the said Sir Henry Lea would give unto the said Henry Lea two hundred pound per Annum And for not performance of this promise made to the King Henry Lea Exhibited his Bill in the Court of Requests upon which the said Decree was grounded The said Sir Henry Lea answered that he did not know of any such promise he made to the Kings Majestie and pleaded to the Jurisdiction of the Court But upon a Certificate made by the Kings Majestie that he made such a promise unto him the Court of Requests made the said Decree which Certificate was mentioned in the body of the said Decree And Mountegue prayed that because it appeared that the said Henry Lea had remedy by way of Action upon the case at the common Law upon the said promise That this Court would grant a Prohibition in this case unto the Court of Requests and deliver the party from his Imprisonment But the Court said that they would advise of the Case because they never had heard of the like case But Cook Chief Justice advised Sir Henry Lea to agree the matter betwixt Him and his Kinsman Henry Lea For he said that he had learned a Rule in his youth which was this viz. Cum pare luctare dubium cum Principe stultum est Cum puero poena cum Muliere pudor Trinit 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 286 GARVEN and PYM's Case GArven libelled against Pym for a Seat in the Church before the Bishop of Exeter in the spiritual Court there which by Appeal was removed into the Court of Arches And the Defendant did surmise in the Court of Common Pleas That he and his Ancestors have used time out of mind c. to have an Isle with a seat in the said Church for himself and his family and thereupon prayed a Prohibition But because it did appear upon Examination of the party himself That the Parish have alwayes used to repair the said Isle and seat the Court would not grant a Prohibition in this case for that proves that his Ancestors were not the Founders of the said Isle and Seat Also another man hath alwayes used to sit with him in the same seat which also proves that it doth not belong to him alone Cook chief Justice said That if a Gentleman with the assent of the Ordinary hath built an Isle juxta Ecclesiam for to set convenient Seats for him and his family and hath alwayes repaired the same at his own costs and charges In such case if the Ordinary place another man with the Founder without his consent in the same Seat that he may have his Action upon the Case against the Ordinary And if he be impleaded in the spirituall Court for such Seat that a Prohibition will lie And he said That the Heydons in Norfolk have built such an Isle next to the Church and placed convenient Seats there for them and their family But he said That if a man with the assent of the Ordinary set up a Seat in navi Ecclesiae for himselfe and another man doth pull up the same or defaceth it Trespas vi armis will not lie against him because the Freehold is in the Parson and he hath no remedy for the same but to sue the party in the Ecclesiastical Court And 9. E. 4. 14. the Dame Wiches Case was vouched where she brought an Action of Trespasse against the Parson for taking away her Husbands Coat-armour which was fixed to the Church at his Funerall and it was adjudged that the Action would lie and so will an Action in such case brought by the heir And Cook said That the Ordinary hath the onely disposing of Seats in the Body of the Church with which agrees the opinion of Hassey in 8. H. 7. And if the Ordinary long time past hath granted to a
parcel of it for in the one Case the Visne shall be of the Manor in the other not Vide 9. Eliz. Dyer ar But it was said That in this Case the Modus did extend only to things in Stangrave and therefore the Visne should be of Stangrave only Nichols Justice said That although the Parish be a Town and of one name yet the Visne shall be from the Parish to which the Court agreed And in the principall Case the Pleading was That the Manor was in Parochia and the Modus alledged to be in Parochia and the Prohibition de Parochia and therefore the Venire facias ought to be de Parochia and not de Manerio or de Villâ—â— Cook cited 4. E. 4. and 23. E. 4. that in Trespass de Parochia is a good addition for it shall not be intended that there are two Towns in one Parish And it was said by the Court in this Case That before the Statute of 2. E. 6. all Prohibitions to the Spirituall Court were quia secutus est de Laico feodo for when a man had a Modus dicimandi the Corn and other things were lay things Then it was moved by a Serjeant at Bar That at the Assizes where the tryall of the Modus decimandi was one of the principal Panel did appear only upon the Venire facias and the question was If in such Case a tales might be awarded de circumstantibus And it was holden by the Court that such tales might be well awarded and 10. Eliz. Dyer vouched to prove the same It was also said by the Court That at the common Law if not in appeal the tales might be of odd number as quinque tales or novem tales but now since the Statute of 35. H. 8. the tales may be even or odd as pleaseth the party But it was adjudged in this Case That in no Case where a triall is at the Bar shall any Tales de circumstantibus be awarded And so are all the Presidents Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 292 LEIGHTON against GREEN and GARRET THomas Leighton an Administrator durante minori 〈◊〉 of J. S. did libell in the Court of Admiralty against the Defendants and shewed in the Libel That there were Covenants made betwixt them by a Charter party they being Owners of the Ship called the Mary and John of Lynn that the Defendants should victuall the said Ship for a Voyage into Denmark and that the Ship should be staunch and without leak And shewed in his Libel that the Ship being upon the Seas did spring a leak by reason of which the Plaintiff did lose a great part of the Freight of the said Ship consisting in divers Commodities viz. Coney skins The Defendant pleaded That the Covenants were made infra Portum de Lynn And further pleaded That the Plaintiffe had before that time brought an Action of Covenants against the same Defendant upon the same Deed in which Action the Plaintiffe was Non-suit and it was adjudged That it was a good Plea in Bar and thereupon a Prohibition was awarded to the Court of Admiralty Cook Chief Justice in this Case said That charter party est charta partita and is all one in the Civil Law as an Indenture is in the Common Law And in this Case it was adjudged That the Triall should be there where the contract was made and so was it adjudged in Constantine and Gynns Case Where the Originall Act was in England and the subsequent matter upon the Sea the Tryall shall be where the Originall Act is done And so it was agreed in this Case that the Tryal should be Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Star-Chamber 293 MILLER against REIGNOLDS and BASSET SIr Henry Mountagu the Kings Serjeant did informe the Lords in the Star-Chamber How that the Defendants had conspired and practised Malitiosè to draw the Plaintiffs life in question being a man of One thousand Pounds per annum and otherwise very rich The Case was shortly thus Basset the Defendant was Tenant unto the Plaintiffe of a house in R. in Kent rendring a Rent the rent was behind and the Plaintiff demanded his Rent of him the Defendant told him That he was not able to satisfie him the Rent but he promised to give unto the Plaintiffe all his Goods in satisfaction of the Rent or so many of them as should countervaile the Rent and it was agreed betwixt the Plaintiff and the Defendant Basset that the Goods should be apprised by two men which was done accordingly and the Plaintiff came to the Defendants house at the time the said Goods were apprised but it was deposed and proved did not go out of the room where the apprisement was made at the time he was in the said house which was the 10 of May 7. Jacobi ar Afterwards the Defendants Reignolds being an Atturny at Law and Basset did conspire to accuse the Plaintiffe because that when he came to the Defendant Bassets house at the time of the apprising of the said Goods that the Plaintiffe went up into an upper Chamber in the said house and broke up a Chest and out of the same took a Gold Ring 10. s. in Money and the Defendant Bassets Lease of his house and thereupon brought the Plaintiff before divers Justices of the Peace who upon Examination of the matter found no ground of suspicion against the Plaintiff and therefore they did not bind him over to the Sessions to answer the same Accusation After this the Defendants made severall motions to the Plaintiff that he would give unto them 300l. and so he should be acquitted and there should be no proceeding against him and because the Plaintiffe refused so to do they told him that divers Courtiers had begged his Estate of the King and that the same was granted unto them when as in truth there was not any thing moved to any Courtier of any such matter but all this was said in a shew only to the end they might get great sums ef mony from him And in that matter they layed the scandall upon S. Rob. Car then Viscount Rochester that he was made privy to it who then was the Kings Maj. great Favorite And when all this could not prevail to gain any Composition from the Plaintiff the Defendants did prefer a Bill of Indictment at the Assizes in Kent against the Plaintiff and there upon Evidence given unto the Grand Jury they found an Ignoramus upon the Bill and divers other plots and divises were contrived by the Defendants all to the end the Plaintiff might lose his life his estate And this matter came to Sentence before the Lords and the Bill proved in every point and circumstance as well by the confession of the Defendants themselves as by divers writings depositions of witnesses and letters read and shewed in open Court and it was said by the whole Court of Lords in this case that this was a very great offence and an offence in Capite and that if such
And per Curiam a Prohibition shal be awarded And Cook chief Justice said That there were three Causes in the Bill for which a Prohibition should be granted which he reduced to three Questions 1. If a Copy-holder payeth his rent and the Lord maketh a Feoffment of the Manor Whether the Copy-holder shall be compelled to attorn 2. If a man be seised of Freehold Land and Covenants to stand seised to an use Whether in such case an Attornment be needfull 3. If a Feoffment be made of a Manor by Deed Whether the Feoffee shall compell the Tenants to attorn in a Court of Equity And for all these Questions It was said That the Tenants shall not be compelled to attorn for upon a Bargain and Sale and a Covenant to stand seised there needs no attronement And Cook in this case said That in 21. E. 4. the Justices said That all Causes may be so contrived that there needed to be no Suit in Courts of Equity and it appears by our books That a Prohibition lies to a Court of Equity when the matter hath been once determined by Law And 13. E. 3. Tit. Prohibition and the Book called the Diversity of Courts which was written in the time of King Henry the eighth was vouched to that purpose And the Case was That a man did recover in a Quare Impediâ— by default and the Patron sued in a Court of Equity viz. in the Chancery and a Prohibition was awarded to the Court of Chancery Mich. 11 Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 298 Sir JOHN GAGE and SMITH's Case AN Action of Waste was brought and the Plaintiffe did declare that contrary to the Statute the Lessee had committed Waste and Destruction in uncovering of a Barn by which the timber thereof was become rotten and decayed and in the destroying of the stocks of Elmes Ashes Whitethorn and Blackthorn to his damage of three hundred pound And for title shewed That his Father was seised of the Land where c. in Fee and leased the same to the Defendant for one and twenty years and died and that the Land descended to him as his son and heir and shewed that the Waste was done in his time and that the Lease is now expired The Defendant pleaded the generall issue and it was found for the Plaintiffe and damages were assessed by the Jury to fifty pound And in this case it was agreed by the whole Court 1. That if six of the Jury are examined upon a Voyer dire if they have seen the place wasted that it is sufficient and the rest of the Jury need not be examined upon a Voyer dire but onely to the principall 2. It was agreed if the Jury be sworn that they know the place it is sufficient although they be not sworn that they saw it and although that the place wasted be shewed to the Jury by the Plaintiff's servants yet if it be by the commandment of the Sheriffe it is as sufficient as if the same had been shewed unto them by the Sheriff himselfe 4. It was resolved That the eradicating of Whitethorn is waste but not of the Blackthorn according to the Books in 46. E. 3. and 9. H. 6. but if the blackthorn grow in a hedg and the whole hedg be destroyed the same is Waste by Cook chief Justice It was holden also so that it is not Wast to cut Quick-set hedges but it shall be accounted rather good husbandry because they will grow the better 5. It was agreed That if a man hath under-woods of Hasell Willowes Thornes if he useth to cut them and sell them every ten years If the Lessee fell them the same is no wast but if he dig them up by the roots or suffereth the Germinds to be bitten with cattel after they are felled so as they will not grow again the same is a destruction of the Inheritance and an Action of wast will lie for it But if he mow the Stocks with a wood-sythe as he did in the principall Case the same is a malicious Wast and continuall mowing and biting is destruction 6. It was said That in an Action of Wast a man shall not have costs of Suit because the Law doth give the party treble damages And when the generall issue Nul Wast is pleaded and the Plaintiff counted to his damages 100l. the Court doubted whether they could mitigate the damage But 7. It was agreed That in the principal Case although the issue were found for the Plaintiff that he could not have judgment because he declared of Wast done in 8. several closes to his damage of 300l. generally and did not sever the damages And the Jury found That in some of the said Closes there was no Wast committed Wherefore the Court said he could not have judgement through his own default But afterwards at another day Hobart then chief Justice and Warburton Justice said That the verdict was sufficient and good enough and so was also the declaration and that the Plaintiffe might have judgment thereupon But yet the same was adjourned by the Court untill the next Term. Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 299 CLARK's Case NOte It was said by Cook chief Justice and agreed by the whole Court and 41. and 43. E. 3. c That if a man deliver money unto I. S. to my use That I may have an Action of Debt or account against him for the same at my election And it was agreed also That an Action of Trover lieth for money although it be not in bags but not an Action of Detinue Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 300 IRELAND and BARKER's Case IN an Action of Wast brought the Writ was That the Abbot and Covent had made a Lease for years c. And it was holden by the Court that it was good although it had been better if the Writ had been That the Abbot with the assent of the Covent made the Lease for that is the usuall form but in substance the Writ is good because the Covent being dead Sons in Law by no intendment can be said to make a Lease But the Dean and Chapter ought of necessity to joyne in making of a Lease because they are all persons able and if the Dean make a Lease without the Chapter the same is not good per curiam if it be of the Chapter Lands And in Adams and Wâ—oâ—â—stey's Case Harris Serjeant observed That the Lease is said to be made by the Abbot and Covent and it is not pleaded to be made by the Abbot with the assent of the Covent Mich. 11 Iacobi In the Common Pleas. 301 The Dean and Canons of Winsor and WEBB's Case IN this Case it was holden by the Court That if a man give Lands unto Dean and Canons and to their Successors and they be dissolved or unto any other Corporations that the Donor shall have back the Lands again for the same is a condition in Law annexed to the Gift and in such Case no Writ of
there are divers Covenants in the Negative and to those he ought in pleading to shew in certain that he hath not broken them The Court said nothing at all to the case but yet Cook chief Justice seemed to be cleer or opinion That the Bond was void and so he said he conceived it had been adjudged before in this Court in the same Sir Daniel Nortons case against Chamberlain 〈◊〉 9. Jacob◠〈◊〉 And it was adjourned Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 304 AN Action upon the Case was brought by an Attorney of the Court against another Man for speaking these words of him viz. Thou art an Ambodexter and the words were adjudged actionable because the same slandred him in his Profession for it is as much in effect as if he had said that he was corrupt in his Office Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 305 IT was Ruled by the whole Court that a Fieri facias or Capias ad satisfaciendum or other Judicial Process did not run into Wales But it was agreed that a Capias utlagatum did run into Wales And Brownloe one of the Pronothories said that an Extent hath gon into Wales Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 306 HUGHE's Case A Man who dwelt in Somersetshire made his Will and by his said Will did bequeath to each of his children being Enfants a Legacy of 20. pound a piece the Procurators of the Enfants did Libel in the Court of Arches against the Executors of the Testator for the said Legacies being out of the Diocess and a Prohibition was awarded and in this Case it was said by Justice Warburton to have been agreed by all the Justices that the exception in the Statute of 23. H. 8 cap. 9. doth extend onely to probate of Wills It was also holden in this case That an Averrment might be that the parties were sued out of there proper Deocess if the same doth not appeare in the Libel as it may be in like case where one sueth in the Court of Admiralty for a thing done upon the land and Averrment may be that the contract was made infra Corpus Comitatus And in this case it was also agreed by the Court that if an Infant bringeth an action against his Gardian for mony and recovereth and he bringeth the mony into Court and there deposite it that the same is a good discharge against the Enfant and he shall not answer the Suit again in an account Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 307 Sir THOMAS SEYMORE's Case MOuntague Serjeant shewed to the Court that the Wife of Sir Thomas Seymore did Libel against her Husband in the Spiritual Court for that he did threaten her and beat her and in the end of the Libel she prayed allowance of Allimony and a Prohibition was prayed by him because the Suit in that Court was for a force which was not triable in that Court and to that purpose he remembred the case of 11 H. 4. 88. Where a Clark sued in the Spiritual Court for a battery and laying of violent hands upon him and because in such case an action of Trespas of assault and battery did lye at the Common Law a Prohibition was awarded Vide. 22. E. 4. 29. pl. 9. the Abbot of St. Albans case and 12. H. 7. 23. Cook Chief Justice agreed all those Cases And said that if a Clark sueth in the Spiritual Court for damages a Prohibition shall be awarded and no damages are given in the Spiritual Court if not for repairing of the Church as appeareth by the Statute of Articuli Cleri Quaere Vide. 20. E. 4. 10. professione Fidei c. And Linwood saith that if a Clark walketh in his doublet and hose non habet habitam Clericalem but goeth in colours if another man doth beat him he shall not sue for the same in the Spiritual Court But in the principal Case it was agreed by the whole Court that no prohibition should be awarded because the Wife cannot have remedy against the Husband at the Common Law for the beating of her because she is sub virga viri and also because the Suit there is but by way of inducement to have a Divorce causâ metus And Warburton said that she should recover there expensas litis against her Husband Cook held that the Husband could not give correction to his Wife But Nicols and Warburton Justices held the contrary and that the Wife may have a Writ de securitate Pacis against the Husband as appeareth by F. N. B. 80. f. quod benè honestè tractabit gubernabit nec malum aliquod ei aliter quà m ad virum suum causa regiminis castigationis vxoris suae licitè rationabiliter pertinet non faciet c. And F. N. B. 238. s acc Cook vouched 31. E. 3. Fitz. Tit. Attachment for Prohibition 8. where the Wife Libelled against her Husband in the Spiritual Court for beating and imprisoning of her and no Prohibition was granted and the Suit in the Spiritual Court was there as an Inducement to have a Divorce Mich 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 308 PAYNE's Case IT was moved by Hutton Serjeant for a Prohibition to the Court of Requests The Case was this A man in consideration That Alice S. would obtain the good will of his Master that hee the Defendant might have a shop in his Masters house did promise her that when she was married that he would give unto her ten pound And the Plaintiff shewed That she did get the good will of her Master and that the Defendant had a shop in his Masters house and that she the said Alice was afterwards married to the Plaintiff Payn. And the opinion of the whole Court was That a good Action upon the Case would lie upon such promise And a Prohibition was awarded unto the Court of Requests a Suit being there brought for the same matter which matter being a thing meerly triable at Law and not in a Court of Equity that Court had no Jurisdiction of it Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 309 MOuntague Serjeant demanded the opinion of the Justices in a Case upon the Statute of 3. Jacobi of Recusants in the behalfe of the University of Oxford viz. That if a Recusant convict do avoid the said Statute doth grant his Patronage for years to one of his friends in trust Whether the same were void or not within the said Statute The Justices did deny to deliver any opinion in the case for they said perhaps it might be that that point and case might come judicially before them and such they said was the answer of Hussey in 1. H. 7. in Humfrey Staffords case which was King Henry the seventh came in Bance and demanded a queston of the Justices But yet the Court tacitè seemed to agree That such a Lease of the Patronage was void by the said Statute of 3. Jacobi And they said That they would not have the University discouraged in
Tenures of such men viz. A. B. C. 3. All his lands which he had by Purchase c. And the words All my Lands are to be intended all those my Lands which are within the restrictions And he said that the word Et being in the copulative was not material for all was but one sentence and it did not make several sentences and the word Et is but the conclusion of the sentence 3. They resolved That general words in a Grant may be overthrown by words restrictive as is 2 E. 4. and Plow Com. Hill Granges Case And therefore if a man giveth all his lands in D. which he hath by Discent from his Father if he have no lands by Discent from his Father nothing passeth 4. They agreed That a Restriction may be in a special Grant as in C. 4. par Ognels Case but they said that if the Restriction doth not concur and meet with the Grant that then the Restriction is void Note the principal Case was adjudged according to these Resolutions Mich. 11. Iacobi in the Common-Pleas 293. COOPER and ANDREWS Case TO have a Prohibition to the Spiritual Court suggestion was made That the Lord De la Ware was seised of 140 Acres of lands in the County of Sussex which were parcel of a Park And a Modus Decimandi by Prescription was said to be That the Tenants of the said 140 Acres for the time being had used to pay for the tythes of the said 140 Acres two shillings in mony and a shoulder of every third Deer which was killed in the same Park in consideration of all tythes of the said Park And it was shewed how that the Lord De la Ware had enfeoffed one Cumber of the said 140 acres of land who bargained and sold the said 140 acres of land to the Plaintiffe who prayed the Prohibition The Defendant said that the said Park is disparked and that the same is now converted into arable lands and pasture-grounds and so demanded tythes in kind upon which the Plaintiffe in the Prohibition did demur Hutton Serjeant By the disparking of the Park the Prescription is not gone nor extinct because the Prescription is said to be to 140 acres of lands and not to the Park and although the shoulder of the Deer being but casual and at the pleasure of the party be gone yet the same shall not make void the Prescription 2. He said that the act of the party shall not destroy the Prescription and although it be not a Park now in form and reputation yet in Law the same still remains a Park And he compared the Case unto Lutterels Case C. 4. par 48. where a Prescription was to Fulling-Mils and afterwards the Mils were converted to Corn-Mils yet the Prescription remained 3. He said Admit it is not now a Park yet there is a possibility that it may be a Park again and that Deer may be killed there again For the Disparking in the principal Case is only alleadged to be that the Pale is thrown down which may be amended For although that all the Park-pale or parcel of it be cast down yet the same doth still remain in Law a Park and a Park is but a Liberty and the not using of a Liberty doth not determine it nor any Prescription which goes with it And if a man have Estovers in a Wood by Prescription if the Lord felleth down all the Wood yet the right of Estovers doth remain and the Owner shall have an Assise for the Estovers or an Action upon the Case Vid. C. 5. par 78. in Grayes Case the Case vouched by Popham Further he said That in the beginning a Modus Decimandi did commence by Temporal act and Spiritual and the mony is now the tythe for which the Parson may sue in the Spiritual Court And a Case Mich. 5. Jacobi was vouched where a Prescription to pay a Buck or a Doe in consideration of all Tythes was adjudged to be a good Prescription And the Case Mich. 6. Jacobi of Skipton-Park was remembred where the difference was taken when the Prescription runs to Land and when to a Park In the one case although the Park be disparked the Prescription doth remain in the other not And 6 E. 6. Dyer 71. was vouched That although the Park be disparked yet the Fee doth remain And so in the Case at Bar although the casual profit be gone yet the certain profit which is the two shillings doth remain Harris Serjeant contrary And he said that the Conveyance was executory and the Agreement executory and not like unto a Conveyance or Agreement executed And said that Tythes are due jure divino and that the party should not take advantage of his own wrong but that now the Parson should have the tythes in kind And upon the difference of Executory and Executed he vouched many Authorities viz. 16 Eliz. Dyer 335. Calthrops Case 15 E. 4. 3. 5 E. 4. 7. 32 E. 3. Anuitie 245. And in this case he said that the Parson hath no remedy for the shoulder of the Deer and therefore he prayed a Consultation Hobart Chief Justice said That the Pleading was too short and it was not sufficiently pleaded For it is not pleaded That the Park is so disparked that all the benefit thereof is lost But he agreed it That if a man doth pull down his Park-pale that the same is a disparking without any seisure of the Liberty into the Kings hands by a Quo Warranto But yet all the Court agreed That it doth yet remain a Park in habit And they were all also of opinion That the disparking the Park of the Deer was not any disparking of the Park as to take away the Prescription The Case was adjourned till another day Mich. 11. Iacobi in the Common-Pleas 330. PIGGOT and PIGGOT's Case IN a Writ of Right the Donee in tail did joyn the Mise upon the meer Right and final Judgment was given against the Donee in which case the Gift in tail was given in Evidence Afterwards the Donee in tail brought a Formedon in the Discender and it was adjudged by the whole Court that the Writ would not lie For when final Judgment is given against the Donee in tail upon issue joyned upon the meer Right it is as strong against him as a Fine with Proclamations and the Court did agree That after a year and day where final Judgment is given the party is barred and also that such final Judgment should bar the Issue in tail Mich. 11 Iacobi in the Exchequer-Chamber 331 AN action upon the Case was brought for speaking these words Thou doest lead a life in manner of a Rogue I doubt not but to see thee hanged for striking Mr. Sydenhams man who was murdered And it was resolved by all the Justices in the Exchequer-Chamber That the words were not actionable At the same day in the same Court a Judgment was reversed in the Exchequer-Chamber because the words were not actionable The words
should be made of words as to make them actionable and words shall be taken in mitiori sensu if there be no particular description and declaration that the words were spoken maliciously And therefore general words which of themselves are actionable by construction shall be taken to bear no action as C. 4. par Stanhops case And so if a man saith of another that he hath the Pox they shall be taken in mitiori sensu because they are not described by any subsequent words which declares malice in the party And Nichols vouched a Case which was in this Court this Term where an action was brought for these words Thou usest me now as thy Wife did when she stole my Cushions that the words were not actionable Warburton Justice When words are spoken which scandal a man in his trade or profession they are actionable as if one say of an Attorney Thou cosenest Mr. Winsor of his Fees and so if words are spoken maliciously And therefore an action was brought by one who was a Jury-man for these words viz. Thou hast deceived me any my children of eight hundred pounds they were adjudged actionable And so Hill 6. Jacobi rot 1159. Thou art a Jury-man and hast been the death of a hundred men by thy false means Being maliciously spoken although in themselves they are not actionable yet they will bear an action But it was adjudged in the principal Case for the reasons given by the two other Justices that the words would bear no action to which Warburton Justice in the end did seem to agree Hill 11. Iacobi in the common-Common-Pleas 337. AYLIFFE and BROWNS Case A Woman who was possessed of a Term for divers years had issue two Daughters the one married to Ayliffe and the other to Brown Ayliffe had issue four Daughters and Brown had also issue and the Woman did demise Legacies to the children of Ayliffe out of the Rent reserved upon the Lease and made Brown her Executor and dyed Ayliffe required Brown in the behalf of his children to pay the money to him that he might imploy the same for the benefit of the children which he refused to do and thereupon he sued him in the Spiritual Court and there Sentence was given for the Plaintiffe Brown the Executor moved for a Prohibition and alleadged for ground of it that he was Executor and chargeable in an accompt for the money But because he came after sentence and also after he had appealed to the Court of Delegates and after a sentence given there also against him the Court refused to grant a Prohibition in the Cause and also because he did refuse to give security for the payment of the Legacies to the children Hill 11. Iacobi in the Common-Pleas 338. WORMLEIGHTON and HUNTERS Case TWo men are bounden with J. S. as Sureties in an Obligation One of the Sureties viz. Wormleighton was sued upon the Bond and the whole penalty recovered against him He exhibited an English Bill into the Court of Requests against the Defendant being the other Surety to have contribution and it was moved to the Court for a Prohibition to the Court of Request and the same was granted because by entring into the Obligation it became the debt of each of them jointly and severally and the Obligee had his election to sue which of them he pleased and take forth Execution against him and the Court said That if one Surety should have contribution against the other it would be a great cause of suits and therefore the Prohibition was awarded and so it was said it was lately adjudged and granted in the like case in Sir William Whâ—rwoods case Hill 11. Iacobi in the Common-Pleas 339. LAMBERTS Case TWo men were Partners in goods the one of the Partners sold unto J. S. at several times goods to the value of 100 l. and for the goods at one time bought he paid the money according to the time afterwards an action was brought by one of the Partners for the rest of the money and the Plaintiff declared upon one contract for the whole goods whereas in truth they were sold upon several contracts made and the Defendant in that case would have waged his Law But the Court advised the Plaintiff to be Non-suit and to bring a new action because that action was not well brought for it ought to have been a several action upon the several contract And in this case it was agreed by the Court that the sale of one Partner is the sale of them both and therefore although that one of them selleth the goods or merchandizeth with them yet the action must be brought in both their names and in such case the Defendant shall not be received to wage his Law that the other Partner did not sell the goods unto him as is supposed in the Declaration Hill 11. Jacobi in the Common-Pleas 340. WHITE and MOORS Case A Man did recover in an action of Debt brought in the Common-Pleas and had Judgment and afterwards before Execution was taken forth the Defendant in the Debt exhibited an English Bill into the Court of Requests to overthrow the Judgment and to stay Execution pretending in his Bill that there was a parol agreement betwixt him and the other that he should not be charged with that Judgment nor the payment of the money It was moved for a Prohibition in this case which was granted by the Court because the Plaintiffe there by practice did endeavour to subvert a Judgment given at the Common-Law And in speaking of this Case the Court did very much condemn the course used in the Court of Requests in taking Bonds of the parties to perform their Decrees made there for it was said that such Bonds were against Law and so it had been oftentimes adjudged Hill 11 Jacobi in the Common-Pleas 341. BALDWYN and GIRRIES Case A Parson did Libel in the Spiritual Court for Tythes and the substraction of them and grounded his Libel upon the Statute of 2 E. 6. The Defendant alleaged that he was to be discharged from the payment of tythes by reason of priviledge within the Statute of 31 H. 8. of Dissolutions and the Plaintiffe here had a Prohibition And afterwards they were at issue here Whether he ought to be discharged hy Priviledge or not and after issue joyned the Plaintiffe in the Prohibition was Non-suit And thereupon the Parson had a Consultation and proceeded in the Spiritual Court and there obtained a sentence and the sentence there was That he should recover the single damages and the same was set in certain and ulterius that recuperet duplicem valorem which was also by the said sentence set in certain And it was resolved in that Case by the whole Court That a Prohibition should be granted grounded upon the sentence because the Spiritual Court in their sentence did exceed the damages which was to be given by the Statute in that Court and it was said That although the sentence there given be not
in the Kings Bench is Judicium affirmetur stet in pleno robore effectu And it is not as the Judgment is in 20 E. 4 44. Judicium stet in aeternum And so that not being the fundamental Judgment the Reversal thereof is but the beginning of another suit 38 H. 6. 3. And admit that the VVrit of Error be a Supersedeas for the second Judgment yet it is a Question whether it shall be for the first which is not touched by the VVrit And whether they may grant Execution upon it or not Vide 13 E. 4. 4 43 E. 3. 3. 8 H. 7. 20. And therefore the Court advised Sir Christopher Heydon to sue unto the Kings Majesty by Petition to have a new Writ of Error for without Petition he cannot have the Writ 32 E. 3 1. 8 E 2. Error 88. And the Justices gave him warning to do it in time convenient otherwise they would award Execution if they did perceive the same to be meerly for delay according to the Cases in 6 H 7. 8 â— 7. And afterwards the Parliament being upon a sudden dissolved without any thing done therein Execution was awarded Pasch 12 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 346. BLITHMAN and MARTIN's Case IOhn Blithman brought an Action upon the Case against Martin upon an Assumpsit and recovered And it was moved That because the Consideration which was the Cause of the Action was against Law that the Judgment might be stayed For the Plaintiffe did alleadge the same to be in consideration That if the Plaintiff being Goaler of such a Prison in Devâ—nshire would deliver one who was in Execution for Debt he promised to give him Twenty pounds And he alleadged in facto that he did deliver him the Debt not being satisfied And because the Consideration was to do a thing which was against the Law the opinion of the Court was that it was void and that the Plaintiffe should not have Judgment Pasch 12 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 347. SHERLOE's Case SHerloe brought an Action of Assault and Battery and declared Quod eum the Defendant verberavit And did not shew certain nor alleadge precisely in his Declaration That the Defendant did beat him Exception was taken unto it For there is a difference betwixt a Declaration in an Ejectione Firme Debt and this Action for in those Actions such Declaration is good but not in this Action And to prove the same one Sheriffe and Bridges Case in 39 Eliz. was cited where such Declaration was adjudged void But yet the opinion of the Justices was That the Declaration was good enough notwithstanding the said Judgment in 39 Eliz. Pasch 12 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 348. GRUBE's Case IT was moved in Arrest of Judgment upon issue joyned inter Mathiam Grub and in the Venire facias he was called Matheum Grub. And Cook Chief Justice said That the Venire facias was vitious but because that the Jury did appear upon the Habeas Corpora the Trial was well enough Pasch 12 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 349. CROOK and AVERIN's Case CRook Merchant brought an Action upon the Case against Averine for speaking these words viz. Mr. Crook came into Cornwal with a blue Coat but now he hath gotten much wealth by trading with Pirats and by cosening by tale of Pilchers and by Extortion And Cook Chief Justice said That the Law giveth no favour to those verbal Actions and we see there is not any such Action brought in our old Law-books And therefore he said Words ought to be certain And he examined the words in this Case by themselves and said That the first words are not actionable because they are not material And the other words by trading with Pyrats are too general for an honest man might trade with a Pyrate not knowing him to be a Pyrate and so no damage might come to him But as to the other words he gave no opinion Pasch 12 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 350. CLAYDON Sir JEROM HORSEY's Case CLaydon brought an Action upon the Case against Sir Jerom Horsey for erecting of a house in a certain place called Risborough Common and alleadged in certain That every one who had Common in Risborough pred c. and did not alleadge That the Common is in the Mannor of Risborough But he declared That there is such a Custome within the Mannor of Risborough And the opinion of the Court was That the Declaration was good because there is but one Risborough alleadged and therefore of necessity it must be meant de Manerio Pasch 12 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 351. The CLOTHWORKERS of IPSWICH Case THe Masters and Wardens of the Clothworkers of Ipswich in the County of Suffolk brought an Action of Debt for 3l. 13s. 4d. against D. and declared That the King who now is had incorporated them by the same name c. And had granted unto them by Charter Quod nullus exerceat artem sive occupationem in aliqua shoppa domo sive camera infra villam predict of a Clothworker or Tailor nisi ante eos vel duos eorum probationem faceret quod Apprentic fuit per spacium 7 annorum per eos sive duos eorum sit approbat sub paena 3l. 13s. 4d. pro qualibet septimana qua exerceat predict artem contra hanc constitutionem And layed in facto That the Defendant had used the Trade of a Tailor for the space c. against c. The Defendant pleaded That he was retained in service with one Mr. Pennel Gen of Ipswich and had been an Apprentice for the space of seven years in tali loco c. And that he made garments for his said Master and his wife and their children infra c. quae quidem exercitio est eadem exercitio artis which is supposed by the Plaintiffs in their Declaration Upon which the Plaintiffs did demur in Law Goldsmith for the Plaintiffs That the Plea in Bar is void For every Plea in Bar ought to confesse and avoid traverse or deny that which is alleadged in the Plaintiffs Declaration But this Plea in Bar had not done any of them and therefore was void For the exercising of the Trade which he hath confessed in his Bar cannot be intended the same matter with which the Plaintiffs have charged him in their Declaration and therefore it is no good bar at all And to prove the same vide 14 H. 6. 2. 35 H. 6. 53. 12 H. 7. 24. 27 H. 8. 2. Sir Robert Hitcham for the Defendant And he held that the matter is well confessed and avoided because that usage which he hath confessed in the Bar is colourable the same usage with which the Plaintiffs have charged him in their Declaration As in a Writ of Maintenance the Defendant saith That he was of Councel with the party being a Serjeant at Law c. which is the same Maintenance which is supposed by the Plaintiffe vide 28 H. 6. 7. 12. 19 H.
6. 30. 18 E. 4. 2. 36 H. 6. 7. Also he said When a Declaration is general the Defendant need not traverse 1 E. 4. 9. 2 E. 4. 28. And further he said That the Statute of 27 Eliz. cap. 5. of Demurs helped that defect for that it is but only in matter of form But the Justices did not argue that point But the Question which they made was Whether the Constitution or Ordinance were lawful or not And as to that it was holden by the whole Court That the said Ordinance was unlawful And it was agreed by the Court That the King might make Corporations and grant to them that they may make Ordinances for the ordering and government of any Trade but thereby they cannot make a Monopoly for that is to take away Free-trade which is the birthright of every Subject And therefore the Case was in 2 H. 5. 5. in Debt upon a Bond upon Condition That one should not use his Trade of a Dyer in the Town where the Plaintiffe did inhabit for one year And there said That the Obligation was void because the Condition was against the Law And he swore by God if the Plaintiffe were present that he should go to prison till he had paid a Fine to the King Yet regularly Modus Conventio vincunt legem 2. It was resolved That although such Clause was contained in the Kings Letters Patents yet it was void But where it is either by Prescription or by Custome confirmed by Parliament there such an Ordinance may be good Quia Consuetudo Legalis plus valet quam Concessio Regalis The King granted unto the Abbot of Whitny the Custody of a Port which is as it were a Key of the Kingdom and therefore the Grant was void and so adjudged And such Grants are expresly against the Statute of 9 E 3. cap. 1. And the Charter granted by King Henry the 8. to the Physitians of London hath the same Clause in it But if it had not been confirmed by Act of Parliament made 33 H. 8. it had been void The King granted unto B. that none besides himself should make Ordnances for Battery in the time of war Such Grant was adjudged void But if a man hath brought in a new Invention and a new Trade within the Kingdom in peril of his life and consumption of his estate or stock c. or if a man hath made a new Discovery of any thing In such Cases the King of his grace and favour in recompence of his costs and travail may grant by Charter unto him That he only shall use such a Trade or Trafique for a certain time because at first the people of the Kingdom are ignorant and have not the knowledge or skill to use it But when that Patent is expired the King cannot make a new Grant thereof For when the Trade is become common and others have been bound Apprentices in the same Trade there is no reason that such should be forbidden to use it And Cook Chief Justice put this Case The King granted to B. That he solely should make and carry Kersies out of the Realm and the Grant was adjudged void which Crook concessit 3. It was resolved That this Charter was void because of the words viz. Nisi ante eos vel duos eorum probationem fecerit c. And therefore it was considered what proof should be sufficient for the party And as to that it was agreed That the proof cannot be upon Oath for such a Corporation cannot admidister an Oath unto the party And then the proof must be by his Indentures and Witnesses and perhaps the Corporation will not allow of any of them For which the party hath no remedy against the said Corporation but by his Action at the Common Law and in the mean time he should be barred of his Trade which is all his living and maintenance and to which he had been Apprentice for seven years Another reason was given because that by this way they should be Judges in their own cause which is against the Law And the King cannot grant unto another to do a thing which is against the Law And afterwards Trin. 12 Jacobi Judgment was entred Quod Querentes nihil capiant per Billam And Judgment was then given for the Defendant Pasch 12 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 352. LINSEY and ASHTON's Case LInsey brought an Action of Debt against Ashton upon a Bond the Condition of which was to perform an Award The Defendant said that the Award was That the Defendant should surcease all suits depending betwixt them which he had done The Plaintiffe in his Replication said That the Arbitrators made such Award ut supra and also that the Defendant should pay unto the Plaintiffe 25l. at the house of J. S. absque hoc that they made the other Award only Upon which the Defendant did rejoyn and said That well and true it is that they made those Awards c. But they further awarded that the Plaintiffe should release unto the Defendant which he had not done And upon the Rejoynder the Plaintiffe did demur in Law And the opinion of the Court was without question That the Plea was a departure 19 H. 6. 19. But it was argued by Finch That the Replication was insufficient For the Plaintiffe ought not to have traversed as this Case is because that a man ought not to traverse a thing alleadged by Implication but ought to traverse that which is alleadged de facto upon which there may be an issue joyned And to prove the Traverse void the Case in 11 H. 6. 50. was put But the Exception was not allowed by the Court Another Exception was taken because the Award it self was void because it was to do a thing upon the Land of another man which he might not lawfully do And although the Arbitrators might award him to do the thing which is inconvenient yet they cannot award him to do a thing which is impossible and against the Law as in 17 E. 4 5. Two were bound to stand to the Arbitrement of J. S. of all Trespasses who awarded that the one should pay unto the other 40. and that he find Sureties to be bounden for the payment of it And by the opinion of the Justices the Award was void because he could not award a man to do that which did not lie in his power and he hath no means to compel the stranger to be bound for him But the opinion of the whole Court was against Finch For first the mony is to be paid apud domum J. S. and not in domo And it might be for any thing that appeareth that the said House is adjoyning to the High-way so as every Stranger might lawfully come unto it although he might not come into it without being a Trespassor But admit it be not adjoyning to the High-way yet he might come as neer unto the house as he could or he might get leave to come thither Secondly It was
resolved That although the Award was void as to that part yet for the residue it stood good and therefore for not performance of the same the Bond is forfeited As if J. be bounden to perform the Award of J. S. for White-Acre and that he award that I enfeoffe another of White-Acre and that he give unto me Ten pounds If I tender unto him a Feoffment of White-Acre and he refuseth it and will not give to me the 10l. I shall have an Action of Debt upon the Bond as it is adjudged in Osborn's Case C. 10. par 131. The same Law If J. S. and J. N. submit themselves unto the Award of J. D. who awardeth that J. S. shall surcease all suits and procure J. N. to be bounden with a stranger and make a Feoffment of his Mannor of D. which is a thing out of the Submission In that case there are three things enforcing the Arbitrement the first is only good the second is against the Law and the other is out of the Submission yet being in part good it ought to be performed in that otherwise the Bond is forfeited But this Case was put If J. be bounden to stand to the Award of A. ita quod it be made de super premissis and afterwards A. maketh an Award but of part of the premises there it is void in all because it is not according to the authority given unto him And afterwards in the principal Case Judgment was given for the Plaintiffe Pasch 12 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 353. DOCKWARY and BEAL's Case IN an Essex Jury The opinion of the Court was That Wood will passe by the name of Land if there be no other Land whereby the words may be otherwise supplied Also it was agreed That the Tenant for Years might fell Underwoods of 25 years growth if the same hath used to be felled Pasch 12 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 354. WROTESIEY and CANDISH's Case ELizabeth Wrotesley did recover Dower 6 Jacobi in the Common-Pleas in which Writ she demanded tertiam partem Manerii de D. eum pertinaciis Nec non tertiam partem quarundam terrarum jacent in Hovelan And upon Ne unque seise que Dower the parties were at issue and the Venire facias awarded de Hovelan And it was found for the Plaintiffe and Judgment was given for her And Candish the Defendant brought a Writ of Error in the Kings Bench and assigned for Error That it was a Mis-trial For that the Venire facias ought to have been de Manerio and not of Hovelan 6 H. 7. 3. 11 H. 7. 20. C. 6 par â— 19 H. 6. 19. 19 E. 4. 17. Yet the Councel of the Defendant moved That the Trial was good for the Land in Hovelan And it being found that the Husband was seised of the Mannor of D. that now the Trial was good for the whole Pasch 12 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 355. COWLEY and LEGAT's Case COwley brought an Audita quaerela against Legat and the Case was this Cowley and Bates bound themselves in a Bond of 200l. jointly and severally to Legat And afterwards 6 Jacobi Legat brought an action of Debt upon the Bond against Bates and had Judgment and 7 Jacobi the said Legat brought Debt against Cowley in the Kings Bench upon the same Bond and obtained Judgment and afterwards he sued forth Execution upon the first Judgment by Elegit and had the Land of Bates who was Tenant thereof only for another mans life in Execution and afterwards he took forth a Capias ad satisfaciendum against Cowley upon the Judgment in the Kings Bench And thereupon Cowley brought an Audita quaerela containing in it all the whole matter And the opinion of all the Justices was That the Audita quaerela was well brought And first it was holden That when a man may plead the matter in bar he shall not have an Audita quaerela upon the matter because it was his lachess that he did not take advantage of it by way of plea. But secondly in this Case it was said That he could not have pleaded the special matter and therefore as to that point the Audita quaerela was well brought But the onely doubt in the Case was Whether Legat the Defendant might have a new Execution by Capias ad satisfaciendum after that he had Execution against one of the Obligers by Elegit and the doubt was because the Judgments upon which he grounded his Executions were given at several times and in several Courts and against several persons For it was agreed by the whole Court That a Capias doth not lie after Execution sued by Elegit against the same person but after a Capias an Elegit is grantable And the reason of the difference is because upon the prayer to have an Elegit it is entred in the Roll Elegit sibi executionem per medietatem terrae so as he is estopped by the Record to have another Execution but upon a Capias nothing at all is entred upon Record Yet Cook Chief Justice said That it is the common practice of a good Attorney to deferre the entry in the Roll of Execution upon an Elegit until the Sheriffe hath retorned it served And in such case it was agreed That if the Sheriffe retorn upon the Elegit That the party hath not Lands c. then the party may take forth a Capias Also the Elegit is in it self a satisfactory Execution and by the Common-Law a man shall have but one Execution with satisfaction And therefore at the Common-Law if after Execution the Land had been evicted the party had no remedy And Cook said If part of the Land be evicted the party shall not have remedy upon the Statute of 32 H. 8. cap. 5. to which Crook Justice agreed And the Court held it to be no difference although that the Judgments were given in several Courts against persons several and at several times and where it is but one Judgment against one person Vide the Case 43 E. 3. 27. where in Debt the Defendant said That the Plaintiffe had another Action for the same Debt depending in the Exchequer by Bill Judgment c. And by Mowbray and Finchden cleerly it is a good plea although it be in another Court And Dodderidge Justice said That in the first case the said Legat might sue the said Cowley and Bates severally and after Judgment he might choose his Execution against which of them he pleased But he could not have Execution by Elegit against them both And therefore he said That although there be an Eviction of the Land or that the Judgment be reversed by Error after that he hath Execution against one by Elegit yet Legat could not have Execution against the other for by the first Execution he had determined his Election and he could not sue the other which Cook agreed Mich. 12 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 356. FOX and MEDCALF's Case IN a Writ of Accompt brought in
the Court of York the Plaintiffe had Judgment that the Defendant should accompt And upon that Judgment the Defendant in the Court there brought a Writ of Error in the Kings Bench. And it was adjudged That no Writ of Error lay in that case because the Judgment to Accompt is but the Conveyance and the Plaintiffe hath not any benefit until he be satisfied by the Award of the Auditors for upon their Award the final Judgment shall be given Mich. 12 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 357. The Bishop of SALISBURY's Case IT was holden in this Case That if a Bishop Parson or other Ecclesiastical person do cut down Trees upon the Lands unless it be for Reparations of their Ecclesiastical houses and do or suffer to be done any delapidations That they may be punished for the same in the Ecclesiastical Court and a Prohibition will not lie in the Case and that the same is a good cause of deprivation of them of their Ecclesiastical Livings and Dignities But yet for such Wastes done they may be also punished by the Common Law if the party will sue there Vide 2 H. 4. 3. Trin. 13 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 358. PRAT and the Lord NORTH'S Case A Man was distreined by the Bailiffe of the Lord North for 20s. imposed upon him in the Court-Leet for the erecting and storing of a Dove-Cote And it was said That it cannot properly be called a Nusance but for the destroying of Corn which cannot be but at certain times of the year And therefore it was conceived That the party who was presented might traverse the Nusance to be with his Pidgeons and it was said that a man might keep Pidgeons within his new house all the year or put them out at such a time as they could not destroy the corn And Cook Chief Justice said That there is not any reason that the Lord should have a Dove-Cote more then the Tenant and he asked the Question where the Statute of E. 2. saith Inquiratur de Dove-Cotes erected without Licence Who should give the Licence Ad quod non fuit responsum In Mich. Term following the Case was argued by Damport who said That the erecting of a Dove-Cote by a Freeholder was no Nusance For a Writ of Right lieth of a Dove-Cote and in the Register it is preferred and named before Land Garden c. But he said that there was a fatal defect in the Plea which was That the Presentment at the Leet was That Prat had erected a Dove-Cote unlawfully and did not say ad commune nocumentum as it ought to be otherwise it is not presentable in the Leet And therefore although it was otherwise in the Plea That it was ad commune nocumentum the same did not help the defective Presentment Mich. 10 Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 359. GREENWAY and BARKER's Case BEtwixt Greenway and Barker It was moved for a Prohibition to the Court of Admiralty and the Cause was for taking of a Recognisance in which the Principal and his Sureties his heirs goods and lands were bounden And it was in the nature of an Execution at the Common-Law and thereupon they in the Admiral Court made out a Warrant to arrest the body of the Defendant there Dodderidge Serjeant said That it was not a Recognisance at the Common-Law but only a Stipulation in the nature of a Bail at the Common-Law and he said That it was the usual course to pledge goods there in Court to answer the party if sentence were given against him Nichols Serjeant They cannot take a Recognisance and by the Civil Law if the party render his body the Sureties are discharged and Execution ought to be only of the goods for the ship is only arrested and the Libel ought to be only against the ship and goods and not against the party 19 H. 6. acc ' And afterwards Dr. Steward and Dr. James were desired by the Court to deliver their opinions what the Civil Law was in this Case and Doctor Steward said He would not rest upon the Etymologie of the word for if it be a Recognisance Bail or Stipulation it is all one in the Civil Law and in such case he said by their Law Execution might be against the sureties And he argued 1. That ex necessitate it must be agreed that there is an Admiral Court 2. That that Court hath a Jurisdiction And by a Statute made in Henry the 8. time and by another in the time of Queen Elizabeth divers things as Appeals c. were triable by the Civil Law And he said That every Court hath his several form of proceedings and in every Court that form is to be followed which it hath antiently used And as to the proceedings he said That first they do arrest the goods 2. That afterwards the party ought to enter Caution which is not a Bond but only a Surety or Security which doth bind the parties And he said That the word Haeredes was necessary in the Instrument For for the most part the Sureties were strangers And he said That Court took no notice of the word Executors and therefore the word Haeredes is used which extends as well to Executors and Administrators as to Heirs And he said That upon a Judgment given in the Court of Admiraltie they may sue forth an Execution of it in forein parts as in France c. And he said That if Contracts be made according to other Laws the same must be tryed according to the Law of that Country the Contract is made Dr. James said That in the same Court there are two manners of proceedings 1 The Manner 2 the Customs of the Court are to be observed And he said that Stipulation ought to be in the Court by coertion which word is derived à stipite by which the party is tyed as he said as a Bear to the stake or as Vlisses to the Mast of the ship And he said In a Judicial stipulation four things are considerable 1 The Judicial Sistem 2. Reparratum habere 3. Judicatum solvere 4. De expensis solvendis as appeareth in Justinians Institutes cap de Satisdationibus For Satisdatio and Stipulatio are all one in the Civil Law And after Cook Chief Justice said That it ought to be confessed that there hath been a Court of Admiralty 2. That their proceedings there ought to be according to the Civil Law And he observed four things 1. The Necessity of the Court 2. The Antiquity of it 3. The Law by which they proceed and lastly the Place to which they are confined And as to the necessity of the Court he said That the Jurisdiction of that Court ought to be maintained by reason of Trade and Traffique betwixt Kingdom and Kingdom for Trade and Traffique is as it were the life of every Kingdom 2. A mans life is in danger by reason of traffique and Merchants venture all their estates and therefore it is but reasonable that they have a place for the trial of
Contracts made upon the Sea by them or their Factors And for the Antiquity of the Court v. t' E. 1. sitz t' Annuity 7 R. 2. t' trespas in Statham And so long as there hath been any Commerce and Traffique by this Kingdom so long there hath been a Court of Admiralty 3. He said The Court of Admiralty is no Court of Record in which a Writ of Error lieth 37 H. 6. acc ' 4. He considered the place And that he said was of things super altum mare only as appeareth by the Stat. of 13 R. 2. And he said That all the Ports and Havens within England are infra corpus Comitatus and vouched 23 H. 6. 30 H. 6. Hollands Case who was Earl of Exeter and Admiral of England who because he held plea in the Court of Admiralty of a thing done infra Portam de Hull damages were recovered against him of 2000l And he said That if the Court and Civil Law be allowed then he said the Customs of that Court ought to be allowed and he said That the Custome of the Civil Law is That in no case the Surety is chargeable when the Principal is sufficient And he agreed with the Doctors That the word Haeredes ought to be in the Stipulation because those beyond the Seas did not take any cognisance of the word Executors Also he said That they may take the body in Execution which are for the most part the Masters of the ships and Merchants who are transeuntes and therefore if they could not arrest their bodies they might perhaps many times lose the benefit of their suits But he said that in no case they might take forth Execution upon Lands And he said That if a Contract be made in Paris in France it shall be tryed either by the Common Law or by the Law of France and if it be tryed here then those of France shall write to the Justices of England and shall certifie the same unto them And he said That in Sir Robert Dudley's Case it was allowed for good Law where a Fine was levied and acknowledged in Orleance in France which was certified and allowed for good by the Common Law here in England But he said That the Civil Law could not determine of the Fine And to conclude he said That no Custome can be good which is against an Act of Parliament The principal Case was adjourned Mich. 13 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 360. The MAIOR of YORK'S Case IN an Action of False Imprisonment brought It was holden by the whole Court 1. That no man can claim to hold a Court of Equity viz of Chancery by Prescription because every Prescription is against Common Right and a Chancery-Court is founded upon Common Right and is by the Common Law 2. It was holden per Curiam That the King by his Charter cannot grant to another any of the Customs of London But the like Liberties Franchises and Customs as London holdeth or useth the King by his Letters Patents may grant Quaere because the Customs in London are confirmed by Act of Parliament Mich. 13 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 361. LAMBERT and SLINGBY'S Case A Man brought an Action of Debt as Administrator and took the Defendants body in Execution The Sheriffe suffered him to escape And afterwards a Will was found by which Will the said Administrator is nominated Executor The Question now was Whether he might maintain an Action against the Sheriffe for the Escape as Executor when he was but Administrator at the time and it was the opinion of the Court that the action of Debt against the Sheriff upon the Escape would lie and that the same Debt should be assets in the Executors hands And it was holden cleer That the Executor of an Executor might have Debt upon the Escape for that he is Executor to the first Testator and therefore à fortiori the Action in the principal Case would lie Mich. 13 Iacobi in the Common-Pleas 362. IT was holden by the Court That if a man present by Usurpation to my Advowson within six moneths I may have a Quare Impedit But after the six moneths past if the Church become void I cannot present but am put to my Writ of Right of Advowson And that if a man usurpeth upon the King he is put to his Quare Impedit within the six moneths And it was holden That a double Usurpation upon the King doth put him to his Writ of Right v. 22 24 E. 3 acâ— Pasch 13 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 363. OWEN alias COLLIN'S Case JOhn Owen alias Collins of Godstow in the County of Oxford was indicted and arraigned of High-Treason for speaking these traiterous English words at Sandwich in the County of Kent viz. If the King be excommunicate by the Pope it is lawfull for every man to kill him and it is no murder For as it is lawfull to put to death a man that is condemned by a Temporal Judge so it is lawfull to kill the King if he be excommunicate by the Pope For that is the execution of the Law and this of the Popes supreme sentence The Pope being the greater includes the King being the lesser To which words he pleaded Not guilty And the Evidence to the Jury was the Major of Sandwich a Parson of the same Town and the Servant of the Town-Clark And this was the sum of the Evidence That the said Owen coming from S. Lucar in Spain spake the said words to divers persons who told them to the Major whereupon the said Major had conference with Owen and then he spake the like words unto the Major and thereupon the Major tendred unto him the Oath of Allegiance which he refused to take and he put his hand to awriting containing the said words as his opinion and further said That if he had twenty hands he would put them all to it The Exception which Owen took unto the Evidence given against him was That he did not speak of the King of England But the same was said to be a simple Exception For before he spake the words to the Major the Major asked him if he were an Englishman or not To which he answered that he was and then after he spake the said words to the Major which must necessarily have reference to the speeches which were before betwixt him and the Major And Cook Chief Justice said That if he had not spoken of the King of England but of the King generally yet it had included the King of England The matter of his Indictment of Treason was not grounded upon the Statute of Supremacie but upon the Common-Law of which the Statute of 25 â— 3. is but an Explâ—nation which was his intent to compass the death of the King And he said That notwithstanding that the words as to this purpose were but conditional viz. If he were Excommunicate yet he said it was High-Treason For proof of which two Cases were cited The Duke of Buckingham in
the time of King Henry the 8. said That if the King should arrest him of High-Treason that he would stab him with his dagger and it was adjudged a present Treason So was it also adjudged in the Lord Stanley's Case in the time of King Henry the 7. who seeing a Young-man said That if he knew him to be one of the Sons of E. 4. that he would aid him against the King In the like manner a woman in the time of Hen. 8. said That if Henry the 8. would not take again his wife Queen Katherine that he should not live a year but should die like a dog So if discontented persons with Inclosures say That they will petition unto the King about them and if he will not redress the same that then they will assemble together in such a place and rebell In these Cases it is a present Treason and he said That in point of Allegiance none must serve the King with Ifs and Ands. Further Cook Chief Justice said That Faux the Gunpowder Traitor being brought before King James the King said to him Wherefore would you have killed me Faux answered him viz. Because you are excommunicated by the Pope How said the King He answered Every Maunday-Thursday the Pope doth excommunicate all Herâ—tiques who are not of the Faith of the Church of Rome and you are within the same Excommunication And afterwards Owen was found guilty and Judgment of Treason was given against him Mich. 13 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 364. SIMPSON'S Case RIchard Simpson a Copy-holder in Fee jacens in extremis made a Surrender of his Copyhold habendum to an Enfant in ventrefamier and his heirs and if such Enfant die before his full age or marriage then to John Simpson his brother and his heirs The Enfant is born and dieth within two moneths Upon which John was admitted and a Woman as Heir-general to the Devisor and to the Enfant is also admitted and entreth into the Land against whom John Simpson brought an Action of Trespasse and it was adjudged against the Plaintiffe And two points were resolved in this Case 1. That a Surrender cannot begin at a day to come no more then a Livery as it was adjudged 23 Eliz in this Court in Clarks Case 2. That the Remaindor to John Simpson cannot be good because it was to commence upon a Condition precedent which was never performed And therefore the Surrender into the hands of the Lord was void for the Lord doth not take but as an Instrument to convey the same to another And it was therefore said That if a Copy-holder in Fee doth surrender unto the use of himself and his heirs because that the Limitation of the use is void to him who had it before the Surrender to the Lord is void Trin. 13 Jacobi in the Chancery 365. The Lord GERARD'S Case IT was holden in the Chancery in the Lord Gerards Case against his Copyholds of Aâ—dley in the County of Stafford That where by antient Rolls of Court it appeareth that the Fines of the Copyholds had been uncertain from the time of King Hen. the 3 to the 19 of H. the 6. and from thence to this day had been certain Except twenty or thirty That these few antient Rolls did destroy the Custome for certainty of Fine But if from 19 H. 6. all are certain except a few and so incertain Rolls before the few shall be intended to have escaped and should not destroy the Custome for certain Fines Hill 13 Jacobi in the Common-Pleas 366. BAGNAL and HARVEY'S Case IN a Writ of Partition it was found for the Plaintiffe And a Writ was awarded to the Sheriffe that he should make the partition And the Sheriffe did thereupon allot part of the Lands in severalty and for other part of the Lands the Jurors would not assist him to make the partition All which appeared upon the Retorn of the Sheriffe And an Attachment was prayed against the Jurors who refused to make the Partition and a new Writ was prayed unto the Sheriffe And the Court doubted what to do in the Case whether to grant an Attachment or not and whether a new Writ to the Sheriffe might be awarded And took time to advise upon it and to see Presidents in the Case Hill 13 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 367. BLANFORD'S Case A Man seised of Lands in Fee devised them unto his Wife for life and afterwards to his two Sons if they had not issue males for their lives and if they had issue males then to their issue males and if they had not issue males then if any of them had issue male to the said issue male The wife died the sons entred into the lands and then the eldest son had issue male who afterwards entred and the younger son entred upon the issue and did trespasse and the issue brought an Action of Trespasse And it was adjudged by the whole Court that the Action was maintainable because by the birth of the issue male the lands were devised out of the two sons and vested in the issue male of the eldest Crook Justice was against the three other Justices Hill 13 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 368. BROOK and GREGORY'S Case IN a Replevin the Defendant did avow the taking of the Cattle damage feasants And upon issue joyned it was found for the Plaintiffe in the Court at Winsor being a Three-weeks Court And the Defendant brought a Writ of Error and assigned for Error That the Entry of the Plaint in the said Court was the 7. day of May and the Plaintiffe afterwards did Declare there of a taking of the Cattel the 25. day of May. And whether the same was Error being in a Three-weeks Court was the Question and 21 E. 4. 66. was alleadged by Harris that it was no Error But the Court held the same to be Error because no Plaint can be entred but at a Court and this Entry of the Plaint was mesne betwixt the Court dayes and so the Declaration is not warranted no â—ustome being alleadged to maintain such an Entry 2. It was holden by the Court in this Case That 〈…〉 est erratum is pleaded the Defendant cannot alleadge Dimâ—â—â—tion because there is a perfect issue before 3. It was holden That a 〈◊〉 cannot alleadge Diminution of any thing which appeareth in the Râ—â—â—d to be 〈◊〉 And because the Defendant â—id alleadge Diminution 〈◊〉 Case of the Record and by the Record it was certified that the 〈◊〉 was entred the 25 day of May the same was not good after issue joyned and after Judgment is given upon the â—â—â— Record upon the first Dâ—â—â—aration and Pleading in the said Court of Winsor And therefore the Judgment was reversed by the opinion of all the Justices Hill 13 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 369. BISSE and TYLER'S Case IN an Action of Trover and Conversion of goods the Defendant said That J. S. was possessed of the said goods and sold them unto him in open market
â—uaere whether it be a good Plea because it doth amount to the general issue of Not guilty Curia avisare vult And v. Tompsons Case 4 Jac. in the Kings Bench It was adjudged that it was no good Plea Hill 6 Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 370. PAGINTON and HUET'S Case IN an Ejectione Firme the Case was this That the Custome of a Manor in Worcestershire was That if any Copyholder do commit Felony and the same be presented by twelve Homagers That the Tenant should forfeit his â—opyhold And it was presented in the Court of the Mannor by the Homage That Hâ—â—t the Defendant had committed Felony But afterwards at the Asâ—ises he was acquitted And afterwards the Lord seised the Copyhold And it was adjudged by the Court that it was no good Custom because in Judgment of Law before Attaindor it is not Felony The second point was Whether the special Verdict agreeing with the Presentment of the Homage That the party had committed Felony did entitle the Lord to the Copyhold notwithstanding his Acquital Quaere For it was not resolved Mich. 7 Iacobi in the Common Pleas. 371. THe Custom of a Mannor was That the Heirs which claimed Copy-hold by Discent ought to come at the first second or third Court upon Proclamations made and take up their Estates or else that they should forfeit them And a Tenant of the Mannor having Issue inheritable beyond the Seas dyed The Proclamations passed and the Issue did not return in twenty years But at his coming over he required the Lord to admit him to the Copyhold and proffered to pay the Lord his Fine And the Lord who had seised the Copyhold for a Forfeiture refused to admit him And it was adjudged by the whole Court That it was no Forfeiture because that the Heir was beyond the Seas at the time of the Proclamations and also because the Lord was at no prejudice because he received the profits of the Lands in the mean time Mich. 14 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 372. A Copyholder in Fee did surrender his Copyhold unto the use of another and his heirs which surrender was into the hands of two Tenants according to the custome of the Mannor to be presented at the next Court. And no Court was holden for the Mannor by the space of thirty years within which time the Surrenderor Surrenderee and the two Tenants all dyed The heir of the Surrenderor entred and made a Lease for years of the Copyhold according to the Custome of the Mannor And it was adjudged per Curiaâ—â— That the Lease was good Mich. 14 Iacobi in the Common-Pleas 373. FROSWEL and WEICHES Case IT was adjudged That where a Copyholder doth surrender into the hands of Copy-Tenants That before Presentment the Heir of the Surrenderor may take the profits of the Lands against the Surrenderee For no person can have a Copyhold but by admittance of the Lord. As if a man maketh Livery within the view although it cannot be countermanded yet the Feoffee takes nothing before his entry But it was agreed That if the Lord doth take knowledge of the Surrender and doth accept of the customary Rent as Rent due from the Tenant being admitted that the same shall amount unto an Admittance but otherwise if he accept of it as a duty generally Mich. 5 Iacobi in the Exchequer 374. IT was adjudged in the Exchequer That where the King was Lord of a Mannor and a Copyholder within the said Mannor made a Lease for three lives and made Livery and afterwards the Survivor of the three continued in possession forty years And in that case because that no Livery did appear to be made upon the Endorsment of the Deed although in truth there was Livery made that the same was no forfeiture of which the King should take any advantage And in that case it was cited to be adjudged in Londons case That if a Copy-Tenant doth bargain and sell his Copy-Tenement by Deed indented and enrolled that the same is no forfeiture of the Copyhold of which the Lord can take any advantage And so was it holden in this Case Pasch 14 Iacobi in the Kings Bench 375. FRANKLIN'S Case LAnds were given unto one and to the heirs of his body Habendum unto the Donee unto the use of him his heirs and assignes for ever In this â—ase two points were resolved 1. That the Limitation in the Habendum did not increase or alter the Estate contained in the premisses of the Deed. 2. That Tenant in Tail might stand seised to an use expressed but such use cannot be averred Hill 13 Iacobi in the Chancery 376 WINSCOMB and DUNCHES Case VVInscomb having issue two sons conveyed a Mannor unto his eldest son and to the daughter of Dunch for life for the joynture of the wife the Remainder to the 〈…〉 The son having no issue his Father-in-law Dunch procured him by Deed indented to bargain and sell to him the Manner The Bargâ—ynor being sick who died before enrolment of the Deed within the 〈…〉 Deed â—ot being acknowledged And 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 coming to be enrolled the Clark who enrolled the same did proâ—â—â—e Waâ—â—â—nt from the Master of the Rolls who under-â—â—â— upon the Deâ—◠〈◊〉 the Deed be enrolled upon Affidavit made of the delivery of the Deed by one of the Witnesses to the same And afterwards the Deed was eâ—â—â—â—d within the six moneths And the opinion of the Court wasâ— That 〈◊〉 Conveyance was a good Conveyance in Law And therefore the younger brother exhibited his Bill in Chanchery pretending the Conveyance to be made by practice without any Consideration Mich. 15 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 377 LUDLOW and STACIâ—S Case A Man bargained and sold Land by Deed indented bearing date 11 Junii 1 Jacobi Afterwards 12 Junii The same year Common was granted â—nto the Bargainee for all manner of Cattell commonable upon the Land 15 Junii theâ— Deed of Bargain and Sale was enrolled And it was adjudged a good grant of the Common And the Enrolment shall have Relation as to that although for collaterall things it shall not have relation Hill 15 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 378. NOte that it was held by Dodderidge Justice and Mountagu Chief Justice against the opinion of Haughton Justice That if Lessee for years covenanteth to repair and sustein the houses in as good plight as they were at the time of the Lease made and afterwards the Lessee assigneth over his Term and the Lessor his Reversion That the Assignee of the Reversion shall maintain an Action of Covenant for the breach of the Covenants against the first Lessee Hill 15 Jacobi in the Common-Pleas 379. SMITH and STAFFORD'S Case A Man promised a Woman That if she would marry with him that if he dyed and she did survive him that he would leave unto her 100â— They entermarried and then the husband dyed not performing his promise The wife sued the Executor of her husband upon the said promise And whether the
duty did survive with the wife or were extinguished by the entermarriage was the Question And Hâ—bart Chief Justice and Warburton were against Winch and Hutton Justices That the marriage was a Release or discharge of the 100â— Quaere Hill 15 Jacobi in the Kings Bench 380. PLOT' 's Case AN Enâ—ant brought an Assise in the Kings Bench for Lands in Mich depending which The Tenant in the same Assise brought an Assise for the same Lands in the Common-Pleas which last Writ bore date and was recornable after the first Writ And the Demandant in the second Writ did recover against the Enfant by default by the Aâ—â—â—se who found the Seisin and Disseisin And upon a Plea in 〈◊〉 of the first Assise of that Recovery the Enfant by way of Replication set forth all the special matter And that the Deâ—andant at the time of the second Writ brought was Tenant of the Land And prayed that he might 〈◊〉 the Recovery And it was adjudged That he might falsifie the Recovery For in all Cases where a man shall not have Error noâ—â—â—taint he may Falsifie But in this case he could not have Error nor Attaint because the Judgment in the Common-Pleas was not given only upon the Default but also upon the Verdict And it should be in vain for him to bring an Attaint because he shall not be 〈◊〉 to give other Evidence then what was given at the first Trial. Also he shall falsifie the Recovery because it was a practise to defeat and take away the Right of the Enfant and to leave him without any remedy whatsoever Pasch 16 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 381 INGIN and PAYN'S Case LEssee for years was bounden in a Bond to deliver the possession of a house unto the Lessor his heirs and assignes upon demand at the end of the term The Lessor did bargain and sell the Rendition by Deed enrolled to two One of the Bargainees at the end of the term demanded the Delivery of the Possession The Lessee refused pretending that he had no notice of the bargain and sale It was adjudged that the Bond was forfeited Pasch 16 Iacobi in the Common-Pleas 382. JERMYN and COOPER'S Case A Man by Deed gave Lands to A. and to a Feme sole and to their heirs and assigns for ever Habendum to them and to the heirs of their bodies the Remainder to them and the survivor of them for ever And it was adjudged by the Court That they had an Estate in tail with the Fee-simple Expectant Pasch 16 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 383. A Man was Indicted De verberationem vulnerationem of J. S. and the words vi armis were left out of the Indictment And the same was adjudged to be helped by the Statute and that the Indictment was good Mich. 16 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 384. BARNWEL and PELSIE'S Case A Parson did Covenant and grant by Deed with one of his Parishioners That in consideration of Six pounds thirteen shillings and four pence per annum be paid unto him that the said Parishioner should be discharged of all Tythes upon condition to be voyd upon default of payment Afterwards the Parson against his grant did sue the Parishioner in the Spirituall Court for Tythes in kind and it was moved for a Prohibition But the Court would not grant it because that the Originall viz. the Tythes do belong to spirituall jurisdiction But it was said that the Parishioner might have an Action of Covenant against the Parson upon the Deed in the Temporall Court 385. Posch 16 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. AN Action upon the Case was brought for speaking of these words viz. J. S. 34 years since had two Bastards and hath paid for the nursing of them And the Plaintiff shewed that by reason of these words contention grew betwixt him and his wife almost to a Divorce And it was adjudged That an Action would not lye for the words And the Chief Justice said That an Action upon the Case doth not lye for every ill word but for words by speaking of which the Plaintiff is damnified and that cannot be in this Case the time being so long past And the causes wherefore a man shall be punished for saying that a man hath a Bastard are twoâ— the one because by the Statute of 14 Eliz. the offender is to be punished for the same And secondly because the party by such means is discredited or hindered in his preferment Hill 16 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 386 HURLSTON and WODROFS Case HEnry Hurlston was Plaintiff against Robert Wodroffe in an Action of Debt upon a Demise of a Messuage with a Sheep-walk the Latin word being Ovile And it was moved in arrest of Judgement after a verdict found for the Plaintiff That the sheepwalk was not alledged to be appurtenant nor pleaded to be by Grant by Deed. But notwithstanding that it vvas ruled by the vvhole Court because it rested indifferent whether there was a grant by Deed or not That when the Jury find that the Sheep-walk did passe it shall be intended that there was a Deed. Dodderidge Justice in the Argument of this Case did hold That by the word Ovile although it be translated in English a Sheep-walk yet a Sheep-walk did not passe by it but a Sheep-Cote and by that the Land it self did passe Hill 16 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 387. HILL and WADE'S Case HIll brought an Action upon the Case against Wade and declared upon an Assumpsit to pay mony upon request and did not alleadge the Request certain but issue was joyned upon another point and found for the Plaintiffe That the failing of certain alleadging of the Request in the Declaration made the same insufficient And so it was adjudged by the Court with this difference where it was a duty in the Plaintiffe before and where the Request makes it a duty For in the first case the Plaintiffe need not alleadge the Request precisely but otherwise in the later Dodderidge Justice put this Case If I promise J. S. in consideration that he will marry my daughter to give him 20â— upon request there the day and place of the request ought to be alleadged in the Declaration Montagu Chief Justice cited 18 E. 4. and 5 H. 7. to be contrary viz. That the finding of the Jury made the Declaration which was vitious to be good As if Executors plead That they have nothing in their hands the day of the Action brought it is insufficient But if the Jury find Assets it is good and so by consequence the Verdict shall supply the defect of Pleading But the Court held these books to be good Law and not to be contrary and well reconciled with this difference For there the Plea was naught only in matter of circumstance but otherwise it is where it is vitious in substance as in this case it is And a difference also was taken where the Verdict doth perfect all which is material and ought to be expressed
and where not For in the principal Case notwithstanding that the Jury find the Assumpsit yet the same doth not reach to the Request and without that the Assumpsit is void Dodderidge Justice cited 5 E. 4. That if the Declaration be vitious in a point material and issue is taken upon another point there the finding of it by the Jury doth not make the Declaration to be good And so in the principal Case Judgment was given for the Defendant In this Case it was agreed That if a man bring an Action of Trover and Conversion and not alleadge a place where the Conversion was Although the issue for the Trover be found for the Plaintiff yet he shall not have Judgment Hill 16 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 388. GODFREY and DIXON'S Case COrnelius Godfrey brought an Action of Debt upon a Lease against Dixon and declared That Cornelius Godfrey his Father being an Alien had issue Daniel Godfrey born in Flanders the Father is made a Denizen and hath issue the Plaintiffe his second son born in England The Father dieth Daniel is Naturalized by Act of Parliament and made the Lease to Dixon for years rendring Rent and dyed without issue And the Plaintiffe his brother brought an Action of Debt for the Arrearages as heire and upon that it was demurred in Law And George Crook in his Argument said That Inheritance is by the Common-Law or by Act of Parliament And that three persons cannot have heirs in travnsersali linea but in recta linea viz. 1. A Bastard 2. A person Attainted 3. An Alien see for that 39 E. 39. Plow Dom. 445. 17. E. 4. 1. 22 H. 6. 38. 3 E. 1. sitz t' Cousinage 5. Dr. Student And he said That Denization by the Kings Charter doth not make the heir inheritable 36 H. 8. Br. to Denizen and C. 7. part 77. And he said That he who inheriteth ought to be 1. Next of blood 2. Of the whole blood and 3. He ought to derive his Pedigree and discent from the stock and root Bracton lib. 2. fol. 51. And he said That if a man doth covenant to stand seised to the use of his brother being an Alien that the same is not good and the use will not rise But that was denyed by the Court. And he said That an Alien should not have an Appeal of the death of his brother And he took a difference betwixt an Alien and a person Attainted and said that the one was of corrupt blood the other of no blood and cited 9 E. 4. 7. 36 Eliz. Hobby's Case Dodderidge upon the argument of this Case said That if a man claim as Cousin and Heir he must shew how he is Cousin and Heir but not when he claims as Brother or Son and Heir The Case was adjourned Hill 16 Iacobi in the Kings Bench 389 GRAY'S Case AN Action of Debt was brought upon a Bond with Condition to stand to an Arbitrement and also that he should not begin proceed in or prosecute any suit against the Obliger before such a Feast The Obliger did continue a Suit formerly brought George Crook said That the Bond was forfeited because it is the act of the Obliger to continue or discontinue a suit and profit accrues to him therefore it shall be adjudged his act But it is otherwise of an Essoin because that that may be cast by a stranger And he cited the books of 36 H. 6. 2. 5 H. 7. 22 14 E. 41. 18 H. 6. 9. And he held That it was a good Award to continue or discontinue a suit because it is in the power of the party to do it or not Hill 16 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 390 SLYE'S Case IN a Scire facias to have Execution the Sheriffe retorned That by vertue of a Writ of Fieri facias he took the goods in Execution ad valentiam of 11l. which remained in his custody for want of buyers and that they were rescued out of his possession Mountagu Chief Justice and Dodderidge Justice The Plaintiffe shall have an Execution against the Sheriff relyed upon the book of 9 E. 4. 50. 16 E. 4. Faulconbridge Case 7 Eliz. Dyer 241. 5 E. 3. t' Execution C. 5. par Pettifers Case And Dodderidge said That by this Retorn he had concluded himself and was liable to the value of 11l. And he took this difference where the Sheriffe by vertue of the Writ Venditioni exponas sels the thing under the value there he shall be discharged but otherwise where he sels the goods ex officio Crook and Haughton Justices The Plaintiffe shall not have a Scire facias against the Sheriffe but where he hath the money in his purse And they said That the Plaintiffe must have a Distringas directed to the new Sheriffe or a Venditioni exponas Note the Court was divided in opinion But the Law seems to be with Crook and Haughton and the books before cited prove their difference and warrant it Hill 16 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 391 Sir JOHN BRET and CUMBERLAND'S Case IN an Action of Covenant brought by Sir John Bret against Cumberland Executor of I. C. the Case was this Q. Eliz. by her Letters Patents did demise a Mill unto the Testator for 30 years reserving Rent and these words were in the Letters-Patents viz. That the Lessee his Executors and Assignes should repair the Mill during the Term. The Lessee assigned over all his interest unto Fish who attorned Tenant and paid the Rent to the Queen and afterwards the Queen granted the Reversion to Sir John Bret and Margaret his wife The Assignee is accepted Tenant the Mill came to decay for want of Reparations and Sir John Bret brought an Action of Covenant against the Executor of the first Lessee And it was adjudged for the Plaintiffe And Dodderidge Justice gave the reasons of the Judgment 1. Because that by the Statute of 32 H. 8. all the benefit which the Queen had was transferred to the Grantee of the Reversion 2. It might be parcel of the Consideration to have the Covenant against the Lessee For a Mill is a thing which without continual Reparations will be ruinous and perish and decay And he said That the Assignee had his election to bring his Action against the Lessee or against the Assignee because it was a Covenant which did run with the Land Mountagu Chief Justice said That the reason of the three Cases put in Walkers Case is in respect of the Interest And took a difference where there is privity of Contract and where not It was adjourned Hill 16 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 392. WEBB and TUCK'S Case IN an Action of False Imprisonment it was agreed That a Fine may be assessed for Vert and Venison And it was said in this Case by the Justices That a Regarder is an Officer of whom the Law takes knowledge and so are Justices in Eyre 2. It was agreed That such things of which the Law takes notice
ought to be pleaded 3. That if a man in his pleading is to set forth the jurisdiction of the Court of Justices in Eyre if he say Curia tent c. he need not set forth all the Formalities of it And Mountagu Chief Justice in this Case said That if a man do justifie for divers causes and some of the causes are not good the same doth not make the whole Justification to be void but it is void for that only and good for the residue Hill 16 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 393 CULLIFORDS Case CVlliford and his Wife brought an Action upon the Case against Knight for words And declared upon these words viz. Thou art Luscombs Hackney a pockey Whore and a theevish Whore and I will prove thee to be so which was found for the Plaintiffe And in arrest of Judgment it was moved that the words were not Actionable which was agreed by the whole Court quia verba accipienda sunt in mitiori sensâ—â—â— And Judgment was staied accordingly Hill 16. Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 371. IN an Action upon the Case for Words The Plaintiffe did relate that he was brought up in the Studie of a Mathematition and a Measurer of Land And that he was a Surveyor and that the Defendant spake these words of him viz. Thou art a Cosener and a cheating Knave and that I can prove And the opinion of the Court was That the words were actionable And Montague Chief Justice said that it was ruled accordingly in 36 Eliz. Rot. 249. betwixt Kirby and Walter And a Surveyor is an Officer of whom the Statute of 5. E. 6. takes notice And he said that Verba de persona intelligenda sunt de Conditione personae And he said that the words are Actionable in regard it is a faculty to be a Measuror of Lands But Dodderidg Justice put it with a difference viz. Betwixt a Measurer of Land by the Pole and one who useth the Art of Geometrie or any of the Mathematicks for he said that in the first Case it is no scandal for that his Credit is not impeached thereby but it is contrary in the other Case because to be a Geometritian or Mathematitian is an Art or faculty which every man doth not attain unto And he put this Case If a man be Bailiffe of my Mannor there no such words can discredit him and by consequence he shall not have an Action for the words because the words do not found in discredit of his Office because the same is not an Office of Skill but an Office of Labour quod nota Hill 16 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 395. BISHOP and TURNERS Case IN a Prohibition it was holden by the whole Court That for such things as a Church-Warden doth ratione officii no Action will lie by his successor against him in the Spiritual Court and a Churchwarden is not an Officer but a Minister to the Spiritual Court But it was holden that a Churchwarden by the Common Law may maintain an Action upon the Case for defacing of a Monument in the Church Trin. 16 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 396. BLACKSTON and HEAP'S Case IN an Action of Debt for Rent the Case was this A man possessed of a Tearm for 20 years in the right of his Wife made a Lease for 10 years rendring Rent to him his Executors and assignes and died The Question was whether the Executors or the Wife should have the Rent Haughton and Crook Justices against Montague Chief Justice Doddridg being absent that the Rent was gon But it was agreed by them all that the Executors of the Husband should not have it But Montague held that the Wife should have it But it was agreed that if Lessee for 20 years maketh a Lease for 10 years and afterwards surrendreth his Tearm that the Rent is gon And yet the Tearm for 10 years continues And in the principal Case If the Husband after the Lease made had granted over the Reversion his grantee should not have the Rent But Montague said that in that Case the Wife in Chancery might be Releived for the Rent Mich. 16 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 397. WAIT and the Inhabitants of STOKE'S Case WAyte a Clothier of Nubery was robbed in the Hundred of Stoke of 50l upon the Saboth day in the time of Divine Service The Question was whether the Hundred were chargeable or not for not making out Hue and Cry And 3 of the Justices were against Montague Chief Justice that they were chargeable For they said that the apprehending of Theeves was a good work and fit for the Saboth day and also fit for the Commonwealth Montague Chief Justice agreed that it was bonum opus and that it might be lawfully done But he said that no man might be compelled upon any penalty to do it upon that day For he said That if he hath a Judgment against I. S. and he comes to the Parish-Church where I. S. is with the Sheriffe and shews unto the Sheriffe I. S. upon the Saboth day and commandeth the Sheriffe to do his Office If the Sheriffe do arrest I. S. in Execution upon that day it is good but if he doth not arrest him it is no escape in the Sheriffe And he took a difference betwixt Ministerial Acts and Judicial Acts for the first might be done upon the Saboth day but Judicial Acts might not But the case was adjudged according to the opinion of the three other Justices Pasch 17 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 398. SPICER and SPICE'S Case UPon a special Verdict the Case was this A man seised of Gavil-kind Land devised the same to his Wife for life paying out of it 3l per annum to his eldest son and also devised the Land to his second Son paying 3l per annum to his third Son and 20s to such a one his Daughter and whether the second Son had the Land for his life or in Fee was the Question And it was adjudged that he had a Fee-simple in it by reason of the payment of the Collateral Sums of 3l and 20s to his brother and sister which charge to the brother might continue af-after the death of the Devisee and if he should have but an estate for life his charge should continue longer then his own estate And so it was adjudged Mich. 17 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 399. IN a Habeas Corpora which was to remove two men who were imprisoned in Norwich The Case was this That within Norwich there was a Custom that two men of the said place should be chosen yearly to make a Feast for the Bailiffs and upon refusal for to do it that they should be Fined and imprisoned which two men brought to the Barr by the Habeas Corpra were imprisoned for the same cause It was urged and much stood upon That the Custom was no good Custom for the causes and reasons which are delivered in Baggs Case in C. 11. part But yet at the last the Court did remand
38 H. 6. 14. If the Law doth not lie for parcel then it is suspended for the whole where the debt is an entire debt And so it was adjudged in this Case Pasch 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 421. NOte it was cited by Chamberlain Justice 15 Jacobi to be adjudged That where a man brought an Action upon the Case against another man for calling of him Bastard that the Action was maintainable The Defendant brought a Writ of Error and shewed for Error That the Plaintiffe did not claim any Inheritance or to be heir to any person certain But notwithstanding that Error assigned the Judgment was affirmed And he said That if one saith of J. S. that his Father is an Alien that an Action upon the Case will lie because it is a disability to the Son Quaere Trin. 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 422. YOUNG and ENGLEFIELD'S Case Intratur Pasch 21 Jac. Rot. 102. YOung brought an Action of Trespass for entring his Close c. abutted upon one side with Pancras and butted on the other side with Grayes-Inne-Lane Upon Not guilty pleaded the parties were at issue Aud the Record of Nisi prius was Graves-Inne-Lane And thereupon the party was Nonsuit And now it was moved to have a Venire facias de novo And a Case was cited expresse in the point betwixt Farthing and Dupper 9 Jacobi Rot. 1349. Where in an Action upon the Case upon Assumpsit the Plea-Roll was Six weeks and the Record of Nisi prius Six moneths And the Jury being sworn the Plaintiffe was Nonsuit and a Venire facias de novo was awarded and the Nonsuit was recorded Ley Chief Justice You cannot have a new Venire facias if the Nonsuit be recorded And if the Record of Nisi prius varieth from the Record then it can be no Nonsuit because there is no Record upon which the Nonsuit can be and the Nisi prius was prosecuted without warrant Judicial Procss are of Record because they are by the Award of the Court But if the Transcript of a Record be mistaken by a Clark it issueth out by the Award of the Court and if it vary then it is no Record The president cited is direct in the point There was a Venire facias de novo But I conceive there is a difference where the Jury is sworn as it is in the President and then the Plaintiffe is Non-suit but in our Case the Plaintiffe was Nonsuit before the Jury was sworn But per Curiam the Case is the stronger to have a new trial Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 423. PRITCHARD and WILLIAMS Case IN an Ejectione Firme the Jury found for the Defendant Now it was moved for the Plaintiffe That the Defendant might not have Costs because the Venire facias is mistaken And the Defendants Councel cited a President in the Case viz. Mich 18 Jacobi betwixt Done and Knot where the Defendant had Judgment for his Costs notwithstanding that the Plaintiffe mistooke his Venire facias in an Ejectione Firme where the Jury found for the Defendant Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 424. WISEMAN and DENHAM'S Case Wiseman brought an Action upon the Case against Denham Parson and declared that there is a Custom within the Town and Parish of Landone of which the Defendant is the Parson That every Parishoner who keeps so many Kyne within the said Parish should give and pay to the Parson for his Tythe-Milk so many Cheeses at Michaelmas and shewed how that he kept so many Kyne viz. 20 c. within the said Parish and that he did tender apud Landone so many Cheeses at Michaelmas to Denham the Defendant being Parson who refused them and to take them away but suffered them to be and continue in the Plaintiffs house for which cause he brought the Action The Defendant did demur upon the Declaration George Crook the Action will lie for the Plaintiffe hath a damage by reason that the Parson doth not take away his Tythe-Cheese And it is like unto the Case in 13 H. 4. Action sur le Case 48. Where a man sold unto another Hay and because that the Vendee took not away his Hay an Action upon the Case did lie for it was a damage to the Plaintiffe to let it stand upon his ground for he durst not put his Cattel into his ground to feed lest they should eat the Hay and spoil it and so he should be lyable to an Action to be brought by the Vendee So if Tythe be lawfully seâ—forth and the Parson refuseth the Tythe but will sue in the Spiritual Court for the Tythe an Action upon the Case will lie à fortiori in this Case for the Cheeses may be cumbersome and troublesome to the Partie so as he cannot make the best use or benefit of his house Paul Crook contrarie and he took exception because the tender is alledged to be apud Landone and it is not shewed that it was at his house at Landone or in any place certain and he said that the Action will not lie because here is no damage to the Plaintiffe and it is like the Case when a man makes a Lease rendring Rent Cheese or Corn and the Tenant tendreth it and the Lessor refuseth it the Lessee cannot have an Action upon the Case against his Lessor but he may plead the matter in barr in an Action brought by the Lessor And the Case of 13 H. 4. before put is not to the purpose for there it was part of the Bargain to take it away by such a time And in our Case the Plaintiffe may plead the matter in barr to the Plaint ' 43 Eliz. betwixt Crispe and Jackson an Action upon the Case was brought for suing in the Ecclesiatical Court for Tythes which were due and he recovered damages Secondly Admit that the Action doth lie then it is because it is a damage unto him that they remain in his house but it doth not appear that the tender was made at his house but apud Landone which might be a mile from the house and so because it was his own fault the Action will not lie as this Case is by reason of the tender George Crook It was adjudged in a Cornish Case that an Action upon the Case lieth against a Parson which doth not take away his Tythe corn or hay because it spoyles the ground upon which it stands and because the partie cannot have the free use of his Land So in our Case he cannot have the free aâ—e of his house the cheeses cumbring his house and offending him with their smell Haughton Justice If the Action were well laid it would lie for the Cause but in this Case it is not well laid If any thing makes the Action to lie it is the damage which the Plaintiffe doth sustain by the cheeses being in his house but here it is laid to be tendred apud Landone and it is not said at his house and non constat how the
cheeses came to his house for if they were brought back by the Plaintiffe or by his commandment then the Action will not lie but if he had laid his Action that he gave notice to the Parson that he had so many cheeses ready for him for his Tythe and had required him to send for them then if the Parson had not carried them away the Action would have lien but for the reason before the Action as it is laid is not maintainable Dodderidge Justice There are two matters in this case First If the Action will lie for the matter Secondly If the Action will lie by reason of the Tender as to the first I put this difference That in some case it will lie and in some case it will not lie in this case the Action is not maintainable Where a tender is of a thing which the Partie ought to have by the tender the property is changed and there a damage may arise by reason that he will not take it away as in the case of 13 H. 4. put before there the Plaintiffe had damage by the standing of the hay upon the ground for he could not put in his cattel for then he might be in danger of an Action because the cattel might eat the hay If one setteth forth his Tythe and the Parson having notice thereof will not take it away an Action lyeth because it as a damage to the Land But in our Case admit the tender were at his house yet this tender doth not alter the Property in the person and they being his own cheeses he hath no loss so the difference is where the partie hath damage and loss and where he hath none as here in our Case he hath no damage the tender of the Rent saves from the penaltie but doth not discharge the dutie but admit that the Action will lie yet in this Case the Declaration is insufficient For the tender is not alledged to be at any place certain in the Village for it may be that he tendred them to the Parson in the Church-yard of Landone and then by the carrying of them home to his house again he hath lost the Action which he might have had if he had tendred them at his house Ley Chief Justice There is a difference in the case of Tenders If I tender such a thing which is due and the other refuseth it and I must pay the same thing in kinde if by the keeping of it I be endamaged I may have an Action upon the Case and that is our Case If a man setteth out his Tythe hay or Corn the tender in our Case is a setting forth of the Tythe Cheese and the Parson refuseth to take it away and it perish in keeping I am excused for the perishing of it but I may have an Action against the Parson for letting it stay upon my Land to my anoyance So if A. commit goods to me to keep in my house and I require him to take them away and he refuseth to do it I may have an Action upon the Case against him for it is a trouble to me to remove them for him and so in our Case but it is otherwise where I pay Rent-Corn and the Lessor doth refuse it I may pay him in other corn If one be to pay so much corn and the other will not receive it being tendred unto him untill it be dearer an â—ction upon the Case will lie for he is thereby endamaged In our Case the partie is damnified for his house is anoyed by the smell and also encombred therewith and the rooms of his house are valuable and he cannot make use of them at his pleasure the Tender ought to be where by the ordinary course the thing hath its beeing As at the place of the shearing of the Sheep the Parson is to demand his Tythe wool and there it is to be paid if there be be a person who hath power to deliver it the things which are ordinarily in the house as butter cheese c. are to be tendred there and there they are to be demanded and thereof notice is to be given to the Parson and the partie is not bound to carry them to the Parsons house The cheeses which are to be paid by this Custom are to be paid of cheeses made upon that Land and not of cheeses which the Parishoner shall buy elsewhere The tender is alledged to be in the Town of Landone and the Law intends the cheeses to be in the Parishoners house and this general tender is to be understood at the place where the cheeses by intendment of Law are to be and on the other side it ought to be alledged that the tender was not at the house so as I conceive that the tender is good Dodderidge The intendment is not good in this case for in every Declaration there ought to be certainty and verity but in a plea in bar there if it be a common intendment it is sufficient If a man speak generally of a Town it is to be meant at the Hamlet where the Church stands Ley when a tender is pleaded it is supposed to be at the place where the tender ought to be by the Law As a man is bound to pay money if he plead that he tendred it at D. it shall be intended that D. is the place where it ought to be paid If the partie goeth to the Parsons house and tells the Parson that he hath at his house such Tythe cheeses for him and requires the Parson to send for them here the notification is at the Parsons house but the real tender is at the parties own house And the partie plaintiffe in our Case cannot plead it otherwise then at Landone Haughton In this case the Law requires a special place of tender expressed or else he shews no cause of Action For if it were at any place out of his house the Action will not lie and the cheeses ought to be personally tendred Ley Chief Justice That would be inconvenient for then he must carry them to him and so he should be forced to wait upon the Parson Dodderidge 40 E. 3. If I tender to one a marriage or a Ward the woman or Ward ought to be present at the time of the tender Tender of money in a bag as to say I have money for you is no good tender and so it is of cheeses to say I have cheeses for you is but a verbal tender and it is not good but it ought to be tendred personally and in kinde You will intend that the Parson was at the plaintiffs house at the time of this tender and here is nothing in the case to direct you so to think Ley The place is but circumstance for the Parson is tyed to demand them at the house being the proper place of tender by reason of their being there Dodderidge The cheese must be shewed the Parson and that proves that he must be present Ley If he were present
then the tender is good But if he be not there but at another place the notice is sufficient Dodderidge The Law requires certainty in a Declaration and the matter cannot be taken by intendment so we ought to have a certainty set forth otherwise no certain Judgment can be given It was adjourned for Dodderidge and Haughton Justices were against Ley Chief Justice But as I have heard the Case was afterwards adjudged for the Plaintiffe There quaere the Record of the Judgment Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 425. A Man made a Lease for life and covenanted for him and his heirs That he would save the Lessee harmless from any claiming by from or under him The Lessor dyed and his wife brought a Writ of Dower against the Lessee and recovered and the Lessee brought an Action of Covenant against the heir And it was adjudged against the heir because the wife claimed under her husband who was the Lessor But if the woman had been mother of the Lessor who demanded Dower the Action would not have layen against the heir because she did not claim by from or under the Lessor And so it was adjudged v. 11. H. 7. 7. b. Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 426. SNELL And BENNET'S Case A Parson did contract with A. his Executors and Assigns That for ten shillings paid to him every year by A. his Executors and Assigns that he his Executors or Assigns should be quit from the payment of Tythes for such Lands during his life viz. the life of the Parson A. paid unto the Parson ten shillings which the Parson accepted of And made B. an Enfant his Executor and dyed The mother of the Enfant took Letters of Administration durante minori aetate of the Enfant and made a Lease at Will of the Lands The Parson libelled in the Ecclesiastical Court for Tythes of the same Lands against the Tenant at Will who thereupon moved for a Prohibition Dodderidge During the life of the Parson the Contract is a foot but the Assignee cannot sue the Parson upon this Contract yet he may have a Prohibition to stay the suit in the Ecclesiastical Court and put the Parson to his right remedy and that is to sue here This agreement is not by Deed and so no Lease of the Tythes The Parson shall have his remedy against the Executor for the ten shillings but not against the Tenant at Will and the Executor hath his remedy against the Tenant at Will Crook 21 H. 6. A Lease of Tythes without Deed is good for one but not for more years v. 16 H. 7. And afterwards a Prohibition was granted Trin. 16 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 427. PHILPOT and FEILDER'S Case THe Parties are at issue in the Chancery and a Venire facias is awarded out of the Chancery to try the issue and the Venire facias was Quod venire facias coram c. duodecim liberos legales homines de vicineto de c. quorum quilibet habeat quatuor lib. terrae tenementorum vel reddituum per annum ad minus per quos rei veritas melius sciri poterit c. And it was moved in arrest of Judgment That the Venire facias is not well awarded for it ought to be Quorum quilibet habeat quadraginta solidos terrae tentorum vel reddit per an ad minus according to the Statute of 35 H. 8. cap. 6. which appoints that every one of the Jurors ought by Law to expend forty shillings per annum of Freehold and it ought not to be quatuor libras terrae c. according to the Statute of 27 Eliz cap. 6. which Statute of Elizabeth doth not speak of the Chancery but only of the Kings Bench Common-Pleas and the Exchequer or before Justices of Assise Before the Statute of 35 H. 8. no certain Land of Jurors was named in the Venire facias but since the Statute of 35 H. 8. it was quadragint solidos untill the said Statute of 27 Eliz. and now it is quatuor libras in the Kings Bench Common-Pleas and Exchequer It was adjourned At another day the Case was moved again That the Venire facias ought to be 40 solidos c. according to the Statute of 35 H. 8. cap. 6. And 10 H. 7. 9. 15 were vouched That if a Statute appoint that the King shall do an act in this form the King ought to do it in the same form and manner So if a Letter of Attorney be to make a Bill in English and the same is made in Latine it is not good although it be the same in form and matter Cook lib Entries 578. Waldrons Case is That in the Chancery the Venire facias was but 40 but that Case was between 35 H. 8. and 27 Eliz. cap 6. Dodderidge and Haughton Justices It is a plain case For the Venire facias ought to be according to 35 H. 8. cap. 6. because the Statute of 27 Eliz. cap. 6. speaks nothing of the Chancery Quod nota Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 428. HEWET and BYE'S Case IN an Ejectione Firme of a house in Winchester the Ejectment was laid to be of a house which was in australi parte vici Anglice the High-street Ley Chief Justice If it had been ex australi parte vici then the South part had been but a Boundary but here it is well laid Then it was moved That the Venire facias is Duodecim liberos legales homines de Winton and doth not say of any Parish in Winton But notwithstanding it was holden good For Dodderidge Justice said That it is not like unto Arundels Case C. 6. part 14. For there the Offence was laid to be done in paroechiae Sanctae Margaret de Westminster therefore the visne ought to be of the Parish but in this case it being laid generally in Winton it is sufficient that the visne come out of Winton Judgment was given for the Plaintiffe Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 429 WATERER and MOUNTAGUE'S Case A Man made a Lease for six years and the Lessor covenanted That if he were disposed to lease the said lands after the expiration of the said term of six years that the Lessee should have the refusal of it The Lessee within the six years made a Lease thereof to J. S. for 21 years Dodderidge Haughton and Ley Chief Justice The Covenant is not broken because it is out of the words of the Covenant But Dodderidge said Temp. E. 1. Covenant 29. The Lessee covenanted to leave the houses trees and woods at the end of the term in as good plight as he found them and afterwards the Lessee cut down a tree that in that case the Covenant was broken and the Lessor shall not stay untill the end of the term to bring his action of Covenant because it is apparant that the tree cannot grow again and be in as good plight as it was when he took the Lease Trin. 21
Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 430. OWFIELD against SHIERT A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a Judgment given in an Action of Debt The Action of Debt was upon a Concessit solvere c. pro diversis summis pecuniae and the opinion of the Court was That Debt doth not lie upon Concessit solvere pro diversis summis c. because it is incertainty But the same Term in another Case viz. Stacies Case That by Custom of London it was holden that Debt doth lie upon a Concessit solvere pro diversis summis And it was then said That in an Action upon the Case it was good to say That in consideration de diversis summis Concessit solvere and so it hath been adjudged Trin 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. HAWKSWITH and DAVIES Case Intratur 431. Pasch 19. Jur. Rot. 83. LEssee for years of divers parcels of Lands reservant Rent and for not payment a reentrie The Lessee assignes part of the Land to A. and other part to B. and keeps a part to himself afterwards the Lessee levies a Fine of all the Lands unto the use of the Conusee and his heirs afterwards the Lessee paies the Rent for the whole unto the Conusee and afterwards the Rent becomes behind and the Conusee enters for the Condition broken and made a Lease to the Plaintiffe who thereupon brought an Ejectione firme and all this matter was found by special Verdict and it was moved that by the assigning of the Lessee of part of the lands to one and part to another that the Condition was gone and destroyed but notwithstanding it was agreed by all the Justices that the Condition did remain and was not gone nor destroyed And they said that this Case was not like unto Winters Case in Dyer 308 309. where the Lessor did assigne over part of the Reversion to one and part unto another for that in that Case the Lessor by his own Act had destroyed the Condition but in this Case it is the Act of the Lessee and therefore no colour that the Condition be gone and destroyed And so it was resolved for the Plaintiffe and Judgment given accordingly Trin. 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 432. KILLIGREW and HARPER'S Case HArper in consideration of 100l. doth assume and promise to Killigrew That the Lady Weston and her Son shall sell to Killigrew such Lands Proviso that Killigrew such a day certain pay to the said Lady and her Son 2000l At which time the Lady and her Son shall be ready to assure and convey to Killigrew the said lands And for want of payment of the said 2000l at the said day that Killigrew shall lose the said 100l. and that the Contract for the Land shall be void Killigrew brought an Action upon the Case sur Assumpsit against Harper and all this matter was found by special Verdict Athow Serjeant argued that the Action would lie because the Lady and her Son were to do the first act viz. to make the Assurance 22 H. 6. 57. Rent is reserved upon a Lease for years in which are divers Covenants and a Bond is given for the performance of all the Covenants within such Indenture of Lease the Rent is behind the Bond is not forfeited unlesse the Lessor doth make a demand of the Rent because the Lessor is to do the first act viz. to demand the Rent Yelverton contr ' That the Action will not lie The question is Of whose part is the breach The Assumpsit is grounded upon the Consideration and not upon the Promise The Jury find that Killigrew was not ready to pay the 2000l. and that the Lady and her Son were not ready to assure the land The Agreement was for which not time is expressed That the Lady and her Son should convey such lands Then the Agreement was That Killigrew should pay at such a day certain at which day the Lady should be ready c. and if Killigrew made default of the payment of the 2000l. then he was to lose the said 100l. which he gave to Harper to procure the Bargain and also that the Bargain should be void Ley Chief Justice If Killigrew had paid or tendred the 2000l. at the said day and the Lady and her Son had not been ready at that time to have assured the lands Killigrew should have had an Action upon the Case for the 100l. and recovered damages If the Lady had been to have done the first action then the Action would have been maintainable but in this Case Killigrew is to do the first act and therefore the Action will not lie Dodderidge If it had been indefinite then the Assurance and Conveyance is to be before the Payment but here the bargain is to pay the mony first Harper promiseth to Killigrew in consideration of 100l. that Killigrew shall buy such lands then comes the time of payment and assurance of the land at that time shall be made Proviso that if he do not pay the 2000l then Killigrew to lose the 100l. and the Contract to be void so there are two penalties so as of necessity the 2000l must first be paid for otherwise how can the Contract be void for not payment For if the Conveyance shall be first made then it was present before the mony paid and so the clause viz. Then the Contract to be void should be of no effect Haughton Justice agreed Chamberlain Justice You have bound your self with a penalty and the bargain ought to be performed as it was made And so being made that the mony should be first paid at which time the conveyance shall be made and for want of payment that Killigrew should lose the 100l. and also the Contract to be void The opinion of the whole Court was against the Plaintiffe that the Action would not lie and so Judgment was given Quod nihil capint per Billam Trin. 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 433. Sir ARTHUR GORGE and Sir ROBERT LANE'S Case AN Action of Debt was brought upon a Bond for not performance of Covenants The Case was Lane did marry with the daughter of Gorge and in consideration of marriage and also of 3000l portion given in marriage by Gorge Lane did covenant That he within one year would make a Jointure of lands within England then of the value of 500l per annum over and above all Reprises to his said wife so as Sir Henry Yelverton and Sir John Walter Councellors at Law should devise and advise In Debt for the breach of these Covenants Lane pleaded That he did inform Gorge of lands which he was determined should be for her Jointure but neither Yelverton nor Walter did devise the Assurance Paul Crook did demur upon the Plea and first shewed That Lane did not give notice to Yelverton and Walter as he ought to have done by law For in this case it is not sufficient to give notice to Gorge but the notice ought to be to the Councellors otherwise how could
Billam Trin. 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 435. SHOETER against EMET and his WIFE THe plaintif being a midwife the Defendants wife said to the plaintif Thou art a Witch and wert the death of such a mans child at whose birth thou wert Midwife In an Action upon the Case in Arrest of Judgment it was moved that the words were not actionable Hill 15 Jacobi in the Common Pleas Stone and Roberts Case adjudged That an Action upon the Case doth not lie for saying thou art a Sorcerer 9 Jac. Godbolds Case in the Kings Bench Thou art a Sorcerer or an Inchanter 30 Eliz. betwixt Morris and Clark for saying Thou art a Witch no Action will lie for of the words Witch or Sorcerer the Common Law takes no notice but a Witch is punishable by the Statute of 1 Jacobi cap. 12. Pasch 44 Eliz Lowes Case Thou hast bewitched my cattel or my child there because an Act is supposed to be done an Action upon the Case will lie for the words 1. Jacobi Sir Miles Fleetwoods Case He was Receiver for the King in the Court of Wards and Auditor Curle said of him Thou hast deceived the King and it was adjudged that an Action upon the Case would lie for the words because it was in his calling by which he got his living Chamberlain Justice Since the Statute 1 Jacobi for calling one Witch generally an Action will lie For for the hurting of any thing a Witch is punishable by shame viz. Pillory in an open place Dodderidge Justice Thief or Witch will bear Action and the reason of the Case before cited by the Councel is because that the common Law doth not take notice of a Witch But punishment is inflicted upon a Witch by the Statute of 1 Jacobi and by that Statute a Witch is punishable Trin. 21 Jacobi Betwixt Mellon and Herâ— Judgment was stayed where the words were Thou art a witch and hast bewitched my child because that the words shall be taken in mitiori sensu as thou hast bewitched him with pleasure And in that sense Saint Paul said Who hath bewitched you O Galatians That case was adjudged in the Common Pleas. Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 436. KNOLLIS and DOBBINE'S Case KNollis did assume and promise apud London within such a Parish that he would cast so much Lead and cover a Church in Ipswich in Suffolk and one Scrivener promised him to give him 10l for his costs and pains Scrivener died Knollis brought an Action upon the Case against Dobbins who was Administrator of Scrivener and declared that he such a day did cast the Lead and cover the said Church apud London The Defendant pretended that the Intestator made no such promise and it was found for the Plaintiffe and in arrest of Judgment it was moved That the Declaration was not good by reason that the Agreement was to cover a Church in Ipswich and he declared he had covered such a Church apud London which is impossible being 60 miles asunder and so the Declaration is not pursuing the promise Dyer 7 Eliz. 233. In Avowry for Rent upon a Lease for life c. That the Prior and Covent of c. at Bathe demiserunt Lands which was out of Bathe it was void for they being at Bathe could not make Livery of Land which was out of Bathe Vi. Dyer 270. The second Exception to the Declaration was That the Commissary of the Bishop of Norwich apud London did commit Administration of the Goods and Chattels of Scrivener to Dobbins apud London which was said not to be good because he had not power in London to execute any power which appertained unto him at Norwich Dodderidge Justice The plaintiffe declares that apud London he did cover the said Church that is not good and makes the Declaration to be insufficient because it is not according to the promise The place where the Commissary of the Bishop of Norwich did grant the Administration is not material For if the Bishop of Norwich be in London yet his power as to granting of Letters of Administration and making of Deacons and Clarks in his own Diocese doth follow the person of the Bishop although his other Jurisdiction be Local to which the Court agree And it was adjudged that the Declaration was not good and therefore Judgment was given Quod querens nihil capiat per Billam Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 437. BULLEN and SHEENE'S Case SHeene brought a Writ of Error upon a Judgment given in the Common Pleas. The Case was Bullen being a Commoner intituling himself by those whose Estate he had in the Land brought an Action upon the Case against Sheene because he had digged clay in the land where the Plaintiffe had Common and had carried away the same over the Common per quod he lost his Common and by that could not use his Common in as ample manner as he did before Sheene entitled himself to be a Commoner and have common in the said land also and so justified the Entrie and set forth a prescription That every Commoner had used to dig clay there and the first issue was found for the Defendant Sheene viz. that he was a Commoner but the other issue was found for the Plaintiffe Bullen viz. that there was no such prescription That a Commoner might dig clay And the Jury did assesse damages to the Plaintiffe generally and the same was moved to be Error because that the Plaintiffe had not damage by carrying away of the clay because the same did not belong to him for that he was but a Commoner and so the Judgment given in the Court of Common Pleas was Erroneous Ley Chief Justice By the digging of a pit the Commoner is prejudiced by the laying of the clay upon the Common the Commoner is prejudiced and so the damages are given for the digging and carrying away of the clay per quod Commoniam suam amisit and the damages are not given for the clay Chamberlain Justice If he had suffered the clay to lie by the pit it had been damage to the Commoner If the Owner of the soil plough up or maketh conyburies in the Land an Action upon the case lyeth against him by the Commoner for thereby the Common is much the worse and the Commoner prejudicedS If the pit be deep it is dangerous to the Commoner and so a damage unto him for it is dangerous lest his cattel should fall into it and it will not suddenly be filled up again and so no grass there for a long time and the longer because that which should fill up the pit is carried away Haughton Justice The proceedings are Erroneous both Plaintiffe and Defendant are Commoners The wrong is in two points First That the Defendant had with his cattell fed the Common Secondly That the Defendant had digged clay there and carried the same away The Defendant makes Title to both First he prescribes to have Common there Secondly That the Commoners
by prescription have used to have and dig clay there The first point is found for the Defendant and the last issue is found against the Defendant and damages are given generally All the question is upon the Declaration Coepit asportavit the clay which implies a propertie and interest in the clay to be to the Plaintiffe It is not said that the clay was carried over the land I conceive that the property of the clay is in issue and the Commoner hath nothing to do with that So damages being given to him for that which doth not belong unto him I hold the Judgment to be Erroneous and that it ought to be reversed Dodderidge The Declaration is well enough and of necessity it cannot be otherwise Here the Plaintiffe challengeth nothing but Common In an Action upon the Case there ought to be injurie and damage which is the consequent upon injurie For an Action upon the Case will not lie for an injurie without damage Here Bullen doth not complain for any thing but the loss of his Common which is the first wrong The second wrong is the digging of the pit in the which his cattel may fall and perish The third wrong is for carrying away of six loads of clay over the Common which is a great detriment to the Common to carrie it either by Carts or otherwise and for these three wrongs he concludes his damages ratione cujus he could not have his Common in as ample manner as before he was used to have it and he doth not conclude any damage for the clay Every one of these injuries doth increase the damages and so it would have been if he had left the clay to lie upon the land by the pit for thereby so much Common would have been lost Here he makes himself title only to the Common and these Acts do increase the damages only 2. E. 4. 7 E. 4. Where one was unlawfully and falsly imprisoned and being imprisoned compelled to levie a Fine or make a Feoffment or other Deed. In an Action of false Imprisonment the Jurie gave damages by reason of his restraint of his Liberty and increased them by reason of the levying of the Fine or making the Feoffment or other Deed which he then made The Jurie found that he is not to have any clay and coepit asportavit doth not alter the Case for that is a special Action of trespass And by three of the Justices against Haughton the Judgment given in the Court of Common Pleas was affirmed Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 438. CAlthrope Councellor cited this Case to have been adjudged 25 Eliz. The husband seised in the right of his wife of Copyhold Land made a Lease for years and it was holden by the Court then That by the death of the husband the forfeiture of the Copyhold was purged and that the wife should have the land again notwithstanding this forfeiture by the husband by making a Lease for years without Licence And the Court seemed to allow of the said Case to be Law And afterwards this very Term the like Case came in question in this Court betwixt Severn and Smith where in an Ejectione firme a special Verdict found That a Copyholder seised in the right of his wife made a Lease for years and it was a question whether it were a forfeiture of the inheritance of the wife Hitcham Serjeant said it was no forfeiture Dodderidg Justice took this difference Where a Feme Sole is a Copyholder and she takes a husband who makes a lease for years without licence the same is a forfeiture because it is her folly to take such a husband as will forfeit her Land But where a Copyhold is granted to a Feme Covert and the husband maketh a Lease without Licence in such case it is no forfeiture and so in the Case of a Feme Lessee for life at the Common Law against Whitinghams Case C. 8. part 44. It was adjourned Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 439. NOte It was the opinion of all the Justices and so declared That if the Plaintiffe in an Ejectione firme doth mistake his Declaration That the Defendant in such Case shall have his Costs of the Plaintiffe by reason of his unjust vexation Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 440. FOur several men were joyntly Indicted for erecting and keeping of four several Inns in Bathe It was moved that the Indictment was insufficient because the offence of the one is not the offence of the other like unto the Case in Dyer 19. Where two joyn in an Action upon the Case for words 't is not good but they ought for to sever in their Actions because the wrong to the one is no wrong to the other Dodderidge Iustice One Indictment may comprehend several offences if they be particularly laid and then it is in Law several Indictments It may be intended that the Inns were lawfull Inns for it is not laid to be ad nocumentum and therefore not punishable but if they be an anoyance and inconvenient for the Inhabitants then the same ought particularly to appear otherwise it is a thing lawfull to erect an Inn. An Action upon the Case lyeth against an Inn-keeper who denies lodging to a Travailer for his money if he hath spare lodging because he hath subjected himself to keep a common Inn. And in an Action upon the Case against an Inn-keeper he needeth not to shew that he hath a Licence to keep the Inn. If an Inn-keeper taketh down his Signe and yet keepeth an Hosterie an Action upon the Case will lie against him if he do deny lodging unto a Travailer for his money but if he taketh down his Signe and giveth over the keeping of an Inn then he is discharged from giving lodging The Indictment in the principal case is not good for want of the words ad Nocumentum Haughton and Ley Iustices argreed Ley If an Indictment be for an Offence which the Court ex Officio ought to take notice to be ad Nocumentum there the Indictment being general ad Nocumentum contra Coronam dignitatem is sufficient without shewing in what it is ad Nocumentum But for Inns it is lawfull for to erect them if it be not ad Nocumentum c. and therefore in such Indictments it ought to be expressed that the erecting of them is ad Nocumentum c. and because in this Case there wants the words ad Nocumentum the Indictment was quashed Vi. The Lord North and Prat's Case before to this purpose Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 441. BRIDGES and NICHOLS's Case THey were Indicted for the not repairing of such a Bridg and the Indictment was debent solent reparare pontem c. It was moved that the Indictment was insufficient because it is not alledged in the Indictment that the the Bridg was over a Water and no needfull that it be amended Secondly It did not appear in the Indictment that
at the time of the Indictment the said Bridg was ruinous and decayed Thirdly The Indictment is that Bridges and Nichols debent solent reparare poâ—tem and it is not shewed that their charge of repairing of the same is ratione tenare 21 E. 4. 38. Where it is said That a prescription cannot be that a common person ought to repair a Bridg unless it be said to be by reason of his Tenure but it is otherwise in case of a Corporation For these Errors the Indictment was quashed by Iudgment of the Court. Trin 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. Intratur Trin. 20. Rot. 1609. 442. Sir THOMAS LEE and GRISSEL's Case GRissel brought an Action upon the Case against Lee in the Common Pleas and shewed that diu fuit adhuc seisitus existens of a house c. and he did prescribe that he and all those whose Estate he hath in the said house c. had used to have Common in the waste of L. and that Lee in Jacobi made Coniburies in the waste quorum quidem premissorum he lost his Common The Action was brought 18 Jacobi and Iudgment given in the Common Pleas for the Plaintiffe there and thereupon a Writ of Error was brought in the Kings Bench and it was assigned for Error First That diu seisitus is not good because it hath not any limitation of time for it may contain as well forty years as one year He laid the wrong to be 15 Jacobi and doth not shew that at that time he was seised for diu doth not express any certain time and then it is like unto the case of Waste where the Grantee of a Reversion brings an Action of waste and doth not shew that he committed waste to his disâ—heresin but doth not shew when the waste was done for it might be that it was done betwixt the Grant and the Attornment and then he had no cause to have waste or otherwise it might be that the waste was done in the time of the Grantor and then the Grantee had no cause of Action But in such case he ought to have shewed that he was seised of the Reversion at the time of the waste done 4 E. 4. 18. There Trespass was brought upon the Statute of R. 2. and the Writ was That he did enter in diversa terras tenementa There it was holden that the Writ being insufficient the Court should not make it good because it is too general In our Case it ought to have been that he was diu adhuc est seisitus Et seisitus that the Defendant did do the wrong Another Error was assigned because he doth not conclude quorum quidem premissorum praetextu he lost his Common But he saies quorum quidem premissorum he lost his Common and leaves out the word prâ—textu which word ought to have been in the Declaration The Action is brought three years after the wrong done and he ought to have shewed that he 15 Jacobi which was the time of the wrong done fuit seisitus diu ante fuit seisitus in dominico ut de feodo All before the clause quorum quidem c. is but collection and he ought to have concluded with a cause of grievance viz. quorum quidem premissorum praetextu he lost his Common 7 H. 7. 3. There it is said that this word praetextu is a conclusion that the particular wrong doth contain and doth affirm that which went before but in this case the word praetextu is wanting and a Seisin first ought to be laid and then praetextu quorum is good Vi. Bullen and Sheenes case before where the Plaintiffe first made him title to the Common viz. that he was such a time seised in Fee adhuc seisitus existens that the Defendant did dig clay Vi. Brown and Greens Case in the Common Pleas. 40 Eliz. Where a man pleaded a Feoffment and Livery Virtute cujus he was seised in fee and did not shew that he entred and yet the same was good because the Virtute cujus was a good conclusion Ley Chief Justice diu doth not denote any time certain If in a Case it had been postea or sic inde seisitus the Defendant did the wrong then the Declaration had been good but here is nothing to which diu may have reference If he had said that he being diu seisitus that the Defendant had such a day done the wrong it had been good Secondly Here ought to have been either quorum quidem premissorum ratione or praetextu he lost his Common here the Latine is good viz. quorum quidem premissorum Commoniam perdidit but it is not good in Law Dodderidge Justice You ought to have coupled the damage and the wrong and in this case there wants the coupling for want of the word praetextu for the word praetextu is the application of the precedent matter The matter of wrong is the making of the conyburies by reason of which he lost his Common and the quorum quidem here hath not any sense The Declaration wants matter of form also diu fuit seisitus adhuc seisitus existens Might you not have purchased this Common after the wrong done by the making of the conyburies for it doth not appear otherwise by the Declaration for as well as diu may comprehend forty years so it may but one moneth If it had been diu seisitus sic seisitus that he made the conyburies then the Declaration had been well but as this case is it is not good Haughton Justice Your Action ought to have contained your matter of time as well as your matter of wrong Diu includes no certainty of time and quorum quidem premissorum c. is a speech without sense If a man maketh title to have Common pro omnibus averiis and the word suis is omitted it is not good Ley Chief Justice here the wrong and damage are not knit together by these words and it might be that in this case he had lost his Common by some other means For he doth alleadge that he lost his Common but how he lost it that doth not appear to us If he had said Virtute cujus or per quod or ratione cujus he had lost his Common then the Declaration had been certain and had been well enough But here it being incertain both in the seisitus and also in the alleadging the damage The Judgment given in the Court of Common-Pleas for these Errors was reversed Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 443. PYE and BONNER's Case AN Information was in the Common-Pleas by Pye against Bonner for buying of Cattel selling of them again in the same Market against the Satute Which was found against the Defendant and the Judgment was entred Quod sit in misericordia whereas it ought to have been Capiatur being upon an Information For it is a Contempt and punishable by Imprisonment And in this Case upon a Writ of Error brought in
house and then by his Will deviseth his houses called the Swan The rooms of the Lyon which A. occupied with the Swan shall pass by the Devise although of right those rooms do belong to the Lyon-house Pasc 36 Eliz. Ewer and Heydon's Case A man hath a house and divers lands in W. and also a house and lands in D. And by his Will he deviseth his house and all his lands in W. D. there the house which is in D. doth not pass for his intent and meaning plainly appears that his house in D. doth not pass But if he had devised all his lands in W. and had not spoken of the house the house had passed A Case was in the Common-Pleas betwixt Hyam and Baker The Devisor had two Farms and occupied parcel of one of the Farms with the other Farm and devised the Farm which he had in his possession The part of the other Farm which he occupied with it did pass with the Farm devised Dodderidge Justice The Devise is in the Case at Bar All his Farm called Locks to his eldest Son and all his Farm called Brocks to his younger Son And the Land in question was purchased long after that the Devisor purchased Brocks but that Land newly purchased was not expresly named in the Will and therefore it shall discend to the heir viz. the eldest Son Land is not parcel of a house and in strictness of Law cannot appertain to a house Yet Land is appertaining to the Office of the Fleet and the Rolls but that is to the Office which is in another nature then the Land is For the Land newly purchased the Jury did not find the same to be usually occupied with Brocks it shall not pass with Brocks although it be occupied together with Brocks I do occupie several Farms together and then I devise one of the Farms called D. and all the lands to the same belonging the other Farms shall not pass with it although they be occupied all together Haughton Justice What time will make lands to belong unto a house All the profits of the lands used with the house for a small time will serve the turn Ley Chief Justice There are two manner of belongings One belonging in course of Right and another belonging in case of Occupation To the first belonging there ought to be Prescription viz. time out of mind But in our Case Belonging doth borrow some sense from occupying for a year or a time And then another year to occupie it will not make it belonging in the later sense In strictness of Law Land cannot be said to belong to a house or land but in vulgar reputation it may be said belonging And in such case in case of grant the Land will not pass as appertaining to Land C. 4. part Terringham's Case But in our Case it is in case of a Will Usually occupied is not to be meant time out of mind Here other lands were belonging to Brocks and so the words of the Will are satisfied But it might have been a Question if there had been no other lands belonging to it Dodderidge Justice If the Devisor had turned all the profits thereof to Brocks then it had passed by the Will Ley Chief Justice This occupying of it promiscuously doth make it belong to neither At another day Ley Chief Justice said Here is nothing which makes it appear to us that this Land doth belong to Brocks For the Jury find not that it was occupied either with Brocks or Locks and so this Land belongs to neither of them Dodderidge There is not any Question in the Case It is not found that it doth belong And then we must not judge it belonging The ground of this question ariseth out of the matter of fact and it ought to be found at the least that it is appertaining in Reputation Haughton The Jury find that Knight was seised of Brocks and of lands belonging to it And that he was seised of Locks and of lands belonging to that And lastly they find that he was seised of this Land in question but they do not find that it was any wayes belonging to Brocks or Locks It was adjudged for the Plaintiff and that the Land did not pass by the Devise but that it did discend to the heir Trin. 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 448. SELY against FLAYLE and FARTHING IN an Ejection Firme the Verdict was found for the Defendant Three of the Jurors had Sweet-meats in their pockets and those three were for the Plaintiffe untill they were searched and the Sweet-meats found with them and then they did agree with the other nine and gave their Verdict for the Defendant Haughton Justice It doth not appear that these Sweet-meats were provided for them by the Plaintiffe or Defendant and it doth not appear that the said three Jurors did eat of the Sweet-meats before the Verdict given And so I conceive there is not any cause to make void the Verdict given but the said three Jurors are fineable Dodderidge Justice Whether they eat or not they are fineable for the having of the Sweet-meats with them for it is a very great misdemeanour And now we cannot tell which of the Jurors the three were and because it was not moved before the Jurors departed from the Bar it is now too late to examine the Jurors for we do not know for which three to send for The nine drew the three which had the Sweet-meats to their opinions and therefore there is no cause to stay Judgment But if the three Jurors had drawn the nine other to them then there had been sufficient cause to have stayed the Judgment but as this case is there is no cause And therefore per Curiam Judgment was given for the Defendant according to the Verdict Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench 449. NOte It was vouched by George Crook and so was also the opinion of the whole Court That by way of Agreement Tythes may pass for years without Deed but not by way of Lease without a Deed. But a Lease for one year may be of Tythes without Deed. Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 450. THe Plaintiffe recovered in Debt in the Kings Bench and a Capias ad Satisfaciendum was awarded and immediately upon the awarding of the Capias the Defendant dyed Quaere if in such case an Action of Debt lieth against the special Bail The Executors having nothing a Scire-facias doth not lie against the Bail And in the Common-Pleas in that case the Court was divided two Judges being against the other two Judges Ideo quare Trin. 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 451. LEONARD's Case IN a Scire facias to have Execution of a Recognizance the Case was That a special Supplicavit for the Peace was directed out of the Chancery to A. and B. Justices of the Peace and to the Sheriffe of the County of c. to take a Recognizance of L. M. N. for the Peace and good behaviour and the
Commission was to A. B. and the Sheriff cuilibet eorum The Supplicavit was delivered to the two Iustices who took a Recognizance from L. but M. N. could not be found The Sheriffe was afterwards out of his Office because his year of Sheriffwick expired The new Sheriffe made a Retorn That M. N. non sunt inventi in balliva mea And also Retorned That A. B. had taken a Recognizance of L. as appeareth per quandam schedulam huic annex in haec verba c. This Case was argued and 21 H. 7. 20. 21. vouched That if the Writ be first delivered to the Sheriffe then he only is for to execute the Writ and retorn the Supplicavit But if it be first delivered to the Iustices then they ought to execute it and retorn it 9 E. 4. 31. A Supplicavit is a Iudicial Writ and cannot be executed by a Deputy but a Ministerial Writ may be executed by a Deputy In this case the succeeding Sheriffe did retorn the Writ and it was not directed unto him And the same being delivered to the Chancellor whether the same should be a Record or not was the Question 4 H. 7. 17. Debt was brought upon an Obligation The Kings Serjeant prayed the Bond for the King because that the Plaintiffe was a person Outlawed Bryan Iustice You ought to bring a Writ of Detinue to recover the Bond which is a legal course for the King And so in this case here is no Record for the King because the Recognizance comes not in by a legal course viz. a lawful Retorn for it was retorned by the new Sheriffe and also by him who did not execute the Commission Heath said cleerly There was no Record for the King and vouched 21 H. 7. 20 21. Note the whole Case there 1. Where it is said In casu superiori ipse Justiciarius qui primo illud breve de Supplicavit recepit tota executione ejusdem Brevis tantummodo tenetur reliqui sociorum suorum tangent dictum Breve exonerentur Justiciarius hanc recipiens nomine suo proprio illud retornabit And in our Case it was directed to the Sheriffe and Iustices and being delivered to the Iustices the Sheriffe had not to do to make Certificate of it and in this case he is but as a private man This suit is a Scire facias to have Execution upon the said Recognizance A Dedimus potestatem is directed to two and one of them doth execute it the other cannot certifie it for the Execution of it ought to be upon his own knowledge A Record taken by one cannot be certified by another for if it be it is not any Record upon which a Scirefacias can be awarded In our Case the Justices made the Record and the Sheriffe did certifie it Ley Chief Justice When the Recognizance is put to writing or Notes of Remembrance taken of the Recognizance before the Commissioners it is immediately a Record One takes Notes of a Recognizance and dyeth He to whose hands the Notes come may certifie the same for it is a perfect Record by the taking of the Notes of Remembrance But that is to be understood when no Writ is directed to Commissioners but when a Justice takes is In our Case the Sheriffe may retorn the Writ ex officio and also retorn That executio istius brevis patet in quadam schedula annexa And it doth not appear but that the now Sheriffe was at the Execution of this Commission But admit that he was not yet now the Writ being retorned into the Chancery your pleading and taking issue upon another matter hath made it a good Record And therefore I hold that the Judgment ought to be given for the King according to the Verdict Haughton Justice Judgment cannot be for King If the Record doth not come duly into the Chancery according to course of Law it is not any Record upon which there can be any Procution If a Judge take a Fine and dyeth before it be certified a Certiorari ought to be directed to the Executors of the Judge v. 2 H. 7. 10. but the Certiorari ought not to be to a stranger If two Iustices of Peace have Commission to take a Recognizance and one of them taketh it and dyeth the Certiorari must be to his Executors and not to the other Iustice In this Case the Record came into the Chancery by undue course The Commission was several Cuilibet eorum and those who took upon them the Execution thereof are now made Officers by the express words of the Writ and it is not so here retorned and therefore Iudgment ought to be against the King A Dedimus potestatem is directed to four to take a Fine of Lands in several Counties Two of them take it in one County and they certifie it and the two other take it in another County and they certifie it None of the Certificates are good Dodderidge Iustice Iudgment ought to be against the King There are two Questions in the Case 1. Whether the Sheriffe as this Case is may onely make the Retorn 2. Admitting that he cannot but the same being retorned and the Chancery accepting of it and sending it to this Court whether we can damn the Record 1. This is a special Recognizance upon the grievance of the party and by the Kings Commission they are made especial Iudges in this case And when the party who sues delivers the same to the two Justices the Sheriff cannot entermeddle therewith for then the Justices ought to retorn the Recognizance by vertue of that Commission 21 H. 7. 20 21. there the Case is direct in the point That they to whom the Writ is first delivered they only are to execute it and retorn it for they only have power by vertue of the special Commission The Writ was against three and two of them are not to be found The Sheriff cannot retorn Non sunt inventi for the two by force of this Commission and he is not to make his Retorn as a Minister or Officer to the other because the Writ is Judicial If a Challenge be to the Sheriff and Coroners and process is directed to Esliors they are to execute the process as particular Officers by vertue of the Writ and they are to retorn the same and not the Sheriff because their authority is by vertue of a special Writ To the 2. point it hath been said That the Record is in the Chancery and the partie hath pleaded to it to issue and it is now sent into this Court and now fault is found with it but not before Though all this be so yet we cannot accept of it here if it have not due proceedings If process be directed to the Coronors for Challenge to the Sheriff and then a new Sheriff is made against whom there is no cause of challenge yet the Coronors must execute and finish the process and not the new Sheriff for the Law will not endure that Offficers do
make a mingling of their Offices Vi. 13 E. 4 10 E. 3. By Hill and Herle For Trials out of the Chancery the Chancery and Kings Bench are but as one Court and if the Record come not in duely as it should the Court was never well seised of the Record Ley Chief Justice The coming of the Writ to the hands of one or two of the Commissioners shall not stay the Commission but the receipt of the one of them is the receit of them all having notice of it and the others may joyn with him to whom the Commission is delivered So it is in all cases every one of the Commissioners are interessed therein upon notice and not he only to whom the Commission is delivered If one Justice of peace taketh a Recognizance and dieth before it be certified the Certiorari shall be directed to the other Justice to certifie it if it come to his hands and he may retorn the Recognizance and it shall not be directed to the Executors of the Iustice who have not the Recognizance for the Certiorari is but the hand for the Court to receive it for otherwise the King might lose the benefit of the Recognizance And in our Case the Sheriff by a special Commission hath Authority to take the Recognizance and to retorn it upon Record One may do part of the Office as to make and take the Recognizance and the other may retorn it but one cannot execute a thing in part and another in another part the taking of the Recognizance by the two Justices doth exclude the Sheriff from medling with the taking or making of it but it doth not hinder him but that he may retorn it well enough and the Writ or Commission is general Vicecomiti which may extend as well to the new Sheriff as to the old Sheriff The Case was adjourned for by two Iudges the Supplicavit and Recognizance were not well retorned by the new Sheriff but Ley Chief Justice was against them Quaere Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 452. RANDAL and HARVEY's Case THe Case was Harvey in consideration that Brown might go at large who was arrested at the suit of Randal gave his word that Brown should pay the money at such a day certain and for non-payment of the money Randal brought his Action against Harvey and being at issue upon the promise it was found for the Plaintiff Yelverton moved in arrest of Iudgment that the arrest of Brown was not warrantable by Law and that being the consideration the Promise was void and he said A man cannot make another his Attorney to arrest another man without Deed neither can the Sheriff give Warrant to his Baylie to arrest another without a Deed sealed And in the principal case Randal gave one a VVarrant to T. being an Attorney to demand receive and recover money from Brown but it did not appear by the Declaration that the VVarrant was by Deed in writing George Crook said that it was no Exception For be the Arrest lawfull or unlawfull yet he said the consideration was good Randal gave to his Attornie Authority to receive demand and recover thereby he gave him Authority to arrest Brown because the arrest is incident to the Recoverie 2 R. 2. Grants One grants to another all the Fish in his Pond he may fish with Nets For when he giveth the principal the incidents do follow VVhen Brown had yieldded himself to be lawfully arrested and then Harvey in consideration that Brown might go at liberty made the promise the same was good The Declaration was That Randal gave Authority to T. being an Attorney to receive deliver and recover the Debt by force of which Letter of Attorney T. did arrest Brown and so in the Declaration it is shewed that the Warrant was a Letter of Attorney Yelverton 34 H. 6. In Debt upon a Recoverie in the 5 Ports If a man will declare and set forth a thing in particular if he faileth in any thing it overthroweth his Action But if a man alledge generally a Recoverie in the 5 Ports then the same is good enough I agree the Case of 9 E. 4. Where a man gives leave to another to lay Pipes of Lead through his Lands that he may dig the ground to lay them there because it is incident to it And I agree the Case of 2 R. 2. for there the one thing cannot be done without the other viz. the Fish cannot be taken without Nets but in this Case the partie might have come by his money by Outlawrie and so there needed no arresting of the partie Ley Chief Justice If he had declared debito modo arrestatus it had been generally good and it must be intended that the Arrest was by vertue of a Letter of Attorney For he alledges that he gave him Authority to recover and then he shall have and use the means to recover as to arrest the partie or to outlaw him Haughton Justice Things incident and accessary may be comprehended in the principal as to dig for to mend the Pipe 9 E. 4. Because he grants him leave to lay them in the ground and so he may dig and justifie the same for the amending of the pipes If A. Licence B. to hunt in his Park and to kill a Deer yet B. cannot carry away the Deer for that is not incident to the thing granted In this case the Declaration is not good for he ought to set forth that the VVarrant was by Deed in writing and yet one may plead a Judgment generally quod debito modo he recovered and the same is good but here in this case he ought to set forth and shew the VVarrant and Authority by which he was arrested but not so in the case of pleading of a Judgment because there it doth refer to matter of Record Dodderidge Justice The promise was to free him from the arrest and if the arrest was unlawfull then there was no consideration and so by consequent the promise was void It ought to be shewed that Brown was lawfully arrest and if the arrest had been only matter of inducement and no cause of the Action then it had been sufficient to have said debito modo arrestatus but in this case the arrest it self is material and the Plaintiff hath shewed that the arrest was per debitum legis Cursum by vertue of a VVarrant of Attorney and it doth not appear but that it was a Letter of Attorney to deliver Seisin and so because the Plaintiff hath not shewed the arrest to be lawfull there was no good consideration whereupon to ground the promise and so no cause of Action Yelverton took another Exception viz. That the Plaintiff doth not shew that the arrest was per breve Regis or how it was Chamberlain Justice If the partie had brought an Action of false Imprisonment this Plea had not been good and in this case there appeareth to be no good consideration for it doth not appear that it was a
for years rendring Rent by an Enfant and afterwards at his full age he accepts the Rent of the particular Tenant it is a good comfirmation of the estate of him in the remainder Litt. 547. If he at full age confirm it is good which could not be if the Lease were void and yet in that Case it doth not appear that there was any Rent reserved The Enfant being a Copyholder makes no difference in the Case And in Murrels Case C. 4. part It is said That if a Copyholder make a Lease not warrantable by the Custome it is a forfeiture which proves it is a good Lease otherwise it could not be a forfeiture Hill 37 Eliz. in the Kings Bench Rot. 99. East and Hardings Case A Copyholder makes a Lease for three years by word to begin at Michaelmas next ensuing it is a forfeiture of the Copyhold and a good lease betwixt the parties Hill 18 Jacobi Haddon and Arrowsmiths Case One licensed his Copyholder for life to make a Lease for 20. if he should so long live and he made a lease for 20 years and left out the words if he should so long live yet because he was a Copyholder for life and so the lease did determine by his death and so he did no more then by Law he might do it was adjudged a good Lease and no forfeiture otherwise if he had been a Copyholder in Fee All Conditions in Fact shall bind an Enfant but not Conditions in Law C. 8. part 44. Whittinghams Case An Enfant Tenant for life or years makes a Feoffment in Fee it is no forfeture For if the Lessor entreth the Enfant may enter upon him again yet it is a good Feoffment but he shall avoid it by Enfancy but if it be by matter of Record then it is otherwise For if an Enfant be Lessee for life and levieth a Fine it is a forfeiture and in that case if the Lessor enter for the forfeiture the Enfant shall not enter again The same Law if an Enfant committeth Waste which is against a Statute it is a forfeiture and if the Lessor recovereth the place wasted the Enfant shall not enter again 9 H. 7 24. A woman an Enfant who hath right to enter into lands taketh a husband and a discent is cast yet she shall avoid the discent after the death of her husband The Court said That if in the Case at Barr the Enfant had been Tenant in Fee at the Common Law and made a lease without Deed and had accepted the Rent at his full age that the same had been good for that there he had a recompence but being a Copyholder it is a question Jones Justice It was adjudged in the Common Pleas in Peters Case That if a Copyholder without licence maketh a Lease not warranted by the Custome That such Lessee should maintain an Ejectione firme The Councel against the Enfant in the Case at Barr said That the Enfant made the Lease as Tenant by the Common-Law for that he made it by Conveyance of the Common-Law And so the Lease was voidable and not void and then the acceptance of the Rent had made the Lease to be good It was adjourned to another day Hill 2. Caroli Rot. 389 in the Kings Bench. 457. GEORGE BUSHER against MURRAY Earl TILLIBARN A Scire facias was brought dated 28 Junii retornable in Mich. Term 2 Car. Regis why Execution should not be awarded against the Defendant upon a Iudgment had against him in this Court The Defendant pleaded That King Charles 7 Octob. in the second year of his Reign did take him into his protection for a year and did grant unto him that during that time he should be free from all manner of Plaints but Dower Quare Impedit and Placit coram Justiciariis Itinerantibus It was said that this Protection was not warrantable by Law for three causes 1. Because it is after the purchase of the Scire facias and before the Retorn 10 H. 6. 3. 11 H. 4. 7. A Protection depending the Suit is not allowable although it make mention that the party is to go a voyage with the Kings Son 2. Because he doth not specifie any particular cause why the Protection was granted unto him All our books do express a cause viz. Quia moratur c. quia profecturus c. Register 22 23. there three Protections are Quia incarceratus 39 H. 6. 38 39 40. per Curiam The Protection ought to express a special cause otherwise it is not good Fitz. 28. a. b. the cause is expressed 1. R. 2. cap. 16. The particular cause ought to be in the Protection A Protection being general the party hath no remedy against him to traverse it or to procure it to be repealed 3. This Court is greater then a Iustice in Eyre and he is excepted in placitis itinerantibus That Court was of opinion that there was no colour for allowing of the Protection A Safe-conduct will only keep the party safe from harm but will not protect him from Actions Mich. 2 Caroli Intratur Pasch 18. Jur. Rot. 298. in the Common Pleas. 458. ROYDEN and MOULSTER's Case IN Trespass for entring into his Close called Dipson in Suffolk upon Not guilty pleaded the Jury gave a special verdict That the said Close was parcel of the Mannor of Movedon and demisable by Copy of Court-Roll and that the same was granted to G. Starling in Fee by Copy of Court-Roll who had issue two sons John and Henry And that 35 Eliz. George Starling did surrender the same to the use of his Will and thereby demised the same to John and the heirs males of his body with divers Remainders over and dyed seised And that the Surrender was presented according to the Custom and that John was admitted to have to him his heirs And that the said John had issue 3 sons Harry George and Nicholas And that the said John 43 Eliz. did surrender to the use of his Will and thereby devised the same to Katherine his wife and dyed and that the said Surrender 9 Martii 4t Eliz. was presented and the said Katherine was admitted Harry George and Nicholas dyed without issue They further found That the Custom of the Mannor is That the youngest brother is to have the Copyhold by discent And also That no Copyholder by the Custome could make any Estate in feodo and that the said Katherine took to her husband Francis Robinson who 1 Sept 17 Iacobi leased the same to Royden the Plaintiffe for one year who entred and was thereof possessed untill Moulster the Defendant by the commandment of c. did out him c. In which case the only Question was Whether a Copyhold be within the Statute of West 2. so as an estate thereof so limited should be a Fee tail or a Fee conditional And by the opinion of the Justices of the common-Common-Pleas it was adjudged That a Copyhold could not be entituled within the
Bill Obligatory and doth not shew that it was delivered Dyer 156. Per scriptum suum gerens datum and doth not say Primò deliberatum is not good The fourth Error was That in the Replication the Plaintiffe saith dixit whereas it ought to be dicit in present tense 10 H. 7. 12. The title to the Assise took Exception to the Plaintiffs title because that he said fuit seitus of a Messuage whereas he ought to have said est seitus But yet it was there holden good because he saith that all those whose title he hath c. by which words the possession shall be intented to continue 35 H. 6. 11. 85. vi 268. A Writ a False Judgment directed to the Sheriffe Recordare loquelam que est and the form and the presidents are quae fuit 9 H. 6. 12. The Sheriff retorns Non est inveni whereas it ought to be Nom est inventus and adjudged Error And he said That Detinue is only to be brought when it self is to be recovered in as good plight and no other Action It doth appear by the Record that in this Case at Trial 18 were only retorned upon the Pannel wheras there ought to have been 24 retorned By the Statute of West 2. cap. 38. 24 ought to be retorned on the Pannel 8 H. 4. 20. More then 24. shall not be retorned 2 H. 7. 8. The Sheriffe retorned but 12. and it was ruled to be an insufficient retorn because 24 ought to have been retorned 36 H. 6. 27. Trespass is brought for a Box and Charters which concerned the Plaintiffs lands and damages were given entirely and there it was adjudged not to be good because the Plaintiffe did not make any title to the Box nor did shew that the same was locked or sealed For the Box may belong to one and the Charters to another as the Evidences to the heir and the Box to the Executors unless the Box be first locked Note The opinion of the whole Court was because that the issue was particular That he was not guilty of the Trespass and detaining untill the Plaintiff had entred into a Bond. And the Jury found him guilty of the Trespass generally That the Verdict was not good to make the Defendant guilty by implication And Justice Dodderidge said That the Plaintiff hath brought his Action of Trespass and doth not lay any possession of the Box And Trespass is a possessory Action Also he said That the Plaintiff did not set forth the Quality of the Evidences viz. Whether they were Releases Deeds of Feoffments or other particular Evidences And for these causes and for the causes before alleadged the Judgment given in the Court at Lincoln was reversed Pasch 3 Caroli in the Kings Bench. 461. Sir WILLIAM FISH and WISEMAN's Case JUdgment was given in the Common-Pleas against Sir William Fish and after the year and day Execution was awarded by Capias where it ought to have been by a Scire facias first And the Plaintiff was taken in Execution and brought a Writ of Error in this Court where the Judgment was affirmed but the Execution was reversed because the Execution was not warrantable the Process being erronious And out of the Kings Bench another Execution was awarded by Capias sicut alias within the year of the affirmance of the Judgment in the Kings Bench. And it was moved by Banks That the Execution was erronious because he ought to have a Scire facias because the year is past after the Judgment in the Common-Pleas and although that the Court be changed yet the Plaintiffe ought to have the same Process for Execution as he ought to have in the first Court 14 H. 7. 15. The first Process was reversed for Error and then he cannot have a Sicut alias but ought to have a new Original We pray a Supersedeas of the Execution for Sir William Fish the Plaintiffe and that he may be delivered out of Execution Sir William Fish had a Release and that was the cause that Wiseman would not take a Scirefacias Sir William Fish upon the Judgment in the Common-Pleas was taken in Execution and upon a Writ of Error brought Bail was put in to proceed with effect and then he was delivered out of Execution And then he cannot now be taken in Execution again upon the same Judgment 16 H. 7 2. per Curiam If one be in Execution upon Condemnation in the Common-Pleas and the Record and the body is removed into the Kings Bench by Error then the party shall find collateral Securities by their Recognisance to pay the Condemnation in case the Judgment be affirmed and further to proceed with effect In this case the body is discharged of Execution as to any Process to take the body unless he render himself to prison of his own accord to discharge his Sureties And if he will not do it he who recovereth hath no remedy but to make the Sureties to pay the Condemnation by reason of their Recognisance 2 E. 4. 8. A man is condemned in London tempore Vacationis and hath Execution in the Term and the Defendant sueth a Corpus cum causa and had his priviledge in the Common-Pleas Danby The Plantiffe shall not have Debt for at the beginning when the Defendant was in Execution the Action of Debt was gone and then he being discharged here the Action of Debt doth not lie To which Needham agreed And Choke said He did not know any remedy that the party had and conceived that he could not have a new Execution 14 H. 7. 1. If one escape out of Execution the Plaintiffe cannot take him again in Execution but his remedy is against the Gaoler The Court may supersedeat this Execution because it is erronious 34 H. 6. 45. b. An Action of Debt was brought against an Executor who pleaded that he had fully administred And it was found that he had Assets and Judgment was given against the Defendant and a Capias was awarded against him and after that an Exigent And the Court granted a Supersedeas to supersede that Erronious process For a Capias doth not lie against an Executor where he pleads c. but a Fieri facias And therefore in the principal Case Banks prayed a Supersedeas Jones Justice If Error be brought within the year of the Judgment in the common-Common-Pleas and the Judgment be affirmed here the party shall have a Capias although the Judgment be affirmed two years after the bringing of the Writ of Error For he shall take the same Execution in the Kings Bench as in the Common-Pleas and the altering of the Court makes no difference in it And so was Garnon's case The Writ of Error was brought within the year of the Judgment in the Common-Pleas but it was not affirmed in two years after and yet there he had the same Process in the Kings-Bench as he was to have had in the Common-Pleas Dodderidge Justice If the Execution be lawfull and upon lawfull Process
The want of a letter out of a word is out of the Statutes C. 8. part You should have alleadged some place The Statute of 21 Jacobi is not of any Venire facias which is misawarded generally but the Statute helpeth when there are two places and the visne ought to come from both places and the visne comes but from one place and when there is but one place and the visne comes from two places If Enfancie be to be tryed sc If he were at such a time within age it ought to be tryed by the Country This matter is collateral to the first Record and it is a new Record sc upon Error The whole Court was of opinion that it was out of the Statute and a Repleader was granted Whitlock Justice There is no Trial at all for there is no Venire facias at all Dodderidge Justice If the Defendant in Error plead an ill plea he shall replead But if in this Action he had alleadged a place of his Enfancie sc at Dale and the Venire facias had been of Sale there it had been good trial and there he should not replead for that he hath pleaded well but there he shall have a Venire facias de novo Pasch 3 Caroli in the Kings Bench. 470. DAY 's Case DAY was Indicted for erecting of a Cottage It was moved that the Indictment was insufficient for that the words of the Statute of 31 Eliz. cap. 7 are Shall willingly uphold maintain and continue And the Indictment is only That he continued and so wants the words voluntarily upheld according to the Statute 2. It did not appear in the Indictment that it was newly erected for it is only that he continued but not that he erected The Indictment was quashed because being a penal Law it was not pursued Pasch 3 Caroli in the Kings Bench. 471. MAN's Case MAN was Indicted That he fuit adhâ—â—c est a common Barrettor and no place is expressed where he was a Barrettor so as no trial can be Dodderidge Justice If he be a Barrettor in one place he is a Barrettor in all places The Indictment was Per quod he did stir up contentions Jurgia And no place alleadged where he did stir up Jurgia contentions And it was said that in that case the place was very material And so the Indictment was quashed for want of setting forth the place where he did stir up many Contentions Jurgia c. Pasch 3 Caroli in the Kings Bench. 472. GREEN and MOODY'S Case AN Action of Debt was brought for Rent and it was found for the Plaintiff Thyn Serjeant moved in arrest of Judgment and set forth the Case to be That a Lease was made for years to begin at Michaâ—lmaâ— after And the Plaintiff in the Action of Debt for the Rent did declare Virtuâ—e cujus the Lessee did enter and did not shew what day according to Cliffords Case 7 E. 6. Dyer 89. But the Court said It is said in this Case Virtute cujus dimissionis he did enter and was possessed and that must be intended at Michaelmas Alexander and Dyer's Case 33 Eliz. was resolved accordingly And Cliffords Case Dyer 89. is not virtute cujus dimissionis And the Court held a difference betwixt Debt and Ejectione firme Cliffords case was an Ejectione firme but here it is Debt Jones Justice If he did enter before Michaelmas yet Debt will lie for the Rent upon the privity of contract for the Lessee cannot destroy the contract unless he make a Feoffment It was adjudged for the Plaintiff Quaere If when the Lessor in the case which Jones put hath brought his action and recovered when the Lessee hath entred before the day If the Lessor shall put him out as a Disseisor by reason of the Recovery in the action of Debt in which he hath admitted him to be Lessee for years Or if the Lessor after he hath recovered in Debt dyeth whether his heir shall be estopped by the Record to say otherwise then that he is in by the Lease Or whether the Recovery in Debt hath purged the wrong Like unto the Case 14 H. 8. 12. by Carret If one entreth into my lands and claims 20 years therein and I suffer him to continue there and accept of the Rent and afterwards he committeth Waste I shall maintain an action of Waste and declare upon the special matter If one entreth into my Land claiming a Lease for years per Curiam he is a Disseisor and he cannot qualifie his own wrong Dyer 134. Traps case But Sir Henry Yelverton said That I may admit him to be Tenant for years if I accept of the Rent or bring Waste as Carret said 14 H. 4. But he hath not but for years in respect of his claim But I am concluded by acceptance of the Rent or by bringing of the action of Waste So here by the bringing of the action of Debt the Lessor is concluded But Quaere if it shall bind his heir It was conceived it shall because it is by Record the strongest conclusion that is Pasch 3 Caroli in the Kings Bench. 473. SMITH's Case A Lease for years was made of Lands in Middlesex and the Lessor brought Debt in London against the Assignee The opinion of the whole Court was that it was not well brought but the Action ought to have been brought in Midd. Jones Justice Debt for Rent upon the privity of Contract may be brought in another County but if it be brought upon the privity of Estate as by the Grantee of the Reversion or against the Assignee of the Lessee then it ought to be brought in the County where the Land is Quod nota Pasch 3 Caroli in the Kings Bench. 474. CREMER and TOOKLEY's Case AN action of Debt was brought for suing in the Court of Admiralty against the Statutes of 13 R. 2. cap. 5. 15 R. 2. cap. 3. whereby it is enacted That of manner of Contracts Pleas and Complaints arising within the body of the Counties as well by land as by water the Admiral shall in no wise have conusans And the Statute gives damages part to the party and part to the King And the Plaintiff in the action of Debt did declare That the Defendant Tookley did implead Cremer the Plaintiff in the Court of Admiralty And in his Declaration set forth That one Mullâ—beck was Master of a Ship c. and that the Contract was made in London And that Tookley the Defendant did force the Plaintiff to appear and prosecuted the suit upon the Contract in the Admiral Court And by special Verdict it was found That a Charter-party was made betwixt Mullibeck and Cremer at Dunkirk And that Tookley did prosecute Cremer in the Admiral Court by vertue of a Letter of Attorney and so that he as Attorney to Mullibeck did prosecute the suit there The Case was argued by Andrewes for the Plaintiff There are two points The first upon the Jurisdiction of the Admiralty the Contract
was not found and so the King was not entitled to rights and priviledges and by consequence so was not his Pattentee 2. It did not appear that the Councel of Lateran 15 Johannis did extend to these Orders which was said to have been created 17 E. 3. whereas indeed it was created in the time of Henry the 1. Regularly this priviledge is not transferrable for it is ratione Ordinis As when the King makes a Duke and gives to him possessions those possessions annexed to the Dukedom are not transferrable over but by special Act of Parliament 35 H. 6. 36. Moile There if there had been special words in the Act of Parliament it had been Frankalmoigne This Priviledge is transferred to the King by the Act of 32 H. 8. and that Statute requires no aid of Regular or Ecclesiastical persons Secondly the words are special And all other things of theirs This Case opposeth not the Bishop of Canterbury's Case C. 3 part For that refers to the Statute of 1 E. 6. which had not so large words The intent of an Act shall be taken largely and beneficially to inlarge the Kings possessions as the grants of the King shall be taken largely and beneficially for the King There is a difference betwixt this Statute of 32 H. 8. and the Statute of 27 H. 8. The copulative words of the Statute of 27 H. 8. are To have all Rights and Interests and Hereditaments C. 11. part 13. pro omnibus demandis c. there the demand shall extend to Temporal demand so All rights and Interest and Inheritance shall be construed All temporal rights c. But the Statute of 32 H. 8. is larger viz. Of what name and nature soever If by the words of the Statute of 31 H. 8. Priviledges Tythes had been given to the King without especial provision after made then what needed the special Clause after was the Objection which hath been made I answer The special Clause was necessary For in pleading otherwise he ought to have shewed what Priviledge and Discharge it was in particular and so the Clause was added for the case of pleading C. 9. part The Abbot of Strata Mercellos case there it is said That if a man plead to have such priviledges as such a one had he ought to shew in particular what those priviledges were But this provision in the Statute of 31 H. 8. was made for the benefit of pleading The Statute of 17 E. 2. which gave the Tythes to the Hospitalers give them by the word of Priviledges for they had their possessions as it were by a new purchase Cook Entries 450. there the Case much differs from this so then the general word Priviledges doth extend to Tythes 14 H. 8. 2. By a grant of All trees Apple-trees will not pass yet if it be of all trees cujuscunque generis naturae nominis aut qualitatis then they will pass C. 3. part 81. By grant of all goods Apparel will not pass Here are special words in the Statute cujuscunque naturae nominis c. Nominla sunt symboa rerum And then call them what you will they are given to the King and intended to be transferred to the King and so there needs no special provision for the discharge of the Tythes For to say that the Priory was of the Order of the Cistertians is sufficient Admit then that the King shall have the Tythes as I have argued he shall then his Pattentee shall have them It is a real discharge in the King and not a discharge in respect of his person only Priviledges of discharge may be transferred as well as Priviledges of profit Then the question further is Whether they of S. Johns of Jerusalem were Ecclesiastical They were Regular as appeareth by the Statute of 32 H. 8. for that saith that they shall be free from Obedience Trin. 8. Jacobi in the Common-Pleas Bowyers case Whore Cook Nichols Warburton and Winch did agree that they were Ecclesiastical Priests The Prior had Parsonages and none could have Parsonages but Ecclesiastical persons 3 E. 3. 11. They had Appropriations which could not be unto Lay-men 22 E. 4. 42. There a Writ of Annuity was brought against the Prior of S. Johns of Jerusalem and it was ruled there that he ought to be named Parson which proves that he was Ecclesiastical 26 H. 8. cap. 2. there it is said That he shall pay First-fruits as other Parsons which proves that he was Parson 42 E. 3. 22. there they are called Ecclesiastical 35 H. 6. 56. they were seised in the right of the Church Linwood lib. cap. 47. de Judiciis That they were Ecclesiastical It was objected that Knight-hood cannot be given to Ecclesiastical persons and they were Knights Popham once Chief Justice of this Court said That he had seen a Commission directed unto a Bishop to Knight all the Parsons within his Diocese and that was the cause that they were called Sir John Sir Thomas and so they continued to be called untill the Reign of Queen Elizabeth Jones and Dodderidge Justices They were Ecclesiastical persons although they were divided from the jurisdiction of the Bishop The Case was adjourned to be further argued Pasch 3 Caroli in the Kings Bench. 479. LANGLEY and STOTE's Case IN an Ejectione firme the Plaintiff declared of an Ejectment 26 Martii 23 Jacobi contra pacem dicti Domini Regis nunc which could not be because King James dyed the 27 of March and so it was not contra pacem Caroli Regis 8 H. 4. 21. An Appeal of Maheim was brought and the Plaintiff declared That he meyhemed in the time of the King that now is and the Writ did suppose the same to be in the time of King R. 2. And for that cause it was adjudged Quod nihil capiat per Breve Pasch 3 Caroli in the Kings Bench. 480. MUTLE and DOE's Case DEbt was brought upon a Bond aud the Plaintiff in his Declaration doth not say hic in Curio prolat It was holden by the Court That although it be in the election of the Defendant to demand Oyer of it yet the Plaintiff ought to shew it The Judgment also was entred Concessum est whereas it ought to have been Ideo consideratum est And for these causes the Judgment was reversed So was it adjudged also the same Term in this Court in Barret and Wheeler's Case Pasch 3 Caroli in the Kings Bench. 481. Serjeant HOSKIN's Case HE was Indicted for nor paving of the Kings high-way in the County of Middlesex in S. Johns street ante tenementaâ— sua And in the Indictment it was not shewed How he came chargeable to pay the same Nor was it shewed that he was seised of any house there nor that he dwelt there nor was it averred that he had any Tenement there The opinion of the Court was that the Indictment was incertain for it might be that his Lessee dwelt in the house and so the Lessee ought to have repaired it and
also mended the high-way And for these Incertainties the Indictment was quashed Pasch 3 Caroli in the Kings Bench. 482. SAMSON and GATEFIELD's Case ERror was brought to reverse a Judgment given in the Court of Virge in an Action upon the Case where the original Process fuit a Sommons whereas it ought to have been an Attachment Pasch 3 Caroli in the Kings Bench. 483. HERN and STUB's Case IN an Action of Detinue the Plaintiff did declare upon the Bailment of a Cloak of the value of 10l. to the Defendant to be safely kept and to be redelivered unto him upon request And shewed That he did request the Defendant to redeliver it and that yet he doth detain it to his damage c. The Defendant justified the Detainer by reason of a Forain Attachment in London And said That London is an ancient City and that there is a Custom in London c. That if any one be indebted unto another that if he will enter his suit or plaint into the Counter of the Sheriff of London that a Precept shall be awarded unto a Sergeant at Mace to summon the Defendant and if he retorn Nihilâ— viz. that he hath nothing within the City by which he may be summoned and Non est inventus And if he be solemnly called at the next Court and makes default that then if he can shew that the Defendant hath goods in the hands of one within the Liberty of the City that the said goods shall be attached And if the Defendant make default at four Court-dayes being solemnly called that then if the Plaintiff will swear his Debt and put in Bail for the goods viz. That if the Debt be disproved within one year and a day or the Judgment be reversed That he he shall have Judgment for the said goods And he shewed That he entred his plaint against the now Plaintiff in the Counter of Woodstreet for the Debt of 20l. and that a Precept was awarded to a Sergeant at Mace to summon him And because he had not any thing by which he could be summoned he shewed that the now Plaintiff had goods in his the Defendants hands which were attached in his hands And that he sware his Debt and put in bail for the goods and had Judgment thereupon Upon which Plea the Plaintiff did demur in Law Ward argued for the Plaintiff There are four Reasons of the Demurrer 1. He sets forth That J. S. did levy a plaint against the now Plaintiff for the Debt of 20l. but doth not set forth expresly that he did owe him 20l. And he ought to have set down how the Debt grew due for that is traversable by the Plaintiff and now hee cannot traverse it C. 10. part 77. The generall Count in an Action upon the Case Quod cum indebitatus fuit in such a summe Super se Assumpsit without shewing the Cause of the Debt is insufficient 5 H. 7. 1. Trespass was brought for taking of a Chain of Gold The Defendant said That the Plaintiff before the trespass supposed did License him to take the same Chain and to retain it untill he paid him 200 Marks which he ought to pay him Keble took Exception because the Defendant did not alledge for what cause the 200 Marks was due which Cause the Plaintiff might traverse to which Brian acc ' 9 E. 4. 41. Trespass for taking a Bagg with Money the Defendant said That the Plaintiff was indebted unto him in a certain Summ and delivered unto him the Bagg of Money in satisfaction Littleton The plea is not good for he ought to shew how he was indebted unto him Old Entries 155 156. there in a Forraign Attachment the certainty of the Debt was expressed and averred 2. He pleads a Custom and doth not prosecute his Case according to Custom The Custom is That if the Sergeant retorn that he hath nothing within the City whereby he may be summoned And Non est inventus And at the next Court day he be solemnly demanded and make default c. And he saith That because he had nothing by which he could bee summoned but doth not say That the Officer did return that he had not any thing whereby to be summoned nor that he was not to be found nor doth he plead or say That at the next Court day he was solemnly demanded Dyer 196. b. where this Case of Forraign Attachment was there the Custom is set forth viz. That the Debt ought to be affirmed by the Oath of the party in Curia Guildhall and this was pleaded to be in Curia Vicecomit in Computatorio Also he doth not averr That he had found pledges according to the Custom and therefore the plea is insufficient because he hath not purchased the Custom 3. He sheweth that the goods were attached in the Defendants hands but he doth not shew that it was within the Liberty of the City and it might be out of the liberty of the City and all the Presidents are infra Jurisdictionem c. And the Plea of every person shall be taken strongest against the Pleader And he ought to have shewed that it was within the Liberty of the City because it is a peculiar Jurisdiction 34 E. 3. breve 789. Debt was brought in the Common Pleas the Defendant said That the Plaintiff had a Bill for the same Debt depending in the Exchequer and demanded Judgment of the Writ non allocatur for it doth not appear by the Plea that the Plaintiff or Defendant were priviledged in the Exchequer and then by the Statute of Articuli super Chart as cap. 4. it is provided That no Common plea shall be holden in the Exchequer 4 E. 4 36. a In trespass for Imprisonment the Defendant doth justifie c. there he ought to shew that the Tower of London hath priviledges c. For where a man will take advantage of a particular Priviledge and Liberty he ought to shew that he was within the Priviledge of Liberty Miâ— 2. Car-Willis was Indicted before the Justices of Northampton for frequenting of a Bawdy-house in Northampton and the Indictment was quashed for it might be within Northampton and yet out of the Liberties and Jurisdiction of Northampton 4. He doth not shew in his Plea that his Debt was a due Debt and it was pleaded Dyer 196. that it was a due Debt vi Entries 155 156. It is not enough to swear his Debt but he must sweat his Debt to be a due Debt Stone for the Defendant 1. I agree that if the Action had been brought in that Court to recover a Debt then he ought to set forth how it became due but here he pleads to bar him and not to recover and so the Debt is not traversable 5 H. 7 1. there Brian took the Exception but two Judges are against him because he brought not Debt but another Action for the Chain 9 E. 4. 41. It is good by Moile without shewing the Debt because it is by way of excuse
but doth not shew by whom And shewed that the Lands inclosed out of which the Inhabitants had their Common And said That there were divers other Grievances to the Inhabitants of Tue but did not shew by whom they were nor what they were and shewed that at a Parliament the Defendant did deliver such a Writing to the Prince as one of the Peers of Parliament supposing that the grievances were set upon the Inhabitants by the Plaintiff by reason the Plaintiff occupied the Lands so inclosed and for Reformation thereof that he delivered the Writing to the Prince Absque hoc that he did deliver it in any other manner And upon this Plea in Barr Tanfield the Plaintiff did demurr in Law Noy for the Plaintiff said That the Defendant complains of wrong and doth not shew any wrong to be done by Tanfield the Plaintiff It is a grievous scandal to deliver this Writing for it is a scandalous Writing and no Petition for therein he doth not desire any Reformation but complains generally Betwixt John Frisel and the Bishop of Norwich The Case touched in 21 E. 3. was That Frisel brought a Prohibition to The Bishop and the Bishop excommunicated him for the delivering of it unto him The Bishop was fined And there it is said As Reverence is due to the King so it is due to his Ministers Our Action is brought at the Common Law and not upon the Statute of R. 2. de scandalis magnatum M. 18 E. 3. Rot. 162. Thomas Badbrook sent a Letter to Ferris one of the Kings Councel the effect of which was That Scot Chief Justice of the Kings Bench and his Companions of the same Bench would not do a vain thing at the Command of the King yet because he sent such a Letter to the Kings Councel although he spake no ill yet because it might incense the King against the Judges he was punished for it might be a means to make the King against his Judges We are to see here if the Defendant hath made any good Justification If there were no wrong then there was no cause to complain Secondly If he had demeaned himself as he ought he ought to have had the wrong if there were any reformed and that he did not do 11 H. 4. 5 H. 7. A voice of Fame is a good cause for to Arrest a man of Felony but then some Felony ought to be committed 7 H. 4. 35. A certain person came and said to one that there were certain Oxen stoln and that he did suspect such a one who he arrested upon the suspition It is a good cause of Justification if any Oxen were stoln but if no Fellony was committed if one be arrested upon suspicion that he hath committed Fellony it is not good If Fellony be done then a good cause to suspect him but if no Fellony be done nor he knoweth nor heareth of any Fellony committed there is no cause for to suspect that the partie hath committed Fellony but there ought to be suspition that the partie hath committed such a particular Fellony Where Fellony is committed certainly one may be arrested upon suspition but unless a Fellony be committed he cannot be arrested For where no Fellony is committed at all he shall not be drawn to a Tryal to clear himself of the suspition but if a Fellony be certainly committed and he be arrested upon the suspition there he being forced to answer to the Fellony he may clear and purge himself of the infamy upon his tryal and so the infamy is not permanent as in case when no Fellony is committed for there he may bring his Action upon the Case Here he saith that parcel of the Waste is inclosed and doth not shew what parcel so as no certain issue can be taken upon it Moor and Hawkins Case in an Ejectione firme It was alledged that he entred into parcel of the Land and the Land was alledged to lie in two several Towns and it was not good because no certain issue could be thereupon He saith the same was inclosed but doth not shew by whom it was inclosed viz. whether by the Feoffor or Tanfield the Feoffee he complains of many grievances but doth not shew what they are and he ought not to be his own Judge Secondly He hath not demeaned himself as he ought for he hath not desired in the Letter any Reformation but only he complains of the oppression of Tanfield He ought to have directed the Writing unto the Parliament and he directed the same unto the Prince by name In the Letter he doth not shew that Tanfield the Plaintiff did oppress but that the Plaintiff was an oppressor but he doth not shew in what thing The Case was adjourned Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 487. SCOT'S Case PRoborum legalium hominum is omitted in the Certificate of an Indictment by the Clark of the Sessions Curia If it had been in Trespass the omission of the said words had vitiated the Indictment but not in Case of Felony Quaere the reason Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. Intratur M. 19 Jac. Rot. 322. 488. CROUCH and HAYNE'S Case IN a Writ of Error the Record is removed out of the Common Pleas The Defendant pleads in nullo est Erratum and a Demurrer is joyned and the Defendant afterwards alledgeth Diminution of the Original 7 E. 4. 25. The Assignement of Errors is in lieu of the Declaration 4 E. 4. Error 44. After that in nullo est erratum is pleaded the Defendant shall not alledg Diminution for they are agreed before that that is the Record The Writ of Error was general and did not shew when the Judgment was when the Ejectment was what the Lands were and nothing is certain in the Writ of Error but the persons and the Action He shall not be concluded by the general retorn of the Record by the Chief Judg of the Common Pleas. Fitz. 25. a. C. 6. Entr. 231. The Record was removed and a Scire facias awarded ex recorde and Diminution was alledged for omitting of certain words yet the Retorn there was of the Record omnia ea tangentia Dyer 330. The Court certifie that the partie was not essoigned there then cannot be any Certificate of the Chief Justice to the contrary The Principal Case was An Original bore date in June 18 Jacobi and another Original in September 18 Jacobi and both were retornable S. Mich. And the Trespass was done after the first Original sued forth and before the later and both the Writs are in Court The question was upon which of the Originals the Judges should judge 4 E. 4. 26 27 28. There it is holden that the Judges ought not to suppose any Error 22 E. 4. 45 Error was brought to reverse a Judgment in a Writ of Dower And the Error assigned was That there was not any Issue joyned but because there was sufficient matter upon which the Judges might give their verdict therefore the Judgment was affirmed
Dodderige Justice the encroachment doth not make it to be no parcell of the Mannor Ley chief Justice it is not layed to be a Disseisin but an Encroachment and therefore it is not so strong as a Disseisin with a Discent but in Right it belongs to the Mannor Tenant in Tail makes a Feoffment to the use of himself and deviseth the Lands to A. the Devise doth prevent the Remitter Haughton Justice the Discent is Traversed The Father dieth seised and hath issue two Sons and that the Lands discended to him the other may say That the Land is borough English and that the Lands discend unto him Absque hoc that they discended to the Eldest Dodderidge Justice Regularly you shall not Traverse the Discent but by the dying seised but in this Case it ought to be of necessity sc â— in case of a Devise the Traverse must be of the Discent for here they cannot traverse the dying seised for if they traverse the dying seised then they overthrow their own Title sc the Devise but here in Case of a Will the partie shall traverse the Discent for he cannot say that it is true that the Lands did discend and that he Devised it c. The heir cannot traverse that which entitles him by Discent but here his Title is by the Devise and not as heir Finch Recorder the Devise is not of the four Foot for if we confess the dying seised of the four Foot which was holden in Capite then we should overthrow our own Devise The Office finds that he died seised of the whole and therefore of the four foot He being never seised we traverse the dying seised thereof and we deny that he ever had it so the Traverse is good without making of us any Title unto it for we desire not to have it Dodderidge Justice If a man deviseth to his heir it is a void Devise for the discent shall be preferred But if one hath Issue four daughters and he deviseth to one of them it is good for the whole Land so devised to her and no part of the Land so devised shall discend to the other the Lands being holden in Socage Ley Chief Justice and the whole Court did agree That they might deny and traverse the four Foot if the Ancestor had no Title unto it and Judgment was given accordingly against the King quod nota Trin. 21 Jac. in the Kings Bench. 490. PAYNE and COLLEDGES Case AN Agreement was made between Payne and Colledg That if Payne being Chirurgion did Cure Colledg of a great Disease viz. A Noli me tangere That then he should have 10l and that if he did not cure him That then for his pains and endeavours Colledg would give him 5l In an Action upon the Case brought by Payne he doth not shew in his Declaration in what place he used his endeavour and Industry And there is a difference where the Plaintiff is to do any thing of Skill and Industry for there he may do the same at several times and in several places and so this Case differs from the Cases in our books 15 H. 6. Accord 1. is expresly in the point There the Defendant pleaded an Accord That if the Defendant by his Industry c. And exception was taken because that he did not shew a place 3 E. 4. 1. Debt brought by a Servant and declares that he was reteined by the predecessor of the Defendant c. and that he had performed his Service c. It was moved in Arrest of Judgment and Exception taken as in our Case because he did not shew where he did the Service for that is issuable and Denly there said That he need not shew the place because he might do it in several places Bridgeman Serjeant contrarie If the issue had been upon a Collateral matter it had been good enough but here the issue is taken upon an endeavour and you ought to alleadg a place for the tryal of it Dodderidge Justice The Jury was from the place where the Agreement was made the verdict will not make good the Declaration although the Jury have found the whole matter of fact for it doth not appear to us That that was the Jury which could try his endeavour The Case of 3 E. 4. of the Servant was to serve him seaven years and there he need not shew any place where he did his Service but only that he obeyed his Master in his Service for the seaven years If the Plaintiff in this Case had shewed but any one place of doing his endeavour in it had been sufficient but here he sheweth no place at all And therefore Judgment was given That Querens nihil Capiat per Billam Trin. 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 491. The Lord ZOUCH and MOORES Case IN an Action of Trespass for cutting down of Trees in Odiham Park in Hampshire It was found by special Verdict That King Henry the eighth was seised of the Mannor and Park of Odiham And by his Letters Patents 33 of his Reign did grant unto Genny the Office of Stewardship of the said Mannor and the Office of Parkership of the said Park with reasonable Herbage and by the same Letters Patents did grant unto him the Mannor of Odiham cum pertinaciis and 100. Loads of Wood excepting the Park the Deer and the Wood for fifty years if he should so long live Then they found That after that Genny did surrender and restore the Letters Patents in the Chancery to be cancelled and that in truth they were cancelled and that the said Surrender was made to the intent to make a new Lease thereof unto Pawlet and that this Lease of 33 H. 8. being surrendred That King Henry the 8. Anno 36. of his Reign reciting the Letters Patents made to Genny to be dated anno 32 H. 8. whereas in truth they were dated 33 H. 8. and that they were surrendred and that the intent of the Surrender was to make a new Lease to Pawlet Did grant the same to Pawlet as before they were granted to Genny excepting as before They further found That King Philip and Queen Mary 5 6 of their Reigns being seised of the said Mannor and Park in jnro Coronae reciting that Henry the 8. anno 36 of his Reign had granted unto Paulet as before omitting the Proviso which was for 50 years if he should so long live and the Exceptions before And reciting that those Letters-Patents were surrendred ea intentione to make a new Lease in forma sequente They in consideration of good service and 200l paid did grant the Office as before and by those Letters-Patents did grant Herbage generally whereas the first Patent was reasonable Herbage And by these Letters-Patents did grant to him the Mannor cum pertinaciis except the grand trees and woods in the Park and Felons goods which were granted by the first Letters Patents for 50 years And here was a Rent reserved and a Proviso that for doing of Waste that the
and it is 32. whereas in truth it was 33 H. 8. The second Point then is If the Lease of 36. H. 8. be void then of necessity the Lease of 5. 6. Philip and Mary is void for therein is falsity of three things 1. The thing recited is the custody of the Park with reasonable Herbage and the Patentee would have nothing but pramissa and he trusts the King to give that and he takes from the Queen Herbage leaving out reasonable and so hee takes more then was intended him and therefore hee hath deceived the Queen and if you are to have reasonable Herbage the King may put one to be Overseer that you have that which is fitting and reasonable and the Queen may agister Cattel there but in our Case the Queen can neither set any Overseer nor can she agist Cattel there Dyer 285. 2. H. 8. Killaway 159. He who hath reasonable Herbage cannot inclose but hee which hath Herbage may inclose Then forasmuch as here the Patent is larger then it was before scil that which was surrendred the Patent is void for the Queen Grants more then she took by the surrender For hee did surrender eâ intentione that the Queen should regrant him praemissa and by this new Grant he hath more 2. He recites That hee had a Lease for fifty years absolutely whereas it was determinable upon death and the Queen grants the same for fifty years absolutely and that was by reason of his false Suggestion It may be objected That the Queen is not deceived for the limitation for life is not annexed to the Habendum 20. Eliz. in the Kings Bench Hunts Case The Queen made a Lease to begin at a day to come and afterwards the Queen by the suggestion of the party and for the surrender of the present Lease did make a new Lease unto the party it was adjudged That the new Lease was void So here the Queen was deceived in the quality of the Lease 9. E. 4. 12. Baggots Case The King reciting that Baggot was born in Normandy whereas in truth he was born in France made him a Denizen and the Patent notwithstanding this false recital of the party was adjudged good for the intent was to make him a Denizen That Case was objected against me But put the Case a little further and it is otherwise for if at that time Edward the fourth had had Wars with France then the Patent had been void for it was not the Kings intent to protect a man who was an Enemy and to nourish him in his own bosom If the Queen had made the new Lease to begin after the first fifty years then it had been void C. 1. part the Rector of Chedington's Case It is not the years but the death of the Patentee which determins the Lease C. 2. part 72. In a Deed there is not any proper place where the Proviso shall be inserted then if it come in any place so as it doth not lean upon a Covenant it is a good condition 35. Eliz. betwixt Throgmorton and Sir Moile Finch Queen Mary made a Lease unto Throgmorton for 21 years and in the end of the Lease there is a Proviso That the Lease shall cease if the Rent be behind Popham Chief Justice said That Throgmorton hath such a Lease which is absolute but shortned by limitation in the end of the Lease and he might plead it generally and absolutely That those who will take advantage of the Proviso ought to shew where the Proviso comes in another clause So here Pawlet should have informed the Queen of the Proviso for hee trusts the Queen and the Queen trusts him The third Falsity is It is pretended That the Park of Odiham doth passe with the Manor for the Manor is granted by King Philip and Queen Mary cum pertinentiis and it is found by the Jury that the Park is parcel of the Manor He hath deceived and mis-informed the Queen for in the Lease which he surrendred the Park is excepted and now he would steal it in by the general words cum pertinentiis If the Park doth not passe then the Defendants are Trespassors to the Plaintiffe and if the Manor doth not passe then they are Trespassors so as they are in a Dilemma This Park admit the Manor passeth doth not passe for Queen Mary shortly after made Pawlet a Marquess and then she granted unto him by Letters Patents The custody of the Park and the Interest of the Park cannot stand together in one person and he cannot be the Queens Parker when as it is his own Park C. 8 part 117. The best Expositor of Letters Patents are the Letters Patents themselves joyning one part of the Letters Patents with the other And here in one clause the custodie of the Park is granted by express name and the general words viz. Grant of the Manor cum pertinentiis doth not convey it There is a difference betwixt the Custody of a Park and the Interest of the Park In Com. 399. If a Parker be attainted and pardoned hee loseth not his Park but hee may be a Parker notwithstanding such Attainder but if the Owner of a Park be attainted and pardoned he loseth his Park a Parker is a matter of service and cannot be forfeited but an Interest may 10. H. 7. 6. The Keeper shall render account for the Hawks for it is parcel of the profits of the Park but Lessee for years of a Park shall not render account for them So there is a difference betwixt the Interest in a Park and a Parkership 12. H. 8. 1. Lessee for years of a Park suffereth the Pale to fall down or decay Waste lieth but if a Parker suffereth the Pale to decay he can onely lose his Office Dyer 71. The Owner of a Park may dispark it but he who hath only the Herbage of it cannot A man hath the custody of a house and afterwards he becomes the Owner of the house his custodie therein ceaseth There are four Mischiefs in our Case 1. By expressing himselfe to be Parker hee excludes himselfe from being Owner 2. The Keeper is Accountable but Lessee for years is not 3. If he be only Keeper of it then the Queen might dispark but if he were Lessee the Queen could not 4. Where he is Keeper all will rest upon account as well the Deer which hee findes there when hee became Keeper as those which came after But that makes the Queen in doubt whether the Exception should extend to the Deer then whether to those Deer which came after The third Point was concerning WALSINGHAM'S Lease It is of the Manor and Custodiam Parci First This Lease hath one of the wounds of the former Leases for the Parkership is granted expresly Secondly The leases before being void then this Lease must needs be void also Thirdly This Lease is to take effect upon the end Surrender or Forfeiture of the Lease to Pawlet which was made 5. 6. Philip and Mary and that
reasonable Herbage Here the Grant is not De omnibus grossis arboribus bonis catellis Felonum and of the Goods of Felons themselves and in the former Patent these were granted and so the Grant is for the Kings benefit and to the prejudice of the Patentee Also this Patent is ad proficuum Domini Regis For here is a Rent reserved and here is a Proviso for the committing of Waste in the premisses which were not in the first Letters Patents and in these Letters Patents there are divers Covenants which were not in the former Patents and so it is in forma sequente And so the Lease of Philip and Mary is good The King seised of a Manor to which he hath a Park doth grant the Stewardship of the Manor and the Custodie of the said Park with reasonable Herbage Afterwards in the same Letters Patents hee grants the said Manor of O. and all the Lands in O. excepting grosse trees in the Park If this Grant be not good for the Manor it is not good for the Park that was the Objection It is good for the Manor and also for the Park It was objected That the King grants the custody of the Park and so not the Park it selfe for how can the King grant the custody of the Park if he grant the Park it selfe it is dangerous that upon an implication in one part of a Patent the expresse words which follow should be made void the subsequent words in this Case are The King grants the Manor and all the Lands to the same belonging now the Park doth belong to it and the King excepts only the Deer C. 10 part 64. The King at this day grants a Manor unto a man as entirely as such a one held the same before it came into his hands c. the Advowson doth passe without words of grant of the Advowson for the Kings meaning is That the Advowson shall passe The meaning of the King is manifest in our Case C. 3. Part 31 32. Carr's Case There the Rent was extinct betwixt the Parties yet for the benefit of the King for his tenure it hath continuance for a thing may be extinct as to one purpose and in esse as to another purpose 38. Ass 16. a Rent extinct yet Mortmain Dyer 58 59. The Exception ought to be of the thing demised In our Case the Park doth passe but the King shall have the liberties in it and so here the Park shall passe and the Exception is of the liberties Com. 370. the Exception ought to be of that which is contained in the former words in the former Patents the Offices were first granted and in the same Letters Patents the Manor was afterwards granted But now King James grants the Manor first and then the Offices Construction of Statutes ought to be secuncundùm intentionem of the makers of them and construction of Patents secundùm intentionem Domini Regis C. 8. part 58. You ought to make such a construction as to uphold the Letters Patents C. 8. part 56. Auditor Kings Case There the Letters Patents were construed secundùm intentionem Domini Regis and adjudged good But to make void the Patent they shall not be construed secundùm intentionem but to make a Patent good they shall be construed secundùm intentionem Domini Regis The Case was adjourned till Michaelmas Terme next Note I have heard Sir Henry Yelverton say That it was the opinion of the Judges in this Case That he had but the custody of the Park and not the interest of the Park for that by the acceptance of the custody of the Park when he had a Lease of the Park before it was a surrender of his Lease Trinit 21. Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 492 SHORTRIDGE and HILL's Case SHortridge brought an Action upon the Case against Hill for ravishing of his Ward and the Writ was contra pacem without the words Vi armis Lib. Dent. 366. where three Presidents are of Actions upon the Case without Vi armis An Action upon the case for doing of any thing against a Statute must be contra pacem Ley Chief Justice Recovery in this Action may be pleaded in Barre in a Writ of Ravishment of Ward brought Dodderidge Justice The Action of Trespasse at the common Law is only for the taking away of the Ward and here he hath elected his Action at the common Law and then he shall not have an Action upon the Statute viz. a Ravishment of Ward but here the Action upon the Case is brought for the taking and detaining of the Ward so as he cannot preferr him in marriage and upon this speciall matter the Action upon the Case lieth without the words Vi armis A Writ of Ravishment of Ward ought to be brought in the Common Pleas but yet you may bring a Writ of Ravishment of Ward in this Court if the Defendant be in the custody of the Marshal of the Marshalsey for in such special Case it shall be brought in this Court if there be an extraordinary matter besides the Trespass then an Action upon the Case lieth as when A. contracts with B. to make an estate unto B. of Bl. Acre at Michaelmas if C. enter into Bl. Acre A. may have an Action upon the Case against C. for the speciall damage which may happen to him by reason that he is not able to perform that contract by reason of the entry of C. and he shall declare contra pacem but not Vi armis Trinit 21. Jacobi in the King 's Bench. 493 BAKER and BLAKAMORE's Case IN Trespass the Defendant pleaded That J. S. being seised in Fee gave the Lands unto Baker and the Heirs of his body and conveyed the Lands by descent to four Daughters and Blakamore the Defendant as servant to one of the Daughters did justifie The Plaintiff did reply That the said J. S. was seised in Fee and gave the same to Baker and the Heirs Males of his Body and conveyed the Land by descent to himself as Heir Male absque hoc that J. S. was seised in Fee Henden Serjeant did demur in Law upon the Replication and took Exception to the Traverse for that here he traverseth the Seisin of J. S. whereas he ought to have traversed the gift in tail made by J. S. for the being seised is but an inducement not traverseable and therefore he ought to have traversed the gift in taile for then he had traversed the seisin for he could not give the Lands in tail if that he were not seised thereof in Fee L. 5. E. 4 9. there in Formedon the Tenant would have traversed the Seisin of the Donor but the book is ruled that the Traverse ought to be of the gift in tail and that includes the Seisin Bridgment for the Plaintiffe and said That the Serjeant is of opinion contrary to the Books when he saith positively that you ought to traverse the gift in tail and not the seisin of the Donor
The Case shortly is A. being seised in Fee makes a gift in tail to B. and that descends to four daughters c. And the Plaintiff replies That A. was seised in Fee and gave the Lands to B. and to his Heirs Males and the Plaintiffe claimes the entail as Heir Male and the Defendants under the generall tail absque hoc that A. was seised in Fee 27. H. 8. 4. by Englefield If in Trespass the Defendant plead the Feoffment of a stranger and the Plaintiff saith That he was seised in Fee and made a Lease for years to the said stranger who enfeoffed the Defendant he need not to traverse absque hoc that he was seised in Fee C. 6. part 24. The seisin in Fee is traversable Br. Travers 372. acc Dodderidge Justice The seisin in this Case is traverseable Ley Chief Justice Take away the Seisin and then no gift and therefore the Seisin here is Traverseable Haughton and Chamberlain Justices agreed The Court resolved That either the Seisin in Fee or the gift in tail is traverseable Dodderidge Justice If you both convey from one and the same person then you must traverse the conveyance It is a rule C. 6. part 24. there the Books are cited which warrants the traverse of either Quod nota It was adjudged for the Plaintiff Trinit 21. Jacobi In the Kings Bench. 494 Sir EDWARD FISHER and WARNER's Case THE Testator being indebted unto Fisher made Warner his Executor and Warner in consideration that Fisher would forbear suing of him upon the Assumpsit of the Testator did promise to pay him Fifty Pounds and in an Action upon the Case upon this promise Warner pleaded Non Assumpsit in the Common Pleas and it was found for the Plaintiff And a Writ of Error was brought in this Court because it was not shewed for what consideration the Testator did promise 2. Because it was not shewed That Warner the Executor had Assets in his hands It was said by the Councel of Sir Edward Fisher That they need not shew that he hath Assets because the Defendant Warner was sued upon his own promise C. 9. part 94. The Testator made a promise to pay to Fisher fifty pound and died The Executor in consideration of the forbearance of a Suit upon that promise of the Testator doth assume to pay c. The Jury find for the Plaintiff The Error is that no time is limited nor no place where the promise was made and also it is not shewed when the Testator died and so it is not shewed whether the promise were made in the life time of the Testator or not for if it were in the life time of the Testator then the promise was void Nor is the time of the forbearance shewed and so no good consideration Hill 5. Jacobi a consideration to forbear paululum tempus is no good consideration by Cook And the like case was adjudged 36. Eliz. Rot. 448. Sackbdos case We do alledge de facto that we have forborn our Suit and that the Defendant hath not paid us the money Dodderidge Justice It is alledged that the Plaintiff paid money to the Testator upon which he promised And the Action now brought is upon the promise of the Executor Part of the promise is That he paid the fifty pound to the Testator and that ought to be proved in evidence to the Jury C. 6. part Gregories case if it be not specially named how he shall prove it Haughton to forbear to sue him is for all his life time and not paululum tempus Dodderidge Justice Exception was taken that he doth not shew that the Testator was dead at the time of the promise by the Executor It was shewed That after the death of the Testator that he took upon him the Execution of the Will and then promised and that of necessity must be after the death of the Testator Trinit 21. Jacobi in the King 's Bench. 495 WILLIAM's and FLOYD's Case IN an Ejectione firme The Array was challenged because it was made at the Nomination of the Plaintiffe And by consent of the parties two Atturneys of the Court did try the Array The question was Whether the Triall of the Array was good It was said by the Councel which argued for the Defendant That it was not good If one of the four Knights be challenged the three other Knights shall try that challenge and if he be found favourable he shall be drawn and if another of the Knights be challenged hee shall be tried by the other two and if one of the two be challenged then a new Writ shall issue forth to cause three Knights to appear 9. E. 4. 46. The two which quash the Array ought to try the Array of the Tales for that they are strangers to them The assent of the parties in this case is to no purpose for the consent of the parties cannot alter the Law neither can the King alter the Law but an Act of Parliament may alter the Law 29. Ass 4 19. H. 6. 9. by Newton 27. H. 8. 13. Where a triall cannot be out of the County by the assent of the parties and if it be it is errour By the Councel of the other side contrary This triall of the Array is much in the discretion of the Judges for sometimes it is tried by the Coroners and they are strangers to the Array 21. Ass 26. 20. Ass 10. there the Judges at their discretion appointed one of the Array and the Coroners to try it 27. Ass 28. there upon such a challenge it was tried by the Coroners and Shard said That the triall by any of them was sufficient and by Forriners de Circumstantibus 31. Ass 10. so as it rests much in the discretion of the Judges 29. Ass 3. there it was denied But note That that was in Oyer and Terminer and there it did not appear that the Array was made at the Nomination of one of the parties but in other challenges it may be tried by one of the Panell But in our case they were all challenged was the objection 9. E. 4. 20. Billing For if one of the parties will nominate all of the Jurours to the Sheriffe it is presumed that they are all partiall and 〈◊〉 â—his case the whole Array is challenged but in other cases he may challenge one or two of the Array and yet the others may be indifferent But admit it had been errour yet being by the assent of the parties it is no errour Baynams case in Dyer A Venire facias by assent of the parties was awarded to one of the Coroners and good Dyer 367. 43. E. 3. Office of Court 12. One of the twelve doth depart If the Justices do appoint one of the panell to supply his place it is erroneus but yet if it be with the assent of the parties it is good So in our case 21. E. 4. 59. Brian saith That he hath not seen more then two to try the Array yet by assent of the
parties more may try it 30. E. 3. 2. or 39. E. 3. 2. In a Writ of Right processe issued to the Sheriff to return four Knights he returns two Knights and two Esquires without making any mention that there were no more Knights in the County the same is errour yet if two Knights and two Esquires had been returned by the assent of the parties it had been good 6. E. 6. Dyer A man cannot enter for Non-payment of Rent without a demand yet by assent of the parties it may be good 22. H. 6. 59. the triall in favour of Liberty ought to be in the same County where the Action is brought and not where the Manor is But 44. E. 3. 6. by the assent of the parties it is sufficient In the Abridgement of the Book of Assizes 48. the books are cited to the contrary there it is said to be no Law where the Coroners â—ry the panell I agree that where it is not against a fundamentall point of the common Law that the consent of the parties tollit errores Dodderidg Justice Two questions are in this case 1. If this tryall be good 2. Admitting it be not good whether the assent of the parties doth make it good First it is a meer matter in the discretion of the Justices which is not tied to any strict rule in Law In the Book of the Assizes it was tried by the Coroners because it was in the discretion of the Justices And the Coroners are Ministers to the Court and ought to attend at the Assizes The Book of the Assizes is the Report of the Cases which happened at the Assizes in the Circuits of the Justices and they are not Term cases For the Exception which is taken by him who made the Abridgment of the Book of Assizes is of no moment for the Authour thereof was but a Student and no Councellor at Law In these Courts the Coroners do not attend therefore sometimes two four or six of the Panell are chosen to try those who are challenged as the Court shall think fit and if the Triers cannot agree we put them together into a room and swear one to keep them as a Jury is kept so as you see it rests much in the discretion of the Justices Court And if there were a certain rule to try it then it ought to be strictly observed 31. Ass 10. there the triall was de Circumstantibus 2. The assent of the parties doth make it good It is not a triall in point of the right of the cause but only of the indifferency of the Ministers The Array was challenged because the Sheriffe made it at the request of one of the parties and the Sheriffe hath confessed it upon his Examination The principal Array shal be first tried and if that be quashed then the Tales shall not be tried but if it be affirmed then two of the Panell shall try the Panell and two of the Tales shall try the Tales This is a triall only of indifference and not of the fundamentall point of the Cause If the Plaintiffe require the Venire facias to the Coroners because that the Sheriffe is chosen the Defendant shall be examined if he will agree to it if he will not agree but the Sheriffe returneth the Jury the Defendant in that case shall not challenge the Jury or any of the Array The four Knights in the Writ of Right shall choose the other twenty of the Grand Assize who shall be joyned with them and they shall be the Judges of the twenty when they are named by them 39. E. 3. 2. Haughton Justice The appearance by Atturney by assent of the parties is not errour although by the Law the Plaintiffe ought for to appear in proper person Chamberlain Justice would be advised because he had not seen the Books Ley chief Justice When the whole Panel as in this case comes to be challenged then it is in the discretion of the Justices to choose triers and chiefly in this case because all the Array is partiall If the Coroners be absent 〈◊〉 is good to take two Atturneys of the Court who the Court know to be honest by their honest carriage and fair practice The assent of the parties strengthens this case It is a rule That the assent of the parties cannot make that good which is against any fundamentall point of the Law therefore it is best to view the Presidents and to draw a Jurour but that we cannot do of our selves by the Law yet with the assent of parties we may do it It is a contempt and a deceit to the Court if his assent be entred upon record and notwithstanding that the Defendant will question the matter by a Writ of Error or otherwise relinquish his consent and for such contempt the Court may commit him and fine him also But if the matter be not a matter of Record but be onely by a Rule of the Court then we may award an Attachment onely against the party In this case the triall of the Panell was good and so was it afterwards adjudged by the whole Court Quod nota Pasch 3. Caroli in the King 's Bench. 496 EVERS and OWEN's Case SAmson Evers the Guardian of Compton Evers did sue Owen the Executor of the Lady Anne Evers for a Legacy before the Councell of the Marches of Wales Henden Serjeant moved for a Prohibition and said That by Law no intent of a Will ought to be averred contrary to the words of the Will C. 5. part 68. Cheyneys case And so no equity shall be taken upon a forrain intent contrary to that which is in the Will 2. He said That the party might not sue in the Marches of Wales for a Legacie for that the party ought to sue for the same in the Ecclesiasticall Court Banks contrary They may proceed there in an Ecclesiasticall Cause wherein there is cause of equity The Statute of 34. H. 8. cap. 26. giveth power unto them to proceed as they proceeded heretofore by Commission And before that Statute they proceeded there in case of a Legacy and so are divers Presidents therefore no Prohibition is to issue Samson Evers is the Kings Atturney for the Marches of Wales and his personall attendance is requisite there And this Court cannot grant a Prohibition to stay a Suit when he cannot sue in this Court for the same thing Finch Recorder contrary If you shew Presidents yet they will not bind this Court and give power unto them to hold plea of that which they ought not to hold plea of It is usuall to grant a Prohibition if the Court of Requests holds plea of a Legacy if it be not by reason of some speciall circumstance and it is usuall to dismisse Legacies out of the Chancery And no Priviledges shal be granted unto an Executor Administrator or Guardian Hyde Chief Justice Two have an Obligation as Executors and the one releaseth it is good and a good cause of equity against him who
of his eldest son in tail and afterwards he married a wife and died that the wife should not be endowed for when he had limited the use to himself for his life he could not limit arâ— Remainder over And Edwards Case adjudged in the Court of Wards which was That there was Tenant for life the Remainder in tail he in the Remainder granted his Remainder to I. S. and his heirs and afterwards Tenant for life dyed and then the grantee dyed his heirs within age it was adjudged that the heir of the garntee should not be in ward because the Tenant in tail could not by his Grant grant a greater estate then for his own life But he said That in the principall Case it appeareth That the Tenant in tail in Remainder hath particularly recited his estate And where it appeareth in the Conveyance it self that he hath but an estate in tail a greater estate shall not passe As if Tenant for life granteth a Rent to one and his heirs the same at the first sight seems to be a good Rent in Fee but when it appeareth in the Conveyance that the grantor was but Tenant for life there upon the Construction of the Deed it self it cannot be intended that he granted a Fee but that an estate for life passed only in the Rent Secondly he argued That although the estate in tail in the principall case was an abeyance Yet a Common Recovery would barr such estate tail in abeyance And therewith agreeth C. 2. part Sr Hugh Cholmleys Case 3. He said That the estate was out of the King and vested in the party without any Offence found as 49. E. 3. Isabell Goodcheaps case A man devised houses in London holden of the King in tail and if the Donee dyed without Issue that the Lands should be sold by his Executors The devisee died without Issue The bargain and sale of the Lands by the Executor doth divert the estate out of the King without Petition or Monstrans de Droit So If there be Tenant in tail the Remainder in tail and Tenant in tail â—n Remainder levieth a fine of his Remainder to the King and afterwards dyeth without Issue the Kings estate is determined and there needs no Petition or Monstrans de Droit 4. He said That in the principall case nothing was in the King because it doth not appeare that there was any seisure or Offence found to entitle the King And the Tenant in tail in the Remainder died in the life of King James and then if the Kings estate were then determined as before by the death of the Tenant in taile the King which now is never had any title And hee said that he needed not to shew a greater title then he had And hee took a difference when Tenant in taile doth onely defend or make defence and when he makes title to Lands in the one Case he ought for to shew That the Tenant in taile died without issue and in the other Case not And therefore in the principall case he demanded Judgment for the Defendant The Case was adjourned to another day Mich. 4. Caroli in the Star-Chamber 511 TAILOR and TOWLIN's Case A Bill was preferred against the Defendant for a Conspiracy to Indict the plaintiff of a Rape And the Plaintiff aleadged in his Bill That an Indictment was preferred by the Defendant against the Plaintiff before the Justices of Assise and Nisi prius in the County of Suffolk And did not lay it in his Bill that the Indictment was preferred before the Justices of Oyer and Terminer and Gaole delivery and the same was holden by the Court to be a good Exception to the Bill for that the Justices of Assise and Nisi prius have not power to take Indictments But afterwards upon veiw of the Bill because the Conspiracy was the principall thing tryable and examinable in this Court and that was well layd in the Bill the Bill was retayned and the Court proceded to Sentence And in this Case Richardson Justice said That in Conspiracy the matter must bee layed to be falsè et malitiosè and if it be layed for a Rape It must be layd that there was recens persecutio of it otherwise it will argue a Consent And therefore because the Defendant did not preferre an Indictment of Rape in convenient time after the Rape supposed to be done but concealed the same for half a years time and then would have preferred a Bill of Indictment against the plaintiff for the same Rape he held that the Indictment was false and malitious And Hyde Chief Justice said That upon probable proof a man might accuse another before any Justice of Peace of an Offence and although his accusation be false yet the Accuser shall not be punished for it But where the Accusation is malitious and false it is otherwise and for such Accusation he shall be punished in this Court Trinit 8. Caroli in the King Bench. 513 JONES and BALLARD's Case AN Action upon the Case was brought for these words viz These Jones are proper Witnesses they will sweare any thing They care not what they say They have already forsworn themselves in the Chancery and the Lord keeper Committed them for it Jermyn took Exceptions because it was not said to be in the Court of Chancery nor that it was in any Deposition there taken upon Oath But it was adjudged per Curiam That the Action would lie and Jones Justice said that the Addition in the Chauncery was as much as if he had said he was perjured there And Hâ—msies case was vouâ—hed by him Where one said of a Witness presently after a Tryall at the Guild Hall in London You have now forsworn your self That it was adjudged that the words were actionable Trinit 8. Caroli in the Kings Bench. 513. SYMME's and SMITH's Case A Woman being entituled to copyhold Lands of the Manor of D did covenant upon reasonable request to be made unto her to surrender the Copy-hold Land according to the Custome of the Manor And it was found That the Custome of the Manor is That a surrender may be made either in person or by Letter of Atturney and that the plaintiff did request the woman to make the surrender by a Letter of Atturney which shee refused to do And whether shee ought to surrender presently or might first advise with her Councell was the Question It was argued for the plaintiff that shee ought to do it presently And Munser's Case C. 2. part and 16. Eliz. Dyer 337. Sir Anthonie Cooks Case were vouched that she was to do it at her perill And the Election in this Case was given to the Covenantee and hee might require it to be done either in Court in person or by Letter of Atturney And C. 2. part Sir Rowland Heywards Case and C. 5. part Hallings Case was vouched to that purpose Rolls contrary for the Defendant And he said That the woman was to have convenient time to do it and
to Thomas Spence and his Wife and the Survivor the Rent of seventeen Pounds yearly and every year during the terme Proviso that if the Rent be arrere by forty daies that Thomas and his Wife or the Survivor of them should enter Thomas Spence died his Administrator did demand the Rent and being denied entred for the Condition broken Calthrope argued That the reservation to the Wife was void because she had not any interest in the Land and also never sealed the Indenture of Assignment but was as a stranger to the Deed and so he said that the Wife could not enter for the condition broken nor make any demand of the Rent The 2l l Point was Admitting that the wife could not enter nor demand the Rent Whether the Administrator of the Husband might demand it and enter for the condition broken because the words are Yeilding and paying to Thomas Spence and Jane his Wife and the Survivor of them during the term and no words of Executors or Assigns are in the Case and he conceived the Administrator could not and so he said it had been resolved in one Butcher and Richmonds Case about 6. Jacobi Banks contrary and he said It was a good Rent and well demanded and the reservation is good during the Term to the Husband and Wife and although the word Reddendo doth not create a rent to the Wife because the Husband cannot give to the Wife yet the Solvendo shall gain a good rent to the Wife during the life of the Wife and the reservation shall be a good reservation to him and his Administrators during the Survivor Vide C. 5. part Goodales Case 38. E. 3. 33. 46. E. 3. 18. and admitting that the rent shall be paid to the Wife yet the condition shall go to the Administrator 2. The word Solvendo makes the Rent good to the Wife and amounts to an agreement of the Lessee to pay the Rent to them and the Survivor of them and that which cannot be good by way of reservation yet is good by way of grant and agreement and many times words of reservation or preception shall enure by way of grant Vide 10 E. 3 500. 10. Ass 40. 8. H. 4. 19. Richard Colingbrooks Case 41. E. 3. 15. 13. E. 2 Feasts and Fasts 108. Richardson Justice The Reservation being during the term is good and shall go to the Administrator Jones Justice contrary It is good only during the life of the Lessor and so was it adjudged in Edwyn and Wottons Case 5. Jacobi Crook Justice accorded The Administrator hath no title and the Wife is no party to the Deed and therefore the Rent is gone by the death of the Husband If it had been durante termino generally perhaps it had been good but durante termino praedicto to him and his Wife it ceaseth by his death And the words durante termino couple it to him and his Wife and the Survivor and it cannot be good to the Wife who is no party nor sealed the Deed neither can it inure to the Wife by way of Grant And the words Reddendo and Solvendo are Synonima and the Administrator is no Assignee of the Survivor for she cannot assign because she hath no right in the Rent Barkley Justice The intention of the parties was That it should be a continuing Rent and Judges are to make such Exposition of Deeds as that the meaning of the parties may take effect I do agree That the Wife could not have the Rent neither by way of Reservation nor by way of Grant if she were not a party to the Indenture but here she is a party to the Deed for it is by Deed indented made by the husband and wife and the husband hath set his Seal to it And 2. The Solvendo doth work by way of Grant by the intent of the parties The Reddendo shall go and relate as to the husband and the Solvendo to the wife and he agreed the Case 33. H. 8. Br. Cases because there expressum facit cessare tacitum but in case of a Lease for years the words Reserving Rent to him shall go to the Executor who represents the person of the Testator and 27. El. it was adjudged in Constables Case and Littleton agrees with it That the Executor shall be possessed and is possessed in the right of his Testator And therefore if an alien be made an Executor in an Action brought by him the Tryal shall not be per medâ—â—tatem lâ—nguae And this Case is the stronger because the Reservation is during the Term. And C. 3. part in Malleries Case That the Law shall make such a construction Upon reservation of Rent upon a Lease as may stand with the intent and meaning of the parties and therefore in that where an Abbot and Covent made a Lease for years rendring Rent yearly during the Term to the Abbot and Covent or to his Successors it is all one as if it had been to him and his Successors and although the words be joint or in the Copulative yet by construction of Law the Rent shall be well reserved during the terme for if the reservation had been only Annually during the terme it had been sufficient and his Successors should have had the Rent Quaere the principall Case for the Judges differed much in their opinions Hill 8. Caroli in the Kings Bench. 517 The KING against HILL AN Information was by the Kings Atturney against Hill and others upon the Statute of 32. H. 8. of Maintenance Where the Point was A man was out of Possession and recovered in an Ejectione firme in May 2. Car. and Habere Possessionem was awarded and 29. Sept. 4. Car. he sold the Land And whether he might sell presently or not was the Question And it was determined That he being put in possession by a Writ of Habere facias possessionem that he might sell presently Vide Com. Crookers Case and C. Littl. acc and so was it holden in Sir John Offley's Case 7. Car. in this Court Barkley Justice If a Disseisor doth recover in an Ejectione firme if he afterwards sell the Land it is a pretended Title Jones Justice It was adjudged 36. El. in the Common Pleas in Pages Case in the Case of a Formedon That if a man be out of Possession for seven years and afterwards he recover that he may sell the Lands presently Crook Justice There is a difference where the recovery is in a reall Action and where it is in an Ejectione firme It was Master Browneloes Case in the Star-Chamber resolved by all the Judges of England That a Suit in Chancery cannot make a Title pretended nor Maintenance Barkley Justice put this Case If Husband and Wife bargaineth and selleth whereas the Wife hath nothing in the Land and afterwards a Fine is levied of the same Lands by the Husband and Wife it shall have a relation to conclude the Wife and to make the Wife to have a Title ab initio It was