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A33627 Certain select cases in law reported by Sir Edward Coke, Knight, late Lord Chief Justice of England ... ; translated out of a manuscript written with his own hand, never before published ; with two exact tables, the one of the cases, and the other of the principal matters therein contained.; Reports. Part 13. English Coke, Edward, Sir, 1552-1634. 1659 (1659) Wing C4909; ESTC R1290 92,700 80

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shillings eight pence for the Admittance of a Copyholder in Fee-simple upon a Surrender made For this is not like to a voluntary Grant as when the Copyholder hath but an Estate for life and dieth Or if he hath an Estate in Fee-simple and committeth Felony there Arbitrio Dom. res estimari debet but when the Lord is compellable to admit him to whose use the Surrender is And when Cestui que use is admitted he shall be in by him who made the Surrender and the Lord is but an Instrument to present the same And therefore in such Case the value of two years for such an Admittance is unreasonable especially when the value of the Cottage and one acre of Pasture is a Rack at fifty three shillings by the year 5. It was resolved That the Surjoynder is no more then what the Law saith For in this Case in the Iudgment of the Law the Fine is unreasonable and therefore the same is but ex abundanti and now the Court ought to judge upon the whole speciall matter And for the Causes aforesaid Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff And Coke chief Iustice said in this Case That where the usage of the Court of Admiralty is to amerce the Defendant for his default by his discretion as it appeareth in 19 H. 6. 7. That if the Amerciament be outrageous and excessive the same shall not bind the party and if it be excessive or not it shall be determined in the Court in which the Action shall be brought for the levying of it And the Writ of Account is against the Bayliff or Guardian Quod reddat ei rationabilem Computum de exitibus Manerii And the Law requireth a thing which is reasonable and no excesse or extremity in any thing II. Mich. 6 Jacobi in the Common Pleas. Porter and Rochesters Case THis Term Lewis and Rochester who dwelt in Essex within the The Statute of 23 H 8. of citing out of Dioces Dioces of London were sued for substraction of Tithes growing in B. within the County of Essex by Porter in the Court of the Arches of the Bishop of Canterbury in London And the Case was That the Archbishop of Canterbury hath a peculiar Iurisdiction of fourteen Parishes called a Deanry exempted from the Authority of the Bishop of London whereof the Parish of S. Mary de Arcubus is the Chief And the Court is called the Arches because the Court is holden there And a great question was moved If in the said Court of Arches holden in London within his Peculiar he might cite any dwelling in Essex for substraction of Tithes growing in Essex Or if he be prohibited by the Statute of the twenty third year of King Henry the eighth cap. 9. And after that the matter was well debated as well by Councell at the Bar as by Dr. Ferrard Dr. James and others in open Court and lastly by all the Iustices of the Common Pleas A Prohibition was granted to the Court of Arches And in this Case divers Points were resolved by the Court. 1. That all Acts of Parliament made by the King Lords and Commons of Parliament are parcell of the Laws of England and therefore shall be expounded by the Iudges of the Laws of England and not by the Civilians and Commonists although the Acts concern Ecclesiasticall and Spirituall Iurisdiction And therefore the Act of 2 H. 4. cap. 15. by which in effect it is enacted Quod nullus teneat doceat informet c. clam vel publice aliquam nefandam opinionem contrariam sidei Catholicae seu determinationi Ecclesiae sacro-sanctae nec de hujusmodi secta nephandis Doctrinis Conventiculas faciat And that in such Cases the Diocessan might arrest and imprison such Offender c. And in 10 H. 7. the Bishop of London commanded one to be imprisoned because that the Plaintiff said that he ought not to pay his Tithes to his Curat and the party so imprisoned brought an Action of False Imprisonment against those who arrested him by the commandment of the Bishop and there the matter is well argued What words are within the said Statute and what without the Statute So upon the same Statute it was resolved in 5 E. 4. in Keysars case in the Kings Bench which you may see in my Book of Presidents And so the Statutes of Articuli Cleri de Prohibitione regia De Circumspecte agatis of 2 E. 6. cap. 13. and all other Acts of Parliament concerning Spirituall Causes have alwaies been expounded by the Iudges of the Common Law as it was adjudged in Woods Case Pasch 29 Eliz. in my Notes fol. 22. So the Statute of 21 H. 8. cap. 13. hath been expounded by the Iudges of the Realm concerning Pluralities and the having of two Benefices Common Laws and Dispensations see 7 Eliz. Dyer 233. The Kings Courts shall adjudge of Dispensations and Commendams See also 17 Eliz. Dyer 251. 14 Eliz. Dyer 312. 15 Eliz. Dyer 327 18 Eliz. Dyer 352. and 347. 22 Eliz. Dyer 377. Construction of the Statute cap. 12. Smiths Case concerning Subscription which is a meer Spirituall thing Also it appeareth by 22 Eliz. Dyer 377. That for want of subscription the Church was alwaies void by the said Act of 23 Eliz. and yet the Civilians say that there ought to be a Sentence Declaratorie although that the Act maketh it void 2. It was resolved by Coke chief Iustice Warberton Daniel and Foster Iustices That the Archbishop of Canterbury is restrained by the Act of 23 H. 8. cap. 9. to cite any one out of his own Diocesse or his Peculiar Iurisdiction although that he holdeth his Court of Arches within London And first it was objected That the Title of the Act is An Act that no person shall be cited out of the Diocess where he or she dwelleth except in certain Cases And here the Archbishop doth not cite the said Party dwelling in Essex out of the Diocesse of London for he holdeth his Court of Arches within London 2. The Preamble of the Act is Where a great number of the Kings Subjects dwelling in divers Diocesses c. And here he doth not dwell in divers Diocesses 3. Far out of the Diocesse where such men c. dwell and here he doth not dwell far out c. 4. The body of the Act is No manner of person shall be cited before any Ordinance c. out of the Diocesse or peculiar Iurisdiction where the person shall be inhabiting c. And here he was not cited out of the Dioces of London To which it was answered and resolved That the same was prohibited by the said Act for divers Causes 1. As to all the said Objections One answer makes an end of them all For Diocesis dicitur distinctio vel divisio sive gubernatio quae divisa diversa est ab Ecclesia alterius Episcopatus Commissa Gubernatio in unius and is derived a Di● quod est duo electio id est
not of Tythes severed from the nine parts for that shall be in Case of a Praemunire and it appeareth to the Common Law See 16 H. 2. in the Case of Mortuary Vide Decretalia Sexti Lib. 3. tit de Decimis cap. 1. fo 130. Col. 4. Et summa Angelica fo 72. the same And that also appeareth by Linwood amongst the Constitutions Simonis Mephum tit de Decimis cap. Quoniam propter fo 139. 6. verbo Consuetudines Consuetudo ut non solvantur aut minus plene solvantur Decimae non valet and ibidem secundum alios Quod in Decimis realibus non valet Consuetudo ut solvatur minus decima parte sed in personalibus c. And ibidem Litt. M. verbo Integre faciunt expresse contra opinionem quorundum Theologorum qui dicunt sufficere aliquid dari pro Decima And that is the true Reason in both the said Cases scil de modo Decimandi de Limitibus Parochiorum c. that they would not adjudg according to their Canons and therefore a Prohibition lieth and therewith agreeth 8 E. 4. 14. and the other Boóks abovesaid and infinite presidents and the rather after the Statute of 2 E. 6. cap. 13. And also the Customs of the Realm are part of the Laws of the Realm and therefore they shall be tryed by the Common Law as is aforesaid See 7 E. 6. Dyer 79. and 18 Eliz. Dyer 349. the Opinion of all the Iustices VI. Mich. 6 Jacob. in the Exchequer Baron and Boys Case IN the Case between Baron and Boys in an Information upon the Sur Stat. 2 E. 6. cap. 14. of Ingrossers Statute of 5 E. 6. cap. 14. of Ingrossers after Verdict it was found for the Informer That the Defendant had ingrossed Apples against the said Act The Barons of the Exchequer held clearly That Apples were not within the said Act and gave Iudgment against the Informer upon the matter apparent to them and caused the same to be entered in the Margent of the Record where the Iudgment was given and the Informer brought a Writ of Error in the Exchequer chamber and the only Question was Whether Apples were within the said Act the letter of which is That whatsoever person or persons c. shall ingross or get into his or their hands by buying contracting or promise taking other then by Demise Grant or Lease of Land or Tythe any Corn growing in the Fields or any other Corn or grain Butter Cheese Fish or other dead Victual within the Realm of England to the intent to sell the same again shall be accepted c. an unlawful Ingrosser And although that the Statute of 2 E. 6. cap. 15. made against Sellers of Victual which for their great gain conspire c. numbereth Butchers Brewers Bakers Cooks Costermongers and Fruterers as Victualers yet Apples are not dead Victuals within the Statute of 5 E. 6. For the Buyers and Sellers of Corn and other Victuals have divers Provisoes and Qualifications for them as it appeareth by the said Act but Costermongers and Fruterers have not any Proviso for them also always after the said Act they have bought Apples and other Fruits by Ingross and sold them again and before this time no Information was exhibited for them no more then for Plums or other fruit which serveth more for delicacy then for necessary Food But the Statute of 5 E. 6. is to be intended of things necessary and of common use for the sustenance of man and therefore the words are Corn Grain Butter Cheese or other dead Victual which is as much to say as Victual of like quality that is of like necessary and common use But the Statute of 2 E. 6. cap. 15. made against Conspiracies to enhaunce the prices was done and made by express words to extend it to things which are more of pleasure then of profit So it was said That of those Fruits a man cannot be a Forestaller within this Act of 5 E. 6. for in the same Branch the words are any Merchandize Victual or any other thing But this was not resolved by the Iustices because that the Information was conceived upon that branch of the Statute concerning Ingrossers VII Hill 27 Eliz. in the Chancery HIllary Term the 27 of Eliz. in the Chancery the Case was thus One Ninian Menvil seised of certain Lands in Fee took a wife Fine Dower Relation and levyed a Fine of the said Lands with proclamations and afterwards was indicted and out-lawed of High Treason and dyed The Conusees convey the Lands to the Queen who is now seised the five years pass after the death of the Husband The Daughters and Heirs of the said Ninian in a Writ of Error in the Kings Bench reverse the said Attainder M. 26 and 27 Eliz. last past and thereupon the Wife sueth to the Queen who was seised of the said Land as aforesaid by Petition containing all the special matter scil the Fine with proclamations and the five years passed after the death of her Husband the Attainder and the reversal of it and her own title scil her marriage and the seisin of her Husband before the Fine And the Petition being endorsed by the Queen Fiat droit aux parties c. the same was sent into the Chancery as the manner is And in this case divers Objections were made against the Demandant 1. That the said Fine with proclamations should bar the Wife of her Dower and the Attainder of her Husband should not help her for as long as the Attainder doth remain in force the same was a bar also of her Dower so as there was a double bar to the Wife viz. the Fine levyed with proclamations and the five years past after the death of her Husband and the Attainder of her Husband of his Treason But admit that the Attainder of the Husband shall avail the Wife in some manner when the same is now reversed in a Writ of Error and now upon the matter is in Iudgment of Law as if no Attainder had been and against that a man might plead That there is no such Record because that the first Record is reversed and utterly disaffirmed and annihilated and now by Relation made no Record ab initio and therewith agreeth the Book of 4 H. 7. 11. for the words of the Iudgment in a Writ of Error are Quod Judicium praedict Errores praedict alios in Recordo c. revocetur admittetur c. quod ipsa ad possessionem suam sive seisinam suam as the case requireth tenementorum suorum praedictorum una cum exitibus proficuis inde a tempore Judicii praedict reddit praecept ad omnia quae occasione Judicii illius omisit restituatur By which it appeareth that the first Iudgment which was originally imperfect and erroneous is for the same Errors now adnulled and revoked ab initio and the party against whom the Iudgment was given restored to his possession and to
delivered to the party without difficulty if the Ecclesiastical Iudg when the cause which depends before him is meer Ecclesiastical denyeth the Libel a Prohibition lieth because that he doth against the Statute and yet no Prohibition by any express words is given by the Statute And upon the same Statute the Case was in 4 E. 4. 37. Pierce Peckam took Letters of Administration of the Goods of Rose Brown of the Bishop of London and afterwards T. T. sued to Thomas Archbishop of Canterbury That because the said Rose Brown had Goods within his Diocess he prayed Letters of Administration to be committed to him upon which the Bishop granted him Letters of Administration and afterwards T. T. libelled in the Spiritual Court of the Archbishop in the Arches against Pierce Peckam to whom the Bishop of London had committed Letters of Administration to repeal the same and Pierce Peckam according to the said Statute prayed a Copy of the Libel exhibited against him and could not have it and thereupon he sued a Prohibition and upon that an Attachment And there Catesby Serjeant moved the Court that a Prohibition did not lie for two causes 1. That the Statute gives that the Libel shall be delivered but doth not say that the Plea in the Spiritual Court shall surcease by Prohibition 2. The Statute is not intended of matter meer spiritual as that case is to try the Prerogative and the Liberty of the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of London in committing of Administrations And there Danby Chief Iustice If you will not deliver the Libel according to the Statute you do wrong which wrong is a temporal matter and punishable at the Common Law and therefore in this case the party shall have a special Prohibition out of this Court reciting the matter and the Statute aforesaid commanding them to surcease until he had the Copy of the Libel delivered unto him which case is a stronger case then the case at the Bar for that Statute is in the Affirmative and the said Act of 2 E. 6. cap. 13. is in the Negative scil That no Suit shall be for any Tythes of any Land in kinde where there is Modus Decimandi for that is the effect of the said Act as to that point And always after the said Act in every Term in the whole Reigns of King E. 6. Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth until this day Prohibitions have been granted in Causa Modi Decimandi and Iudgments given upon many of them and all the same without question made to the contrary And accordingly all the Iudges resolved in 7 E. 6. Dyer 79. Et contemporanea expositio est optima fortissima in lege a communi observantia non est recedendum minime mutanda sunt quae certam habuerunt interpretationem And as to the first Objection That the Plea of Modus Decimandi is but accessary unto the Right of Tythes it was resolved that the same was of no force for three causes 1. In this case admitting that there is Modus Decimandi then by the Custom and by the Act of 2 E. 6. and the other Acts the Tythes in kinde are extinct and discharged for one and the same Land cannot be subject to two manner of Tythes but the Modus Decimandi is all the Tythe with which the Land is chargeable As if a Horse or other thing valuable be given in satisfaction of the Duty the Duty is extinct and gone and it shall be intended that the Modus Decimandi began at the first by real composition by which the Lands were discharged of the Tythes and a yearly sum in satisfaction of them assigned to the Parson c. So as in this case there is neither Principal nor Accessary but an Identity of the same thing 2. The Statute of 2 E. 6. being a Prohibition in it self and that in the Negative If the Ecclesiastical Iudg doth against it a Prohibition lieth as it appeareth clearly before 3. Although that the Rule be general yet it appeareth by the Register it self that a Modus Decimandi is out of it for there is a Prohibition in Causa Modi Decimandi when Lands are given in satisfaction of the Tythes As to the second Objection it was answered and resolved That that was from or out of the Question for status Quaestionis non est deliberativus sed judicialis what was fit and convenient but what the Law is and yet it was said It shall be more inconvenient to have an Ecclesiastical Iudg who is not sworn to do Iustice to give sentence in a case between a man of the Clergy and a Lay-man then for twelve men sworn to give their Verdict upon hearing of Witnesses viva voce before an indifferent Iudg who is sworn to do Right and Iustice to both parties But convenient or inconvenient is not the Question Also they have in the Spiritual Court such infinite exceptions to Witnesses that it is at the Will of the Iudg with which party he shall give his sentence As to the third Objection it was answered and resolved First That satisfactio pecuniaria of it self is Temporal But for as much as the Parson hath not remedy pro Modo Decimandi at the Common Law the Parson by force of the Acts cited before might sue pro Modo Decimandi in the Ecclesiastical Court but that doth not prove That if he sueth for Tythes in kinde which are utterly extinct and the Land discharged of them that upon the Plea de Modo Decimandi that a Prohibition should not lie for that without all question appeareth by all that which before hath been said that a Prohibition doth lie See also 12 H. 7. 24. b. Where the original cause is Spiritual and they proceed upon a Temporal a Prohibition lieth See 39 E. 3. 22 E. 4. Consultation That Right of Tythes which is meerly Ecclesiastical yet if the question ariseth of the limits of a Parish a Prohibition lieth and this case of the limits of a Parish was granted by the Lord Chancellor and not denyed by the other side As to the Objection That an Averment is taken of the refusal of the Plea de Modo Decimandi it was answered and resolved That the same is of no force for divers causes 1. It is onely to inforce the contempt 2. If the Spiritual Court ought to have the Tryal de Modo Decimandi then the refusal of acceptance of such a Plea should give cause of Appeal and not of Prohibition as if an Excommunication Divorce Heresie Simony c. be pleaded there and the Plea refused the same gives no cause of Prohibition as if they deny any Plea meer spiritual Appeal and no Prohibition lieth 3. From the begining of the Law no Issue was ever taken upon the refusal of the plea in Causa Modi Decimandi nor any Consultation ever granted to them because they did not refuse but allowed the plea. 4. The refusal is no part of the matter issuable or material in
Trees and Clay c. which he had not but as things annexed to the Land and therefore he could not have them when he had departed with his whole interest nor he could not take them either for Reparations or otherwise But when Tenant for life Leaseth for years except the Timber Trees the same remaineth yet annexed to his Freehold and he may command the Lessee to take them for necessary Reparations of the Houses And in the said case of Saunders a Iudgment is cited between Foster and Miles Plaintiffs and Spencer and Bourd Defendants That where Lessee for years assigns over his term except the Trees that Waste in such case shal be brought against the Assignee but in this case without question Waste lieth against the Tenant for life and so there is a difference c. XXVIII Mich. Term 7 Jacobi Regis In the Court of Wards Hulmes Case THe King in the right of his Dutchy of Lancaster Lord Richard Hulm seised of the Mannor of Male in the County of Lancaster holden of the King as of his Dutchy by Knights service Mesne and Robert Male seised of Lands in Male holden of the Mesn as of his said Mannor by Knights service Tenant Richard Hulm dyed after whose death 31 Hen. the eight it was found that he dyed seised of the said Menalty and that the same descended to Edward his Son and Heir within age and found the Tenure aforesaid c. And during the time that he was within age Robert Male the Tenant dyed after which in anno 35 H. 8. it was found by Office That Robert Male dyed seised of the said Tenancy peravail and that the same descended to Richard his Son and Heir within age and that the said Tenancy was holden of the King as of his said Dutchy by Knights service whereas in truth the same was holden of Edward Hulm then in Ward of the King as of his Menalty for which the King seised the Ward of the Heir of the Tenant And afterwards anno quarto Jacobi Regis that now is after the death of Richard Male who was lineal Heir of the said Robert Male by another Office it was found That the said Richard dyed seised of the said Tenancy and held the same of the King as of his Dutchy by Knights service his Heir within age whereupon Richard Hulm Cosin and Heir of the said Richard Hulm had preferred a Bill to be admitted to his Traverse of the said Office found in quarto Jacobi Regis And the Question was Whether the Office found in 35 H. 8. be any estoppel to the said Hulm to Traverse the said last Office or if that the said Hulm should be driven first to Traverse the Office of 35 H. 8. And it was objected That he ought first to Traverse the Office of 35 H. 8. as in the Case of 26 E. 3. 65. That if two Fines be levyed of Lands in ancient Demesn the Lord of whom the Land is holden ought to have a Writ of Deceit to reverse the first Fine and in that the second Fine shall not be a Bar And that the first Office shall stand as long as the same remains in force To which it was answered and resolved by the two Chief Iustices and the Chief Baron and the Court of Wards That the finding of an Office is not any estoppel for that is but an enquest of Office and the party grieved shall have a Traverse to it as it hath been confessed and therefore without question the same is no estoppel But when an Office is found falsly that Land is holden of the King by Knights service in capite or of the King himself in Socage if the Heir sueth a general Livery now it is holden in 46 E. 3. 12. by Mowbray and Persey that he shall not after add that the Land is not holden of the King but that is not any estoppel to the Heir himself who sueth the Livery and shall not conclude his Heir for so saith Mowbray himself expresly in 44 Assis pl. 35. That an Estoppel by suing of Livery shall estop onely himself the Heir during his life And in 1 H. 4. 6. b. there the case is put of express confession and suing of Livery by the issue in tayl upon a false Office and there it is holden that the Iurors upon a new Diem clausit extremum after the death of such special Heir are at large according to their conscience to finde that the Land is not holden c. for they are sworn ad veritatem dicendum and their finding is called veredictum quasi dictum veritatis which reason also shall serve when the Heir in Fee-simple sueth Livery upon a false Office and the Iurors after his death ought to finde according to the truth So it is said 33 H. 6. 7. by Laicon that if two sisters be found Heirs whereof the one is a Bastard if they joyn in a Suit of Livery she which joyneth with the Bastard in the Livery shall not alledg Bastardy in the other but there is no Book that saith that the Estoppel shall endure longer then during his life and when Livery is sued by a special Heir the force and effect of the Livery is executed and determined by his death and by that the Estoppel is expired with the death of the Heir but that is to be intended of a general Livery but a special Livery shall not conclude one But as it is expressed the words of a general Livery are When the Heir is found of full age Rex Escheatori c. Scias quod cepimus homigium I. filii haeredis B. defuncti de omnibus terris tenementis quae idem B. Pater suus tenuit de nobis in capite die quo obiit ei terras tenement illa reddidimus ideo tibi praecipimus c. And when the Heir was in Ward at his full age the Writ of Livery shall say Rex c. Quia I. filius haeres B. defuncti qui de nobis tenuit in capite aetatem suam coram te sufficienter probavit c. Ceperimus homagium ipsius I. de omnibus terris tenementis quae idem B. Pater suus tenuit de nobis in capite die quo obiit ei terras tenement illa reddidimus ideo tibi praecipimus ut supra c. Which Writ is the Suit of the Heir and therefore although that all the words of the Writ are the words of the King as all the Writs of the King are and although that the Livery be general de omnibus terris tenementis de quibus B. pater I. tenuit de nobis in capite die quo obiit without direct affirmation that any Mannor in particular is holden in capite and notwithstanding that the same is not at the prosecution of the Kings Writ and no Iudgment upon it yet because the general Livery is founded upon the Office and by the Office it was found That divers Lands or
Lease be made to one for the lives of J. S. and J. N. there the Freehold doth not determine by the death of one of them for the reasons and causes given in the Case of Brudnel in the fifth part of my Reports fol. 9 Which Case was affirmed to be good Law by the whole Court XXXIII Easter Term anno 8 Jacobi In the Common-Pleas Heydon and Smiths Case RIchard Heydon brought an Action of Trespass against Michael Smith and others of breaking of his Close called the Moor in Ugley in the County of Essex the 25 day of June in the fifth year of the King quendam arborem suum ad valentiam 40 s. ibidem nuper crescen succiderunt The Defendants said that the Close is and at the time of the Trespass was the Freehold of Sir John Leventhrop Knight c. and that the said Oak was a Timber Tree of the growth of thirty years and more and justifies the cutting down of the Tree by his commandment The Plaintiff replyeth and saith That the said Close and a House and 28 Acres of Land in Ugley are Copyhold and parcel of the said Mannor of Ugley c. of which Mannor Edward Leventhrop Esquire Father of the said Sir John Leventhrop was seised in Fee and granted the said House Lands and Close to the said Richard Heydon and his Heirs by the Rod at the Will of the Lord according to the custom of the said Mannor and that within the said Mannor there is such a custom Quod quilibet tenens Customar ejusdem Manerii sibi haeredibus suis ad voluntatem Domini c. a toto tempore supradicto usus fuit consuevit ad ejus libitum amputare ramos omnimodum arborum called Pollingers or Husbords super terris tenem suis Customar crescen pro ligno combustibili ad like libitum suum applicand in praedicto Messuagio comburend and also to cut down and take at their pleasure all manner of Trees called Pollengers or Husbords and all other Timber trees super ejusdem Custumariis suis crescen for the reparation of their Houses built upon the said Lands and customary Tenements and also for Ploughbote and Cartbote and that all Trees called Pollengers or Husbords and all other trees at the time of the Trespass aforesaid or hitherto growing upon the aforesaid Lands and Tenements customary of the said Richard Heydon were not sufficient nor did serve for the necessary uses aforesaid And that the said Richard Heydon from the time of the said Grant made unto him had maintained and preserved all trees c. growing upon the said Lands and Tenements to him granted And that after the death of the said Edward Leventhrop the said Mannor descended to the said Sir John Leventhorp and that at the time of the Trespass the aforesaid Messuage of the said Richard Heydon was in decay egebat necessariis reparationibus in Maremio ejusdem Vpon which the Defendant did demur in Law And this Case was oftentimes argued at the Bar and now this Term it was argued at the Bench by the Iustices And in this case these points were resolved 1. That the first part of the Custom was absurd and repugnant scil Quod quilibet tenens Customarii ejusdem Manerii habens tenens aliqua terras seu tenementa Custom c. usus fuit amputare ramos omnimodum arborum vocat Pollingers c. pro ligno combustabili c. in praedicto Messuagio comburend which ought to be in the Messuage of the Plaintiff for no other Messuage is mentioned before which is absurd and repugnant That every customary Tenant should burn his Fuel in the Plaintiffs house But that Branch of the Custom doth not extend unto this case for the last part of the custom which concerneth the cuting down of the Trees concerns the point in question and so the first part of the custom is not material It was objected That the pleading that the Messuage of the Plaintiff was in decay egebat necessariis reparationibus in maremio ejusdem was too general for the Plaintiff ought to have shewed in particular in what the Messuage was in decay as the Book is in 10 E. 4. 3. He who justifieth for Housebote c. ought to shew that the House hath cause to be repaired c. To which it was answered by Coke chief Iustice That the said Book proved the pleading in the case at Bar was certain enough scil Quod Messuagium praed egebat necessariis reparationibus in maremio without shewing the precise certainty and therewith agrees 7 H. 6. 38. and 34 H. 6. 17. 2. It was also answered and resolved That in this case without question it needs not to alledg more certainty for here the Copyholder according to the custom doth not take it but the Lord of the Mannor doth cut down the Tree and carryeth it away where the rest was not sufficient and so preventeth the Copyholder of his benefit and therefore he needeth not to shew any decay at all but onely for increasing of the damages for the Lord doth the wrong when he cutteth down the Tree which should serve for reparations when need should be 3. It was resolved That of common Right as a thing incident to the Grant the Copyholder may take Housebote Hedgbote and Plowbote upon his Copyhold Quia concesso uno conceduntur omnia sine quibus id consistere non potest Et quando aliquis aliquid concedit concedere videtur id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest and therewith agreeth 9 H. 4. Waste 59. But the same may be restrained by custom scil That the Copyholder shall not take it unless by assignment of the Lord or his Bayliff c. 4. It was resolved That the Lord cannot take all the Timber Trees but he ought to leave sufficient for the Reparation of the Customary houses and for Ploughbote c. for otherwise great Depopulation will follow scil Ruine of the Houses and decay of Tillage and Husbandry And it is to be understood That Bote being an ancient Saxon word hath two significations the one compensatio criminis as Frithbote which is as much as to say to be discharged from giving amends for the breach of the peace Manbote to be discharged of amends for the death of man And secondly in the latter signification scil for Reparation as was Bridgbote Burghbote Castlebote Parkbote c. scil Reparation of a Bridg of a Borough of a Castle of a Park c. And it is to be known that Bote and Estovers are all one Estovers are derived of this French word Estouer i. e. fovere i. e. to keep warm to cherish to sustain to defend And there are four kinds of Estovers scil ardendi arandi construendi claudendi scil Firebote Housebote Ploughbote and Hedgbote 5. It was resolved That the Copyholder shall have a general Action of Trespass against the Lord Quare clausum fregit arborem