and to bring an Account next Parliament ad quod praedictum Episcopum adjornavimus are the Words of the Writ And that the Business was heard in Parliament appears by the Records 31 E 1. The King seized on the Temporalities of the Bishop of Durham upon a Judgment given against him in Parliament for extending his Spiritual Jurisdiction too far as appears by the Record of the Concord made between the King and him In the Reign of King Edward the Second In the Reign of K. E. 2. nothing is produced but the Statute 9 E. 2. for Regulating the Proceedings between the Civil and Ecclesiastical Courts But how the Kings Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction is proved hereby is hard to understand It appears indeed that the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction is allowed and limited by Parliament But from hence saith he it follows that these Laws may be called the Kings Eccclesiastical Laws or the Ecclesiastical Laws of England There is no question but they may But there is a Difference between Laws so called by Acceptation and Allowance and such as have their whole Force and Authority from the King. For otherwise where the Popes Jurisdiction is owned and received the Pope must receive his Authority from the King. But a Liberty to exercise Authority and deriving Authority are two Things In the Reign of King Edward the Third In the Time of E. 3. many things are alledged and to more purpose but yet a short Answer will serve If the first Instance doth hold viz. That the Sentence of Excommunication by the Archbishop holds against the Sentence of the Pope or his Legate it only proves that the Eccesiastical Jurisdiction here by Law is in the Archbishop and not in the Pope or his Legate But there may be another Reason mentioned by Fitz Herbert viz. That the Certificate of the Archbishop might be more Authentick than the Seal of a Legate The second sixth and eighth only prove the King Supreme Patron and a Right of Patronage is distinct from a Right of Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction and so it was resolved in Grendon's Case Pl. f. 498. That the King presents by Lapse as Supreme Patron and not as Supreme Ordinary For this belongs to him as King the Land on which Churches are built being originally held of him And this Right the King enjoyed when the Pope was owned to be Supreme Ordinary But in the Case of his own free Chapels Fitz-Herbert saith right That in Case of Lapse by the Dean the King presents as Ordinary the Archbishop and Bishop having no Authority there as Ordinaries The third fourth and fifth are about Exemptions from Episcopal Jurisdictions granted by the King especially in his own free Chapels which are only visitable by Commission from the King. But this very Pretence of Exemptions from Episcopal Jurisdiction was founded upon the Belief of the Pope's being Supreme Ordinary for exempt Places were not supposed to be free from all Ordinary Jurisdiction but from that of Inferior Ordinaries being immediately subject to the Pope A Bishop by the Canon Law may grant an Exemption from his Right of Jurisdiction but not from his Right of Visitation but the Pope from both And in the Grant of Exemption the immediate Subjection to the Roman See is expressed As to the King 's free Chapels their Exemption was by an express Bull of Innocent III to King John and in the Case of the free Chapels of S. Martins Henry III granted a Prohibition wherein it is inserted That it was a free Chapel ab omni Jurisdictione Episcopali per Sedem Apostolicam exempta And 45 Hen. 3. in a Prohibition concerning the free Chapel of Wolverhampton the Grant of Innocent III is repeated The Right to extra-parochial Tithes is Provisional and not by way of Inheritance and so it may belong to the King although he have no Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction As to the severe Proceeding about Bulls from Rome I have given an Account of that already in E. 1. The anointing of Kings proves no more their Capacity of Spiritual Jurisdiction than it proves the Kings of Israel to have been High Priests There is no doubt the Ecclesiastical Courts may be limited by the Laws of the Land and there are some Causes which belong to them not originally of a Spiritual Nature but they have been a long time possessed of them by Custom and are allowed by Law which is well expressed in 24 Hen. 8. c. 12. where it is said That all Causes Testamentary Causes of Matrimony and Divorces Rights of Tithes Oblations and Obventions the Knowledge whereof by the Goodness of Princes of this Realm and by the Laws and Customs of the same appertaineth to the Spiritual Jurisdiction of this Realm shall be determined within the Kings Jurisdiction and Authority It doth not seem probable That the King by his own Authority would remove Secular Canons and put in Regular when Hoveden saith in the same Case H. 2. did it by the Pope's Authority and with the free Consent of the Parties The Statutes of Provisors were excellent Statutes but are said to be enacted for the Good and Tranquility of the Realm which no doubt the King and his Parliament were bound to take care of But they prove no more Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction than the Pragmatick Sanctions of Lewis IX and Charles VII in France did which were of the same nature The following Instances in other Reigns are many of them of the same kind with those already answered but what seems to have any new Force shall be considered In the Reign of King Henry the Fourth 2 H. 4. c. 15. is urged to prove That the King by consent of his Parliament did direct the Proceedings of the Spiritual Courts in Cases of Heresie and other Matters more Spiritual but it is evident by the Act it self That the Spiritual Jurisdiction was left wholly to the Ordinaries and only an Inforcement of it by the Civil Power was added by the Law then made for the Words are Whereas the Diocesans of the said Realm cannot by their Jurisdiction Spiritual without Aid of the said Royal Majesty sufficiently correct c. Therefore a Power to Imprison and Fine was given to the Ordinaries who might before have proceeded by Ecclesiastical Censures but these being contemned by them the Ordinaries called in the Assistance of the Civil Power If there had been a Power before to have proceeded against Hereticks by Common Law when convict by their Ordinaries I cannot see any Reason why that Law should be made In case of Apostacy i. e. Renouncing Christianity Bracton saith The Person convict is to be burned and he instanceth in the Deacon who turned Jew in the Council of Oxford And Fleta speaks only of Apostates whether Clerks or others and those are the Miscreants in Briton and in Horn Heresie was then the same with renouncing Baptism or turning Jew or Turk or using Sorcery but after Wickliff's Time the Ordinaries inlarged the Notion of Heresie and took
the Prince and the Council and Consent of the great Men and Agreement of the Common-wealth And he adds further That our Laws being thus made and established mutari non poterunt nec destrui sine communi Consensu Consilio eorum omnium quorum Consilio Consensu fuerunt promulgatae Which are very remarkable Words against a dispensing power For that doth imply a Power to change the Law and in effect to destroy it without the Advice or Consent of those that made it He saith indeed The Law may be improved without their Consent i. e. by the Judges Interpretation as to parallel Cases not expressed But if any new or hard Case happens it ought he saith to be respited usque ad magnam Curiam i. e. to the Parliament ut ibi per Concilium Curiae terminentur that being the Supreme Judicature of the Nation Fortescue who very well understood our Constitution saith That the King although he be the Head of the Political Body can neither change our Laws nor take away Property without Consent And that our Laws are made not by the Princes Will but by General Consent Totius Regni Assensu He saith They may be changed but it must be Non sine Communitatis Procerum Regni Assensu quali ipsae primitus emanarunt He takes notice That several of our Kings did not like our Constitution but affected a more Arbitrary and therefore approved the Civil Law for that Maxim Quod Principi placuit Legis habet vigorem But he shews our Constitution to be better for King and People For here he saith The King levies no Taxes nor alters Laws or makes new ones sine Concessione vel Assensu totius Regni sui in Parliamento suo expresso But certainly dispensing with Laws is altering them not as to their Words but as to the Intention and Design of them which is the main thing in a Law and he that alters the Law as to any one whose Case is common with others may alter it as to all others in equal Circumstances And what doth such a Law then signifie In the Charter of King John the Commune Consilium Regni was to pass all Aids and besides particular Summons to the Great Men general Summons were to be given to others to appear within forty days and if they did not Matters were to go on however This very Charter as appears by Matt. Paris was renewed 9 H. 3. But he had learned the Trick of a Non obstante from his good Friend the Pope and when he was urged with his own Grants he said Doth not the Pope void his Grants with a Non-obstante Why may not I do the same by the Grants of my Self and my Predecessors To whom a sharp Reply was made As long as he observed Justice in his Actings he would be King and no longer Which I only mention to shew that the Use of a Non obstante was then looked on as a Violation of Justice And so it must needs be if our Laws as Bracton saith be Communis Reipub. Sponsio for then they are of the Nature of Contracts and when Laws are so it is agreed by those who write of these Matters although otherwise no Enemies to a Dispensing Power That they are not to be Dispensed with by a non obstante If a Prince makes a Grant of any thing wherein he hath Power to oblige himself in Justice it becomes saith Baselius Pontius of the Nature of a Contract which gives a Right to those to whom it is made and lays an Obligation of Justice upon him Where a Grant is made for the Benefit of others and is ac cepted by them it is not in the Granter's Power to revoke it as Sanchez shews from many Authorities And the Lawyers are of the same Mind as appears by what is already produced out of Baldus and others but I shall mention some who declare the Opinion of others Explorati juris est eas Constitutiones quae in contractum transeunt ita ligare Principes ut iis derogare nequeant saith Gerl. Buxtorffius Gail saith That Princes are bound by all Grants made per modum contractus de Jure Communi and that is the general Opinion One of the latest Writers de Jure Gentium saith That Princes are more strongly bound by Laws which pass by way of Contracts than by any positive Laws made by Absolute Power Although they relate to the weightiest Points of Government That a Prince cannot grant a non obstante to such Laws as he hath sworn to observe is not only the Opinion of other Lawyers but of some of the highest Canonists And it is a Rule among them That no Clause of non obstante can take away Constitutionem Juratam Where there is therefore not only a Contract with others in the passing of a Law but an Oath to observe the Laws I do not see how a non obstante or a Dispensing Power can take Place 2. We have the Advantage in Point of Authority as well as Reason as to this very Case of Dispensing with the Statute of 23 H. 6. For I take it for granted That the Authority of Parliament is more to be regarded than the Opinion of Judges And I think we have good Reason to believe That the Parliament did not think this Act could be voided by a non obstante 1. The Parliament that declared any non obstante against the Act to be void was certainly of that Opinion or else they did a ridiculous thing to put in a Clause which was void of it self 2. The Parliament 28 H. 6. c. 3. was of that Mind for what need an Indemnity by Act of Parliament if the King could by his Dispensing Power have made it lawful for the Sheriffs to continue 3. The Parliament 8 E. 4. 4. continued in the same mind for whereas in the beginning of his Reign Sheriffs were continued more than a Year by reason of the Troubles it was not then thought though in a Case of such Necessity That the King could Dispense with this Law but they were indemnified by Act of Parliament and the Act declared to stand in full Force 4. the Parliament 6 H. 8. c. 18. after the supposed Judgment 2 H. 7. And in the time of a Prince who would lose none of his Prerogatives was still of the same Judgment for it not only recites the Statute but particularly takes notice of the voiding all Pardons and non obstante's and by Act of Parliament indemnisies the Under-Sheriffs of Bristow and gives them the same Priviledge which those of London had What need all this if it had been thought good Law at that time that the King might by his Dispensing Power have given Sheriffs leave to have acted against that Statute And now I leave any Man of Reason to judge Whether this famous Case be a sufficient Foundation for the seting up a Dispensing Power either as to a
Cases besides those which depended on the Canon-Law For saith he the Pope usurped such a Power in derogation of the Authority Royal and then that Power must be originally in the King otherwise in the Construction of the Act it could be no Usurpation But this is a very false way of Reasoning The Pope usurped such a Power on the Crown therefore the Crown hath it of Right For the Popes Usurpations were many of them unreasonable his Primacy according to Canons being allowed and our Law did restore to the King the ancient Right and Jurisdiction of the Crown and not put him into the Possession of all the extravagant Power which the Pope usurped For this Law charges the Pope with intolerable Exactions of great Sums of Money in Pensions Censes Peter-Pence Procurations Fruits Suits for Provisions and Expeditions of Bulls for Arch-Bishopricks and Bishopricks and for Delegates and Rescripts in Causes of Contentions and Appeals Jurisdictions Legantine as well as Dispensations Licenses Faculties Grants Relaxations Writs called Perinde valere Rehabilitations Absolutions c. Now all these were Usurpations in Derogation of the Crown but doth it therefore follow that the Crown hath a Right to them all But to go no further than the Business of Dispensations Hath the King a Right by this Statute to dispense as far as the Pope The Pope usurped a Power of dispensing in Matrimonial Contracts in Oaths in Vows in some positive Divine Laws which I suppose H. 8. by vertue of the Supremacy never pretended to So that it is a very mistaken Notion of some Men That the King had all the Power which the Pope usurped And as to the Act it is plain by the Words of it That the Original Power of Dispensing was lodged in the King Lords and Commons and the Ministerial Execution of it with the Arch Bishop of Canterbury even with respect to the King himself But if the King had pretended to all the Power which the Pope usurped he must have dispensed with himself But this Author offers to Prove That there is a Power in the Crown to dispense with Acts of Parliament even such as concern the Consecration of Bishops because it is said 8 Eliz. That the Queen by her Supreme Authority had dispensed with all causes or Doubts of any Imperfection or Disability in the Persons c. To give a clear Answer to this we must consider these Things 1. That 1 Eliz. 1. The Act of 25 H. 8. for the Order and Form of Electing and Making Arch-Bishops and Bishops was revived as appears by the same Act 8. Eliz. 1. 7. 2. That by another Act 1 Eliz. 2. The Book of Common-Prayer and Administration of Sacraments and other Rites and Ceremonies of the Church of England which were in use in the time of 6 E. and repealed by Queen Mary were re-inforced 1 Eliz. 2. 2. and the Repeal annulled But by the Act 5 and 6 E. 6. c. 1. § 5. the Form and Manner of making Arch-Bishops Bishops Priests and Deacons was added to the Book of Prayer as of like Force and Authority with it 3. That the Act of E. 6. being revived with the express mention of the Alterations and Additions made to it there was ro Necessity apprehended 1 Eliz. to make a distinct Act for that which was in force already by the Name of Additions therein added and appointed by that Statute And this I conceive was the true Reason why a Bill did not pass 1 Eliz. to that purpose For I find by the Journals of the House a Bill was prepared and read the third time in the House of Lords but upon Consideration it was laid a side as superfluous 4. That the Popish Party took Advantage of this and pretended That the Book of Consecration c. was not established by Law being not expresly mentioned and therefore the Bishops made by it were not Legal Bishops And upon this Bonner resolved to stand the Trial against Horn Bishop of Winchester as may be seen in Dyer R. f. 234. So that the Papists then stood upon it That the Crown could not dispense with Laws otherwise Bonner's Plea signified nothing For if there were such an Inherent Right in the Crown to Dispense with Laws in Ecclesiastical Matters then these were Legal Bishops having all the Queen 's Dispensing Power for them 5. The Clause in the Queen's Letters Patents for Dispensing with Imperfections and Disability was put in out of abundant Caution and not for any Necessity that we can find But it was Customary in the Popes Bulls to put in such kind of Clauses and therefore they would omit no Power in that Case which the Pope did pretend to which the Act faith was for avoiding all Ambiguities and Questions 6. But after all lest there should be any Colour for Disputing this Matter left according to the express Letter of the Law therefore it was declared 8 Eliz. 1. 3. That not only the Book of Common-Prayer but the Form of Consecrating Archbishops Bishops c. which was set sorth in Edward the Sixth's Time and added to the Common Prayer shall stand and be in full Force and Effect And all Acts done by it are declared to be Good and Perfect to all Intents and Purposes So that this Act of Parliament doth rather overthrow a Dispensing Power for if there were then such a Supreme and Absolute Power in the Crown as to Ecclesiastical Matters what need such an Act of Parliament to Confirm and Ratifie what our Author supposes done by virtue of it But to return to the 25th of H. 8. In the same Act of Parliament care is taken for the Visiting Exempt Places as Monasteries Colledges and Hospitals by a particular Commission under the Great Seal But that which comes nearest to our Business is That 26 H. 8. c. 1. another Act passed wherein the King's Supremacy is acknowledged and a Power given by Act of Parliament for him to Visit Redress and Amend all Errors Heresies Abuses Contempts and Enormities whatsoever which by any manner of Spiritual Authority or Jurisdiction ought or may lawfully be Reformed in any Usage Custom Foreign Laws Foreign Authority Prescription or any Thing or things to the contrary hereof notwithstanding If the King had this Power by virtue of his Supremacy and Prerogative Royal can we imagin H. 8. so weak a Prince and so little a valuer of his own Prerogative as to have that given him by Act of Parliament which was acknowledged to be in him before But the Words are express And that our Sovereign Lord c. shall have full Power and Authority from Time to Time to Visit c. From whence it follows That in the Judgment of H. 8. and the Parliament such a Power was not personally inherent in him but that it did belong to the Legislative Power and therefore an Act of Parliament was required for it so that the Supremacy as then setled by Law lay in a total rejecting any Foreign Jurisdiction
he is not Lord over the Community but Governour 2. That for him to Dispense in a Law made for the Community without a just Cause is not only malum quia prohibitum sed ex se ex natura rei semper malum Therefore Suarez was far from thinking a Prince might Dispense with any thing that was not malum in se for he makes it to be so for him to dispense with a malum quia prohibitum if it be prohibited by a Law made for a Publick Good and there be no just Cause for it 3. That although a Prince sins in Dispensing with such a Law yet his Dispensation holds as to the Force of the Law which he supposes to depend on the Will of the Prince and therefore his Will being altered the Obligation ceaseth as to the Persons Dispensed with 4. That although such a Dispensation holds as to the Law yet he thinks a Prince bound in Conscience to Revoke such a Dispensation because it is unlawful for him to persist in such a Will it being repugnant to the Common Good and the Obligation of his Duty 5. That if such a Dispensation be to the Injury of a third Person then it is void in it self as being repugnant to Justice Vasquez saith They are all agreed That no Prince hath a Power to Dispense with his Laws according to his Pleasure or because they are his Laws But he saith There is a Dispute Whether an unlawful Dispensation be valid or not And he thinks not and that a Man's Action after the Dispensation is as faulty as if there had been none His Reason is because a Prince is bound by his own Laws so that he cannot Dispense with himself as to the Obligation of them for if he could at Pleasure Dispense with himself he could never be bound for how can a Man be bound to keep a Law in which he can Dispense with himself when he pleases And if he cannot Dispense with himself much less with any under him Having thus endeavoured to clear the Nature and Original of the Dispensing Power I now come 2. To the Reason assigned by Sir E. Coke from the Year Books why the King may Dispense with Laws because they be mala prohibita and not mala per se. My Lord Vaughan said Right concerning it That this Rule hath more confounded Men's Judgments on this Subject than rectified them Which I shall make appear by shewing I. That it alters the Frame of our Government II. That it takes away all Security by Law. III. That it contradicts the Sense of our Nation in former Ages IV. That the Rule is contrary to the Precedents in Law. I. That it alters the Frame of our Government For it goes upon a very false Ground viz. That the King may Dispense with any thing which is not Evil in its own Nature or antecedently to any Human Laws which is to suppose the whole Legislative Power to be lodged in the Person of the King For all who understand these Matters do agree That a Power to Dispense with Laws is the same with a Power to make them Dispensare hoc est lege solvere is solus potest qui ferendae abrogandaeque leg is potestatem habet saith H. Grotius Suarez saith He hath the Power of Dispensing qui legem tulit quia ab ejus voluntate potentia pendet Vasquez That the Dispensing Power lies in him qui habet Potestatem condendi abrogandi legem Pufendorf That none can Dispense with a Law but such as have the Power of making it But we need no Authorities in this Matter For to Dispense in the Sense it is here taken is to take away the Obligation of a Law and whoever takes it away must have the Power of laying it on And there is no Difference between the Dispensation with a Law and the Abrogation of it but that a Dispensation is an Abrogation of it to particular Persons while others are under the Force of it and an Abrogation is a General Dispensation that being no more than a Relaxation of the whole Law to those Persons who were bound by it before But if a part of the Law be taken away as to the whole Community then it is called a Derogation of it But if the Law be Relaxed only for a limited Time and under certain Conditions then it is not an Abrogation but an Indulgence or Suspension of the Law. To Dispense with a Law is more than to give an Equitable Sense or a Favourable Interpretation of a Law for he that Inteprets a Law supposes his Interpretation to agree with the Sense and Design of the Law he that Dispenses owns that which he dispenses with to be against the Intention of the Law but that he hath Power to take away the Force of it so far as he thinks fit He that saith Thou shalt not kill doth not reach to Legal Executioners of Justice interprets the Law according to Reason and Equity But when God said to Abraham Go and Sacrifice thy Son he must be supposed by virtue of his Supreme Authority to Dispense with the Law in his Case so as to make that Lawful upon his Command which would not have been so without it Some will not allow this to be called a Dispensation but an alteration of the Matter of the Law but when that Alteration comes from the Authority of the Law Makers it is the same so that to Interpret a Law is an Act of Discretion and Judgment but to Dispense with it of Authority and Jurisdiction And none can therefore Dispense in the Law of God but he that made it all that the Wisest and greatest Men can justly pretend to is no more than to give the true Sense of it and it is intolerable Prsumption for any Creature to pretend to more An Equitable Sense as to Human Law is not always that which seems to be most favourable to those who go against the Letter of it but that which most enforces the End and Design of the Law although it be not comprehended in the Words of it If a Law mentions a Crime of a lesser nature in regard of Circumstances and in regard of those Circumstances promises some Favour as Benefit of the Clergy it can be no Equitable Sense to extend it to such Acts which have worse Circumstances because the Ground of the Favour was the extenuation of the Fact by the Circumstances so that the chief Rule of Equity in the Interpretation of a Law is to attend to the Intention and Design of it more than to the bare Words The Intention and Design of the Law is not to be measured by Particular and Accidental Cases wherein some Inconveniencies are to be born but by the Publick and General Good which more than makes amends for them which is the Reason of that Maxim Better a Mischief than an Inconvenience which is false unless taken in such an Equitable Sense There are
as they could to the Laws in force But the Judges confessed That although de jure both the Jurisdictions were ever in the Crown yet the one was sometimes usurped by the See of Rome which is a plain acknowledgment that by the Matters of Fact in those times the Right could not be proved and especially in the times of H. 3. when the Popes Usurpations here were at so great a height that the King upon Writs of Enquiry sent into the several Counties found That the Revenues of the Roman Court by Provisions Extortions c. exceeded the Kings And the King had so little Authority left that the Pope put Bishops upon him Rege penitus irrequisito saith Matt. Westm. so that he was so far from Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction that he had not the Nomination of his Bishops nor so much as a Consent to their Election unless the Pope thought fit sometimes to gratifie him in it For the Pope pretended to the Right of Disposal of Church Preferments by Vertue of his Ordinary Jurisdiction which was said to be twofold 1. Voluntary in the Collation of Benefices 2. Judicial in the hearing of Causes the former might be done at Rome but the other in the Ordinary Ecclesiastical Courts And Bracton who was a Judge in his time owns the Pope as much to have the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction as the King had the Temporal but yet he adds That if an Ecclesiastical Judge did meddle with Matters out of their Cognizance the King's Prohibition did lye against him and he ought to supersede his Proceedings till it were tryed in the King's Court to whom the Jurisdiction belonged But it is still harder to prove the King's Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction because the Spiritual Courts were to certifie the Kings Courts in case of Bigamy Bastardy and such like For the Question is not about their Temporal Subjection to the King in signifying the Sentence of the Court but whence they derived their Authority of holding the Ecclesi astical Courts over which Bracton saith the Pope had the ordinary Jurisdiction the Power to delegate others to execute it What doth it signifie to the Kings Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction that the Barons of England would not receive that part of the Canon Law which concerned the Legitimation of Children born before Wedlock For it depended upon the Barons Consent Whether a Canon of the Church should be made the Law of the Land concerning the Rights of Inheritance In the Reign of King Edward I. In the Time of Ed. I. we may expect some brisker Sallies towards the Kingdoms Deliverance from the Popes Usurpations which were thought so intolerable even by the Monkish Historians in his Fathers Reign What that Bull was the bringing whereof the Law-Books say was then adjudged Treason it would have been worth our while to have known For it is hard to imagine that at that time the meer bringing a Bull should be so Capital a Crime when so many were brought without danger both before and after But it seems by the Certificate of the Judges concerning it still in the Tower the Matter of it was very prejudicial to the Crown And it argues no Spiritual Jurisdiction for Princes to examine and refuse when they see cause Bulls that come from Rome For this is practised in those Countries which profess Obedience to the Popes Jurisdiction Covarruvias affirms it of Spain In Portugal when John the Second would have given up that Right to the Pope the Estates of the Kingdom would not permit him Peter the Second Duke of Britain forbad receiving any Bull before Examination by his Council under pain of Corporal Punishments and Confiscation of Goods Ant. Faber saith in Savoy No Bulls have Authority there till they are approved by the Senate and an Appeal lies from them tanquam ab Abusu Even in Naples it self Ferdinand the Catholick King gave a severe Reprimand to his Vice-Roy for not hanging up a Person who would have executed a Bull without his Authority The Letter it self is Published in the Jus Belgarum where many other things may be seen to the same purpose The Right of Patronage is a Civil Right in Princes as well as others and therefore E. 1. Without pretending to Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction might justly punish the Archbishop of York for his obstinate refusing to admit the Kings Clerk because of a Papal Provision The Statute of Bigamy might very well be interpreted in Parliament and yet the King have no Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction For it was no more than declaring in what sense a Law should be taken i. e. Whether it should extend to Bigamy before the Constitution of the Council of Lyons or after The Act of Parliament made at Carlisle 35 E. 1. against Aliens possessing Benefices is no more than hath been done in Countries where the Popes Jurisdiction is the most owned As in Spain Covarruvias saith They have Prescription and Pragmatical Sanctions against Aliens possessing Benefices The Laws of Poland and many Edicts in France exclude Strangers But I shall now produce some considerable Precedents in the time of Ed. 1. to shew that the Proceedings against the Arch-Bishops and Bishops for Misdemeanors or Contempts was in Parliament and not by Commissioners the inferior Clergy being left to the Jurisdiction of their Ordinaries 3 Ed. 1. E. Warren complained to the King That the Archbishop of Canterbury had contemned his Orders in not taking off Excommunication from some of his Servants The King sends to him to proceed no further against the Earl or his Servants usque ad Parliamentum where the Matter of Contempt might be debated But in the mean time the Archbishop sends to the King a true Account of the Matter and how far he was from Contempt which is still extant in the Records of the Tower. 7 E. 1. John Peckam Archbishop of Canterbury was summoned to Parliament to answer to a Charge of Misdemeanors against him for some Passages in the Council at Reading which he was fain to revoke and to declare that no Articles there passed should create any Prejudice to the Crown or Kingdom 8 E. 1. The Archbishop went about to Visit the Kings Free Chappels The King hearing of it sent a Writ to him to forbear usque ad proximum Parliamentum ut tunc ex unamini mutuo consensu provideamus quid fieri debeat in Praemissis 21 E. 1. John Roman Archbishop of York was Attached upon a Contempt for Excommunicating the Bishop of Durham while he was in the King's Service And after a full hearing in pleno Parliamento he was condemned and upon Submission was Fined to the King sour thousand Marks 28 E. 1. A Controversie arose between the King and the Bishop of Chichester about his refusing to admit a Person Presented to a Prebend in the Free Chappel of Hastings the King sends his Writ to the Warden of Cinque-Ports extant in the Tower among the Writs of that Time to enquire into this Matter