this the fault of his Councellor Nor when a Judge in the Common-Pleas hath given an Erroneous Sentence it is always likely that the Judge of the Kings-Bench will reverse the Judgment though there be no Question but as you may find in Bracton and other Learned Men he has power to do it because being Professors of the same Common-Law they are perswaded for the most part to give the same Judgments For Example if Sir Edw. Coke in the last Terme that he sate Lord-Chief-Justice in the Court of Common-Pleas had given an Erroneous Judgment that when he was removed and made Lord-Chief-Justice of the Kings-Bench would therefore have reversed the said Judgment it is possi he might but not very likely And therefore I do believe there is some other power by the King constituted to reverse Erroneous Judgments both in the Kings-Bench and in the Court of Common-Pleas La. I think not for there is a Statute to the contrary made 4 o Hen. 4. cap. 23. in these words Whereas as well in Plea Real as in Plea Personal after Judgment in the Court of our Lord the King the Parties be made to come upon grievous pain sometimes before the King himself sometimes before the Kings Council and sometimes to the Parliament to answer thereof anew to the great Impoverishing of the Parties aforesaid and to the subversion of the Common-Law of the Land it is ordained and established that after Judgment given in the Court of our Lord the King the Parties and their Heirs shall be there in Peace until the Judgment be undone by Attaint or by Error if there be Error as hath been used by the Laws in the times of the Kings Progenitors Ph. This Statute is so far from being repugnant to that I say as it seemeth to me to have been made expresly to confirm the same For the substance of the Statuâ—e is that there shall be no Suit made by either of the Parties for any thing adjudged either in the Kings-Bench or Court of Common-Pleas before the Judgment be undone by Error or Corruption prov'd and that this was the Common-Law before the making of this Statute which could not be except there were before this Statute some Courts authorised to examine and correct such Errors as by the Plaintiff should be assign'd The inconvenience which by this Statute was to be remedied was this that often Judgment given in the Kings Courts by which are meant in this place the Kings-Bench and Court of Common-Pleas the Party against whom the Judgment was given did begin a new Suit and cause his Adversary to come before the King himself here by the King himself must be understood the King in Person for though in a Writ by the words Coram nobis is understood the Kings-Bench yet in a Statute it is never so nor is it strange seeing in those days the King did usually sit in Court with his Council to hear as sometimes King James and sometimes the same Parties commenced their Suit before the Privy-Council though the King were absent and sometimes before the Parliament the former Judgment yet standing For remedy whereof it was ordained by this Statute that no Man should renew his Suit till the former Judgment was undone by Attaint or Error which Reversing of a Judgment had been impossible if there had been no Court besides the aforesaid two Courts wherein the Errors might be Assigned Examin'd and Judg'd for no Court can be esteemed in Law or Reason a Competent Judge of its own Errors There was therefore before this Statute some other Court existent for the hearing of Errors and Reversing of Erroneous Judgments What Court this was I enquire not yet but I am sure it could not be either the Parliament or the Privy-Council or the Court wherein the Erroneous Judgment was given La. The Doctor and Student discourses of this Statute cap. 18. much otherwise than you do For the Author of that Book saith that against an Erroneous Judgment all Remedy is by this Statute taken away And though neither Reason nor the Office of a King nor any Law positive can prohibit the remedying of any Injury much less of an unjust Sentence yet he shows many Statutes wherein a Mans Conscience ought to prevail above the Law Ph. Upon what ground can he pretend that all Remedy in this case is by this Statute prohibited La. He says it is thereby enacted that Judgment given by the Kings Courts shall not be examin'd in the Chancery Parliament nor elsewhere Ph. Is there any mention of Chancery in this Act It cannot be examin'd before the King and his Council nor before the Parliament but you see that before the Statute it was examin'd somewhere and that this Statute will have it examin'd there again And seeing the Chancery was altogether the highest Office of Judicature in the Kingdom for matter of Equity and that the Chancery is not here forbidden to examine the Judgments of all other Courts at least it is not taken from it by this Statute But what Cases are there in this Chapter of the Doctor and Student by which it can be made probable that when Law and Conscience or Law and Equity seem to oppugne one another the written Law should be preferr'd La. If the Defendant wage his Law in an Action of Debt brought upon a true Debt the Plaintiff hath no means to come to his Debt by way of Compulsion neither by Subpoena nor otherwise and yet the Defendant is bound in Conscience to pay him Ph. Here is no preferring that I see of the Law above Conscience or Equity for the Plaintiff in this case loseth not his Debt for want either of Law or Equity but for want of Proof for neither Law nor Equity can give a Man his Right unless he prove it La. Also if the Grand-Jury in Attaint affirm a false Verdict given by the Petty-Jury there is no farther Remedy but the Conscience of the party Ph. Here again the want of Proof is the want of Remedy for if he can prove that the Verdict given was false the King can give him remedy such way as himself shall think best and ought to do it in case the Party shall find surety if the same Verdict be again affirmed to satisfie his Adversary for the Dammage and Vexation he puts him to La. But there is a Statute made since viz. 27 Eliz. c. 8. by which that Statute of Hen. 4. 23. is in part taken away for by that Statute Erroneous Judgments given in the Kings-Bench are by a Writ of Error to be examin'd in the Exchequer-Chamber before the Justices of the Common-Bench and the Barons of the Exchequer and by the preamble of this Act it appears that Erroneous Judgments are only to be reform'd by the High Court of Parliament Ph. But here is no mention that the Judgments given in the Court of Common-Pleas should be brought in to be examin'd in the Exchequer-Chamber why therefore may not the Court of Chancery
which have either been not preserv'd in the Records or else by Sir Edw. Coke because they were against his opinion not alledged For this is possible though you will not grant it to be very likely therefore I insist only upon this that no Record of a Judgment is a Law save only to the party Pleading until he can by Law reverse the former Judgment And as to the proceeding without Juries by two sufficient Witnesses I do not see what harm can proceed from it to the Common-wealth nor consequently any just Quarrel that the Justice of the Common-Law can have against their proceedings in the Admiralty For the Proof of a Fact in both Courts lyeth meerly on the Witnesses and the difference is no more but that in the Imperial-Law the Judge of the Court Judgeth of the Testimony of the Witnesses and the Jury doth in a Court of Common-Law Besides if a Court of Common-Law should chance to Incroach upon the Jurisdiction of the Admiral may not he send a prohibition to the Court of Common-Law to forbid their proceeding I pray you tell me what Reason there is for the one more than for the other La. I know none but long Custom for I think it was never done Ph. The Highest ordinary Court in England is the Court of Chancery wherein the Lord Chancellour or otherwise Keeper of the Great Seal is the only Judge This Court is very Antient as appears by Sir Edw. Coke 4 Inst. p. 87. where he nameth the Chancellors of King Edgar King Etheldred King Edmund and King Edward the Confessor His Office is given to him without Letters Patents by the Kings delivery to him of the Great Seal of England and whosoever hath the keeping of the Great Seal of England hath the same and the whole Jurisdiction that the Lord Chancellour ever had by the Statute of 5 Eliz. cap. 18. wherein it is declar'd that such is and always has been the Common-Law And Sir Edw. Coke says he has his name of Chancellour from the highest point of his Jurisdiction viz. a Cancellando that is from Cancelling the Kings Letters Patents by drawing strokes through it like a Lattice Ph. Very pretty It is well enough known that Cancellarius was a great Officer under the Roman Empire whereof this Island was once a Member and that the Office came into this Kingdom either with or in Imitation of the Roman Government Also it was long after the time of the 12 Caesars that this Officer was created in the State of Rome For till after Septimius Severus his time the Emperors did diligently enough take cognizance of Causes and Complaints for Judgments given in the Courts of the Praetors which were in Rome the same that the Judges of the Common-Law are here but by the continual Civil Wars in after-times for the choosing of Emperors that diligence by little and little ceased and afterwards as I have Read in a very good Author of the Roman Civil Law the number of complaints being much increased and being more than the Emperor could dispatch he appointed an Officer as his Clerk to receive all such Petitions and that this Clerk caused a partition to be made in a Room convenient in which partition-Wall at the heighth of a Mans reach he placed at convenient distances certain Bars so that when a Suitor came to deliver his Petition to the Clerk who was sometimes absent he had no more to do but to throw in his Petition between those Bars which in Latin are called properly Cancelli not that any certain Form of those Bars or any Bars at all were necessary for they might have been thrown over though the whole space had been left open but because they were Cancelli the Clerk Attendant and keeping his Office there was called Cancellarius And any Court Bar may properly enough be called Cancelli which does not signifie a Lattice for that is but a meer Conjecture grounded upon no History nor Grammar but taken up at first as is likely by some Boy that could find no other word in the Dictionary for a Lattice but Cancelli The Office of this Chancellour was at first but to Breviate the matter of the Petitions for the easing of the Emperor but Complaints encreasing daily they were too many considering other Businesses more necessary for the Emperor to determine and this caused the Emperor to commit the Determination of them to the Chancellor again what Reason doth Sir Edw. Coke alledge to prove that the highest point of the Chancellors Jurisdiction is to Cancel his Masters Letters Patents after they were Sealed with his Masters Seal unless he hold Plea concerning the validity of them or of his Masters meaning in them or of the surreptitious getting of them or of the abusing of them which are all causes of Equity Also seeing the Chancellor hath his Office only by the delivery of the Great Seal without any Instruction or Limitation of the Process in his Court to be used it is manifest that in all Causes whereof he has the hearing he may proceed by such manner of hearing and examining of Witnesses with Jury or without Jury as he shall think fittest for the Exactness Expedition and Equity of the Decrees And therefore if he think the Custome of proceeding by Jury according to the Custome of England in Courts of Common-Law tend more to Equity which is the scope of all the Judges in the World or ought to be he ought to use that method or if he think better of another proceeding he may use it if it be not forbidden by a Statute La. As for this Reasoning of yours I think it well enough but there ought to be had also a reverend respect to Customs not unreasonable and therefore I think Sir Edw. Coke says not amiss that in such Cases where the Chancellor will proceed by the Rule of the Common-Law he ought to deliver the Record in the Kings-Bench and also it is necessary for the Lord Chancellor to take care of not exceeding as it is limited by Statutes Ph. What are the Statutes by which his Jurisdiction is limited I know that by the 27 Eliz. cap. 8. He cannot Reverse a Judgment given in the Kings-Bench for Debt Detinue c. Nor before the Statute could he ever by virtue of his Office Reverse a Judgment in Pleas of the Crown given by the Kings-Bench that hath the Cognizance of such Pleas nor need he for the Judges themselves when they think there is need to relieve a Man opprest by ill Witnesses or power of great Men prevailing on the Jury or by Error of the Jury though it be in case of Felony may stay the Execution and Inform the King who will in Equity relieve him As to the regard we ought to have to Custome we will Consider of it afterward La. First in a Parliament holden the 13th of Rich. 2. the Commons Petitioned the King that neither the Chancellor nor other Chancellor do make any order against the Common-Law
whatsoever was repugnant to those 4 General Councils For if they had I believe the Anabaptists of which there was great plenty in those times would one time or other have been question'd upon this Article of the Nicene Creed I believe one Baptism for the Remission of sins nor was the Commission it self for a long time after Registred that Men might in such uncertainty take heed and abstain for their better safety from speaking of Religion any thing at all But by what Law was this Heretick Legat burnt I grant he was an Arian and his Heresie contrary to the Determination of the Church of England in the Highest Points of Christianity but seeing there was no Statute-Law to burn him and no Penalty forbidden by what Law by what Authority was he burn't La. That this Legat was accused of Heresie was no fault of the High Commissioners but when he was accused it had been a fault in them not to have examin'd him or having examin'd him and found him an Arian not to have judged him so or not to have certified him so All this they did and this was all that belonged unto them they medled not with his Burning but left him to the Secular Power to do with him what they pleased Ph. Your Justification of the Commissioners is nothing to the Question the Question is by what Law he was burn't the Spiritual-Law gives no Sentence of Temporal Punishment and Sir Edw. Coke confesseth that he could not be burned and Burning forbidden by Statute-Law By what Law then was he burned La. By the Common-Law Ph. What 's that It is not Custom for before the time of Henry the 4th there was no such Custom in England for if there had yet those Laws that came after were but Confirmations of the Customs and therefore the Repealing of those Laws was a Repealing of the Custom For when King Ed. the 6th and Queen Eliz. abolished those Statutes they abolished all Pains and consequently Burning or else they had abolished nothing And if you will say he was burn't by the Law of Reason you must tell me how there can be Proportion between Doctrine and Burning there can be no Equality nor Majority nor Minority Assigned between them The Proportion that is between them is the Proportion of the Mischief which the Doctrine maketh to the Mischief to be Inflicted on the Doctor and this is to be measur'd only by him that hath the charge of Governing the People and consequently the Punishing of Offences can be determined by none but by the King and that if it extend to life or member with the Assent of Parliament La. He does not draw any Argument for it from Reason but alledgeth for it this Judgment executed upon Legat and a story out of Hollingshed and Stow But I know that neither History nor Precedent will pass with you for Law And though there be a Writ de haeretico comburendo in the Register as you may Read in Fitzherbert grounded upon the Statutes of 2 H. 4. cap. 15. and 2 H. 5. cap. 7. yet seeing those Statutes are void you will say the VVrit is also void Ph. Yes indeed will I. Besides this I understand not how that is true that he saith that the Diocesan hath Jurisdiction of Heresie and that so it was put in ure in all Queen Elizabeths Reign whereas by the Statute it is manifest that all Jurisdiction spiritual was given under the Queen to the High Commissioners how then could any one Diocesan have any part thereof without deputation from them which by their Letters Patents they could not grant nor was it reasonable they should For the Trust was not committed to the Bishops only but also to divers Lay-Persons who might have an Eye upon their Proceedings lest they should Incroach upon the power Temporal But at this day there is neither Statute nor any Law to Punish Doctrine but the ordinary Power Ecclesiastical and that according to the Canons of the Church of England only Authorized by the King the High Commission being long since abolished Therefore let us come now to such Causes Criminal as are not Capital Of Praemunire La. THe greatest Offence not Capital is that which is done against the Statute of Provisoes Ph. You have need to expound this La. This Crime is not unlike to that for which a Man is outlawed when he will not come in and submit himself to the Law saving that in Outlawries there is a long Process to precede it and he that is outlawed is put out of the Protection of the Law But for the Offence against the Statute of Provisors which is called Praemunire facias from the words in the Original VVrit if the Offender submit not himself to the Law within the space of 2 Months after notice he is presently an Outlaw And this Punishment if not Capital is equivalent to Capital For he lives secretly at the Mercy of those that know where he is and cannot without the like Peril to themselves but discover him And it has been much disputed before the time of Queen Elizabeth whether he might not be lawfully killed by any Man that would as one might kill a VVolf It is like the Punishment amongst the old Romans of being barred the use of Fire and VVater and like the great Excommunication in the Papacy when a Man might not eat or drink with the Offender without incurring the like Penalty Ph. Certainly the Offence for which this Punishment was first Ordained was some abominable Crime or of extraordinary Mischief La. So it was For the Pope you know from long before the Conquest incroached every day upon the Power Temporal VVhatsoever could be made to seem to be in ordine ad Spiritualia was in every Common-wealth claimed and haled to the Jurisdiction of the Pope And for that end in every Country he had his Court Ecclesiastical and there was scarce any cause Temporal which he could not by one shift or other hook into his Jurisdiction in such sort as to have it tryed in his own Courts at Rome or in France or in England it self By which means the Kings Laws were not regarded Judgments given in the Kings Courts were avoided and presentations to Bishopricks Abbies and other Benefices founded and endowed by the Kings and Nobility of England were bestowed by the Pope upon Strangers or such as with Money in their Purses could travel to Rome to provide themselves of such Benefices And suitably hereunto when there was a Question about a Tythe or a VVill though the point were meerly Temporal yet the Popes Court here would fetch them in or else one of the Parties would appeal to Rome Against these Injuries of the Roman Church and to maintain the Right and Dignity of the Crown of England Ed. 1. made a Statute concerning Provisors that is such as provide themselves with Benefices here from Rome for in the 25th year of his Reign he ordained in a full Parliament that the Right of Election of
Bishops and Right of Advowsans and Presentations belonged to himself and to the Nobility that were the founders of such Bishopricks Abbies and other Benefices And he enacted farther that if any Clerk which he or any of his Subjects should present should be disturbed by any such Provisor that such Provisor or Disturber should be attached by his Body and if Convicted lye in Prison till he were Ransomed at the Kings Will and had satisfied the Party griev'd renouced his Title and sound sureties not to sue for it any farther and that if they could not be found then Exigents should go forth to Outlawrie and the Profits of the Benefice in the mean time be taken into the Kings hands And the same Statute is confirmed in the 27th year of King Ed. the 3d which Statute alloweth to these Provisors six weeks Day to appear but if they appear before they be outlaw'd they shall be received to make Answer but if they render not themselves they shall forfeit all their Lands Goods and Chattels besides that they stand outlaw'd The same Law is confirmed again by 16 Rich. 2d cap. 5. in which is added because these Provisors obtained sometimes from the Pope that such English Bishops as according to the Law were instituted and inducted by the Kings Presentees should be excommunicated that for this also both they and the Receivers and Publishers of such Papal Process and the Procurers should have the same Punishment Ph. Let me see the Statute it self of 27 Ed. 3. La. It lies there before you set down verbatim by Sir Edw. Coke himself both in English and French Ph. 'T is well we are now to consider what it means and whether it be well or ill interpreted by Sir Edw. Coke And first it appeareth by the Preamble which Sir Edw. Coke acknowledgeth to be the best Interpreter of the Statute that this Statute was made against the Incroachments only of the Church of Rome upon the Right of the King and other Patrons to collate Bishopricks and other Benefices within the Realm of England and against the power of the Courts Spiritual to hold Plea of Controversies determinable in any of the Courts of the King or to reverse any Judgment there given as being things that tend to the Disherison of the King and Destruction of the Common-Law of the Realm always used Put the case now that a Man had procur'd the Pope to reverse a Decree in Chancery had he been within the danger of Premunire La. Yes certainly or if the Judgment had been given in the Court of the Lord Admiral or in any other Kings Court whatsoever either of Law or Equity for Courts of Equity are most properly Courts of the Common-Law of England because Equity and Common-Law as Sir Ed. Coke says are all one Ph. Then the word Common-Law is not in this Preamble restrained to such Courts only where the Tryal is by Juries but comprehends all the Kings Temporal Courts if not also the Courts of those Subjects that are Lords of great Mannors La. 'T is very likely yet I think it will not by every Man be granted Ph. The Statute also says That they who draw Men out of the Realm in Plea whereof the Cognizance pertaineth to the Kings Court or of things whereof Judgment is given in the Kings Court are within the Cases of Premunire But what if one Man draw another to Lambeth in Plea whereof Judgment is already given at Westminster Is he by this Clause involv'd in a Premunire La. Yes For though it be not out of the Realm yet it is within the meaning of the Statute because the Popes Court not the Kings Court was then perhaps at Lambeth Ph. But in Sir Edw. Coke's time the Kings Court was at Lambeth and not the Popes La. You know well enough that the Spiritual-Court has no power to hold Pleas of Common-Law Ph. I do so but I know not for what cause any simple Man that mistakes his right Court should be out of the Kings Protection lose his Inheritance and all his Goods Personal and Real and if taken be kept in Prison all his Life This Statute cannot be by Sir Edw. Cokes Torture made to say it Besides such Men are ignorant in what Courts they are to seek their Remedy And it is a Custom confirmed by perpetual usage that such ignorant Men should be guided by their Council at Law It is manifest therefore that the makers of the Statute intended not to prohibit Men from their suing for their Right neither in the Chancery nor in the Admiralty nor in any other Court except the Ecclesiastical Courts which had their Jurisdiction from the Church of Rome Again where the Statute says which do sue in any other Court or defeat a Judgment in the Kings Court what is the meaning of another Court Another Court than what Is it here meant the Kings-Bench or Court of Common-Pleas Does a Premunire lye for every Man that sues in Chancery for that which might be remedied in the Court of Common-Pleas Or can a Premunire lye by this Statute against the Lord Chancellor The Statute lays it only on the Party that sueth not upon the Judge which holdeth the Plea Nor could it be laid neither by this Statute nor by the Statute of 16 Rich. 2. upon the Judges which were then punishable only by the Popes Authority Seeing then the Party Suing has a just excuse upon the Council of his Lawyer and the Temporal Judge and the Lawyer both are out of the Statute the punishment of the Premunire can light upon no body La. But Sir Edw. Coke in this same Chapter bringeth two Precedents to prove that though the Spiritual-Courts in England be now the Kings Courts yet whosoever sueth in them for any thing tryable by the Common-Law shall fall into a Premunire One is that whereas in the 22d of Hen. 8. all the Clergy of England in a Convocation by publick Instrument acknowledged the King to be Supream Head of the Church of England yet after this viz. 24 of H. 8. this Statute was in force Ph. Why not A Convocation of the Clergy could not alter the Right of Supremacie their Courts were still the Popes Courts The other Precedent in the 25th of Hen. 8. of the Bishop of Norwich may have the same Answer for the King was not declared Head of the Church by Act of Parliament till the 26th year of his Reign If he had not mistrusted his own Law he would not have laid hold on so weak a Proof as these Precedents And as to the Sentence of Premunire upon the Bishop of Norwich neither doth this Statute nor that other of R. 2. warrant it he was sentenced for threatning to excommunicate a Man which had sued another before the Mayor But this Statute forbids not that but forbids the bringing in or publishing of Excommunications or other Process from Rome or any other Place Before the 26 Hen. 8. there is no Question but that for a
Justice La. The Judgment for Felony is Ph. Heresie is before Felony in the Catalogue of the Pleas of the Crown La. He has omitted the Judgment against a Heretick because I think no Jury confin'd Heresie nor no Judge Temporal did ever pronounce Judgment upon it For the Statute of 2 H. 5. c. 7. was that the Bishop having convicted any Man of Heresie should deliver him to the Sheriff and that the Sheriff should believe the Bishop The Sheriff therefore was bound by the Statute of 2 H. 4. after he was delivered to him to burn him but that Statute being repeal'd the Sheriff could not burn him without a Writ de Heretico comburendo and therefore the Sheriff burnt Legat 9. king James by that Writ which was granted by the Judges of the Common-Law at that time and in that Writ the Judgment is expressed Ph. This is strange reasoning when Sir Edw. Coke knew and confessed that the Statutes upon which the Writ de Heretico comburendo was grounded were all repeal'd how could he think the Writ it self could be in force Or that the Statute which repealeth the Statutes for burning Hereticks was not made with an intent to forbid such burning It is manifest he understood not his Books of Common-Law For in the time of Hen. 4. and Hen. 5. the word of the Bishop was the Sheriff's warrant and there was need of no such Writ nor could he till the 25 Hen. 8. when those Statutes were repeal'd and a Writ made for that purpose and put into the Register which Writ Fitzherbert cites in the end of his natura brevium Again in the later end of the Reign of Queen Elizabeth was published a correct Register of Original and Judicial Writs and the Writ de Haeretico comburendo left out because that Statute of 25 H. 8. and all Statutes against Hereticks were repeal'd and burning forbidden And whereas he citeth for the granting of this Writ 9. Jac. the Lord Chief Justice the Lord Chief Baron and two Justices of the Common-pleas it is as to all but the Lord Chief against the Law for neither the Judges of Common-Pleas nor of the Exchequer can hold Pleas of the Crown without special Commission and if they cannot hold Plea they cannot condemn La. The Punishment for Felony is that the Felon be hang'd by the Neck till he be dead And to prove that it ought to be so he cites a Sentence from whence I know not Quod non licet Felonem pro Felonia decollare Ph. It is not indeed lawful for the Sheriff of his own Head to do it or to do otherwise than is commanded in the Judgment nor for the Judge to give any other Judgment than according to Statute-Law or the usage consented to by the King but this hinders not the King from altering his Law concerning Judgments if he see good cause La. The King may do so if he please And Sir Edw. Coke tells you how he altered particular Judgments in case of Felony and sheweth that Judgment being given upon a Lord in Parliament that he should be hang'd he was nevertheless beheaded and that another Lord had the like Judgment for another Felony and was not hang'd but beheaded and withal he shews you the inconveniency of such proceeding because saith he if hanging might be altered to beheading by the same reason it might be altered to burning stoning to Death c. Ph. Perhaps there might be inconveniency in it but 't is more than I see or he shews nor did there happen any inconveniency from the execution he citeth Besides he granteth that death being ultimum supplicium is a satisfaction to the Law But what is all this to the purpose when it belongeth not to consider such inconveniencies of Government but to the King and Parliament Or who from the authority of a deputed Judge can derive a power to censure the actions of a King that hath deputed him La. For the death of a Man by misfortune there is he saith no express Judgment nor for killing a Man in ones own defence but he saith that the Law hath in both Cases given judgment that he that so killeth a Man shall forfeit all his Goods and Chattels Debts and Duties Ph. If we consider what Sir Edw. Coke saith 1 Inst. Sect. 745. at the word Felony these Judgments are very favourable For there he saith that killing of a Man by Chance-medley or se defendendo is Felony His words are wherefore by the Law at this day under the word Felony in Commissions c. is included Petit Treason Murder Homicide burning of Houses Burglary Robbery Rape c. Chance-medley and se defendendo But if we consider only the intent of him that killeth a Man by misfortune or in his own defence the same judgments will be thought both cruel and sinful Judgments And how they can be Felony at this day cannot be understood unless there be a Statute to make them so For the Statute of 25 H. 3. cap. 25. The words whereof Murder from henceforth shall not be judged before our Justices where it is found Misfortune only but it shall take place in such as are slain by Felony and not otherwise make it manifest if they be Felonies they must also be Murders unless they have been made Felonies by some latter Statute La. There is no such latter Statute nor is it to say in Commission nor can a Commission or any thing but another Statute make a thing Felony that was not so before Ph. See what it is for a Man to distinguish Felony into several sorts before he understands the general name of Felony what it meaneth but that a Man for killing another Man by misfortune only without any evil purpose should forfeit all his Goods and Chartels Debts and Duties is a very hard Judgment unless perhaps they were to be given to the Kindred of the Man slain by way of amends for dammage But the Law is not that Is it the Common-Law which is the Law of Reason that justifies this Judgment or the Statute-Law It cannot be the Law of Reason if the Case be meer misfortune If a Man be upon his Apple-tree to gather his Apples and by ill fortune fall down and lighting on the Head of another Man kill him and by good fortune saves himself shall he for this mischance be punished with the forfeiture of his Goods to the King Does the Law of Reason warrant this He should you 'l say have look'd to his Feet that 's true but so should he that was under have look'd up to the Tree Therefore in this Case the Law of Reason as I think dictates that they ought each of them to bear his own misfortune La. In this Case I agree with you Ph. But this Case is the true Case of meer misfortune and a sufficient reprehension of the Opinion of Sir Edw. Coke La. But what if this had hapned to be done by one that had been stealing Apples upon the Tree
little worth if they tended not to the preservation and improvement of Mens Lives seeing then without Humane Law all things would be Common and this Community a cause of Incroachment Envy Slaughter and continual War of one upon another the same Law of Reason Dictates to Mankind for their own preservation a distribution of Lands and Goods that each Man may know what is proper to him so as none other might pretend a right thereunto or disturb him in the use of the same This distribution is Justice and this properly is the same which we say is one owns by which you may see the great Necessity there was of Statute Laws for preservation of all Mankind It is also a Dictate of the Law of Reason that Statute Laws are a necessary means of the safety and well being of Man in the present World and are to be Obeyed by all Subjects as the Law of Reason ought to be Obeyed both by King and Subjects because it is the Law of God Ph. All this is very Rational but how can any Laws secure one Man from another When the greatest part of Men are so unreasonable and so partial to themselves as they are and the Laws of themselves are but a dead Letter which of it self is not able to compel a Man to do otherwise than himself pleaseth nor punish or hurt him when he hath done a mischief La. By the Laws I mean Laws living and Armed for you must suppose that a Nation that is subdued by War to an absolute submission of a Conqueror it may by the same Arm that compelled it to Submission be compelled to Obey his Laws Also if a Nation choose a Man or an Assembly of Men to Govern them by Laws it must furnish him also with Armed Men and Money and all things necessary to his Office or else his Laws will be of no force and the Nation remains as before it was in Confusion 'T is not therefore the word of the Law but the Power of a Man that has the strength of a Nation that makes the Laws effectual It was not Solon that made Athenian Laws though he devised them but the Supream Court of the People nor the Lawyers of Rome that made the Imperial Law in Justinian's time but Justinian himself Ph. We agree then in this that in England it is the King that makes the Laws whosoever Pens them and in this that the King cannot make his Laws effectual nor defend his People against their Enemies without a Power to Leavy Souldiers and consequently that he may Lawfully as oft as he shall really think it necessary to raise an Army which in some occasions be very great I say raise it and Money to Maintain it I doubt not but you will allow this to be according to the Law at least of Reason La. For my part I allow it But you have heard how in and before the late Troubles the People were of another mind Shall the King said they take from us what he please upon pretence of a necessity whereof he makes himself the Judg What worse Condition can we be in from an Enemy What can they take from us more than what they list Ph. The People Reason ill they do not know in what Condition we were in the time of the Conqueror when it was a shame to be an English-Man who if he grumbled at the base Offices he was put to by his Norman Masters received no other Answer but this Thou art but an English-Man nor can the People nor any Man that humors them in their Disobedience produce any Example of a King that ever rais'd any excessive Summ's either by himself or by the Consent of his Parliament but when they had great need thereof nor can shew any reason that might move any of them so to do The greatest Complaint by them made against the unthriftiness of their Kings was for the inriching now and then a Favourite which to the Wealth of the Kingdom was inconsiderable and the Complaint but Envy But in this point of raising Souldiers what is I pray you the Statute Law La. The last Statute concerning it is 13 Car. 2. c. 6. By which the Supream Government Command and disposing of the Militia of England is delivered to be and always to have been the Antient Right of the Kings of England But there is also in the same Act a Proviso that this shall not be Construed for a Declaration that the King may Transport his Subjects or compel them to march out of the Kingdom nor is it on the contrary declared to be unlawful Ph. Why is not that also determined La. I can imagine cause enough for it though I may be deceiv'd We love to have our King amongst us and not be Govern'd by Deputies either of our own or another Nation But this I verily believe that if a Forraign Enemy should either invade us or put himself in t a readiness to invade either England Ireland or Scotland no Parliament then sitting and the King send English Souldiers thither the Parliament would give him thanks for it The Subjects of those Kings who affect the Glory and imitate the Actions of Alexander the Great have not always the most comfortable lives nor do such Kings usually very long enjoy their Conquests They March to and fro perpetually as upon a Plank sustained only in the midst and when one end rises down goes the other Ph. 'T is well But where Souldiers in the Judgment of the Kings Conscience are indeed necessary as in an insurrection or Rebellion at home how shall the Kingdom be preserved without a considerable Army ready and in pay How shall Money be rais'd for this Army especially when the want of publick Treasure inviteth Neighbour Kings to incroach and unruly Subjects to Rebel La I cannot tell It is matter of Polity not of Law but I know that there be Statutes express whereby the King hath obliged himself never to Levy Money upon his Subjects without the consent of his Parliament One of which Statutes is 25 Ed. 1. c. 6. in these words We have granted for us and our Heirs as well to Arch-Bishops Bishops Abbots and other Folk of the Holy Church as also Earls Barons and to all the Commonalty of the Land that for no Business from henceforth we shall take such Aids Taxes or Prizes but by the common Consent of the Realm There is also another Statute of Ed. 1. in these words No Taxes or Aid shall be taken or Leveyed by us or our Heirs in our Realm without the good will and assent of the Arch-Bishops Bishops Earls Barons Knights Burgesses and other Freemen of the Land which Statutes have been since that time Confirmed by divers other Kings and lastly by the King that now Reigneth Ph. All this I know and am not satisfied I am one of the Common People and one of that almost infinite number of Men for whose welfare Kings and other Soveraigns were by God Ordain'd For
Enemies there is no end for the War will continue by a perpetual Subdivision and when it ends they will be in the same Estate they were before That they are often Abused by Men who to them seem wise when then their Wisdom is nothing else but Envy to those that are in Grace and in profitable Employments and that those Men do but abuse the Common People to their own ends that set up a private Mans Propriety against the publick Safety But say withal that the King is Subject to the Laws of God both Written and Unwritten and to no other and so was William the Conqueror whose Right it all Descended to our present King La. As to the Law of Reason which is Equity 't is sure enough there is but one Legislator which is God Ph. It followeth then that which you call the Common-Law Distinct from Statute-Law is nothing else but the Law of God La. In some sense it is but it is not Gospel but Natural Reason and Natural Equity Ph. Would you have every Man to every other Man alledge for Law his own particular Reason There is not amongst Men an Universal Reason agreed upon in any Nation besides the Reason of him that hath the Soveraign Power yet though his Reason be but the Reason of one Man yet it is set up to supply the place of that Universal Reason which is expounded to us by our Saviour in the Gospel and consequently our King is to us the Legislator both of Statute-Law and of Common-Law La. Yes I know that the Laws Spiritual which have been Law in this Kingdom since the Abolishing of Popery are the Kings Laws and those also that were made before for the Canons of the Church of Rome were no Laws neither here nor any where else without the Popes Temporal Dominions farther than Kings and States in their several Dominions respectively did make them so Ph. I grant that But you must grant also that those Spiritual Laws Legislators of the Spiritual Law and yet not all Kings and States make Laws by Consent of the Lords and Commons but our King here is so far bound to their Assents as he shall Judge Conducing to the Good and safety of his People for Example if the Lords and Commons should Advise him to restore those Laws Spiritual which in Queen Maries time were in Force I think the King were by the Law of Reason obliged without the help of any other Law of God to neglect such Advice La. I Grant you that the King is sole Legislator but with this Restriction that if he will not Consult with the Lords of Parliament and hear the Complaints and Informations of the Commons that are best acquainted with their own wants he sinneth against God though he cannot be Compell'd to any thing by his Subjects by Arms and Force Ph. We are Agreed upon that already since therefore the King is sole Legislator I think it also Reason he should be sole Supream Judge La. There is no doubt of that for otherwise there would be no Congruity of Judgments with the Laws I Grant also that he is the Supream Judge over all Persons and in all Causes Civil and Ecclesiastical within his own Dominions not only by Act of Parliament at this time but that he has ever been so by the Common-Law For the Judges of both the Benches have their Offices by the Kings Letters Patents and so as to Judicature have the Bishops Also the Lord Chancellour hath his Office by receiving from the King the Great Seal of England and to say all at once there is no Magistrate or Commissioner for Publick Business neither of Judicature nor Execution in State or Church in Peace or War but he is made so by Authority from the King Ph. 'T is true But perhaps you may â—â—ink otherwise when you Read such Acts of Parliament as say that the King shall â—ave Power and Authority to do this or that by Virtue of that Act as Eliz. c. 1. That your Highness your Heirs and Successors Kings or Queens of this Realm shall have â—â—ll Power and Authority by Virtue of this Act by Letters Patents under the Great Seal of England to Assign c. Was it not this Parliament that gave this Authority to the Queen La. For the Statute in this Clause is no more than as Sir Edw. Coke useth to speak an Affirmance of the Common-Law For she being Head of the Church of England might make Commissioners for the deâ—iding of Matters Ecclesiastical as freely â—s if she had been Pope who did you know pretend his Right from the Law of God Ph. We have hitherto spoken of Laws without considering any thing of the Naâ—ure and Essence of a Law and now unless we define the word Law we can go no â—arther without Ambiguity and Fallacy which will be but loss of time whereas on the contrary the Agreement upon our words will enlighten all we have to say â—hereafter La. I do not remember the Definition of Law in any Statute Ph. I think so For the Statutes were made by Authority and not drawn from any other Principles than the care of the safety of the People Statutes are not Philosophy as is the Common-Law and other disputable Arts but are Commands or Prohibitions which ought to be obeyed because Assented to by Submission made to the Conqueror here in England and to whosoever had the Soveraign Power in other Common wealths so that the Positive Laws of all Places are Statutes The Definition of Law was therefore unnecessary for the makers of Statutes though very necessary to them whose work it is to Teach the sence of the Law La. There is an Accurate Definition of a Law in Bracton Cited by Sir Edw. Coke Lex est sanctio justa jubens honesta prohibens contraria Ph. That is to say Law is a just Statute Commanding those things which are honest and Forbidding the contrary From whence it followeth that in all Cases it must be the Honesty or Dishonesty that makes the Command a Law whereas you know that but for the Law we could not as saith St. Paul have known what is sin therefore this Definition is no Ground at all for any farther Discourse of Law Besides you know the Rule of Honest and Dishonest refers to Honour and that it is Justice only and Injustice that the Law respecteth But that which I most except against in this Definition is that it supposes that a Statute made by the Soveraign Power of a Nation may be unjust There may indeed in a Statute Law made by Men be found Iniquity but not Injustice La. This is somewhat subtil I pray deal plainly what is the difference between Injustice and Iniquity Ph. I pray you tell me first what is the difference between a Court of Justice and a Court of Equity La. A Court of Justice is that which hath Cognizance of such Causes as are to be ended by the Possitive Laws of the Land and a
also if he will And they say true but they have no reason to think he will unless it be for his own profit which cannot be for he loves his own Power and what becomes of his power when his Subjects are destroyed or weakned by whose multitude and strength he enjoyes his power and every one of his Subjects his Fortune And lastly whereas they sometimes say the King is bound not only to cause his Laws to be observ'd but also to observe them himself I think the King causing them to be observ'd is the same thing as observing them himself For I never heard it taken for good Law that the King may be Indicted or Appealed or served with a Writ till the long Parliament practised the contrary upon the good King Charles for which divers of them were Executed and the rest by this our present King pardoned La. Pardoned by the King and Parliament Ph. By the King in Parliament if you will but not by the King and Parliament you cannot deny but that the pardoning of Injury to the Person that is Injur'd Treason and other Offences against the Peace and against the Right of the Soveraign are Injuries done to the King and therefore whosoever is pardoned any such Offence ought to acknowledge he ows his Pardon to the King alone But as to such Murders Felonies and other Injuries as are done to any Subject how mean soever I think it great reason that the parties endammaged ought to have satisfaction before such pardon be allow'd And in the death of a Man where restitution of Life is Impossible what can any Friend Heir or other party that may appeal require more than reasonable satisfaction some other way Perhaps he will be content with nothing but Life for Life but that is Revenge and belongs to God and under God to the King and none else therefore if there be reasonable satisfaction tendred the King without sin I think may pardon him I am sure if the pardoning him be a sin that neither King nor Parliament nor any earthly Power can do it La. You see by this your own Argument that the Act of Oblivion without a Parliament could not have passed because not only the King but also most of the Lords and abundance of Common People had received Injuries which not being pardonable but by their own Assent it was absolutely necessary that it should be done in Parliament and by the assent of the Lords and Commons Ph. I grant it but I pray you tell me now what is the difference between a general Pardon and an Act of Oblivion La. The word Act of Oblivion was never in our Books before but I believe it is in yours Ph. In the State of Athens long ago for the Abolishing of the Civil War there was an Act agreed on that from that time forward no Man should be molested for any thing before that Act done whatsoever without exception which Act the makers of it called an Act of Oblivion not that all Injuries should be forgotten for then we could never have had the story but that they should not rise up in Judgment against any Man And in imitation of this Act the like was propounded though it took no effect upon the death of Julius Caesar in the Senate of Rome By such an Act you may easily conceive that all Accusations for offences past were absolutely dead and buried and yet we have no great reason to think that the objecting one to another of the Injuries pardoned was any violation of those Acts except the same were so expressed in the Act it self La. It seems then that the Act of Oblivion was here no more nor of other nature than a General Pardon Of Courts Ph. SInce you acknowledge that in all controversies the Judicature originally belongeth to the King and seeing that no Man is able in his own person to execute an Office of so much business what order is taken for deciding of so many and so various Controversies La. There be divers sorts of Controversies some of which are concerning Mens Titles to Lands and Goods and some Goods are Corporeal and Lands Money Cattel Corn and the like which may be handled or seen and some Incorporeal as Priviledges Liberties Dignities Offices and many other good things meer Creatures of the Law and cannot be handled or seen And both of these kinds are concerning Meum and Tuum Others there are concerning Crimes punishable divers wayes and amongst some of these part of the punishment is some Fine or Forfeiture to the King and then it is called a Plea of the Crown in case the King sue the party otherwise it is but a private Plea which they call an Appeal And though upon Judgment in an Appeal the King shall have his Forfeiture yet it cannot be called a Plea of the Crown but when the Crown pleadeth for it There be also other Controversies concerning the Government of the Church in order to Religion and virtuous Life The offences both against the Crown and against the Laws of the Church are Crimes but the offences of one Subject against another if they be not against the Crown the King pretendeth nothing in those Pleas but the Reparation of his Subjects injur'd Ph. A Crime is an offence of any kind whatsoever for which a penalty is Ordain'd by the Law of the Land But you must understand that dammages awarded to the party injur'd has nothing common with the nature of a penalty but is meerly a Restitution or satisfaction due to the party griev'd by the Law of Reason and consequently is no more a punishment than is the paying of a Debt La. It seems by this Definition of a Crime you make no difference between a Crime and a sin Ph. All Crimes are indeed Sins but not all Sins Crimes A Sin may be in the thought or secret purpose of a Man of which neither a Judge nor a Witness nor any Man take notice but a Crime is such a Sin as consists in an Action against the Law of which Action he can be Accused and Tryed by a Judge and be Convinced or Cleared by Witnesses Farther that which is no Sin in it self but indifferent may be made Sin by a positive Law As when the Statute was in force that no Man should wear Silk in his Hat after the Statute such wearing of Silk was a Sin which was not so before Nay sometimes an Action that 's good in it self by the Statute Law may be made a Sin as if a Statute should be made to forbid the giving of Alms to a strong and sturdy Beggar such Alms after that Law would be a Sin but not before For then it was Charity the Object whereof is not the strength or other Quality of the poor Man but his Poverty Again he that should have said in Queen Maries time that the Pope had no Authority in England should have been Burnt at a Stake but for saying the same in the time of Queen Elizabeth
should have been Commended You see by this that many things are made Crimes and no Crimes which are not so in their own Nature but by Diversity of Law made upon Diversity of Opinion or of Interest by them which have Authority And yet those things whether good or evil will pass so with the Vulgar if they hear them often with odious terms recited for hainous Crimes in themselves as many of those Opinions which are in themselves Pious and Lawful were heretofore by the Popes Interest therein called Detestable Heresie Again some Controversies are of things done upon the Sea others of things done upon the Land There need by many Courts to the deciding of so many kinds of Controversies What order is there taken for their Distribution La. There be an extraordinary great number of Courts in England First there be the Kings Courts both for Law and Equity in matters Temporal which are the Chancery the Kings-Bench the Court of Common-Pleas and for the Kings Revenue the Court of the Exchequer and there be Subjects Courts by Priviledge as the Court in London and other priviledg'd places And there be other Courts of Subjects as the Courts of Landlords called the Court of Barons and the Courts of Sherifs Also the Spiritual Courts are the Kings Courts at this day though heretofore they were the Popes Courts And in the Kings Courts some have their Judicature by Office and some by Commission and some Authority to Hear and Determine and some only to Inquire and to Certifie into other Courts Now for the Distribution of what Pleas every Court may hold it is commonly held that all the Pleas of the Crown and of all Offences contrary to the Peace are to be holden in the Kings Bench or by Commissioners for Bracton saith Sciendum est quod si Actiones sunt Criminales in Curia Domini Regis debent determinari cum sit ibi poena Câ—rporalis infligenda hoc coram ipso Rege si tangat personam suam sicut Crimen Laesae Majestatis vel coram Justitiariis ad hoc specialiter assignatis That is to say That if the Plea be Criminal it ought to be determin'd in the Court of our Lord the King because there they have power to inflict Corporeal punishment and if the Crime be against his person as the Crime of Treason it ought to be determin'd before the King himself or if it be against a private person it ought to be determin'd by Justices Assigned that is to say before Commissioners It seems by this that heretofore Kings did hear and determine Pleas of Treason against themselves by their own Persons but it has been otherwise a long time and is now For it is now the Office of the Lord Steward of England in the Tryal of a Peer to hold that Plea by a Commission especially for the same In Causes concerning Meum and Tuum the King may sue either in the Kings-Bench or in the Court of Common Pleas as it appears by Fitzherbert in his Natura Brevium at the Writ of Escheat Ph. A King perhaps will not sit to determine of Causes of Treason against his Person lest he should seem to make himself Judge in his own Cause but that it shall be Judged by Judges of his own making can never be avoided which is also one as if he were Judge himself La. To the Kings-Bench also I think belongeth the Hearing and Determining of all manner of Breaches of the Peace whatsoever saving alwayes to the King that he may do the same when he pleaseth by Commissioners In the time of Henry the 3d and Edward the 1st when Bracton wrote the King did usually send down every seven years into the Country Commissioners called Justices Itinerant to Hear and Determine generally all Causes Temporal both Criminal and Civil whose places have been now a long time supplyed by the Justices of Assize with Commissions of the Peace of Oyer and Terminer and of Goal-delivery Ph. But why may the King only Sue in the Kings-Bench or Court of Common-Pleas which he will and no other Person may do the same La. There is no Statute to the contrary but it seemeth to be the Common-Law for Sir Edw. Coke 4 Inst. setteth down the Jurisdiction of the Kings-Bench which he says has First Jurisdiction in all Pleas of the Crown Secondly The Correcting of all manner of Errors of other Justices and Judges both of Judgments and Process except of the Court of Exchequer which he sayes is to this Court Proprium quarto modo Thirdly That it has power to Correct all Misdemeanours extrajudicial tending to the breach of the Peace or oppression of the Subjects or raising of Factions Controversies Debates or any other manner of Misgovernment Fourthly It may hold Plea by Writ out of the Chancery of all Trespasses done Vi Armis Fifthly It hath power to hold Plea by Bill for Debt Detinu Covenant Promise and all other personal Actions but of the Jurisdiction of the Kings-Bench in Actions real he says nothing save that if a Writ in a Real Action be abated by Judgment in the Court of Common-Pleas and that the Judgment be by a Writ of Error reversed in the Kings-Bench then the Kings-Bench may proceed upon the Writ Ph. But how is the Practice La. Real Actions are commonly decided as well in the Kings-Bench as in the Court of Common-Pleas Ph. When the Kng by Authority in Writing maketh a Lord-Chief-Justice of the Kings-Bench does he not set down what he makes him for La. Sir Edw Coke sets down the Letters Patents whereby of Antient time the Lord Chief-Justice was Constituted wherein is expressed to what end he hath his Office viz. Pro Conservatione nostra tranquilitatis Regni nostri ad Justitiam universis singulis de Regno nostro exhibendam Constituimus Dilectum Fidelem nostrum P. B. Justitiarium Angliae quamdiu nobis placuerit Capitalem c. That is to say for the preservation of our self and of the Peace of our Realm and for the doing of Justice to all and singular our Subjects we have Constituted our Beloved and Faithful P. B. during our pleasure Chief Justice of England c. Ph. Methinks 't is very plain by these Letters Patents that all Causes Temporal within the Kingdom except the Pleas that belong to the Exchequer should be decidable by this Lord-Chief-Justice For as for Causes Criminal and that concern the Peace it is granted him in these words for the Conservation of our self and peace of the Kingdom wherein are contained all Pleas Criminal and in the doing of Justice to all and singular the Kings Subjects are comprehended all Pleas Civil And as to the Court of Common-Pleas it is manifest it may hold all manner of Civil-Pleas except those of the Exchequer by Magna Charta Cap. 11. So that all original Writs concerning Civil-Pleas are returnable into either of the said Courts but how is the Lord-Chief-Justice made now La. By these
examinâ—â— Judgment given in the Court of Common-Pleas La. You deny not but by the Antient Law of England the Kings-Bench may examine the Judgment given in the Court of Common-Pleas Ph. 'T is true but why may not also the Court of Chancery do the same especially if the fault of the Judgment be against Equity and not against the Letter of the Law La. There is no necessity of that for the same Court may examine both the Letter and the Equity of the Statute Ph. You see by this that the Jurisdiction of Courts cannot easily be distinguished but by the King himself in his Parliament The Lawyers themselves cannot do it for you see what Contention there is between Courts as well as between particular Men. And whereas you say that Law of 4 Hen. 4. 23. is by that of 27 Eliz. cap. 8. taken away I do not find it so I find indeed a Diversity of opinion between the makers of the former and the latter Statute in the preamble of the latter and Conclusion of the former The Preamble of the latter is forasmuch as Erroneous Judgments given in the Court called the Kings-Bench are only to be reformed in the High Court of Parliament and the Conclusion of the former is that the contrary was Law in the times of the Kings Progenitors These are no parts of those Laws but Opinions only concerning the Antient Custom in that Case arising from the different Opinions of the Lawyers in those different times neither Commanding nor Forbidding any thing though of the Statutes themselves the one forbids that such Pleas be brought before the Parliament the other forbids it not But yet if after the Act of Hen. 4. such a Plea had been brought before the Parliament the Parliament might have Heard and Determin'd it For the Statute forbids not that nor can any Law have the force to hinder the Law of any Jurisdiction whatsoever they please to take upon them seeing it is a Court of the King and of all the People together both Lords and Commons La. Though it be yet seeing the King as Sir Edw. Coke affirms 4 Inst. p. 71. hath committed all his power Judicial some to one Court and some to another so as if any Man would render himself to the Judgment of the King in such case where the King hath committed all his power Judicial to others such a render should be to no effect And p. 73. he saith farther That in this Court the Kings of this Realm have sitten on the High Bench and the Judges of that Court on the Lower Bench at his feet but Judicature belongeth only to the Judges of that Court and in his presence they answer all Motions Ph. I cannot believe that Sir Edw. Coke how much soever he desir'd to advance the authority of himself and other Justices of the Common-Law could mean that the King in the Kings-Bench sate as a Spectator only and might not have answered all motions which his Judges answer'd if he had seen cause for it For he knew that the King was Supream Judge then in all causes Temporal and is now in all Causes both Temporal and Ecclesiastical and that there is an exceeding great penalty ordained by the Laws for them that shall deny it But Sir Edw. Coke as he had you see in many places before hath put a Fallacy upon himself by not distinguishing between Committing and Transferring He that Transferreth his power hath deprived himself of it but he that Committeth it to another to be Exercised in his name and under him is still in the Possession of the same power And therefore if a Man render himself that is to say Appealeth to the King from any Judge whatsoever the King may receive his Appeal and it shall be effectual La. Besides these 2 Courts the Kings-Bench for Pleas of the Crown and the Court of Common-Pleas for Causes Civil according to the Common-Law of England there is another Court of Justice that hath Jurisdiction in Causes both Civil and Criminal and is as Antient a Court at least as the Court of Common Pleas and this is the Court of the Lord Admiral but the proceedings therein are according to the Laws of the Roman Empire and the Causes to be determin'd there are such as arise upon the Marine Sea For so it is ordain'd by divers Statutes and confirm'd by many Precedents Ph. As for the Statutes they are always Law and Reason also for they are made by the Assent of all the Kingdom but Precedents are Judgments one contrary to another I mean divers Men in divers Ages upon the same case give divers Judgments Therefore I will ask your Opinion once more concerning any Judgments besides those of the King as to their validity in Law But what is the difference between the proceedings of the Court of Admiralty and the Court of Common-Law La. One is that the Court of Admiralty proceedeth by two Witnesses without any either Grand-Jury to Indict or Petty to Convict and the Judge giveth Sentence according to the Laws Imperial which of old time were in force in all this part of Europe and now are Laws not by the Will of any other Emperor or Forraign Power but by the Will of the Kings of England that have given them force in their own Dominions the reason whereof seems to be that the causes that arise at Sea are very often between us and People of other Nations such as are Governed for the most part by the self same laws Imperial Ph. How can it precisely enough be determin'd at Sea especially near the mouth of a very great River whether it be upon the Sea or within the Land For the Rivers also are as well as their Banks within or a part of one Country or other La. Truly the Question is difficult and there have been many Suits about it wherein the Question has been whose Jurisdiction it is in Ph. Nor do I see how it can be decided but by the King himself in case it be not declar'd in the Lord Admirals Letters Patents La. But though there be in the Letters Patents a power given to hold Plea in some certain cases to any of the Statutes concerning the Admiralty the Justices of the Common-Law may send a Prohibition to that Court to proceed in the Plea though it be with a non-obstante of any Statute Ph. Methinks that That should be against the Right of the Crown which cannot be taken from it by any Subject For that Argument of Sir Edw. Coke's that the King has given away all his Judicial Power is worth nothing because as I have said before he cannot give away the Essential Rights of his Crown and because by a non-obstante he declares he is not deceived in his Grant La. But you may see by the Precedents alledged by Sir Edw. Coke the contrary has been perpetually practised Ph. I see not that perpetually for who can tell but there may have been given other Judgments in such cases
and a Traytor But now let us come to his Comment upon this Statute The Statute says as it is Printed in English when a Man doth Compass or Imagine the Death of our Lord the King c. What is the meaning of the word Compassing or Imagining La. On this place Sir Edw. Coke says that before the making of this Act Voluntas reputabatur pro facto the Will was taken for the Deed. And so saith Bracton Spectatur Voluntas non Exitus nihil interest utrum quis occidat aut causam praebeat That is to say the Cause of the killing Now Sir Edw. Coke says this was the Law before the Statute and that to be a Cause of the killing is to declare the same by some open Deed tending to the Execution of his Intent or which might be Cause of Death Ph. Is there any English-man can understand that to Cause the Death of a Man and to declare the same is all one thing And if this were so and that such was the Common-Law before the Statute by what words in the Statute is it taken away La. It is not taken away but the manner how it must be prov'd is thus Determin'd that it must be prov'd by some open Deed as providing of Weapons Powder Poyson Assaying of Armour sending of Letters c. Ph. But what is the Crime it self which this Statute maketh Treason For as I understand the words To Compass or Imagine the Kings Death c. The Compassing as it is in the English is the only thing which is made High Treason so that not only the killing but the Design is made High Treason or as it is in the French Record Fait Compasser That is to say the causing of others to Compass or Design the Kings Death is High Treason and the words par overt fait are not added as a specification of any Treason or other Crime but only of the Proof that is requir'd by the Law Seeing then the Crime is the Design and Purpose to kill the King or cause him to be killed and lyeth hidden in the Breast of him that is Accused what other Proof can there be had of it than words Spoken or Written And therefore if there be sufficient Witness that he by words Declared that he had such a Design there can be no Question but that he is Comprehended within this Statute Sir Edw. Coke doth not deny but that if he Confess this Design either by Word or Writing but that he is within the Statute As for that Common saying that bare words may make a Heretick but not a Traytor which Sir Edw. Coke on this occasion maketh use of they are to little purpose seeing that this Statute maketh not the words High Treason but the Intention whereof the words are but a Testimony and that Common-saying is false as it is generally Pronounced for there were divers Statutes made afterwards though now expir'd which made bare words to be Treason without any other Deed As 1 El. cap. 6. 13. El. cap. 1. If a Man should Publickly Preach that the King were an Usurper or that the Right of the Crown belonged to any other than the King that Reigned there is no doubt but it were Treason not only within this Statute of E. 3. but also within the Statute of 1 Ed. 6. c. 12. which are both still in Force La. Not only so but if a Subject should counsel any other Man to kill the King Queen or Heir apparent to the Crown it would at this day be Judged High Treason and yet it is no more than bare words In the third year of King James Henry Garnet a Jesuit-Priest to whom some of the Gun-Powder Traytors had Revealed their design by way of Confession gave them Absolution without any Caution taken for their desisting from their purpose or other provision against the danger was therefore Condemned and Executed as a Traytor though such Absolution were nothing else but bare words Also I find in the Reports of Sir John Davis Attorney-General for Ireland that in the time of King Henry the 6th a Man was Condemned of Treason for saying the King was a Natural Fool and unfit to Govern but yet this Clause in the Statute of Edw. 3. viz. That the Compassing there mentioned ought to be proved by some Overt Act was by the Framers of the Statute not without great Wisdom and Providence inserted For as Sir Edw. Coke very well observeth when Witnesses are Examin'd concerning words only they never or very rarely agree precisely about the words they Swear to Ph. I deny not but that it was wisely enough done But the Question is not here of the Treason which is either Fact or design but of the Proof which when it is doubtful is to be Judged by a Jury of 12 Lawful Men Now whether think you is it a better Proof of a Mans Intention to kill that he declares that same with his own Mouth so as it may be Witnessed or that he provide Weapons Powder Poyson or Assay Arms If he utter his Design by words the Jury has no more to do than to consider the Legallity of the VVitnesses the Harmony of their Testimonies or whether the words were spoken advisedly For they might have been uttered in a Disputation for Exercise only or when he that spake them had not the use of Reason nor perhaps any Design or wish at all towards the Execution of what he talked of But how a Jury from providing or buying of Armour or buying of Gun-Powder or from any other overt Act not Treason in it self can infer a Design of Murdering the King unless there appear some words also signifying to what end he made such Provision I cannot easily conceive Therefore as the Jury on the whole matter VVords and Deeds shall ground their Judgment concerning Design or not Design so in Reason they ought to give Verdict But to come to the Treason of Counterfeiting the Great or Privy-Seal seeing there are so many ways for a Cheating Fellow to make use of these Seals to the Cousening of the King and his People why are not all such abuses High-Treason as well as the making of a false Seal La. So they are For Sir Edw. Coke produceth a Record of one that was Drawn and Hang'd for taking the Great Seal from an expir'd Patent and fastning it to a Counterfeit Commission to gather Money But he approveth not the Judgment because it is the Judgment for Petty Treason also because the Jury did not find him Guilty of the Offence laid in the Indictment which was the Counterfeiting of the Great-Seal but found the special matter for which the Offender was Drawn and Hang'd Ph. Seeing this Crime of taking the Great Seal from one VVriting and fastning it to another was not found High Treason by the Jury nor could be found upon special matter to be the other kind of Treason mentioned in the same Statute what ground had either the Jury to find it
Suit in the Spiritual Court here in a Temporal Cause there lay a Premunire and if perhaps some Judge or other hath since that time judged otherwise his Judgment was erroneous La. Nay but by the Statute of 16. Rich. 2. cap. 5. it appeareth to the contrary as Sir Edw. Coke here will shew you The effect saith he of the Statute of Rich. 2. is That if any Pursue or cause to be Pursued in the Court of Rome or elsewhere any thing which toucheth the King against him his Crown or Regality or his Realm they their Notaries c. shall be out of the Kings Protection Ph. I pray you let me know the very words of the Statutes as they ly La. Presently The words are if any Man Purchase or Pursue or cause to be Purchased or Pursued in the Court of Rome or elsewhere any such Translations Processes and Sentences of Excommunication Bulls Instruments or any other things whatsoever which touch the King against him his Crown and his Regality or his Realm as is aforesaid c. Ph. If a Man bring a Plea of Common-Law into the Spiritual Court which is now the Kings Court and the Judge of this Spiritual Court hold Plea thereof By what Construction can you draw it within the compass of the words you have now read To sue for my Right in the Kings Court is no pursuing of Translations of Bishopricks made or procur'd in the Court of Rome or any place else but only in the Court of the King nor is this the suit against the King nor his Crown nor his Regality nor his Realm but the contrary Why then is it a Premunire No. He that brings in or setteth out a Writing in any place whatsoever wherein is contained that the King hath so given away his Jurisdiction as that if a Subject be condemned falsly his Submission to the Kings Judgment is of none effect or that the King upon no necessity whatsoever can out of Parliament time raise Money for the defence of the Kingdom is in my opinion much more within the Statute of Provisors than they which begin suit for a Temporal Matter in a Court Spiritual But what Argument has he for this Law of his since the Statute Law fails him from the Law of Reason La. He says they are called Courts either because they proceed by the Rules of other Laws as by the Canon or Civil Law or by other Tryals than the Common Law doth Warrant For the Tryals Warranted by the Law of England for matter of Fact is by verdict of 12 Men before the Judges of the Common Law in matters pertaining to the Common Law and not upon Examination of Witnesses as in the Court of Equity so that Alia Curia is either that which is govern'd per aliam Legem or which draweth the Party ad aliud Examen For if Ph. Stop there Let us consider of this you have read for the Tryal warranted by the Law of England is by Verdict of 12 Men. What means he here by the Law of England Does it not warrant the Tryals in Chancery and in the Court of Admiralty by Witnesses La. By the Law of England he means the Law used in the Kings Bench that is to say the Common-Law Ph. This is just as if he had said that these two Courts did warrant their own way of Tryal but other Courts not so but were warranted by the King only the Courts of Common Law were VVarrants to themselves You see that alia Curia is this way ill expounded In the Courts of Common Law all Tryals are by 12 Men who are Judges of the Fact and the Fact known and prov'd the Judges are to pronounce the Law but in the Spiritual Court the Admiralty and in all the Courts of Equity there is but one Judge both of Fact and of Law this is all the difference If this difference be intended by the Statute by alia Curia there would be a Premunire for suing in a Court being not the Kings Court The Kings Bench and Court of Common Pleas may also be different kinds of Courts because the Process is different but 't is plain that this Statute doth not distinguish Courts otherwise than into the Courts of the King and into the Courts of the Forraign States and Princes And seeing you stand upon the name of a Jury for the distinguishing of Courts what difference do you find between the Tryals at the Common-Law and the Tryals in other Courts You know that in Tryals of Fact naturally and through all the World the Witnesses are Judges and it is impossible to be otherwise What then in England can a Jury judge of except it be of the sufficiency of the Testimony The Justices have nothing to judge of nor do but after the Fact is proved to declare the Law which is not Judgment but Jurisdiction Again though the Tryal be in Chancery or in the Court of Civil Law 1. The Witnesses are still Judges of the Fact and he that hath the Commission to hear the Cause hath both the parts that is to say of a Jury to judge of the Testimony and of a Justice to declare the Law In this I say lyes all the difference which is indeed enough to make a Dispute as the World goes about Jurisdiction But seeing it tends neither to the Disherison of the King nor of the People nor to the subversion of the Law of Reason i. e. of Common-Law nor to the subversion of Justice nor to any harm of the Realm without some of which these Statutes are not broken it cannot be a Premunire La. Let me read on For if the Freehold Inheritances Goods and Chattels Debts and Duties wherein the King and Subject have Right and Property by the Common-Law should be judged per aliam Legem or be drawn ad aliud Examen the 3 Mischiefs afore exprest would follow viz. the destruction of the King and his Crown the Disherison of his People and the undoing and destruction of the Common-Law always used Ph. That is to say of the Law of Reason From hence it follows that where there are no Juries and where there are different Laws from ours that is to say in all the World besides neither King nor People have any Inheritance nor Goods nor any Law of Reason I will examine his Doctrine concerning Cases Criminal no farther He no where defineth a Crime that we may know what it is An odious name sufficeth him to make a Crime of any thing He hath put Heresie among the most odious Crimes not knowing what it signifies and upon no other Cause but because the Church of Rome to make their usurped Power the more terrible had made it by long Preaching against it and Cruelty shown towards many Godly and learned Men of this and other Reformed Churches appear to common People a thing detestable He puts it in as a Plea of the Crown in the time of Queen Elizabeth whereas in her time there was no
Doctrine Heresie but Justice Stamford leaves it out because when Heresie was a Crime it was a Plea of the Mitre I see also in this Catalogue of Causes Criminal he inserteth costly Feeding costly Apparel and costly Building though they were contrary to no Statute 'T is true that by evil Circumstances they become sins but these sins belong to the Judgment of the Pastors Spiritual A Justice of the Temporal Law seeing the Intention only makes them sins cannot judge whether they be sins or no unless he have power to take Confessions Also he makes flattery of the King to be a Crime How could he know when one Man had flattered another He meant therefore that it was a Crime to please the King And accordingly he citeth divers Calamities of such as had been in times past in great favour of the Kings they serv'd as the Favourites of Hen. 3. Ed. 2. Rich. 2. Hen. 6. which Favourites were some imprisoned some banished and some put to death by the same Rebels that imprisoned banished and put to death the same King upon no better ground than the Earl of Strafford the Arch-Bishop of Canterbury and King Charles the first by the Rebels of that time Empson and Dudley were no Favourites of Hen. the 7th but Spunges which King Hen. the 8th did well Squeeze Cardinal Woolsey was indeed for divers years a favourite of Hen. the 8th but fell into disgrace not for flattering the King but for not flattering him in the business of Divorce from Queen Katharine You see his Reasoning here see also his Passion in the words following We will for some Causes descend no lower Qui eorum vestigiis insistunt eorum exitus perhorrescant this is put in for the Favourite that then was of King James But let us give over this and speak of the legal Punishments to these Crimes belonging Of Punishments ANd in the first place I desire to know who it is that hath the power for an Offence committed to define and appoint the special manner of Punishment for suppose you are not of the Opinion of the Stoicks in old time that all faults are equal and that there ought to be the same Punishment for killing a Man and for killing a Hen. La. The manner of Punishment in all Crimes whatsoever is to be determined by the Common-Law That is to say if it be a Statute that determins it then the Judgment must be according to the Statute if it be not specified by the Statute then the Custome in such Cases is to be followed But if the Case be new I know not why the Judge may not determine it according to Reason Ph. But according to whose reason If you mean the natural Reason of this or that Judge authorized by the King to have cognisance of the Cause there being as many several Reasons as there are several Men the punishment of all Crimes will be uncertain and none of them ever grow up to make a Custome Therefore a Punishment certain can never be assigned if it have its beginning from the natural Reasons of deputed Judges no nor from the natural of the Supream Judge For if the Law of Reason did determine Punishments then for the same Offences there should be through all the World and in all times the same Punishments because the Law of Reason is Immutable and Eternal La. If the natural Reason neither of the King nor of any else be able to prescribe a Punishment how can there be any lawful Punishment at all Ph. Why not For I think that in this very difference between the rational Faculties of particular Men lyeth the true and perfect reason that maketh every Punishment certain For but give the authority of defining punishments to any Man whatsoever and let that Man define them and right Reason has defin'd them Suppose the Definition be both made and made known before the Offence committed For such authority is to trump in Card-playing save that in matter of Government when nothing else is turn'd up Clubs are Trump Therefore seeing every Man knoweth by his own Reason what Actions are against the Law of Reason and knoweth what Punishments are by this authority for every evil action ordained it is manifest Reason that for breaking the known Laws he should suffer the known Punishments Now the person to whom this authority of defining Punishments is given can be no other in any place of the World but the same Person that hath the Soveraign Power be it one Man or one assembly of Men For it were in vain to give it to any Person that had not the power of the Militia to cause it to be executed for no less power can do it when many Offenders be united and combin'd to defend one another There was a Case put to King David by Nathan of a rich Man that had many Sheep and of a poor Man that had but one which was a tame Lamb The rich Man had a stranger in his House for whose entertainment to spare his own Sheep he took away the poor Mans Lamb. Upon this Case the King gave Judgment surely the Man that hath done this shall die What think you of this Was it a Royal or Tyrannical Judgment La. I will not contradict the Canons of the Church of England which acknowledgeth the King of England within his own Dominions hath the same Rights which the good Kings of Israel had in theirs nor deny King David to have been one of those good Kings But to punish with death without a precedent Law will seem but a harsh proceeding with us who unwillingly hear of Arbitrary Laws much less of Arbitrary Punishments unless we were sure that all our Kings would be as good as David I will only ask you by what Authority the Clergy may take upon them to determine or make a Canon concerning the power of their own King or to distinguish between the Right of a good and an evil King Ph. It is not the Clergy that maketh their Canons to be Law but it is the King that doth it by the Great Seal of England and it is the King that giveth them power to teach their Doctrines in that that he authoriseth them publickly to teach and preach the Doctrine of Christ and his Apostles according to the Scriptures wherein this Doctrine is perspicuously contained But if they had derogated from the Royal Power in any of their Doctrines published then certainly they had been too blame nay I believe that had been more within the Statute of premunire of 16 Rich. 2. c. 5. than any Judge of a Court of Equity for holding Pleas of Common Law I cite not this Precedent of King David as approving the breach of the great Charter or justifying the Punishment with loss of Life or Member of every Man that shall offend the King but to shew you that before the Charter was granted in all Cases where the Punishments were not prescribed it was the King only that could prescribe them
and that no deputed Judge could punish an Offender but by force of some Statute or by the words of some Commission and not ex officio They might for a contempt of their Courts because it is a contempt of the King imprison a Man during the Kings pleasure or fine him to the King according to the greatness of the Offence But all this amounteth to no more than to leave him to the Kings Judgment As for cutting off of Ears and for the Pillory and the like corporal Punishments usually inflicted heretofore in the Star-Chamber they were warranted by the Statute of Hen. 7. that giveth them power to punish sometimes by discretion And generally it is a rule of Reason that every Judge of Crimes in case the positive Law appoint no Punishment and he have no other Command from the King then to consult the King before he pronounce Sentence of any irreparable dammage on the Offender For otherwise he doth not pronounce the Law which is his Office to do but makes the Law which is the Office of the King And from this you may collect that the Custome of punishing such and such a Crime in such and such a manner hath not the force of Law in it self but from an assured presumption that the Original of the Custome was the Judgment of some former King And for this Cause the Judges ought not to run up for the Customs by which they are warranted to the time of the Saxon Kings nor to the time of the Conquest For the most immediate antecedent precedents are the fairest warrants of their Judgments as the most recent Laws have commonly the greatest vigor as being fresh in the memory of all Men and tacitly confirmed because not disapprov'd by the Soveraign Legislator What can be said against this La. Sir Edw. Coke 3 Inst. p. 210. in the Chapter of Judgments and Executions saith that of Judgments some are by the Common-Law some by Statute-Law and some by Custome wherein he distinguisheth Common-Law both from Statute-Law and from Custome Ph. But you know that in other places he makes the Common-Law and the Law of Reason to be all one as indeed they are when by it is meant the Kings Reason and then his meaning in this distinction must be that there be Judgments by Reason without Statute-Law and Judgments neither by Statute-Law nor by Reason but by Custome without Reason for if a Custome be Reasonable then both he and other Learned Lawyers say it is Common-Law and if unreasonable no Law at all La. I believe Sir Edw. Coke's meaning was no other than yours in this point but that he inserted the word Custom because there be not many that can distinguish between Customs reasonable and unreasonable Ph. But Custom so far forth as it hath the force of a Law hath more of the nature of a Statute than of the Law of Reason especially where the question is not of Lands and Goods but of Punishments which are to be defined only by authority Now to come to particulars What Punishment is due by Law for High Treason La. To be drawn upon a Hurdle from the Prison to the Gallows and there to be hanged by the Neck and laid upon the ground alive and have his Bowels taken out and burnt whilst he is yet living to have his Head cut off his Body to be divided into four parts and his Head and Quarters to be placed as the King shall assign Ph. Seeing a Judge ought to give Judgment according to the Law and that this Judgment is not appointed by any Statute how does Sir Edw. Coke warrant it by Reason or how by Custom La. Only thus Reason it is that his Body Lands Goods Posterity c. should be torn pulled asunder and destroy'd that intended to destroy the Majesty of Government Ph. See how he avoids the saying the Majesty of the King But does not this Reason make as much for punishing a Traytor as Metius Suffetius in old time was executed by Tullus Hostilius King of Rome or as Ravillac not many years ago in France who were torn in pieces by four Horses as it does for Drawing Hanging and Quartering La. I think it does But he confirms it also in the same Chapter by holy Scripture Thus Joab for Treason 1 Kings 2. 28. was drawn from the horns of the Altar that 's proof for drawing upon a Hurdle Esth. 2. 22. Bithan for Treason was Hang'd there 's for hanging Acts. 1. 18. Judas hanged himself and his Bowels were poured out there 's for hanging and embowelling alive 2 Sam. 18. 14. Joab pierced Absalom's heart that 's proof for pulling out a Traytors heart 2 Sam. 20. 22. Sheba the Son of Bichri had his Head cut off which is proof that a Traytors Head ought to be cut off 2 Sam. 4. 12. They slew Baanah and Rechab and hung up their Heads over the Pool of Hebron this is for setting up of Quarters And Lastly for forfeiture of Lands and Goods Psal. 109. v. 9. 10. c. Let their Children be driven out and beg and other Men make spoil of their labours and let their Memory be blotted out of the Land Ph. learnedly said and no Record is to be kept of the Judgment Also the Punishments divided between those Traytors must be joyn'd in one Judgment for a Traytor here La. He meant none of this but intended his Hand being in to shew his Reading or his Chaplains in the Bible Ph. Seeing then for the specifying of the Punishment in Case of Treason he brings no argument from natural Reason that is to say from the Common Law and that it is manifest that it is not the general Custom of the Land the same being rarely or never executed upon any Peer of the Realm and that the King may remit the whole Penalty if he will it follows that the specifying of the Punishment depends meerly upon the authority of the King But this is certain that no Judge ought to give other Judgment than has been usually given and approv'd either by a Statute or by Consent express or implyed of the Soveraign Power for otherwise it is not the Judgment of the Law but of a Man subject to the Law La. In Petit Treason the Judgment is to be drawn to the place of execution and hang'd by the Neck or if it be a Woman to be drawn and burnt Ph. Can you imagine that this so nice a distinction can have any other foundation than the wit of a private Man La. Sir Edw. Coke upon this place says that she ought not to be beheaded or hanged Ph. No not by the Judge who ought to give no other Judgment than the Statute or the King appoints nor the Sheriff to make other execution than the Judge pronounceth unless he have a special warrant from the King And this I should have thought he had meant had he not said before that the King had given away all his Right of Judicature to his Courts of
of another Man Then as Sir Edw. Coke says 3 Inst. p 56. it had been Murder Ph. There is indeed great need of good distinction in a Case of killing by misfortune but in this Case the unlawfulness of stealing Apples cannot make it Murder unless the falling it self be unlawful It must be a voluntary unlawful Act that causeth the death or else it is no Murder by the Law of Reason Now the death of the Man that was under the Tree proceeded not from that that the Apples were not his that fell but from the fall But if a Man shoot with a Bow or a Gun at another Man's Deer and by misfortune kill a Man such shooting being both voluntary and unlawful and also the immediate Cause of the Mans death may be drawn perhaps well enough sometimes to Murder by a Judge of the Common-Law So likewise if a Man shoot an Arrow over a House and by chance kill a Man in the Street there is no doubt but by the Law of Reason it is Murder for though he meant no malice to the Man slain yet it is manifest that he cared not whom he slew In this difficulty of finding out what it is that the Law of Reason dictates who is it that must decide the Question La. In the Case of misfortune I think it belongs to the Jury for it is matter of Fact only But when it is doubtful whether the action from which the misfortune came were Lawful or Unlawful it is to be judged by the Judge Ph. But if the unlawfulness of the action as the stealing of the Apples did not cause the death of the Man then the stealing be it Trespass or Felony ought to be punished alone as the Law requireth La. But for killing of a Man se defendendo the Jury as Sir Edw. Coke here says shall not in their Verdict say it was se defendendo but shall declare the manner of the Fact in special and clear it to the Judge to consider how it is to be called whether se defendendo Manslaughter or Murder Ph. One would think so for it is not often within the capacity of a Jury to distinguish the signification of the different and hard names which are given by Lawyers to the killing of a Man as Murder and Felony which neither the Laws nor the makers of the Laws have yet defined The Witnesses say that thus and thus the Person did but not that it was Murder or Felony no more can the Jury say who ought to say nothing but what they hear from the Witnesses or from the Prisoner Nor ought the Judge to ground his Sentence upon any thing else besides the special matter found which according as it is contrary or not contrary to the Statute ought to be pronounced La. But I have told you that when the Jury has found misfortune or se defendendo there is no judgment at all to be given and the Party is to be pardoned of course saving that he shall forfeit his Goods and Chattells Debts and Duties to the King Ph. But I understand not how there can be a Crime for which there is no Judgment nor how any Punishment can be inflicted without a precedent Judgment nor upon what ground the Sheriff can seize the Goods of any Man till it be judged that they be forfeited I know that Sir Edw. Coke saith that in the Judgment of hanging the Judgment of forfeiture is implyed which I understand not though I understand well enough that the Sheriff by his Office may seize the Goods of a Felon convicted much less do I conceive how the forfeiture of Goods can be implyed in a no-judgment nor do I conceive that when the Jury has found the special manner of the Fact to be such as is really no other than se defendendo and consequently no fault at all why he should have any Punishment at all Can you shew me any Reason for it La. The Reason lies in the Custom Ph. You know that unreasonable Customs are not Law but ought to be abolished and what Custom is there more unreasonable than that a Man should be punished without a fault La. Then see the Statute of 24 Hen. 8. cap. 5. Ph. I find here that at the making of this Statute there was a Question amongst the Lawyers in case one Man should kill another that attempted feloniously to Rob or Murder him in or near any Common High-way Court-way Horse-way or Foot-way or in his Mansion Messuage or Dwelling-place whether for the death of such a Man one shall forfeit his Goods and Chattells as a Man should do for killing another by Chance-medley or in his own defence This is the Preamble and penned as well as Sir Edw. Coke could have wished but this Statute does not determine that a Man should forfeit his Goods for killing a Man se defendendo or for killing him by misfortune but supposeth it only upon the opinion of the Lawyers that then were The body of the Statute is that if a Man be indicted or appealed for the death of such Person so attempting as aforesaid and the same by verdict be so found and tryed he shall not forfeit any thing but shall be discharged as if he had been found not Guilty You see the Statute now consider thereby in the case of killing se defendendo Frst if a Man kill another in his own defence it is manifest that the Man slain did either attempt to Rob or to Kill or to Wound him for else it was not done in his own defence If then it were done in the Street or near the Street as in a Tavern he forfeits nothing because the Street is a High-way So likewise it is to be said of all other Common-ways In what place therefore can a Man kill another in his own defence but that this Statute will discharge him of the forfeiture La. But the Statute says the attempt must be felonious Ph. When a Man assaults me with a Knife Sword Club or other mortal Weapon does any Law forbid me to defend my self or command me to stay so long as to know whether he have a felonious intent or no Therefore by this Statute in case it be found se defendendo the forfeiture is discharged if it be found otherwise it is Capital If we read the Statute of Glocester cap. 9. I think it will take away the difficulty For by that Statute in case it be found by the Countrey that he did it in his own defence or by misfortune then by the report of the Justices to the King the King shall take him to his Grace if it please him From whence it followeth first that it was then thought Law that the Jury may give the general verdict of se defendendo which Sir Edw. Coke denies Secondly that the Judge ought to report especial matter to the King Thirdly that the King may take him to his Grace if he please and consequently that his Goods are not to be seiz'd till the
oldness newness or swelling vanity of the words and of the last sort is that spoken of in 2 Pet. 2. 18. By this fallacie the Papists conclude the Fathers to be on their side for deserving by good works Whosoever saith Mans merits are Crowned they say Mans works do deserve But the Fathers say Mans merits are Crowned Therefore the Fathers say Mans works do deserve Where Merits is an old word put for any works done under the hope of reward whether it come by desart or freedom of promise Doubtfulness of a word Likeness of name is either called Homonymia or by a Trope or fineness of speech The Likeness of name or Homonymia is when one word is given to signifie divers things As He that believeth shall be saved The Hypocrites to whom our Saviour Christ would not commit himself believed Therefore they shall be saved Where Faith doth note out both a justifying Faith and a dead Faith Doubtfulness by a Trope is when a word is taken properly which is meant figuratively or contrarily As That which Christ saith is true Christ saith that Bread is his Body Therefore it is true Where by body is meant the Sign or Sacrament of his body Unto the first a perfect Logician would answer that the Proposition is not an Axiome necessarily true according to the Rule of truth because of the doubtfulness of the old and new signification of merit And if the word be far worn out of use that it be not understood then the answer must be I understand it not or put your Axiome in plain words To the second he would answer that the Proposition or first part is not according to the Rule of Righteousness because the proper Subject and Adjunct are not joyned together which hath justifying faith or believing sincerely shall be saved and then the assumption being in the same sense inferred is false Unto the third he would answer that the Assumption is not necessarily true because if the word Body be taken properly it is not then true that is set down but if it be taken figuratively it is true and therefore would bid him make the Assumption necessarily true and then say Christ saith in proper words It is my Body and then it is false Hitherto of the fallacies in single words Now of those that are joyned together It is either Amphibolia or the doubtfulness of speech or Exposition or unapt setting down of the reason The first is when there is doubtfulness in the frame of speech as thus If any obey not our word by a Letter note him where some refer by a Letter to the first part of the Sentence and some to the latter where the signification of the word and right pointing doth shew that it must be referred to the first The answer is that the right and wise placing of the Sentence is perverted Unapt setting down of the Reason is when the parts of the Question and the reasons intreated is not set down in fit words as All sin is evil Every Child of God doth sin Therefore every Child of God is evil Here the answer according to Logick is that the assumption doth not take the argument out of the proposition but putteth in another thing and so it is no right Frame of concluding as appeareth by the definition of the assumption Hitherto of the deceits of reason which lye in words Now of the default of Logick called Sophisme It is either General or Special The General are those which cannot be referred to any part of Logick They are either begging of the question called the Petition of the principle or bragging of no proof Begging of the Question is when nothing is brought to prove but the Question or that which is doubtful As That Righteousness which is both by Faith and works doth justifie But this Righteousness is inherent Righteousness Ergo. Here the Proposition in effect is nothing but a Question If together with the Blood of Christ we must make perfect satisfaction for our sins before we come to Heaven Then there must be Purgatory for them that die without perfection But the first is so Ergo. Where the argument they bring is as doubtful and needeth as much proof as the Question The answer is this out of the definition of the Syllogisme that there is no new argument invented therefore it cannot be a certain frame of concluding Bragging of no proof is when that which is brought is too much called Redounding It is either impertinent to another matter called Heterogenium or a vain repetition called Tautologia Impertinent or not to the purpose is when any thing is brought for a proof which is nothing near to the matter in hand whereunto the common Proverb giveth answer I ask you of Cheese you answer me of Chalk A vain repetition is when the same thing in effect though not in words is repeated as they that after long time of Prayer say Let us pray And this fallacie our Saviour Christ condemneth in prayer Mat. 5. and this is a fault in Method Special are those which may be referred to certain parts of Logick and they are of two sorts Such as are referred to the spring of reasons called Invention or to Judgment Those referred to Invention are when any thing is put for a reason which is not as no cause for a cause no effect for an effect and so of the rest In the Distribution this is a proper Fallacie when any thing simply or generally granted thereby is inferred a certain respect or special not meant nor intended as He that saith there are not seven Sacraments saith true He that saith there are only three saith there are not seven Therefore he that saith there are three saith true The right answer is that the Proposition is not necessarily true for there may be a way to say there are not seven and yet affirm an untruth Fallacies of judgment are those that are referred to the judgment of one sentence or of more Of one Sentence either to the Proprieties of an Axiome or to the sorts To the Proprieties as when a true is put for a false and contrarily and Affirmative for a Negative and contrarily So some take the words of Saint John I do not say concerning it that you shall not pray for no denyal when as it doth deny to pray for that sin To the sorts are referred either to the Simple or Compound The first when the General is taken for the Special and contrarily So the Papists by this fallacy do answer to that general saying of Paul We are justified by Faith without the works of the Law Which they understand of works done before Faith when that was never called in doubt The fallacies which are referred to a compound Axiome are those which are referred either to a disjoyned or knitting Axiome To a disjoyned Axiome when the parts indeed are not disjoyned As Solomon was either a King or did bear Rule To a Knitting Axiome is when the parts
are not necessarily knit together 〈◊〉 If Rome be one Fire the Popes Chair is burnâ— And hitherto of the first sort of Fallacie referred to judgment Now followeth the second And they be either those that are referâ—red to a Syllogisme or to Method And they again are General and Special General which are referred to the general properties of a Syllogisme It is either when all the parts are Denyed or are Particular All parts denyed As No Pope is a Devil No man is a Devil Therefore No man is a Pope And this must be answered that it is noâ— according to the definition of a Negativâ— syllogisme which must have always one Affirmative All particular As Some unlawful thing must be suffered 〈◊〉 namely that which cannot be taken away The Stews in some unlawful thing Therefore the Stews must be suffered This is answered by the definition of â— special syllogism which is that hath one part general The special are those which are Simple or Compound The Simple is of two sorts The first is more Plain The second less Plain More plain is when the assumption is denyed or the question is not particular As Every Apostle may Preach abroad Some Apostle is not a Pope Therefore Some Pope may not Preach abroad Also Every Pope is a Lord Some Pope may give an universal licence Therefore every Lord may give an universal licence Less plain hath one fallacy in common when the proposition is special As Some Player is a Rogue Every Vagabond is Rogue Therefore every Player is a Vagabond Also Some Player is a Rogue Every Vagabond is a Player Therefore every Player is a Rogue The fallacie of the first kind is when all the parts be affirmative As All Pauls Bishops were ordained for unity All Arch-Bishops be ordained for unity Therefore all Arch-Bishops are Pauls Bishops The fallacie of the second kind is when the assumption is denyed As Every Puritane is a Christian. No Lord Bishop is a Puritane Therefore no Lord Bishop is a Christian. Hitherto of the fallacies referred to a simple Syllogism Now follow those which are referred to a compound which are those which are referred either to the Connexive or to the disjoyned Of the first sort one is when the first part or antecedent is denyed that the second or consequent may be so likewise As If any Man have two Benefices he may escape unpunished at the Bishops hands But he may not have two Benefices Therefore He may not escape unpunished at the Bishops hands The second part is affirmed that the first may be so also As If every ignorant Minister were put out of the Church and a Preacher in his place we should have good order But we have good order Therefore Every ignorant Minister is put out of the Church and a Preacher in his place Of those referred to the disjoyned the first is when all the parts of the Disjunction or Proposition are not affirmed As Every ignorant Minister is to be allowed or not But he is not Therefore he is The second kind is when the second part of the copulative negative Axiome is denyed that the first may be so As A Non-Resident is either a faithful or unfaithful Minister But he is unfaithful Ergo c. And thus much of the fallacies in a Syllogism The fallacie in Method is when to deceive withal the end is set in the beginning the special before the general good order be gone confounded And finally when darkness length and hardness is laboured after PINIS A DIALOGUE Between A PHYLOSOPHER AND A STVDENT OF The Common-Laws of England Of the Law of Reason Law WHat makes you say that the Study of the Law is less Rational than the study of the Mathematicks Phylosoph I say not that for all study is Rational or nothing worth but I say that the great Masters of the Mathematicks do not so often err as the great Professors of the Law Law If you had applyed your reason to the Law perhaps you would have been of another mind Ph. In whatsoever Study I examine whether my Inference be rational and have look't over the Titles of the Statutes from Magna Charta downward to this present time I left not one unread which I thought might concern my self which was enough for me that meant not to plead for any but my self But I did not much examine which of them was more or less rational because I read them not to dispute but to obey them and saw in all of them sufficient reason for my obedience and that the same reason though the Statutes themselves were chang'd remained constant I have also diligently read over Littleton's Book of Tenures with the Commentaries thereupon of the Renowned Lawyer Sir Ed. Coke in which I confess I found great subtility not of the Law but of Inference from Law and especially from the Law of Humane Nature which is the Law of reason and I confess that it is truth which he sayes in the Epilogue to his Book that by Arguments and Reason in the Law a Man shall sooner come to the certainty and knowledge of the Law and I agree with Sir Edw. Coke who upon that Text farther That Reason is the Soul of the Law and upon sect 138. Nihil quod est Rationi contrarium est licitum that is to say nothing is Law that is against Reason and that Reason is the life of the Law nay the Common Law it self is nothing else but Reason And upon Sect. 21. Aequitas est perfecta quaedam Ratio quae Jus scriptum interpretatur emendat nulla scriptura comprehensa sed solus in vera Ratione consistens i. e. Equity is a certain perfect Reason that interpreteth and amendeth the Law written it self being unwritten and consisting in nothing else but right Reason When I consider this and find it to be true and so evident as not to be denyed by any Man of right sense I find my own reason at a stand for it frustrates all the Laws in the World for upon this ground any Man of any Law whatsoever may say it is against Reason and thereupon make a pretence for his disobedience I pray you clear this passage that we may proceed La. I clear it thus out of Sir Edw. Coke I Inst. Sect. 138. that this is to be understood of an artificial perfection of Reason gotten by long Study Observation and Experience and not of every Mans natural Reason for Nemo nascitur Artifex This Legal Reason is summa Ratio and therefore if all the Reason that is dispersed into so many several heads were united into one yet could he not make such a Law as the Law of England is because by so many successions of Ages it hath been fined and refined by an infinite number of Grave and Learned Men. Ph. This does not clear the place as being partly obscure and partly untrue that the Reason which is the Life of the Law should be not Natural but Artificial I
nor that any Judgment be given without due Process of Law Ph. This is no unreasonable Petition for the Common-Law is nothing else but Equity And by this Statute it appears that the Chancellors before that Statute made bolder with the Courts of Common Law than they did afterward but it does not appear that Common-Law in this Statute signifies any thing else but generally the Law Temporal of the Realm nor was this Statute ever Printed that such as I might take notice of it but whether it be a Statute or not I know not till you tell me what the Parliament Answer'd to this Petition La. The Kings Answer was the Wages heretofore shall stand so as the Kings Royalty be saved Ph. This is slatly against Sir Edw. Coke concerning the Chancery La. In another Parliament 17 Rich. 2. It is Enacted at the Petition of the Commons That forasmuch as People were Compelled to come before the Kings Council or in Chancery by Writs grounded upon untrue Suggestions that the Chancellor for the time being presently after such Suggestions be duly found and proved untrue shall have power to Ordain and Award Dammages according to his discretion to him which is so Travelled unduly as is aforesaid Ph. By this Statute it appears that when a Complaint is made in Chancery upon undue Suggestions the Chancellor shall have the Examination of the said Suggestions and as he may avoid Dammages when the Suggestions are untrue so he may also proceed by Process to the detemining of the Cause whether it be Real or Personal so it be not Criminal La. Also the Commons Petitioned in a Parliament of 2 Hen. 4. not Printed That no Writs nor Privy-Seals be sued out of Chancery Exchequer or other places to any Man to appear at a day upon a pain either before the King and his Council or in any other place contrary to the ordinary Course of Common-Law Ph. What Answer was given to this Petition by the King La. That such Writs should not be granted without necessity Ph. Here again you see the King may deny or Grant any Petitions in Parliament either as he thinks it necessary as in this place or as he thinks it prejudicial or not prejudicial to his Royalty as in the Answer of the former Petition which is a sufficient proof that no part of his Legislative Power or any other Essential part of Royalty can be taken from him by a Statute Now seeing it is granted that Equity is the same thing with the Law of Reason and seeing Sir Edw. Coke 1 Inst. Sect. 21. Defines Equity to be a certain Reason comprehended in no Writing but consisting only in right Reason which interpreteth and amendeth the Written-Law I would fain know to what end there should be any other Court of Equity at all either before the Chancellor or any other Person besides the Judges of the Civil or Common-Pleas Nay I am sure you can alledge none but this that there was a necessity of a Higher Court of Equity than the Courts of Common-Law to remedy the Errors in Judgment given by the Justices of Inferior Courts and the Errors in Chancery were irrevocable except by Parliament or by special Commission appointed thereunto by the King La. But Sir Edw. Coke says that seeing matters of Fact by the Common-Law are Tryable by a Jury of 12 Men this Court should not draw the matter ad aliud Examen i. e. to another kind of Examination viz. by Deposition of Witnesses which should be but evidence to a Jury Ph. To the Deposition of Witnesses any more or less then to evidence to the Lord-Chancellor 'T is not therefore another kind of Examination nor is a Jury more capable of duly examining Witnesses than a Lord-Chancellor Besides seeing all Courts are bound to Judge according to Equity and that all Judges in a Case of Equity may sometimes be deceiv'd what harm is there to any Man or to the State if there be a subordination of Judges in Equity as well as of Judges in Common-Law Seeing it is provided by an Act of parliament to avoid Vexation that Subpoenas shall not be granted till surety be found to satisfie the Party so grieved and vexed for his Dammages and Expences if so be the matter may not be made good which is contained in the Bill La. There is another Statute of 31 Hen. 6. cap. 2. wherein there is a Proviso cited by Sir Edw. Coke in these words Provided that no matter determinable by the Laws of the Realm shall be by the said Act determined in other Form then after the course of the same Law in the Kings Courts having the Determination of the same Law Ph. This Law was made but for Seven years and never continued by any other Parliament and the motive of this Law was the great Riots Extortions Oppressions c. used during the time of the Insurrection of John Cade and the Indictments and Condemnations wrongfully had by this usurped Authority and thereupon the Parliament Ordained that for 7 years following no Man should disobey any of the Kings Writs under the Great Seal or should refuse to appear upon Proclamation before the Kings Council or in the Chancery to Answer to Riots Extortions c. For the first time he should lose c. Wherein there is nothing at all concerning the Jurisdiction of the Chancery or any other Court but an extraordinary power given to the Chancery and to the Kings Privy-Council to Determine of those Crimes which were not before that time Tryable but only by the Kings-Bench or special Commission For the Act was made expresly for the punishment of a great Multitude of Crimes committed by those that had Acted by the said Cade's Authority to which Act the Proviso was added which is here mention'd that the Proceeds in those Courts of Chancery and of the Kings Council should be such as should be used in the Courts to which the said Courts before this Act was made do belong That is to say such causes as were Criminal should be after the order of the Kings-Bench and such Causes as were not Criminal but only against Equity should be Tryed after the manner of the Chancery or in some cases according to the Proceedings in the Exchequer I wonder why Sir Edw. Coke should cite a Statute as this is above two hundred years before expir'd and other two Petitions as if they were Statutes when they were not passed by the King unless he did it on purpose to diminish as he endeavours to do throughout his Institutes the Kings Authority or to insinuate his own opinions among the People for the Law of the Land For that also he endeavours by Inserting Latin Sentences both in his Text and in the Margin as if they were Principles of the Law of Reason without any Authority of Antient Lawyers or any certainty of Reason in themselves to make Men believe they are the very grounds of the Law of England Now as to the Authority you