general as this Case There are many instances where Breaches have been generally assigned and held ill that in Croke is so but the later Opinions are otherwise Affirmetur Judicium Pye versus Brereton A Lease was made of Tythes for three years rendring Rent at Michaelmas and Lady-day and an Action of Debt was brought for Rent arrear for two years Vpon Nil debet pleaded the Plaintiff had a Verdict and it was now moved in Arrest of Iudgment that the Declaration was too general for the Rent being reserved at two Feasts 2 Cro. 668. the Plaintiff ought to have shewed at which of those Feasts it was due But the Council for the Plaintiff said That it appears by the Declaration that two years of the three were expired so there is but one to come which makes it certain enough Curia This is helped by the Verdict but it had not been good upon a Demurrer DE Term. Sancti Mich. Anno 1 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1685. MEmorandum That in Trinity-Vacation last died Sir Francis North Baron of Guilford and Lord Keeper of the Great Seal of England at his House in Oxfordshire being a Man of great Learning and Temperance And Sir George Jefferies Baron of Wem and Chief Justice of the Kings-Bench had the Seal delivered to him at Windsor and was thereupon made Lord High Chancellor of England And Sir Edward Herbert one of the Kings Council succeeded him in the Place of Chief Justice There died also this Vacation Sir Thomas Walcott one of the Justices of the Kings-Bench and he was succeeded by Sir Robert Wright one of the Barons of the Exchequer Sir John Newton al' versus Stubbs IN an Action on the Case for Words Words laid to be spoke ad tenorem effectmu sequen ' not good The Plaintiffs declared that they were Iustices of the Peace for the County of Gloucester c. and that the Defendant spake these scandalous Words of them Viz. Sir John Newton and Mr. Meredith make use of the Kings Commission to worrie Men out of their Estates postea eodem die c. they spoke these words Viz. Sir John Newton and Mr. Meredith make use of the Kings Commission to worrie me and Mr. Creswick out of our Estates And afterwards these words were laid in Latin without an Anglice ad tenorem effectum sequen ' c. There was a Verdict for the Plaintiffs and entire damages and now Mr. Trindar moved in Arrest of Iudgment 1. That the words in the Declaration are laid in Latin Roll. Abr. 74. pl. 2. without an Anglice and without an Averment that the hearers did understand Latin 2. 'T is not expressly alledged that the Defendant spoke those very words for being laid ad tenorem effectum sequen ' something may be omitted which may alter the sense and meaning of them Cro. Eliz. 857. and for this very reason Iudgment was staied though the Court held the words to be actionable Rex versus Ayloff al' THey were Outlawed for High-Treason Treason and on Tuesday the 27th day of October they were brought to the Bar and a Rule of Court was made for their Execution on Fryday following The Chief Iustice said that there was no hardship in this proceeding to a Sentence upon an Outlawry because those Malefactors who wilfully flie from Iustice and a new Crime to their former Offence and therefore ought to have no benefit of the Law for tho' a Man is Guilty yet if he put himself upon his Tryal he may by his submissive Behaviour and shew of Repentance incline the King to mercy In Felonies which are of a lower nature than the Crimes for which these persons are attainted flight even for an Hour is a forfeiture of the Goods of the Criminal so likewise a Challenge to three Iuries is a defiance to Iustice and if that be so then certainly flying from it is both despising the mercy of the King and contemning the Iustice of the Nation They were both Executed on Frday the 30th of October following Dominus Rex versus Colson al' AN Information was exhibited against the Defendants Information for a Riot not good setting forth that they with others did riotously assemble themselves together to divert a Watercourse and that they set up a Bank in a certain place by which the Water was hindred from running to an antient Mill in so plentifull a manner as formerly c. Vpon Not Guilty pleaded it came to a Tryal and the Iury found that Quoad factionem Ripae the Defendants were Guilty and quoad Riotum not Guilty And now Mr. Williams moved in arrest of Iudgment because that by this Verdict the Defendants were acquitted of the charge in the Information which was the Riot and as for the erecting of the Bank an Action on the Case would lie and the Iudgment was accordingly arrested Mason versus Beldham Trin. 1 Jac. Rot. 408. THE Plaintiff brings his Action against the Defendant Quantum meruit will lie for Rent and sets forth That in consideration that he would suffer the Defendant to enjoy a House and three Water-Mills c. he promised to pay so much yearly as they were reasonably worth and avers that they were worth so much And upon a Demurrer the Question was whether this Action would lie for Rent It was argued for the Defendant that it would not lie Cro. Eliz. 242. 786 859. 2 Cro. 668. because it was a real Contract 'T is true there is a Case which seems to be otherwise 't is between Acton and Symonds Cro. Car. 414. which was in consideration that the Plaintiff would demise to the Defendant certain Lands for three years at the Rent of 25 l. by the year he promised to pay it this was held to be a personal Promise grounded upon a real Contract and by the Opinion of three Iudges the Action did lie because there was an express promise alledged which must also be proved But Iustice Croke was of a contrary Opinion Mr. Pollexfen contra If a Lease be made for years reserving a Sum in gross for Rent and which is made certain by the Lease in such case an Action of Debt will lie for the Rent in arrear But if where no Sum certain is reserved as in this Case a Quantum meruit will lie and no reason can be given why a Man may not have such an Action for the Rent of his Land as well as for his Horse or Chamber And Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Anonymus THere was a Libel in the Spiritual Court for scandalous Words Prohibition for words where some are actionable and others not Viz. She is Bitch a Whore an old Bawd And a Prohibition was now prayed by Mr. Pollexfen because some of the words were actionable at Law and some punishable in the Spiritual Court and therefore prayed that it might go Quoad those words which were actionable at Law The Chief Iustice granted
it because the words were an entire Sentence and spoken altogether at the same time and therefore if a Prohibition should not go it would be a double vexation DE Termino Paschae Anno 1 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1685. Earl of Yarmouth versus Darrel THE Plaintiff brought an Action on the Case Grant of the King of sole Printing not good setting forth Letters Patents of King Charles the II. by which the Sole Printing of Blank Writs Bonds and Indentures were granted to him excepting such Forms which belonged to the Custom-House and which were formerly granted to Sir Roger L'Estrange that this Grant was to continue for the space of 30 Years and that the Defendant had notice thereof and had printed 500 Blank Bonds which he laid to his damage of the sum of 40 l. Vpon Not Guilty pleaded the Iury found a special Verdict the substance of which was that the Defendant was a Stationer and that the Company of Stationers for the space of 40 years last past before the granting of these Letters Patents had constantly printed Blank Bonds and so made a general conclusion Mr. Trindar argued for the Plaintiff and the only Question was Whether this Patent did vest a sole Interest in the Plaintiff exclusive to all others In his Argument he insisted on these Points 1. That the King hath a Prerogative in Printing and may grant it Exclusive to others 2. That this Prerogative extends to the Case at the Bar. That he hath such a Prerogative 't is confirm'd by constant Vsage for such Grants have been made by the Kings of England ever since Printing was invented But to instance in a few Viz. The Patent for Printing of Law-Books was granted to one More on the 19th day of January in the 15th year of King James the I. And when that Patent was expired another was granted to Atkyns and others on the 15th day of November in the 12th year of King Charles the II. In 23. Eliz. a Patent was granted to the Company of Stationers for the sole Printing of Psalm-Books and Psalters for the space of 30 years And on the 8th of August 31 Eliz. the like Patent was granted to Christopher Barker for Life Another Patent to the Company of Stationers for printing of Corderius c. These and many more of the like nature shew what the constant usage hath been Now the Statute of Monopolies doth not reach to this Case because of the Proviso therein to exempt all such Grants of sole Printing and by the Statute of King Charles the II. for regulating of the Press 14 Car. 2. cap. 33. 't is Enacted That no person shall Print any Copy which any other hath or shall be granted to him by Letters Patents and whereof he hath the sole Right and Priviledge to Print And upon the breaches of these Statutes several Iudgments have been given Between Streater and Roper in this Court Mich. 24 Car. 2. Rot. 237. 't is true the Iudgment was against the Plaintiff but upon a Writ of Error brought in Parliament that Iudgment was reversed The same Term there was a Iudgment given upon a special Verdict in the Common-Pleas for the Plaintiffs Hill 35 Car. 2. B. R. Rot. 99. who were the Company of Stationers against Seymour for Printing of Almanacks And they obtained the like Iudgment against Wright for Printing of Psalters and Psalm-Books Now to apply this to the principal Case 't is to be considered that these Books for which the sole Printing was so claimed were of a publick nature and importance relating to the good and benefit of the Subjects and so likewise are Blank Bonds for there may be false and vitious Impressions to the ruin and destruction of many innocent people And as a farther Argument that the King hath this Prerogative 't is likewise to be considered that where no individual person can claim a Property in a thing there the King hath a Right vested in him by Law and it cannot be pretended that any particular person hath a Right to Print those Bonds therefore the finding that such were printed by the Company for above 40 years is immaterial because there being an inherent Prerogative in the King whenever he exerts it all other persons are bound up who were at liberty before To prove which the Iudgment in the Case of the East-India Company is express in point for before that Patent the subject had liberty to Trade to those places prohibited by that Grant but afterwards they were restrained by that Grant Neither is this in the nature of a Monopoly 11 Co. 84. 't is not like that of the sole Grant of making Cards which hath been adjudged void and with great reason because that Grant reached to prohibit a whole Trade and therefore differs from this Case for the Defendant may print other Instruments or Books and exercise his Trade in some other lawful and profitable Commodities and so might the Merchants in the Case of the East-India Company for they were restrained by the Patent as to particular places but might Trade to any other part of the World Neither will the Subjects in general receive any prejudice by this or such like Grants for if the Patentees make ill use of their Priviledges tho' it cannot be properly called an Office yet 't is a Trust and a Scire Facias will lie to repeal their Grants It was argued by the Councel for the Defendant E contra That the Verdict having found that the Company of Stationers had used to print those Bonds for above 40 years before the making of this Grant the Question will be Whether they are now divested of a Right so long enjoyed And as to that 't is not a new thing to object That notwithstanding such Grants yet other persons have insisted on a Right to Print and have printed accordingly Thus the sole Printing of Law-Books was granted to one Atkyns yet the Reports of Iustice Jones and my Lord Chief Iustice Vaughan were printed without the direction of the Patentees Printing as 't is a manual Occupation makes no alteration in this Case for the King hath as great a Prerogative in Writing any thing that is of a publick Nature as he hath in Printing of it Now considering Printing as an Art exclusive from the thing printed this Patent is not good For if a Man invent a new Art and another should learn it before the Inventor can obtain a Patent if afterwards granted 't is void Then consider it in relation to the thing printed 1 Roll. 4. 11 Co. 53. id which in this Case are Blank-Bonds 't is not a new Invention because the Company of Stationers have printed such above 40 years and for that reason this Patent is void for where the Invention is not New there Trade shall not be restrained No Man can receive any prejudice by the printing of such Bonds for they are of no Vse till filled up 't is only a bare Manufacture
the Common Law for a false Oath made by any Witness and therefore an Action will not lye for a scandalous Affidavit Adjornatur Anonymus NOta An Action of Assault and Battery Release of one Def. shall not discharge the rest of a personal thing and false imprisonment was brought against four Defendants the Plaintiff had Iudgment and they brought a Writ of Error The Plaintiff in the Action pleaded the Release of one of them and to this Plea all four jointly demur The Opinion of the Court was that Iudgment might be given severally for they being compelled by Law to join in a Writ of Error the release of one shall not discharge the rest of a personal thing But where divers are to recover in the personalty 6 Co. Ruddock's Case the Release of one is a Bar to all but it is not so in point of discharge If two Coparceners make a Lease of a House and the Rent is in arrear and one of them brings the Action and recovers the Iudgment shall be arrested because one alone hath recovered in Debt for a moiety when both ought to join But it is agreed that if one Tenant in Common make a Lease rendring Rent which afterwards is in arrear Litt. Sect. 316. they must join in an Action of Debt because it savours of the Personalty But 't is otherwise in case of the Realty DE Term. Sanct. Trin. Anno 2 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1686. Herbert Chief Justice Wythens Justices Holloway Justices Wright Justices Sawyer Attorny General Powis Sollicitor General Aldridge versus Duke ASsault Trespass continued many years and the Statute of Limitations pleaded the Jury gives Damages only for the last six years Battery Wounding and Imprisoning of him from the 10th of August 24 Car. 2. usque exhibitionem Billae The Defendant pleaded not Guilty infra sex infra Annos The Plaintiff replied that the Writ was sued out 2 Octobris 1 Jacobi 2. And that the Defendant was Guilty within six years next before the Writ brought Vpon this Issue was joyned and a Verdict was given for the Plaintiff and entire damages given Mr. Pollexfen moved two Exceptions in Arrest of Iudgment 1. That a Verdict cannot help what appears to be otherwise upon the face of the Record Now here the Plaintiff declared that he was imprisoned the 10th of August 24 Car. 2. which is 13 years since and being one entire Trespass the Issue is found as laid in the Declaration which cannot be for so many years between the cause of Action and bringing of the Writ for if a Trespass be continued several years the Plaintiff must sue only for the last six years for which he hath a compleat cause of Action but when those are expired he is barred by the Statute When the Plaintiff hath any cause of Action Sid. 25. then the Statute of Limitations begins as in an Action on the Case for words if they are actionable in themselves without alledging special damages the Plaintiff will recover Damages from the time of the speaking and not according to what loss may follow So in Trover and Conversion when there is a cause of Action vested and the Goods continue in the same possession for seven years afterwards in such case 't is the first conversion which entitles the Plaintiff to an Action So in the Case at Bar tho' this be a continued imprisonment yet so much as was before the Writ brought is barred by the Statute Thompson contra The Verdict is good for the Iury reject the beginning of the trespass and give Damages only for that which falls within the six years and this may be done because 't is laid usque exhibitionem Billae If the Defendant had pleaded not Guilty generally Cro. Car. 160 381 404. then Damages must be for the 13 years though the Plaintiff of his own shewing had brought his Action for a thing done beyond the time limited by the Statute but having pleaded not Guilty at any time within six years if the Verdict find him guilty within that time 't is against him As to the Objection that the Cause of Action ariseth beyond six years tho' it doth appear so in the Declaration yet that doth not exclude the Plaintiff for there might have been Process out before or he might be disabled by an Outlawry which may be now reversed or he might be in Prison and newly discharged from which time he hath six years to begin his Action for being under either of these circumstances the Statute doth not hurt him Curia If an Action of false Imprisonment be brought for seven years and the Jury find the Defendant guilty but for two days 't is a Trespass within the Declaration This Statute relates to a distinct and not to a continued Act for after six years it will be difficult to prove a Trespass many accidents may happen within that time as the death or removal of Witnesses c. Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Dobson versus Thornistone THE Plaintiff was a Husbandman Words spoken of a Farmer actionable who brought an Action against the Defendant for these words He owes more mony than he is worth he is run away and is broke He had a Verdict and it was moved now in Arrest of Iudgment that the Words being spoken of a Farmer are not actionable To say that a Gentleman is a Cozener Hill 28 Eliz. B.R. Godb. 40. a Bankrupt and hath got an Occupation to deceive Men though he used to Buy and Sell yet being no Merchant 't was the better Opinion of the Court that the Words were not actionable So to say of a Farmer Stiles 420. that he is a Whoreson Bankrupt Rogue and it not appearing that he got his living by Buying and Selling or that the Words were spoken of him relating to his Occupation 't is not actionable For it must not only appear that the Plaintiff hath a Trade Sid. 299. Hutt 50. but that he gets his Living by it otherwise the Words spoken of him will not bear an Action But the Court held the Words to be actionable the like Iudgment was given in the Case of a Carpenter Mich. 3 Jac. for Words Viz. He is broke and run away Anonymus NOta Misentry of a Writ of Enquiry amendable without paying Costs Iudgment was given upon a Demurrer and a Writ of Enquiry was awarded and in the Entry thereof upon the Roll the Words per Sacramenum duodecim proborum legalium hominum were left out and now the Question was Whether it shall be amended It was said that a Capiatur for a Misericordia shall be amended upon the new Statute of Jeofails after a Verdict but whether upon a Demurrer it was doubted In a Quo Warranto Iudgment was entred by disclaimer Cro. Car. 184. by the consent of all Parties and the Words virtute praetextu literarum patentium geren dat 17 Jacobi were wrote in the Margin of the
Latch 262. is said not to be adjudged for the Court was divided in Opinion The Case of Marwood and Turpin is the same Moor 600. Cro. Eliz. 715. but there the Defendant pleaded the acceptance of the Rent after the assignment which was not done here Now if both those Cases should be admitted to be Law Sid. 240 266. Allen 34 42. Palm 118. Latch 260. Noy 97. 2 Cro. 334. Mooo 392. and parallel with this yet the later Resolutions have been quite contrary for 't is now held and with great reason that the privity of Contract of the Testator is not determined by his death but that his Executor shall be charged with all his Contracts so long as he hath Assets and therefore such Executor shall not discharge himself by making of an Assignment but shall still be liable for what Rent shall incur after he hath assigned his Interest nay if the Testator himself had assigned the term in his life-time yet his Executor shall be charged in the Detinet so long as he hath Assets Newton versus Trigg Mich. 1. Jac. Rot. 226. TRespass for breaking and entring of his Close Statute of Bankrupts do not extend to an Inn-kepeer treading down of his Grass c. and taking away of his Goods Vpon not Guilty pleaded a special Verdict was found That the Plaintiff was an Inn-Keeper and a Freeman of the City of London that he bought Oates Hay c. which he sold in his Inu by which he got his Living that he with others built a Ship and he had a Share therein and a Stock of 50 l. to Trade withal that he was indebted to several persons and departed from his House and absconded from his Creditors that thereupon a Commission of Bankrupcy was taken out against him at the Petition of the Creditors that the Plaintiff was indebted to Trigg and that the Commissioners found him to be a Bankrupt and by Indenture bearing date the 25th day of June made a Bargain and Sale of the Goods of Trigg who did take and carry them away c. The Question was whether upon the whole matter the Plaintiff was a Bankrupt or not Serjeant Thomson argued that he was not within any of the Statutes of Bankrupcy for an Inn-Keeper is under many obligations and circumstances different from all other Trades-men for he is to take care of the Goods of Travellers and if he set any unreasonable Price upon his Goods 't is an Offence which the Iustices of Peace and Stewards in their Leets have power to hear and determine 2. He doth not buy and sell by way of Contract for most of his Gains arise by the entertaining and lodging of his Guests by the attendance of his Servants and by the Furniture of his Rooms and by uttering of Commodities as in other Trades Cro. Car. 548. And therefore by the Opinion of three Iudges in the Case of Crisp and Prat it was held that an Inn-holder doth not get his Living by Buying and Selling for though he buyeth Provision he doth not sell it by way of Contract but utters it at what gain he thinks reasonable which his Guests may refuse to give Iustice Berkley in the arguing of that Case agreed that he who getteth his Living by Buying and Selling and not by both is not within the Statutes but the Iury having found that he got a livelyhood by both and using the Trade of an Inholder therefore he was a Bankrupt But the other three Iudges were of a contrary Opinion because an Inn-Keeper cannot properly be said to sell his Goods As to his having a Share in a Ship 't is no more than a Stock to Trade which may go to an Infant or to an Executor after his decease and if either of these persons should Trade with it they cannot be made Bankrupts because 't is in auter droit E Contra. E contra It was argued that he who keepeth an Inn is a Trades-man and may be properly said to get his Living by Buying and Selling. The Goods of a Traveller are not distrainable for the Rent of an Inn-Keeper the reason is because he is more immediately concern'd as a Trades-man for the benefit of Comerce It was the Opinion of my Lord Rolls 2 Roll. Abr. 84. that an Inn-Keeper was a Trades-man therefore any Man might build a New Inn for it was no Franchise but a particular Trade to keep an Inn. And as a Trades-man he selleth his Goods to his Guests by way of Contract 39 H. 6.18 19. for he is not bound to provide Hay and Dates for the Horses of his Guests without being paid in hand as soon as the Horses come into the Stable for the Law doth not oblige him to trust for the payment The Case of Crisp and Prat as Reported by Iustice Croke seems to be against this Opinion Jones 437. March 34. but 't is mis-reported for Jones who mentions the same Case says that it being found that the Inn-Keeper got his Living by Buying and Selling it was the Opinion of two Iudges that he was within the Statute but the other two Iudges as to this Point were of a contrary Opinion for they held that an Inn-Keeper could be no more a Bankrupt than a Farmer who often Buys and Sells Cattel and other Goods Tho' a Man is of a particular Trade yet if it doth not appear that he got his Livelyhood by Buying and Selling 't is not actionable to call such a person Bankrupt Now certainly if the Plaintiff had declared that he was an Inn-Keeper Stiles 420. Sid. 299. and got his living after that manner and that the Defendant to scandalize him said He was a Bankrupt the Action would lie as well as for a Dyer Farmer Carpenter or such like Trades of manual Occupation Most of the Inn-Keepers are Farmers and if it had been so found in this Case it would not have been denied but that he had been within the Statute of Bankrupts Afterwards in Trinity Term 3 Willielmi Judgment Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff for taking the whole matter as found by this Verdict 't is not sufficient to make him a Bankrupt 1. That he had a Ship which he let to Freight this was not much insisted on at the Bar to make him a Bankrupt for 't is no more than for a Man to have a Share in a Barge Hackney-Coach or Wagon all which are let for Hire Besides in this Case 't is found that the Plaintiff was but a Partner with another And as to the 50 l. which he had in this Trade that is not sufficient to make him a Bankrupt Cro. Car. 282. Sid. 411. for he must be actually a Trader at the time that the Debt was contracted which is not found so it must be to make the word Bankrupt actionable for it must be found that he was a Trader at the time of the words spoken All the Question of difficulty is that the Plaintiff was
quam ad illud facere debet solet And it was the Opinion of a * Justice Doderidge in Surry and Piggots Case Pop. 171.27 Assise placito 8. Br. Prescription 49. Rast Entr. 441 Tit. Nusance learned Iudge that the words currere consuevit solebat did supply a Prescription or Custom Thus it was in an Assise of Nusance wherein the Plaintiff set forth that he had a Fountain of Water currentem usque ad rotam molendini c. and that the Defendant divertit cursum aquae and this was held good The Cases of stopping up of Lights and diverting of Water-courses are not parallel the Prescription to Lights must be ratione loci and therefore if a Man will erect a new House and a Stranger will stop the Lights 't is an injury done and the Action may be maintained upon the Possession Lutterel 's Case was grounded upon the Possession for upon the Plaintiff Cottell 's own shewing the Prescription was gone because he set forth that he had pulled down the old Mills and that the Defendant Lutterel diverted the Water from running to those Mills which the Plaintiff newly built All which prove that a Prescription goes to the Right but a possession is sufficient to support an Action against a Tort-fesor Lastly Slackman vers West Palmer 387. 2 Cro. 673. in the Case of a Common or a Rent which cannot pass without Deed if the Plaintiff shews a Que Estate he must produce the Deed by which it was granted but where he prescribes for a Way he may set forth his Estate without shewing how he came by it because 't is but a Conveyance to the Action which is grounded upon the disturbance done to the Possession Cur. The word solet implies Antiquity and will amount to a Prescription and solitus cursus aquae running to a Mill makes the Mill to be antient for if it be newly erected there cannot be solitus cursus aquae towards that Mill For which Reasons the Iudgment in the Original Action was affirmed in Hillary Term Primo Willielmi But the Chief Iustice was of Opinion that if the Cause had been tried upon such a Oeclaration that the Plaintiff ought to prove his Prescription or else he must be Nonsuit Anonymus ONE was Indicted for drinking of an Health to the Pious Memory of Stephen Colledge who was Executed at Oxford for High Treason He was Fined 1000 l. and had Sentence to stand in the Pillory and was ordered to find Sureties for his good Behaviour Rex versus Rosewel THE Defendant was a Non-conformist Minister and Indicted for High-Treason in Preaching of these words viz. Why do the People innuendo the People of England make a flocking to the King innuendo Carolum Secundum under pretence of curing the Kings Evil which the King cannot do but we are the Priests and Prophets to whom they ought to flock who by our Prayers can heal them We have had two Wicked Kings now together innuendo Carolum Primum Carolum Secundum who have suffered Popery to be introduced under their Noses whom I can liken to none but wicked Jeroboam and if they innuendo the People c. would stand to their Principles I make no doubt but to COnquer our Enemies innuendo the King and all his Loyal Subjects with Rams Horns broken Pitchers and a Stone in a Sling as in the time of old Vpon this Indictment he was arraigned and pleaded Not Guilty and was Tried at Bar and found Guilty of High Treason upon the Evidence of two Women And the Court having assigned Mr. Wallop Mr. Pollexfen and Mr. Bampfield to be his Council they moved in Arrest of Iudgment First That the Words discharged of the Innuendo's if taken seperate or altogether have no tendency to Treason The first Paragraph doth not import any Crime and to say that we have had two wicked Kings may be a Misdemeanor but 't is not Treason either by intendment of the Death of the King or by levying War against him The Crime seems to consist in the next Words which are if they would stand to their Principles c. This seems to stir up the People to Rebellion but as they are placed in the Indictment they will not admit of such a Construction neither as they have reference to the words precedent or as they stand by themselves The words which go before are viz. We have had two wicked Kings together 'T is not expressed what Kings or when they Reigned which is very uncertain Et si ipsi ad fundamentalia sua starent which word ipsi is relative and must refer ad proximum antecedens and then it must be ipsi Reges which is the proper and natural sense of the words But now if the Innuendo's must be incerted 4 Co. 17. it must be under some Authority of Law either to design the person or the thing which was not certain before that the intention of the Party speaking may be more easily collected and this is the most proper Office of an Innuendo It will not change the meaning of the words Hob. 45. 2 Cro. 126. for that is to make them still more incertain Now most of the Innuendo's in this Indictment are naught because they do not ascertain the subject matter First by the word People innuendo the People of England may be as well intended any other People because there was no previous Discourse of the People of England Then follow these words We have had two wicked Kings now together innuendo King Charles the First and Second which may be as well intended of King Ethelred and Alfred because the words denote a time past and therefore cannot possibly intend the King of whom there was no precedent Discourse And the Rule is De dubiis generalibus benignior Sententia recipienda est Besides those words are insensible and indeed impossible for we cannot have two wicked Kings together it ought to be successively Then to say we shall Conquer our Enemies cannot be intended the Enemies of the King because the word Enemies is of a large sense for Man by reason of his Sins and Infirmities hath many Enemies and possibly such might be intended If therefore it be doubtful what Enemies were meant if it shall not be in the power of a Clerk by an innuendo to make Words of another sense than what they will naturally bear nor to help where they are insensible as in this Case If there was no precedent Discourse either of Kings People or Enemies which must be proved by the Evidence then is this Indictment naught and therefore Iudgment ought to be arrested Mr. Attorney and Solliciter contra 'T is laid in this Indictment that the words were spoken to stir up Rebellion and to depose the King and 't is so found by the Verdict of twelve Men. That which aggravates the offence is That it was spoken in a publick Assembly to the People which must be intended the People of England
the Court of Arches the Case was Prohibition not granted where a temporal loss may ensue The Plaintiff was presented by the Mayor and Aldermen of Bristol to the Parish Church of Christ-Church in the said City and the Defendant libelled against him because he was not 23 years of Age when made Deacon nor 24 when he entred into the Orders of a Priest 13 Eliz. c. 12. and the Statute requires that none shall be made a Minister or admitted to preach being under that Age. The reason now alledged for a Prohibition was because this Matter was triable at Law and not in the Spiritual Court because if true a Temporal Loss viz Deprivacion might follow But the Court denied the Prohibition and compared this Case to that of a Drunkard or ill Liver who are usually punished in the Ecclesiastical Courts though a temporal loss may ensue and if Prohibitions should be granted in all Cases where Deprivation is the consequence of the Crime it would very much lessen the Practice of those Courts David Burgh 's Case THE Parishioners of St. Leonard Foster Lane gave this Man who had a Wife and five Children 5 l. in Mony to remove into another Parish upon Condition that if he returned in 40 days that he should repay the Mony he removed accordingly and stayed away by the space of 40 days the Parish to which he removed obtained an Order upon an Appeal for his settlement in the last Parish where he was lawfully an Inhabitant which Order being removed into this Court and the Matter appearing thus upon Affidavits they declared their Opinion only upon the Order to remove viz. That the Man had gained a Settlement in the Parish to which he removed for he being an Inhabitant there for so long time as was required by Law to make a Settlement and not disturbed by the Officers they were remiss in their Duty and the Court would not help their negligence DE Term. Sanctae Trin. Anno 1 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1685. Dominus Rex versus Dangerfield THE Defendant was convicted of publishing a Libel wherein he had accused the King when Duke of York that he had hired him to kill the late King Charles c. And on Fryday June 20. He was brought to the Barr where he received this Sentence viz. That he should pay the Fine of 500 l. That he should stand twice in the Pillory and go about the Hall with a Paper in his Har signifying his Crime That on Thursday next he should be whipped from Algate to Newgate and on Saturday following from Newgate to Tyburn which Sentence was executed accordingly and as he was returning in a Coach on Saturday from Tyburn one Mr. Robert Frances a Barrister of Greys-Inn asked him in a jeering manner whether he had run his Heat that day who replied again to him in scurrilous words whereupon Mr. Frances run him into the Eye with a small Cane which he had then in his Hand of which wound the said Mr. Dangerfield died on the Monday following Mr. Frances was indicted for this Murder and upon Not-guilty pleaded was tried at the Old-Bayly and found guilty and executed at Tyburn on Fryday July the 24th in the same year Mr. Baxter's Case HE was a Nonconformist Minister against whom an Information was exhibited for writing of a Book which he Entituled A Paraphrase upon the New Testament and the Crime alledged against him in the said Information was That he intending to bring the Protestant Religion into contempt and likewise the Bishops innuendo the Bishops of England did publish the Libel in which was contained such words c. setting forth the words He was convicted And Mr. Williams moved in arrest of Iudgment that the words in the Information and the Bishops therein mentioned were misapplied to the Protestant Religion and the Bishops of England by such Innuendoes which could not support this Charge against the Defendant That the Distringas and Habeas Corpora were inter nos Richardum Baxter which could not be because the Information was exhibited in the name of the Attorney General But the Court over-ruled these Exceptions and said that by the word Bishops in this Information no other could be reasonably intended but the English Bishops thereupon the Court fined him 500 l. and ordered him to give Security for his Good Behavior for seven years Procter versus Burdet AN Action of Covenant was brought by an Apprentice setting forth the Indenture by which the Defendant In Covenant the Breach was generally assigned and held good his Master had covenanted to find and allow the Plaintiff Meat Drink Lodging and all other things necessary during such a time and the Breach was as general as the Covenant viz. That he did not find hind him Meat Drink Lodging alia necessaria The Plaintiff had Iudgment by Nil dicit and upon a Writ of Enquity brought entire Damages were given against the Defendant And in a Writ of Error upon this Iudgment the Error assigned was that the Breach was too general and that entire Damages were given amongst other things for alia necessaria and doth not say for what 2 Cro. 436. Astel versus Mills and a Case was cited in the Point in Trinity-Term 16 Jacobi where the Iudgment was reversed for this very reason The Council contra argued that that which is required in an Action of Covenant is that there may be such a certainty as the Defendant may plead a former Recovery in Barr if he be sued again and therefore one need not be so particular in assigning of the Breach upon a Covenant as upon a Bond for in a Bond for performance of Covenants where there is a Covenant to repiar if it be put in suit 't is not sufficient to say That the House is out of repair but you must shew how but in a Covenant 't is enough to say That it was out of repair If in this Case the Plaintiff had shewed what necessaries were not provided for him Kelway 85. it would have made the Record too long and therefore 't is sufficient for him to say that the Defendant did not find alia necessaria That Case in 2 Cro. 2 Cro. 304 367. 1 Rol. Rep. 173. 3 Bulst 31. 2 Saund. 373. has since been adjudged not to be Law for many contrary Iudgments have weakened the Authority of it viz. That the Breach may be assigned as general as the Covenant as where a Man covenanted that he had a lawful Estate and Right to let c. the Breach assigned was that he had no lawful Estate and Right to let c. and doth not shew that the Lessor had not such Right or that he was evicted yet it was held good Curia In a Quantum meruit they formerly set out the Matter at length but now of late in that Action in general Words and also in Trover and Conversion pro diversis aliis bonis hath been held good which is as
' Francisco Wythens Mil ' Justiciariis Richardo Holloway Mil ' Justiciariis Thoma Walcot Mil ' Justiciariis MEmorandum That the First day of this Term Sir Thomas Jones Chief Justice of the Common-Pleas had his Quietus and Sir Henry Beddingfield one of the Justices of the same Court succeeded him in that Office Likewise the Honourable William Mountagu Esq Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer had his Quietus and Sir Edward Atkyns one of the Barons of the same Court succeeded him Sir Job Charleton one of the Justices of the Common-Pleas had his Quietus but was made Chief Justice of Chester and Sir Edward Lutwich the King's Serjeant was made one of the Justices of the Common-Pleas and Serjeant Heath was made one of the Barons of the Exchequer Okel versus Hodgkinson THE Father and Son join in a Fine in order to make a Settlement upon the second Wife of the Father who was only Tenant by the Curtesie the Remainder in Tail to his said Son One of the Cognizors died after the Caption and before the Return of the Writ of Covenant and now a Writ of Error was brought to Reverse it and this was assigned for Error Curia If it had been in the Case of a Purchasor for a valuable Consideration the Court would have shewed him some favour but it being to do a wrong to a young Man they would leave it open to the Law THE first day of this Term being the 22th day of April there was a Call of Serjeants viz. Sir John Holt of Grays-Inn Recorder of London who was made Kings Serjeant Sir Ambrose Phillips made also Kings Serjeant Christopher Milton John Powell John Tate William Rawlinson George Hutchins William Killingworth Hugh Hodges and Thomas Geers They all appeared that day at the Chancery-Bar where having taken the Oaths the Lord Chancellor Jefferies made a short Speech to them after which they delivered a Ring to him praying him to deliver it to the King They went from the Inner-Temple-Hall to Westminster and Counted at the Common-Pleas and gave Rings the Motto whereof was DEUS REX LEX Dominus Rex versus Saloway SAloway drowned himself in a Pond and the Coroners Enquest found him Non Compos Mentis because 't is more generally supposed that a Man in his Senses will not be Felo de se The Kings Councel moved for a Melius Inquirendum and that the Inquisition might be quashed for that it sets forth Quod pred Defend circa horam octavam ante meridiem in quoddam stagnum se projecit per abundantiam aquae ibidem statim suffocat emergit ' erat which is insensible Pemberton Serjeant contra Here is no Exception taken to the substance of the Inquisition and the word suffocat had been sufficient if the word emergit ' had been left out The Court were of Opinion that there being another word in this Inquisition which carries the sense 't is therefore sufficient but if it had stood singly upon this word Emergit ' it had not been good And this Fact happening about the time of the general Pardon the Court was of Opinion that where an Interest is vested in the King a Pardon of all Forfeitures will not divest it but that nothing was vested here before Inquisition found 2. It was objected that this Inquisition ought to set forth that Saloway came by his death by this means Et nullo alio modo quocunque To which it was answered by Pemberton that in matters of Form only the Iudges have sent for the Coroner into Court and ordered him to amend it Rodney versus Strode AN Action on the Case was brought against three Defendants one of them suffered Iudgment to go by default In a joynt Action the Jury may sever the Damages and the other two pleaded Not Guilty The Cause was tryed the last Assises at Exeter and it was for imposing the Crime of Treason upon the Plaintiff and for assaulting and imprisoning of him there was a Verdict for the Plaintiff and 1000 l. damages against Mr. Strode and 50 l. against the other Defendant who pleaded The Plaintiff entred a nolle prosequi against him who let the Iudgment go by default and against the other Defendant for the 50 l. damages and took judgment only against Mr. Strode Serjeant Pemberton moved for a new Trial by reason of the excessive Damages which were not proportioned to the quality of the Plaintiff he being a Man of mean Fortune But it was opposed by the Plaintiff for that the Defendant pursued him as a Traytor and when he was apprehended for that Crime he caused him to be arrested for 1000 l. at the Suit of another person to whom he was not indebted so that upon consideration of the Circumstances of the Case the Court refused to grant a new Tryal Then Serjeant Pemberton for the Defendants moved in arrest of Iudgment and for cause shewed that the Iury have found both guilty and assessed several Damages which they cannot do because this is a joynt Action to which the Defendants have pleaded jointly and being found guilty modo forma the Iury cannot assess the damages severally for the damage is the same by the one as the other Cro. Eliz. 860. Austen vers Millard al' and therefore it hath been adjudged that where an Action of Battery was brought against three and one pleaded not guilty and the other two Son Assault demesne and several damages found against them it was held ill for that very reason because it was a joint offence 'T is true where there are divers Defendants and damages assessed severally the Plaintiff hath his election to take execution de melioribus damnis but this is when the Trials are at several times So 't is where they plead several Pleas Cro. Car. 239. Walsh versus Bishop as in an Action of Battery one pleads not guiity and the other justifies and both Issues are found for the Plaintiff in such case he may enter a non pros against one and take Iudgment against the other because their Pleas are several but where they plead jointly the Iury cannot sever the Damages But Mr. 1 Bulst 157. Sampson vers Cramfield al' Rast Entr. 677. b. Pollexfen for the Plaintiff insisted that even in this case damages may be assessed severally for where two Defendants are sued for the same Battery and they plead the same Plea yet damages may be assessed severally So was Trebarefoot and Greenway 's Case in this Court which was an Action for an Assault and Battery and false Imprisonment one of the Defendants pleaded not Guilty and the other justified Issue was joined and there was a Verdict for the Plaintiff and damages assessed severally the Plaintiff entred a nolle prosequi as to one and took judgment against the other and upon this a Writ of Error was brought in this Court and the Iudgment was affirmed So if an Action of Trespass be brought against two for taking of 100 l.
the one took 70 l. and the other 30 l. damages shall be assessed severally It was admitted that regularly the damages ought to be entire especially where the Action is joint but where the Facts are several damages may likewise be so assessed but in this Case the Iury hath done what the Court would do had it béen in a Criminal Cause Curia This is all but one Fact which the Iury is to try 'T is true when several Persons are found Guilty criminally then the damages may be severed in proportion to their Guilt but here all are equally guilty of the same offence and it seems to be a contradiction to say that the Plaintiff is injured by one to the value of 50 l. and by the other to the value of 1000 l. when both are equally Guilty Every Defendant ought to answer full as much as the Plaintiff is damnified now how is it possible he should be damnified so much by one and so little by the other But notwithstanding this Opinion Iudgment was afterwards given for the Plaintiff Peak versus Meker IN an Action on the Case for Words the Plaintiff declared that he was a Merchant and bred up in the Church of England and that when the present King came to the Crown the said Plaintiff made a Bonfire at his Door in the City of London and that the Defendant then spoke of him these words for which he now brought this Action viz. He innuendo the Plaintiff is a Rogue a Papist Dog and a pitiful Fellow and never a Rogue in Town has a Bonfire before his Door but he The Plaintiff had a Verdict and 500 l. Damages were given A Writ of Error was brought but it was adjudged without argument that the words were actionable Joyner versus Pritchard AN Action was brought upon the Statute of R. II. Admiralty for prosecuting of a Cause in the Admiralty Court which did arise upon the Land it was tried before the Chief Iustice in London and a Verdict for the Plaintiff Mr. Thompson moved in Arrest of Iudgment for that the Action was brought by Original in which it was set forth that the Defendant prosecut fuit adhuc prosequitur c. in Curia Admiralitat now the prosequitur is subsequent to the Original and so they have recovered Damages for that which was done after the Action brought Curia These words adhuc prosequitur must refer to the time of suing forth this Original like the Case of a Covenant for quiet Enjoyment and a breach assigned that the Defendant built a Shed whereby he hindred the Plaintiff that he could not enjoy it hucnsque which word must refer to the time of the Action brought and not afterwards Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Dominus Rex versus ........ AN Information was brought against the Defendant for Forgery Forgery setting forth that the Defendant being a man of ill fame c. and contriving to cheat one A. did forge quoddam scriptum dated the 16th day of October in the year 1681. continens in se scriptum obligatorium per quod quidem scriptum obligatorium praed A. obligatus fuit praed Defend in quadraginta libris c. He was found Guilty and afterwards this Exception was taken in arrest of Iudgment Viz. That the Fact alledged in the Information was a contradiction of it self for how could A. be bound when the Bond was forged 2. It is not set forth what that scriptum obligatorium was whether it was scriptum sigillatum or not Curia The Defendant is found Guilty of the forging of a Writing in which was contained quoddam scriptum obligatorium and that may be a true Bond. Iudgment was arrested MEMORANDUM On Tuesday April the 27th Sir Thomas Powes of Lincolns-Inn was made Sollicitor General in the Place of Mr. Finch and was called within the Bar. Hanchet versus Thelwal IN Ejectment a special Verdict was found Devise What words in a Will make an Estate for Life and what in Tail in which the Case did arise upon the construction of the words in a Will Viz. The Testator being seised in Fee had Issue Two Sons and Four Daughters He made his Will and devised his Estate being in Houses by these words Viz. Irem I give and bequeath to my Son Nicholas Price my Houses in Westminster and if itplease God to take away my Son then I give my Estate to my four Daughters naming them share and share alike and if it please God to take away any of my said Daughters before Marriage then I give her or their part to the rest surviving And if all my Sons and Daughters dye without Issue then I give my said Houses to my Sister Anne Warner and her Heirs Nicholas Price entred and died without Issue then the four Sisters entred and Margaret the eldest married Thellwel and died leaving Issue a Son who was the Lessor of the Plaintiff who insisted upon his Title to a fourth part of the Houses The Question was what Estate the Daughters took by this Will whether joint Estates for Life or several Remainders in Tail If only joint Estates for Life then the Plaintiff as Heir to his Mother will not be entituled to a fourth part if several Remainders in Tail then the Father will have it during his Life as Tenant by the Curtesie This Case was argued this Term by Mr. Pollexfen for the Plaintiff And in Hillary Term following by Councel for the Defendant The Plaintiffs Council insisted that they took joint Estates for Life and this seemed to be the intent of the Testator by the words in his Will the first Clause whereof was Viz. I give and bequeath my Houses in W. to Nicholas Price Now by these words an Estate for Life only passed to him and not an Inheritance for there was nothing to be done or any thing to be paid out of it 2. The next Clause is Viz. If it please God to take away my Son then I give my Estate to my four Daughters share and share alike Now these words cannot give the Daughters a Fee-simple by any intendment whatsoever but if any word in this Clause seems to admit of such a Construction it must be the word Estate which sometimes signifies the Land it self and sometimes the Estate in the Land But here the word Estate cannot create a Fee-simple because the Testator gave his Daughters that Estate which he had given to his Son before and that was only for Lise Then follow the words share and share alike and that only makes them Tenants in Common 3. The next Clause is Viz. If it please God to take away any of my said Daughters before Marriage then I give her or their part to the rest surviving These words as they are penned can have no influence upon the Case 4. Then followeth the last Clause Viz. And if all my Sons and Daughters dye without Issue then I give c. These words create no Estate tail in the
Sir Thomas claimed a Property whereupon he was ordered to amend his Return and then the Court of Common-Pleas bailed him Banson versus Offley AN Appeal of Murder was tried in Cambridgshire against three persons An Appeal of a Murder was tried not where the Stroak was given but where the Party died and the Count was that Offley did assault the Husband of the Appellant and wounded him in Huntingtonshire of which Wound he did languish and dye in Cambridgeshire and that Lippon and Martin were assisting The Iury found a special Verdict in which the Fact appeared to be that Lippon gave the Wound and that Martin and Offley were assisting The first Exception to this Verdict was that the Count and the Matter therein alledged must be certain and so likewise must the Verdict otherwise no Iudgment can be given but here the Verdict finding that another person gave the Stroak and not that person against whom the Appellant had declared 't is directly against her own shewing 2. This Fact was tried by a Iury of Cambridgshire when it ought to have been tried by a Iury of both Counties The Court answered to the first Exception that it was of no force and that the same Objection may be made to an Indictment where in an Indictment if one gives the Stroak and another is abetting they are both principally and equally guilty and an Indictment ought to be as certain as a Count in an Appeal As to the second Exception 't is a good Trial by a Iury of Cambridgshire alone and this upon the Statute of 2 3 Ed. 6. 2 3 Ed. 6. cap. 24. the Words of which Statute are viz. Where any person c. shall hereafter be feloniously striken in one County and dye of the same Stroak in another County that then an Indictment thereof found by the Jurors of the County where the death shall happen whether it be found before the Coroner upon the sight of the Body or before the Justices of the Peace or other Justices or Commissioners who shall have Authority to enquire of such Offences shall be as good and effectual in the Law as if the Stroak had been in the same County where the Party shall dye or where such Indictment shall be found 'T is true 4 Inst 49 that at the Common Law if a Man had received a mortal Wound in one County and died in another the Wife or next Heir had their Election to bring an Appeal in either County but the Trial must be by a Iury of both Counties But now that mischief is remedied by this Statute which doth not only provide that an Appeal shall be brought in the County where the Party dyed but that it shall be prosecuted which must be to the end of the Suit Adjornatur Dominus Rex versus Hinton and Brown AN Indictment was brought against the Defendants setting forth Subornation of Perjury that a Conventicle was held at a certain place and that they movebant persuadebant subornaverunt a certain person to swear that several Men were then present who really were at that time at another place They were found guilty and a Writ of Error was brought to reverse the Iudgment the Error assigned was that the Indictment doth not set forth that any Oath was made so it could not be Subornation There is a difference between the persuading of a man to swear falsly and Subornation it self for an Indictment for Subornation always concludes contra formam Statuti Curia 'T is not enough to say a Man suborned another to commit a Perjury but he must shew what Perjury it is which cannot be without an Oath for an Indictment cannot be framed for such an Offence unless it appear that the thing was false which he was perswaded to swear The Question therefore is If the person had sworn what the Defendants had persuaded him to do whether that had been Perjury There is a difference when a Man swears a thing which is true in Fact and yet he doth not know it to be so and to swear a thing to be true which is really false the first is Perjury before God and the other is an Offence of which the Law takes notice But the Indictment was quashed because the Words Per Sacramentum duodecim proborum legalium hominum were left out They held that if the Return had been right upon the File the Record should be amended by it Blaxton versus Stone THE Case was this viz. A Man seised in Fee c. What words make an Estate Tail in a Will had Issue two Sons he devised all his Land to his eldest Son and if he die without Heirs Males then to his other Son in like manner The Question was Whether this was an Estate Tail in the eldest Son Curia 'T is plain the Word Body which properly creates an Estate Tail is left out but the intent of the Testator may be collected out of his Will that he designed an Estate Tail for without this Devise it would have gone to his second Son if the first had died without Issue 'T is therefore an Estate Tail DE Termino Paschae Anno 3 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1687. Herbert Chief Justice Wythens Justices Holloway Justices Powel Justices Dominus Rex versus William Beal MEmorandum A Souldier executed not in the County where he wes condemned That on Saturday April 15. Mr. Attorny moved that this Court would award Execution upon the Defendant who was a Souldier for deserting of his Colours and was condemned for the same at the Affizes at Reading in Berks and reprieved and that he might be executed at Plymouth where the Garrison then was The Chief Iustice in some heat said that the Motion was irregular for the Prisoner was never before the Court. Mr. Attorny then moved for a Habeas Corpus and on Tuesday April the 18th the Souldier was brought to the Barr and Mr. Attorny moved it again But it was affirmed by the Chief Iustice and Iustice Wythens that it could not be done by Law for the Prisoner being condemned in Berks and reprieved by the Iudge to know the Kings Pleasure and now brought hither cannot be sent into another County to be executed it may be done in Middlesex by the Prerogative of this Court which sits in that County but no where else but in the proper County where the Trial and Conviction was so the Prisoner was committed to the Kings Bench and the Record of his Conviction was not filed But it was the King's Will that this Man should be executed at Plymouth where the Garrison was that by this Example other Souldiers might be deterred from running from their Colours SIR Robert Wright who was made Chief Justice of the Common Pleas in the room of Sir Henry Beddingfield who died the last Term as he was receiving of the Sacrament was on Friday following being the 21st of April made Chief Justice of this Court in the place of
the said Master c. for the use of the Company and that no Member of the Company should buy rough Horn within four and twenty miles of London but of those two Men so appointed under a Penalty to be imposed by the said Master Warden c. That the Defendant did buy a quantity of rough Horn contrary to the said Law c. There was Iudgment in this Case by default And for the Defendant it was argued that this was not a good By-Law 1. Because it doth restrain Trade 11 Co. 54. Hob. 210. for the Company are to use no Horns but such as those two Men shall buy and if they should have occasion for more than those Men should buy then 't is plain that Trade is thereby restrained 2. The Master c. hath reserved a power which they may use to oppress the Poor because they may make what Agreements they will amongst themselves and set unreasonable prices upon those Commodities and let the younger sort of Tradesmen have what quantity and at what rates they please To which it was answered by Serjeant Thompson First This By-Law is for the encouragement of Trade because the Horns are equally to be distributed when brought to the Hall for the benefit of the whole Company But the material Objection was that this being a Company incorporated within the City of London they have not Iurisdiction elsewhere but are restrained to the City and by consequence cannot make a By-Law which shall bind at the distance of four and twenty miles for if they could make a Law so extensive they might by the same reason enlarge it all over England and so make it as binding as an Act of Parliament and for this reason it was adjudged no good By-Law Sir John Wytham versus Sir Richard Dutton ASsault and False Imprisonment 14 Octob. 36 Car. 2. c. The Defendant as to the Assault before the 6th day of November pleads Not-Guilty and as to the False Imprisonment on the said 6th day of November in the same year he made a special Iustification viz. That 28 Octob. 32 Car. 2. c. the King by his Letters Patents did appoint the Defendant to be Captain general and Chief Governour of Barbadoes and so sets forth the Grant at large by which he appoints twelve Men to be of the King's Council during pleasure of which the Plaintiff Wytham was one that the Defendant had also power by the advice of that Council to appoint and establish Courts Iudges and Iustices and that the Copies of such Establishments must be sent hither for the King's Assent with power also to establish a Deputy-Governour that by vertue of these Letters Patents the Defendant had appointed Sir John Wytham to be Deputy-Governour of the said Island in his absence and that he being so constituted did male arbitrarie execute the said Office That when the Defendant returned to Barbadoes viz. 6 Novemb 35 Car. 2. he called a Council before whom the Plaintiff was charged with male Administration in the absence of the Defendant viz. That he did not take the usual Oath for observing of Trade and Navigation that he assumed the Title of Lieutenant Governour and that Decrees made in Court were altered by him in his Chamber Vpon which it was then ordered that he should be committed to the Provost Marshal until discharged by Law which was done accordingly in whose Custody he remained from the 6th day of November to the 20th of December following which is the same Imprisonment c. To this Plea the Plaintiff demurred and the Defendant joyned in Demurrer Mr. Pollexfen argued for the Plaintiff and Serjeant Thompson for the Defendant 1. It was said for the Plaintiff that the Causes of his Commitment if any yet were such which they ought not meddle withal because they relate to his Mis-behaviour in his Government for which he is answerable to the King alone But supposing they might have some cause for the committing of him this ought to be set forth in the Plea that the Plaintiff might answer it for to say he did not take the Oath of Deputy Governour in what concerned Trade and Navigation is no cause of Commitment because there was no Body to administer that Oath to him for he was Governour himself Then to alledge that he did alter in his Chamber some Decrees made in the Court of Chancery that can be no cause of Commitment for the Governour is Chancellor there Besides the Defendant doth not shew that any Body was injured by such alterations neither doth he mention any particular Order but only in general so 't is impossible to give an Answer to it 2. He doth not alledge that the Plaintiff had made or done any of these things but that he was charged to have done it and non constat whether upon Oath or not The Governour hath a large power given by these Letters Patents to make Laws such as he by consent of a general Council shall enact Ex parte Def. The Fact is set forth in the Plea the Plaintiff was committed by vertue of an Order of Council until he was brought to a general Court of Oyer and Terminer by which Court he was again committed That the Court had power to commit him is not denied for the King is not restrained by the Laws of England to govern that Island by any particular Law whatsoever and therefore not by the Common Law but by what Law he pleaseth For those Islands were gotten by Conquest or by some of his Subjects going in search of some prize and planting themselves there Calvin 's Case The Plaintiff being then committed by an Order of Council till he should be discharged by due course of Law this Court will presume that his Commitment was legal The Court were all of Opinion that the Plea was not good so Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff but afterwards 5 Willielmi Mariae this Iudgment was reversed by the House of Peers Sir Robert Jefferies versus Watkins THIS was an Action brought for a Duty to be paid for weighing of Goods at the Common Beam of London Verdict cures a defective Declaration setting forth that the Lord Mayor c. time out of mind kept a common Beam and Weights and Servants to attend the weighing of Goods That the Defendant bought Goods c. but did not bring them to the Beam to be weighed per quod proficuum amisit Vpon Not-Guilty pleaded there was a Verdict for the Plaintiff and it was moved in arrest of Iudgment that the Plaintiff had not brought himself within the Prescription for he doth not say that the Defendant sold the Goods by Weight and this is a fault which is not helped by a Verdict This had been certainly naught upon a Demurrer and being substance is not aided by this Verdict This is Substance for the Duty appears to be wholly in respect of the Weights which are kept now Weighing being the Principal and it
a new Recovery Debt will not lie F.N.B. 122. E. and to prove this there is and Authority in Fitzherbert where a Prior had Iudgment for an Annuity and brought a Scire Fac. upon that Iudgment against the Successor of the parson who was to pay it and obtained a Iudgment upon that Scire Fac. to recover the arrearages and afterwards brought an Action of Debt upon the last Iudgment and the Book says fuit maintein There is another Case in 2 Leon. 2 Leon. 14. 4 Leon. 186. 15 H. 7.16 where 't is held that an Action of Debt will lye upon a Iudgment in a Scire Facias upon a Recognizance Which Objections may receive this Answer First As to the Case in Fitzherbert 't is admitted to be Law but 't is not an Authority to be objected to this purpose because the first Iudgment for the Annuity charges the Successor but the Original Iudgment in this Case doth not charge the Husband so the Cases are not parallel The like answer may be given to the Case in Leonard for a Recognizance is a Iudgment in it self and Debt will lie upon it without a Sci. Fa. upon that Iudgment But on the other side it was argued E contra that the award of execution is absolute against Husband and Wife for 't is a Recovery against both whereas before it was only the Debt of the Wife but now 't is joynt against the one as well as the other The Iudgment upon the Sci. Fa. is a distinct Action It cannot be denied but that if a Woman be indebted and marrieth the Husband is chargable during the Coverture Bro. Ab. tit Baron and Feme pl. 27. 49 E. 3.35 b. which shews that by the Marriage he is become the principal Creditor As to the Sci. Fa. t is true at the Common Law if a Man had recovered in Debt and did not sue forth Execution within a year and a day he must then bring a new Original 1 H. 5. 5. a 43 Ed. 3.2 b. and the Iudgment thereon had been a new Recovery but now a Sci. Fa. is given by the Statute instead of an Original and therefore a Iudgment thereon shall also be a new Iudgment for tho' t is a Iudicial Writ yet 't is in the nature of an Action because the Defendant may plead any matter in Bar of the Execution upon the first Iudgment 1 Inst 290. b. and 't is for this reason that a Release of all Actions is a good bar to it Besides Rast Ent. 193. 4 Leon. 186. Dyer 214. b. an Action of Debt will lie upon a Iudgment on a Sci. Fa. which shews that 't is an Action distinct from the Original and upon such a Iudgment the Defendant may be comitted to Prison several years afterwards without a new Sci. Fa. The Husband may have execution of a Iudgment recovered by him and his Wife after the death of his Wife without a Sci. Fa. 1 Mod. Rep. 179. for the Iudgment hath made it a proper Debt due to him and he alone may bring an Action of Debt upon that Iudgment and it seems to be very reasonable that he should have the benefit of such a Iudgment and yet not be charged after the death of his Wife when there hath been a Recovery against both in her life-time This is like the Case where a Devastavit is returned against Husband and Wife as Executrix Moor 299. 3 Cro. 216. Cro. Car. 603. Sid. 337. and a Iudgment thereon quod querens habeat executionem de bonis propriis the Wife dies yet the Husband shall be charged for the Debt is altered If it should be otherwise this inconvenience would follow that if the Wife should die F.N.B. 121. c. 1 Rol. Abr. 351. 10 H. 6.11 the Husband will possess himself of her Estate and defraud the Creditors so that he takes her but not cum onere But the Law is otherwise for if a Feme being Lessee for years doth marry and the Rent is behind and she dies the Husband shall be charged with the Rent arrear because he is entituled to the Profits of the Land by his marriage To which it was answered that if a Man should marry an Exerecutrix and then he and his Wife are sued and Iudgment obtained against them to recover de bonis testatoris and thereupon a Fi. Fa. is awarded to levie the Debt and Damages and the Sheriff returns a Devastavit and then the Wife dies the Husband is not chargeable because the Iudgment is not properly against him who is joyned only for conformity but if upon the return of the Devastavit there had been an award of execution De bonis propriis that would have been a new Iudgment and the old one De bonis testatoris had been discharged 1 Roll. Abr. 351. and then the Husband must be charged for the new wrong Adjornatur Afterwards in 1 Will. Mar. the Iudgment was affirmed Bowyer versus Lenthal INdebitatus Assumpsit quantum meruit ad insimul computasset Valerent for Valebant good after Verdict The Plaintiff had a Iudgment by default in the Court of Common-Pleas and a Writ of Enquiry was brought and entire Damages given and now the Defendant brought a Writ of Error and it was argued that if any of the Promises be ill Iudgment shall be reversed the Error now assigned was in the second Promise Viz. That in consideration that the Plaintiff would let the Defendant have Meat Drink and Lodging he promised to pay so much Quantum rationabiliter valerent it should have been valebant at the time of the Promise made Sed non allocatur So the Iudgment was affirmed DE Termino Paschae Anno 4 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1688. Wright Chief Justice Holloway Justices Powel Justices Allibon Justices Powis Attorny General Wm. Williams Sollicitor General NOTA Wednesday May 2. being the first day of this Term Sir Bartholomew Shower Recorder of London was called within the Bar. Heyward versus Suppie IN an Action of Covenant which was to make such an Assignment to the Plaintiff Covenant to make an Assignment as Council should advise according to an Agreement made between him and the Defendant as Council should direct and advise and for non-performance thereof this Action was brought the Defendant pleaded non est factum and Iudgment was obtained against him Vpon which a Writ of Error was brought and the common Error assgned It was objected that the Plaintiffs Council should give the advice because he is the person interested This Objection was answered by Mr. Pollexfen who said that the Defendant had likewise an interest in this matter for 't is an advantage to him to make the Assignment that his Covenant might be saved 't is true it had been otherwise if the Covenant had been to make such a Conveyance as Council should advise for then the person to whom the Covenant is made may chuse whether he will have a Feoffment
the King may be seized in Fee of an Hundred and that he may grant Retorna Brevium the Statutes are plain in it 14 E. 3. c. 9. for otherwise how came any Lords to have Hundreds in Fee but by the Kings Grants And 't is as plain that Hundreds may be divided from the County 2 E. 3. c. 12. for else to what purpose was the Statute of Lincoln made which adjoins Hundreds and Wapentakes to the Counties and provides that they shall never be separated again this shews that they were divided at that time The Objections which have been made are viz. That the Defendant cannot have a Title to this Office by Grant and he hath not made any Prescription to it The Reasons given why he could not have it by Grant were because ancient Hundreds which were united to the Counties by the Statute of Ed. 3. could never afterwards be divided from them by any Grant of the King and those which were excepted in that Statute as being granted in Fee by the King or his Ancestors when they come again to the Crown cannot be regranted because they are merged in it In answer to which it was said that such ancient Liberties which were created by the Crown and did subsist by the King 's Grant before the Statute of Ed. 3. when afterwards they came to the King were not merged but remained a distinct Interest in him The Hundred of Gartree in the County of Leicester was such a Liberty it was an ancient Hundred and granted by Ed. 2. Cole versus Ireland Raym. 360. to John Sedington not in Fee but durante bene placito Regis this Grant was long before the making of the Statute of Ed. 3. and yet afterwards this very Hundred was granted to several other persons by the suceeding Kings of England which shews it was merged in the Crown when it came to the King The other Objection was that Retorna Brevium doth not lie in Prescription Now as to that though it be true that no Title by Prescription can be made to such Franchises and Liberties which cannot be seized as forfeited before the cause of Forfeiture appears on Record because Prescription being an Vsage in pais doth not extend to such things which cannot be had without matter of Record 1 Inst 114. b. Yet my Lord Coke is clear that a good Title may be made to hold Pleas Leets Hundreds c. by Prescripteon only without Matter of Record But notwithstanding what was said to maintain this Plea Iudgment was given against the Defendant Rex versus Griffith THE Defendant was convicted of Manslaughter at the Old-Bayly Indictment for Murder the Party was found guilty of Manslaughter and pleaded his Pardon and afterwards the Indictment was quashed to save the Forfeiture of his Goods and the Record being removed into this Court by Certiorari he pleaded his Pardon and had Iudgment Quod eat inde sine die But being once convicted the Dean and Chapter of Westminster did seize his Goods as forfeited by that Conviction who thereupon although he was out of the Court by that Iudgment yet he moved by his Council to quash the Indictment The Exceptions taken were viz. That the Indictment was Per Sacramentum duodecim proborum legalium hominum jurat ' onerat ' praesentat ' existit modo forma sequen ' Midd. ss Juratores pro Domino Rege praesentant c. That there was no President to warrant such an Indictment for this may be the Presentment of another Iury it being very incoherent to say that it was presented by the Oaths of twelve Men that the Iury do present It ought to be praesentat ' existit quod c. and so is the form of this Court as the Clerk of the Crown inform'd them 2. They present that Griffith and two others did make an Assault on the Body of the deceased and that quidam Johannes in nubibus did wound him with a Gun so that 't is uncertain who did shoot and what Gun was discharged which ought to be certainly laid in the Indictment Vaux 's Indictment for Poisoning Ridley was 4 Co. 44. b. that the said Ridley not knowing the Beer to be poyson'd but being perswaded by Vaux recepit bibit but did not say venenum praedictum and so it not appearing what thing he did drink which ought to have been expresly alledged the Indictment was held insufficient And the reason is plain for an Indictment for Felony being a Declaration for the King against the Life of a Subject ought to set forth a sufficient certainty of the Fact which shall not be supplied either by Argument or any intendment whatsoever And therefore in Long 's Case the Defendant was indicted for discharging a Gun upon Long 5 Co. 122. b. Dans eidem Henrico Long mortale vulnus and doth not say percufsit for which reason that Indictment was also held insufficient because in all Indictments for Murder they ought expresly to alledge a stroke given For these Reasons the Indictment was quashed and a new Roll was made on which this Indictment and Certiorari were both entred and Iudgment quod exoneretur and this was done to avoid the seizure And afterwards in Michaelmas Term primo Will. Mar. it was said by the Chief Iustice that it must be intended these were two persons for no Court would justifie such a Iudgment Anonymus IN Assault and Battery After a Traverse you must not conclude to the Country the Defendant pleaded a Release of all Actions c. The Plaintiff replied that the Release was gotten by duress c. The Defendant rejoyned and shewed cause why it was not gotten by duress but that he sued forth a Capias and did Arrest him c. and that the Release was voluntary c. The Plaintiff surrejoyns and saith that it was gotten by duress absque hoc that it was voluntary Et hoc petit quod inquiratur per patriam Vpon this Issue the Cause was tryed Dyer 353. a. 1 Inst 126. a. Cro. Car. 316. Sid. 341. 2 Cro. 588. 2 Rol. Rep. 186. and the Plaintiff had a Verdict and now it was moved in Arrest of Iudgment that he ought not to conclude to the Country after a Traverse because a Traverse it self is Negative and therefore the Defendant ought to have joyned issue in the Affirmative 't is true if issue had been joyned before the Traverse it might have been helped by the Statute of Ieofails but it was not so in this Case and therefore the Iudgment was Arrested Hitchins versus Basset Mil ' IN Ejectment upon the Demise of Mr. Nosworthy The Iury found a special Verdict A subsequent Will which doth not appear shall not be a Revocation of the former the substance of which was Viz. That Sir Henry Killigrew was seised in Fee of the Lands in question in the County of Cornwal and being so seised did in the year 1644. devise the
Revocation or not at all which revocation must depend upon the construction and exposition of the sixth Paragraph in the Statute of Frauds c. the words whereof are Viz. That no Devise of Lands c. or any clause thereof shall be Revoked otherwise than by some Codicil in Writing or other Writing declaring the same or by burning cancelling tearing or obliterating the same by the Testator himself or in his presence and by his direction or consent But all devises of Lands c. shall be good until burnt cancell'd torn c. by the Testator c. or unless the same be altered by some other Will or Codicil in Writing or other Writing of the Devisor signed in the presence of three Witnesses declaring the same So that the Question will be whether a Will which revokes a former Will ought to be signed by the Testator in the presence of three Witnesses 'T is clear that a Will by which Lands are devised ought to be so signed and why should not a Will which revokes another Will have the same formality The Statute seems to be plain that it should for it saies that a Will shall not be revoked but by some Will or Codicil in writing or other writing of the Devisor signed by him in the presence of three or four Witnesses declaring the same which last Clause is an entire sentence in the disjunctive and appoints that the Writing which revokes a Will must be signed in the presence of three Witnesses c. Before the making of this Act it was sufficient that the Testator gave directions to make his Will tho' he did never see it when made which mischief is now remedied not in writing the Will but that the Party himself should sign it in the presence of three Witnesses and this not being so signed but only published by the Testator in their presence 't is therefore no good Revocation Iustice Street was of a contrary Opinion that this was a good Revocation That the words in the fifth Paragraph of this Statute which altered the Law were Viz. That all Devises of Lands c. shall be in Writing and signed by the Party so devising or by some other person in his presence and by his express Directions and shall be attested and subscribed in the presence of the Devisor by three or four credible Witnesses In which Paragraph there are two parts 1. The act of the Devisor which is to sign the Will but not a word that he shall subscribe his Name in the presence of three Witnesses 2. The act of the Witnesses viz. that they shall attest and subscribe the Will in the presence of the Devisor or else the Will to be void But the sixth Paragraph is penn'd after another manner as to the Revocation of a Will which must be by some Codicil in writing or other Writing declaring the same signed in the presence of three Witnesses Now here is a Writing declaring that it shall be revoked not expresly but by implication and though that Clause in the disjunctive which says that the revocation must be by some Writing of the Devisor signed in the presence of three Witnesses c. yet in the same Paragraph 't is said that it may be revoked by a Codicil or Will in Writing and therefore an exposition ought to be made upon the whole Paragraph that the intention of the Law may more fully appear Such a construction hath been made upon a whole Sentence Sid. 328. 1 Sand. 58. where part thereof was in the disjunctive as for instance viz. A Man was possessed of a Lease by disseisin who assigned it to another and covenanted that at the time of the assignment it was a good true and indefeasable Lease and that the Plaintiff should enjoy it without interruption of the Disseisor Or any claiming under him in this Case the Diffeisee re-entred and though the Covenant was in the disjunctive to defend the Assignee from the Disseisor or any claiming under him yet he having undertaken for quiet enjoyment and that it was an indefeasable Lease it was adjudged that an exposition ought to be made upon the whole Sentence and so the Plaintiff had Iudgment The Chief Iustice Herbert was of the same Opinion with Iustice Street Rex versus Grimes and Thompson THE Defendants were indicted for being Common Pawn-Brokers Two are indicted for a Confederacy one is acquitted and that is the acquittal of the other and that Grimes had unlawfully obtained Goods of the Countess of c. and that he together with one Thompson per confoederationem astutiam did detain the said Goods until the Countess had paid him 12 Guineas Thompson was acquitted and Grimes was found Guilty which must be of the first part of the Indictment only for it could not be per confoederationem with Thompsom and therefore it was moved in arrest of Iudgment that to obtain Goods unlawfully was only a private injury for which the party ought not to be indicted To which it was answered that a plain Fraud was laid in this Indictment which was sufficient to maintain it and that tho one was acquitted yet the Iury had found the other guilty of the whole But the Court were of Opinion that the acquittal of one is the acquittal of both upon this Indictment and therefore it was quash'd King versus Dilliston Hill 2 3 Jacobi Rot. 494. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a Iudgment in Ejectment given in the Common-Pleas Infant not bound by a Custom for one Messuage and twenty Acres of Land held of the Manor of Swafling There was a special Verdict found the substance of which was viz. That the Land in question was Copy-hold held of the said Manor of Swafling in the County of Suffolk and that Henry Warner and Elizabeth his Wife in right of the said Elizabeth were seized thereof for Life Remainder to John Ballat in Fee That the Custom of the said Manor was that if any Customary Tenant doth surrender his Estate out of Court that such Surrender shall be presented at the next Court of the said Manor and publick Proclamation shall be made three Court days afterwards for the Party to whose use the Surrender was made to come and be admitted Tenant and if he refuseth then after three Proclamations made in each of the said Courts the Steward of the said Manor issueth forth a Precept to the Bailiff thereof to seise the Copyhold as forfeited They find that Henry Warner and his Wife and John Ballat made this Surrender out of Court to the use of Robert Freeman and his Heirs who died before the next Court and that John Freeman an Infant was his Son and Heir That after the said Surrender three Proclamations were made at three several Courts held for the said Manor but that the said John Freeman did not come to be admitted Tenant thereupon the Steward of the said Manor made a Precept to the Bayliff who seized the Lands in
question as forfeited to the Lady who entred and made a Lease to the Plaintiff upon whom the Defendant re-entred The single Question upon this special Verdict was whether this was a Forfeiture and so a good seisure to bind the right of an Infant It was argued for the Plaintiff in the Action that it was a good Seisure and a Forfeiture till the Infant should come of Age for as a Copyhold is established by Custom so likewise 't is Custom which obligeth the Infant to the Conditions thereof and therefore where one under Age hath an Estate upon a Condition to be performed by him 8 Co. 44. b. Whittingham 's Case Latch 199. Jones 157. and that Condition is broken during his Minority the Estate is lost for ever In this Case the Custom obligeth the Heir to be admitted that the Lord may be entituled to a Fine which if he should lose because his Tenant is an Infant then that priviledge of Infancy works a wrong which the Law will not permit 'T is true an Infant shall not be prejudiced by the Laches of another but shall be answerable for himself and therefore if he is Tenant of Lands and the Rent should be unpaid for two years and no Distress can be found a Cessavit lies against him and the Lord shall recover the Land because of the Non-performance which arises by his own default So if one under Age be a Keeper of a Gaol and suffer a Prisoner to escape out of Execution 2 Inst 382. an Action of Debt will lie against him upon the Statute of W. 2. It was agreed that such a Custom and Non-claim will not foreclose an Heir 8 Co. 100. Sir Rich. Letchford 's Case who is an Infant and beyond Sea at the time of his Ancestors Death though he is bound by the Custom to claim it at the next Court but that if he will come over and tender himself though after a Seisure he shall be admitted and so shall the person in this Case if after his Minority he offer himself to be admitted But it cannot be denied 2 Cro. 226. but that the Lord may seize when the Heir is beyond Sea till he return and tender himself to be admitted and by the same reason he may also seize in this case during the Minority A Temporary Forfeiture is no new thing in the Law Cro. Car. 7. for if a Feme Covert be a Copyholder and marrieth and her Husband makes a Lease for years without License of the Lord 't is a Forfeiture and shall bind her during the Coverture So the Law is Cro. El. 351. that the Lord may seize the Land till a Fine is paid for 't is a reasonable Custom so to do It hath been a good Custom for the Lord to assign a person to take the Profits of a Copyhold Estate descended to the Infant during his Minority without rendring an Accompt when he came of Age. 1 Leon. 266. 2 Leon. 239. So that all taht is to be done in this Case is to enforce the Infant to be admitted that the Lord may be entituled to a Fine The Inheritance is not bound but the Land is only seized quousque E contra It was argued that here is a general Seizure E contra which cannot extend to an Infant for he is not bound in a Writ of Right much less in an inferior Court after three Proclamations but if this had been a Temporary Seisure the Iury ought to have found it so which is not done There are many Authorities in the Books which affirm that an Infant is not obliged to be admitted during his Non-age 1 Leon. 100. 3 Leon. 221. or to tender the Fine in order to an Admittance that the Law was settled in this Point and therefore without any further Argument he prayed Iudgment for the Defendant Afterwards in Hillary-Term 1 Willielmi Mariae this Case was argued seriatim at the Bench three Iudges being of a contrary Opinion to the Chief Iustice for the affirming of the Iudgment Iustice Eyre premised two things 1. That he could not intend but that this Verdict had found an absolute Forfeiture the Iury having no way qualified it as to a certain time and therefore he would give a Iudgment upon the whole Record 2. He agreed that a Feoffment of an Infant was no Forfeiture at the Common Law and that as a particular Custom may bind an Infant for a time so it may barr him for ever but whether this Custom as 't is found in general words shall bind an Infant after three Proclamations is now the Question he not coming then to be admitted And he held that it shall not and that for these reasons 1. The Right of Infants is much favoured in the Law and their Laches shall not be prejudicial to them as to Entry or Claim upon a Presumption that they understand not their Right 1 Inst 380. 2 Inst 401. and therefore in a Cessavit per biennium which is a remedy given by the Statute of W. 2. and which extends to Infants Westm 2. c. 31. who have not the Land by descent for if a Cesser be in that Case the Infant shall have his Age because the Law intends that he doth not know what Arrerages to tender 'T is admitted that if an Infant doth not present to a Church within six Months or doth not appear within a year that his Right is bound but this is because the Law is more tender of the Church and the life of a Man than of the Priviledges of Infancy So if an Office of Parkship be given or descends to an Infant if the Condition in Law annexed to such an Office which is skill be not observed the Office is forfeited But that a Proclamation in a base Court should bind an Infant when he is not within the reason of the Custom is not agreeable either to Law or Reason 2. Cro. Jac. 80. Cro. El. 879. Noy 42. 1 Rol. Abr. 568. All Customs are to be taken strictly when they go to the destruction of an Estate and therefore a Custom was that if a Copyholder in Fee surrender out of Court and the Surrendree doth not come in after three Proclamations the Lord shall seize it A Copyholder in Fee surrendred to another for Life the Remainder over in Fee if the Tenant for Life will not come in he in the Remainder shall not be barred for the Custom shall be intended to extend only to those in possession But the Infant in this Case is not within the Letter of the Custom for 't is found that the Surrender was made to one Freeman who died before the next Court-day and that John Freeman the Infant was his Son and Heir so they have found a Title in him for the word Heir is not here a word of Purchase but of Limitation 3. Jones 157. Noy 92. Infants are not bound by other Customs like this as a Custom that every Copyholder
the benefit of the Obligor and shall be taken most beneficially for him who had election either to perform the one or the other to save the penalty of the Bond. But the Council for the Plaintiff said that the whole intent of the Condition in that Case was to provide a Security for G. who died before her Husband so that no body could be hurt for the non-performance of that Condition there being no manner of necessity that any thing should be done in order to it after her decease 'T is quite otherwise in the Case at Bar for Hannah Goddard paid Mony for the House and certainly it was never intended that Chappel the Father to whom the Mony was paid should have both House and Mony If she had lived the House ought to have been conveyed to her now she is dead the Mony ought to be paid for 't is not lost by her death In Laughter's Case the person who was to do the thing was the Obligor himself but here the Father undertakes for his Son that he should convey when he came of Age or to repay the Mony so that 't is not properly a Condition in the disjunctive for 't is no more than if it had been penn'd after this manner Viz. The Father undertakes for his Son that he shall convey at the Age of 21 years if he refuse then the Father is to repay what mony he received Besides Cro. Eliz. 399. Laughter's Case is Reported by Iustice Croke and therein he cites two other Cases of Chew and Baker That of Chew was viz. A. promised B. that if C. did not appear at Westminster such a day he would pay him 20 l. The Defendant pleaded that C. died before the day and ruled to be no Plea for he ought to pay the Mony which Case is parallel to this for 't is the same in Reason and Sense That of Baker was viz. A Man was bound that A. should appear the first day in the next Term at the Star-Chamber or he would pay 20 l. A. died before the day so as by the act of God he could not appear yet it was adjudged that the Mony must be paid The like Case was adjudged between Huntley and Allen in the Common-Pleas in my Lord Hale 's time 't is entred Pasch 1658. Rot. 1277. The Rule in Laughter's Case cannot be denied viz. where the Condition is in the disjunctive consisting of two parts and one becomes impossible by the act of God the Obligor is not bound to perform the other but then it must be governed by the subsequent matter As in Greningham's Case Cro. Eliz. 396. Moor 395. viz. Debt upon Bond conditioned that if the Defendant delivered three Bonds to the Plaintiff wherein he was bound to the Defendant or a Release of them as should be advised by the Plaintiff's Council before such a day then c. The Defendant pleaded that neither the Plaintiff or his Council did advise a Release before the day c. and upon Demurrer it was adjudged that the Plea was good for the Defendant had an election to deliver or release as the Plaintiff should devise which if he will not do the Defendant is discharged by the neglect of the Plaintiff for the Defendant being at his choice to perform the one thing or the other 't is not reason that the Plaintiff should compel him to perform one thing only It was argued on the other side E contra that this is a disjunctive condition and not only an undertaking of the Father for the Son Where a Condition is to perform two things and if either be done no Action will lye such Condition is in the disjunctive as in this Case if the Son had conveyed or the Father repaid the Mony By the Condition of this Bond the Father did as much undertake for his Son as Laughter did for Rainsford viz. to convey the House or pay the Mony to Hannah Goddard now the last part of the Condition being discharged by the Act of God he is acquitted of the other Suppose the Condition had been single to convey to Hannah Goddard if she die the Bond is void There is an Authority to this purpose Cro. Eliz. 380. Reported by Iustice Croke which was an Action of Debt was brought by the Plaintiff as Executor c. The Condition of the Bond was for the yearly payment of a Sum of Mony twice in a year viz. at Michaelmas and Lady day during the Life of a Lady or within 30 days after either of the said Feasts the Lady died after one of the Feasts but within the 30 days it was adjudged that by her death that payment which was due at the Feast preceding was discharged In the Case at Bar the Condition is that if the Son should not convey when of Age or otherwise if the Defendant re-pay c. Now certainly these words or otherwise make the Condition disjunctive 'T is like the common Case of Bail entred into in this Court whereby the Parties undertake that the Defendant shall render himself to Prison if condemned in the Action or they shall pay the condemnation mony this is a disjunctive condition and if the Defendant dye before the return of the second Sci. Fa. the Bail are discharged Iustice Allibon said Roll. Abr. tit condition 450. pl. 4. that if a condition be to make an Assurance of Land to the Obligee and his Heirs and the Obligee dies before the Assurance made yet it shall be made to the Heir for this copulative is a disjunctive Sed Adjornatur Franshaw versus Bradshaw Mich. 1 Jac. Rot. 45. DEbt upon a Iudgment obtained in this Court 34 Car. 2. Matter of Form not amendable upon Demurrer setting forth the said Iudgment c. Sicut per Recordum processum inde remanen ' in eadem Curia nuper Domini Regis coram ipso Rege apud Westmonast plenius liquet apparet And upon a Demurrer to the Declaration this Objection was made viz. It doth not appear that the Iudgment was in force or where the Reeord was at the time of this Action brought he should have declared Coram ipso nuper Rege apud Westm sed jam coram Domino Rege nunc residen ' c. plenius liquet c. The Court held it was but matter of form but being upon a Demurrer it was not amendable Letchmere versus Thorowgood al' Vic. London TRespass by the Assignees of Commissioners of Bankrupcy for taking of their Goods When a Judgment is once executed the Goods are in Custodia Legis and shall not be taken away by an Exchequer Process or Assignment of Commissioners of Bankrupts upon not Guilty pleaded the Iury find a special Verdict the substance of which was viz. one Toplady a Vintner on the 28th of April became a Bankrupt against whom a Iudgment was formerly obtained the Iudgment Creditor sued out a Fi. Fa. and the Sheriffs of London by virtue thereof did
the Neglect in this Case was in the Servant the Action may be brought against all the Owners for it is grounded quasi ex contractu though there was no actual Agreement between the Plaintiff and them And as to this purpose 2 Sand. 345. Hob. 206. Hutt 121. 1 Mod. 198. 't is like the Case where a Sheriff levies Goods upon an Execution which are rescued out of the hands of his Bailiffs this appearing upon the Retorn an Action of Debt will lie against him though there was no actual Contract between the Plaintiff and him for he having taken the Goods in Execution there is quasi a Contract in Law to answer them to the Plaintiff 2. As to the second Point it was ruled that Not-Guilty was a good Plea to any Mis-feazance whatsoever and that a Plea in Abatement viz. that the rest of the Owners super se susceperunt simul cum Defendente absque hoc quod Defendens super se suscepit tantum had been no more than the general Issue 3 Cro. 554. Vering versus More but he hath not pleaded thus Iustice Dolben agreed that the Action ought to be brought against all the Proprietors it being upon a Promise created by Law but he was Opinion that this Matter might have been pleaded in Abatement Gold versus Strode AN Action was brought in Somersetshire and the Plaintiff recovered and had Iudgment and died Intestate Gold the now Plaintiff took out Letters of Administration to the said Intestate in the Court of the Bishop of Bath and Wells and afterwards brought a Scire Facias upon that Iudgment against the Defendant to shew Cause quare Executionem habere non debeat He had Iudgment upon this Scire Facias and the Defendant was taken in Execution and escaped An Action of Debt was brought by the said Gold against this Defendant Strode who was then Sheriff for the Escape and the Plaintiff had a Verdict It was moved in arrest of Iudgment and for Cause shewen that if the Administration was void then all the dependencies upon it are void also and so the Plaintiff can have no Title to this Action Now the Administration is void because the entring upon Record of the first Iudgment recovered by the Intestate in the County of Middlesex where the Records are kept made him have bona notabilia in several Counties and then by the Law Administration ought not to be committed to the Plaintiff in an inferior Diocess but in the Prerogative Court Curia The Sheriff shall not take advantage of this since the Iudgment was given upon the Scire Fac. and the Capias ad satisfaciendum issuing out against the then Defendant directed to the Sheriff made him an Officer of this Court and the Iudgment shall not be questioned by him for admitting it to be a Recovery without a Title yet he shall take no advantage of it till the Iudgment is reversed 'T is not a void but an erronious Iudgment and when a person is in execution upon such a Iudgment and Escapes and then an Action is brought against the Goaler or Sheriff 8 Co. 141. and Iudgment and Execution thereon though the first Iudgment upon which the party was in execution should be afterwards reversed yet the Iudgment against the Goaler being upon a collateral thing executed shall still remain in force The Ca. Sa. 21 E. 4. 23. b. Cro. El. 164. Moor 274. 2 Cro. 3. 1 Rol. Abr. 809 God b. 403. 2 Leon. 84. was a sufficient authority to the Sheriff to take the Body though grounded upon an erronious Iudgment and that Execution shall be good till avoided by Error and no false Imprisonment will lie against the Goaler or Sheriff upon such an Arrest Coghil versus Freelove In the Common-Pleas DEBT for Rent was brought against the Defendant as Administratrix of Thomas Freelove her late Husband deceased Debt for Rent incurred after an assignment by an Administrator for the privity of Contract is not determined by the death of the intestate 2 Vent 209. in which Action the Plaintiff declared That on the 1st of May 21 Car. 2. he did by Indenture demise to the said Thomas Freelove one Messuage and certain Lands in Bushey in Hertfordshire Habendum from Lady day then last past for and during the term of 21 years under a yearly Rent that by virtue thereof he entred and was possessed That on the 7th of March 1685. the said Thomas Freelove died Intestate and that the next day Administration of his Goods and Chattels was granted to the Defendant and that 78 l. was in arrear for Rent due at such a time for which this Action was now brought in the Detinet The Defendant confessed the Lease prout c. and the death of the Intestate and that the Administration was granted to her but saith that before the Rent was due she by Articles made between her of the one part and Samuel Freelove of the other part did assign the said Indenture and all her right title and interest thereunto and which she had in the Premisses unto the said Samuel Freelove who entred and was possessed that the Plaintiff had notice of this Assignment before he brought this Action but nothing was said of his acceptance To this Plea the Plaintiff demurred and the Defendant joined in Demurrer And Iudgment was given by the Opinion of the whole Court for the Plaintiff against the Authorities following Viz. Cro. Eliz. 555. 'T is true in Overton and Sydal 's Case it was resolved that if an Executor of Lessee for years assign his Interest Debt for Rent will not lye against him after such Assignment the reason there given was because the personal privity of the Contract is determined by the death of the Lessee as to the Debt it self and for the same reason the Executor shall not be lyable to the Rent after the death of the Lessee if such Lessee doth make an assignment of his Term in his life-time My Lord Coke mentioning this Case 3 Co. 24. a. in his third Report affirms that it was resolved by Popham Chief Iustice and the whole Court that if an Executor of a Lessee for years assign his Interest Debt will not lye against him for Rent due after such an Assignment Pop. 120. but my Lord Popham himself in Reporting that very Case tells us he was of another Opinion which was that so long as the Covenant in the Lease hath the nature and essence of a Contract it shall bind the Executor of the Lessee who as well to that as to many other purposes represents the person of the Testator and is privy to his Contracts T is true my Lord Popham held in that Case that the Action did not lye but because it was brought by the Successor of a Prebendary upon a Lease made by him in his life-time who being a single Corporation the personal Contract was determined by his death But the same Case reported by others Moor 251.
mistaken in that Action and being in the wrong was barred but that will be no Bar where a right Action is brought as if I deliver a Bond to another for advice who refusing to redeliver it I bring an Action of Trespass and am barred either by Verdict or Demurrer yet I may bring Detinue Trespass and Detinue are not the same Actions Pro Def. and therefore a Iudgment in one shall be no bar to the other but where two Actions are brought for one thing to be recovered in such case a Recovery in one shall be a bar to the other There is no substantial difference between Trespass and Trover for the disposing of the Goods in the one case is the same with the Conversion in the other the taking vi armis and likewise the Conversion are both tortious and therefore either Action may be well brought But for the Reasons given by the Plaintiffs Council he had Iudgment by the Opinion of the Chief Iustice and the other two Iudges Jones and Raymond of which Iustice Dolben did very much doubt Dominus Rex versus Sir Robert Atkins Knight of the Bath al' AN Indictment was found at the Quarter Sessions held for the County of the City of Bristol 4 Octob. 33 Car. 2. The County of the City of Bristolâ— against Sir Robert Atkins Knight of the Bath and Recorder and Senior Alderman of the said City Sir John Knight Alderman John Lawford Alderman and Joseph Creswick Alderman setting forth 1. That King Henry the VII th by his Charter dated 17 Decemb 15 Regni sui granted to the Mayor and Commonalty of the Town of Bristol the now City of Bristol being then a Town and to their Successors That if any shall procure abett or maintain any Debate and Discord upon the Election of the Mayor or other Minister he shall be punished instantly by the Mayor and two Aldermen to be chosen and named by the Mayor after the quantity and quality of his offence according to the Laws and Custom of the Realm 2. That according to the Priviledges granted by Queen Elizabeth to the Mayor and Commonalty of the said City and their Successors by Charter dated 28 June 23d of her Reign After which time as the Indictment sets forth the said Town was made a City there have been or ought to have been from the time of the making the said Charter twelve Aldermen whereof the Recorder was to be and now is one 3. That according to the Priviledges so as aforesaid granted by all the time aforesaid which is from the time of the Charter after the death of every Alderman the Mayor and the rest of the surviving Aldermen eorum major pars ad summonitionem of the said Mayor being called together have accustomed to choose another person of the circumspect Citizens to be an Alderman in the place of him so deceased and the Mayor and Aldermen by the same Privileges so granted have been and ought to be Iustices of the Peace for the said City 4. That continually after the time of the said Charter of Queen Elizabeth the Recorder and the rest of the Aldermen were and ought to be of the Privy Council de privato Concilio of the Mayor in particular Cases concerning the Government of the City whensoever the Mayor shall call them together And such Privy Council by all the time aforesaid which still is from the said Charter of Queen Elizabeth have not accustomed nor ought not to be called together to transact any Business belonging to that Council unless by the Summons and in the presence of the Mayor That after the death of one Sir John Lloyd being at his death an Alderman of the said City the said Sir Robert Atkins then being Recorder Sir John Knight John Lawford Esquire and Joseph Creswick being all Aldermen then of the City and free Burgesses of the City to make debate and discord upon the Election of an Alderman in the place of the Alderman so dead 8 March 33 Car. 2. in the Parish and Ward of St. Andrew within the said City did conspire to hold a Privy Council of the Aldermen of the said City and therein to choose an Alderman sine summonitione in absentia contra voluntatem Richardi Hart Militis then being Mayor of the City And in pursuance of their said wicked Conspiracy the day and year aforesaid entred by force and arms into the Tolzey and in the Chamber of the Council of the Mayor and Commonalty of the said City commonly called The Council House and there riotously c. did assemble and the same day and year they the said four Aldermen una cum aliis Aldermannis which must be two more Aldermen at the least which makes six and there were but five more in all then in being taking the Mayor in the said rest of the Aldermen not knowing their purposes held a Privy Council of Aldermen and then and there as much as in them lay chose Thomas Day for an Alderman in the place of Sir John Lloyd sine aliqua summonitione per praedictum Richardum Hart then Mayor to meet and in his absence and against his Will And they farther caused to be entred in the Common Council-Book the said Election as an Order of the Privy Council in which Book the Acts of the Mayor and Aldermen in their Privy Council are commonly written from whence great Discord hath risen c. Which Indictment was tryed at the Assises at Bristol by Nisi Prius and the Defendants found guilty and thereupon Sir Robert Atkins one of the Defendants having then lately before this Case been one of the Judges of the Common Pleas but then discharged of his Place after eight years sitting there secure came into the Court of Kings Bench and in Arrest of Iudgment argued his own Case not as Council nor at the Bar but in the Court in his Cloak having a Chair set for him by the Order of the Lord Chief Iustice and said as followeth 1. The Indictment in the first place mentions the Letters Patents of King H. 7. made to the Mayor and Commonalty of Bristol that the Mayor with two Aldermen such as he should choose should by their discretions according to Law punish such as should make debate and discord at the Elections of Officers They have not pursued this course against us but gone the ordinary way of Indictment and therefore I shall not need to speak to it 2. The Indictment in the next place proceeds to mention Letters Patents of Queen Elizabeth granted to the Mayor and Commonalty in the 23d year of her Reign which provides that there shall be twelve Aldermen and how upon the death or removal of an Alderman a new one should be chosen that is by the Mayor and the surviving Aldermen and the greater number of them being call'd together as the Indictment suggests by the Summons of the Mayor The whole Indictment and the Offence we are charged with being
Man from having any Office whatsoever who shall affirm the King to be a Papist 13 Car. 2. cap. 1. that is a person who endeavours to introduce Popery 2. But if the word Papist is not actionable of it self yet as coupled with his Offices 't is otherwise and the Plaintiff may well maintain this Action And of that Opinion was all the Court So the Iudgment was affirmed Malloon versus Fitzgerald ERror of a Iudgment in Ireland Where an Estate Tail shall not be determined for want of notice of a Proviso to determine it for Lands in the County of Waterford the Case upon the special Verdict was this John Fitzgerald was seized in Fee of the Lands in question who had Issue Katherine his only Daughter He by Lease and Release made a Settlement of those Lands upon the Earl of Ossory and other Trustees therein named and their Heirs to the use of himself for Life and after his Decease to the use of his Daughter Katherine in Tail Provided that she Married with the consent of the said Earl and the Trustees or the major part of them or their Heirs some worthy person of the Family and Name of Fitzgerald or who should take upon him that Name immediately after the Marriage but if not then the said Earl should appoint and raise a Portion out of the said Lands for the Maintenance of the said Katherine with a Remainder to Laetitia in Tail John Fitzgerald died his Daughter being then but two years old She afterwards at the Age of fourteen had Notice of this Settlement but not by the Direction of the Trustees That on the 20th of March in the 16th year of her Age she Married with the Plaintiff Edward Villiers Esq without the consent of the Trustees or the major part of them and that her Husband Mr. Villiers did not take upon him the Name of Fitzgerald after the said Marriage That Laetitia the Aunt was married to Franklyn who likewise did not take upon him the Name of Fitzgerald 1. The Questions were Whether the Estate limited to Katherine be forfeited without Notice given to her of the Settlement by the Trustees themselves 2. Whether her Estate be not determined by her marrying Mr. Villiers without their consent And it was argued That the Estate Tail was determined And first as to the point of Notice 't is not necessary to be given to the Daughter because the Father had not made it in the Settlement He might dispose of his Estate at his pleasure and having made particular Limitations of it there is no room now for the Law to interpose to supply the defect of Notice in the Deed. And to this purpose the Mayor of London 's Case was cited which was That George Monox Devised certain Houses to his Executors in Trust and their Heirs Cro Car. 576. Idem Jones 452. upon condition to pay mony to several Charitable uses which if not performed then he devised them over to his Heir in Tail upon the same Conditions and if not performed by him then to the * The Devise to him was void because it was a possibility upon a possibility Mayor and Commonalty of London The Trusts were not performed by the first Devisees A Stranger entered and levied a Fine with Proclamations and five Years passed Then the Mayor of London brought his Action supposing he had a right of Entry for the non performance of the Trusts but was barred by the Fine although it was argued for him that he had not notice of the Devise or breach of the Trust till after the Fine levied which shews that Notice was not necessary for if it had been so when his Title accrewed he could not have been barred by the Fine As Katherine the Daughter takes notice what Estate she hath in the Land so as to pursue a proper Remedy to recover it so she ought to take notice of the Limitations in the Settlement and hath the same means to acquaint her self with the one as with the other and the same likewise as her Aunt had to know the Remainder Suppose a Promise is made to indempnifie another from all Bonds which he should enter into for a third person 2 Cro. 432. Hob. 51. Jones 207. Pop. 164. and then an Action is brought against him wherein the Plaintiff declared that he was bound accordingly and not saved harmless but doth not shew that he gave notice of his being bound yet the Plaintiff shall recover As to the Case of a Copyholder having three Sons who surrendred to the use of his Will 2 Cro. 56. and then devised to his middle Son in Fée upon condition to pay Legacies to his Sisters at full age which were not paid Now tho' it was adjudged that his Estate was not determined upon the non-performance of this Condition without an actual demand and denial and that he was not bound to take notice of the full age of his Sisters yet this is not an Authority which can any wise prevail in this Case because 't is a * If the Devise had been to the eldest Son then it had been a Limitation annexed to his Estate and not a Condition because if it had been a Condition it would have descended upon the Heir who could not be sued for the breach 1 Ventr 199. Rep. Canc. 140. Sid. Poph. 104. Condition to pay Legacies which is a thing in its nature not to be paid without a demand which implies notice In all Cases where Conditions are annexed to Estates to pay Mony there notice is necessary but where Estates are limited upon the performance of collateral acts 't is not necessary And this has been held the constant difference So is Fry and Porter 's Case which was this The Earl of Newport had two Daughters and he devised Newport House to the Daughter of his eldest Daughter in Tail which she had by the Earl of Banbury Provided and upon condition that she marry with the consent of her Mother and two other Trustees or the major part of them if not or if she should dye without Issue then he devised the said House to George Porter in Fee who was the Son of his youngest Daughter and who had married one Thomas Porter without her Fathers consent The Lady Ann Knowles the first Devisee married Fry without the consent of her Grandmother or Trustees and it was adjudg'd against her upon point of Notice that it was not necessary because her Grandfather had not appointed any person to give notice he might have imposed any Terms or Conditions upon his own Estate and all Parties concerned had the same means to inform themselves of such Conditions The third Resolution in Frances Case 8 Co. comes nearest to this now in question it was in Replevin the Defendant avowed the taking Damage Fesant The Plaintiff pleaded in Barr to the Avowry that R. Frances was seized in Fee of the place where c. and devised it to John who was his
Daughters for the Testator having two Sons and four Daughters it cannot be collected by these words how they shall take and by consequence it cannot be an Estate Tail by implication Now suppose one of the Daughters should dye without Issue 't is uncertain who shall have her part and therefore there being no appointment in what order this Estate shall go it cannot be an Estate Tail and to maintain this Opinion this Case was cited One Collier was seised in Fee of three Houses 2 Cro. 655. Gilbert versus Witty and had Issue three Sons John Robert and Richard he devised to each of them a House in Fee Proviso if all my Children dye without Issue of their Bodies then the Houses to be to his Wife The two eldest Sons died without Issue the younger had Issue a Daughter who married the Lessor of the Plaintiff The Question was Whether by the death of the eldest Son without Issue there was a cross Remainder to Richard and the Heirs of his Body or whether the Wife shall take immediately or expect till after the Death of all the Sons without Issue And it was adjudged that the Wife shall take immediately and that there were no cross Remainders nor any Estate by implication because it was a devise to them severally by express limitation So that if no Estate tail ariseth to the Daughters in this Case by implication Cro. Eliz. Taylor versus Sawyer then 't is no more than a devise to his Issue which extends to them all and gives only an Estate for Life For the Defendant it was argued Ex parte Def. that the Sons and Daughters have no Estate Tail by implication It was agreed that Nicholas had only an Estate for Life and that the word Estate in this case means the Houses and not the Interest in them 'T is true there is no express Limitation of any Estate to them but there is an express determination of it Now if this be not an Estate Tail by implication then the words dying without Issue are void A devise to his Son More 127. and if he dye not having a Son then 't is devised over This is an Estate tail in Remainder It cannot be a doubt who shall take first for the Daughters shall take it Dyer 333. and after them as 't is most natural the eldest Son for where there is the same proximity of Blood the Estate shall go to the eldest As for instance Hob. 33. one Chapman being seised in Fee of two Houses and having three Brothers devised the House which A. dwelt in to his said three Brothers and the House in which his Brother Thomas Chapman did dwell he devised to the said Thomas paying so much c. or else to remain to the Family of the Testator provided that the Houses be not sold but go to the next of the Males and the blood of the Males Thomas died without Issue the eldest of the two surviving Brothers had Issue a Daughter and died the Question was whether that Daughter or the youngest Brother of the Testator should have the House It was adjudged that the Daughter should have it in tail For the Proviso that the Houses be not sold c. made it a tail and the words viz. to remain to the Family must be intended to the eldest If this be not an Estate tail then the Devise over to Anne Warner is void As to the Case of Gilbert and Witty that moves upon another reason for there every one took by a distinct and separate Limitation Curia In that Case all the Estate was limited distinctly to the three Sons but in this 't is otherwise for the Testator had two Sons and no Estate was limited to one of them before then he saith If all my Sons and Daughters dye without Issue then c. And thus the Cases differ which creates the difficulty But no reason can be given why this Court should not construe Wills according to the Rules of Common Law where an Estate by implication is so incertain for when Men are sick and yet have a disposing power left they usually write Nonsense and the Iudges must rack their Brains to find out what is intended This cannot be an Estate tail in the Daughters and therefore the Heir must come in for his fourth part Iudgment for the Plaintiff Dixon versus Robinson THIS was a special Issue directed out of Chancery Wayhil Fair. and tried this day at the Bar by a Middlesex Iury. The Question was Whether Ballivus probi homines Burgenses Burgi de Andover in Hampshire had power to keep a Fair at Wayehil in any one place where they please the Bill being Exhibited to confine the Fair to a particular place which Fair was granted to them by Charter from Queen Elizabeth They who would have it confin'd to a certain place gave in Evidence that the Hospitaller of Ewelme in Oxfordshire was seised in Fee of the Manor of Rambridge within which Manor the place was where the Fair was always kept and that the Parson of Andover had Glebe there That this place was called Wayehil and that the profits did arise by Piccage and Stallage to the yearly value of 200 l. That it was an ancient Fair held there by Prescription before the Town of Andover had a Charter That upon the late Surrender of Charters the Town of Andover did likewise surrender and took a new Charter in which liberty was given to them to keep this Fair in what place they would That both the Hospitaller and Parson petitioned the King in Council and obtained an Order to Try where the Fair ought to be kept which was tried accordingly at the Exchequer Bar and a Verdict for the Parson Chief Justice If the Fair belongs to Andover they may chuse whether they will keep it at any place and that may create another Question Whether they may not forfeit this Franchise by disuser But certainly if the place be not limited by the King's Grant they may keep it where they please or rather where they can most conveniently and if it be so limited they may keep it in what part of such place they will Dawling versus Venman AN Action on the Case was brought against the Defendant Action for a Scandalous Affidavit in Chancery for making a Scandalous Affidavit in Chancery in which were these words Viz. Mr. Dawling is a Rogue and a Knave and I will make it out before my Lord Chancellor and I will have him in the Pillory Vpon not Guilty pleaded there was a Verdict for the Plaintiff and damages entire It was moved in arrest of Iudgment for that the truth of on Oath shall not be liable to a Trial in an Action on the Case for the Law intendeth every Oath to be true Before the Statute of 3 11 H. Cro. Eliz. 521 2 Cro. 607. Sid. 50. Hutt 11. 7. which gives power to examine Perjury there was not any Punishment at
Paper Book by the then Attorny General but by reason of a stroak cross them the Clerk omitted them in engrossing the Iudgment But upon a Motion the Court held this amendable at the Common Law Curia The Error is only a Misentry of the Writ of Enquiry and amendable without paying of Costs Mr. Aston the Secondary said that Costs were never paid in this Court upon such Amendments nor in the Common Pleas until my Lord Chief Iustice Vaughan's time but he altered the Practice and made that Rule that if you amend after a Writ of Error brought you must pay Costs Holcomb versus Petit. A Devastavit was brought against an Administrator of a rightful Executor who pleaded an insufficient Plea Administrator of a rightful ful Executor is liable to a Devastavit 30 Car. 2. c. 7. and upon a Demurrer the Question was upon the Statute of 30 Car. 2. The Title whereof is An Act to enable Creditors to recover Debts of Executors and Administrators of Executors in their own wrong which is introductory of a new Law and charges those who were not chargeable before at the Common Law but it enacts That when Executors of persons who are Executors de son tort or Administrators shall convert the Goods of any person deceased that they shall be liable as their Testator or Intestate would have been Gold held that he shall not be charged for where an Act of Parliament charges an Executor in such case an Administrator shall be likewise charged but if an Administrator be charged that shall never extend to an Executor The Rule is A majori ad minus valet Argumentum sed non e contra therefore the rightful Executor shall not be charged by this Act which only makes Executors of Executors de son tort lyable Pollexfen contra There can be no reason given why the Act should make an Administrator of an Administrator lyable to a Devastavit and not an Administrator of an Executor de son tort for the mischief will be the same and therefore a rightful Executor who wasts the Testator's Goods ought to be charged The Recital of this Act is large enough the Preamble is general and the enacting Clause expresseth Executors and Administrators of Executors de son tort but then it also mentions Administrators but not such who are their Administrators de son tort Now the Word Administrator is in it self a general Word and extends to any one who meddles with the personal Estate so that the Preamble being general and the Act remedial 't is within the same mischief Curia The Word Administrator is very comprehensive for when an Executor pleadeth he saith Plene administravit If a rightful Executor waste the Goods he is a kind of an Administrator de son tort for abusing of the Trust There is no Superiority between an Executor or an Administrator for by this Act they are both equal in power as to the Goods of the deceased Iudgment was given that the Administrator of the rightful Executor shall be liable Jenings versus Hankeys 'T IS enacted by the Statute of 13 Car. Where an Informer shall be a Witness though he hath part of the Penalty 13 Car. 2. c. 10. 2. That they who kill course hunt or take away Red or Fallow Deer in any Ground where Deer are kept c. or are aiding therein if such are convicted by Confession or Oath of one Witness before one Justice of the Peace within six Months after the Offence done shall forfeit 20 l. one Moiety to the Informer the other to the Owner of the Deer to be levied by Distress by Warrant under the Justice's Hand The Defendant was convicted by the Oath of the Informer and Mr. Shower moved that it might be quashed because the Informer is not to be admitted as a Witness he being to have a Moiety of the Forfeiture The Party to an usurious Contract shall not be admitted as an Evidence to prove the Vsury 12 Co. 68. 2 Rol. Abr. 685 because he is Testis in propria causa and by their Oath may avoid their own Bonds Mr. Pollexfen contra The Statute gives power to convict by the Oath of a credible Witness and such is the Informer 'T is not a material Objection to say That the Informer shall not be a Witness because he hath a Moiety of the Forfeiture for in Cases of the like nature the Informer is always a good Witness As upon the Statute for suppressing of Conventicles the Informer is a good Witness and yet he hath part of the Penalty for otherwise that Act would be of little force for if who sees the People met together be not a good Witness no Body else can Curia In the Statute of Robberies a Man swears for himself because there can be no other Witness he is a good Witness Harman versus Harman DEBT upon a Bond against an Administrator Notice of a Debt must be given to an Administrator who pleaded Fully administred and that he had not notice of this Bond before such a day In this Case a special Verdict was found upon which the Question was Whether Notice was necessary to be given of Debts of an inferior nature The Court gave no Opinion but they agreed that a Iudgment upon a simple Contract may be pleaded in Barr to an Action of Debt upon a Bond and that 't is no Devastavit in an Executor to pay a Debt upon such a Contract before a Bond Debt Vaughan 94. of which he had no Notice So where an Obligor did afterwards enter into a Recognizance in the nature of a Statute 2 Anders 159. 1 Mod. 157. and Iudgment was against him upon the Bond and then he dyed his Executrix paid the Creditor upon the Statute and the Obligee brought a Scire Facias upon the Judgment on the Bond Debt and she pleaded payment of the Recognizance this was held a good Plea for she is not bound to take Notice of the Iudgments against the Testator without being acquainted therewith by his Creditors for she is in no wise privy to his Acts. DE Term. Sancti Mich. Anno 2 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1686. Anonymus AN Information was exhibited against the Defendant for Perjury Perjury in a Deposition taken before Commissioners in Chancery setting forth that a Bill in Chancery was exhibited by one A. B. and the Proceedings thereon The Perjury was assigned in a Deposition made by the Defendant 30 Julii 1683. and taken in that Cause before Commissioners in the Country It was tried this day at the Barr and the Question was Whether the Return of the Commissioners that the Defendant made Oath before them shall be a sufficient Evidence to convict him of Perjury without their being present in Court to prove him the very same person Serjeant Pemberton for the Defendant admitted an Information will lie in this Case against him but the Commissioners must be here or some other person to prove that he was
ground he had for such an Opinion is not known the Year Books quoted in the Margent will not warrant it for they are in no sort parallel That Case in the 27th of H. 27 H. 6.3 6. is no more than Tenant at Will cannot grant over his Estate because he hath no certain or fixed Interest in it and much to the same purpose is the Book of 22 E. 22 E. 4.5 4. there cited But suppose this to be a void Grant and to amount to a determination of the Tenancy at Will yet if the Trustees had no notice of it that shall not determine their Estates A Devise to an Executor that he shall have the oversight of the Testators Estate till his Daughter should come of Age Yelv. 73. the Executor made a Lease at Will rendring Rent before the year expired the Daughter came of age to whom the Tenant at Will attorned the Executor brought an Action of Debt against him for the Rent arrear it was held that this Attornment to the Daughter was no determination of his Will for it would be of ill consequence to the Lessor if such a Tenant should determine his Will a day or two before the end of the year who had enjoyed all the Profits of the Land 2. Whether he may make a Deputy 'T is true a judicial Officer cannot make a Deputy unless he hath a Clause in his Patent to enable him because his Judgment is relied on in matters relating to his Office which might be the reason of the making of the Grant to him neither can a Ministerial Officer depute one in his stead if the Office be to be performed by him in person but when nothing is required but a Superintendency in the Office he may make a Deputy This appears more evident in the common Case of a Sheriff who is an Officer made by the Kings Letters Patents and 't is not said that he shall execute his Office per se vel sufficientem Deputatum suum Roll. Rep. 274. 1 Leon. 146. 3 Leon. 99. Cro. Eliz. 173. yet he may make a Deputy which is the Vnder-Sheriff against whom Actions may be brought by the Parties grieved And such a Deputy may be made without a Deed for he claims no Interest in the Office but as a Servant Cro. Eliz. 67. 10 Co. 192. a. and therefore where an Action on the Case was brought against the Deputy of a Sheriff for an Escape who pleaded that the Sheriff made him his Deputy to take Bail of Prisoners and that he took Bond c. and shewed no Deed of Deputation yet the Plea was held good upon a Demurrer 3. Whether the Assignment of this Trust without giving notice to this Court be a Forfeiture Tenant in Fee simple may do it for he hath a power so to do by reason of the Dignity of his Estate He who grants this Office without acquainting of this Court therewith must remain an Officer still and is subject to all Duties and Attendance till the Court hath notice of the Grant But there is no occasion of acquainting the Court in this Case for upon the Grant made to the Trustees by Mr. Lenthal he is still the Officer though he hath not the same Estate It was objected that Sir Edward Norris c. hath not said any thing to the Escapes but that doth neither concern Mr. Lenthal or the Trustees 2 Cro. 17. for if he be Tenant at Will they are not answerable for his neglect for 't is a personal Tort in him If Tenant for years makes a Feoffment 't is a Forfeiture of his Estate but if he makes a Lease and Release though 't is of the same operation yet it will not amount to a Forfeiture Now if any Escapes should happen there is a plain remedy for the Parties agrieved for if Tenant at Will remaineth in possession of an Office and suffers voluntary Escapes his Office shall be seised into the Hands of this Court then he in the Reversion must make his Claim and when that is done he is an Officer nolens volens and this was the Duke of Norfolk's Case Now though these Escapes are found by the Inquisition to be voluntary yet they are answered in the Plea for that part of the Inquisition is traversed and that they were vi armis and this being not yet tried the Court cannot give Iudgment thereon If there be many negligent Escapes these shall not amount to a Forfeiture as if a Rebel should break Prison or the Prison should be on Fire those are negligent but the Officer should not be so much as fined But if it should be a Forfeiture the Neglect must be particularly alledged for the Word Neglect is too general Adjornatur 5 E. 4.27 Dyer 66. Anonymus A Man was indicted for using of a Trade not being an Apprentice An Indictment quashed for misreciting of a Statute against the Statute of 5 Eliz. cap. 4. And now a Motion was made to quash it because the Act gives power to two Iustices of the Peace Quorum unus to hear and determine Offences committed against any branch thereof either by Indictment or Information before them in their Sessions and 't is not said that one of the Iustices before whom this Indictment was taken was of the Quorum This Objection was answered by the Court that the Sessions cannot be kept without one Iustice of the Quorum The Act saith That it shall not be lawful to any person other than such who did then lawfully use any Art Mystery or Manual Occupation to set up any Trade used within this Realm except he had been an Apprentice for seven years c. and 't is not averred that the Trade mentioned in the Indictment was a Trade used before the making of the Act. This seemed to be a material Objection but the Indictment was quashed for misreciting of the Statute Price versus Davies ERror to reverse a Fine taken by Commission and the Error assigned was that the Cognizor died before the return of the Writ of Covenant But this Point was not argued because Iustice Allybon was of Opinion that the Plaintiff in the Errors had not well entituled himself by the Writ for it was brought by him ut Consanguineus Haeres scilicet Filius c. but doth not shew how he was of Kindred To this Objection Sir William Williams the Solicitor General replyed that if a Descent be from twenty Ancestors 't is not necessary to say that he was Son and Heir of such a one who was Son and Heir of such a one and so to the twentieth Ancestor Agreable to this are all the Presidents in Formedons 't is only said that Jus descendit Adjornatur The Countess of Plymouth versus Throgmorton ERror to reverse a Iudgment in the Common Pleas in an Action of Debt upon a Mutuatus brought by Mr. Contract where 't is entire shall not be separated in an Action of Debt Throgmorton as Executor
to Sir Edward Biggs against the Countess as Administratrix of the Earl of Plymouth wherein the Plaintiff sets forth a Writing by which the Earl had given power to Sir Edward to be the Collector and Receiver of his Mony and Rents and that he promised to allow him 100 l. per Annum for his pains and in default of payment thereof that Sir Edward should detein the same which Writing was in these Words following viz. I do direct and appoint Sir Edward Biggs to take and receive to his own use 100 l. of lawful Mony of England out of the first Mony which he shall receive of mine The Action was brought for 75 l. being his Salary for three quarters of a year and Iudgment by Nil dicit It was argued this Term and in Easter Term by Councel on both sides It was agreed on all sides that the Earl left sufficient Assets to satisfie all his Bond Creditors but not enough to pay Debts upon simple Contract First it was said for the Plaintiff in the Errors that no Action of Debt will lie against an Executor upon a Mutuatus 11 Co. Godfreys Case because the Testator might have waged his Law but this was not much insisted on 2. That admitting an Action would lye yet this is an erronious Iudgment because the Suit was for 75 l. for three quarters Salary when by the Writing Sir Edward was to serve the Earl a whole year and this being an entire Contract shall not be seperated Therefore he cannot be well entituled to the Actionn unless his Testator had served a year and he had averred it so in his Declaration As where a Covenant was to pay 2 s. Yelv. 133. 7 Co. 10. Allen 9. for copying every Quire of Paper and the Breach assigned that he copyed 4 Quire and 3 sheets for which 8 s. and 3 d. was due to the Plaintiff 't is true he had Iudgment but it was reversed because it was an entire Covenant of which no apportionment could be made pro rata 3. That which was chiefly insisted on was to make these words amount to an Obligation that so it might be satisfied amongst the Bond Creditors But those who argued for the Plaintiff in the Errors said that it cannot be an Obligation for it was only a bare Letter of Attorney and an Authority and no more for there were no words to oblige the Earl or which can make a Warranty and therefore if the Mony was not received the Party to whom the Note was given could not resort back to him who made it had they been both living neither shall the Plaintiff now to his Administratrix Like the common Cases of the assigning of Iudgment if the Assignee doth not receive the Mony he cannot have an Action against the Assignor who only directs and appoints him so to do But on the other side Ex parte Def. the second Objection was thus answered viz. That this being only an Executory thing the Plaintiff may now bring an Action for so long time as his Testator served and this may be apportioned secundum ratam if the Law should be otherwise the Case of all Servants would be bad for they are generally hired for a year and not usually serve so long In an Assumpsit to pay for a years board Sid. 225. and the Plaintiff had declared only for three quarters of a year but yet had Iudgment because as the Book saith if there be any variance in the Agreement 't is for the advantage of the Defendant The 3d. Vaughan 92 93. Pl. Com. 182. Dyer 21. Objection answered viz. When a Man is indebted to another by simple Contract which is aknowledged by Deed an Action of Debt will lie against his Executor for any thing which is under Hand and Seal will amount to an Obligation especially where the Debt is confessed Now there are words in this Deed to shew that Mony was due and that makes it a Bond. But the Court was of Opinion that this was an entire Agreement and therefore the Action not well brought for three quarters Salary and for this reason the Iudgment was reversed Nisi c. Chapman versus Lamphire AN Action on the Case was brought for scandalous words spoken of the Plaintiff Words spoken of a Carpenter where actionable who declared that he was a Carpenter and a Freeman of the City of London and that he got great Sums of Mony by buying of Timber and Materials and by building of Houses and that the Defendant having discourse of him and of his Trade spoke these words viz. He is broken and run away and will never return again There was a Verdict for the Plaintiff and a Motion was now made in arrest of Iudgment for that a Carpenter was not a Trade within the Statute of Bankrupts and a day being given to speak to it again Mr. Pollexfen argued that before the Statutes made against Bankrupts words spoken reflecting upon a man in his Trade were actionable even at the Common Law because it might be the occasion of the loss of his Livelyhood 1 Rol. Abr. 59. pl. 6. Hutton 60. and therefore it was actionable to say of a Scrivener that he is broken and run away and dares not shew his Face and yet a Scrivener was not within the Statutes of Bankrupcy before the Act of 21 Jac. therefore the Action must lie at the Common Law because words disparage him in his Trade But the Councel for the Defendant said that these words were not actionable for they do not tend to his disparagement he may be broke and yet as good a Carpenter as before The Case of one Hill in 2 Car. Latch 114. in this Court was much stronger than this the words spoken of him were viz. Hill is a base broken Rascal and hath broken twice already and I will make him break the third time the Plaintiff had Iudgment but it was arrested A Carpenter builds upon the Credit of other men and so long as the words do not touch him in the skill and knowledge of his Profession they cannot injure him Chief Iustice The Credit which the Defendant hath in the World may be a means to support his skill for he may not have an opportunity to shew his Workmanship without those Materials for which he is entrusted The Iudges were divided in Opinion two against two and so the Plaintiff had his Iudgment there being no Rule made to stay it so that he had his Iudgment upon his general Rule for Iudgment but if it had been upon a Demurrer or Special Verdict then it would have been adjourned to the Exchequer Chamber Goring versus Deering IN an Appeal for the Murder of Henry Goring Esq Auterfoits convict of Manslaughter no good Plea in an Appeal for Murder brought by his Widow The Defendant pleaded that he was indicted for the said Murder at the Sessions-house in the Old Bayly in Middlesex that he was found guilty of Manslaughter
and not of Murder prout patet per Recordum that he was Clericus paratus fuit legere ut Clericus if the Court would have admitted him and that he is the same person c. To this Plea the Appellant demurred The truth of this Case was that after the Conviction and before the Sentence an Appeal was brought so that the Defendant had not an opportunity to pray his Book It was argued by Mr. Pollexfen for the Appellant and by Sir George Treby for the Appellee If the Statute of 3 H. 3 H. 7. c. 1. 7. was not in the way this Plea might be a good Barr to the Appeal because before the making of that Law Auterfoits convict c. had been a good Plea but now that Statute deprives the Defendant of that benefit for 't is enacted That if any man be acquitted of Murder at the King's Suit or the Principal attainted the Wife or next Heir to him so slain may take and have their Appeal of the Murder within a year and a day after the said Murder done against the said persons so acquitted or attainted if they be alive and the Benefit of * Nota At this time Clergy was allowed for Murder but now taken away by the Statute of 23 H. 8. c. 1. Hales Pl. Cor. 232. Clergy before not had Now though the Party be neither acquitted or attainted but is only convicted of Manslaughter yet the word Attaint in this Statute signifies the same with Convict and this appears by the penning of the Act in that Clause which mentions the benefit of Clergy viz. That if any man be attainted of Murder the Heir shall have an Appeal if the benefit of Clergy be not had Now an Attainder supposeth a Conviction for one is the consequence of the other and if it should not signifie the same thing in this place then that Clause would be in vain because if it should be taken for the Iudgment given upon the Conviction then 't is too late for the Party to have any benefit of his Clergy Thus it was held in the second Resolution of Wrot and Wigg's Case that the word Attaint in this very Act shall not be intended only of a person who hath Iudgment of Life 4 Co. 46. a. but also of one Convict by Confession or Verdict 'T is true 2 Anders 68. 't is said in that case and so likewise in Holecroft's Case that Auterfoits convict of Manslaughter upon an Indictment of Murder is a good Bar to an Appeal at the Common Law as well as if the Clergy had been allowed the reason may be because in both those Cases the Iudgments were by Confession so that the Court ought to have granted the Clergy but this is a Conviction by Verdict which alters the Case E contra Auterfoits convict is a good Plea at the Common Law in all other Cases Treason only excepted at this day it appears by the Statute of H. 7. that the year and day which was the time allowed for the Appeal and in which time the Kings Indictment could not be tried was an usage but not a Law therefore that Act provides that the King shall proceed upon the Indictment within the year and a day and not stay for the Appeal of the Party If the Party be attainted or acquitted the Wife or next Heir shall have an Appeal but not if he be convicted But now admitting that the word Attaint hath the same signification with the word Convict yet this is a good Plea both within the Words and the Equity of the Statute This appears upon the Construction of that Law which must be expounded according to the vulgar Sense and signification of the words and therefore where the Statute saith That an Appeal lies where the benefit of Clergy is not had is that it is not had de Jure but the Clergy in this Case was de Jure and the Defendant was ready to read if he had been admitted thereunto by the Court. Thus is the Statute of Malbridge about the taking away of Wards viz. Si parentes conqueruntur that is if they had cause to complain 2. This Statute hath been expounded according to Equity for though it gives an Appeal to the Wife or next Heir of him slain yet if a Woman be killed her next of Kin shall bring an Appeal Therefore by the same Equity these words viz. The benefit of Clergy not had shall be construed had by the Grant of the Court Co. Ent. 355. for if a Man be indicted without the addition of Clerk he cannot demand his Clergy unless the Court ask him but if he be indicted with that addition then he may demand it because 't is supposed by the Court that he can read That this Appeal was not well brought these Exceptions were taken grounded upon the Statute of Gloucester by which seven things are required in an Appeal of Murder 6 E. 1. ca. 9. That the Appellor declare the Fact the Year the Day the Hour the Year of the King the Town where the Fact was done and with what Weapon the Party was slain Now in this Case there is a defect in two of the things required by that Statute 1. That of the Hour which is laid too general for 't is circa horam octavam which is not certain enough 2. They have laid no Vill for 't is that the Defendant did assault the Husband of the Appellant in Parochia Sancti Martini in Campis now though that word Parochia has crept into Fines and Recoveries and likewise into Indictments it must not be allowed in Appeals There may be several Vills in one Parish and though this is ruled good in Indictments it ought not to be so here because of the difference between an Indictment and an Appeal Stamf. 80. b. Doct. Stud. 48. for in Indictments you need not mention the Hour but it must be done in Appeals A Parish is an Ecclesiastical Division and though such may be a Vill 't is not necessary Ex vi termini that it should be so But afterwards in Trinity-Term 4 Jac. the Chief Iustice delivered the Opinion of all the Iudges except Iustice Street who were assembled for that purpose at Serjeants-Inn that this was no good Plea and that the Court ought not to ask the Prisoner what he had to say and so to let him into the benefit of his Clergy Tamen quaere for 't is otherwise resolved The Company of Horners versus Barlow DEBT upon a By-Law wherein the Company set forth A By-Law restrained to London and not to extend farther that they were incorporated by Letters Patents of King Charles I. and were thereby empowred to make By-Laws for the better Government of their Corporation and that the Master Warden and Assistants of the Company made a Law viz. That two Men appointed by them should buy rough Horns for the Company and bring them to the Hall there to be distributed every Month by
being no where alledged that the Goods were weighed elsewhere or that they were such which are usually sold by Weight then there is no need of bringing of them to the Beam If one prescribes to a Common and doth not say for Cattle Levant and Couchant the Prescription is not good This being the consideration of the Duty it ought to be precisely alledged as in an Assumpsit where the Plaintiff declared that in consideration that the Defendant owed him 40 l. he promised to pay it ante inceptionem proximi itineris to London Yelv. 175. 2 Cro. 245. and alledged that such a day incepit iter suum ad London ' but for omitting the Word proxime Iudgment was arrested after Verdict because the Duty did arise upon the commencement of his next Iourney The true reason why any thing is helped by Verdict is for that the thing shall be presumed to be given in Evidence at the Trial. Mr. E contra Pollexfen contra Here is enough set forth in the Plea to shew that the Goods were not weighed and it must be given in Evidence at the Trial that they were sold contrary to the Custom which is the only Offence to be proved The want of Averment that the Goods sold by the Defendant were not weighed shall not vitiate this Declaration after a Verdict To prove this some Authorities were cited Cro. Eliz. 458. 2 Cro. 44. Siderfin 218. Palmer 360. Cro. Car. 497. as where in Trespass the Defendant justified for Common by Prescription for Beasts Levant and Couchant and that he put in his Beasts utendo Communia Issue was taken upon the Prescription and found for the Defendant now though he did not averr that the Cattle were Levant and Couchant yet it was held that it was cured by a Verdict And of this Opinion were three Iudges now but Iustice Allybon differed for says he if this Declaration should be good after a Verdict then a Verdict will cure any fault in Pleading Iudgment for the Plaintiff Prowse versus Wilcox AN Action on the Case for scandalous Words Words spoken of a Justice of the Peace where actionable The Plaintiff declared that he was a Justice of the Peace for the County of Somerset that there was a Rebellion in the West by the Duke of Monmouth and others that search was made for the Defendant being suspected to be concerned in that Rebellion and that the Defendant thereupon spoke these words of the Plaintiff viz. John Prowse is a Knave and a busie Knave for searching after me and other honest Men of my sort and I will make him give me satisfaction for plundering me There was a Verdict for the Plaintiff and the Iudgment being stayed till the Return of the Postea Mr. Pollexfen moved that the Plaintiff might have his Iudgment because the Words are actionable 1 Roll. Abr. 59. pl. 3. for they touched him in his Office of a Iustice of a Peace It was objected to stay the Iudgment that the Words were improper and therefore could not be actionable But admitting them so to be yet if they in any wise reflect upon a Man in a publick Office they will bear an Action Shore contra The Plaintiff doth not lay any Colloquium of him as a Justice of the Peace or that the words were spoken of him relating to his Office or the Execution thereof and therefore an Action will not lie though an * Vid. antea Rex versus Darby 2 Cro. 315. Information might have been proper against him If a Man should call another Lewd Fellow and that he set upon him in the High-way and took his Purse from him an Action will not lie because he doth not directly charge him with Felony or Robbery The Court were divided in Opinion two against two so the Plaintiff had his Iudgment Boyle versus Boyle A Libel was in the Spiritual Court against a Woman causa jactitationis Maritagii Prohibition granted The Woman suggests that this person was indicted at the Sessions in the Old-Bayly for marrying of her he then having a Wife living contra formam Statuti Godb. Rep. Can. 507. Hales 121. 1 Jac. cap. 11. Sid. 171. that he was thereupon convicted and had Iudgment to be burned in the Hand so that being tried by a Iury and a Court which had a Iurisdiction of the cause and the Marriage found a Prohibition was prayed Serjeant Levinz moved for a Consultation because no Court but the Ecclesiastical Court can examine a Marriage for in the Dower Writ is always directed to the Bishop to certifie the lawfulness of the Marriage and if this Woman should bury this Husband and bring a Writ of Dower and the Heir plead Ne unques accouple c. this Verdict and Conviction shall not be given in Evidence to prove the illegality of the Marriage but the Writ must go to the Bishop This is proved by the Case of Emerton and Hide in this Court The Man was married in fact and his Wife being detained from him she being in the Custody of Sir Robert Viner brought an Habeas Corpus she came into the Court but my Lord Hales would not deliver the Body but directed an Ejectment upon the Demise of John Emerton and Bridget his Wife that the Marriage might come in question It was found a Marriage and afterwards at an Hearing before the Delegates this Verdict was not allowed to be given in Evidence because in this Court one Iury may find a Marriage and another otherwise so that it cannot be tried whether they are legally married by a Temporal Court 'T is true this Court may controle the Ecclesiastical Courts but it must be eodem genere E contra E contra It was said that if a Prohibition should not go then the Authority of those two Courts would interfere which might be a thing of ill consequence If the lawfulness of this Marriage had been first tried in the Court Christian the other Court at the Old-Bayly would have given Credit to their Sentence But that Court hath been prohibited in a Case of the like nature 2 Cro. 535. for a Suit was there commenced for saying That he had a Bastard The Defendant alledged that the Plaintiff was adjudged the reputed Father of a Bastard by two Iustices of the Peace according to the Statute and so justified the speaking of the words and this being refused there a Prohibition was granted and so it was in this Case by the Opinion of three Iudges Dr. Hedges a Civilian being present in the Court said that Marriage or no Marriage never came in question in their Court upon a Libel for Jactitation unless the Party replies a lawful Marriage and that the Spiritual Court ought not to be silenced by a Proof of a Marriage de facto in a Temporal Court for all Marriages ought to be de jure of which their Courts had the proper Iurisdiction Sir John Newton versus Francis Creswick IN an Action on the
Case Plea where it amounts to the general Issue wherein the Plaintiff declared that the Defendant exhibited a Peittion against him and Sir R. H. before the King in Council by reason whereof he was compelled to appear at his great Expence and that he was afterwards discharged of the matter alledged against him which was the erecting of Cottages in Kingswood Chase in the County of Gloucester This Action was first laid in Gloucestershire and the Defendant moved that it might be laid in Middlesex where the Petition was exhibited But it was insisted for the Plaintiff that where a cause of Action ariseth in two places he hath his Election to lay it in either The Court held that the exhibiting of the Petition was the ground of the Action and though it conteined matter done in another place yet it shall be tried in the County where the Petition was delivered for suppose the Petition had contained Matter done beyond Sea c. Now in this Case the Action being brought in Middlesex the Defendant pleaded that the Chase was injured by the erecting the said Cottages by the digging of Pits and by the making of a Warren by Sir John Newton and that the other person Sir R. H. being then a Iustice of the Peace for the County of Gloucester upon Complaint to him made did not impose Penalties upon the Offenders but did abet the said Plaintiff by reason whereof the Deer were decreased from 1000 head to 400. To this Plea the Plaintiff demurred Mr. Pollexfen argued against the Plea first that it charged Sir R. H. with no particular Crime but enlargeth the Matter upon the Plaintiff and amounts to no more than the general Issue for the Question is whether the Defendant hath fasly prosecuted the Plaintiff before the King in Council which is only matter of fact and which is charged upon the Defendant and therefore he ought to have pleaded Not-Guilty 'T is true where the Defence consists in matters of Law there the Defendant may plead specially but where 't is purely fact the general Issue must be pleaded E contra E contra It was insisted upon that what is alledged in this Plea might be given in Evidence upon the general Issue but the Defendant may likewise plead it specially and not trust the Matter to the Lay-gents As in Conspiracy for procuring of the Plaintiff to be falsly and maliciously indicted of a Robbery Cro. Eliz. 871 900. 21 E. 3.17 27 Ass 12. Kelway 81. Moor 600. Rast Ent. 123. Sed nota This Defence was matter of Law the Defendants plead that they were robbed and suspecting the Plaintiff to be guilty procured a Warrant in order to have the Plaintiff examined before a Iustice of the Peace of which he had notice and absented himself but was afterwards committed to the Gaol by a Iudge of this Court who advised them to preferr a Bill of Indictment c. quae est eadem conspiratio this was adjudged a good Plea though it amounted to no more than the general Issue and all this matter might have been given in Evidence at the Trial. The Court except Iustice Allybon advised the Plaintiff to waive his Demurrer and the Defendant to plead the general Issue But Iustice Allybon took an Exception to the Declaration for that the Plaintiff had not alledged any damnification but only that he was compelled to appear and doth not shew how either by the Petition of the Defendant or by Summons c. He ought to set forth that he was summoned to appear before the King in Order to his discharge but to say coactus fuit comparere is incertain for that might be in the vindication of his Honour or Reputation He complains of a Petition exhibited against him which the Defendant hath answered by shewing to the Court sufficient matter which might reasonably induce him so to to and for that reason he held the Plea to be good Sed adjornatur Rex versus Hockenhul AN Information was exhibited against him for a Riot Misprision of a Clerk amended of which he was found guilty and this Exception was taken in arrest of Iudgment Memorandum quod ad general ' quarterial ' Session ' Pacis tent ' c. die Sabbati prox ' post quindenam Sancti Martini praesentat ' existit quod the Defendant 27 die Januarii in such a year vi armis c. So the Fact is laid after the Indictment which was exhibited against the Defendant at the Michaelmas Sessions and the Fact is laid to be in January following in the same year But the Attorny General said this was only a Misprision of the Clerk in titling the Record viz. in the Memorandum 8 Co. 156. 4 H. 6.16 10 Ass 26. Cro. Car. 144. and there was no fault in the Body of the Information and that it was amendable at the Common Law He cited some Cases to prove where amendments have been in the Cases of Subjects of greater Mistakes than here a fortiori it ought to be amended in the King's Case 'T is not only amendable at the Common Law 4 H. 6. c. 3. 8 H. 6. c. 12. Jones 421. but by several Statutes which extend to all Misprisions of Clerks except Treason Felony and Outlawry wherefore this mistake of Quinden ' Martini was amended and made Quinden ' Hillarii Rex versus Sellars THE Defendant was indicted at the Sessions in London for not attending at the Wardmote Inquest being chosen of the Iury for such a year Indictment quashed To this Indictment he pleaded the King's Grant to the Company of Cooks of which he was a Member by which Grant that Company is exempted from being put or summoned upon a Iury or Inquest before the Mayor or Sheriffs or Coroner of London c. And upon a Demurrer the Question was whether the Cooks are discharged by this Grant from their Attendance at the said Wardmote Inquest And for the King it was argued that they are not discharged Before the Iudgment upon the Quo Warranto brought against the City of London these Courts there were like the Hundred Courts in the County for as these were derived out of the County 4 Inst 249. so those were derived from the Lord Mayor's Court which is a Court of Record and erected for the better Government of the City and the Aldermen of every Ward had right to hold Leets there 1. But now the words of this Grant do not extend to this Case for the Cooks are thereby discharged only from being of a Iury before the Mayor Sheriffs or Coroner c. but the Court of Wardmote is held before neither for 't is held before the Alderman of the Ward 2. Dyer 269. The words in this Grant ought to be taken strictly viz. that Cooks shall be exempted if there be other sufficient Men in the Ward to serve besides and if this doth not appear the Grant is void but this is not alledged E contra E
Defendant Elizabeth The Question in which Case was whether by the Entry of the Son who was Tenant at Will and his making of this Lease the Father was disseised of the Freehold And it was held not for it was found in that Verdict that he occupying at Will and entring by his Fathers Assent the Lease was also intended to be made by his Assent But on the other side it was said that this Fine was a Barr by the express Words of the Statute of H. 7. E contra which excludes in all Cases but where there is Fraud or the person is incapable 4 H. 7. c. 24. or where the Right to be barred is not divested In this Case John Basket had an Interest and present Right and though it be closed with a Trust yet that will not make any difference 1. Cro. Car. 550. 10 Co. 56. Here is no Fraud for the Fine was levyed by Tenant in Tail in possession but if there had been Fraud it ought to be found otherwise it shall not be presumed This is not like Blunden's Case for there the Son was Tenant at Will but 't is not found by this Verdict that John occupied at Will There is no difference between this Term and a Trust of a Term to attend the Inheritance whose Interest shall be barred by such a Fine and Nonclaim because the Trust is included in the Fine and therefore the Trustees not making of their Claim within the five years are for ever excluded It cannot be denied but a Term for years is such an Interest which may be barred by Fine 5 Co. 123. 't is Saffin's Case expresly which was a Lease for years to commence in futuro after a Lease then in being should be determined the first Lease ended the second Lessee did not enter but the Reversioner did and made a Feoffment and levyed a Fine and five years passed without Entry or Claim by the second Lessee it was adjudged that this Fine was a Barr to him for when his future Interest commenced then and not before he had such a present Interest in the Land which might be divested and turned to a Right To which it was answered that this differs from Saffin's Case which was an interesse Termini and the Case of Alport which was an Executory Devise If John Basket had still continued in Possession it might have altred the Case but he died and his Wife entred and then the five years passed without any Claim Adjournatur Evans versus Crocker A Special Verdict in Ejectment was found in Ireland In Ejectment where the Entry seems to be before the Title yet the Declaration is good and Iudgment given there for the Plaintiff and now a Writ of Errour was brought in this Court and the Common Error assigned The Objection was to the Declaration which was That the Plaintiff declared upon a Demise made 12 Junii c. Habendum a praedicto duodecimo die Junij which must be the 13th day of the same Month usque c. virtute cujus quidem dimissionis he entred c. and that the Defendant postea scilicet eodem duodecimo die Junij did eject him c. So that it appears upon the Face of the Declaration that the Defendant entred before the Plaintiff had a Title for the Lease commenced on the 23th of June and the Entry was on the 12th of that Month. And it was said that this agrees with a former Resolution in this Court where the Lease was made the 24th of June for five years Habendum a die datus Siderfin 8. 2 Cro. 96. which must be the 25th by vertue whereof the Plaintiff entred and that the Defendant postea scilicet 24th Junij did eject him which must be before the commencement of the Lease Curia The Plaintiff entred as a Disseisor by his own shewing and thereupon Iudgment was reversed Rex versus Kingsmill QUO Warranto against the Defendant to shew cause why he executed the Office of a Bayliff of the Hundred of Barnstaple Grant of an Hundred where good c. The Defendant pleaded that the said Hundred was an ancient Hundred and that the Office of Bayliff was an ancient Office and that the Hundred Court was an ancient Court held from three Weeks to three Weeks before the Steward thereof that the Return of Writs was an ancient Liberty and Franchise which did belong to the said Bayliff that King Charles I. was seized of the said Franchise jure Coronae in Fee who by Letters Patents dated c. did grant the same to one North Habendum the said Hundred to him and his Heirs and that by several mesne Assignments it came to and was vested in the Defendant and so he justified to have Retorna Brevium To this Plea the Plaintiff demurred And for the King it was argued that this Claim was not good First as to the manner of the Grant as 't is here pleaded viz. that the King was seized in Fee c. and that he granted the Franchise Habendum the said Hundred That such a Grant can never include the Hundred for nothing can pass in the Habendum but what was mentioned in the Premisses 2. The Defendant hath derived a Title from the Crown to this Office of a Bayliff which must be either by Grant or Prescription It cannot be by Grant for 't is a Question whether the Hundred Court can now be separated from the County Court it hath been derivative from it in former times when the Sheriffs did let those Hundreds to farm to several persons who put in Bayliffs errant to the great oppression of the People which was the occasion of the making of the Statute of Ed. 14 E. 3. c. 9. 3. by which such Hundreds were united and rejoyned to the Counties as to the Bailiwicks thereof 4 Inst 267. except such as were then granted in Fee by the King or his Ancestors Now these Hundreds were usually granted to Abbots and other religious persons 31 H. 8. c. 13. and their Possessions coming afterwards to the King by the dissolution of their Abbies and Monasteries are now merged in the Crown and cannot be regranted after the making of that Statute And as the Defendnat cannot have a Title by Grant so he hath not prescribed to have this Office 't is true the Plea sets forth that 't is an ancient Office but that is not a Prescription but a bare Averment of its Antiquity But admitting he had alledged it by way of Prescription 14 H. 4.89 he could not do it by a Que Estate to have Retorna Brevium A man cannot preserive to have Cognizance of Pleas in an Hundred Court he may in a County Palatine because 't is of a mixed Iurisdiction Neither can he prescribe to have Return of the King's Writs Abbot de Strata Marcella because they are matter of Record Here is a good Title pleaded E contra It was never yet denied but that
same to Mrs. Berkley for Life remainder over to Henry Killigrew in Tail and that he made Mrs. Berkley Executrix of his Will which was found in haec verba That afterwards in the year 1645. the said Sir Henry Killigrew made aliud Testamentum in Writing but what was contained in the said last mentioned Will juratores penitus ignorant They find that Sir Henry Killigrew in the year 1646. died seised of those Lands and that Mrs. Berkley conveyed the same to Mr. Nosworthy 's Father whose Heir he is and that the Defendant Sir William Basset is Cosin and Heir to Sir Henry Killigrew c. The Question upon this special Verdict was whether the making of this last Will was a revocation of the former or not It was argued this Term by Mr. Finch and in Michaelmas Term following by Serjeant Maynard for the Plaintiff that it was not a revocation In their Arguments it was admitted that a Will in it's nature was revocable at all times but then it must be either by an express or implied revocation That the making of this latter Will cannot be intended to be an implied revocation of the former for if so then the Land must also be supposed to be devised contrary to the express disposition in the first Will and that would be to add to the Record which finds Viz. that what the last Will was penitus ignorant It is possible that a subsequent Will may be made so as not to destroy but consist with a former for the Testator may have several parcels of Land which he may devise to many persons by divers Wills and yet all stand together A man may likewise by a subsequent Will revoke part and confirm the other part of a former Will and therefore admitting there was such a Will in this case 't is still more natural that it should confirm than revoke the other If the Testator had purchased new Lands and had devised the same by a subsequent Will no person will affirm that to be a revocation of the former Will When a Man hath made a disposition of any part of his Estate 't is a good Will as to that part so is likewise the disposal of every other part they are all several Wills tho' taken altogether they are an intire disposition of the whole Estate Nothing appears here to the contrary but that the latter Will may be only a devise of his personal Estate or a confirmation of the former which the Law will not allow to be destroyed without an express revocation The Case of Coward and Marshal is much to this purpose Cro. Eliz. 721. which was a devise in Fee to his younger Son and in another Will after the Testators Marriage to a second Wife he devised the same Lands to his Wife for Life paying yearly to his younger Son 20 s. It was the Opinion of Anderson and Glanvil that both these Wills might stand together and that one was not a revocation of the other because it appeared by the last Will that he only intended to make a Provision for his Wife but not to alter the Devise to his Son So where a Man had two Sons by several Venters Cro. Car. 24. Hodgkinson vers Whood Co. Lit. 22. b. 1 Co. 104. a. 319. b. and devises the Lands to his eldest Son for Life and to the Heirs Males of his Body and for default of such Issue to the Heirs Males of his second Son and the Heirs Males of their Bodies Remainder to his own right Heirs and then made a Lease of 30 years to his youngest Son to commence after the death of the Testator the youngest Son entred and surrendred the Term to his elder Brother who made a Lease to the Defendant and then dyed without Issue afterwards the youngest Brother entred and avoided this Lease made by his Brother It was held that the Lease thus made to him was not a revocation of the devise of the Inheritance to his Brother tho' it was to commence at the same time in which the devise of the Inheritance was to take effect but it was a revocation quoad the Term only that the elder Brother should not enter during that time for the devise shall not be revoked without express words and that tho' the Testator had departed with the whole Fee without reserving an Estate for Life to himself yet the Law created such an Estate in him till the future Vse should commence and in such case the right Heirs cannot take by Purchase but by Descent so that here the Inheritance in Fee simple was not vested in the elder Brother by Descent for then the Lease which he made would be executed out of the Feé and the younger Brother would be bound thereby But in the Case at the Bar there is no colour of a Revocation 1. Vpon the nature of the Verdict to which nothing can be added neither can it be diminished for whatever is found must be positive and not doubtful because an Attaint lies if the Verdict be false Therefore the Court cannot take notice of that which the Iury hath not found Now here the entry of the Iudgment is Viz. Quibus lectis auditis per Curiam hic satis intellectis c. But what can be read or heard where nothing appears That Case in the Year-Book of the 2 R. 3. 2 R. 3. f. 3. comes not up to this question it was an Action of Trespass for the taking of his Goods The Defendant pleaded that the Goods did appertain to one Robert Strong who before the supposed Trespass devised the same to him and made him Executor c. The Plaintiff replied that the said Strong made his last Will and did constitute him Executor And upon a Demurrer to this Replication because he had not traversed that the Defendant was Executor it was argued for the Plaintiff that this last Will was a Revocation of the former for tho' there were no express words of Revocation yet by the very making another the Law revoked the former and to prove this two Instances were then given viz. That if a Man devise his Lands to two and by another Will gives it to one of them and dies he to whom 't is devised by the last Will shall have it So likewise if the Testator by one Will giveth Lands to his Son and by another Will deviseth the same again to his Wife then makes an Alienation and taketh back an Estate to himself and dieth and in an Assise brought between the Widow and the Son he was compelled by the Court to shew that it was his Father's intention that he should have the Land otherwise the last Devisee will be entituled to it Now both these Instances are not sufficient to evince that the last Will in this Case was a revocation of that under which the Plaintiff claims because those Wills were contradictory to each other for by one the Land was devised to the Son and by the other to
which he claims he ought to shew the other Will by which it must appear that nothing is contradictory to it or that it doth confirm the first but if Presumptions shall be admitted it must be in favour of the Heir for nothing shall be presumed to disinherit him Afterwards in Trinity-Term 5 Willielmi Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff and a Writ of Error was brought in the House of Peers to reverse that Iudgment but it was affirmed Anonymus A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a Iudgment in the Common Pleas in an Ejectment for Lands in the County of Essex in which a Special Verdict was found viz. That R. F. What Words in a Will make Tenants in Common was seized in Fee of the Lands in question who had Issue two Daughters Frances Jane Frances had Issue Philp Frances Anne R. F. the Father devised unto Philip Frances and Anne the Children of his Daughter Frances and to Jane his other Daughter the Rents and Profits of his Mannor of Spain for thirty years to hold by equal parts viz. the three Grandchildren to have one Moiety and his Daughter Jane the other Moiety And if it happen that either of them should die before the thirty years expired then the said Term should be for the benefit of the Survivor and if they all die then the same was devised over to other Relations Afterwards he made a Codicil in these words viz. I give Power and Authority to my Executors to let my whole Lands for the Term of thirty years for the benefit and behalf of my Children Anne one of the Granchildren died without Issue Frances another of the Grandchildren died but left Issue The first Question was whether the Power given to the Executors by the Codicil will take away that Interest which was vested in the Grandchildren by the Will Mr. Appleton argued that it would not because the Executors had only a bare Authority to let it or improve it for the benefit of the Children there was no Devise of the Land to them If Power be given to Executors to sell Lands 't is only an Authority and not an Interest in them but a bare Authority only to let is of much less importance 2. After the Testator had devised the Profits of these Lands to his Grandchildren and Daughter equally to be divided during the term and had provided that if any dye without Issue that then it should survive and if all dye then to remain over to collateral Relations c. Whether Frances being dead but leaving Issue her Interest shall survive to Philip or go to such her Issue As to that he held that the Testator made them Tenants in Common by equal parts and therefore he devised it by Moieties in which there can be no Survivorship 'T is like a Devise to the Wife for life 2 Cro. 448. 1 Roll. Abr. 833. King versus Rumbal Cro. Car. 185. and after her decease to his three Daughters equally to be divided and if any of them die before the other then the Survivors to be her Heirs equally to be divided and if they all die without Issue then to others c. the Daughters had an Estate Tail and there was no Survivorship So in this Case it shall never go to the third Grandchild as long as any Issue of the second are living On the other side it was argued that they are Ioyntenants and not Tenants in Common E contra for the Testator having devised one Moiety to his three Grandchildren joyntly by equal parts that will make them Ioyntenants But the Court were all of Opinion that the words in the Will shew them to be Tenants in Common for equally to be divided runs to the Moieties So the Iudgment was affirmed Woodward 's Case THE Statute of 23 H. 8. c. 9. Church Ornaments are a personal Charge upon the Inhabitants and not upon those who live else where though they occupy Lands in that Parish Godb. 134. pl. 4. 152. pl. 29. 154. pl. prohibites a Citation out of the Diocess wherein the Party dwelleth except in certain Cases therein mentioned one whereof is viz. Except for any Spiritual Cause neglected to be done within the Diocess whereunto the Party shall be lawfully cited One Woodward and others who lived in the Diocess of Litchfield and Coventry but occupied Lands in the Diocess of Peterborough were taxed by the Parishioners where they used those Lands for the Bells of the Church and they refusing to pay this Tax a Suit was commenced against them in the Bishop of Peterborough's Court who thereupon suggested this Matter and prayed a Prohibition because they were not to be charged with this Tax it being only for Church Ornaments And a Prohibition was granted the reason given was because 't is a personal charge to which the Inhabitants only are liable and not those who only occupy in that Parish and live in another but the repairing of the Church is a real Charge upon the Land let the Owner live where he will DE Term. Sanct. Trin. Anno 4 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1688. Wright Chief Justice Holloway Justices Powel Justices Allibon Justices The Bishop 's Case Friday June 15th THE King having set forth a Declaration for Liberty of Conscience did on the 4th day of May last by Order of Council enjoyn that the same should be read twice in all Churches c. and that the Bishops should distribute it through their respective Diocesses that it might be read accordingly The Archbishop of Canterbury who then was together with six other Bishops petitioned the King setting forth that this Declaration was founded upon a dispensing Power which had been declared illegal in Parliament and therefore they could not in Honour or Conscience make themselves Parties to the Distribution and Publication of this Declaration who thereupon were summoned before the King in Council and refusing there to give Recognizance to appear before the Court of Kings Bench they were committed to the Tower by Warrant of the Council-Board The Attorney General moved for a Habeas Corpus retornable immediate and the same Morning in which that Motion was made Sir Edward Hales Lieutenant of the Tower returned the same and they were all brought into the Court. The Substance of the Return was viz. That they were committed to his Custody by Warrant under the Hands and Seals of the Lord Chanchellor Jefferies and also naming more of the Lords of the Privy-Council Dominos Concilij for contriving making and publishing a Seditious Libel against the King c. Then it was prayed that the Return might be filed and that the Information which was then exhibited against them for this Crime might be read and that they might all plead instanter Serjeant Pemberton Mr. Finch and Mr. Pollexfen oppsed the reading of it and moved that the Bishops might be discharged because they were not legally before the Court for it appears upon the Return that there is no lawful cause of
Where an Averment may be made of another person so as it consists with the Condition of a Bond. in which Bond the said A. B. the elder and A. B. the younger were joyntly and severally bound in the penal Sum of 1000 l. conditioned that if the above bounden A. B. omitting the word younger do and shall forbear knowingly and wittingly to come to or write Letters unto C. the Wife of D. that then the Obligation to be void The Defendant pleaded that he did not come to or write Letters to the said C. knowingly c. The Plaintiff replied that he exhibited an Information against A. B. the younger shewing in what Term and that it was agreed between them that in consideration that he would forbear to prosecute the same the said A. B. the elder together with A. B. the younger should become bound to the Plaintiff in 1000 l. that the said A. B. the younger should not knowingly or wittingly come into the Company c. then sets forth the Bond and the Condition thereof at large and avers that A. B. in the Condition mentioned is A. B. the younger and farther that the said A. B. the younger did afterwards knowingly come into the Company c. The Defendant re-joyned and said that the Plaintiff ought not to averr that the aforesaid A. B. the younger is the person in the Condition of the said Bond c. And upon a Demurrer the Question was whether the Plaintiff was estopped by the words in the Condition to make such an Averment It was argued for the Plaintiff that he might make such an Averment which is to reduce a thing to a certainty which was very incertain before if it be not repugnant in it self nay sometimes an Averment doth reduce contradictory things to a certainty 'T is plain that A. B. the younger is bound in this Bond the Objection is that A. B. the elder being of the Name and being likewise bound that the Condition might referr to either 'T is agreed there are many Cases where a Man shall be estopped to averr against a Record but this Averment is not contradictory to any thing in the Record for it appears by the Pleadings that the Information was prosecuted against A. B. the younger and therefore he must be intended to be bound not to come to the said C. knowingly c. If an Estate should be devised to A. and the Name of the Testator omitted in the Will 2 Leon. 35. yet the Devise is good by averring of the Name and by proof that it was his intention to give it him by his Will So if the Plaintiff should claim a Title under the Grant of such a person Knight and the Iury find he was an Esquire Lit. Rep. 181 223. but that the Knight and the Esquire are both the same person this is a good Declaration 'T is usual to make an Allegation even against the express words of a Condition to shew the truth of an Agreement Cro. Car. 501. as if Debt be brought upon a Bond of 100 l. conditioned to pay 50 l. within six Months the Defendant pleaded the Statute of Vsury the Plaintiff replied that he lent the Mony for a year and alledged that by the mistake of the Scrivener the Bond was made paiable in six Months The Defendant rejoyned that it was lent for six Months only And upon a Demurrer this was adjudged to be a good Allegation though it was against the very words of the Condition which is a stronger Case than this at the Barr because the Averment consists with the Condition of the Bond. If a Man should levy a Fine and declare the Vses thereof to his Son William and he hath two Sons of that Name 4 Co. 71. 8 Co. 155. a. Dyer 146. then an Averment is made that he intended to declare the Vses to his youngest Son of that Name this Averment out of the Fine hath been adjudged good for the same reason given already which is because it standeth with the words thereof and 't is a good Issue to be tried It cannot be objected that the Bond is illegal being entred into for the not prosecuting of an Information because a Nolle prosequi was entred as to that Matter so 't is the Act of the Court. Lastly It was said that every Estoppel must be certain to every intent which cannot be in this Case for by the words of this Condition 't is incertain which of the Obligors shall be intended E contra It was argued that an Estoppel is as well intended by Law as expressed by Words that if an Averment can be taken yet this is not well because the Plaintiff hath absolutely averred that A. B. in the Condition is A. B. the younger he should have said that A. B. in the Condition is intended A. B. the younger which might have been traversed and Issue taken thereon No Iudgment was given for this Case was ended by Compromise Hoil versus Clerk In the Common-Pleas THIS was a special Verdict in Ejectment for Lands in Wetherfield A subsequent Will though not made pursuant to the Statute is a Revocation of a former in the County of Essex upon the demise of Abigail Pheasant The Iury find that one John Clark was seised in Fee of the Lands in question who by his last Will in writing bearing date the 14th day of September in the year 1666. devised the same to Benjamin Clark for Life so to his first and second Sons c. in Tayl Male and for default of such Issue then to his two Sisters for Life Remainder over c. This Will was attested by one Witness only They find that the said John Clark made another dated the sixth day of February 1672. which was 13 years after the making of his first Will and that by this last Will he revoked all former Wills and Testaments by him made They find an Endorsement on this Will written by the Testator himself in these words Viz. My Will and Testament dated the 6th of February 1679. and then published by me in the presence of three Witnesses They find that this last Will was so published and attested by three Witnesses in his presence but that it was not signed by the Testator in their presence They find that Benjamin Clark entred and devised the Lands to Mary Micklethwaite who made a Lease thereof to the Plaintiff for three years upon whom the Defendant entred This Case was argued at the Bar and in this Term at the Bench Seriatim The single Question was 29 Car. 2. cap. 3. whether this last Will not being duly executed according to the Statute is a Revocation of the first Will or not It was admitted by all that it was a good Will to pass the personal Estate but as to the point of Revocation the Court was divided Iustice Lutwitch argued that it was not a Revocation He agreed that if the last Will hath any respect to the first it must be as a
Indebitatus Ass will lye for a Fine upon an Admission c. That a Fine was due to him for an admission That upon the death of the said Lord the Manor descended to W. as his Son and Heir who died and the Plaintiff as Executor to the Heir brought an Indebitatus Assumpsit for this Fine He declared also that the Defendant was indebted to him in 25 l. for a reasonable Fine c. The Plaintiff had a Verdict and entire Damages and it was now moved in arrest of Iudgment that an Indebitatus will not lie for a Customary Fine because it doth not arise upon any Contract of the Parties but upon the Tenure of the Land for upon the death of the Lord there is a Relief paid for there must be some personal Contract to maintain an Action of Debt or an Indebitatus Assumpsit 2 Cro. 599. Jones 339. and therefore it was held that where the Plaintiff locasset a Ware-house to the Defendant he promised to pay 8 s. per Week An Assumpsit was brought for this Rent and a Verdict for the Plaintiff And a Motion was made in Arrest of Iudgment that this was a Lease at Will and the weekly payment was in the nature of a Rent and it was agreed that an Assumpsit would not lie for a Rent reserved because it sounds in the Realty but because it was only a Promise in consideration of the occupying of the Warehouse the Action was held to be well brought 2. Where the Cause of an Action is not grounded upon a Contract but upon some special Matter there an Indebitatus Assumpsit will not lie and therefore it will not lie upon a Bill of Exchange or upon an Award or for Rent though there is a Privity both of Contract and Estate without a special Assumpsit E contra E contra It was argued that the Action lies for though a Fine savours of the Realty yet 't is a certain Duty In all Cases where Debt will lie upon a simple Contract there an Assumpsit will lie likewise 't is true this doth concern the Inheritance but yet 't is a Contract that the Tenant shall be admitted paying the Fine It hath been also maintained for Mony had and received out of the Office of Register for the Plaintiffs use and for Scavage Mony due to the Mayor and Commonalty of London 3 Keb. 677. which is also an Inheritance 'T is a Contract implyed by Law and therefore the Action is well brought Afterwards in Michaelmas Term 1 Willielmi Mariae by the Opinion of Iustice Dolben 2 Leon. 79. Eyre and Gregory Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff But the Chief Iustice was of another Opinion for he held that if the Defendant had died indebted to another by Bond and had not Assets besides what would fatisfie this Fine if the Executor had paid it to the Plaintiff it would have been a Devastavit in him Suppose the Defendant promiseth that in consideration that the Plaintiff would demise to him certain Lands that then he would pay the Rent If the Defendant pleads Non Assumpsit Cro. Car. Acton versus Symonds the Plaintiff must prove an express Promise or be Non suit Also here is no Tenure or Custom set out Yet by the Opinion of the other three Iustices the Plaintiff had his Iudgment Rex versus Johnson INformation upon the Statute of 29 30 Car. 2. cap. 1. Pardon after a Verdict for the King excuseth the Forfeiture prohibiting the Importation of several French Commodities and amongst the rest Lace under the Penalty of 100 l. to be paid by the Importer and 50 l. by the Vendor and the Goods to be forfeited The Information sets forth that a Packet containing so many yards of Lace was imported by the Defendant from France and that he did conceal it to hinder the Seisure and that he did privately sell it contra formam Statuti Vpon Not-Guilty pleaded the King had a Verdict and on the 2d of October there came forth a general Pardon in which were these Words viz. That the Subjects shall not be sued or vexed c. in their Bodies Goods or Chattels Lands or Tenements for any Matter Cause or Contempt Misdemeanour Forfeiture Offence or any other thing heretofore done committed or omitted against us Except all Concealments Frauds Corruptions Misdemanours and Offences whereby we or our late Brother have been deceived in the Collection payment or answering of our Revenues or any part thereof or any other Mony due or to be due to us or received for us or him and all Forfeitures Penalties and Nomine Poena's thereupon arising and all Indictments and Informations or other Process and Proceedings now depending or to be depending thereupon The Question now was whether this Forfeiture was excused by this Pardon The Attorney General argued that it was not because an Interest is vested in the King by the Iudgment and that no particular or general Pardon shall divest it without words of Restitution So was Tooms's Case who had Iudgment against another 1 Sand. 361. and then became Felo de se his Administrator brought a Scire Facias quare Executionem non haberet The Debtor pleaded that after the Iudgment the Intestate hanged himself which was found by the Coroners Enquest returned into this Court. The Plaintiff replied the Act of Pardon But it was adjudged for the Defendant for when the Inquisition was returned then the Debt was vested in the King which could not be divested without particular words of Restitution and which were wanting in that Act of Pardon The most proper word in the Body of this Pardon which seems to excuse the Defendant is the word Offence but the same word is likewise in the Exception viz. Except all Offences c. in collecting or paying of Mony due to us and all Forfeitures c. Now the concealing of forfeited Goods from Seisure is an Offence excepted for 't is a remedy for the King's Duty of which he was hindred by the Concealment 'T is true the first part of the Pardon excuseth all Misdemeanours comitted against the King in his standing Revenue but this Exception takes in all Concealments and Frauds in answering of the Revenue and this Information is principally grounded upon Fraud 5 Co. 56. so that the Exception ought to be taken as largely for the King as the Pardon it self to discharge the Subject No Fraud tending to the diminution of the Revenue is pardoned for it excepts not only all Concealments in collecting the Revenue but other Mony due or to be due to the King If therefore when the King is entituled by Inquisition Office or Record there must be express and not general words to pardon it and since this Fact was committed before the Pardon came out and so found by the Iury whose Verdict is of more value than an Enquest of Office so that the King by this means is entituled to the Goods by Record
Cattle to be his own sciens the same to be the Goods of another or that he sold them to the Plaintiff fraudulenter deceptive or that there was any Warranty for this Action will not lie upon a bare Communication But notwithstanding these Exceptions the Plaintiff had his Iudgment it might have been good upon Demurrer but after Verdict 't is well enough Lea versus Libb IN Ejectione firmae for Lands in Hampshire Two Witnesses to a Will and two to a Codicil one whereof was a Witness to the Will these are not three Witnesses to the Will it self the Iury found a special Verdict the substance of which was this viz. That the Lessor of the Plaintiff was Heir at Law to one John Denham his Ancestor who being seised in Fee of the Lands in question did by Will bearing date the 28th day of January in the year 1678. devise the same to the Defendant which he subscribed and published in the presence of two Witnesses and they likewise attested it in his presence They find that on the 29th day of December 1679. he made another Will or Codicil in Writing reciting that he had made a former Will and confirming the same except what was excepted in the Codicil and declared his Will to be that the Codicil should be taken and adjudged as part of his Will They find that he published this Codicil in the presence likewise of two Winesses one of which was Witness to the first Will bue the other was a new Man They find that these were distinct Writings c. The Question was whether this was a good Will attested by three Witnesses since one of the Witnesses to the Codicil was likewise a Witness to the Will so that the new Man if any must make the third Witness Serjeant Thompson argued that it was not a good Will The Clause of the Statute is That all Devises of Lands shall be in Writing and signed by the Testator in the presence of three Witnesses and they to attest it in his presence But here are not three subscribing Witnesses in the presence of the Testator so that the first Will must be void for one of the Witnesses to the Codicil did never see that Will Besides the Codicil is not the same thing with the Will 't is a confirmation of it and this being in a Case wherein an Heir is to be disinherited ought not to have a favourable Construction Attorney General contra A Will may be contained in several Writings and yet but one entire Will 'T is true if it be attested only by two Witnesses 't is not good but if the Testator call in a third person and he attests that individual Witing in his presence this is a good Will though the Witnesses were not all present together and at the same time for there is the Credit of three persons to such a Will which is according to the intent of the Statute And therefore it cannot be objected that these are distinct Wills or that the Papers are not annexed for no such thing is required by Law for a Man may make his Will in several Sheets of Paper and if the Witnesses subscribe the last Sheet 't is well enough or if he doth put up all the Sheets in a blank piece of Paper and the Witnesses attest that Sheet 't is a good Will In these Cases the intent of the Law-makers must and ought to be chiefly regarded and for what reasons and purposes such Laws were made and what Iudgments have been given in parallel Cases If a Man grants a Rent-Charge to his youngest Son for Life 2 Cro. 144. Noy 117. and afterwards devises that he shall have the Rent as expressed in the Grant Now though the Writing was no part of the Will but of another nature yet the Will referring to the Deed is a good Devise of the Rent-charge within the Statute of Wills But in this Case the Codicil is part of the Will 't is of the same nature and being made animo restandi the end of the Statute is performed for both Will and Codicil joined together make a good Devise the first was a Will to all purposes it only wanted that circumstance of a third Witness to attest it which the Testator compleated after by calling in of a third person for that purpose Curia If a Man makes a Will in several pieces of Paper and there are three Witnesses to the last Paper and none of them did ever see the first this is not a good Will Afterwards in Hillary-Term Iudgment was given that this was not a good Will Tippet versus Hawkey TIppet the Elder and his Son covenant with John Hawkey to sell and convey Land to him free from all Incumbrances and that they will levy a Fine c. and deliver up Writings Where two covenant the Action may be brought in the name of one Item 'T is agreed between the Parties that the said Hawkey shall pay to Tippet the younger so much Mony c. The Action is brought in the name of both and upon a Demurrer to the Declaration it was held ill for the Duty is vested in Tipper the younger and he only ought to have brought this Action Iudgment for the Defendant Rees versus Phelps DEBT upon a Bond conditioned for performance of an Award Award where good Vpon nullum fecerunt arbitrium pleaded the Plaintiff replied and shewed an Award that the Defendant should pay 5 l. to the Plaintiff presently and give Bond for the payment of 10 l. more on the 29th day of November following and that this should be for and towards the Charges and Expences in and about certain differences then depending between the Parties and that they should now sign general Releases And upon a Demurrer it was argued to be a void Award because mutual Releases were then to be given which would discharge the Bond payable in November following 1 Roll. Abr. 259 260. But the Court held it to be good for the Releases shall discharge such Matters only which were depending at the time of the Submission Godfrey al' versus Eversden THere was a Parish Church and a Chappel of Ease in the Parish of Hitchen Prohibition denied upon Suggestion that there was a Chappel of Ease and so ought not to repair the Parish Church the Defendant was taxed towards the Repairs of the Church and a Livel was brought against him for the refusing of the payment of that Tax He now suggests that there was a Chappel of Ease in the same Parish to which the Inhabitants do go and that they have always repaired that Chappel and so prayed a Prohibition But Serjeant Tremain moved for a Consultation because the Parishioners of common right ought to repair the Church and though there is a Chappel of Ease in the same Parish yet that ought not to excuse them from repairing of the Mother Church He produced an Affidavit that there had been no Divine Service there for
ought to be left out and of that Opinion was the Court and therefore a Rule was made that he might discontinue this Action without Costs Mordant versus Thorold Hill 1 2 Gulielmi Rotulo 340. THE Plaintiff brought a Scire Fac. upon a Iudgment The Case was thus Viz. Ann Thorold recovered in Dower against Sir John Thorold in which Action Damages are given by the Statute of Merton 20 H. 3. c. 1. Sir John Thorold brought a Writ of Error in B. R. and the Iudgment was affirmed Then the Plaintiff in Dower brought a Writ of Enquiry for the Damages and married Mr. Mordant and died before that Writ was executed Mr. Mordant takes out Letters of Administration to his Wife and brought a Sci. Fa. upon the Iudgment and the question was whether it would lie This depended upon the construction of the Statute of King Charles the II. which enacts That in all personal Actions 17 Car. 2. c. 8. and real and mixt the death of either party between the Verdict and the Iudgment shall not hereafter be alledged for Error so as such Iudgment be entred within two Terms after such Verdict Serjeant Pemberton insisted that this was a judicial Writ and that the Administrator had a right to it though the Wife died before the Profits were ascertained by the Writ of Enquiry 't is no more than a plain Sci. Fa. upon a Iudgment which an Executor may have and which was never yet denied though this seems to be a Case of the first Impression The Council on the other side argued that 't is true an Executor may have a Scire Facias upon a Iudgment recovered in the life of the Testator by reason only of such Recovery but this Scire Facias is brought for what never was recovered because the Wife died before any thing was vested in her for the Iudgment will stand so as to effect the Lands but not for the Damages Curia When a Statute which gives a remedy for mean Profits is expounded it ought to be according to the Common Law Now where entire Damages are to be recovered and the Demandant dies before a Writ of Enquiry executed the Executor cannot have any remedy by a Scire Facias upon that Iudgment because Damages are no duty till they are assessed Sed adjornatur DE Term. Sanctae Trin. Anno 2 Gulielmi Mariae Regis Reginae in Banco Regis 1690. Shotter versus Friend Vxor ' Hill 2 Willielmi Rot. 39. THE Plaintiff and his Wife declared upon a Prohibition setting forth Proof by one Witness good in the Spiritual Court that John Friend on the 13th of October 22 Car. 2. made his Will by which he bequeathed to Mary Friend 10 l. to be paid to her within two years after his decease and that he made Jane the Wife of the Plaintiff Shotter Executrix and dyed that the said Executrix whilst sole and unmarried paid the said Legacy to Mary Friend who is since dead that Thomas Friend the Husband of the said Mary did after her death demand this Legacy in the Consistory Court of the Bishop of Winton that the Plaintiff pleaded payment and offered to prove it by one single Witness which Proof that Court refused though the Witness was a person without Exception and thereupon Sentence was given there against the Plaintiff which Sentence was now pleaded and upon Demurrer to the Plea The Question was whether upon the whole matter the Defendant should have a Consultation or whether a Prohibition should be granted because the proof by one Witness was denied by that Court. It was argued that the Defendant should not have a Consultation because Matters Testamentary ought to have no more favour than things relating to Tythes in which Cases the Proof by one Witness hath been always held good So 't is in a Release to discharge a Debt which is well proved by a single Testimony and it would be very inconvenient if it should be otherwise for Feoffments and Leases may come in question which must not be rejected because proved by one Witness A Modus decimandi comes up to this Case upon the Suggestion whereof Prohibitions are never denied and the chief reason is because the Spiritual Court will not allow a Modus to be any discharge of Tythes of Kind The Courts of Equity in Westminster-Hall give Relief upon a Proof by one Witness so likewise do the Courts of the Common Law if the Witness is a good and credible person 'T is true a Prohibition shall not go upon a Suggestion that the Ecclesiastical Court will not receive the Testimony of a single Witness If the Question is upon Proof of a Legacy devised or Marriage or not or any other thing which originally doth lie in the Cognizance of that Court but payment or not payment is a matter of Fact triable at the Law and not determinable there if therefore they deny to take the Evidence of a single Witness a Prohibition ought to go 2 Inst 608. 2. The Sentence is no obstacle in this Case because the Plaintiff had no Right to a Prohibition until the Testimony of his Witness was denied and Sentence thereupon given and this is agreeable to what hath been often done in cases of like nature As for instance Cro. Eliz. 88. Moor 907. Prohibitions have been granted where the Proof of a Release of a Legacy by one Witness was denyed So where the Proof of payment of Cythes for Pidgeons was denied upon the like Testimony Cro. Eliz. 666. Moor 413. 2 Rol. Rep. 439. 2 Rol Abr. 300. pl. 9. 299 pl. 14 17. Yelv. 92. Latch 117. 3 Bulst 242. Hutt 22. So where a Suit was for Subtraction of Cythes and the Defendant pleaded that he set them out and offered to prove it by by one Witness but was denied a Prohibition was granted And generally the Books are that if the Spiritual Court refuse such Proof which is allowed at the Common Law they shall be prohibited There is one Case against this Opinion which is that of Roberts in 12 Co. 12 Co. 65. Rep. but it was only a bare Surmise and of little Authority Those who argued on the other side held that a Consultation shall go E contra and that for two Reasons 1. Because a Prohibition is prayed after Sentence 2. Because the Ecclesiastical Court have an original Iurisdiction over all Testamentary things As to the first Point 'T is plain that if that Court proceed contrary to those Rules which are used and practised at the Common Law yet no Prohibition ought to go after Sentence but the proper remedy is an Appeal 2. It cannot be denied but that that Court had Cognizance of the principal matter in this Case which was a Legacy and Payment or not is a thing collateral Now wherever they have a proper Iurisdiction of a Cause both that and all its dependences shall be tried according to their Law which rejects the Proof by a single Witness
3 Willielmi Judicium Iudgment was given for the Defendant absente Dolbin Iustice who was also of the same Opinion It was held that the Custom was well alledged both as to the manner and matter 't is true all Customs must have reasonable beginnings but it would be very difficult to assign a lawful commencement for such a Custom as this is so it would be for the Custom of Gavelkind or Burrough English which are circumscribed to particular places and since 't is sufficient to alledge a Custom by reason of the place where t is used it may be as reasonable in this Case to say that there hath been an ancient Ferry-Boat kept in this place 't is but only an inducement to the Custom which did not consist so much in having a Right to the Passage as to be discharged of Toll This might have a lawful beginning either by a Grant of the Lord to the Ancestors of the Defendant or by the agreement of the Inhabitants A Custom alledged for all the Occupiers of a Close in such a Parish to have a Foot-way Cro. Car. 419. Co. Lit. 110. b. Cro. Eliz. 746. 1 Roll. Rep. 216. c. is not good the reason is because the Plaintiff ought to prescribe in him who hath the Inheritance but where a thing is of necessity and no manner of profit or charge in the Soil of another but only a thing in discharge or for a Way to a Market or to be quit of Toll in such cases not only a particular person but the Inhabitaints of a Vill may alledge a Prescription This may be as well alledged as a Custom to turn a Plow upon another mans Land or for a Fisherman to mend his Nets there 'T is good as to the matter for 't is only an easment 't is like a Custom alledged for a Gateway or Watercourse and for such things Inhabitants of a Vill Cro. Eliz. 441. or all the Parishioners of a Parish may alledge a Custom or Vsage in the place 2. Point But as to the Plea in Bar 't is not good because the execting of a Bridge is but laying out a Way t is a voluntary act and no man by reason of his own act can be discharged of what he is to do upon the interest he hath in the Ferry If the Defendant had petitioned the King to destroy the Ferry and got a Patent to erect a Bridge and had brought a Writ ad quod dampnum and it had been found by inquisition to be no damage to the People then he might safely have built this Bridge 3. But notwithstanding the Plea is not good yet the Plaintiff can have no advantage of it because he cannot have an Action on the Case for this matter for by his own shewing 't is a common Passage Cro. Car. 132 167. 1 Inst 56. a. Cro. Eliz. 664. 13 Co. 33. Davis 57. which is no more than a common High-way now for disturbing him in such a Passage no Action on the Case will lie unless he had alledged some particular damage done to himself for if he could maintain such an Action any other person is entituled to the like and this would be to multiply Suits which the Law will not allow but hath provided a more apt and convenient remedy which is by presentment in the Leet If Toll had been extorted from him F. N. B. 94. 22 H. 6.12 then an Action on the Case had been the proper remedy but no such thing appeared upon this Declaration Prince 's Case THE Suggestion in a Prohibition was that Prince was seized of the Rectory of Shrewsby ut de feodo jure and that he being so seised de jure ought to present a Vicar to the said place but that the Bishop of the Diocess had of his own accord appointed a person thereunto This Exception was taken to it viz. He doth not say that he was Impropriator but only that he was seised of the Rectory in Fee so it not appearing that he had it Impropriate he ought no to present the Vicar Iustice Dolben replied That in several places in Middlesex the Abbots of Westminster did send Monks to say Mass and so the Vicaridges were not endowed but he put in and displaced whom he pleased That he had heard my Lord Chief Iustice Hales often say that the Abbot had as much reason to displace such Men as he had his Butler or other Servant Curia Declare upon the Prohibition and try the Cause Harrison versus Hayward Pasch 2 Gulielmi Rot. 187. AN Agreement was made to assign a Stock upon Request When a thing is to be done upon request the performance must be when the person requires it and the Defendant cannot plead that he was ready to assign after the promise made and for non-performance an Action was now brought setting forth the Agreement and that the Plaintiff did request the Defendant at such a time c. The Defendant pleaded that he was ready to assign the Stock after the promise made c. and upon a Demurrer it was ruled if the thing was not to be done upon Request then the Defendant was bound to do it in a convenient time after the promise but it being to be done upon request the time when the Plaintiff will require the performance of the Agreement is the time when the Defendant must do it Iudgment pro Quer. Thompson versus Leach WRit of Error upon a Iudgment in Ejectment given in the Common-Pleas Surrender not good without acceptance of the Surrendree 2 Vent 198. the Case upon the special Verdict was thus Viz. Simon Leach was Tenant for Life of the Lands in question with Remainder in contingency to his first second and third Son in Tail Male Remainder to Sir Simon Leach in Tail c. This Settlement was made by the Will of Nicholas Leach who was seised in Fee The Tenant for Life two months before he had a Son born did in the absence of Sir Simon Leach the Remainder man in Tail seal and deliver a Writing by which he did Grant Surrender and Release the Lands which he had for Life to the use of Sir Simon Leach and his Heirs and continued in possession five years afterwards and then and not before Sir Simon Leach did accept and agree to this Surrender and entred upon the Premisses But that about four years before he thus agreed to it Simon Leach the Tenant for Life had a Son born named Charles Lessor of the Plaintiff to whom the Remainder in contingency was thus limited The Tenant for Life died then Sir Simon Leach suffered a Common Recovery in order to bar those Remainders 1. The Question was whether this was a legal and good Surrender of the Premisses to vest the Freehold immediately in Sir Simon Leach without his Assent before Charles Leach the Son of Simon Leach the Surrenderor was born so as to make him a good Tenant to the Precipe upon which the Recovery was
certain or 't is not good 134 4. Must be taken strictly when it goes to the destruction of an Estate 224 5. A Custom that every Copyholder who leases his Land shall forfeit it doth not bind an Infant 229 6. Amongst Merchants where it must be particularly set forth 226 7. It must be certain and therefore where it was laid for an Infant to sell his Land when he can measure an Ell of Cloth 't is void for the incertainty 290 8. To have solam separalem pasturam hath been held good 291 9. Prescription must have a lawful commencement but 't is sufficient for a Custom to be certain and reasonable 292 10. Whether a Custom likewise ought to have a lawful commencement 293 D. Damages See Ejectment 3. Ioint Action 2. Trespass 2. Baron and Feme brought an Action for words spoken of the Wife and concluded ad damnum ipsorum 't is good for if she survive the Damages will go to her 120 Det See Admittance 5. Assignment 1. Iudgment 1. Quantum meruit Where 't is brought upon a Specialty for less than the whole Sum it must be shewed how the other was discharged 41 2. Whether it lies for a Fine upon an admission to a Copyhold Estate for it doth not arise upon any Contract 240 3. There must be a personal Contract or a Contract implyed by Law to maintain an Action of Debt ibid. Deceit See Action on the Case Deputy See Office 6 7 9. Devise See Tail Where it shall not be extended by implication 82 2. Where the word Estate passeth a Fee where not 45 105. 3. I give All to my Mother passeth only an Estate for Life for the Particle All is a Relative without a Substantive 32 4. To A. and the Testator's Name is omitted in the Will yet 't is good by averring his Name and proving his Intention to devise it 217 5. The Testator after several Specifick Legacies and Devises of Lands gave all the rest and remaining part of his Estate c. by those Words the Reversion in Fee passed 228 6. By the Devise of an Hereditament the Reversion in Fee passeth 229 Disseisin See Election 1. Interest 2. The Son Purchased in Fee and was disseised by his Father who made a Feoffment with Warranty the Son is bound for ever 91 2. Lessor made a Lease for Life and died his Son suffered a Common Recovery this is a Disseisin ibid. 3. Where an Estate for Life or years cannot be gained by a Disseisin ibid. 4. A wrongful Entry is never satisfied with any particular Estate nor can gain any thing but a Fee-simple 92 Distribution Before the Statute if there was but one Child he had a right of Administration but it was only personal so that if he died before Administration his Executor could not have it 62 E. Ejectment THE Demise was laid to be the 12th of Junii habendum a praed duodecimo die Junii which must be the 13th day by vertue whereof he entred and that the Defendant Postea eod 12 die Junii did Eject him which must be before the Plaintiff had any Title for his Lease commenced on the 13th day not good 199 2. De uno Messuagio sive Tenemento not good because the word Tenementum is of an incertain signification but with this addition vocat ' the Black Swan 't is good 238 3. If the Term should expire pending the Suit the Plaintiff may proceed for his Damages for though the Action is expired quoad the possession yet it continues for the Damages 249 Election Where the Cause of Action ariseth in two places the Plaintiff may choose to try it where he pleases 165 2. Tenant at Will made a Lease for years the Lessee entreth this is no disseisin but at the Election of him who had the Interest in it 197 Entry In Feoffments Partitions and Exchanges which are Conveyances at the Common Law no Estate is changed until actual Entry 297 2. Lease for years not good without Entry 297 3. Tenant for Life Remainder in Tail Male levied a Fine and made a Feoffment having but one Son then born and afterwards had another Son the eldest died without Issue the Contingent Remainder to the second was not destroy'd by this Feoffment for it was preserved by the right of Entry which his elder Brother had at the time of the Feoffment made 305 Escape Debt upon an Escape would not lie at the Common Law against the Goaler it was given by the Statute of W. 2. 145 2. The superior Officer is liable to the voluntary Escapes suffered by his Deputy unless the Deputation is for life 146 3. If an Escape is by negligence it must be particularly found 151 4. A person was in Execution upon an erroneous Judgment and escaped and Judgment and Execution was had against the Gaoler and then the first Judgment was reversed yet that against the Gaoler shall stand 325 Evidence See Witness An Affidavit made in Chancery shall not be read as Evidence but only as a Letter unless Oath is made by a Witness that he was present when it was taken before the Master 36 2. What shall be Evidence of a fraudulent Settlement ibid. 3. An Answer of a Guardian in Chancery shall not be read as Evidence to conclude an Infant 259 4. Whether the return of the Commissioners in a Chancery Cause that the person made Oath before them is sufficient Evidence to convict of Perjury 116 5. Whether a true Copy of an Affidavit made before the Chief Justice is sufficient to convict the person for the like Offence 117 6. A Verdict may be given in Evidence between the same Parties but not where there are different persons unless they are all united in the same interest 142 7. Conviction for having two Wives shall not be given in Evidence to prove the unlawfulness of a Marriage but the Writ must go to the Bishop because at Law one Jury may find it no Marriage and another otherwise 164 Exchange Ought to be executed by each Party in their Life time otherwise 't is void 135 Excommunication Stat. 5 Eliz. For not coming to the Parish Church the Penalties shall not incurr if the person hears Divine Service in any other Church 42 2. The Causes are enumerated in the Statute which must be contained in the Significavit otherwise the Penalties are not to incurr 89 Executor See Grants Notice 5. Whether an Executor de son tort can have any interest in a Term for years 91 93 2. An Executor may sell the Goods before Probate 92 3. May pay Debt upon a simple Contract before a Bond of which he had no notice 115 4. Whether an Action of Debt will lie against an Executor upon a Mutuatus 5. By what words he hath an Authority only without an Interest in the thing devised 209 210 6. He had both Goods of his Testator and of his own and granted omnia bona sua that which he hath as Executor will not pass for
4. It will lie for such words for which an Action will not 139 5. For a Riot in unduly electing of an Alderman of Bristol not being summoned by the Mayor 5 6. Exception to it viz. doth not say that 't is antiqua Villa or whether it was a Corporation by Charter or Prescription of which the Court cannot judicially take notice if not shewn 5 7. Doth not say that any Charter was granted to the City of Bristol where the Riot was supposed to be committed 7 8. Must be very exact and certain for 't is not aided by any Statute of Ieofails ibid. 9. For treasonable words preached in a Sermon viz. We have had two wicked Kings together c. whether good without some preceding discourse of the King 53 54 69 10. For Subornation of Perjury in perswading another to swear and doth not set forth that the Oath was made that it might appear that the thing sworn was false 122 11. Quashed because the words per Sacramentum duodecim proborum legalium hominum were left out ibid. 12. For using a Trade not being an Apprentice upon 5 Eliz. and doth not averr that it was a Trade used before the making of the Act 152 13. For not serving upon a Wardmote Enquest quashed for incertainty 168 14. For Perjury by the Name of A. B. de Parochia de Algate and did not shew in what County it was for which reason it was held not good 139 15. In Indictments there must be an addition to the person and place viz. To the person of what Estate and Degree he is To the place viz in what Hamlet Town Place and County he liveth 139 16. Caption was coram Justiciariis ad pacem dicti Domini Regis conservand ' and did not say nunc whether good ibid. 17. For Burglary the very day need not be set down for if it be either before or after the Offence the Jury ought to find according to the truth 141 18. 'T is sufficient to lay the Fact to be committed in Parochia c. without laying a Vill though Parish is an Ecclesiastical division 158 19. Per Sacramentum 12 praesentat ' existit modo forma sequen ' Midd. viz. Juratores pro Domino Rege praesentant it should have been praesentat ' existit quod c. and not modo forma quashed 201 20. The certainty of the Fact ought to be particularly alledged if for Murder it must be alledged that a Stroak was given 202 21. Pardon was pleaded and Judgment quod Defendens eat sine die but being convicted of Manslaughter his Goods were forfeited and though he was out of the Court by this Pardon and Judgment yet the Indictment was quashed upon a Motion for a fault in it and this was to prevent the Seisure 202 22. Two were indicted for a Confederacy one of them was acquitted and the other found guilty the acquittal of one is the discharge of the other 220 Inducement In Trover the Contract is but Inducement the Cause of Action is upon the Conversion 322 Inferior Court See Court Infant See Copyhold 2. Custom 5 7. Evidence 3. After three Proclamations in a Court Baron of a Mannor he did not come to be admitted to a Copy-hold Estate and held no Forfeiture 223 2. Had an Estate upon Condition to be performed by him and 't is broken during his Minority the Estate is gon for ever 222 224 226 3. The Law will not allow the Priviledge of Infancy to work a wrong to any body 222 226 4. Shall not be prejudiced by the Latches of another but shall be answerable for himself 222 223 5. Custom to be admitted after three Proclamations will not barr him if beyond Sea 222 6. He is not obliged to be admitted during his Infancy 223 7. His Feoffment is no Forfeiture at the Common Law ibid. 8. If he doth not present to a Church within six Months it shall lapse ibid. 9 He may be admitted to a Copy-hold but not obliged to pay the Fine during his Nonage 224 10 May be bound by acts of Necessity and by some Customs ibid. 11 Where he hath a right it shall be preserved after a Fine and Non-claim but he hath no right before admittance to a Copyhold 226 12. Cases of Coverture and Infancy are guided by the same reason of Law so are Cases of Infants and Lunaticks ibid. 13. Where he brought an Audita Querela to avoid a Statute entred into by him in his minority 229 14. A Surrender made by an Infant is void 303 15. Where Acts done by him are void in themselves where voidable 307 16. When he is made Defendant he must appear by Guardian and not by Attorny for he hath not capacity to choose one the appearance by Guardian is the Act of the Court when he is Plaintiff he may sue per Prochein Amy 236 17. Whether in Replevin one of them who made Cognizance being an Infant may do it per Attornatum it may be pleaded in Abatement 248 18. If he is Administrator he may bring an Action of Debt per Attornatum because he sueth in the right of another 248 19. Where he recovers as Plaintiff the Defendant shall not assign infancy for Error ibid. 20. Answer of his Guardian in Chancery shall not be read as Evidence at Law to conclude him 259 21. He is not capable to take a Surrender because he cannot give his assent which is an essential requisite to a Surrender 298 22. Release by an Infant Executor is no bar for it worketh the destruction of his Estate 303 23. Cannot surrender a future Interest by his acceptance of a new Lease or make an absolute Surrender of a Term by Deed 304 Information For a Forgery brought against a Coroner who inserted the Names of two persons in an Indictment upon his Enquest for a Murder whom the Jury had not found Guilty 66 2. For a Riot in breaking a Bank and diverting a Watercourse the Jury found quoad fractionem Ripae guilty and quoad Riotam not guilty for which reason the Judgment was arrested 73 3. For going Armed to terrifie the People 't is an Offence at Common Law 118 4. For forging quoddam scriptum per quod A. was bound which cannot be if the Bond was forged 104 5. For Perjury in a Deposition taken before Commissioners in Chancery whether they ought to be present to testifie that the Defendant is the same person 116 6. An Information of Perjury will not lye against a Person for Swearing to the value of Lands if not true 134 7. Upon the 5th of Eliz. against a Turkey-Merchant for imploying Men in his House to dress Cloath it was held to be exercising the Trade of a Cloath-Worker 315 Inn-Keeper See Pleading 11. Inquisition See Melius Inquirendum Found to be an Ideot per spatium octo Annorum those words are surplusage for he must be so a nativitate 44 2. Quashed because the year of the King was omitted 80 3. Taken