be admitted sufficient causes to remand persons to prison To those Objections made by the Prisoners Council against the Retorn as too general 1. It hath been said That Institutum est quod non inquiratur de discretione Judicis 2. That the Court of Sessions in London is not to be look'd on as an inferiour Court having all the Judges Commissioners that the Court having heard the Evidence it must be credited that the Evidence given to the Iury of the Fact was clear and not to be doubted As for any such Institution pretended I know no such nor believe any such as it was applyed to the present cause but taking it in another and in the true sense I admit it for truth that is when the King hath constituted any man a Iudge under him his ability parts fitness for his place are not to be reflected on censured defamed or vilified by any other person being allowed and stampt with the Kings Approbation to whom only it belongs to judge of the fitness of his Ministers And such scandalous Assertions or Inquiries upon the Judges of both Benches is forbidden by the Statute of Scandalum Magnatum 2 R. 2. c. 5. Nor must we upon supposition only 2 R. 2. c. 5. either admit Judges deficient in their Office for so they should never do any thing right nor on the other side must we admit them unerring in their places for so they should never do any thing wrong And in that sense the saying concerns not the present Case But if any man thinks that a person concern'd in Interest by the Iudgment Action or Authority exercis'd upon his person or fortunes by a Judge must submit in all or any of these to the implyed discretion and unerringness of his Judge without seeking such redress as the Law allows him it is a perswasion against common Reason the received Law and usage both of this Kingdome and almost all others If a Court Inferiour or Superiour hath given a false or erroneous Iudgment is any thing more frequent than to reverse such Iudgments by Writs of False Judgment of Error or Appeals according to the course of the Kingdome If they have given corrupt and dishonest Iudgments they have in all Ages been complained of to the King in the Starr-Chamber or to the Parliament Andrew Horne in his Mirror of Justices Hornes Mirror f. 296. mentions many Judges punisht by King Alfred before the Conquest for corrupt Iudgments and their particular Names and Offences which could not be had but from the Records of those times Our Stories mention many punisht in the time of Edward the First our Parliament Rolls of Edward the Third's time of Richard the Second's Time for the pernicious Resolutions given at Nottingham Castle afford Examples of this kind In latter times the Parliament Journals of 18 and 21 Jac. the Iudgment of the Ship-mony in the time of Charles the First question'd and the particular Judges impeacht These Instances are obvious and therefore I but mention them In cases of retorns too general upon Writs of Habeas Corpus of many I could urge I will instance in two only One Astwick brought by Habeas Corpus to the Kings Bench 9 El. Moore f. 837. was retorn'd to be committed per Mandatum Nicholai Bacon Militis domini Custodis magni Sigilli Angliae virtute cujusdam Contemptus in Curia Cancellar facti and was presently bail'd 13 Jac. Moore f. 839. One Apsley Prisoner in the Fleet upon a Habeas Corpus was retorn'd to be committed per considerationem Curiae Cancellar pro contemptu eidem Curiae illato and upon this retorn set at liberty In both these Cases no inquiry was made or consideration had whether the Contempts were to the Law Court or equitable Court of Chancery either was alike to the Judges lest any man should think a difference might arise thence The reason of discharging the Prisoners upon those retorns was the generality of them being for Contempts to the Court but no particular of the Contempt exprest whereby the Kings Bench could judge whether it were a cause for commitment or not And was it not as supposeable and as much to be credited That the Lord Keeper and Court of Chancery did well understand what was a Contempt deserving commitment as it is now to be credited that the Court of Sessions did understand perfectly what was full and manifest Evidence against the persons indicted at the Sessions and therefore it needed not to be reveal'd to us upon the retorn Hence it is apparent That the Commitment and Retorn pursuing it being in it self too general and uncertain we ought not implicitly to think the Commitment was re vera for cause particular and sufficient enough because it was the Act of the Court of Sessions And as to the other part That the Court of Sessions in London is not to be resembled to other inferiour Courts of Oyer and Terminer because all the Judges are commission'd here which is true but few are there at the same time and as I have heard when this Tryal was none of them were present However persons of great quality are in the Commissions of Oyer and Terminer through the Shires of the Kingdom and always some of the Judges nor doth one Commission of Oyer and Terminer differ in its Essence Nature and Power from another if they be general Commissions but all differ in the Accidents of the Commissioners which makes no alteration in their actings in the eye of Law Another fault in the retorn is That the Jurors are not said to have acquitted the persons indicted against full and manifest Evidence corruptly and knowing the said Evidence to be full and manifest against the persons indicted for how manifest soever the Evidence was if it were not manifest to them and that they believ'd it such it was not a finable fault nor deserving imprisonment upon which difference the Law of punishing Jurors for false Verdicts principally depends A passage in Bracton is remarkable to this purpose concerning Attainting Inquests Committit Jurator perjurium propter falsum Sacramentum Bracton l. 4. c. 4. f. 288. b. ut si ex certa scientia aliter Juraverit quam res in veritate se habuerit si autem Sacramentum fatuum fuerit licet falsum tamen non committit perjurium licet re vera res aliter se habeat quam juraverat quia jurat secundum conscientiam eo quod non vadit contra mentem Sunt quidam qui verum dicunt mentiendo sed se pejerant quia contra mentem vadunt The same words and upon the same occasion Fleta l. 5. c. 22 f. 336. n. 9. are in effect in Fleta Committit enim Jurator perjurium quandoque propter falsum Sacramentum ut si ex certa scientia aliter juraverit quam res in veritate se habuerit secus enim propter factum quamvis falsum and lest any should think that these passages are to be
them in Civil Tryals And how the Iury should in any other manner according to the course of Tryals us'd find against the direction of the Court in matter of Law is really not conceptible True it is if it fall out upon some special Tryal that the Iury being ready to give their Verdict and before it is given the Iudge shall ask whether they find such a particular thing propounded by him or whether they find the matter of Fact to be as such a Witness or Witnesses have depos'd and the Iury answer they find the matter of Fact to be so if then the Iudge shall declare The matter of Fact being by you so found to be the Law is for the Plaintiff and you are to find accordingly for him If notwithstanding they find for the Defendant this may be thought a finding in matter of Law against the direction of the Court for in that case the Iury first declare the Fact as it is found by themselves to which Fact the Iudge declares how the Law is consequent And this is ordinary when the Iury find unexpectedly for the Plaintiff or Defendant the Iudge will ask How do you find such a Fact in particular and upon their answer he will say then it is for the Defendant though they found for the Plaintiff or è contrario and thereupon they rectifie their Verdict And in these Cases the Iury and not the Iudge resolve and find what the Fact is Therefore alwaies in discreet and lawful assistance of the Iury the Iudge his direction is Hypothetical and upon supposition and not positive and upon coercion viz. If you find the Fact thus leaving it to them what to find then you are to find for the Plaintiff but if you find the Fact thus then it is for the Defendant But in the Case propounded by me where it is possible in that special manner the Iury may find against the Direction of the Court in matter of Law it will not follow they are therefore finable for if an Attaint will lye upon the Verdict so given by them they ought not to be fined and imprisoned by the Judge for that Verdict for all the Iudges have agreed upon a full conference at Serjeants Inn in this case And it was formerly so agreed by the then Judges in a Case where Justice Hide had fined a Jury at Oxford for finding against their Evidence in a Civil Cause That a Jury is not finable for going against their Evidence where an Attaint lies for if an Attaint be brought upon that Verdict it may be affirmed and found upon the Attaint a true Verdict and the same Verdict cannot be a false Verdict and therefore the Jury fined for it as such by the Judge and yet no false Verdict because affirmed upon the Attaint Another Reason that the Jury may not be fined in such case is because until a Jury have consummated their Verdict which is not done until they find for the Plaintiff or Defendant and that also be entred of Record they have time still of deliberation and whatsoever they have answered the Judge upon an interlocutory Question or Discourse they may lawfully vary from it if they find cause and are not thereby concluded Whence it follows upon this last Reason That upon Tryals wherein no Attaint lies as well as upon such where it doth no case can be invented wherein it can be maintained that a Jury can find in matter of Law nakedly against the direction of the Judge And the Judges were as before all of Opinion That the Retorn in this latter part of it is also insufficient as in the former and so wholly insufficient But that this Question may not hereafter revive if possible It is evident by several Resolutions of all the Judges That where an Attaint lies the Judge cannot fine the Jury for going against their Evidence or Direction of the Court without other Misdemeanour For in such case finding against or following the direction of the Court barely will not barr an Attaint but in some case the Judge being demanded by and declaring to the Jury what is the Law though he declares it erroneously Ingersalls C. Cr. 35 El. f. 309. n. 18. and they find accordingly this may excuse the Jury from the Forfeitures for though their Verdict be false yet it is not corrupt but the Iudgment is to be revers'd however upon the Attaint for a man loseth not his right by the Judges mistake in the Law Therefore if an Attaint lies for a false Verdict upon Indictment not Capital as this is either by the Common or Statute Law by those Resolutions the Court would not fine the Jury in this case for going against Evidence because an Attaint lay But admitting an Attaint did not lye as I think the Law clear it did not for there is no Case in all the Law of such an Attaint nor Opinion but that of Thirnings 10 H. 4. Attaint 60. 64. for which there is no warrant in Law though there be other specious Authority against it toucht by none that argued this Case The Question then will be Whether before the several Acts of Parliament which granted Attaints and are enumerated in their order in the Register Reg. f. 122. a. the Judge by the Common Law in all Cases might have fined the Jury finding against their Evidence and direction of the Court where no Attaint did lye or could so do yet if the Statutes which gave the Attaints were repeal'd If he could not in Civil Causes before Attaints granted in them he could not in Criminal Causes upon Indictment wherein I have admitted Attaint lies not for the fault in both was the same viz. finding against Evidence and Direction of the Court and by the Common Law the Reason being the same in both the Law is the same That the Court could not Fine a Jury at the Common Law where Attaint did not lye for where it did is agreed he could not I think to be the clearest position that ever I consider'd either for Authority or Reason of Law After Attaints were granted by Statutes generally As by Westminster the First c. 38. in Pleas Real and by 34 E. 3. c. 7. in Pleas Personal and where they did lye at Common Law which was only in Writs of Assise The Examples are frequent in our Books of punishing Jurors by Attaint But no Case can be offer'd either before Attaints granted in general or after That ever a Jury was punish't by Fin◠and Imprisonment by the Judge for not finding according to their Evidence and his Directtion until Popham's time nor is there clear proof that he ever fined them for that Reason separated from other Misdemeanor If Juries might be fined in such Case before Attaints granted why not since for no Statute hath taken that power from the Judge But since Attaints granted the Judges resolved they cannot Fine where the Attaint lies therefore they could not Fine before Sure this latter Age did
not first discover that the Verdicts of Juries were many times not according to the Judges opinion and liking But the Reasons are I conceive most clear That the Judge could not nor can Fine and Imprison the Jury in such Cases Without a Fact agreed it is as impossible for a Judge or any other to know the Law relating to that Fact or direct concerning it as to know an Accident that hath no Subject Hence it follows That the Judge can never direct what the Law is in any matter controverted without first knowing the Fact and then it follows That without his previous knowledge of the Fact the Jury cannot go against his Direction in Law for he could not direct But the Judge quà Judge cannot know the Fact possibly but from the Evidence which the Jury have but as will appear he can never know what Evidence the Jury have and consequently he cannot know the matter of Fact nor punish the Jury for going against their Evidence when he cannot know what their Evidence is It is true if the Jury were to have no other Evidence for the Fact but what is depos'd in Court the Judge might know their Evidence and the Fact from it equally as they and so direct what the Law were in the Case though even then the Judge and Jury might honestly differ in the result from the Evidence as well as two Judges may which often happens But the Evidence which the Jury have of the Fact is much other than that For 1. Being return'd of the Vicinage whence the cause of Action ariseth the Law supposeth them thence to have sufficient knowledge to try the matter in Issue and so they must though no Evidence were given on either side in Court but to this Evidence the Judge is a stranger 2. They may have Evidence from their own personal knowledge by which they may be assur'd and sometimes are that what is depos'd in Court is absolutely false but to this the Judge is a stranger and he knows no more of the Fact than he hath learn'd in Court and perhaps by false Depositions and consequently knows nothing 3 The Jury may know the Witnesses to be stigmatiz'd and infamous which may be unknown to the parties and consequently to the Court. 4. In many Cases the Jury are to have View necessarily in many by consent for their better information to this Evidence likewise the Judge is a stranger 5. If they do follow his direction they may be attainted and the Iudgment revers'd for doing that which if they had not done they should have been fined and imprisoned by the Judge which is unreasonable 6. If they do not follow his direction and be therefore fined yet they may be attainted and so doubly punisht by distinct Iudicatures for the same offence which the Common Law admits not Chevin and Paramours Case 3 El. Dyer 201. a. n. 63. A Fine revers'd in Banco Regis for Infancy per inspectionem per testimonium del 4. fide dignorum After upon Examination of divers Witnesses in Chancery the suppos'd Infant was prov'd to be of Age tempore finis levati which Testimonies were exemplified and given in Evidence after in Communi Banco in a Writ of Entry in the quibus there brought And though it was the Opinion of the Court That those Testimonies were of no force against the Iudgment in the Kings Bench The Progress in this Writ of Right till Judgment for Paramour the Defendant is at large 13 El. Dyer f. 301. n. 40. yet the Jury found with the Testimony in Chancery against direction of the Court upon a point in Law and their Verdict after affirmed in an Attaint brought and after a Writ of Right was brought and battle joyn'd 7. To what end is the Jury to be retorn'd out of the Vicinage whence the cause of Action ariseth To what end must Hundredors be of the Jury whom the Law supposeth to have nearer knowledge of the Fact than those of the Vicinage in general To what end are they challeng'd so scrupulously to the Array and Pole To what end must they have such a certain Free-hold and be probi legales homines and not of affinity with the parties concern'd To what end must they have in many Cases the view for their exacter information chiefly To what end must they undergo the heavy punishment of the villanous Iudgment if after all this they implicitly must give a Verdict by the dictates and authority of another man under pain of Fines and Imprisonment when sworn to do it according to the best of their own knowledge A man cannot see by anothers Eye nor hear by anothers Ear no more can a man conclude or inferr the thing to be resolv'd by anothers Vnderstanding or Reasoning and though the Verdict be right the Jury give yet they being not assur'd it is so from their own Vnderstanding are forsworn at least in foro conscientiae 9. It is absurd a Jury should be fined by the Judge for going against their Evidence when he who fineth knows not what it is as where a Jury find without Evidence in Court of either side so if the Iury find 14 H. 7. f. 29. per Vavasor in Camer Scace without contradiction Hob. f. 227. upon their own knowledge as the course is if the Defendant plead Solvit ad diem to a Bond prov'd and offers no proof The Jury is directed to find for the Plaintiff unless they know payment was made of their own knowledge according to the Plea And it is as absurd to fine a Jury for finding against their Evidence when the Judge knows but part of it for the better and greater part of the Evidence may be wholly unknown to him and this may happen in most Cases and often doth as in Graves and Shorts Case Error of a Iudgment in the Common Bench Graves vers Short 40 El. Cro. f. 616. the Error assign'd was The Issue being whether a Feoffment were made and the Jurors being gone together to conferr of their Verdict one of them shew'd to the rest an Escrow pro petentibus not given in Evidence by the parties per quod they found for the Demandant upon Demurrer adjudg'd no Error for it appears not to be given him by any of the parties or any for them it must be intended he had it as a piece of Evidence about him before and shew'd it to inform himself and his Fellows and as he might declare it as a witness that he knew it to be true They resolv'd If that might have avoided the Verdict which they agreed it could not yet it ought to have been done by Examination and not by Error That Decantatum in our Books Ad quaestionem facti non respondent Judices ad quaestionem legis non respondent Juratores literally taken is true For if it be demanded What is the Fact the Judge cannot answer it if it be asked What is the Law in the Case the Jury
Liegeance and Obedience of the King of England are Aliens born in respect of the time of their birth The time of his birth is chiefly to be considered for he cannot be a Subject born of one Kingdom that was born under the Liegeance of a King of another Kingdom albeit afterwards one Kingdom descend to the King of the other Therefore Ramsey being not under the Liegeance of the King of England at the time of his birth must still continue an Alien though he were naturalized in Ireland Notwithstanding all this it may be urg'd A person naturalized in England is the same as if he had been born in England and a person naturalized in Ireland is the same as if he had been born in Ireland But a person born in Ireland is the same as if he had been Obj. 1 born or naturalized in England Therefore a person naturalized in Ireland is the same as if he had been born or naturalized in England This seems subtile and concluding Answ For Answer I say That the same Syllogism may be made of a person naturalized in Scotland after the Vnion viz. A person naturalized in England is the same with a person born in England and a person naturalized in Scotland after the Vnion is the same with a person born in Scotland after the Vnion But a person born in Scotland after the Union is the same with a person born or naturalized in England Therefore a person naturalized in Scotland after the Union is the same with a person born or naturalized in England Yet it is agreed That a person naturalized in Scotland since the Union is no other than an Alien in England Therefore the same Conclusion should be made of one naturalized in Ireland To differ these two Cases it may be said That the naturalizing Obj. 2 of a person in Scotland can never appear to England because we cannot write to Scotland to certifie the Act of Naturalizing as we may to Ireland out of the Chancery and as was done in the present Case in question as by the Record appears This is a difference but not to the purpose and then it is the same as no difference For I will ask by way of Supposition Admit an Act of Parliament were made in England for clearing all Questions of this kind That all persons inheritable in any Dominion whatsoever whereof the King of England was King whether naturalized or Subjects born should be no Aliens in England it were then evident by the Law That a naturalized Subject of Scotland were no Alien in England yet the same Question would then remain as now doth How he should appear to be naturalized because the Chancery could not write to Scotland as it can to Ireland to certifie the Act of Naturalizing Answ 1 The fallacy of the Syllogism consists in this It is true that a person naturalized in Ireland is the same with a person born in Ireland that is by the Law of Ireland But when you assume That a person born in Ireland is the same with a person born or naturalized in England that is not by the Law of Ireland but by the Law of England And then the Syllogism will have four terms in it and conclude nothing Answ 2.3 But to answer the difference taken there are many things whereof the Kings Courts sometimes ought to be certified which cannot be certified by Certiorari or any other ordinary Writ 42 E. 3. f. 2. b. An Act of Parliament of Scotland may be evidence as a Sentence of Divorce or Deprivation and Forraign Laws for raising or abasing Mony or Customes upon accompt between Merchants but not as Records In the Case of the Lord Beaumond 42 E. 3. a Question grew Whether one born in Ross in Scotland were within the Kings Liegeance because part of Scotland then was and part not in his Liegeance the Court knew not how to proceed until Thorpe gave this Rule That doubtless the King had a Roll what parts of Scotland were in his Liegeance what not upon the Treaty or Conclusion made that therefore they must address themselves to the King to have that certified The like may now happen of Virginia Surenam or other places part of which are in the Kings Liegeance part not So the King hath or may have Rolls of all naturalized Subjects and upon petition to him where the occasions require it may cause the matter in his name to be certified The like may happen upon emergent Questions upon Leagues or Treaties to which there is no common access but by the Kings permission For illustration a feign'd Case is as good as a Case in fact Suppose a Law in Ireland 5 El. c. 4. f. 957 like that of 5. of the Queen That no man should set up Shop in Dublin unless he had serv'd as an Apprentice to the Trade for Seven years and suppose a Law in England That whosoever had served Seven years as an Apprentice in Dublin might set up Shop in London If by a particular Act of Parliament in Ireland J. S. be enabled to set up Shop in Dublin as if he had serv'd an Apprentiship for Seven years by this fiction he is enabled in Ireland to set up but not in London unless he have really served for Seven years as the Law in England requires Considerations That an Act of Parliament of Ireland should so operate as to effect a thing which could not by the Laws of England be done without an Act of Parliament in England regularly seems so strange that it is suppos'd an Act of Parliament of England did first impower the doing of it though it be not extant by an Act of Parliament The Argument then is 1. A man is naturalized in Ireland and thereby no Alien in England which could not lawfully be done without an Act of Parliament in England to impower the doing it Which in effect is to say a thing was done which could not lawfully be done without an Act of Parliament to warrant it Ergo it being done there was an Act of Parliament to warrant it 2. This Supposition seems rather true because other things relating to Ireland and admitted to be Law could not be but by Act of Parliament in England yet no such Act is extant that is that a Writ of Error lies in the Kings Bench to reverse a Judgment given in the Kings Bench in Ireland 3. That this must be by Act of Parliament not by Common Lew because such a Writ did not lye in Wales or Calais at Common Law to reverse an Error there Still the Argument is no better then before Some things are of known Law through many successions of Ages which could not commence without an Act of Parliament which is not extant Therefore a thing wholly new not warranted by any Testimony of former time because it cannot be lawful without an Act of Parliament must be suppos'd without other proof to be lawful by an Act of Parliament If the lawfulness of any
thing be in question suppose the Laws of Ireland were made the Laws of England by Act of Parliament here only Two were material to this Question 1. That a Postnatus of a Forraign Dominion of the Kings should be no Alien the Law is so in Ireland 2. That persons naturalized in England are naturalized for all the Dominions belonging to England if the Law were so in Ireland it follows not That one naturalized there must be naturalized in England thereby for England is not a Dominion belonging to Ireland but è contrario Fitz. Assise pla 382.18 E. 2 A Writ of Error lies to reverse a Iudgment in any Dominions belonging to England Breve Domini Regis non currit in Wallia is not to be intended of a Writ of Error but of such Writs as related to Tryals by Juries those never did run in Forraign Dominions that most commonly were governed by different Laws Error of a Judgment in Assize of Gower's Land in B. R. 18 E. 2. 21. H. 7. f. 31. b. A Writ of Non molestando issued out of the Chancery to the Mayor of Calais retornable in the Kings Bench and by the whole Court agreed That there are divers Presidents of Writs of Error to reverse Iudgments given in Calais though it was Objected They were governed by the Civil Law 7. Rep. f. 20. a. Calvins Case And Sir Edward Coke cites a Case of a Writ directed to the Mayor of Burdeaux a Town in Gascoigny and takes the difference between Mandatory Writs which issued to all the Dominions and Writs of ordinary remedy relating to Tryals in the Kingdom 7 Rep. Calvins Case f. 18. a. And speaking of Ireland among other things he saith That albeit no Reservation were in King John's Charter yet by Judgment of Law a Writ of Error did lye in the Kings Bench of England of an Erroneous Judgment in the Kings Bench in Ireland A Writ of Error lies not therefore to reverse a Iudgment in Ireland by Special Act of Parliament for it lies at Common Law to reverse Iudgments in any Inferior Dominions and if it did not Inferior and Provincial Governments as Ireland is might make what Laws they pleas'd for Iudgments are Laws when not to be revers'd Pla. Parl. 21 E. 1. f. 152 157. Magdulph appeal'd from the Court and Iudgment of the King of Scots before King Edward the First Ut Superiori Domino Scotiae And by the Case in 2 R. 3. f. 12. all the Iudges there agree 2 R. 3. f. 12. assembled in the Exchequer Chamber That a Writ of Error lay to reverse Iudgments in Ireland and that Ireland was subject as Calais Gascoigne and Guyen who were therefore subject as Ireland And therefore a Writ of Error would there lye as in Ireland Another Objection subtile enough is That if naturalizing Obj. 3 in Ireland which makes a man as born there shall not make him likewise as born that is no Alien in England That then naturalizing in England should not make a man no Alien in Ireland especially without naming Ireland and the same may be said That one denizen'd in England should not be so in Ireland Answ The Inference is not right in form nor true The Answer is The people of England now do and always did consist of Native Persons Naturaliz'd Persons and Denizen'd Persons and no people of what consistence soever they be can be Aliens to that they have conquer'd by Arms or otherwise subjected to themselves for it is a contradiction to be a stranger to that which is a mans own and against common reason and publique practise Therefore neither Natives or Persons Naturaliz'd or denizen'd of England or their Successors can ever be Aliens in Ireland which they conquer'd and subjected And though this is De Jure Belli Gentium observe what is said and truly by Sir Edward Coke in Calvin's Case in pursuance of other things said concerning Ireland In the Conquest of a Christian Kingdom 7. Rep. Calvins C. f. 18. a. as well those that served in Warr at the Conquest as those that remain'd at home for the Safety and Peace of their Country and other the Kings Subjects as well Antenati as Postnati are capable of Lands in the Kingdom or Country conquer'd and may maintain any real Action and have the like Priviledges there as they may have in England Another Objection hath been That if a person naturaliz'd in Obj. 4 Ireland and so the Kings natural Subject shall be an Alien here then if such person commit Treason beyond the Seas where no local Liegeance is to the King he cannot be tryed here for Treason contra ligeantiae suae debitum 26 H. 8. c. 13. 33 H. 8. c. 23. 35 H. 8. c. 2. Treason by an Irish man in Ireland or elsewhere may be tryed in England by those Statutes 33 El. Andersons Rep. f. 262. b. Orurks Case Calvins Case f. 23. a. by the Statute of 26 H. 8. or 35 H. 8. or any other Statute to that purpose 1. To that I answer That his Tryal must be as it would have been before those Laws made or as if those stood now repeal'd 2. His Tryal shall be in such case as the Tryal of a person naturalized in Scotland after the Union who is the Kings Subject but an Alien in England Ireland Though Ireland have its own Parliament yet is it not absolute sui juris for if it were England had no power over it and it were as free after Conquest and Subjection by England as before That it is a conquer'd Kingdom is not doubted but admitted in Calvin's Case several times And by an Act of Parliament of Ireland Stat. Hib. 11 12. 13 Jac. c. 5. appears in express words Whereas in former times after the Conquest of this Realm by his Majesties most Royal Progenitors Kings of England c. What things the Parliament of Ireland cannot do 1. It cannot Alien it self or any part of it self from being under the Dominion of England nor change its Subjection 2. It cannot make it self not subject to the Laws of and subordinate to the Parliament of England 3. It cannot change the Law of having Judgments there given revers'd for Error in England and others might be named 4. It cannot dispose the Crown of Ireland to the King of Englands second Son or any other but to the King of England Laws made in the Parliament of England binding Ireland A Law concerning the Homage of Parceners 14 H. 3. called Statutum Hiberniae A Statute at Nottingham 17 E. 1. called Ordinatio pro Statu Hiberniae Laws for Ireland made by E. 3. Pat. Rol. 5 E. 3. pars 1. m. 29. pla Parl. f. 586 per advisamentum Concilii nostri in ultimo Parliamento nostro apud Westm tento An Act that no Arch-bishop Bishop or Prior should be chosen 4 H. 5. c. 6. who were Irish nor come to Parliaments with Irish Attendants The late Acts
been breach'd is no Judicial Opinion nor more than a gratis dictum But an Opinion though Erroneous concluding to the Iudgment is a Judicial Opinion because delivered under the Sanction of the Judges Oath upon deliberation which assures it is or was when delivered the Opinion of the Deliverer Yet if a Court give Judgment judicially another Court is not bound to give like Judgment unless it think that Judgment first given was according to Law For any Court may err else Errors in Judgment would not be admitted nor a Reversal of them Therefore if a Judge conceives a Judgment given in another Court to be erroneous he being sworn to judge according to Law that is in his own conscience ought not to give the like Judgment for that were to wrong every man having a like cause because another was wrong'd before much less to follow extra-judicial Opinions unless he believes those Opinions are right The other Case is in Coke 5 Car. Salvin versus Clerk in Ejectment upon a special Verdict Alexander Sidenham Tenant in tayl to him and the Heirs males of his body the Reversion to John his eldest Brother made a Lease for three Lives warranted by the Statute of 32 H. 8. c. 28. with warranty And after 16 Eliz. levies a Fine with warranty and proclamations to Taylor and dies without Issue male leaving Issue Elizabeth his Daughter Mother to the Plaintiffs Lessor In 18 Eliz. the Lease for Lives expir'd In 30 Eliz. John the elder Brother died without Issue the said Elizabeth being his Neece and Heir The Defendant entred claiming by a Lease from Taylor and Points entred upon him as Heir to Elizabeth A question was mov'd upon a suppos'd Case and not in fact within the Case Whether if the Fine had not been with proclamation as it was and no Non-claim had been in the Case as there was this warranty should make a discontinuance in Fee and barr Elizabeth it not descending upon John after Alexanders death but upon Elizabeth who is now also John's Heir or determined by Alexander's death The Judges were of opinion as the Reporter saith That the warranty did barr Elizabeth and consequently her Heir because the Reversion was discontinued by the Estate for Lives and a new Fee thereby gain'd and the Reversion displac'd thereby and the warranty was annex'd to that new Fee But this Case is all false and mis-reported 1. For that it saith the Lease for Lives was a discontinuance of the Reversion thereby a new Fee gain'd to Tenant in tayl which he passed away by the Fine with warranty which could not be for in the Case it appears the Lease was warranted by the Stat. of 32 H. 8 and then it could make no discontinuance nor no new Fee of a Reversion could be gain'd 40 Eliz. Keen Copes C. 602. pl. 13. and then no Estate to which the warranty was annex'd and so was it resolv'd 40 El. Keen Copes Case 2. That Opinion was extra-judicial it being concerning a point not in the Case but suppos'd 3. That Case was resolv'd upon the point of Non-claim and not upon this of the warranty which was not a point in the Case 4. Some of the Judges therefore spoke not to that point as appears in the Case As to the second Question Admitting the warranty of Tenant in tayl doth bind the Donor and his Heirs yet in regard the Defendant Tenant in possession cannot derive the warranty to her self from the Feoffees as Assignee or otherwise Whether she may rebutt the Demandants or not by her possession only is the question and I conceive she may not as this Case is I shall begin with those Authorities that make and are most press'd against me which is the Authority of Sir Edward Coke in Lincoln Colledge Case in the third Report and from thence brought over to his Littleton f. 385. a. His words in Lincoln Colledge Case f. 63. a. are He which hath the possession of the Land shall rebutt the Demandant himself without shewing how he came to the possession of it for it sufficeth him to defend his possession and barr the Demandant and the Demandant cannot recover the Land against his own warranty And there he cites several Cases as making good this his Assertion In the same place he saith it is adjudg'd 38 E. 3. f. 26. That an Assignee shall rebutt by force of a warranty made to one and his Heirs only This Doctrine is transferred to his Littleton in these words If the warranty be made to a man and his heirs without this word Assignes yet the Assignee or any Tenant of the Land may rebutt And albeit no man shall vouch or have a Warrantia Chartae either as party Heir or Assignee but in privity of Estate yet any one that is in of another Estate be it by disseisin abatement intrusion usurpation or otherwise shall rebutt by force of the warranty as a thing annex'd to the Land which sometimes was doubted in our Books when as in the Cases aforesaid he that rebutteth claimeth under and not above the warranty I shall clearly agree no man shall vouch or have a warrantia Chartae who is not in in privity of Estate that is who hath not the same Estate as well as the same Land to which the warranty was annexed And the reason is evident because the Tenant must recover if the Land be not defended to him by the warranter such Estate as was first warranted and no other unless a Fee be granted with warranty only for the life of the Grantee or Grantor in which Case the Grantee upon voucher recovers a Fee though the warranty were but for life I shall likewise agree the Law to be as Sir Edward Coke saith in both places if his meaning be that the Tenant in possession when he is impleaded may rebutt the Demandant without shewing how he came to the possession which he then hath when impleaded be it by dissism abatement intrusion or any other tortious way And for the reason given in Lincoln Colledge Case That it sufficeth that the Tenant defend his possession But if his meaning be that the Tenant in possession need not shew that the warranty ever extended to him or that he hath any right to it then I must deny his Doctrine in Lincoln Colledge Case or in Littleton which is but the former there repeated to be Law For as it is not reasonable a man should recover that Land which he hath once warranted to me from me what title soever I have in it at the time when he impleads me So on the other side it is against reason I should warrant Land to one who never had any right in my warranty And the same reason is if a man will be warranted by Rebutter he should make it appear how the warranty extends to him as if he will be warranted by Voucher for the difference is no other than that in the case of Voucher a stranger impleads him in
Ne Exeat Regnum de Leproso amovendo de Apostata Capiendo ad quod damnum and Writs to call persons thence as hath been done before they had Burgesses to the Parliament of England And Writs of Error into all Dominions belonging to England lye upon the ultimate Iudgments there given into the Kings Courts of England to reverse Judgments or affirm which is the only Writ which concerns Right and Property between the Subjects that lies The Reasons are First for that without such Writ the Law appointed or permitted to such inferiour Dominion might be insensibly changed within it self without the assent of the Dominion Superiour Secondly Judgments might be then given to the disadvantage or lessening of the Superiority which cannot be reasonable or to make the Superiority to be only of the King not of the Crown of England as King James once would have it in the Case of Ireland ex relatione J. Selden mihi whom King James consulted in this Question The practice hath always been accordingly as is familiarly known by reversal or affirmance of Judgments given in the Kings Bench in Ireland in the Kings Bench here which is enough alone to prove the Law to be so to other subordinate Dominions 21 H. 7. f. 3. And it is as clear That Writs of Error did lye in the Kings Bench to reverse Judgments in Calais and the reason is alike per Curiam for which were divers Presidents This being the state of Wales when it first became an Accession to the Dominion of England under E. 1. and when it was far from the Jurisdiction of the Courts of Justice in England as before it was added to the Dominion of the Crown of England And as other Dominions added to it were 7 H. 4. f. 14. it was questioned only Whether a Protection quia moratur in obsequio nostro in Wallia were good because saith the Book it is within the Realm of England it may be as in the Case of Bastardy the Husband being infra quatuor maria which doubtless was the Isle of Brittain so the Primacy of Bishops in Scotland and Wales was that of England Qu. about this but that gives no Jurisdiction to the Courts There were two ways by which alteration might be wrought The first by Act of Parliament in England making Laws to change either the Laws or Jurisdictions of Wales or both The second by Alterations made in the Laws formerly by him established by E. 1. himself and perhaps by his Successors Kings of England without Parliament by a Clause contained in the Close of that Statute or Ordinance called Statutum Walliae in these words Et ideo vobis Mandamus quod premissa de caetero in omnibus observetis ita tantum quod quotiescunque quandocunque ubicunque nobis placuerit possimus predicta Statuta eorum partes singulas declarare interpretari addere sive diminuere pro nostrae libito voluntatis prout securitati nostrae terrae nostrae predictae viderimus expediri This seems to extend but to the person of E. 1. and not to his Successors and however no such change was made by Him or his Successors But the first remarkable Alteration made seems to have been by Act of Parliament and probably in the time of E. 1. who reigned long after the Statute of Wales but the Act it self is no where extant that I could learn But great Evidence that such there was which in some measure gave a Jurisdiction to the Kings Courts of England in Wales not generally but over the Lordships Marchers there This appears clearly by a Case Fitz. Ass 18 E. 2. pl. 382. not much noted nor cited by any that I know to this purpose being out of the printed Year-Books but printed by Fitz-herbert out of the Reports he had of E. 2. as he had of E. 1. and H. 3. all which we want wholly though some Copies are extant of E. 2. which Case is the only light that I know to clear the Question in hand An Assise of Novel Disseisin was brought against C. de libero tenemento in Gowre and the Writ was directed to the Sheriff of Glocester and the Plaint was made of two Commots which is mis-printed Commons and comprehends all Gouers-land now part of the County of Glamorgan by 27 H. 8. but was not so then the Assise past against the Tenant before the Iustice assigned to take Assises in the Marches of Wales The Tenant brought his Writ of Error and Assignes for Error 1. That the Writ was directed to the Sheriff of Glocester and the Land put in view was in Wales 2 That the Land was out of the Power and Bayliwick of the Sheriff of Glocester 3 That the Assise ought to be taken in the County where the Land lies and that Goures-land was in no County 4 That the Writ was de libero tenemento in villa sive Hamletto de Gouerse and Gouer was no Village or Hamlet but an entire Country consisting of two Commots To these Errors assigned Scroope then Chief Justice made Answer 1. That Gower is a great Barony in the Marches of Wales and That every Barony of the Marches hath a Chancellor and its own Writs whereby one Tenant wronged by another may be righted But when the Lord is outed of his intire Barony he can have no remedy by his own Writ for he is outed of all his Jurisdiction And it is repugnant to demand Iustice of him whose Iurisdiction is questioned that is to give it ut mihi videtur That therefore it was ordained by Parliament when the Baron or Marcher is outed of his Barony in the Marches of Wales he ought to go to the King for Remedy and have a Writ in the Kings Chancery directed to the Sheriff of the next English County and the Sheriff of Glocester served the Writ as being the next English Sheriff This being the most material the other Errors were also answered and the Judgment was affirmed From this Case we may learn and from no other as I believe at least with so much clearness That the Summons of Inhabitants in Wales and the tryal of an Issue there arising should be by the Sheriff of and in the next adjoyning English County was first ordained by Parliament though the Act be not extant now nor is it conceived how it should be otherwise it being an empty Opinion that it was by the Common Law as is touched in several Books who knew the practice but were strangers to the reasons of it For if the Law had been that an Issue arising out of the Jurisdiction of the Courts of England should be tryed in that County of England next to the place where the Issue did arise not only any Issue arising in any the Dominions of England out of the Realm might be tryed in England by that rule but any Issue arising in any Forreign parts as France Holland Scotland or elsewhere that were not of the Dominions of England might pari
the Kings license must be without any limitation to him that hath it to exercise his Trade as before it was prohibited otherwise it is no license 346 17. Where the King may dispense generally he is not bound to it but may limit his Dispensation 346 18. Where the King can dispense with particular persons he is not confined to number or place but may license as many and in such places as he thinks fit 347 19. A Corporation is capable of a Dispensation 347 348 20. A Dispensation to a person to keep an Office which person is not capable of such Office is void 355 21. Where a license Ex speciali gratia is good to dispense with a penal Law without a Non obstante 356 Distress 1. A privity is necessary by the common Law between the Distrainer and Distrained 39 2. Attornment and power to Distrain follows the possession and not the Use 43 3. Where a Rent is well vested and there is an Attornment when ever the Rent is arrear a Distress is lawful unless the power is lost 39 4. Where Rent is arrear and afterwards the Rent is granted over in Fee and an Attornment thereunto here the Grantor hath lost his arrears and cannot Distrain 40 5. If a Fine is levied of the Reversion of Land or of Rent to Uses the Cestuy que use may Distrain without attornment 50 51 Dominion 1. Dominions belonging to the Crown of England cannot be separated from it but by Act of Parliament made in England 300 2. What are Dominions belonging to the Realm of England though not in the Territorial Dominions of England ibid. 3. By what Title the Crown of England held Gascoign Guyen and Calais 401 Dower 1. The wife of a Conizee of a Fine shall not be thereof endowed because it is but a fictitious Seisin 41 2. The wife is dowable of a Rent in Fee 40 Droit d'Advowson 1. Where the Writ lies and for whom 11 16 2. In a Droit d'Advowson the King may alledge Seisin without alledging any time 56 Ecclesiastical Court See Archbishop Prohibition THe Secular Judges are most conuzant of Acts of Parliament 213 2. The Temporal Judges have conuzance of what marriages are within the Levitical Degrees and what not and what are incestuous 207 3. The Clergy of this Kingdom shall not enact or execute any Canon Constitution or Ordinance Provincial unless they have the Kings license 329 Elegit 1. It lies upon a Recognizance taken in any of the Courts at Westminster or before any Judge out of Term 102 Error See Presidents Iudgment 1. An erroneous Judgment is a good Judgment to all intents whatsoever until reversed 94 2. If an inferiour or superiour Court gives an erroneous Judgment it is reversible by Writ of Error 139 3. Where the matter concerns the Jurisdiction of the Court a Writ of Error lies no where but in Parliament 396 4. A Writ of Error lies to reverse a Judgment in any Dominion belonging to England 290 402 5. A Writ of Error lay to reverse a Judgment in Calais 402 6. It lies to reverse a Judgment in Ireland 290 291 298 402 Escheat 1. Where the Heir at Law dies without heir the Land escheats and the Lord's Title will precede any future Devise 270 Esplees 1. The profits of a Mine is no Esplees for the Land but only the Esplees for the Mine it self 255 2. So likewise for a Wood the profits of it is no Esplees but only for the Land only upon which the Wood grows ibid. Estates See Grant 1. The Law doth not in Conveyances of Estates admit Estates to pass by Implication as being a way of passing Estates not agreeable to the plainness required by Law in the transferring of Estates 261 262 c. 2. But in Devises they are admitted with due restrictions 261 262 263 c. 3. What Executory Devises and contingent Remainders are good and what not 272 273 4. When a new Estate is granted the privity to the old Estate is destroyed 43 5. The Estate may be changed and yet the possession not changed but remain as formerly 42 6. An Estate in a Rent-charge may may be enlarged diminished or altered and no new Attornment or privity requisite 44 45 46 7. The Seisin of the Conizee of a Fine is but a meer fiction and an invented form of Conveyance only 41 8. His wife shall not be endowed neither shall his heir inherit 41 Estoppel or Conclusion 1. A Demise by Indenture of a Term habendum from the expiration of another term therein recited when really there is no such term in esse is no Estoppel to the Lessor or Lessee but the Lessee may presently enter and the Lessor grant the Reversion 82 Evidence 1. No evidence can be given to a Jury of what is Law 143 2. A witness may be admitted to prove the Contents of a Deed or Will 77 3. The Jury may go upon evidence from their own personal knowledge 147 Execution See Elegit 1. Lands Persons or Goods ought not to be lyable to Judgments in other manner than they were at the time of the Judgment given which was where the Court had Jurisdiction which gave the Judgment 398 2. What Execution shall be sued out upon a Recognizance acknowledged in any of the Courts at Westminster or before a Judge 103 3. What Execution shall be sued out upon a Statute 102 4. Upon a Recovery in England an Execution doth not lye into Wales 397 398 5. Perhaps by special Writs to the chief Officer of the King Execution may be made of Judgments given at Westminster in any of his Dominions 420 Executor See Title Statute 10 20. 1. How they are to administer the Testators estate 96 2. An Executor may refuse but cannot assign over his Executorship 182 3. It is no Devastavit in an Executor to satisfie a Judgment obtained upon a simple Covenant before a debt due by Obligation 94 95 97 4. Where an Action of Debt upon Bond or Judgment is brought against him he may confess the Action if there be no fraud in the Case although he hath notice of a former Suit 95 100 5. The Executor may plead an erroneous Judgment in Barr 94 97 6. A Recognizance in Chancery must be paid before Debts upon simple Contracts and Debts by Bond 103 7. It is a Devastavit in an Executor to pay voluntarily a Debt by simple Contract before a Debt by Bond whereof he had notice and not otherwise 94 95 8. It is a Devastavit to satisfie a later Judgment if there are not Assets left to satisfie a former Judgment 95 9. An Action will not lye against Executors upon a Tally because it is no good Specialty 100 10. The pleading of Plene administravit praeter plene administravit ultra and in what Cases it may be pleaded and how 104 Exposition of Words Quam diu 32 Dum ibid. Dummodo ibid. Usually letten 33 34 At any time 34 Or more 35 More or less ibid. Gurges
Courts upon the insufficiency of the Return only and not for priviledge 154 5. Where a man is brought by Habeas Corpus and upon the Return it appears that he was imprisoned illegally though there is no cause of priviledge for him in the Court yet he shall not be remanded to his unlawful Imprisonment 156 6. The Kings Bench may bayl if they please in all Cases but the Common Bench must remand if the cause of the imprisonment returned is just 157 Heir 1. Children shall inherit their Ancestors without limitation in the right ascending Line and are not inherited by them 244 2. In the collateral Lines of Uncle and Nephew the Uncle as well inherits the Nephew as the Nephew the Uncle ibid. 3. The Heir shall never be disinherited by an Estate given by Implication in a Will if such Implication be only constructive and possible but nor a necessary Implication viz. such an Implication that the Devisee must have the thing devised or none else can have it 262 263 268 4. He that is priviledged by the Law of England to inherit there must be a Subject of the Kings 268 5. The four several ways that a man born out of England may inherit in England 281 6. How long the Heir shall continue in Ward upon the Devise of his Father and a full Exposition of the Statute of 12 Car. 2. 178 7. The Heir of the Conizee of a Fine only shall take nothing by Discent 41 Husband and Wife See Baron Feme  Imprisonment See Title Habeas Corpus  Incest 1. INcest was formerly of Spiritual Conuzance 212 2. The primitive Christian Church could punish incestuous marriages no other way than only by forbidding them communion with them 313 3. The Judges have now full conuzance of what Marriages are incestuous and what not 207 209 210 4. Among the Hebrews there was no Divorce for Incest but the Marriage was void and the Incest punished as in persons unmarried ibid. Incumbent 1. One Incumbent may sue a Writ of Spoliation against the other where the Patrons right comes in question 24 2. If an Incumbent with Cure take another Benefice with Cure the first is void and the Patron may present 21 3. A Bishop may be an Incumbent after Consecration 24 4. The Kings Confirmation of the Commendam transfers no right into the Incumbent 26 5. Where the Incumbent doth not read the Articles according to the Statute he stands ipso facto deprived 131 132 6. And if he had not subscribed the Articles he had been never Incumbent 133 Infant 1. Where the Gardianship of an Infant is devised since the Statute of 12 Car. 2. what passes thereby together with a full Exposition of that Statute from 177 to 186 2. He is capable at Seventeen years of Age of taking Administration in his own name 93 Institution and Induction 1. By Induction into the Rectory the Parson is seised of all the possessions belonging to his Rectory 198 2. Institution and Induction is a good Title until a better appears 7 8 3. Where after Institution and Induction the party inducted may bring his Ejectment and shall not be put to his Quare Impedit 129 130 131 Iointenants 1. There can be no Jointenants in Occupancy 189 2. They may release or confirm to each other and thereupon those priviledges which did belong to both shall pass to one of them 45 Ireland See Alien Error 1. Ireland is a conquer'd Kingdom and appears so by the express words of an Act of Parliament there 292 2. Though Ireland hath its own Parliament yet it is not absolute sui Juris ibid. 3. What things the Parliament of Ireland cannot do ibid. 4. When Ireland received the Laws of England 293 298 5. What Laws made in the Parliament of England are binding in Ireland 293 Issue 1. No Issue can be joyned of matter in Law 143 Iudges of Iustices 1. Where the Law is known and clear although it is unequitable and inconvenient yet Judges must adjudge it as it is 37 285 2. But where it is doubtful and not clear there they must Interpret it to be as is most consonant to equity 38 3. Defects in the Law can only be remedied in Parliament 38 285 4. Judges must judge according as the Law is not as it ought to be but if inconveniences necessarily follow out of the Law the Parliament only can cure them 285 5. An Opinion given in Court if not necessary to the Judgment given upon Record is no Judicial Opinion no more than a gratis dictum 382 6. But an Opinion though erroneous concluding to the Judgment is a Judicial Opinion because delivered under the Sanction of the Judges Oath upon deliberation which assures it is or was when delivered the Opinion of the Deliverer 382 7. When the King hath constituted any man a Judge his Ability Parts and Fitness for the place are not to be reflected upon or censured by any other person being allowed by the King who only is to judge of the fitness of his Ministers 138 8. We must not upon supposition only admit Judges deficient in their Office for so they should never do right Nor on the other side must we admit them unerring in their places for so they should never do any thing wrong 139 9. Judges have in all Ages been complained of and punished for giving dishonest and corrupt judgments 139 10. A Judge cannot Fine and Imprison a Jury for giving a Verdict contrary to his Directions 146 147 148 149 11. Judges ought not to abate Writs ex officio 95 97 12. The Judges direction to the Jury ought to be upon Supposition and not Positive viz. if you find the Fact thus then it is for the Plaintiff if you find it thus then for the Defendant 144 13. The Judge can never direct what the Law is in any controverted matter until he first knows the Fact 147 Iudgment See Error 1. A Judgment is the Act of the Court and compulsory to the Defendant 94 95 2. Where the Plaintiff makes it appear to the Court that the Defendants Title is not good but doth not set forth a good Title for himself the Court shall never give Judgment for him 60 3. An ill Declaration will not avoid the Judgment it only makes it erroneous 93 94 4. An erroneous Judgment is a good barr for an Executor in an Action brought against him 94 5. A Judgment given in England ought not to be executed in Wales 398 6. In a Quare Impedit where the Bishop disclaims and the Parson loseth by Default there shall go a Writ to the Bishop Non obstante Reclamatione to remove the Incumbent but with a Cessat Executio until the Plea is determined between the Plaintiff and Patron 6 Iurisdiction See Courts Prohibition 1. When the Question is of a Jurisdiction in a Dominion belonging to England how to be determined 418 2. Where ever a Debt grows due yet the Debtor is indebted to the Creditor
in Indentura praedict mentionat shall be as is contended an absolute and positive finding of a former Demise made to whose expiration the Indenture 1 Mariae referrs it must be either the demise 29 H. 8. or that of 1 E. 6. for no other are mentioned in the Indenture 1 Mar. and it can be but a finding of one of them for the words à fine prioris dimissionis in Indentur praedict mentionat cannot possibly extend to both Be it then understood the Demise 1 E. 6. for in that the Mannor is clearly named the Consequence must be That the Deed of 1 Mar. which is an intire lease as well of the Mannor as of the Vicaridge Parsonage and of other things under several Rents for Ninety years commencing as to the Mannor from the Expiration of the suppos'd Demise 1 E. 6. shall be a good lease for Ninety years thence forwards because that recited Demise is also suppos'd to be positively found by the Jury by those words of their Verdict But as to the Vicaridge Parsonage and other things and the Rents thereupon reserv'd which are demis'd by the Indenture of 1 Mar. for Ninety years to commence from the Expiration of the other recited Demise suppos'd in 29 H. 8. the lease of 1 Mar. must commence immediately from the Date because the Jury have not found that recited Demise positively but only as recited and therefore not found it to be a real Demise and consequently the lease of 1 Mariae as to those particulars referring the term to commence from the Expiration of a term granted 29 H. 8. not in esse because not found must begin from 1. Mar. which doubtless the Jury never intended But now for Authority I will resume the Case formerly cited of 3 E. 6. in the Lord Brook If A. makes a Lease to B. Habendum for Forty years from the expiration of a former Lease made of the Premises to J. N. and this be found occasionally by special Verdict as our Case is but the Jury in no other manner find any Lease to be made to J. N. then as mentioned in the Lease to B. By the Resolution of that Book the Lease to B for Forty years shall begin presently And who will say in this Case That because the Jury find a Lease made to B. for Forty years Habendum from the Expiration of a former Lease made to J. N. that therefore they find a Lease made formerly to J. N. when in truth J. N. had no such Lease for they only find what the Habendum in the Lease to B. is which makes a false mention of a former Lease to J. N. but had no Evidence to find a Lease which was not Exactly parallel to this is our present Case the Jury find the Bishop of Oxford by a Lease dated the Fourteenth of October 1 Mariae demised to Groker the Mannor of Hooknorton Habendum to him and his Assigns for Ninety years from the Expiration of a former Demise mentioned in the said Indenture of Lease 1 Mariae But do not affirm or find explicitly or implicitly any former demise made when they only find summarily the Habendum of the Lease 1 Mariae which mentions such a former Demise Cr. 10 Car. 1. f. 397. Another Case I shall make use of is the Case of Miller and Jones versus Manwaring in an Ejectment brought in Chester upon the Demise of Sir Randolph Crew The Jury in a Special Verdict found That John Earl of Oxford and Elizabeth his Wife were seis'd in Fee in Right of Elizabeth of the Mannor of Blacon whereof the Land in question was parcel and had Issue John the said John Earl of Oxford by Indenture dated the Tenth of February 27 H. 8. demis'd the Mannor to Anne Seaton for Four and Thirty years Elizabeth died 29 H. 8. And the said Earl of Oxford died March 31. H. 8. Afterwards John the Son then Earl of Oxford the Thirtieth of July 35 H. 8. by Indenture reciting the Demise to Anne Seaton to be dated the Tenth of February 28 H. 8. demis'd the said Mannor to Robert Rochester Habendum after the End Surrender or Forfeiture of the said Lease to Anne Seaton for Thirty years It was adjudged first in Chester and after upon Error brought in the Kings Bench It was resolv'd by all the Iudges who affirmed unanimously the first Iudgment That the Lease to Rochester began presently at the time of the Sealing for several Reasons 1. Which is directly to our purpose because there was no such Lease made to Anne Seaton having such beginning and ending as was recited in Rochester's lease 2. Because the lease made by John first Earl of Oxford was determined by his death Three years before Rochester's lease and consequently no lease in esse when the lease was made to Rochester which Reasons are in effect the same viz. That a lease made to commence from the end of any lease suppos'd to be in esse which indeed is not the lease shall commence presently From this Case these Conclusions are with clearness deducible 1. That if a lease be found specially by a Jury in which one or more other leases are recited the finding of such lease is not a finding of any the recited leases Therefore the finding of the lease made to Rochester was not a finding of the lease therein recited to be made to Anne Seaton in any respect 2. The second thing clearly deducible out of this Case is That although the Jury by their Special Verdict did find that John the Son Earl of Oxford did by his Indenture demise to Rochester for Thirty years the Mannor of Blacon Habendum from the End Surrender or Forfeiture of a former lease thereof made to Anne Seaton dated the Tenth of February 28 H. 8. yet this was not a finding of any such lease made to Anne Seaton but only a finding of the Habendum as it was in the lease made to Rochester which mentioned such a lease to be made to Anne Seaton So in our present Case the Jury finding that the Bishop of Oxford 1 Mariae did demise the Mannor of Hooknorton to John Croker Habendum for Ninety years from the Expiration of a former Demise mentioned in the Indenture of 1 Mar. is not a finding of any such former Demise to be made but a finding that in the Indenture 1 Mariae it is suggested there was such a former Demise and no more And if any man shall object That in Rochester's Case the Reason why no such lease is found to be made to Anne Seaton in 28 H. 8. to be because it is found that the lease made to Anne Seaton was in 27 H. 8. that is not to the purpose because the Jury might find and truly that a lease was made to her Dated the Tenth of February 27 H. 8. but that was no hindrance but that another lease was made to her in 28 H. 8. as is mentioned in Rochester's lease which had been a Surrender in Law
of that made in 27 H. 8. Therefore it is manifest That the sole Reason why no such lease was admitted to be in 28 H. 8. is no other than because the Jury find no such to have been made but find a suggestion of it only in Rochester's lease And it is the same exactly in our present Case The third thing deducible from the Case is That a Demise by Indenture for a term Habendum from the Expiration of another recited or mentioned term therein 35 H. 6. 34 Br. Tit. Faits p. 4. 12 H. 4. 23 Br. Faits 21. which is not or not found to be which is the same thing is no Estoppel or Conclusion to the Lessee or Lessor but that the Lessee may enter immediately and the Lessor demise or grant in Reversion after such immediate lease There is another Case resolv'd at the same time between the same Persons and concerning the same Land and published in the same Report and specially found by the same Jury Edward Earl of Oxford Son of John the Son of John Earl of Oxford by Indenture between him and Geoffry Morley Dated the Fourteenth of July 15 Elizabethae reciting That John his Father by Indenture the Thirtieth of July 35 H. 8. had demised to Robert Rochester the said Farm or Mannor of Blacon Habendum for Thirty years from the end or determination of the lease made to Anne Seaton the Tenth of February 27 H. 8. which is a false recital for the lease to Rochester was to commence from the end or determination of a lease made to Anne Seaton that is recited to be made the Tenth of February 28 H. 8. and that afterwards the said John Earl of Oxford had granted by Indenture Dated the Six and twentieth of March 35 H. 8. reciting the lease to Anne Seaton the Tenth of February 27 H. 8. to Hamlett Freer the Reversion of the said Mannor of Blacon Habendum the said Mannor and Premisses from such time as the same shall revert or come to the possession of the said Earl or his Heirs by Surrender Forfeiture or otherwise for Sixty years for so is the Case put in one part of the Report but in another part of it it seems to be That the Demise to Freer was when it should revert after the Expiration Surrender or Forfeiture omitting the words or otherwise of the Lease made to Anne Seaton which will nothing vary the Case The said Edward Earl of Oxford 〈…〉 demised the said Mannor or Farm of Blacon to the said Geoffry Morley Habendum from the end of the said Leases for Fifty years The Question was Whether any of these leases made either to Hamlett Freer or Morley be good or were in esse at the time of the lease made by Sir Randolph Crew to the Plaintiff Sir Randolph Crew claiming the Inheritance from the Earl of Oxford and Sir William Norris the Leases from Freer and Morley and under him the Defendant And Iudgment was given in Chester for the Plaintiff And upon a Writ of Error of this Iudgment brought in the Kings Bench wherein the Error assign'd was The giving of Iudgment for the Plaintiff After several Arguments at Barr and at the Bench Seriatim by the Iustices it was unanimously agreed The Iudgment in Chester for the Plaintiff should be affirmed And that neither the Lease to Freer nor that to Morley was good to avoid the Plaintiffs Title As for the lease to Freer it being a grant of a Reversion nominally and by Agreement of Parties there being no Reversion because no lease at the time of the Grant was in esse either of Seatons or Rochesters upon a point of Rasure in Rochester's Demise found in the Case and for that Land in possession could not pass by the name of a Reversion though by the name of Land a Reversion may pass for he who will grant Land in possession cannot be thought not to grant the same if only in Reversion L. Chandoes Case 6. Rep. according to the doctrine of Throgmorton's Case in the Commentaries And for that Morley's lease was to commence after the lease granted to Rochester which was to commence after that granted to Seaton the Tenth of February 27 H. 8. whereas no such lease was granted to Rochester but a lease to commence after one granted to Seaton in 28 H. 8. It was resolv'd None of those leases were in esse and that Morley's lease commenced therefore presently The words of the Resolution are these as to Morley's Lease It was Resolv'd that Morley's Lease was not in esse for that misrecites the former Leases and so hath the same Rule as the former where it recites Leases and there be none such Therefore it shall begin from the Date which being in the Fifteenth of the Queen for Fifty years ended 1623. which was before the Lease made to the Plaintiff for these Reasons Judgment was affirmed The same Conclusions are deducible from this lease to Morley as from the former to Rochester and therefore I will not repeat them But here are two Judgments in the very point of our Case and affirmed in a Writ of Error unanimously in the Kings Bench. And where it is thought material that the Jury have found a half years Rent to have been behind at Michaelmas 1643. and thence inferr'd the Jury have found the leases by which that Rent was ascertain'd namely the leases of 29 H. 8. and 1 E. 6. Surely if a lease be for a term of years to commence from the end of a former term and for such Rent as is reserv'd upon such former Demise that never was as no term can commence from the end of another which never was so no Rent can be behind which cannot appear but by a Demise which was never made that is which is never found to be made Add further That if the Iury had found the Leases of 29 H. 8. and 1 E. 6. to have been made as is mentioned in the lease of 1 Mar. that had not been a sufficient finding of them For a Deed is not found at all nor a last Will when only the Jury find but part of the Deed or Will for the Court cannot Iudge but upon the whole and not upon part It it be found in Assise the Defendant was Tenant and disseis'd the Plaintiff nisi verba contenta in ultima voluntate W. M. give a lawful Estate from W. M. to R. M. and find the words contain'd in the Will but not the Will at large the Court cannot judge upon this Verdict 38. 39 El. B.R. West and Mounsons C. Rolls 696. Tit. Tryal whose Office it is to judge upon the whole Will which is not found 38 39 El. B. R. West and Mounsons Case Rolls 696. Title Tryal So for the same reason finding but part of a recited Deed and not the whole is as if no part were found and it appears by the Deed of 1 Mariae that both Deeds of 29 H. 8. and 1 E. 6. are
power lawfully not to abate it and us'd that last lawful power and not the first and wrong'd none in using it To this may be added That the Iudgment upon a simple Contract is the Act of the Court and compulsory to the Executor and he hath then no Election but must obey the Iudgment In conclusion though it were agreed That in the Action of Debt brought by Allington upon a simple Contract Iudgment ought not to have been given against the Defendant being Administrator but the Writ should have abated because the Administrator was not chargeable And though the Iudgment given were erroneous and for that cause reversible yet standing in force unrevers'd It is a good Barr to the Plaintiffs Action But lest this should countenance Iudges abating the Writ ex officio in such Actions brought or Plaintiffs to bring Error upon Iudgments given in such Actions I conceive the Law is clear That Iudges ought not ex officio to abate such Writ nor otherwise than when the Executor or Administrator Defendant in such Action demurrs and demands Judgment of the Writ and that Iudgment given against such Defendants not demurring to the Writ is not Erroneous unless for other cause If it be urg'd further That though a Iudgment obtain'd upon a simple Contract be a barr to an Action of Debt brought after upon an Obligation or to an Action of the Case upon an Assumpsit to pay mony as the present Case is Yet it should not barr if the Action upon which it was obtain'd were commenc'd pending a former Action upon an Obligation or upon an Assumpsit for mony in which the Intestate could not have waged his Law The answer is as before such Iudgment barrs until revers'd if admitted to be reversible as it is not But the Law is setled That wheresoever an Action of Debt upon Bond or Contract is brought against a man he may lawfully confess the Action and give way to a Judgment if there be no fraud in the Case although he have perfect notice of such former Suit depending nor is there any restraint or limit of time for confessing an Action brought upon a simple Contract more than upon a Bond. And to satisfie any Debt upon Obligation 5 H. 7. f. 27. b. Moore Scarleâ— Case f. 678. Crook 38 El. f. 462. Green Wilcocks Case before a Iudgment so obtain'd is a Devastavit in the Executor or Administrator and so it is to satisfie any latter Judgment if there be not assets to satisfie the first also So are the express Books to those points of 5 H. 7. per Curiam and Scarles his Case in Moore and Green and Wilcock's Case in Crook Eliz. Yet in 25 Eliz. when an Action of Debt for 100 l. was brought against an Executor in C. B. and pending that Debt was brought against him in B. R. for 100 l. which latter he confess'd and the Iudgment there had pleaded in Barr to the first Action And upon Question if the Plea were good Fenner and Walmesley held it good but Anderson Mead Wyndham and Periam argued to the contrary and that he ought to have pleaded the first Action pending to the second Action brought The Arguments of both sides you may see in Moore f. 173. Moore 25 El. f. 173. where it is left a Quere the Iudges doubting the Case but since the Law is taken That the Iudgment is a good barr to the first Action It will be still objected That if the Law be that Executors or Administrators may pay debts upon simple Contracts of the deceas'd to which they are not bound and thereby prevent the payment of a debt to which they are bound It is repugnant to Reason and consequently cannot be Law for that is in effect at the same time to be bound and not bound to pay For he who may not pay being bound is not bound at all For clearing this we must know Though Executors or Administrators are not compell'd by the Common Law to answer Actions of Debt for simple Contracts yet the Law of the Land obligeth payment of them For 1. Vpon committing Administration Oath is taken to administer the Estate of the dead duely which cannot be without paying his debts 2. Oath is taken to make true accompt of the Administration to the Ordinary and of what remains after all Debts Funeral Charges and just Expences of every sort deducted 3. This appears also by the Statute of 31 E. 3. c. 11. That Administrators are to administer and dispend for the Soul of the Dead and to answer to other to whom the dead persons were holden and bound which they cannot better do than by paying their debts And as this was the ancient Law and practise before in the Spiritual Court so by the new Act in 22 and 23 of the King for the better settling of Intestates Estates It is enacted accordingly that upon the Administrators accompt deductions be made of all sorts of debts This appears to be the ancient Law by the Great Charter c. 18. and long before by Glanvill in Henry the Second's time and Bracton in Henry the Third's time 4. And by Fitz-herbert in the Writ de rationabili parte bonorum the debts are to be deducted before division to the wife and children And upon the Executors accompt all the Testators debts are to be allow'd before payment of Legacies which were unjust if the payment of them were not due as appears by Doctor and Student Executors be bound to pay Debts before Legacies by the Law of Reason and by the Law of God for Reason wills that they should do first that is best for the Testator that is to pay debts which he was bound to pay before Legacies which he was not bound to give 2. It is better for the Testator his Debts should be paid Doct. Stud. l. 2. c. 11. for not payment of which his Soul shall suffer pain but none for not performing his Legacy The Ordinary upon the accompt L. 2. c. 10. f. 158 in all the Cases before rehears'd will regard much what is best for the Testator And I conceive the Ordinary may inforce the payment of Debts upon Contracts as well as Legacies or Marriage mony and no Prohibition lyes An Executor or Administrator may retain for his own satisfaction a Debt by single Contract due from the Testator or Intestate which he could not do unless the payment were lawful If at the Common Law the Executors payments of Debts upon simple Contracts were not just Why have the Iudges in all Ages given Judgment for the Plaintiffs unless the Defendant either Demurrs in the Commencement of the Plea or avoids the Debt by special matter pleaded and put in issue but he shall never in such case either Arrest the Iudgement or bring Error after Iudgment for that Cause And so it is agreed for Law in Read and Norwoods Case in Plowden where the Iudges had view of numerous Iudgments in that kind as there appears
did the principal Trespass were convicted And the reason of that Law is very pressing for else a man may be found Culpable of aiding or precepting a Trespass to be done when the doers of the Trespass are acquitted and not Culpable which is to be Culpable of aiding the doing of a thing never done which is impossible It will be said The Law in that Case is since alter'd and otherwise practis'd But who could alter a Law affirm'd by Judgment in Parliament to be the Custome and Law of the Kingdome without an Act of Parliament to alter it which was not or at least an Error in another Parliament if that might be which is not so clear For this is not like a Judgment given in one Court and after contraried in another or in the Chequer Chamber Any Law of the Kingdom might as well be alter'd without Act of Parliament as this 5. However letting that pass but as the Law is now taken no man can be guilty of aid or assistance to a Trespass not done and which is the same whereof the Actors are acquitted But in this Case They that put the Plaintiff in the Stocks are found not Guilty and another Defendant found Guilty for bidding him be put in the Stocks 6. Another reason is That Coxe cannot be Culpable of a Trespass which cannot or must not be proved which is the same But by the Statute no regard or respect is to be had of the Evidence proving the Trespass if the Fact be not proved to be done where the Action is laid Therefore there can be no Evidence against Coxe for Evidence not to be regarded and not at all is the same 7. If the other Defendants cannot by the Statute be found Culpable because they were aiding and assisting the Constable though in an undue execution of his Office no more can Coxe For aid or assistance may be by direction or precept as well as by corporal strength And therefore if they be free for assisting to put the Plaintiff in the Stocks forcibly Coxe is free for advising and bidding him be put there directively 8. Lastly the Statute intends like benefit to the Defendants when the Fact is not proved to be done where the Action is laid as if the Plaintiff became Nonsuit or suffer'd a discontinuance But in case of Nonsuit or Discontinuance all the Defendants were to have their double Costs both by 7 and 21 Jac. for a Nonsuit or Discontinuance cannot be against some of the Defendants for the Nonsuit and Discontinuance are of the entire action Therefore here all the Defendants shall have double Costs And if the Iury had not meant the Defendants equally free or equally faulty they would have added in their Verdict That if upon the whole matter found the Court should think that Actio praedicta would lye in London against some of the Defendants and not others then they found such against whom it might be laid in London Culpable and the rest not Culpable The Record is Et praedictus Richardus Coxe Miles Except accersivit the Constable whereas there is no praedictus Richardus Coxe Miles but Baronettus and there is another praedictus Richardus Coxe Armâ—ger which makes the Verdict incertain in this point Quaerens nil Capiat c. Pasch 21 Car. II. in Banc. William Hayes Plaintiff and Charles Bickerstaff Defendant In Arrest of Judgment CHarles Bickerstaff being possessed of a long term of years in certain Woodlands and Copces in Cobham in the County of Kent Demis'd Sett and to Farm lett the same for Six years parcel of his term to the Plaintiff under a Rent and other Reservations and Covenanted The Plaintiff keeping and performing the Agreements of his part to be kept and performed Quod praedictus Willielmus Hayes legitime haberet teneret gauderet habere tenere gaudere potuisset praedicta dimissa praemissa juxta conventionem praeantea in per Indenturam praedict dimiss absque aliquo impedimento perturbatione evictione vel interruptione quibuscunque de vel per dictum Carolum Bickerstaff Executores Administratores vel Assignatos suos aut aliquem eorum prout per Indenturam praedictam plenius apparet That by virtue of the said Demise he entred and was posses'd and that after the Defendant being possess'd for a longer term granted the Reversion to Charles Duke of Lenox to whom the Plaintiff atturn'd and that afterwards the said Duke and others by his command entred upon the Plaintiff although he observ'd all Agreements of his part and carried away many Loads of Faggots and Wood and kept and still keeps him out of Possession to his Damage of Eight hundred pounds And brings his Action for breach of the Covenant aforesaid The Defendant pleads Enjoyment according to the Demise and Traverseth the Grant of the Reversion to the Duke Modo Forma All Covenants between a Lessor and his Lessee are either Covenants in Law or Express Covenants By Covenant in Law the Lessee is to enjoy his Lease against the lawful Entry Eviction or Interruption of any man but not against tortious Entries Evictions or Interruptions and the reason of Law is solid and clear because against tortious acts the Lessee hath proper Remedy against the wrong doers So are the express Books of 22 H. 6. 22 H. 6. f. 52. b. 32 H. 6. f. 32 b. N. Br. â—45 b. Letter L. where a man leas'd by Deed-poll without express Covenant and 32 H. 6. where the Lease was by Deed Indented If the Lessor seaseth the term by Deed-poll Nat. Br. and outeth the Lessee he shall have a Writ of Covenant upon that Deed-poll although he hath no Indenture of it But if a stranger who hath no right outs the Lessee then he shall not have a Writ of Covenant against the Lessor because he hath remedy by Action against the stranger but if a stranger enter by elder Title then he shall have a Writ of Covenant for he hath no other Remedy This shews the Law gives not Remedy to the Lessee upon the Covenant when he hath a proper and natural Remedy against another who doth the wrong By the same Reason if the Lessee be by express Covenant to enjoy his term or enjoy it against all men which is the same he shall not have an Action of Covenant against the Lessor unless he be legally outed or evicted For if he be outed tortiously by any stranger he hath his Remedy So is the express Book of 26 H. 6. f. 3. b. where it is agreed That the warranty of a Lease for years is but an Action of Covenant which extends not to tortious Entries for the former Reason Yet I agree If the Lessor expresly Covenants that the Lessee shall hold and enjoy his term without the Entry or Interruption of any whether such Entry or Interruption be lawful or tortious There the Lessor shall be charg'd by an Action of Covenant for the tortious Entry of a stranger because no other
cannot answer it Therefore the parties agree the Fact by their pleading upon Demurrer and ask the Iudgment of the Court for the Law In Special Verdicts the Jury Inform the naked Fact and the Court deliver the Law and so is it in Demurrers upon Evidence in Arrest of Judgments upon Challenges and often upon the Judges Opinion of the Evidence given in Court the Plaintiff becomes Nonsuit when if the matter had been left to the Jury they might well have found for the Plaintiff But upon all general Issues as upon not Culpable pleaded in Trespass Nil debet in Debt Nul tort Nul disseisin in Assize Ne disturba pas in Quare Impedit and the like though it be matter of Law whether the Defendant be a Trespassor a Debtor Disseisor or Disturber in the particular Cases in Issue yet the Jury find not as in a Special Verdict the Fact of every Case by it self leaving the Law to the Court but find for the Plaintiff or Defendant upon the Issue to be tryed wherein they resolve both Law and Fact complicately and not the Fact by it self so as though they answer not singly to the Question what is the Law yet they determine the Law in all matters where Issue is joyn'd and tryed in the principal Case but where the Verdict is Special Hob. f. 227. To this purpose the Lord Hobart in Needler's Case against the Bishop of Winchester is very apposite Legally it will be very hard to quit a Jury that finds against the Law either Common Law or several Statute Law whereof all men were to take knowledge and whereupon Verdict is to be given whether any Evidence be given to them or not As if a Feoffment or Devise were made to one imperpetuum and the Jury should find cross either an Estate for Life or in Fee-simple against the Law they should be subject to an Attaint though no man informed them what the Law was in that Case The legal Verdict of the Jury to be recorded is finding for the Plaintiff or Defendant what they answer if asked to questions concerning some particular Fact is not of their Verdict essentially nor are they bound to agree in such particulars if they all agree to find their Issue for the Plaintiff or Defendant they may differ in the motives wherefore as well as Judges in giving Iudgment for the Plaintiff or Defendant may differ in the Reasons wherefore they give that Iudgment which is very ordinary I conclude with the Statute of 26 H. 8. c. 4. That if any Jurors in Wales do acquit any Felon Murderer or Accessary or give an untrue Verdict against the King upon the Tryal of any Traverse Recognizance or Forfeiture contrary to good and pregnant Evidence ministred to them by persons sworn before the Kings Justiciar That then such Jurors should be bound to appear before the Council of the Marches there to abide such Fine or Ransome for their Offence as that Court should think fit If Jurors might have been fined before by the Law for going against their evidence in matters criminal there had been no cause for making this Statute against Jurors for so doing in Wales only Objections out of the Ancient and Modern Books 1. A Juror kept his Fellows a day and night 8 Ass pl. 35. without any reason or assenting and therefore awarded to the Fleet. This Book rightly understood is Law That he staid his Fellows a day and a night without any reason or assenting may be understood That he would not in that time intend the Verdict at all more than if he had been absent from his Fellows but wilfully not find for either side In this sense it was a Misdemeanor against his Oath For his Oath was truly to try the Issue which he could never do that resolv'd not to conferr with his Fellows And in this sense it is the same with the Case 34 E. 3. where Twelve being sworn and put together to treat of their Verdict 34 E. 3. Bra. Title Jurors n. 46. one secretly withdrew himself and went away for which he was justly fined and imprison'd and it differs not to withdraw from a mans duty by departing from his Fellows and to withdraw from it though he stay in the same Room and so is that Book to he understood But if a man differ in Iudgment from his Fellows for a day and a night though his dissent may not be as reasonable as the Opinion of the rest that agree yet if his Iudgment be not satisfied one disagreeing can be no more criminal than four or five disagreeing with the rest 2. A Juror would not agree with his Fellows for two dayes 41 Ass p. 11. and being demanded by the Judges If he would agree said He would first die in Prison whereupon he was committed and the Verdict of the Eleven taken but upon better advice the Verdict of the Eleven was quasht and the Juror discharg'd without Fine and the Justices said the way was to carry them in Carts until they agreed and not by fining them and as the Judges err'd in taking the Verdict of Eleven so they did in imprisoning the Twelfth and this Case makes strongly that the Juror was not to be fined who disagreed in Iudgment only Much of the Office of Jurors in order to their Verdict is ministerial as not withdrawing from their Fellows after they are sworn not withdrawing after challenge and being tryed in before they take their Oath 36 H. 6. f. 27. Br. Jurors 18. not receiving from either side Evidence after their Oath not given in Court not eating and drinking before their Verdict refusing to give a Verdict and the like wherein if they transgress they are finable but the Verdict it self when given is not an Act ministerial but judicial and according to the best of their judgment for which they are not finable nor to be punisht but by Attaint 3. The Case of 7 R. 2. Title Coronae Fitz. 108. was cited where upon acquittal of a Common Thief the Judge said The Jury ought to be bound to his good behaviour during his life But saith the Book quere per quel ley but that was only gratis dictum by the Judge for no such thing was done as binding them Hob. f. 114. 4. Bradshaw and Salmons Case was urg'd where a Jury had given excessive Damages upon a Tryal in an Action of Covenant and the Court of Star-Chamber gave Damages to the Complainant almost as high as the Jury had given upon the Tryal But the Jury who gave the Damages were not question'd Though saith the Book they might have been because they receiv'd Briefs from the Plaintiff for whom they gave Damages which was a Misdemeanor but the express Book is That the Jury could not be punisht by Information for the excessive Damages but only by Attaint therefore not for their false Verdict without other Misdemeanor which answers some other Cases alledg'd Nor can any man shew
eas in omnibus sequantur In cujus c. T. R. apud Wadestocks ix die Septembris Out of the Close Rolls of King Henry the Third his Time Clause 1 H. 3. dorso 14. The Kings thanks to G. de Mariscis Justice of Ireland The King signifies that himself and other his Lieges of Ireland should enjoy the Liberties which he had granted to his Lieges of England and that he will grant and confirm the same to them Clause 3. H. 3. m. 8. part 2. The King writes singly to Nicholas Son of Leonard Steward of Meth and to Nicholas de Verdenz and to Walter Purcell Steward of Lagenia and to Thomas the son of Adam and to the King of Connage and to Richard de Burgh and to J. Saint John Treasurer and to the other Barons of the Exchequer of Dublin That they be intendant and answerable to H. Lord Arch-bishop of Dublin as to the Lord the King's Keeper and Bailiff of the Kingdome of Ireland as the King had writ concerning the same matter to G. de Mariscis Justice of Ireland Clause 5. H. 3. m. 14. The King writes to his Justice of Ireland That whereas there is but a single Justice itinerant in Ireland which is said to be dissonant from the more approved custome in England for Reasons there specified two more Justices should be associated to him the one a Knight the other a Clerk and to make their Circuits together according to the Custome of the Kingdom of England Witness c. The Close Roll. 5 H. 3. m. 6. Dorso The King makes a Recital That though he had covenanted with Geoffrey de Mariscis That all Fines and other Profits of Ireland should be paid unto the Treasure and to other Bailiffs of the Kings Exchequer of Dublin yet he receiv'd all in his own Chamber and therefore is removed by the King from his Office Whereupon the King by advise of his Council of England establisheth that H. Arch-bishop of Ireland be Keeper of that Land till further order And writes to Thomas the son of Anthony to be answerable and intendant to him After the same manner it is written to sundry Irish Kings and Nobles there specially nominated Clause 7. H. 3. m. 9. The King writes to the Arch-bishop of Dublin his Justice of Ireland to reverse a Judgment there given in a Case concerning Lands in Dalkera between Geoffrey de Mariscis and Eve his wife Plaintiffs and Reignald Talbott Tenant By the Record of the same Plea returned into England the Judgment is reversed upon these two Errors The first because upon Reignald's shewing the Charter of King John the King's Father concerning the same Land in regard thereof desiring peace it was denyed him The second Because the Seisin was adjudged to the said Geoffrey and Eve because Reynald calling us to warranty had us not to warranty at the day set him by the Court which was a thing impossible for either Geoffrey or the Court themselves to do our Court not being above us to summon us or compel us against our will Therefore the King writes to the Justice of Ireland to re-seise Reynald because he was disseised by Erroneous Judgment Clause 28. H. 3. m. 7. The King writes to M. Donenald King of Tirchonill to aid him against the King of Scots Witness c. The like Letters to other Kings and Nobles of Ireland Clause 40. E. 3. m. 12. Dorso The King takes notice of an illegal proceeding to Judgment in Ireland Ordered to send the Record and Process into England It was objected by one of my Brothers That Ireland received not the Laws of England by Act of Parliament of England but at the Common Law by King John's Charter If his meaning be that the Fact was so I agree it but if he mean they could not receive them by Act of Parliament of England as my Brother Maynard did conjecturally inferr for his purpose then I deny my Brothers Assertion for doubtless they might have received them by Act of Parliament And I must clear my Brother Maynard from any mention of an Union as was discoursed of England and Ireland Nor was it at all to his purpose If any Union other than that of a Provincial Government under England had been Ireland had made no Laws more than Wales but England had made them for Ireland as it doth for Wales As for the Judgment Obj. One of my Brothers made a Question Whether George Ramsey the younger Brother inheriting John Earl of Holdernes before the naturalization of Nicholas Whether Nicholas as elder Brother being naturalized should have it from him Doubtless he should if his Naturalizing were good He saith the Plaintiff cannot have Iudgment because a third person by this Verdict hath the Title Answ If a Title appear for the King the Court ex Officio ought to give Iudgment for him though no party But if a man have a prior Possession and another enters upon him without Title I conceive the priority of Possession is a good Title against such an Entry equally when a Title appears for a third that is no party as if no Title appear'd for a third But who is this third party For any thing appears in the Verdict George Ramsey died before the Earl 2. It appears not that his Son John or the Defendant his Grand-child were born within the Kings Liegeance Patient appears to be born at Kingston and so the Daughters of Robert by the Verdict The Acts of Ireland except all Land whereof Office was found before the Act to entitle the King but that is in Ireland for the Act extends not to England If Nicholas have Title it is by the Law of England as a consequent of Naturalization So it may be for the Act of 7 Jac. cap. 2. he that is Naturalized in England since the Act must receive the Sacrament but if no Alien by consequent then he must no more receive the Sacrament than a Postnatus of Scotland Obj. Ireland is a distinct Kingdom from England and therefore cannot make any Law Obligative to England Answ That is no adequate Reason for by that Reason England being a distinct Kingdom should make no Law to bind Ireland which is not so England can naturalize if it please nominally a person in Ireland and not in England But he recover'd by saying That Ireland was subordinate to England and therefore could not make a Law Obligatory to England True for every Law is coactive and it is a contradiction that the Inferior which is civilly the lesser power should compel the Superior which is greater power Secondly He said England and Ireland were two distinct Kingdoms and no otherwise united than because they had one Soveraign Had this been said of Scotland and England it had been right for they are both absolute Kingdoms and each of them Sui Juris But Ireland far otherwise For it is a Dominion belonging to the Crown of England and follows that it cannot be separate from it but by