Executors one of them of Age 2 Sand. 212. and the other not one may make an Attorney for the other There is no difference between Executors and Infants in this Case for Executors recover in the right of the Testator and the Bayliffs in the Right of him who hath the Inheritance Besides the Avowants are in the nature of Plaintiffs and whereever a Plaintiff recovers the Defendant shall not assign Infancy for Error Adjornatur Capel versus Saltonstal INdebitatus assumpsit in the Common Pleas Where there are several Plaintiffs in a personal thing and one dyeth before Judgment the Action is abated in which Action there were four Plaintiffs one of them died before Iudgment the others recover and now the Defendant brought a Writ of Error in this Court to reverse that Iudgment and the Question was whether the Action was abated by the death of this person Those who argued for the Plaintiffs in the Action held that the Debt will survive and so will the Action for 't is not altered by the death of the party for where Damages only are to be recovered in an Action well commenced by several Plaintiffs and part of that Action is determined by the Act of God or by the Law and the like Action remaineth for the residue the Writ shall not abate As in Ejectment if the Term should expire pending the Suit 1 Inst 285. the Plaintiff shall go on to recover Damages for though the Action is at end quoad the possession yet it continues for the Damages after the Term ended So if the Lessor bring Waste against Tenant pur auter vie and pending the Writ Cestui que vie dieth the Writ shall not abate because no other person can be sued for Damages but the Survivor So where Trover was brought by two 2 Bulst 262. 1 Inst 198. and after the Verdict one of them died the Iudgment shall not be arrested because the Action survives to the other Mr. Pollexfen contra He admitted the Law to be that where two Iointenants are Defendants the death of one would not abate the Writ because the Action is joint and several against them But in all Cases where two or more are to recover a personal thing there the Death or Release of one shall abate the Action as to the rest though 't is otherwise when they are Defendants and are to discharge themselves of a personalty 6 Co. 25. b. Ruddock's Case 2 Cro. 19. And therefore in an Audita Querela by two the death of one shall not abate the Writ because 't is in discharge Now in this Case Iudgment must be entred for a dead Man which cannot be for 't is not consistent with reason The Case of Wedgewood and Bayly is express in it which was this Trover was brought by six and Iudgment for them one of them died the Iudgment could not be entred 'T is true where so many are Defendants and one dies the Action is not abated but then it must be suggested on the Roll. Curia Actions grounded upon Torts will survive but those upon Contracts will not The Iudgment was reversed Fisher versus Wren In the Common-Pleas THE Plaintiff brought an Action of Trespass on the Case Prescription and Custom alledged together and declared that he was seized of an ancient Mesuage and of a Meadow and an Acre of Land parcel of the Demesnes of the Mannor of Crosthwait and sets forth a Custom to grant the same by Copy of Court Roll and that there are several Freehold Tenements parcel of the said Mannor and likewise several Customary Tenements parcel also thereof grantable ad voluntatem Domini and that all the Freeholders c. time out of Mind c. together with the Copyholders according to the Custom of the said Mannor have enjoyed solam seperalem Pasturam of the Ground called Garths parcel of the said Mannor for their Cattle Levant and Couchant c. and had liberty to cut the Willows growing there for the mending of their Houses and the Defendant put some Cattle into the said Ground called Garths which did eat the Willows by reason whereof the Plaintiff could have no benefit of them c. Vpon Not Guilty pleaded there was a Verdict for the Plaintiff And now Serjeant Pemberton moved in arrest of Iudgment and took these Exceptions 1. As to the manner of the Prescription which the Plaintiff had laid to be in the Freeholders and then alledged a Custom for the Copyholders c. and so made a joint Title in both which cannot be done in the same Declaration because a Prescription is always alledged to be in a person and a Custom must be limited to a place and therefore an entire thing cannot be claimed both by a Prescription and Custom Vaughan 215. Carter 200. 1 Sand. 351. because the Grant to the Freeholders and this Vsage amongst the Copiholders could not begin together 2. As to the Custom 't is not good as pleaded to exclude the Lord for it can never have a good Commencement because Copyholders have Common in the Lords Soil only by permission to improve their Estates which Common being spared by the Lord and used by the Tenant becomes a Custom but no Vsage amongst the Tenants or permission of the Lord can wholly divest him of his Soil and vest an Interest in them who in the beginning were only his Tenants at Will 2 Sand. 325. 3. The third Exception and which he chiefly relyed on was viz. That this is a Profit apprender in alieno Solo to which all the Tenants of the Mannor are entituled and that makes them Tenants in Common and therefore in this Action where Damages are to be recovered they ought all to join 'T is true in real Actions Tenants in Common always sever 1 Inst 197 198. Godb. 347. but in Trespasses quare Clasum fregit and in personal Actions they always join and the reason is plain because in those Actions though their Estates are several yet the Damages survive to all and it would be unreasonable to bring several Actions for one single Trespass E contra It was argued that it cannot be denied E contra but that there may be a Custom or Prescription to have solam seperalem pasturam but whether both Prescription and Custom can be joyned together is the doubt now before the Court and as to that he held it was well enough pleaded 1 Sand. 351. for where there is an unusual Right there must be the like remedy to recover that Right it was thus pleaded in North's Case But admitting it not to be well pleaded 't is then but a double Plea to which the Plaintiff ought to have demurred and this may serve for an Answer to the first Exceptions Then as to the last Objection that 't is a Profit apprender in alieno solo for which all the Tenants ought to join 't is true a Common is no more than a Profit apprender
the six Months by this means the Conusee of the Statute is defeated for after the inrollment the Land passeth ab initio and the Bargainee in Iudgment of Law was seised thereof from the delivery of the Deed but not by way of Relation but by immediate Conveyance of the Estate by vertue of the Statute of Vses But the Law will not suffer contingent Remainders to waver about and to be so incertain that no Man knows where to find them which they must be if this Doctrine of Relation should prevail Now suppose the Surrendree had made a Grant of his Estate to another person before he had accepted of the Surrender and the Grantee had entred would this subsequent assent have divested this Estate and made the Grant of no effect if it would then here is a plain way found out for any Man to avoid his own acts and to defeat Purchasors Therefore 't is with great reason that the Law provides that no person shall take a Surrender but he who hath the immediate Reversion and that the Estate shall still remain in the Surrenderor until all acts are done which are to compleat the Conveyance Those who argued against the Iudgment E contra held that the Estate passed immediately without the assent of the Surrenderor and that even in Conveyances at the Common-Law 't is divested out of the person and put in him to whom such Conveyance is made without his actual assent 'T is true in Exchanges the Freehold doth not pass without Entry nor a Grant of a Reversion without an Attornment but that stands upon different Reasons from this Case at the Bar for in Exchanges the Law requires the mutual acts of the Parties exchanging and in the other there must be the consent of a third person But in Surrenders the assent of the Surrendree is not required for the Estate must be in him immediately upon the execution of the Deed if he doth not shew some dissent to it If a Man should plead a Release without saying ad quam quidem relaxationem the Defendant agreavit yet this Plea is good because the Estate passeth to him upon the execution of the Deed. It may be a Question whether the actual assent must be at the very time that the Surrender was made for if it should be afterwards t is well enough and the Estate remaineth in the Surrendree till dis-agreement Presumption stands on this side for it shall never be intended that he did not give his Assent but on the contrary because t is for his benefit not to refuse an Estate Therefore where a Feme Sole had a Lease and married Hob. 203. the Husband and Wife surrendred it to another in consideration of a new Lease to be granted to the Wife and her Sons c. this Estate vests immediately in her tho' a Feme Covert and that without the assent of her Husband for the Law intends it to be her Estate till he dissent 't is true in that Case his assent was held necessary because the first Lease could not be divested out of him without his own consent So a Feoffment to three 2 Leon. 224. and Livery made to one the Freehold is in all 'till disagreement So if a Bond be given to a Stranger for my use and I should die before I had agreed to it my Executors are entituled to an Action of Debt and will recover A Feme Covert and another were Ioint-tenants for Life 1 Rol. Rep. 401 441. she and her Husband made a Lease for years of her moiety reserving a Rent during her Life and the Life of her partner then the Wife died this was held to be a good Lease against the surviving Ioint-tenant till disagreement which shews that the agreement of the Parties is not so much requisite to perfect a Conveyance of this nature as a disagreement is to make it void And this may serve as an answer to the second point which was not much insisted on that Mens Titles would be incertain and precarious if after the assent of the Surrendree the Estate should pass by Relation at the very time that the Deed was executed and that it was not known where the Free-hold was in the mean time for if he had agreed to it immediately it had been altogether as private Then as to the Pleadings 't is true that generally when a Surrender is pleaded 't is said ad quam quidem sursum redditionem the Party adtunc ibidem agreavit which implies that the Surrendree was then present and in such Case he ought to agree or refuse Besides those Actions to which an Agreement is thus pleaded were generally brought in disaffirmance of Surrenders and to support the Leases upon which the Plaintiffs declared and then the proper and most effectual Bar was to shew a Surrender and express Agreement before the Action brought It might have been insufficient pleading not to shew an Acceptance of the Surrendree but 't is not substance for if Issue should be taken whether a Surrender or not Cro. Eliz. 249. and a Verdict for the Plaintiff that defect of setting forth an Acceptance is aided by the Statute of Ieofails In this Case there is not only the Word Surrender but * Grant and Release which may be pleaded without any consent to it and a Grant by operation of Law turns to a Surrender because a Man cannot have two Estates of equal dignity in the Law at the same time Neither can it be said that there remained any Estate in Simon Leach after this Surrender executed for 't is an absurd thing to imagine that when he had done what was in his power to compleat a Conveyance and to divest himself of an Estate yet it should continue in him Therefore the Remainder in Contingency to the Lessor of the Plaintiff was destroyed by this Surrender of the Estate to him in reversion for by that means when it did afterwards happen there was no particular Estate to support it But notwithstanding the Iudgment was affirmed and afterwards Anno quarto Gulielmi Mariae upon a Writ of Error brought in the House of Lords it was reversed Idem versus Eundem THIS Point having received a legal determination the same Plaintiff brought another Action of Trespass and Ejectment against the same Defendant Surrender by a person Non compos is void and at a Trial at the Barr in Easter Term nono Gulielmi Regis another special Verdict was found upon which the Case more at large was viz. That Nicholas Leach being seised in Fee of the Lands in question made his Will in these Words viz. In the Name of God Amen c. I devise my Mannors of Bulkworth Whitebear and Vadacot in Devonshire and Cresby Goat and Cresby Grange in Northallerton in Yorkshire unto the Heirs Males of my Body begotten and for want of such Issue Male I devise the same unto my Brother Simon Leach for Life and after his decease to the
Trust as in the Case of Wardship formerly which always went to the Executor of the Grantee and which was of greater consideration in the Law than the feeding or clothing of an Ideot and of that Opinion was the Court that the King had a good Title to dispose of both the Ward and the Ideot one till he was of Age and the other during his Ideocy Iudgment for the Defendant DE Term. Sanctae Trin. Anno 36 Car. II. in Banco Regis 1684. Reeves versus Winnington THE Testator was a Citizen and a Freeman of London A Devise of all his Estate passed a Fee and being seised in Fee of a Mesuage c. and likewise possessed of a considerable personal Estate made his Will in which there was this Clause viz. I hear that John Reeves is enquiring after my Death but I am resolved to give him nothing but what his Father hath given him by Will I give all my Estate to my Wife c. The Question was Whether by these words the Devisee had an Estate for Life or in Fee in the Mesuage It was argued that she had only an Estate for life because the Words All my Estate cannot be construed to pass a Fee for it doth not appear what Estate was intended and Words in a Will which go to disinherit an Heir must be plain and apparent A Devise was in these Words viz. Sid. 191. Bowman versus Milbank I give all to my Mother all to my Mother and it was adjudged that a Fee did not pass which is as strong a Case as this for by the word All it must be intended All that was in his power to give which is as comprehensive as if he had said All my Estate 'T is true Kerman and Johnson Stiles 281. 1 Rol. Abr. 834. Cro. Car. 447. it hath been adjudged that where a Man devised his whole Estate to his Wife paying his Debts and Legacies that the word Estate there passed a Fee because it was for the benefit of the Creditors there being not personal Assets sufficient to pay all the Debts But that is not found in this Case therefore the Word Estate being doubtful and which will admit of a double construction shall not be intended to pass a Fee Mr. E contra Pollexfen contra The first part of this Sentence consists in negative words and those which are subsequent explain the intention of the Testator viz. That John Reeves should take nothing by the Will The Word Estate doth comprehend the whole in which the Owner hath either an Interest or Property like a Release of all Actions which is a good discharge as well of real as personal Actions In common understanding it carries an interest in the Land and then 't is the same as if he had devised all his Fee-simple Estate In the Case of Bowman and Milbank it was adjudged that a Fee-simple did not pass by the Particle All because it was a Relative Word and had no Substantive joined with it and therefore it might have been intended All his Cattle All his Goods or All his personal Estate for which incertainty it was held void yet Iustice Twisden in that Case said that it was adjudged that if a Man promise to give half his Estate to his Daughter in Marriage that the Lands as well as the Goods are included The Testator devised all his Tenant-right Estate held of such a Manor 3 Keb. 245. Mod. Rep. 100. and this being found specially the Question was Whether any more passed than an Estate for Life because he did not mention what Estate he intended but it was held that the Devisee had a Fee-simple because the Words were as comprehensive as if he had devised all his Inheritance and by these Words a Fee-simple would pass Curia It plainly appears that the Testator intended nothing for John Reeves therefore he can take nothing by this Will and that the Devisee hath an Estate in Fee-simple for the Words All my Estate are sufficient to pass the same Rex versus Sir Thomas Armstrong Saturday June 14th THE Defendant was outlawed for High-Treason and being taken at Leyden in Holland was brought into England and being now at the Bar he desired that he might have leave of the Court to reverse the Outlawry and he tried by virtue of the Stature of Ed. 6. which Enacts 5 6 E. 6. cap. 11. That if the Party within one year after the Outlawry or Judgment thereupon shall yield himself to the Chief Justice of England and offer to traverse the Indictment upon which he was outlawed he shall be admitted to such Traverse and being acquitted shall be discharged of the Outlawry He alledged that it was not a year since he was outlawed and therefore desired the benefit of this Law But it was denied because he had not rendered himself according to the Statute but was apprehended and brought before the Chief Iustice Whereupon a Rule was made for his Execution at Tyburn which was done accordingly DE Term. Sancti Mich. Anno 36 Car. II. in Banco Regis 1684. Hebblethwaite versus Palmes Mich. 36 Car. II. in B. R. Rot. 448. AN Action on the Case was brought in the Common-Pleas Possession is a sufficient cause to maintain an Action against a wrong doer for diverting of a Watercourse The Declaration was That the Defendant Primo Augusti c. injuste malitiose did break down an ancient Damm upon the River Darwent by which he did divert magnam partem aquae ab antiquo solitu cursu erga molendinum ipsius quer c. ad dampnum c. The Defendant pleaded that before the said Breach made he was seised in Fee of an ancient Mill and of six Acres of Land adjoyning upon which the said Damm was erected time out of mind to turn the Water to his said Mill which Damm was always repaired and maintained by the Defendant and the Tenants of the said Land that his Mill was casually burnt and he not intending to Re-build it suffered the Damm to be broken down and converted the Timber to his own use being upon his own Soil prout ei bene licuit c. The Plaintiff replied that by the breaking of the Damm the Water was diverted from his Mill c. The Defendant rejoyned and justified his Plea and Traversed that the Mill of the Plaintiff was an ancient Mill. And upon a Demurrer to this Rejoynder Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff and a Writ of Error now brought to reverse that Iudgment and for the Defendant in the Action it was argued 1. That the Declaration is not good because the Plaintiff had not set forth that his Mill was an ancient Mill. 2. Because he had not entituled himself to the Watercourse 3. That the Plea was good in Bar to this Action because the Defendant had sufficiently justified having a Right to the Land upon which the Damm was erected and always repaired it As to the first Point it
it because the words were an entire Sentence and spoken altogether at the same time and therefore if a Prohibition should not go it would be a double vexation DE Termino Paschae Anno 1 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1685. Earl of Yarmouth versus Darrel THE Plaintiff brought an Action on the Case Grant of the King of sole Printing not good setting forth Letters Patents of King Charles the II. by which the Sole Printing of Blank Writs Bonds and Indentures were granted to him excepting such Forms which belonged to the Custom-House and which were formerly granted to Sir Roger L'Estrange that this Grant was to continue for the space of 30 Years and that the Defendant had notice thereof and had printed 500 Blank Bonds which he laid to his damage of the sum of 40 l. Vpon Not Guilty pleaded the Iury found a special Verdict the substance of which was that the Defendant was a Stationer and that the Company of Stationers for the space of 40 years last past before the granting of these Letters Patents had constantly printed Blank Bonds and so made a general conclusion Mr. Trindar argued for the Plaintiff and the only Question was Whether this Patent did vest a sole Interest in the Plaintiff exclusive to all others In his Argument he insisted on these Points 1. That the King hath a Prerogative in Printing and may grant it Exclusive to others 2. That this Prerogative extends to the Case at the Bar. That he hath such a Prerogative 't is confirm'd by constant Vsage for such Grants have been made by the Kings of England ever since Printing was invented But to instance in a few Viz. The Patent for Printing of Law-Books was granted to one More on the 19th day of January in the 15th year of King James the I. And when that Patent was expired another was granted to Atkyns and others on the 15th day of November in the 12th year of King Charles the II. In 23. Eliz. a Patent was granted to the Company of Stationers for the sole Printing of Psalm-Books and Psalters for the space of 30 years And on the 8th of August 31 Eliz. the like Patent was granted to Christopher Barker for Life Another Patent to the Company of Stationers for printing of Corderius c. These and many more of the like nature shew what the constant usage hath been Now the Statute of Monopolies doth not reach to this Case because of the Proviso therein to exempt all such Grants of sole Printing and by the Statute of King Charles the II. for regulating of the Press 14 Car. 2. cap. 33. 't is Enacted That no person shall Print any Copy which any other hath or shall be granted to him by Letters Patents and whereof he hath the sole Right and Priviledge to Print And upon the breaches of these Statutes several Iudgments have been given Between Streater and Roper in this Court Mich. 24 Car. 2. Rot. 237. 't is true the Iudgment was against the Plaintiff but upon a Writ of Error brought in Parliament that Iudgment was reversed The same Term there was a Iudgment given upon a special Verdict in the Common-Pleas for the Plaintiffs Hill 35 Car. 2. B. R. Rot. 99. who were the Company of Stationers against Seymour for Printing of Almanacks And they obtained the like Iudgment against Wright for Printing of Psalters and Psalm-Books Now to apply this to the principal Case 't is to be considered that these Books for which the sole Printing was so claimed were of a publick nature and importance relating to the good and benefit of the Subjects and so likewise are Blank Bonds for there may be false and vitious Impressions to the ruin and destruction of many innocent people And as a farther Argument that the King hath this Prerogative 't is likewise to be considered that where no individual person can claim a Property in a thing there the King hath a Right vested in him by Law and it cannot be pretended that any particular person hath a Right to Print those Bonds therefore the finding that such were printed by the Company for above 40 years is immaterial because there being an inherent Prerogative in the King whenever he exerts it all other persons are bound up who were at liberty before To prove which the Iudgment in the Case of the East-India Company is express in point for before that Patent the subject had liberty to Trade to those places prohibited by that Grant but afterwards they were restrained by that Grant Neither is this in the nature of a Monopoly 11 Co. 84. 't is not like that of the sole Grant of making Cards which hath been adjudged void and with great reason because that Grant reached to prohibit a whole Trade and therefore differs from this Case for the Defendant may print other Instruments or Books and exercise his Trade in some other lawful and profitable Commodities and so might the Merchants in the Case of the East-India Company for they were restrained by the Patent as to particular places but might Trade to any other part of the World Neither will the Subjects in general receive any prejudice by this or such like Grants for if the Patentees make ill use of their Priviledges tho' it cannot be properly called an Office yet 't is a Trust and a Scire Facias will lie to repeal their Grants It was argued by the Councel for the Defendant E contra That the Verdict having found that the Company of Stationers had used to print those Bonds for above 40 years before the making of this Grant the Question will be Whether they are now divested of a Right so long enjoyed And as to that 't is not a new thing to object That notwithstanding such Grants yet other persons have insisted on a Right to Print and have printed accordingly Thus the sole Printing of Law-Books was granted to one Atkyns yet the Reports of Iustice Jones and my Lord Chief Iustice Vaughan were printed without the direction of the Patentees Printing as 't is a manual Occupation makes no alteration in this Case for the King hath as great a Prerogative in Writing any thing that is of a publick Nature as he hath in Printing of it Now considering Printing as an Art exclusive from the thing printed this Patent is not good For if a Man invent a new Art and another should learn it before the Inventor can obtain a Patent if afterwards granted 't is void Then consider it in relation to the thing printed 1 Roll. 4. 11 Co. 53. id which in this Case are Blank-Bonds 't is not a new Invention because the Company of Stationers have printed such above 40 years and for that reason this Patent is void for where the Invention is not New there Trade shall not be restrained No Man can receive any prejudice by the printing of such Bonds for they are of no Vse till filled up 't is only a bare Manufacture
day of Appearance he is to see that he appear at the day either by keeping of him in Custody or letting of him to Bail the end of the Arrest is to have his Body here If he had not been bailed then he had still remained in Custody and the Plaintiff would have his proper remedy but being once let to Bail and not appearing in Court according to the Condition of the Bond that seems to be the fault of the Defendant who had his Body before the day of Appearance Iudgment for the Defendant DE Term. Sancti Hill Anno 1 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1685. Serjeant Hampson's Case BY the Statute of Queen Elizabeth 't is Enacted 5 Eliz. c. 23. That if the person excommunicated have not a sufficient Addition or if 't is not contained in the Significavit that the Excommunication proceeds for some cause or contempt or of some original Matter of Heresie refusing to have his Child baptized to receive the Sacrament to come to Divine Service or Errors in Matters of Religion or Doctrine Incontinency Usury Simony Perjury in the Ecclesiastical Court or Idolatry he shall not incurr the Penalties in the Act. Serjeant Hampson was excommunicated for Alimony and now Mr. Girdler moved that he might be discharged because none of the aforesaid Causes were contained in the Significavit Curia He may be discharged of the Forfeiture for that reason but not of the Excommunication Anonymus ONE who was outlawed for the Murder of Sir Edmund Bury Godfrey now brought a Writ of Error in his Hand to the Bar praying that it might be read and allowed It was read by Mr. Astry Clerk of the Crown The Errors assigned were viz. That it did not appear upon the Return of the Exigent in the first Exact ' that the Court was held pro Comitatu That the Outlawry being against him and two other persons 't is said in the last Exact ' that Non comperuit but doth not say nec eorum aliquis comperuit For these Reasons the Outlawry was reversed and he held up his Hand at the Barr and pleaded Not-guilty to his Indictment and was admitted to Bail and afterwards he was brought to his Trial and no Witness in behalf of the King appearing against him he was acquitted The Mayor and Commonalty of Norwich versus Johnson A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a Iudgment given for the Plaintiff in the Common-Pleas in an Action of Waste Waste lies against an Executor de son tort of a Term. The Declaration was that the Plaintiff demised a Barn to one Took for a certain Term by vertue whereof he was possessed and being so possessed died that the Defendant was his Executor who entred and made Waste by pulling down of the said Barn The Defendant pleaded that Took died intestate and that he did not administer The Plaintiff replyed that he entred as Executor of his own Wrong and to this Plea the Defendant demurred and the Plaintiff joined in the Demurrer This Case was argued by Mr. Appleton of Lincolns-Inn for the Plaintiff who said That an Action of Waste would not lie against the Defendant because the Mayor and Commonalty c. had a remedy by an Assise to recover the Land upon which the Barn stood and a Trover to recover the Goods or Materials and that such an Action would not lie against him at the Common Law because he neither was Tenant by the Curtesie nor in Dower against whom Waste only lay So that if the Plaintiff is entituled to this Action it must be by vertue of the Statute of Gloucester 6 Ed. 1. c. 5. but it will not lie against the Defendant even by that Statute because the Action is thereby given against the Tenant by the Curtesie in Dower for Life or Years and treble Damages c. But the Defendant is neither of those and this being a penal Law which not only gives treble damages but likewise the Recovery of the place wasted ought therefore not to be taken strictly but according to Equity Tenants at sufferance or at Will by Elegit or Tenants by Statute Staple 11 H. 6. c. 5. and also Pernors of Profits were never construed to be within this Statute and therefore a particular Act was made to give him in Reversion an Action of Waste where Tenant for life or years had granted over their Estates and yet took the Profits and committed Waste Then the Question will be Co. Lit. 371. what Estate this Executor de sontort hath gained by his Entry And as to that he argued that he had got a Fee-simple by Disseisin and that for this reason the Plaintiff was barred from this Action for if the Son purchase Lands in Fee and is disseised by his Father who maketh a Feoffment in Fee to another with Warranty and dieth the Son is for ever barred for though the Disseisin was not done with any intention to make such a Feoffment 1 Roll. Abr. 662. yet he is bound by this Alienation So where a man made a Lease for life and died and then his Heir suffered a Recovery of the same Land without making an actual Entry this is an absolute Disseisin because the Lessee had an Estate for life but if he had been Tenant at Will it might be otherwise But admitting that the Defendant is not a Disseisor then the Plaintiffs must bring their Case to be within the Statute of Gloucester as that he is either Tenant for life or years If he is Tenant for Life he must be so either by right or by wrong He cannot be so by right because he had no lawful Conveyance made to him of this Estate besides 't is quite contrary to the Pleading which is that he entred wrongfully Neither can he be so by wrong for such particular Estates 6 Co. 25. as for life or years cannot be gained by Disseisin and so is Heliar's Case in 6 Co. Then if this should be construed an Estate for years it must be gained either by the Act of the Party or by the Act of the Law but such an Estate cannot be gained by either of those means First it cannot be gained by the Act of the Party Moor 126. Kendrick versus Burges because an Executor de son tort cannot have any interest in a Term and for this there is an express Authority in this Court which was thus viz. A Lease in Reversion for years was granted to a man who died intestate his Wife before she had administred sold this Term to the Defendant and afterwards she obtained Letters of Administration and made a Conveiance of the same Term to the Plaintiff and Iudgment was given for the last Vendee because it was in the case of a Reversion of a Term for years upon which no Entry could be made and of which there could be no Executor de son tort though it was admitted by the Court that such an Executor might make a good sale of
' Francisco Wythens Mil ' Justiciariis Richardo Holloway Mil ' Justiciariis Thoma Walcot Mil ' Justiciariis MEmorandum That the First day of this Term Sir Thomas Jones Chief Justice of the Common-Pleas had his Quietus and Sir Henry Beddingfield one of the Justices of the same Court succeeded him in that Office Likewise the Honourable William Mountagu Esq Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer had his Quietus and Sir Edward Atkyns one of the Barons of the same Court succeeded him Sir Job Charleton one of the Justices of the Common-Pleas had his Quietus but was made Chief Justice of Chester and Sir Edward Lutwich the King's Serjeant was made one of the Justices of the Common-Pleas and Serjeant Heath was made one of the Barons of the Exchequer Okel versus Hodgkinson THE Father and Son join in a Fine in order to make a Settlement upon the second Wife of the Father who was only Tenant by the Curtesie the Remainder in Tail to his said Son One of the Cognizors died after the Caption and before the Return of the Writ of Covenant and now a Writ of Error was brought to Reverse it and this was assigned for Error Curia If it had been in the Case of a Purchasor for a valuable Consideration the Court would have shewed him some favour but it being to do a wrong to a young Man they would leave it open to the Law THE first day of this Term being the 22th day of April there was a Call of Serjeants viz. Sir John Holt of Grays-Inn Recorder of London who was made Kings Serjeant Sir Ambrose Phillips made also Kings Serjeant Christopher Milton John Powell John Tate William Rawlinson George Hutchins William Killingworth Hugh Hodges and Thomas Geers They all appeared that day at the Chancery-Bar where having taken the Oaths the Lord Chancellor Jefferies made a short Speech to them after which they delivered a Ring to him praying him to deliver it to the King They went from the Inner-Temple-Hall to Westminster and Counted at the Common-Pleas and gave Rings the Motto whereof was DEUS REX LEX Dominus Rex versus Saloway SAloway drowned himself in a Pond and the Coroners Enquest found him Non Compos Mentis because 't is more generally supposed that a Man in his Senses will not be Felo de se The Kings Councel moved for a Melius Inquirendum and that the Inquisition might be quashed for that it sets forth Quod pred Defend circa horam octavam ante meridiem in quoddam stagnum se projecit per abundantiam aquae ibidem statim suffocat emergit ' erat which is insensible Pemberton Serjeant contra Here is no Exception taken to the substance of the Inquisition and the word suffocat had been sufficient if the word emergit ' had been left out The Court were of Opinion that there being another word in this Inquisition which carries the sense 't is therefore sufficient but if it had stood singly upon this word Emergit ' it had not been good And this Fact happening about the time of the general Pardon the Court was of Opinion that where an Interest is vested in the King a Pardon of all Forfeitures will not divest it but that nothing was vested here before Inquisition found 2. It was objected that this Inquisition ought to set forth that Saloway came by his death by this means Et nullo alio modo quocunque To which it was answered by Pemberton that in matters of Form only the Iudges have sent for the Coroner into Court and ordered him to amend it Rodney versus Strode AN Action on the Case was brought against three Defendants one of them suffered Iudgment to go by default In a joynt Action the Jury may sever the Damages and the other two pleaded Not Guilty The Cause was tryed the last Assises at Exeter and it was for imposing the Crime of Treason upon the Plaintiff and for assaulting and imprisoning of him there was a Verdict for the Plaintiff and 1000 l. damages against Mr. Strode and 50 l. against the other Defendant who pleaded The Plaintiff entred a nolle prosequi against him who let the Iudgment go by default and against the other Defendant for the 50 l. damages and took judgment only against Mr. Strode Serjeant Pemberton moved for a new Trial by reason of the excessive Damages which were not proportioned to the quality of the Plaintiff he being a Man of mean Fortune But it was opposed by the Plaintiff for that the Defendant pursued him as a Traytor and when he was apprehended for that Crime he caused him to be arrested for 1000 l. at the Suit of another person to whom he was not indebted so that upon consideration of the Circumstances of the Case the Court refused to grant a new Tryal Then Serjeant Pemberton for the Defendants moved in arrest of Iudgment and for cause shewed that the Iury have found both guilty and assessed several Damages which they cannot do because this is a joynt Action to which the Defendants have pleaded jointly and being found guilty modo forma the Iury cannot assess the damages severally for the damage is the same by the one as the other Cro. Eliz. 860. Austen vers Millard al' and therefore it hath been adjudged that where an Action of Battery was brought against three and one pleaded not guilty and the other two Son Assault demesne and several damages found against them it was held ill for that very reason because it was a joint offence 'T is true where there are divers Defendants and damages assessed severally the Plaintiff hath his election to take execution de melioribus damnis but this is when the Trials are at several times So 't is where they plead several Pleas Cro. Car. 239. Walsh versus Bishop as in an Action of Battery one pleads not guiity and the other justifies and both Issues are found for the Plaintiff in such case he may enter a non pros against one and take Iudgment against the other because their Pleas are several but where they plead jointly the Iury cannot sever the Damages But Mr. 1 Bulst 157. Sampson vers Cramfield al' Rast Entr. 677. b. Pollexfen for the Plaintiff insisted that even in this case damages may be assessed severally for where two Defendants are sued for the same Battery and they plead the same Plea yet damages may be assessed severally So was Trebarefoot and Greenway 's Case in this Court which was an Action for an Assault and Battery and false Imprisonment one of the Defendants pleaded not Guilty and the other justified Issue was joined and there was a Verdict for the Plaintiff and damages assessed severally the Plaintiff entred a nolle prosequi as to one and took judgment against the other and upon this a Writ of Error was brought in this Court and the Iudgment was affirmed So if an Action of Trespass be brought against two for taking of 100 l.
the Common Law for a false Oath made by any Witness and therefore an Action will not lye for a scandalous Affidavit Adjornatur Anonymus NOta An Action of Assault and Battery Release of one Def. shall not discharge the rest of a personal thing and false imprisonment was brought against four Defendants the Plaintiff had Iudgment and they brought a Writ of Error The Plaintiff in the Action pleaded the Release of one of them and to this Plea all four jointly demur The Opinion of the Court was that Iudgment might be given severally for they being compelled by Law to join in a Writ of Error the release of one shall not discharge the rest of a personal thing But where divers are to recover in the personalty 6 Co. Ruddock's Case the Release of one is a Bar to all but it is not so in point of discharge If two Coparceners make a Lease of a House and the Rent is in arrear and one of them brings the Action and recovers the Iudgment shall be arrested because one alone hath recovered in Debt for a moiety when both ought to join But it is agreed that if one Tenant in Common make a Lease rendring Rent which afterwards is in arrear Litt. Sect. 316. they must join in an Action of Debt because it savours of the Personalty But 't is otherwise in case of the Realty DE Term. Sanct. Trin. Anno 2 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1686. Herbert Chief Justice Wythens Justices Holloway Justices Wright Justices Sawyer Attorny General Powis Sollicitor General Aldridge versus Duke ASsault Trespass continued many years and the Statute of Limitations pleaded the Jury gives Damages only for the last six years Battery Wounding and Imprisoning of him from the 10th of August 24 Car. 2. usque exhibitionem Billae The Defendant pleaded not Guilty infra sex infra Annos The Plaintiff replied that the Writ was sued out 2 Octobris 1 Jacobi 2. And that the Defendant was Guilty within six years next before the Writ brought Vpon this Issue was joyned and a Verdict was given for the Plaintiff and entire damages given Mr. Pollexfen moved two Exceptions in Arrest of Iudgment 1. That a Verdict cannot help what appears to be otherwise upon the face of the Record Now here the Plaintiff declared that he was imprisoned the 10th of August 24 Car. 2. which is 13 years since and being one entire Trespass the Issue is found as laid in the Declaration which cannot be for so many years between the cause of Action and bringing of the Writ for if a Trespass be continued several years the Plaintiff must sue only for the last six years for which he hath a compleat cause of Action but when those are expired he is barred by the Statute When the Plaintiff hath any cause of Action Sid. 25. then the Statute of Limitations begins as in an Action on the Case for words if they are actionable in themselves without alledging special damages the Plaintiff will recover Damages from the time of the speaking and not according to what loss may follow So in Trover and Conversion when there is a cause of Action vested and the Goods continue in the same possession for seven years afterwards in such case 't is the first conversion which entitles the Plaintiff to an Action So in the Case at Bar tho' this be a continued imprisonment yet so much as was before the Writ brought is barred by the Statute Thompson contra The Verdict is good for the Iury reject the beginning of the trespass and give Damages only for that which falls within the six years and this may be done because 't is laid usque exhibitionem Billae If the Defendant had pleaded not Guilty generally Cro. Car. 160 381 404. then Damages must be for the 13 years though the Plaintiff of his own shewing had brought his Action for a thing done beyond the time limited by the Statute but having pleaded not Guilty at any time within six years if the Verdict find him guilty within that time 't is against him As to the Objection that the Cause of Action ariseth beyond six years tho' it doth appear so in the Declaration yet that doth not exclude the Plaintiff for there might have been Process out before or he might be disabled by an Outlawry which may be now reversed or he might be in Prison and newly discharged from which time he hath six years to begin his Action for being under either of these circumstances the Statute doth not hurt him Curia If an Action of false Imprisonment be brought for seven years and the Jury find the Defendant guilty but for two days 't is a Trespass within the Declaration This Statute relates to a distinct and not to a continued Act for after six years it will be difficult to prove a Trespass many accidents may happen within that time as the death or removal of Witnesses c. Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Dobson versus Thornistone THE Plaintiff was a Husbandman Words spoken of a Farmer actionable who brought an Action against the Defendant for these words He owes more mony than he is worth he is run away and is broke He had a Verdict and it was moved now in Arrest of Iudgment that the Words being spoken of a Farmer are not actionable To say that a Gentleman is a Cozener Hill 28 Eliz. B.R. Godb. 40. a Bankrupt and hath got an Occupation to deceive Men though he used to Buy and Sell yet being no Merchant 't was the better Opinion of the Court that the Words were not actionable So to say of a Farmer Stiles 420. that he is a Whoreson Bankrupt Rogue and it not appearing that he got his living by Buying and Selling or that the Words were spoken of him relating to his Occupation 't is not actionable For it must not only appear that the Plaintiff hath a Trade Sid. 299. Hutt 50. but that he gets his Living by it otherwise the Words spoken of him will not bear an Action But the Court held the Words to be actionable the like Iudgment was given in the Case of a Carpenter Mich. 3 Jac. for Words Viz. He is broke and run away Anonymus NOta Misentry of a Writ of Enquiry amendable without paying Costs Iudgment was given upon a Demurrer and a Writ of Enquiry was awarded and in the Entry thereof upon the Roll the Words per Sacramenum duodecim proborum legalium hominum were left out and now the Question was Whether it shall be amended It was said that a Capiatur for a Misericordia shall be amended upon the new Statute of Jeofails after a Verdict but whether upon a Demurrer it was doubted In a Quo Warranto Iudgment was entred by disclaimer Cro. Car. 184. by the consent of all Parties and the Words virtute praetextu literarum patentium geren dat 17 Jacobi were wrote in the Margin of the
the person who made Oath before them The Commissioners sign the Depositions and they ought to produce them so signed to the Court and prove it for Depositions are often suppressed by Order of the Court. If a true Copy of an Affidavit made before the Chief Iustice of this Court be produced at a Trial 't is not sufficient to convict a Man of Perjury This is not like the Case of Perjury assigned in an Answer in Chancery taken in the Country for that is under the Parties Hand but here is nothing under the Defendant's Hand and therefore the Commissioners ought to be in the Court to prove him to be the Man The Court were equally divided The Chief Iustice and Wythens Iustice were of Opinion that it was not Evidence to convict the Defendant of Perjury it might have been otherwise upon the Return of a Master of Chancery for he is upon his Oath and is therefore presumed to make a good Return but Commissioners are not upon Oath they pen the Depositions according to the best of their skill and a man may call himself by another name before them without any offence The Commissioners cannot be mistaken in the Oath tho' they may not know the person for this Court may be so mistaken in those who make Affidavits here but not in the Oath if the Commissioners or the Clerk to the Commission had been here they would have been good Evidence If an Affidavit be made before a Iustice of the Peace of a Robbery as enjoyned by the Statute if you will convict the person of Perjury you must prove the swearing of the Affidavit The Attorney General perceiving the Opinion of the Court rather than the Plaintiff should be nonsuit because no Evidence could be given offered to enter a Nolle prosequi which the Court said could not be done because the Iury were sworn but he insisted upon it and said he would cause it to be entred Sir John Knight's Case AN Information was exhibited against him by the Attorney General upon the Statute of 2 E. 3. Information upon the Statute for going armed 2 E. 3. c. 3. Which prohibits all persons from coming with Force and Arms before the King's Justices c. and from going or riding armed in affray of Peace on pain to forfeit his Armour and suffer Imprisonment at the King's Pleasure This Statute is confirmed by that of R. 2. 20 R. 2.1 with an Addition of a farther punishment which is to make a Fine to the King The Information sets forth that the Defendant did walk about the Streets armed with Guns and that he went into the Church of St. Michael in Bristol in the time of Divine Service with a Gun to terrifie the King's Subjects contra formam Statuti This Case was tryed at the Bar and the Defendant was acquitted The Chief Iustice said that the meaning of the Statute of Ed. 3. was to punish People who go armed to terrifie the Kings Subjects 'T is likewise a great Offence at the Common Law as if the King was not able or willing to protect his Subjects and therefore this Act is but an affirmance of that Law and it having appointed a Penalty this Court can inflict no other Punishment than what is therein directed DE Term. Sancti Hill Anno 2 3 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1686 7. Kingston versus Herbert A Common Recovery was suffered Anno 22 Jacobi primi Where a Scire Facias must go to the Tertenants before Judgment be reversed and a Writ of Error was brought about five years since to reverse it and Iudgment was given for the Reversal and it was now moved to set aside that Reversal because there was no Scire Facias against the Tertenants Mr. Williams who argued for the Reversal said that the want of a Scire Facias must be either in Law or in Fact it cannot be Error in Law for that must appear upon the Record it self which it doth not here It cannot be Error in Fact because there is no necessity of such a Writ 't is only discretionary in the Court and not ex necessitate juris But on the other side it was insisted that the Court cannot proceed to examine Errors before a Scire Facias is awarded to the Tertenants Dyer 320 331. for they may have a Matter to plead in Barr to the Writ as a Release c. and the Party cannot be restored to all which he hath lost by the suffering of the Recovery unless the Defendant be brought in upon the Scire Facias Curia The only Question is whether this Iudgment be well given without a Scire Facias The Secondary hath reported that the Practice is so Then as to the Ojection that such a Scire Facias is not ex necessitate juris but only discretionary 't is quite otherwise for 't is not only a cautionary Writ as all other Scire Facias but 't is a legal caution which in a manner makes it necessary 'T is true if there had been a Iudgment corruptly obtained this Court might have set it aside but if Erronice 't is a doubt whether it may be vacated but according to the Forms and Methods of Law Adjornatur Baldwin versus Flower BAron and Feme brought an Action on the Case for Words spoken of the Wife Words where actionable without special damage The Declaration was that the Defendant having some discourse with another person called the Wife Whore and that she was his Whore and concluded ad dampnum ipsorum c. The Plaintiff had a Verdict and it was now moved in arrest of Iudgment for that the Words were not actionable without alledging special damage But it was answered Rol. Abr. 35. placit 7. that the Action was well brought To say A Man is rotted with the Pox is actionable without alledging special damage because the person by such means will lose the Communication and Society of his Neighbours As to the Conclusion ad dampnum ipsorum 't is good for if she survive the Husband the Damages will go to her and so are all the Presidents Curia The Words are actionable And three Iustices were of Opinion that the Conclusion of the Declaration was as it ought to be which Iustice Wythens denied for if an Innkeepers Wife be called a Cheat and the House loses the Trade the Husband hath an injury by the Words spoken of his Wife but the Declaration must not conclude ad dampnum ipsorum Sir Thomas Grantham's Case HE bought a Monster in the Indies which was a Man of that Country who had the perfect Shape of a Child growing out of his Breast as an Excrescency all but the Head This Man he brought hither and exposed to the sight of the People for Profit The Indian turns Christian and was baptized and was detained from his Master who brought a Homine Repleg ' the Sheriff returned that he had replevied the Body but doth not say the Body in which
Sir Thomas claimed a Property whereupon he was ordered to amend his Return and then the Court of Common-Pleas bailed him Banson versus Offley AN Appeal of Murder was tried in Cambridgshire against three persons An Appeal of a Murder was tried not where the Stroak was given but where the Party died and the Count was that Offley did assault the Husband of the Appellant and wounded him in Huntingtonshire of which Wound he did languish and dye in Cambridgeshire and that Lippon and Martin were assisting The Iury found a special Verdict in which the Fact appeared to be that Lippon gave the Wound and that Martin and Offley were assisting The first Exception to this Verdict was that the Count and the Matter therein alledged must be certain and so likewise must the Verdict otherwise no Iudgment can be given but here the Verdict finding that another person gave the Stroak and not that person against whom the Appellant had declared 't is directly against her own shewing 2. This Fact was tried by a Iury of Cambridgshire when it ought to have been tried by a Iury of both Counties The Court answered to the first Exception that it was of no force and that the same Objection may be made to an Indictment where in an Indictment if one gives the Stroak and another is abetting they are both principally and equally guilty and an Indictment ought to be as certain as a Count in an Appeal As to the second Exception 't is a good Trial by a Iury of Cambridgshire alone and this upon the Statute of 2 3 Ed. 6. 2 3 Ed. 6. cap. 24. the Words of which Statute are viz. Where any person c. shall hereafter be feloniously striken in one County and dye of the same Stroak in another County that then an Indictment thereof found by the Jurors of the County where the death shall happen whether it be found before the Coroner upon the sight of the Body or before the Justices of the Peace or other Justices or Commissioners who shall have Authority to enquire of such Offences shall be as good and effectual in the Law as if the Stroak had been in the same County where the Party shall dye or where such Indictment shall be found 'T is true 4 Inst 49 that at the Common Law if a Man had received a mortal Wound in one County and died in another the Wife or next Heir had their Election to bring an Appeal in either County but the Trial must be by a Iury of both Counties But now that mischief is remedied by this Statute which doth not only provide that an Appeal shall be brought in the County where the Party dyed but that it shall be prosecuted which must be to the end of the Suit Adjornatur Dominus Rex versus Hinton and Brown AN Indictment was brought against the Defendants setting forth Subornation of Perjury that a Conventicle was held at a certain place and that they movebant persuadebant subornaverunt a certain person to swear that several Men were then present who really were at that time at another place They were found guilty and a Writ of Error was brought to reverse the Iudgment the Error assigned was that the Indictment doth not set forth that any Oath was made so it could not be Subornation There is a difference between the persuading of a man to swear falsly and Subornation it self for an Indictment for Subornation always concludes contra formam Statuti Curia 'T is not enough to say a Man suborned another to commit a Perjury but he must shew what Perjury it is which cannot be without an Oath for an Indictment cannot be framed for such an Offence unless it appear that the thing was false which he was perswaded to swear The Question therefore is If the person had sworn what the Defendants had persuaded him to do whether that had been Perjury There is a difference when a Man swears a thing which is true in Fact and yet he doth not know it to be so and to swear a thing to be true which is really false the first is Perjury before God and the other is an Offence of which the Law takes notice But the Indictment was quashed because the Words Per Sacramentum duodecim proborum legalium hominum were left out They held that if the Return had been right upon the File the Record should be amended by it Blaxton versus Stone THE Case was this viz. A Man seised in Fee c. What words make an Estate Tail in a Will had Issue two Sons he devised all his Land to his eldest Son and if he die without Heirs Males then to his other Son in like manner The Question was Whether this was an Estate Tail in the eldest Son Curia 'T is plain the Word Body which properly creates an Estate Tail is left out but the intent of the Testator may be collected out of his Will that he designed an Estate Tail for without this Devise it would have gone to his second Son if the first had died without Issue 'T is therefore an Estate Tail DE Termino Paschae Anno 3 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1687. Herbert Chief Justice Wythens Justices Holloway Justices Powel Justices Dominus Rex versus William Beal MEmorandum A Souldier executed not in the County where he wes condemned That on Saturday April 15. Mr. Attorny moved that this Court would award Execution upon the Defendant who was a Souldier for deserting of his Colours and was condemned for the same at the Affizes at Reading in Berks and reprieved and that he might be executed at Plymouth where the Garrison then was The Chief Iustice in some heat said that the Motion was irregular for the Prisoner was never before the Court. Mr. Attorny then moved for a Habeas Corpus and on Tuesday April the 18th the Souldier was brought to the Barr and Mr. Attorny moved it again But it was affirmed by the Chief Iustice and Iustice Wythens that it could not be done by Law for the Prisoner being condemned in Berks and reprieved by the Iudge to know the Kings Pleasure and now brought hither cannot be sent into another County to be executed it may be done in Middlesex by the Prerogative of this Court which sits in that County but no where else but in the proper County where the Trial and Conviction was so the Prisoner was committed to the Kings Bench and the Record of his Conviction was not filed But it was the King's Will that this Man should be executed at Plymouth where the Garrison was that by this Example other Souldiers might be deterred from running from their Colours SIR Robert Wright who was made Chief Justice of the Common Pleas in the room of Sir Henry Beddingfield who died the last Term as he was receiving of the Sacrament was on Friday following being the 21st of April made Chief Justice of this Court in the place of
my Lord Coke to be an allowance by the King 's Grant to any person for the sole buying or selling of any thing restraining all others of that Liberty which they had before the making of such a Grant 3 Inst 181. and this he tells us is against the ancient and fundamental Rights of this Kingdom This Patent agreeth exactly with that Definition 9 E. 3. cap. 1. 18 E. 3. c. 3. 25 E. 3. c. 2. Roll. Abr. 180. 2 R. 2. c. 1. 11 R. 2. c. 7. and therefore it must be against Law 't is against an Act of Parliament which gives Liberty to Merchants to buy and to sell in this Realm without disturbance and 't is expresly against the Statute of 21 Jac. cap. 3. which declares all such Letters Patents to be void That which may give some colour to make such Grants good 2 Inst 540. 11 Rep. is a pretence of Order and Government in Trade but my Lord Coke was of Opinion that it was a hinderance to both and in the end it produced Monopolies There is a great difference between the King's Grant and his Prohibition for the one vests an Interest which is not done by the other and all Prohibitions determine by the King's death but Grants still remain in force Adjornatur Langford versus Webber IN Trespass for the taking of a Horse Justification upon a bare possession good against a wrong doer the Defendant justified for that Joseph Ash was possessed of a Close c. and that the Defendant as his Servant took the Horse in that Close Damage fesant And upon a Demurrer to this Plea for that the Defendant did not shew what Title Ash had to this Close The Councel for the Defendant insisted that it being in Trespass 't is sufficent to say that Ash was possessed because in this Case possession is a good Title against all others But it might have been otherwise in Replevin The Title of the Close is not in question Cro. Car. 138. Yelv. 74. Cro. Car. 571. pl. 10. the possession is only an inducement to the Plea and not the substance thereof which is the taking of the Horse and the Law is plain that where the interest of the Land is not in question a Man may justifie upon his own possession against a wrong-doer Mr. Pollexfen on the other side alledged that damage fesant would bring the Title of the Land in question But the Court gave Iudgment for the Defendant Perkins versus Titus A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a Iudgment given in the Common-Pleas Fine upon an Admittance where it must be certain in Replevin for taking of the Plaintiff's Sheep The Defendant avowed the taking damage fesant The Plaintiff replied that the Lands where c. were Copy-hold held of the Manor of Bushy in Com. Hertf. the Custom whereof was that every Tenant of the said Manor qui admissus foret to any Copyhold Estate should pay a years Value of the Land for a Fine as the said Land is worth tempore Admissionis And upon a Demurrer the Question was 1. Whether this be a good Plea or not as 't is pleaded 2. If it be good as pleaded then whether such a Custom may be supported by Law 1. It was for the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error now and in Michaelmas Term following argued that it was not a good Custom The substance of whose Arguments were that Fines are either certain or incertain those which are incertain are arbitrary and therefore cannot be due of Common Right nor by Custom for there can be no Custom for an incertain Fine and such is this Fine for the value of the Land cannot be known because as this Custom is pleaded it doth not appear whether it shall be a years value past or to come at the time of the admittance of the Tenant A Custom to assess rationabilem denariorum summam for a Fine upon an admittance that is to say 13 Rep. 1. being two years Rent of a Tenant of the yearly value of 53 s. 4 d. is no good Custom A Lease is made for so many years as a third person shall name this is altogether incertain 13 Edw. 3. Fitz. Abr. 273. but when the Term is named then 't is a good Lease but this can be done but once How can this Fine be assessed It cannot be by Iury for then it stands in need of the Common Law and will be therefore void for a Custom must have nothing to support it but usage 1. Neither can this be a good Custom as 't is pleaded because all Customs are made up of repeated Acts and Vsages and therefore in pleading them it must be laid time out of mind which is not done here for admissus foret hath a respect to future admissions and are not to those which are past 2. Here is no time laid when this Fine shall be paid for 't is said Quilibet tenens qui admissus foret c. solvet tantam denariorum summam quantum terra valebat per Annum tempore admissionis c. which last words must be taken to relate to the value of the Land and not to the time when the Fine shall be paid so that if there be such a Custom which is Lex loci and not fully set forth and expressed the Common Law will not help it by any Construction 2. Point Whether such a Custom can be good by Law And they argued that it cannot Where the Fine is certain the Lord may refuse to admit without a tender of it upon the prayer of the person to be admitted 4 Rep. 27. b. but where 't is incertain the Lord is first to admit the Tenant and then to set the Fine the reasonableness whereof is to be determined by Iudges before whom the Case shall depend or upon Demurrer or by a Iury upon proofs of the yearly value of the Land but for non payment of an unreasonable Fine the Lord cannot enter Cro. Eliz. 779. Cro. Car. 196. The Law admits of no Custom to be good but such as is very certain for incertainty in a Custom as well as in a Grant makes both void and therefore 't is held a void Custom for an Infant to make a Feoffment when he can measure an Ell of Cloth Rol. Abr. 565. 6 Rep. 60. Davies Rep. 37. It may be objected that certum est quod certum reddi potest the meaning of which saying must be quod certum reddi potest by something which is certain for if this Rule should be taken to be an answer to incertainties it would destroy all the Books which say a Custom must be certain The Law is very clear Fitz. Bar. 177. 2 Rol. Abr. 264. that a Custom is void for the incertainty therefore this Custom must be void for the value of Land is the most incertain thing in nature and therefore Perjury will not lye for swearing to the value Serjeant Fuller and Mr.
Finch contra The chief Objection is the incertainty of this Custom now if a Custom as incertain as this hath been held good in this Court 't is a good Authority to support this Custom And as to that it was said that a Custom for a person whom a Copy holder should name to have his Land after his death and that he should pay a Fine for his admitance And if the Lord and Tenant cannot agree about the Fine that then the rest of the Tenants should assess it 1 Rol. Rep. 48. 2 Cro. 368. 4 Leon. 238. Noy 3. 2 Brownl 85. this was adjudged a good Custom by the Court of Common-Pleas and affirmed upon a Writ of Error in this Court It was the Case of Crab and Bevis cited in Warne and Sawyers Case Adjornatur Afterwards the first Iudgment was affirmed and all the Court held the Custom to be a good Custom Hacket versus Herne JVdgment was had in Debt upon a Bond against Father and Son Where the Defendants in the Action must joyn in a Writ of Error and afterwards the Father alone brought a Writ of Error and the Error assingned was that his Son was under Age but because the Son did not join in the Errors the Court ordered the Writ to be abated If a Quare impedit be brought against a Bishop and others and Iudgment be against them all they must likewise all join in a Writ of Error unless it be where the Bishop claims only as Ordinary 'T is true Rol. Abr. 929. pl. 30. this is against the Opinion of my Lord Rolls in his Abridgment who puts the Case that where a Scire Facias was brought against four Executors who pleaded plene administraverunt the Iury find Assets in the Hands of two of them and that the other eant inde sine die two bring a Writ of Error and altho' at the opening of the Case it was held that the Writ should abate for that reason because brought only by two yet he says the Iudgment was afterwards affirmed and the Writ held good But there is a difference where a Writ of Error is brought by the Plaintiffs in the original Action 5 Co. 25. a Ruddock's Case and when by the Defendants for if two Plaintiffs are barred by an erronious Iudgment and afterwards bring a Writ of Error the Release of one shall bar the other because they are both actors in a personal thing to charge another and it shall be presumed a Folly in him to join with another who might release all But where the Defendants bring a Writ of Error 't is otherwise for it being brought to discharge themselves of a Iudgment the Release of one cannot barr the other because they have not a joint Interest but a joint burthen and by Law are compelled to join in Errors Mosse versus Archer COvenant by an Assignee of an Assignee of Lands which were exchanged the Breach assigned was Breach not well assigned that a Stranger habens jus titulum did enter c. There was a Uerdict for the Plaintiff and it was now moved in Arrest of Iudgment that the Plaintiff had not shewed a sufficient breach for he sets forth the Entry of a Stranger habens jus titulum but doth not shew what Title and it may be he had a Title under the Plaintiff himself 2 Cro. 315. Hob. 35. after the Exchange made and to prove this the Case of Kirby and Hansaker was cited in point and of that Opinion was all the Court. Nota It was said in this Case that an Exchange ought to be executed by either Party in their Life-time or else it is void Taylor versus Brindley THE Original in Trespass was quare Clausum fregit Variance between the Original and Declaration where 't is no Error and the Plaintiff declared quare Clausum Domum fregit and had Iudgment in the Common-Pleas and a Writ of Error was brought in this Court and the variance between the Original and Declaration was assigned for Error and that one was not warranted by the other But Serjeant Levinz argued that because the Original was certified three Terms since 2 Cro. 674. 1 Rol. Abr. 790. n. 7. Cro. Car. 272. 18 Eliz. cap. and no Continuances between it and the Declaration therefore that could not be the Original to this Action and that the Court might for that reason intend a Verdict without an Original which is helped by the Statute of Jeofails But he argued that where the Original varies from the Declaration and is not warranted by it 't is not aided by this Statute Iudgment was affrmed DE Term. Sancti Mich. Anno 3 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1687. Wright Chief Justice Holloway Justices Powel Justices Allibon Justices Sawyer Attorny General Powis Sollicitor General Mathews versus Cary Pasch 3 Jac. Rot. 320. TRespass for entring of his House and taking of a Silver Tankard Where the Defendant justifies by way of excuse he must set forth the Warrant and that he took the Goods virtute Warranti The Defendant made conusance as Bayliff of the Dean and Chapter of Westminster for that the place where c. was within the Iurisdiction of the Leet of the said Dean who was seised of a Court Leet which was held there such a day c. And that the Iury did present the Plaintiff being a Tallow-Chandler for melting of stinking Tallow to the annoyance of the Neighbours for which he was amerced and that the Amerciament was affered to 5 l. which not being paid the Defendant by a Mandate of the said Dean and Chapter distreined the Tankard c. The Plaintiff replied de injuria sua propria absque hoc that he did melt Tallow to the annoyance of the Neighbours c. And upon a Demurrer to this Replication it was argued this Term by Mr. Pollexfen for the Defendant and Tremaine for the Plaintiff and afterwards in Michaelmas Term 1 Will. Mariae by Mr. Bonithan and Serjeant Thompson for the Defendant It was said for the Defendant that a Presentment in a Court Leet which concerns the person as in this Case and not the Free hold 5 H. 7.3 Fitz. Bar. 271. Bro. Abr. tit Travers sans ceo pl. 183. Presentment in Court pl. 15. was not traversable and that the Amerciament was a Duty vested in the Lord for which he may distrain or bring an Action of Debt Co. Entr. 572. But on the other side it was said that if such a Presentment is not traversable the party hath no remedy 't is contrary to the Opinion of Fitzherbert in Dyer Dyer 13. b. who affimed the Law to be that it was traversable and that if upon such a Presentment a Fine should be imposed erroniously 11 Co. 42. 1 Rol. Rep. 79. it may be avoided by Plea and this agrees with the second Resolution in Godfrey 's Case 2. It was objected to the Plea that it was not good for it sets
forth that the Plaintiff was amerced and that it was affered at the Court and so he hath confounded the Office of the Iurors and Affearers together which he ought not to do for he should be amerced to a certain Sum Hob. 129. Rol. Abr. 542. and not in general which Sum may be mitigated or affered by others If it had been a Fine 8 Co. 38. 1 Leon. 142. it need not be affered because that is imposed by the Court but this is an Amerciament which is the act of the Jury and therefore it must be affered 3. The chiefest Exception was to the matter of the Warrant viz. the Defendant sets forth that he seised by virtue of a Precept from the Dean and Chapter whereas he ought to shew it was directed to him from the Steward of the Court and then to set forth the Warrant without which he cannot justifie to distrain for an Amerciament And of this Opinion was the whole Court and therefore Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff in Michaelmas Term Primo Will. Mariae If it had been in Replevin where the Defendant made cognizance in the right of the Lord it might be well enough as here pleaded but where 't is to justifie by way of excuse there you must averr the Fact and alledge it to be done and set forth the Warrant it self 3 Cro. 698.748 1 Leon. 242. and the taking virtute Warranti for a Bayliff of a Liberty cannot distrain for an Amerciament by virtue of his Office but he must have a Warrant from the Steward or Lord of the Leét for so doing The other Exception that the Amerciament ought to be to a Sum Rast Ent. 606. Co. Ent. 665. the Presidents are otherwise for an Amerciament per duodecim probos legales homines adtunc ibidem jurat ad 40 s. afferat ' is well enough but the Warrant is always set forth Dominus Rex versus Darby THE Defendant was indicted for speaking of scandalous words of Sir J.K. a Justice of the Peace Viz. Sir J.K. Indictment for Scandalous words is a buffle-headed Fellow and doth not understand Law he is not fit to talk Law with me I have bafled him and he hath not done my Clyent Justice Mr. Pollexfen for the Defendant said that an Indictment would not lye for these words because not spoken to the Party in the exceution of his Office but behind his back it will not lye for irreverent words but for Libels and Writings because such are publick but words are private offences But the Court being of Opinion that an Indictment would lye where an Action would not because it respects the publick Peace and that an Action would not lye in this Case unless the party had a particular loss Sid. 65. 2 Cio 5 8. and therefore it hath been held not to be actionable to call a Iustice of Peace Fool Ass Coxcomb He then took Exceptions to the Form of the Indictment 1. There is no place of Abode laid where the Defendant did inhabit which is expresly required by the Statute of H. 5. Viz. 1 H. 5. cap. 5 That in Indictments there shall be addition of the Estate Degree c. and of the Towns Hamlets Places and Counties where the Defendants dwell And by the Statute of H. 6. 8 H. 6. cap. 12 which gives the Iudges power to amend Records in affirmations of Iudgments such defects which are named in the Statute of H. 5. are excepted and therefore where a Writ of Error was brought to reverse an Outlawry upon the Statute of 5 Eliz. for Perjury 2 Cro. 167. the Defendant was Indicted by the Name of Nicholas Leech de Parochia de Aldgate and did not shew in what County Aldgate was and for this cause it was reversed 2. The Caption is coram Justiciariis ad pacem dicti Domini Regis conservand ' and the word nunc is left out It was the Opinion of Iustice Twisden that it ought to be nunc conservand ' Sid. 422. for otherwise it may be the Peace of King Stephen The Councel on the other side said that it was a new Doctrine that the King shall not have the same Remedy by an Indictment which the Subject may have by an Action What is the meaning of the words of all Commissions de propalationibus verborum As to the first Exception they said that the Indictment was certain enough for the Defendant is laid to be de Almondbury in the West-Riding of Yorkshire To the second Exception they said that ad pacem conservand ' without nunc is well enough for it cannot be intended upon this Indictment that they were Iustices to preserve the Peace in any other Kings Reign and what was quoted out of Siderfin is but the Opinion of one single Iudge This is a Scandal upon the Government and 't is as much as to say that the King hath appointed an ignorant Man to be a Iustice of Peace for which an Indictment will lye And of that Opinion was the whole Court and gave Iudgment accordingly Ball versus Cock A Writ of Covenant did bear Teste the first day of Trinity Term Error to reverse a Fine where the Cognisor died after the Caption and before it passed the King's Silver retornable tres Trinitatis and it was taken by Dedimus 30 Julii A Writ of Error was brought to reverse this Fine and the Error assigned was that the Cognizor died after the Caption and before the Enrolment at the King's Silver Office It was argued by the Councel for the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error that a Fine Sur Cognizance de droit c. is said to be levied when the Writ of Covenant is returned and the Concord and King's Silver which is an antient Revenue of the Crown pro licencia concordandi duly entred for though the Cognisor dieth afterwards Dyer 220. b. 5 Co. 37. Cro. Eliz. 469. the Fine is good and the Land passeth but if the King's Silver be not entred the Fine may be reversed by Writ of Error for it is an Action and Iudgment and the death of either Party abates it If it should be objected that this cannot be assigned for Error because 't is against the Record which is Placita terrae irrotulat de Termino Sanctae Trinitatis anno primo Jacobi c. 'T is true an Error cannot be assigned against the very essence of a Record but in the matter of time it may and so 't is in this Case 'T is like Syer's Case 32 Eliz. 3 Inst 230. 4 Co. Hind's Case 10 H. 7.24 who was indicted for a Burglary supposed to be done primo Augusti and upon the Evidence it appeared to be done primo Septembris and though he was acquitted of the Indictment for that reason viz. because the Iudgment relates to the day of the Indictment yet it was resolved by all the Iudges of England that the very day needs not be set down in
ground he had for such an Opinion is not known the Year Books quoted in the Margent will not warrant it for they are in no sort parallel That Case in the 27th of H. 27 H. 6.3 6. is no more than Tenant at Will cannot grant over his Estate because he hath no certain or fixed Interest in it and much to the same purpose is the Book of 22 E. 22 E. 4.5 4. there cited But suppose this to be a void Grant and to amount to a determination of the Tenancy at Will yet if the Trustees had no notice of it that shall not determine their Estates A Devise to an Executor that he shall have the oversight of the Testators Estate till his Daughter should come of Age Yelv. 73. the Executor made a Lease at Will rendring Rent before the year expired the Daughter came of age to whom the Tenant at Will attorned the Executor brought an Action of Debt against him for the Rent arrear it was held that this Attornment to the Daughter was no determination of his Will for it would be of ill consequence to the Lessor if such a Tenant should determine his Will a day or two before the end of the year who had enjoyed all the Profits of the Land 2. Whether he may make a Deputy 'T is true a judicial Officer cannot make a Deputy unless he hath a Clause in his Patent to enable him because his Judgment is relied on in matters relating to his Office which might be the reason of the making of the Grant to him neither can a Ministerial Officer depute one in his stead if the Office be to be performed by him in person but when nothing is required but a Superintendency in the Office he may make a Deputy This appears more evident in the common Case of a Sheriff who is an Officer made by the Kings Letters Patents and 't is not said that he shall execute his Office per se vel sufficientem Deputatum suum Roll. Rep. 274. 1 Leon. 146. 3 Leon. 99. Cro. Eliz. 173. yet he may make a Deputy which is the Vnder-Sheriff against whom Actions may be brought by the Parties grieved And such a Deputy may be made without a Deed for he claims no Interest in the Office but as a Servant Cro. Eliz. 67. 10 Co. 192. a. and therefore where an Action on the Case was brought against the Deputy of a Sheriff for an Escape who pleaded that the Sheriff made him his Deputy to take Bail of Prisoners and that he took Bond c. and shewed no Deed of Deputation yet the Plea was held good upon a Demurrer 3. Whether the Assignment of this Trust without giving notice to this Court be a Forfeiture Tenant in Fee simple may do it for he hath a power so to do by reason of the Dignity of his Estate He who grants this Office without acquainting of this Court therewith must remain an Officer still and is subject to all Duties and Attendance till the Court hath notice of the Grant But there is no occasion of acquainting the Court in this Case for upon the Grant made to the Trustees by Mr. Lenthal he is still the Officer though he hath not the same Estate It was objected that Sir Edward Norris c. hath not said any thing to the Escapes but that doth neither concern Mr. Lenthal or the Trustees 2 Cro. 17. for if he be Tenant at Will they are not answerable for his neglect for 't is a personal Tort in him If Tenant for years makes a Feoffment 't is a Forfeiture of his Estate but if he makes a Lease and Release though 't is of the same operation yet it will not amount to a Forfeiture Now if any Escapes should happen there is a plain remedy for the Parties agrieved for if Tenant at Will remaineth in possession of an Office and suffers voluntary Escapes his Office shall be seised into the Hands of this Court then he in the Reversion must make his Claim and when that is done he is an Officer nolens volens and this was the Duke of Norfolk's Case Now though these Escapes are found by the Inquisition to be voluntary yet they are answered in the Plea for that part of the Inquisition is traversed and that they were vi armis and this being not yet tried the Court cannot give Iudgment thereon If there be many negligent Escapes these shall not amount to a Forfeiture as if a Rebel should break Prison or the Prison should be on Fire those are negligent but the Officer should not be so much as fined But if it should be a Forfeiture the Neglect must be particularly alledged for the Word Neglect is too general Adjornatur 5 E. 4.27 Dyer 66. Anonymus A Man was indicted for using of a Trade not being an Apprentice An Indictment quashed for misreciting of a Statute against the Statute of 5 Eliz. cap. 4. And now a Motion was made to quash it because the Act gives power to two Iustices of the Peace Quorum unus to hear and determine Offences committed against any branch thereof either by Indictment or Information before them in their Sessions and 't is not said that one of the Iustices before whom this Indictment was taken was of the Quorum This Objection was answered by the Court that the Sessions cannot be kept without one Iustice of the Quorum The Act saith That it shall not be lawful to any person other than such who did then lawfully use any Art Mystery or Manual Occupation to set up any Trade used within this Realm except he had been an Apprentice for seven years c. and 't is not averred that the Trade mentioned in the Indictment was a Trade used before the making of the Act. This seemed to be a material Objection but the Indictment was quashed for misreciting of the Statute Price versus Davies ERror to reverse a Fine taken by Commission and the Error assigned was that the Cognizor died before the return of the Writ of Covenant But this Point was not argued because Iustice Allybon was of Opinion that the Plaintiff in the Errors had not well entituled himself by the Writ for it was brought by him ut Consanguineus Haeres scilicet Filius c. but doth not shew how he was of Kindred To this Objection Sir William Williams the Solicitor General replyed that if a Descent be from twenty Ancestors 't is not necessary to say that he was Son and Heir of such a one who was Son and Heir of such a one and so to the twentieth Ancestor Agreable to this are all the Presidents in Formedons 't is only said that Jus descendit Adjornatur The Countess of Plymouth versus Throgmorton ERror to reverse a Iudgment in the Common Pleas in an Action of Debt upon a Mutuatus brought by Mr. Contract where 't is entire shall not be separated in an Action of Debt Throgmorton as Executor
' ac qd ' Record ' ill ' in nullo vitiosum aut defectivum existit Ideo considerat ' est qd ' Judicium praed ' adjudication ' executionis superinde in omnibus affirmetur ac in omni suo robore stet effectu dict' causis materiis superius pro Error ' assign ' in aliquo non obstante Et ulterius per Cur. Judgment affirmed Domini Regis Dominae Reginae nunc hic cons est qd ' praedict ' Abel Ram recuperet versus praefatum Donatum Obrian octodecim libras eidem Abel per Curiam Domini Regis Dominae Reginae nunc hic secundum formam Statuti in hujusmodi casu edit ' provis adjudicat ' pro mis custag ' dampn ' suis quae sustin ' occasione dilationis executionis Judicij praedict ' praetextu prosecutionis praedict ' Brevis de Errore Et qd ' praedictus Abel habeat inde executionem c. Obrian versus Ram. ERror to reverse a Iudgment given in Ireland Whether a Sci. fa. will lie against the Husband alone after the death of the Wife upon a Judgment had against her dum sola upon a Scire Fac. brought against the Plaintiff in the Errors setting forth that Debt was brought upon a Bond against Elizabeth Grey and a Iudgment was thereupon obtained for 800 l. dum sola That the said Elizabeth afterwards intermarried with Mr. Obrian That a Scire Facias was brought upon that Iudgment against Husband and Wife to shew cause why the Plaintiff should not have execution That upon this Scire Facias there were two Nichils returned and thereupon Iudgment was had against Husband and Wife It rested for a year and a day and then the Wife died and the Plaintiff brought a new Scire Fac. against the Husband alone to shew cause why he should not have Execution upon the first Iudgmont The Defendant pleaded that there was another Scire Fac. brought against him and his Wife for the same Cause c. And upon a Demurrer to this Plea Iudgment was given in Ireland against him The Question now was whether this Scire Fa. will lye against the Husband alone after the death of his Wife This Case was argued by Mr. Finch and Mr. Pollexfen that the Husband was not chargable It was admitted on all sides that if a Feme sole is indebted and marries that an Action will lye against the Husband and Wife and he is lyable to the payment of her Debts It was agreed also that if a Iudgment be had against a Feme sole and she marries and afterwards dies that the Husband is not chargable because her Debts before Coverture shall not charge him unless recovered in her Life-time In like manner no Debts which are due to her dum sola shall go to the Husband by virtue of the inter-marriage if she dye before those are recovered but her Administrator will be entituled to them which may be the Husband but then he hath a Right only as Administrator 1 Roll Abr. 351. and the reason is because such Debts before they are recoverd are only choses in Action And from hence the Council did inferr that the Iudgment in this Case against the Wife dum sola did not charge the Husband Then the Question will be if the Husband is not chargeable by the Original Iudgment whether the Iudgment on the Scire Fac. had not made an alteration and charged him after the death of his Wife And as to that it was said that this Iudgment upon the Scire Fac. made no new charge for 't is only quod habeat executionem c. and carries the first Iudgment no farther than it was before for 't is introduced by the Sci. Fac. At the Common Law no Execution could be had upon a Iudgment after a year and a day and there was then no remedy but to bring an Action of Debt upon that Iudgment This Inconvenience was remedied by the Statute of Westm W. 2. cap. 45. the 2. which gives a Scire Fac. upon the Iudgment to shew cause why Execution should not be had which can be no more than a liberty to take Execution upon the Original Iudgment which cannot charge the Husband in this case because 't is only a consequence of that Iudgment and creates no new charge for a Release of all Actions will discharge this award of Execution But the Reasons why the original Iudgment shall not be carried farther by the Iudgment in the Scire Fac. are as follow 1. By considering the nature of a Scire Fac. which lay not at the Common Law but is given by the Statute in all persosonal Actions the words whereof are these Viz. 2 Inst 469. Sid. 351. Observandum est de caetero quod ea quae inveniuntur irrotulat c. Vpon which words it is evident that the execution of the first Iudgment on Record is all which is given by this Act after the year and day and it takes off that bar which was incurred by the lapse of time and gives a speedy Execution of the Iudgment recorded 2. The Proceedings upon a Scire Facias shew the same thing for the Writ recites the first Iudgment and then demands the Defendant to shew cause why the Plaintiff should not have Execution thereon juxta vim formam effectum recuperationis praed but prays no new thing 3. A Scire Facias is not an Original but a Iudicial Writ which depends purely upon the first Iudgment 1 Roll. Abr. 777. pl. 6. 8 Co. 143 Dr. Drurie's Case and a Writ of Error suspends the execution of both so likewise if the Original Iudgment be reversed even a Iudgment obtained upon a Scire Facias will be reversed in like manner 4. The Law doth not charge a Man without an Appearance but here is none and the Statute can never operate upon this Case because that extends only to such Iudgments upon which there has been a Recovery and here is nothing recovered upon this Scire Facias for 't is only to have Execution upon the first Iudgment If the Law should be otherwise this absurdity would follow Viz. There would be a Recovery without a Record for the purport of the Scire Facias is only to have Execution according to the form and effect of the Record and the very Record it self doth not charge the Husband Besides the first Iudgment did charge the Lands of the Wife which are still liable to satisfie the Debt why therefore must the Lands of the Husband be charged Cannot the Administrator of the Wife bring a Writ of Error to reverse this Iudgment and if it should be reversed shall the Husband pay the Debt and the Administrator of the Wife be restored The Objections made by the Council on the other side against this Opinion were viz. That if an Action of Debt will lie upon a Iudgment in a Scire Facias the Original Iudgment is by this means carried farther for without
which he claims he ought to shew the other Will by which it must appear that nothing is contradictory to it or that it doth confirm the first but if Presumptions shall be admitted it must be in favour of the Heir for nothing shall be presumed to disinherit him Afterwards in Trinity-Term 5 Willielmi Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff and a Writ of Error was brought in the House of Peers to reverse that Iudgment but it was affirmed Anonymus A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a Iudgment in the Common Pleas in an Ejectment for Lands in the County of Essex in which a Special Verdict was found viz. That R. F. What Words in a Will make Tenants in Common was seized in Fee of the Lands in question who had Issue two Daughters Frances Jane Frances had Issue Philp Frances Anne R. F. the Father devised unto Philip Frances and Anne the Children of his Daughter Frances and to Jane his other Daughter the Rents and Profits of his Mannor of Spain for thirty years to hold by equal parts viz. the three Grandchildren to have one Moiety and his Daughter Jane the other Moiety And if it happen that either of them should die before the thirty years expired then the said Term should be for the benefit of the Survivor and if they all die then the same was devised over to other Relations Afterwards he made a Codicil in these words viz. I give Power and Authority to my Executors to let my whole Lands for the Term of thirty years for the benefit and behalf of my Children Anne one of the Granchildren died without Issue Frances another of the Grandchildren died but left Issue The first Question was whether the Power given to the Executors by the Codicil will take away that Interest which was vested in the Grandchildren by the Will Mr. Appleton argued that it would not because the Executors had only a bare Authority to let it or improve it for the benefit of the Children there was no Devise of the Land to them If Power be given to Executors to sell Lands 't is only an Authority and not an Interest in them but a bare Authority only to let is of much less importance 2. After the Testator had devised the Profits of these Lands to his Grandchildren and Daughter equally to be divided during the term and had provided that if any dye without Issue that then it should survive and if all dye then to remain over to collateral Relations c. Whether Frances being dead but leaving Issue her Interest shall survive to Philip or go to such her Issue As to that he held that the Testator made them Tenants in Common by equal parts and therefore he devised it by Moieties in which there can be no Survivorship 'T is like a Devise to the Wife for life 2 Cro. 448. 1 Roll. Abr. 833. King versus Rumbal Cro. Car. 185. and after her decease to his three Daughters equally to be divided and if any of them die before the other then the Survivors to be her Heirs equally to be divided and if they all die without Issue then to others c. the Daughters had an Estate Tail and there was no Survivorship So in this Case it shall never go to the third Grandchild as long as any Issue of the second are living On the other side it was argued that they are Ioyntenants and not Tenants in Common E contra for the Testator having devised one Moiety to his three Grandchildren joyntly by equal parts that will make them Ioyntenants But the Court were all of Opinion that the words in the Will shew them to be Tenants in Common for equally to be divided runs to the Moieties So the Iudgment was affirmed Woodward 's Case THE Statute of 23 H. 8. c. 9. Church Ornaments are a personal Charge upon the Inhabitants and not upon those who live else where though they occupy Lands in that Parish Godb. 134. pl. 4. 152. pl. 29. 154. pl. prohibites a Citation out of the Diocess wherein the Party dwelleth except in certain Cases therein mentioned one whereof is viz. Except for any Spiritual Cause neglected to be done within the Diocess whereunto the Party shall be lawfully cited One Woodward and others who lived in the Diocess of Litchfield and Coventry but occupied Lands in the Diocess of Peterborough were taxed by the Parishioners where they used those Lands for the Bells of the Church and they refusing to pay this Tax a Suit was commenced against them in the Bishop of Peterborough's Court who thereupon suggested this Matter and prayed a Prohibition because they were not to be charged with this Tax it being only for Church Ornaments And a Prohibition was granted the reason given was because 't is a personal charge to which the Inhabitants only are liable and not those who only occupy in that Parish and live in another but the repairing of the Church is a real Charge upon the Land let the Owner live where he will DE Term. Sanct. Trin. Anno 4 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1688. Wright Chief Justice Holloway Justices Powel Justices Allibon Justices The Bishop 's Case Friday June 15th THE King having set forth a Declaration for Liberty of Conscience did on the 4th day of May last by Order of Council enjoyn that the same should be read twice in all Churches c. and that the Bishops should distribute it through their respective Diocesses that it might be read accordingly The Archbishop of Canterbury who then was together with six other Bishops petitioned the King setting forth that this Declaration was founded upon a dispensing Power which had been declared illegal in Parliament and therefore they could not in Honour or Conscience make themselves Parties to the Distribution and Publication of this Declaration who thereupon were summoned before the King in Council and refusing there to give Recognizance to appear before the Court of Kings Bench they were committed to the Tower by Warrant of the Council-Board The Attorney General moved for a Habeas Corpus retornable immediate and the same Morning in which that Motion was made Sir Edward Hales Lieutenant of the Tower returned the same and they were all brought into the Court. The Substance of the Return was viz. That they were committed to his Custody by Warrant under the Hands and Seals of the Lord Chanchellor Jefferies and also naming more of the Lords of the Privy-Council Dominos Concilij for contriving making and publishing a Seditious Libel against the King c. Then it was prayed that the Return might be filed and that the Information which was then exhibited against them for this Crime might be read and that they might all plead instanter Serjeant Pemberton Mr. Finch and Mr. Pollexfen oppsed the reading of it and moved that the Bishops might be discharged because they were not legally before the Court for it appears upon the Return that there is no lawful cause of
Revocation or not at all which revocation must depend upon the construction and exposition of the sixth Paragraph in the Statute of Frauds c. the words whereof are Viz. That no Devise of Lands c. or any clause thereof shall be Revoked otherwise than by some Codicil in Writing or other Writing declaring the same or by burning cancelling tearing or obliterating the same by the Testator himself or in his presence and by his direction or consent But all devises of Lands c. shall be good until burnt cancell'd torn c. by the Testator c. or unless the same be altered by some other Will or Codicil in Writing or other Writing of the Devisor signed in the presence of three Witnesses declaring the same So that the Question will be whether a Will which revokes a former Will ought to be signed by the Testator in the presence of three Witnesses 'T is clear that a Will by which Lands are devised ought to be so signed and why should not a Will which revokes another Will have the same formality The Statute seems to be plain that it should for it saies that a Will shall not be revoked but by some Will or Codicil in writing or other writing of the Devisor signed by him in the presence of three or four Witnesses declaring the same which last Clause is an entire sentence in the disjunctive and appoints that the Writing which revokes a Will must be signed in the presence of three Witnesses c. Before the making of this Act it was sufficient that the Testator gave directions to make his Will tho' he did never see it when made which mischief is now remedied not in writing the Will but that the Party himself should sign it in the presence of three Witnesses and this not being so signed but only published by the Testator in their presence 't is therefore no good Revocation Iustice Street was of a contrary Opinion that this was a good Revocation That the words in the fifth Paragraph of this Statute which altered the Law were Viz. That all Devises of Lands c. shall be in Writing and signed by the Party so devising or by some other person in his presence and by his express Directions and shall be attested and subscribed in the presence of the Devisor by three or four credible Witnesses In which Paragraph there are two parts 1. The act of the Devisor which is to sign the Will but not a word that he shall subscribe his Name in the presence of three Witnesses 2. The act of the Witnesses viz. that they shall attest and subscribe the Will in the presence of the Devisor or else the Will to be void But the sixth Paragraph is penn'd after another manner as to the Revocation of a Will which must be by some Codicil in writing or other Writing declaring the same signed in the presence of three Witnesses Now here is a Writing declaring that it shall be revoked not expresly but by implication and though that Clause in the disjunctive which says that the revocation must be by some Writing of the Devisor signed in the presence of three Witnesses c. yet in the same Paragraph 't is said that it may be revoked by a Codicil or Will in Writing and therefore an exposition ought to be made upon the whole Paragraph that the intention of the Law may more fully appear Such a construction hath been made upon a whole Sentence Sid. 328. 1 Sand. 58. where part thereof was in the disjunctive as for instance viz. A Man was possessed of a Lease by disseisin who assigned it to another and covenanted that at the time of the assignment it was a good true and indefeasable Lease and that the Plaintiff should enjoy it without interruption of the Disseisor Or any claiming under him in this Case the Diffeisee re-entred and though the Covenant was in the disjunctive to defend the Assignee from the Disseisor or any claiming under him yet he having undertaken for quiet enjoyment and that it was an indefeasable Lease it was adjudged that an exposition ought to be made upon the whole Sentence and so the Plaintiff had Iudgment The Chief Iustice Herbert was of the same Opinion with Iustice Street Rex versus Grimes and Thompson THE Defendants were indicted for being Common Pawn-Brokers Two are indicted for a Confederacy one is acquitted and that is the acquittal of the other and that Grimes had unlawfully obtained Goods of the Countess of c. and that he together with one Thompson per confoederationem astutiam did detain the said Goods until the Countess had paid him 12 Guineas Thompson was acquitted and Grimes was found Guilty which must be of the first part of the Indictment only for it could not be per confoederationem with Thompsom and therefore it was moved in arrest of Iudgment that to obtain Goods unlawfully was only a private injury for which the party ought not to be indicted To which it was answered that a plain Fraud was laid in this Indictment which was sufficient to maintain it and that tho one was acquitted yet the Iury had found the other guilty of the whole But the Court were of Opinion that the acquittal of one is the acquittal of both upon this Indictment and therefore it was quash'd King versus Dilliston Hill 2 3 Jacobi Rot. 494. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a Iudgment in Ejectment given in the Common-Pleas Infant not bound by a Custom for one Messuage and twenty Acres of Land held of the Manor of Swafling There was a special Verdict found the substance of which was viz. That the Land in question was Copy-hold held of the said Manor of Swafling in the County of Suffolk and that Henry Warner and Elizabeth his Wife in right of the said Elizabeth were seized thereof for Life Remainder to John Ballat in Fee That the Custom of the said Manor was that if any Customary Tenant doth surrender his Estate out of Court that such Surrender shall be presented at the next Court of the said Manor and publick Proclamation shall be made three Court days afterwards for the Party to whose use the Surrender was made to come and be admitted Tenant and if he refuseth then after three Proclamations made in each of the said Courts the Steward of the said Manor issueth forth a Precept to the Bailiff thereof to seise the Copyhold as forfeited They find that Henry Warner and his Wife and John Ballat made this Surrender out of Court to the use of Robert Freeman and his Heirs who died before the next Court and that John Freeman an Infant was his Son and Heir That after the said Surrender three Proclamations were made at three several Courts held for the said Manor but that the said John Freeman did not come to be admitted Tenant thereupon the Steward of the said Manor made a Precept to the Bayliff who seized the Lands in
who makes a Lease of his Land shall forfeit it but this doth not conclude an Infant 4. There is not any necessity to construe an Infant to be within this Custom for 't is not found that the Lord was to have a Fine upon admittance and 't is no consequence to say that the Lord shall have a Fine because usually Fines are taken upon admittances 1 Leon. 100. 3 Leon. 221. for an Infant may be admitted to a Copyhold but not be bound to tender his Fine at any time during his Non-age Justice Gregory was of the same Opinion which he chiefly grounded upon Sir Richard Letchford's Case between which and the Case at the Barr he said there was no material difference only in that Case the Heir was beyond Sea and in this at the Barr 2 Cro. 226. Latch 199. Godb. 364. Jones 391. Dyer 104. he was an Infant 'T is very true that the Books mention a Seisure quousque 't is so said by Iustice Williams in Croke but he gives no reason for it 't is only an Opinion obiter but it is clear by many Authorities that Infants may be bound by Acts of necessity and so they may by a Custom Iustice Dolben of the same Opinion which he said was agreeable to the reason of the Law in parallel Cases An Infant is priviledged in a Fine for he is excepted by the Statute because he knows not how to make his Claim He said this was likewise agreeable to the Custom of 26 Mannors of which he was formerly Steward for in such Cases he always marked the Court Roll Nulla Proclamatio quia Infans It cannot be a Forfeiture quousque because an Infant is wholly exempted by the Custom and therefore 't is no Forfeiture at all 'T is an Objection of no moment to say that the Lord by this means will lose his Fine and that he hath no remedy to make the Infant when of Age to be admitted for no Fine is due to him before admittance But this Objection will be of less weight if the loss of the Infant be compared to that of the Lord who looseth only the Interest of a Fine before Admittance and shall this Infant who is now but three years of Age loose the Profits of his Estate for 18 years But there may be a way found out that neither may loose for if it should be that when the Infant comes of Age his Estate should be then forfeited if he doth not tender himself to be admitted after three Proclamations Now upon his admittance the Lord may set a reasonable Fine having respect to the length of time in which it was deteined from him Stowel's Case was no more but this viz. Pl. Com. 356. A Disseisor levied a Fine with Proclamations and lived three years his Heir being under Age and the five years incurred after the said Heir came of Age and then he entred within a year and his Entry was adjudged unlawful But that will not concern this Case because it was a Iudgment upon the Statute of H. 7. 4 H. 7. c. 24. for the five years being once attached and begun in the life of his Ancestor shall incurr and go on and bind the Infant if he do not pursue his Claim within that time after he comes of Age but 't is to be observed that my Lord Dyer in the Argument of that Case said nothing of a Seisure quousque The Chief Iustice was of a contrary Opinion from the other three Iustices and that the Iudgment ought to be reversed Because until the Infant is admitted the Estate remains in the Surrenderor and without an Admittance he cannot enter but by a special Custom to warrant it and for this reason 't is that the Surrenderor shall have an Action of Trespass against any person who enters because he shall be intended still in possession till the Admittance of another If so 2 Cro. 368. Yelv. 16. then Infancy cannot protect an Estate to which the Infant hath no Title till Admittance for till then he hath neither Jus in re nor Jus ad rem This is a Condition annexed to the Estate to be performed by the Infant by which he is bound notwithstanding his Non-age otherwise his Estate is forfeited The Custom which obligeth him to be admitted is to entitle the Lord of the Mannor to a Fine to which he hath a right Now Infancy was never yet extended to endanger that remedy which Men have to recover their Rights it has been often so far extended as to delay such a remedy but never to destroy it for if the Infant should die the Lord looseth the Fine and then another person is to be admitted but he cannot encrease the Fine upon him who is a Stranger for the neglect of the Infant 'T is true Bridg. 83. Yelv. 144. Poph. 127. where an Infant hath a Right it shall be preserved though a Fine be levied and the five years pass but in this Case he hath no Right before Admittance If a Feme Covert be an Heir to a Copyhold Estate where the like Custom is and she marrieth and the Husband after three Proclamations will not come and be admitted 't is a Forfeiture during the Coverture Now the reason in the Cases of Coverture and Infancy is the same for if there shall be a Seisure during the time the woman is Covert why not during the Infancy As to Sir Richard Letchford's Case the Heir was beyond Sea but when he came into England he desired to be admitted but this Infant never yet desired to be admitted he stands upon his Priviledge of Infancy But upon the Opinion of the other three Iustices the Iudgment was affirmed that the Custom doth not bind the Infant Carter versus Dowrich A Covenant to pay so much Mony to the Plaintiff or his Assigns as should be drawn upon the now Defendant by a Bill of Exchange Custom of Merchants where it must be particularly set forth c. The Breach was assigned in Non-payment The Defendant pleaded that the Plaintiff secundum legem Mercatorum did assign the Mony to be paid to A. who assigned it to B. to whom he paid 100 l. and tendred the rest drawn upon by Bill of Exchange c. And upon a Demurrer Mr. Pollexfen insisted that this was not a good Plea because the Defendant had not set forth the Custom of Merchants without which all these Assignments are void of which Custom the Court cannot take any judicial notice but it must be pleaded and 't is not sufficient to say that the Assignment was made secundum legem Mercatoriam but it must be secundum consuetudinem Mercatoriam otherwise 't is not good E contra E contra Litt. 182. It was argued that the Custom of Merchants is not a particular Custom and local but 't is of an universal extent and is a general Law of the Land The pleading it as 't is here is good for if an Action is brought against
said Feoffees made a Feoffment of the Land in Fee without any consideration afterwards Christopher had Issue two Sons Now the Vses limited by the Feoffment of Sir R. C. being only contingent to the Sons of Christopher and they not being born when the second Feoffment was made to their Father the Question now was whether they shall be destroied by that Feoffment before the Sons had a Being in Nature or whether they shall arise out of the Estate of the Feoffees after their Births And it was adjudged in the Exchequer Chamber that the last Feoffment had divested all the precedent Estates and likewise the Vses whilst they were contingent and before they had an existence and that if the Estate for Life which Christopher had in those Lands had been determined by his death before the birth of any Son the future Remainder had been void because it did not vest whilst the particular Estate had a being or eo instanti that it determined So in this Case Mr. Leach cannot have any future Right of Entry for he was not born when the Surrender was made so that the contingency is for ever gone Suppose a Feoffment in Fee to the use of himself and his Wife and to the Heirs of the Survivor The Husband afterwards makes another Feoffment of the same Lands Cro. Car. 102. and dies and the Wife enters the Fee shall not vest in her by this Entry for she had no right the Husband has destroyed the contingent use by the last Feoffment so that it could not accrew to her at the time of his death Nay tho' the particular Estate in some Cases may revive yet if the contingency be once destroyed it shall never arise again As where the Testator being seized in Fee of Houses 2 Sand. 380. devised the inheritance thereof to such Son his Wife should have after her Life if she baptized him by his Christian and Sir-Name and if such Son dye before he attain the Age of 21 years then to the right Heirs of the Devisor He died without Issue the Widow married again then the Brother and Heir of the Testator before the birth of any Son conveyed the Houses thus Viz. To the Husband and Wife and to their Heirs and levied a Fine to those uses Afterwards she had a Son baptised by the Testator's Christian and Sir-Name Then the Husband and Wife sold the Houses to one Weston and his Heirs and levied a Fine to those Vses It was adjudged that by the Conveyance of the Reversion by the Brother and Heir of the Testator to the Baron and Feme before the Birth of the Son her Estate for Life was merged and tho' by reason of her Coverture she might waive the Joint-tenancy 2 Roll. Abr. 796. Wigg versus Villiers and reassume the Estate for Life yet that being once merged the contingent Remainders are all destroied Curia Cro. Car. 502. The Grants of Infants and of persons non compos are parallel both in Law and Reason and there are express Authorities that a Surrender made by an Infant is void therefore this Surrender by a person non compos is likewise void If an Infant grants a Rent-charge out of his Estate 't is not voidable but ipso facto void for if the Grantee should distrain for the Rent the Infant may have an Action of Trespass against him In all these Cases which have been cited where 't is held that the Deeds of Infants are not void but voidable the meaning is that non est factum cannot be pleaded because they have the form though not the Operations of Deeds and therefore are not void upon that account without shewing some special matter to make them of no efficacy Therefore if an Infant maketh a Letter of Attorny though 't is void in it self yet it shall not be avoided by pleading non est factum but by shewing his Infancy Some have endeavoured to distinguish between a Deed which giveth only authority to do a thing and such which conveys an interest by the delivery of the Deed it self that the first is void and the other voidable But the reason is the same to make them both void only where a Feoffment is made by an Infant 't is voidable because of the solemnity of the Conveyance Now if Simon Leach had made a Feoffment in Fee there had still remained in him such a Right which would have supported this Remainder in Contingency This Surrender is therefore void and all persons may take advantage of it Afterwards a Writ of Error was brought to reverse this Iudgment in the House of Lords but it was affirmed Cases Adj. 150. Hall versus Wybank THE Statute of Limitations is Statute of Limitations whether it extendeth to the Defendant being beyond Sea six years 21 Jac. cap. 16. that if any person be entituled to an Action and shall be an Infant Feme Covert Imprisoned or beyond Sea that then he shall bring the Action at full Age Discovert of saue Memory at large and returned from beyond Sea The Plaintiff brought an Indebitatus Assumpsit to which the Defendant pleaded non assumpsit infra sex Annos The Plaintiff replied that the Defendant was all that time beyond Sea so that he could not prosecute any Writ against him c. And upon a Demurrer Serjeant Tremaine argued that the Plaintiff was not barred by the Statute which was made to prevent Suits by limiting personal Actions to be brought within a certain time and it cannot be extended in favour of the Defendant who was a Debtor and beyond Sea because 't is incertain whether he will return or not and therefore there is no occasion to begin a Suit till his return 'T is true the Plaintiff may file an Original and Outlaw the Defendant and so seise his Estate but no Man is compelled by Law to do an act which is fruitless when 't is done and such this would be for if the Plaintiff should file an Original 't is probable the Defendant may never return and then if the Debt was 1000 l. or upwards he would be at a great Expence to no purpose or if the Party should return he may reverse it by Error 'T is a new way invented for the payment of Debts for if the Debtors go beyond Sea and stay there six years their Debts would by this means be all paid The words of the Statute do not extend to this Case for the Proviso is That if the Plaintiff be beyond Sea when the cause of Action doth accrew Cro. Car. 246. 333. that then he have shall liberty to continue it at his return yet 't is within the equity of Law for him to bring his Action when the Defendant returns who cannot be sued 'till then That Statutes have been expounded according to Equity is not now a new Position 2 Roll. Rep. 318. for Constructions have been made according to the sense and meaning and not according to the Letter of many Statutes
that at the Common Law a Man might exercise what Trade he would therefore this Statute is penned in the Negative to prevent many inconveniences which happened before the making of this Law Some Authorities there are where Informations have been brought upon this Statute Cro. Car. 347. 1 Sand. 312. and the Defendants have pleaded the the Custom of London for a Man Educated in one Trade to exercise another and upon Demurrer such Pleas have been over-ruled but reason in this Case is the best Authority Iourny-men who work for Hire cannot be within the meaning of this Statute but the Defendant by employing such had an influence upon the Trade and so 't is found viz. That he provided Materials and paid the Workmen and therefore he and not the Master workman who is but a Iourny-man is the person who did exercise the Trade not being an Apprentice the management was for his Profit the Workmen had no more but their Wages and it would be very mischievous if the Statute should be otherwise construed A Widow shall not exercise her Husbands Trade Hutt 132. unless she is enabled by the Custom of the place and possibly she might live so long with him as to be very skilful in it but the Act being penned in the Negative must have a large construction and therefore an Vsage against it will not take away its force Paying the Wages is as much as using the Trade himself 't is properly his driving the Trade by the Hands and Labour of his Servants 1 Jac. 1. c. 22. And it seems plain by the Statute of 1 Jac. 1. that this may be done for that Statute Enacts that no person using the Mystery of Tanning Leather by himself or any other person shall exercise the Craft of a Shoe-Maker c. which shews that the Trade may be carried on by Servants and Workmen A Goldsmith never makes his own Plate he only provides Materials for the Workmen but yet he is a Trader within the Statute because he makes profit of the Plate An Inn-keeper who sells Beer Bread c. in his House is not within this Statute because 't is part of his Trade to provide such things for his Guests but if he sells any quantities out of Doors 2 Bulst 187. he is then within the reach of this Law which ought to have a very beneficial construction because 't is made to maintain skilful Men in Trades which is for the publick good of Mankind 2. 'T is plain that he who useth one Trade cannot exercise another therefore a Coach-maker shall not make his own Whéels if he doth 't is exercising the Trade of a Wheel-right and so of the Iron and Leather and the other Materials which make up a Coach In Mr. Noy 133. Hunter versus Moon Attorney Noy 's Reports there is a Case of an Information brought upon this Statute against the Defendant being a Felt-maker for dying of his own Hatts and it was adjudged for him that 't is part of his Trade but this is but a single Authority and many have been against it since that time At the Assises in Cambridge the like Information was tryed against a Comb-maker for exercisng the Trade of a Horner it was insisted on that it was part of his Trade for he fitted the Horn for his use in making of Combs but there was a Verdict for the Plaintiff for it was held to be an exercising of the Trade of an Horner and the Council for the Defendant who were learned Men did acquiesce under that Iudgment He who is a Servant who undergoes no hazard but is to have a certain reward for his labour doth not exercise a Trade but 't is the Master who emploies him who hath all the Profit and who in this Case sells at the same rate as if he paid the Clothworker The Statute saith That none who hath not served as an Apprentice in any Mystery c. shall use the same c. Now he who employs Men in his House useth the Trade c. For suppose a Merchant should hire Iourny-men Shoemakers to work in his House for the Plantations this can be no other thing than the exercising of the Trade of a Shoemaker Private usage is not within the meaning of this Law but if what is done be for profit and gain and not confined to a particular Family 't is an exercising of a Trade within the intention of this Statute If the Defendant had sold these Cloths in England he had been a Draper and having exported them he is a Merchant Wherefore for these Reasons Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff But Iustice Dolbin was of another Opinion he said that no encouragement was ever given to Prosecutions upon this Statute and that it would be for the common good if it was repealed for no greater punishment can be to the Seller than to expose Goods to Sale ill wrought for by such means he will never sell more In this Case there is no inconvenience to the Company of Clothworkers because that Trade is a manual Occupation for hire the Master Workman is the person who useth the Trade and the Defendant hath done nothing but what is the proper work of a Merchant in his own House which cannot be a publick use of the Trade The intent of the making of this Statute was to prevent Idleness and that there might be generally a good Manufacture Now the Defendant hath well answered both these ends for he hath employed Men in the working and not only so but such Men who were bound Apprentices and served seven years in that very Trade such who could work well and to whom he gave good Wages 'T is the interest of a Merchant that his Cloth be well wrought but the Clothworker careth not how 't is done so he hath his Wages and by this care and industry of the Defendant that Trade which was almost lost abroad is now come into Reputation again Bradburn versus Kennerdale Mich. 4 Jac. Rot. 640. ERror to reverse a Iudgment in an inferior Court at Chester in Replevin for the taking of a Cow Replication whether good without a Traverse The Defendant made Cognizance as Bailiff to Sir Peter Warburton setting forth that before the taking c. Sir Peter was seised in Fee of the Mannor of Arkey of which the locus in quo was parcel and for that the Cow was there Damage Feasant he took it c. The Plaintiff in barr to the Avowry confesseth That Sir Peter Warburton was seised in Fee c. but that before that time Sir George Warburton his Father was seised of the said Mannor and likewise of one Mesuage in Fee c. and being so seised made a Lease thereof for three Lives viz. for the Life of G. H. the Father and for the Lives of his two Sons George and John alterius eorum diutius viventis that one of them was dead and that the other entred and was seised as
Mony for putting them out which must be to such who are willing to to take them for Mony 270 Arbitrament To pay 5 l. presently and give Bond to pay 10 l. more on a day following and now to sign general Releases it shall only discharge such matters which were then depending at the time of the submission and not the Bond 264 2. A person who was a Stranger to the Submission was awarded to be a Surety 't is void 272 3. Submission was so as the Award be made c. ready to be delivered to the Parties or to such of them who shall desire it the Defendant must desire the Award and plead the matter specially and the Plaintiff need not aver that it was ready to be delivered 330 Assent See Agreement Assets Reversion in Fee Expectant upon an Estate Tail is not Assets but when it comes into possession then and not before 't is Assets 257 Assignment See Privity of Contract 2. Executor of a Lessee for years shall be liable to an Action of Debt for Rent incurr'd after an assignment of the Term for the privity of Contract of the Testator is not determined by his Death but his Executor shall be charged with his Contracts so long as he hath Assets 326 Assizes The Method of arraigning an Assize the Title must be set forth in it 273 Attornment See Bargain and Sale Ejectment of a Manor parcel in Rents and parcel in Services the Attornment of the Tenants must be proved 36 Averment See Devise 4 The consideration of a Duty ought to be precisely alledged as in an Action on the Case for a Duty to be paid for weighing Goods it must be averred that the Goods were such which are usually sold by weight 162 2. The nature of an Averment is to reduce a thing to a certainty which was incertain before 216 3. Where it may be made against the express words of a Condition 217 4. Not allowed to be made against a Record 305 B. Bail IT was demised in a Scandalum Magnatum 4 2. Writ of Error pending in the Exchequer-Chamber the principal in the Action rendred himself the Bail are discharged 87 3. Scire Facias against Bail upon a Writ of Error who plead that the Principal rendred himself before Judgment 't is not good for the Bail are liable not only to render the Body but to pay the Debt ibid. 4. Proceedings were staied by Injunction above two Terms after the Bail was put in and before the Declaration delivered which was pleaded to a Scire Facias brought against them but held not good 274 Bankrupts An Inn-keeper is not within the Statutes of Bankrupcy 327 2. 'T is not actionable to call a Man Bankrupt unless it be laid that he was a Trader at the time of the words spoken 329 3. Inn-keeper buys and sells under a Restraint of Justices and Stewards of Leets which though for a Livelihood yet cannot be a Bankrupt 329 4. Whether a Farmer or Master of a Boarding-School be within the Statutes 330 Baretry Difference between Baretry and Maintenance 97 2. 'T is not Baretry to arrest a Man without a cause ibid. 4. If one design to oppress and to recover his own right 't is Baretry 98 5. Mony may be laid out to recover the just right of a poor man and no Baretry ibid. 6. But mony may not be expended to promote and stir up Suits ibid. Barbadoes It was gotten by Conquest and therefore to be governed by what Law the King willeth 161 Bargain and Sale What words by construction of Law shall amount to a Bargain and Sale to make the Reversion pass with the Rent without Attornment 237 Baron and Feme See Slander 7 Administrator 9 11 Sci. Fa. 7 1. Whether Sci. Fa. will lie against the Husband alone after the death of the Wife upon a Judgment had against her Dum sola 186 2. If a Judgment is recovered against her while sole then she marries and dies the Husband is not chargeable unless had likewise against him during the Coverture ibid. 3. A Debt is due to her whilst sole she marries and dies before 't is recovered it shall not go to the Husband by virtue of the marriage but he may have it as Administrator to his Wife ibid. 4. Judgment is obtained against her whilst sole she marries and a Sci. Fa. is brought against Husband and Wife and Judgment quod habeat executionem the Wife dies a Scire Fa. may be brought against the Husband alone 189 5. The Recovery upon a Sci. fa. is against both and is therefore joynt against both 188 6. Husband may have Execution of a Judgment recovered by him and his Wife after the Death of his Wife without a Sci. fa. 189 7. Devastavit against both the Wife being an Executrix and Judgment that the Plaintiff have Execution de bonis propriis the Wife dies the Goods of the Husband are liable ibid. 8. A Woman who had a Term for years married the Rent is arrear she died the Husband shall be liable because by the Marriage he is entituled to the Profits of the Land ibid. 9. Feme Covert Copy-holder her Husband made a Lease for years without Licence of the Lord 't is a Forfeiture during the Coverture 222 9. Feme Covert Heir to a Copyhold Estate her Husband after three Proclamations will not be admitted 't is a Forfeiture during Coverture 226 10. The Husband hath a Lease in Right of his Wife who was an Executrix and he grnats all his Right and title therein the Right which he had by his Wife passeth 278 12. A. Feme Sole had a Lease and Married then Husband and Wife Surrender in consideration of a new Lease to be granted to the Wife and to her Sons the Estate vests immediately in her without the assent of her Husband for the Law intends it her Estate till he dissassent 300 13. Feme Covert and another joint-Tenant for Life she and the Husband Lease their Moiety reserving a Rent during Life and the Life of her Partner the Wife died 't is a good Lease against the Surviving joint-Tenant till disagreement 300 14. The Husband made a Feoffment in Fee to the use of himself and Wife and to the Heirs of the Survivor he afterwards made another Feoffment of the same Lands and died the Wife entred but the Fee was not vested in her by the first Conveyance because the contingent right was destroyed by the last 310 Barr. Recovery in a personal Action is a Barr to an Action of the like nature where the same Evidence supporteth both Actions 2 Judgment in Trespass is no Barr to an Action of Detinue 2 Bill of Exchange The Drawer and Endorsers are all liable to payment but if Recovery be against one 't is a good Bar to an Action which may be brought against the rest 86 By-Law See Corporation 12. Trade 8. Where 't is too general and where not 193 C. Carrier See Pleading 11. Certainty See Custom Grants Certiorari
the Land 211 5. Not granted for Mariners Wages 244 6. Libel for a Tax upon the Parishioners for not repairing of their Church who suggest that they had a Chappel of Ease in the same Parish the Prohibition was denied for of common right they ought to repair the Mother Church 264 7. Proof of Matter of Fact by one Witness denied to be allowed in the Spiritual Court is a good cause for a Prohibition 284 8. Where the Release of a Legacy offered to be proved by one Witness was denied in the Spiritual Court ibid. 9. Proof of Payment or Subtraction of Tythes denied and a Prohibition granted ibid. 10. Whether a Prohibition ought to be allowed after Sentence an Appeal being then the more proper remedy 284 Property See Interest Q. Quorum MUst be one Justice of the Peace of the Quorum otherwise cannot be a Sessions 14 152 Quantum meruit Will lie for Rent reserved upon a real Contract where the Sum is not certain but if a Sum in gross is reserved then Debt must be brought 73 R. Record ERror shall not be assigned against the Essence of a Record 141 Recovery Common Reversed without a Scire Facias to the Tertenants but it seems not to be good 119 2. For there must be a Scire Facias against the Heir and Tertenants when a Writ of Error is brought to reverse it 274 Relation Where an Estate shall pass by Relation where not 299 300 Release Of a Legacy by one Executor and also of all Actions Suits and Demands whatsoever those general words which follow are tied up to the Legacy and release nothing else 277 2. Of a Demand will not discharge a growing Rent 278 3. A Receipt was given for 10 l. in which there was a Release of all Actions Debts Duties and Demands nothing is released but the 10 l. 277 4. Judgment against four Defendants who all joyned in a Writ of Error and the Plaintiff pleaded a Release of Errors by one it shall not discharge the rest of a personal thing but if there had been four Plaintiffs to recover the Release or death of one is a Barr to all 109 135 249 5. A Release of all Actions will discharge an Award of Execution upon a Scieri Facias 185 187 6. Of all Actions and Demands doth not discharge a Legacy it must be by particular words 279 7. One of the Defendants who made Conusance released the Plaintiff after the taking of the Cattle this was held void upon a Demurrer for he had no Demand or Suit against the Plaintiff having distrained in the right of another ibid. Remainder See Entry 3. Fines levied 4. Must take place eo instanti the particular Estate is determined or else it can never arise 309 2. By the Conveyance of the Reversion in Fee to him who had the Estate for Life before the Birth of a Son the particular Estate is merged and all contingent Remainders are thereby destroyed 311 Replevin Where 't is brought by Writ the Sheriff cannot make deliverance without the taking of Pledges de prosequendo retorn ' Habend ' 35 Replication Where the Plaintiff confesseth and avoideth he ought not to traverse for that would make his Replication double 318 Request When a thing is to be done upon Request the time when the person requires it to be done is the time of the performance 295 Reservation Of a Rent upon a Lease for three years payable at Michaelmas and Lady-Day Debt was brought for 2 years without shewing at which of the Feasts it was due 't is good after Verdict but ill upon a Demurrer 70 Resignation See Abeiance To the Ordinary and Patron presented 'ts void if the Ordinary did not accept the Resignation 297 Reversion See Bargain and Sale Surrender 2. Tenant in Tail who had likewise the Reversion in Fee if he acknowledge a Judgment the Reversion may be extended 256 2. But a Reversion in Fee expectant upon an Estate Tail is not Assets until it comes into possession 257 3. By what words a Reversion in Fee passeth in a Will 228 Revocation A Will shall not be revoked by doubtful words 206 2. It might be revoked by Word without Writing before the Statute of Frauds 207 3. Before that Statute a Will might be revoked by a subsequent Will which was void in it self yet good to revoke the former 207 218 4. A subsequent Will which doth not appear shall not be any Revocation of a written Will which doth appear 204 205 206 5. Whether a subsequent Will which is void in it self may revoke another since the Statute of Frauds 218 6. Such a Will must be good in all circumstances to revoke a former 260 261 Riot See Information Robbery The Hundred was sued and it did not appear that the Parish where the Fact was laid to be done was in the Hundred or that it was done upon the High way or in the day time this was helped after Verdict 258 2. A Servant delivered Mony to a Quaker to carry home for his Master they were both robbed viz. the Servant of 26 s. and the Quaker of 106 l. the Servant made Oath of the Robbery and the Quaker refused the Master brought the Action it doth not lie for him 287 288 S. Scire Facias See Bail 3 4. Baron and Feme 1 4 5. Iudgment 2. Pledges 1. Recovery MUst be to the Tertenants before the Common Recovery shall be reversed by Writ of Error 119 2. Scieri Facias quare Executionem non habet recites the first Judgment but prays no new thing only to have Execution upon that Judgment 187 3. 'T is not an original but a judicial Writ and depends upon the first Judgment 187 4. 'T is suspended by Writ of Error and if the original Judgment is reversed that is so also ibid. 5. Debt will lie upon a Judgment had on a Scire Facias 188 189 6. A Judgment upon a Scire Facias is a distinct Action from the original cause 189 7. Judgment in Dower and a Writ of Enquiry of Damages the Woman marries and dies before the Writ of Enquiry executed the Husband administred and brought a Scire Facias upon the Judgment whether it lieth or not 281 Serjeants at Law See Iudges Surplusage See Inquisition Steward See Court Supersedeas See Parliament Surrender See Assent 1 2. Where it may be pleaded without an acceptance 297 2. No man can take it but he who hath the immediate Reversion 299 3. If pleaded without an Acceptance 't is aided after Verdict which shews 'tis no Substance 301 4. By one Non compos mentis 't is void ab initio 303 T. Tail DEvise to D. for Life the Remainder to her first Son and the Heirs of the Body of such first Son endorsed thus viz. Memorandum that D. shall not alien from the Heirs Males of her Body she had a Son who had Issue a Daughter 't is not an Estate Tail Male for the Memorandum shall not alter the Limitation in the Will
Bradburn versus Kennerdale 318 Brason versus Deane 39 Brett versus Whitchott 96 Bridgham versus Frontee 94 Broad versus Piper 268 Burgh's Case 67 C. CAlthrop versus Axtel 168 Capel versus Saltonstal 249 Carter versus Dowrish 226 Chapman versus Lamphire 155 Clarke versus Hoskins 79 Claxton versus Swift 86 Coghil versus Freelove 325 Cole versus Knight 277 Cross versus Garnett 261 D. DAvies Case 246 Dawling versus Venman 108 Dixon versus Robinson 107 Dobson versus Thornigrove 112 Doe versus Dawson 274 Dorrington versus Edwyn 56 E. ECcleston versus Speke 258 Evans versus Crocker 198 F. FItzgerald versus Villiers 236 Fisher versus Wrenn 250 Franshaw versus Bradshaw 235 Friend versus Bouchier 81 G. GRandison Lord versus Countess of Dover 23 Grantham Mil ' his Case 120 Godfrey versus Eversden 264 Gold versus Strode 324 Goring versus Deering 156 H. HAcket versus Herne 134 Hall versus Wybank 311 Hamson Serjeant his Case 89 Hanchet versus Thelwell 104 Harman versus Harman 115 Harrison versus Austin 237 Harrison versus Heyward 295 Hebblethwait versus Palmes 48 Hexam versus Coniers 238 Heyward versus Guppee 191 Hicks versus Gore 84 Hyley versus Hyley 228 Hinton versus Roffey 35 Hitchins versus Bassett 203 Hobbs qui tam versus Young 313 Hoile versus Clerke 218 Holcomb versus Petit 113 Holloway's Case 42 Horner's Company versus Barlow 158 I. JAckson versus Warren 78 Jefferies Mil ' versus Watkyns 161 Jennings versus Hankeys 114 Joyner versus Pritchard 103 K. KEllow versus Rowden 253 King versus Dilliston 221 Knight versus Cole 277 Knight Mil ' Case 117 Kingston versus Herbert 119 The King against Ayloffe 72 The King against Armstrong Mil ' 47 The King against Atkyns Mil ' 3 The King against Barns 42 The King against Baxter 68 The King against Beale 124 The King against Bunny 238 The King against Cony al' 37 The King against Colson al' 72 The King against Dangerfield 68 The King against Darby 139 The King against Fairfax 269 The King against G l. 97 The King against Griffith 201 The King against Grimes al' 220 The King against Hethersel 80 The King against Hinton al' 122 The King against Hockenhal 167 The King against Inhabitants of Malden The King against Johnson 241 The King against Kingsmill 199 The King against Lenthal 143 The King against Marsh al' 66 The King against Plowright al' 94 The King against Rosewell 52 The King against Saloway 100 The King against Sellars 167 The King against Silcox 280 The King against Sparks 78 The King against Warden of the Fleet 335 L. LAngford versus Webber 132 Lambert versus Thurston 275 Lea versus Libb 262 Leigh's Case 332 Letchmere versus Thorowgood 236 Lidcott versus Willows 229 Lock versus Norborne 141 Lutwich versus Piggot 268 M. MAcklesfield Earl 41 Malloon versus Fitzgerald 28 Marsh versus Cutler 41 Mason versus Beldham 73 Mather versus Mills 252 Matthews versus Cary 137 Mayor and Cominalty of Norwich versus Johnson 90 Merchants Adventurers versus Rebow 126 Mordant versus Thorold 281 Moss versus Archer 135 N. NEwton al' versus Stubbs 71 Newton Mil ' versus Creswick 165 Newton versus Trigg 327 Norwich Mayor c. versus Johnson 90 O. OBrian versus Ram 170 Okel versus Hodgkinson 99 Osborn versus Steward 230 P. PAine versus Partrich 289 Palmer versus Allicock 58 Panton versus Earl of Bath 227 Parkinson's Case 265 Pawley versus Ludlow 87 Peak versus Mather 103 Perkins versus Titus 132 Pitt versus Brereton 70 Plimouth Countess versus Throgmorton 153 Pool versus Trumbull 56 Price versus Davies 152 Prince's Case 295 Proctor versus Burdet 69 Prodgers versus Frazier 43 Proud versus Piper 268 Prowse versus Wilcox 163 Putt versus Rawsterne 1 R. REves versus Phelpes 264 Reeves versus Winnington 45 Roberts versus Pain 67 Rodney versus Strode 101 Roe versus Clargis Mil ' 26 Rowsby versus Manning 330 S. SAvier versus Lenthall 273 Shipley versus Chappel 232 Shotter versus Friend 283 Shuttleworth versus Garnat 239 Smith versus Goodier 36 Smith versus Peirce 195 T. TAyler versus Brindley 136 Thirsby versus Helbott 272 Thompson versus Leach 296 Idem versus Eundem 301 Tippet versus Hawkey 263 U. UPton versus Dawkin 97 W. WHitehal versus Squire 276 Wytham Mil ' versus Dutton Mil ' 159 Woodward's Case 211 Y. YArmouth Earl versus Dorrell 75 Young versus Inhabitants of Tottenham 258 DE Term. Sancti Mich. Anno 34 Car. II. in Banco Regis 1682. Sir Francis Pemberton Chief Justice Sir Thomas Jones Justices Sir William Dolben Justices Sir Thomas Raymond Justices Putt versus Rawstern Mil ' AN Action of Trespass was formerly brought for taking of Goods c. and upon Not-guilty pleaded Trespass is no Barr to Trover for the same Goods Raymond 472 the Defendant had a Verdict The same Plaintiff now brought Trover against the same Defendant for those Goods The Defendant pleads in Barr the Iudgment in the former Action of Trespass and upon a Demurrer the Question was Whether a Iudgment in Trespass vi armis may be pleaded in Bar to an Action of Trover for the same Goods This Case was argued by Mr. Saunders for the Plaintiff and by Mr. Pollexfen for the Defendant And to prove that it was no Bar Lacon versus Bernard Cro. Car. 35. Hutt 81. Stiles 202. a Case was cited to be adjudged in the Common Pleas in the 20th year of King James which was an Action of Trover and Conversion of one hundred Sheep The Defendant pleaded a former Iudgment in Trespass brought against him quare cepit abduxit those Sheep and that the Plaintiff in that Action recovered 2 d. damages and that both Actions were for the same thing The Plaintiff replied that the two pence damages were recoverd for the chasing and not for the value of the Cattle and upon a Demurrer had Iudgment For the smalness of the damages implies it was for the chasing and it shall therefore be intended that he had his Cattle again and that the Conversion was afterwards My Lord Coke in Ferrer's Case tells us Ferrer 's Case 6 Co. 7. Cro. Eliz. 676. Co. Ent. 39. Cro. Jac. 15. that a Recovery by Verdict Confession or upon a Demurrer in a personal Action is a good Bar to an Action of the like nature and for the same thing but that must be understood where the same Evidence will maintain both the Actions Iustice Croke reports the same Case to be ended by Arbitration but that it was the Opinion of my Lord Anderson and Iustice Glanvil that Trover and Trespass are Actions of different natures and one may be brought where the other cannot be maintained as upon a demand and denial Trover will lie but not Trespass vi armis because the taking was not tortious And therefore it may be well intended that when the Plaintiff brought Trespass he was
mistaken in that Action and being in the wrong was barred but that will be no Bar where a right Action is brought as if I deliver a Bond to another for advice who refusing to redeliver it I bring an Action of Trespass and am barred either by Verdict or Demurrer yet I may bring Detinue Trespass and Detinue are not the same Actions Pro Def. and therefore a Iudgment in one shall be no bar to the other but where two Actions are brought for one thing to be recovered in such case a Recovery in one shall be a bar to the other There is no substantial difference between Trespass and Trover for the disposing of the Goods in the one case is the same with the Conversion in the other the taking vi armis and likewise the Conversion are both tortious and therefore either Action may be well brought But for the Reasons given by the Plaintiffs Council he had Iudgment by the Opinion of the Chief Iustice and the other two Iudges Jones and Raymond of which Iustice Dolben did very much doubt Dominus Rex versus Sir Robert Atkins Knight of the Bath al' AN Indictment was found at the Quarter Sessions held for the County of the City of Bristol 4 Octob. 33 Car. 2. The County of the City of Bristolâ— against Sir Robert Atkins Knight of the Bath and Recorder and Senior Alderman of the said City Sir John Knight Alderman John Lawford Alderman and Joseph Creswick Alderman setting forth 1. That King Henry the VII th by his Charter dated 17 Decemb 15 Regni sui granted to the Mayor and Commonalty of the Town of Bristol the now City of Bristol being then a Town and to their Successors That if any shall procure abett or maintain any Debate and Discord upon the Election of the Mayor or other Minister he shall be punished instantly by the Mayor and two Aldermen to be chosen and named by the Mayor after the quantity and quality of his offence according to the Laws and Custom of the Realm 2. That according to the Priviledges granted by Queen Elizabeth to the Mayor and Commonalty of the said City and their Successors by Charter dated 28 June 23d of her Reign After which time as the Indictment sets forth the said Town was made a City there have been or ought to have been from the time of the making the said Charter twelve Aldermen whereof the Recorder was to be and now is one 3. That according to the Priviledges so as aforesaid granted by all the time aforesaid which is from the time of the Charter after the death of every Alderman the Mayor and the rest of the surviving Aldermen eorum major pars ad summonitionem of the said Mayor being called together have accustomed to choose another person of the circumspect Citizens to be an Alderman in the place of him so deceased and the Mayor and Aldermen by the same Privileges so granted have been and ought to be Iustices of the Peace for the said City 4. That continually after the time of the said Charter of Queen Elizabeth the Recorder and the rest of the Aldermen were and ought to be of the Privy Council de privato Concilio of the Mayor in particular Cases concerning the Government of the City whensoever the Mayor shall call them together And such Privy Council by all the time aforesaid which still is from the said Charter of Queen Elizabeth have not accustomed nor ought not to be called together to transact any Business belonging to that Council unless by the Summons and in the presence of the Mayor That after the death of one Sir John Lloyd being at his death an Alderman of the said City the said Sir Robert Atkins then being Recorder Sir John Knight John Lawford Esquire and Joseph Creswick being all Aldermen then of the City and free Burgesses of the City to make debate and discord upon the Election of an Alderman in the place of the Alderman so dead 8 March 33 Car. 2. in the Parish and Ward of St. Andrew within the said City did conspire to hold a Privy Council of the Aldermen of the said City and therein to choose an Alderman sine summonitione in absentia contra voluntatem Richardi Hart Militis then being Mayor of the City And in pursuance of their said wicked Conspiracy the day and year aforesaid entred by force and arms into the Tolzey and in the Chamber of the Council of the Mayor and Commonalty of the said City commonly called The Council House and there riotously c. did assemble and the same day and year they the said four Aldermen una cum aliis Aldermannis which must be two more Aldermen at the least which makes six and there were but five more in all then in being taking the Mayor in the said rest of the Aldermen not knowing their purposes held a Privy Council of Aldermen and then and there as much as in them lay chose Thomas Day for an Alderman in the place of Sir John Lloyd sine aliqua summonitione per praedictum Richardum Hart then Mayor to meet and in his absence and against his Will And they farther caused to be entred in the Common Council-Book the said Election as an Order of the Privy Council in which Book the Acts of the Mayor and Aldermen in their Privy Council are commonly written from whence great Discord hath risen c. Which Indictment was tryed at the Assises at Bristol by Nisi Prius and the Defendants found guilty and thereupon Sir Robert Atkins one of the Defendants having then lately before this Case been one of the Judges of the Common Pleas but then discharged of his Place after eight years sitting there secure came into the Court of Kings Bench and in Arrest of Iudgment argued his own Case not as Council nor at the Bar but in the Court in his Cloak having a Chair set for him by the Order of the Lord Chief Iustice and said as followeth 1. The Indictment in the first place mentions the Letters Patents of King H. 7. made to the Mayor and Commonalty of Bristol that the Mayor with two Aldermen such as he should choose should by their discretions according to Law punish such as should make debate and discord at the Elections of Officers They have not pursued this course against us but gone the ordinary way of Indictment and therefore I shall not need to speak to it 2. The Indictment in the next place proceeds to mention Letters Patents of Queen Elizabeth granted to the Mayor and Commonalty in the 23d year of her Reign which provides that there shall be twelve Aldermen and how upon the death or removal of an Alderman a new one should be chosen that is by the Mayor and the surviving Aldermen and the greater number of them being call'd together as the Indictment suggests by the Summons of the Mayor The whole Indictment and the Offence we are charged with being
of Wills did not Originally belong to the Spiritual Courts de jure they had that Authority per consensum Regis Magnatum And as those Courts had not original Iurisdiction in such Cases so they had no power to grant Administration 'till enabled by the Statute of Edw. 31 Ed. 3. cap. 11. 3. For before that time the Kings of England by their proper Officers solebant capere bona intestatorum in manus suas 'T is plain that the Ordinary had no power by the Common Law over an Intestate's Estate for he could not maintain an Action to recover any part of it now if the Law had given him a power over the Goods it would likewise have given him an Authority or Remedy to recover them An Action would have lain against him at the Common Law 13 E. 1. cap. 19. and by the Statute of Edw. 1. which was made in affirmance thereof if he had possessed himself of such Goods and refused to pay the Debts Then since he hath no original Power in this Case and this being a special kind of Administration when he hath once executed that power he shall not repeal it and the Court enclined to that Opinion vid. 9 Rep. Henslow's Case DE Term. Sancti Mich. Anno 35 Car. II. in Banco Regis 1683. Roe versus Sir Thomas Clargis IN a Writ of Error Papist is actionable Raymond 482. upon a Iudgment in the Common-Pleas in an Action upon the Case wherein the Plaintiff declar'd That the King had made him one of his Privy Council in Ireland and that he was a Deputy Lieutenant of the County of Middlesex and had serv'd in several Parliaments for the Burrough of Christ-Church in Hampshire and that the King having summon'd a Parliament to meet at Westminster he did stand to be a Member of that Burrough and that the Defendant Roe did then speak these words of him Viz. He meaning the Plaintiff is a Papist Vpon a Tryal there was a Verdict and a Iudgment for the Plaintiff This Case was argued by Sir Francis Winnington for the Plaintiff in the Errors and by Mr. Roger North for the Defendant The Questions were these 1. Whether the words abstracted from the Offices set forth in this Declaration were actionable or not 2. Whether they are actionable as joined to those Capacities The Councel for the Plaintiff in the Errors held the Negative in both Points 1. The word Papist is not defin'd either by the Common Law or the Statutes of this Realm for from the first of the Queen to the 25 Car. 2. it is not to be found what a Papist is There are several Statutes between those times which provide against the Iurisdiction of the Pope and which inflict particular Punishments upon committing Offences therein prohibited but none of those Laws give any definition of a Papist If by a Papist is meant him who embraces the Doctrine of the Pope it was punishable before the Reformation to be of a contrary Opinion Now in the vulgar acceptation of the word a man may hold the same Opinion with the Church of Rome and yet not profess the Popish Religion so as to bring himself in danger of any of the Penalties in these Laws There was never yet an Indictment against a person for being a Papist but many have been indicted upon the breach of those Laws made against Recusants by which they incurred the Penalties thereby appointed In Michaelmas 27 H. 8. 27 H. 8. 14. B. an Action on the Case was brought in the Common-Pleas for calling of the Plaintiff Heretick and Willoughby the King's Serjeant argued That the Action would not lye because the word did import a Spiritual Matter of which the Temporal Courts had no knowledge and of that Opinion were the Chief Justice Fitzherbert and Justice Shelley The same may be said in this Case that the word Papist relates to something which is Spiritual of which this Court hath no cognizance Words which are actionable must immediately injure the person of whom they are spoken either in his Profession or bring him in danger of some Punishment Hob. 8. as to call an Attorney Bribing Knave which are adjectively spoken yet 't is an Injury done to him in his Profession It was said at the Trial in the Common-Pleas That 't is actionable to call a Man Papist at this time though it might not be so at another time This seems to be a very vain assertion for though the Times may alter the Law is still the same It would be a very great inconvenience if Men should be deterr'd by Actions to call another Man a Papist for this would be an encouragement to Popery and a check upon the Protestant Religion to punish the Professors thereof for saying a Man is a Papist who is really so both in his Iudgment and Profession But admitting the word to be actionable Not actionable to call a man Papist Cro. Eliz. 191. 't is not so before Conviction for 't is very improperly used and of no signification or discredit before that time 2. These words are not actionable as coupled with his Offices because he hath alledged no particular damage or Loss and his Offices are only Honorary and of no Profit and therefore he could receive no Damage by speaking these words if true when they in no sort relate to his Offices and are too remote to be applied to them 1. E contra The words are actionable in themselves for they scandalize the Plaintiff in his Reputation and may be a means to bring him to corporal Punishment for by several Acts of Parliament many Punishments are inflicted upon Popish Recusants which is the same thing with a Papist they are disabled from holding any Office or Imployment in the Kingdom they are not to come into the Kings presence or within five Miles of the City of London and the calling of him Papist subjects him to the danger of being Indicted for a Traytor for the words are Synonimous When H. 8. took upon him the Supremacy which the Pope had unlawfully Vsurped there were certain Papists in those days who called themselves Roman Catholicks that they might be distinguished from those who bore Allegiance to their lawful King which general appellation was afterwards changed into the word Papist so that both signifie the same thing The Objection that tho Times change the Law is still the same may receive this Answer That when the force of words is changed with the Times those words shall be actionable now which were not so at another time As for Example the proper and genuine signification of the word Knave is a Servant but now the Times have altered the sense of that word and made it to be a term of Reproach so that 't is actionable to call an Attorny Knave who is but a Servant to his Client 1. Then as to the Objection that the word Papist is not defin'd in our Law There is a Statute which disables a
Man from having any Office whatsoever who shall affirm the King to be a Papist 13 Car. 2. cap. 1. that is a person who endeavours to introduce Popery 2. But if the word Papist is not actionable of it self yet as coupled with his Offices 't is otherwise and the Plaintiff may well maintain this Action And of that Opinion was all the Court So the Iudgment was affirmed Malloon versus Fitzgerald ERror of a Iudgment in Ireland Where an Estate Tail shall not be determined for want of notice of a Proviso to determine it for Lands in the County of Waterford the Case upon the special Verdict was this John Fitzgerald was seized in Fee of the Lands in question who had Issue Katherine his only Daughter He by Lease and Release made a Settlement of those Lands upon the Earl of Ossory and other Trustees therein named and their Heirs to the use of himself for Life and after his Decease to the use of his Daughter Katherine in Tail Provided that she Married with the consent of the said Earl and the Trustees or the major part of them or their Heirs some worthy person of the Family and Name of Fitzgerald or who should take upon him that Name immediately after the Marriage but if not then the said Earl should appoint and raise a Portion out of the said Lands for the Maintenance of the said Katherine with a Remainder to Laetitia in Tail John Fitzgerald died his Daughter being then but two years old She afterwards at the Age of fourteen had Notice of this Settlement but not by the Direction of the Trustees That on the 20th of March in the 16th year of her Age she Married with the Plaintiff Edward Villiers Esq without the consent of the Trustees or the major part of them and that her Husband Mr. Villiers did not take upon him the Name of Fitzgerald after the said Marriage That Laetitia the Aunt was married to Franklyn who likewise did not take upon him the Name of Fitzgerald 1. The Questions were Whether the Estate limited to Katherine be forfeited without Notice given to her of the Settlement by the Trustees themselves 2. Whether her Estate be not determined by her marrying Mr. Villiers without their consent And it was argued That the Estate Tail was determined And first as to the point of Notice 't is not necessary to be given to the Daughter because the Father had not made it in the Settlement He might dispose of his Estate at his pleasure and having made particular Limitations of it there is no room now for the Law to interpose to supply the defect of Notice in the Deed. And to this purpose the Mayor of London 's Case was cited which was That George Monox Devised certain Houses to his Executors in Trust and their Heirs Cro Car. 576. Idem Jones 452. upon condition to pay mony to several Charitable uses which if not performed then he devised them over to his Heir in Tail upon the same Conditions and if not performed by him then to the * The Devise to him was void because it was a possibility upon a possibility Mayor and Commonalty of London The Trusts were not performed by the first Devisees A Stranger entered and levied a Fine with Proclamations and five Years passed Then the Mayor of London brought his Action supposing he had a right of Entry for the non performance of the Trusts but was barred by the Fine although it was argued for him that he had not notice of the Devise or breach of the Trust till after the Fine levied which shews that Notice was not necessary for if it had been so when his Title accrewed he could not have been barred by the Fine As Katherine the Daughter takes notice what Estate she hath in the Land so as to pursue a proper Remedy to recover it so she ought to take notice of the Limitations in the Settlement and hath the same means to acquaint her self with the one as with the other and the same likewise as her Aunt had to know the Remainder Suppose a Promise is made to indempnifie another from all Bonds which he should enter into for a third person 2 Cro. 432. Hob. 51. Jones 207. Pop. 164. and then an Action is brought against him wherein the Plaintiff declared that he was bound accordingly and not saved harmless but doth not shew that he gave notice of his being bound yet the Plaintiff shall recover As to the Case of a Copyholder having three Sons who surrendred to the use of his Will 2 Cro. 56. and then devised to his middle Son in Fée upon condition to pay Legacies to his Sisters at full age which were not paid Now tho' it was adjudged that his Estate was not determined upon the non-performance of this Condition without an actual demand and denial and that he was not bound to take notice of the full age of his Sisters yet this is not an Authority which can any wise prevail in this Case because 't is a * If the Devise had been to the eldest Son then it had been a Limitation annexed to his Estate and not a Condition because if it had been a Condition it would have descended upon the Heir who could not be sued for the breach 1 Ventr 199. Rep. Canc. 140. Sid. Poph. 104. Condition to pay Legacies which is a thing in its nature not to be paid without a demand which implies notice In all Cases where Conditions are annexed to Estates to pay Mony there notice is necessary but where Estates are limited upon the performance of collateral acts 't is not necessary And this has been held the constant difference So is Fry and Porter 's Case which was this The Earl of Newport had two Daughters and he devised Newport House to the Daughter of his eldest Daughter in Tail which she had by the Earl of Banbury Provided and upon condition that she marry with the consent of her Mother and two other Trustees or the major part of them if not or if she should dye without Issue then he devised the said House to George Porter in Fee who was the Son of his youngest Daughter and who had married one Thomas Porter without her Fathers consent The Lady Ann Knowles the first Devisee married Fry without the consent of her Grandmother or Trustees and it was adjudg'd against her upon point of Notice that it was not necessary because her Grandfather had not appointed any person to give notice he might have imposed any Terms or Conditions upon his own Estate and all Parties concerned had the same means to inform themselves of such Conditions The third Resolution in Frances Case 8 Co. comes nearest to this now in question it was in Replevin the Defendant avowed the taking Damage Fesant The Plaintiff pleaded in Barr to the Avowry that R. Frances was seized in Fee of the place where c. and devised it to John who was his
upon the Estate which Affidavit was produced in Court but not suffered to be read but as a Note or Letter unless the Plaintiff would produce a Witness to swear that he was present when the Oath was taken before the Master And an Objection was made to the Settlement it self which recited That whereas a Marriage was intended to be had between the said Edmund Goodier and Elizabeth Mees now in consideration thereof and of a Portion he conveyed the said Mannor to the Feoffees to the use of himself for life and after his decease to the use of the said Elizabeth for life but doth not say from and after the Solemnization of the said Marriage so that if she had not married Mr. Goodier yet after his decease she would have enjoyed the Estate for life Vpon the whole matter the Iury found for the Defendant Dominus Rex versus Coney and Obrian THE Defendants were convicted for the Murder of Mr. Murder was pardoned by the name Felonica interfectio and held good 10 E. 3. c. 3. 13 R. 2. c. 1. Tyrrwhite and Mr. Forster in a Duel and now pleaded their Pardon in which there was a Clause Non obstante the Statute of Ed. 3. which appoints him that hath a Pardon of Felony to find Sureties for his Good Behaviour before it shall be allowed and another Non obstante to the Statute of R. 2. which enacts that if the Offence be not specified in the Pardon it shall not be allowed Now the Word Murdrum was not in this Pardon the Offence was expressed by these general Words Felonica interfectione and whether it did extend to pardon Murder was the Question Mr. Astry the Clerk of the Crown informed the Court that one Alexander Montgomery of Eglington pleaded the like Pardon for Murder but it was held insufficient and the Court gave him time to get his Pardon amended which was done likewise in this Case The Defendants came again on another day and Councel being allowed to plead for them insisted that the Pardon was good and that the Murder was sufficiently pardoned by these Words that it is in the power of the King to pardon by general Words and his intent did plainly appear to pardon the Defendants That the murther of a person is rightly expressed by felonious killing though not so properly as by the word Murdrum it self the omission of which word will not make the Pardon void And to prove this he cited the Sheriff of Norfolk's Case 2 R. 3. 7. a. who was indebted to the King during the time he was Sheriff and was pardoned by the Name of J. W. Esquire who was the same person de omnibus debitis computis c. Afterwards he was charged in the Exchequer for 100 l. where he pleaded this Pardon and it was held good though he was not named Sheriff and so not pardoned by the name of his Office yet the Kings intention appearing in his Charter and having pardoned him by his right Name that was sufficient and in that Case the King himself was concerned in point of interest The Books all agree More 752. Lucas's Case 8 Co. 18. 3 Inst 234. that before the Statute of R. 2. the King might pardon Murder by the word Felony now this Prerogative being incident to the Crown and inseparable from the person of the King was not designed to be wholly restrained by that Act for the Parliament only intended that by specifying the Offence in the Pardon the King should be rightly informed of the nature of it and when he understands it to be Murder he would not grant a Pardon But admitting his power to be restrained by that Statute Stamf. 101. yet a Non obstante is a dispensation of it and therefore this Pardon ought to be allowed The Pardon was held good by the whole Court And Jefferies the Chief Justice said that he had proposed this Case to all the Judges of England Sid. 366. and they were all of the same Opinion and that he remembred Dudley's Case where a Pardon in general words was allowed DE Term. Sancti Hill Anno 35 Car. II. in Banco Regis 1683 4. Brason versus Dean A Covenant upon a Charter Party for the Freight of a Ship A thing lawful to be done when the party did covenant to do it and afterwards prohibited the Covenant is binding The Defendant pleaded that the Ship was loaded with French Goods prohibited by Law to be imported and upon Demurrer Judgment was given for the Plaintiff for the Court were all of Opinion That if the thing to be done was lawful at the time when the Defendant did enter into the Covenant though it was afterwards prohibited by Act of Parliament yet the Covenant is binding Barnes versus Edgard TRespass for breaking his Close and impounding of his Cattle Where Damages are under 40 s. the Plaintiff must have ordinary Costs Vpon Not Guilty pleaded the Plaintiff had a Verdict but Damages under 40 s. Whereupon Mr. Livesay the Secondary refused to tar full Costs alledging it to be within the Statute of 22 23 Car. 2. by which 't is Enacted 22 23 Car. 2. cap. 9. That in all Actions of Trespass Assault and Battery and other personal Actions wherein the Judge shall not certifie upon the back of the Record that a Battery was proved or the Freehold or Title of the Land chiefly in question if the Jury find the Damages under 40 s. the Plaintiff shall recover no more Costs than Damages Mr. Pollexfen moved for Costs alledging that this Act doth not extend to all trespasses but only to such where the Freehold of the Land is in question If the Action had been for a Trespass in breaking his Close and Damages given under 40 s. there might not have been full Costs but here is another Count for impounding the Cattle of which the Defendant is found guilty and therefore must have his Costs The like Case was adjudged in this Court in Hillary Term last Smith versus Batterton Raym. 487. Jones 232. which was Trespass for breaking and flinging down Stalls in the Market place The Plaintiff had a Verdict and 2 d. damages and upon a debate whether he should have full Costs the Court were of Opinion that it was not within that Statute because the Title could not come in question upon the destruction of a Chattle In the principal Case the Plaintiff had ordinary Costs DE Termino Paschae Anno 36 Car. II. in Banco Regis 1684. Marsh versus Cutler THE Plaintiff obtained a Iudgment in an Hundred Court for 58 s. and 4 d. If Debt be brought upon a Specialty for part of the Sum the Plaintiff must shew how the other is discharged 2 Cro. 498 499 529 530. and brought an Action of Debt upon that Iudgment in this Court for 58 s. only and did not shew that the 4 d. was discharged and upon Nultiel Record pleaded and a Demurrer to that Plea the
the Court of Arches the Case was Prohibition not granted where a temporal loss may ensue The Plaintiff was presented by the Mayor and Aldermen of Bristol to the Parish Church of Christ-Church in the said City and the Defendant libelled against him because he was not 23 years of Age when made Deacon nor 24 when he entred into the Orders of a Priest 13 Eliz. c. 12. and the Statute requires that none shall be made a Minister or admitted to preach being under that Age. The reason now alledged for a Prohibition was because this Matter was triable at Law and not in the Spiritual Court because if true a Temporal Loss viz Deprivacion might follow But the Court denied the Prohibition and compared this Case to that of a Drunkard or ill Liver who are usually punished in the Ecclesiastical Courts though a temporal loss may ensue and if Prohibitions should be granted in all Cases where Deprivation is the consequence of the Crime it would very much lessen the Practice of those Courts David Burgh 's Case THE Parishioners of St. Leonard Foster Lane gave this Man who had a Wife and five Children 5 l. in Mony to remove into another Parish upon Condition that if he returned in 40 days that he should repay the Mony he removed accordingly and stayed away by the space of 40 days the Parish to which he removed obtained an Order upon an Appeal for his settlement in the last Parish where he was lawfully an Inhabitant which Order being removed into this Court and the Matter appearing thus upon Affidavits they declared their Opinion only upon the Order to remove viz. That the Man had gained a Settlement in the Parish to which he removed for he being an Inhabitant there for so long time as was required by Law to make a Settlement and not disturbed by the Officers they were remiss in their Duty and the Court would not help their negligence DE Term. Sanctae Trin. Anno 1 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1685. Dominus Rex versus Dangerfield THE Defendant was convicted of publishing a Libel wherein he had accused the King when Duke of York that he had hired him to kill the late King Charles c. And on Fryday June 20. He was brought to the Barr where he received this Sentence viz. That he should pay the Fine of 500 l. That he should stand twice in the Pillory and go about the Hall with a Paper in his Har signifying his Crime That on Thursday next he should be whipped from Algate to Newgate and on Saturday following from Newgate to Tyburn which Sentence was executed accordingly and as he was returning in a Coach on Saturday from Tyburn one Mr. Robert Frances a Barrister of Greys-Inn asked him in a jeering manner whether he had run his Heat that day who replied again to him in scurrilous words whereupon Mr. Frances run him into the Eye with a small Cane which he had then in his Hand of which wound the said Mr. Dangerfield died on the Monday following Mr. Frances was indicted for this Murder and upon Not-guilty pleaded was tried at the Old-Bayly and found guilty and executed at Tyburn on Fryday July the 24th in the same year Mr. Baxter's Case HE was a Nonconformist Minister against whom an Information was exhibited for writing of a Book which he Entituled A Paraphrase upon the New Testament and the Crime alledged against him in the said Information was That he intending to bring the Protestant Religion into contempt and likewise the Bishops innuendo the Bishops of England did publish the Libel in which was contained such words c. setting forth the words He was convicted And Mr. Williams moved in arrest of Iudgment that the words in the Information and the Bishops therein mentioned were misapplied to the Protestant Religion and the Bishops of England by such Innuendoes which could not support this Charge against the Defendant That the Distringas and Habeas Corpora were inter nos Richardum Baxter which could not be because the Information was exhibited in the name of the Attorney General But the Court over-ruled these Exceptions and said that by the word Bishops in this Information no other could be reasonably intended but the English Bishops thereupon the Court fined him 500 l. and ordered him to give Security for his Good Behavior for seven years Procter versus Burdet AN Action of Covenant was brought by an Apprentice setting forth the Indenture by which the Defendant In Covenant the Breach was generally assigned and held good his Master had covenanted to find and allow the Plaintiff Meat Drink Lodging and all other things necessary during such a time and the Breach was as general as the Covenant viz. That he did not find hind him Meat Drink Lodging alia necessaria The Plaintiff had Iudgment by Nil dicit and upon a Writ of Enquity brought entire Damages were given against the Defendant And in a Writ of Error upon this Iudgment the Error assigned was that the Breach was too general and that entire Damages were given amongst other things for alia necessaria and doth not say for what 2 Cro. 436. Astel versus Mills and a Case was cited in the Point in Trinity-Term 16 Jacobi where the Iudgment was reversed for this very reason The Council contra argued that that which is required in an Action of Covenant is that there may be such a certainty as the Defendant may plead a former Recovery in Barr if he be sued again and therefore one need not be so particular in assigning of the Breach upon a Covenant as upon a Bond for in a Bond for performance of Covenants where there is a Covenant to repiar if it be put in suit 't is not sufficient to say That the House is out of repair but you must shew how but in a Covenant 't is enough to say That it was out of repair If in this Case the Plaintiff had shewed what necessaries were not provided for him Kelway 85. it would have made the Record too long and therefore 't is sufficient for him to say that the Defendant did not find alia necessaria That Case in 2 Cro. 2 Cro. 304 367. 1 Rol. Rep. 173. 3 Bulst 31. 2 Saund. 373. has since been adjudged not to be Law for many contrary Iudgments have weakened the Authority of it viz. That the Breach may be assigned as general as the Covenant as where a Man covenanted that he had a lawful Estate and Right to let c. the Breach assigned was that he had no lawful Estate and Right to let c. and doth not shew that the Lessor had not such Right or that he was evicted yet it was held good Curia In a Quantum meruit they formerly set out the Matter at length but now of late in that Action in general Words and also in Trover and Conversion pro diversis aliis bonis hath been held good which is as
fearing that this Daughter might be stoln from her applies her self to my Lady Gore and entreats her to take this Daughter into her House which she did accordingly My Lady had a Son then in France she sent for him and married him to this Ruth she being then under the Age of sixteen years without the Consent of her Mother who was her Guardian The Question was whether this was a Forfeiture of her Estate during Life It was proved at the Trial that the Mother had made a Bargain with the Lessor of the Plaintiff that in case he recovered she should have 1000 l. and the Chirds of the Estate and therefore she was not admitted to be a Witness The Plaintiff could not prove any thing to make a Forfeiture and therefore was nonsuited The Chief Iustice said that the Statute was made to prevent Children from being seduced from their Parents or Guardians by flattering or enticing Words Promises or Gifts and married in a secret way to their disparagement but that no such thing appeared in this Case for Dr. Hascard proved the Marriage to be at St. Clements Church in a Canonical Hour and that many People were present and that the Church Doors were open whilst he married them Anonymus BY the Statute of 21 Jacobi 't is Enacted 21 Jac. c. 23. That no Writ to remove a Suit out of an Inferior Court shall be obeyed unless it be delivered to the Steward of the same Court before Issue or Demurrer joined so as the Issue or Demurrer be not joined within six Weeks next after the Arrest or Appearance of the Defendant In this Case Issue was joined and the Steward refused to allow the Habeas Corpus and the Cause was tried but not before an Utter Barrister as is directed by the Statute Curia The Steward ought to return the Habeas Corpus and they having proceeded to try the Cause no Utter Barister being Steward let an Attachment go Claxton versus Swift Hill 1 Jac. 2. Rot. 1163. THE Plaintiff being a Merchant brought an Action upon a Bill of Exchange If the Plaintiff recover against the Drawer of a Bill he shall not afterwards recover against any of Endorsers setting forth the Custom of Merchants c. and that London and Worcester were ancient Cities and that there was a Custom amongst Merchants that if any person living in Worcester draw a Bill upon another in London and if this Bill be accepted and endorsed the first Endorser is liable to the payment That one Hughes drew a Bill of 100 l. upon Mr. Pardoe paiable to the Defendant or Order Mr. Swift endorsed this Bill to Allen or Order and Allen endorsed it to Claxton The Mony not being paid Claxton brings his Action against Hughes and recovers but did not take out Execution Afterwards he sued Mr. Swift who was the first Endorser and he pleads the first Recovery against Hughes in barr to this Action and avers that it was for the same Bill and that they were the same Parties To this Plea the Plaintiff demurred and the Defendant joyned in the Demurrer Mr. Pollexfen argued that it was a good Barr because the Plaintiff had his Election to bring his Action against either of the Endorsers or against the Drawer but not against all and that he had now determined his Election by suing the Drawer and shall not go back again though he never have Execution for this is not in the nature of a joint Action which may be brought against all 'T is true that it may he made joint or several by the Plaintiff but when he has made his choice by suing of one he shall never sue the rest because the Action sounds in Damages which are uncertain before the Iudgment but afterwards are made certain transeunt in rem judicatam and is as effectual in Law as a Release As in Trover the Defendant pleaded that at another time the Plaintiff had recovered against another person for the same Goods so much Damages 2 Cro. 73. Yelv. 65. Brown versus Wootton and had the Defendant in Execution and upon a Demurrer this was held a good Plea for though in that Case it was objected that a Iudgment and Execution was no satisfaction unless the Mony was paid yet it was adjudged that the cause of Action being against several for which Damages were to be recovered and because a Sum certain was recovered against one that is a good discharge against all the other but 't is otherwise in Debt because each is liable to the entire Sum. Chief Iustice If the Plaintiff had accepted of a Bond from the first Drawer in satisfaction of this Mony it had been a good Barr to any Action which might have been brought against the other Indorsers for the same and as this Case is the Drawer is still liable and if he fail in payment the first Endorser is chargeable because if he make Endorsement upon a bad Bill 't is Equity and good Conscience that the Endorsee may resort to him to make it good But the other Iustices being against the Opinion of the Chief Iustice Iudgment was given for the Defendant Pawley versus Ludlow DEBT upon a Bond. The Condition was That if John Fletcher shall appear such a day coram Justitiariis apud Westm c. that then c. The Defendant pleaded that after the 25th day of November and before the day of the appearance he did render himself to the Officer in discharge of this Bond and to this the Plaintiff demurred Darnel for the Defendant admitted that if a Scire Facias be brought against the Bail upon a Writ of Error 3 Bulstr 191. 2 Cro. 402. who plead that after the Recognizance and before the Iudgment against the Principal affirmed he rendred himself to the Marshal in discharge of his Bail that this is not a good Plea but that the Sureties are still liable 3 Jac. cap. 8. because by the Statute they are not only liable to render his Body but to pay the Debt recovered But if a Iudgment be had in this Court 1 Rol. Abr. 334. pl. 11. and a Writ of Error brought in the Exchequer-Chamber and pending that Writ of Error the Principal is rendred the Bail in the Action are thereby discharged It was argued on the other side E contra that this is not the like Case of Bail upon a Writ of Error for the Condition of a Recognizance and that of a Bond for Appearance are different in their nature the one is barely that the Party shall appear on such a day the other is that he shall not only appear and render his Body to Prison but the Bail likewise do undertake to pay the Debt if Iudgment should be against the Principal Now where the Condition is only for an Appearance at a day if the Party render himself either before or after the day 't is not good Chief Iustice If the Party render himself to the Officer before the
that is to make them Iudges whether this Duty is payable or not and so the Courts of Westminster who are the proper Iudges of the Revenue of the King who by this means will be without an Appeal will be excluded Curia This Court may take Cognizance of this Matter as well as in Cases of Bastardy 't is frequent to remove those Orders into this Court though the Act says That the two next Justices may take order as well for the punishment of the Mother as also for the relief of the Parish where it was born except he give Security to appear the next Quarter Sessions The Statute doth not mention any Certiorari which shews that the intention of the Law-makers was that a Certiorari might he brought otherwise they would have enacted as they have done by several other Statutes that no Certiorari shall lie Therefore the meaning of the Act must be that the determination of the Iustices of the Peace shall be final in Matters of Fact only as if a Collector should affirm that a person hath four Chimnies when he hath but two or when the Goods distrained are sold under the value and the Overplus not returned but the Right of the Duty arising by virtue of this Act was never intended to be determined by them Then the Order was filed and Mr. Pollexfen moved that it might be quashed for that by the Statute of 14 Car. 2. 14 Car. 2. c. 10. the Occupier was only chargeable and the Land-Lord exempted Now by the Proviso in that Act such a Cottage as is expressed in this Order is likewise exempted because 't is not of greater value than 20 s. by the year and 't is not expressed that the person inhabiting the same hath any Lands of his own of the value of 20 s. per annum nor any Lands or Goods to the value of 10 l. Now there having been several abuses made of this Law to deceive the King of this Duty occasioned the making of this subsequent Act. The abuses were these viz. The taking a great House and dividing it into several Tenements and then letting them to Tenants who by reason of their poverty might pretend to be exempted from this Duty The dividing Lands from Houses so that the King was by these Practices deceived and therefore in such Cases the charge was laid upon the Land-Lord but nothing of this appearing upon the Order it was therefore quashed Brett versus Whitchot IN Replevin Lands not exempted from repairing of the High-ways by grant of the King The Defendant avowed the taking of a Cup as a Fine for a Distress towards the repairing of the High-way The Plaintiff replyed and set forth a Grant from the King by which the Lands which were chargeable to send Men for the repairing c. were exempted from that Duty And upon a Demurrer the Question was Whether the Kings Letters Patents are sufficient to exempt Lands from the Charge of the repairing of the High-ways 2 3 Ph. Mar. c. 8. which by the Statute of Philip and Mary and other subsequent Statutes are chargeable to send Men for that purpose And it was argued that such Letters Patents were not sufficient because they were granted in this Case before the making of the Statute and so by consequence before any cause of Action and to prove this a Case was cited to this purpose In 2 E. 2 Inst 569. 3. an Action was brought against an Hundred for a Robbery upon the Statute of 13 E. 1. The Bishop of Litchfield pleaded a Charter of R. 1. by which that Hundred which was held in Right of his Church was exempted c. But it was held that this Charter could not discharge the Action because no such Action was given when the Letters Patents were made but long afterwards Iudgment was given for the Avowant Upton versus Dawkin TRespass quare vi armis liberam piscariam he did break and enter and one hundred Trouts ipsius Quer. Trespass for taking Fish ipsius querentis in libera piscaria not good in the Fishery aforesaid did take and carry away Vpon Not guilty pleaded there was a Verdict for the Plaintiff and this Exception was taken in arrest of Iudgment viz. For that the Plaintiff declared in Trespass for taking so many Fish ipsius Quer. in libera piscaria which cannot be because he hath not such a property in libera piscaria to call the Fish his own Pollexfen contra If there had not been a Verdict such a Construction might have been made of this Declaration upon a Demurrer but now 't is helped and the rather because a Man may call them pisces ipsius in a free Fishery for they may be in a Trunk so a Man may have a property though not in himself as in the Case of Iointenants where 't is not in one but in both yet if one declare against the other unless he plead the Iointenancy in Abatement the Plaintiff shall recover But notwithstanding the Iudgment was reversed Dominus Rex versus ...... THE Defendant was indicted for Barretry Barretry the Evidence against him was that one G. was arrested at the Suit of C. in an Action of 4000 l. and was brought before a Iudge to give Bail to the Action and that the Defendant who was a Barrister at Law was then present and did sollicite this Suit when in truth at the same time C. was indebted to G. in 200 l. and that he did not owe the said C. one farthing The Chief Iustice was first of Opinion that this might be Maintenance but that it was not Barretry unless it appeared that the Defendant did know that C. had no cause of Action after it was brought If a Man should be arrested for a trifling Cause or for no Cause this is no Barretry though 't is a sign of a very ill Christian it being against the express Word of God But a Man may arrest another thinking he hath a just cause so to do when as in truth he hath none for he may be mistaken especially where there hath been great dealings between the Parties But if the design was not to recover his own Right but only to ruine and oppress his Neighbour that is Barretry A Man may lay out mony in behalf of another in Suits at Law to recover a just Right and this may be done in respect of the Poverty of the Party but if he lend mony to promote and stirr up Suits then he is a Barretor Now it appearing upon the Evidence that the Defendant did entertain C. in his House and brought several Actions in his Name where nothing was due that he was therefore guilty of that Crime But if an Action be first brought and then profecuted by another he is no Barretor though there is no cause of Action The Defendant was found guilty DE Termino Paschae Anno 2 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1686. Coram Edwardo Herbert Mil ' Capital ' Justic
Sir Edward Herbert who was removed into the Common Pleas and made Chief Justice there and Sir Francis Wythens had his Quietus the Night before The same 21st day of April after this Removal the Souldier was brought again to the Barr and upon the Motion of Mr. Attorny was ordered by the new Chief Iustice to be executed at Plymouth which was done accordingly Wright Chief Justice Holloway Justices Powel Justices Allibon Justices Monday May 2d NOTA. A Writ of Error was brought upon a Iudgment given in this Court returnable in Parliament which was Prorogued from the 28th day of April to the 22d day of November following Sir George Treby moved that it might be discharged for it could not be a Supersedeas to this Execution because there was a whole Term which intervened between the Teste and Return of the Writ of Error viz. Trinity-Term On the other side it was said that the Proclamation was no Record it only shews the present Intention of the King which he may recal at any time But the Court made no Rule DE Term. Sanct. Trin. Anno 2 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1686. Wright Chief Justice Holloway Justices Powel Justices Allibon Justices Sawyer Attorny General Powis Sollicitor General The Company of Merchant Adventurers versus Rebow IN a special Action on the Case Whether the King hath a Prerogative to restrain Trade to a particular number of Men. the Plaintiffs declared that in the Reign of H. 4. there was a Society of Merchants Adventurers in England and that afterwards Queen Elizabeth did by her Letters Patents incorporate them by the Name of the Governour and Company of the Merchants Adventurers c. and gave them Priviledge to trade into Holland Zealand Flanders Brabant the Country belonging to the Duke of Lunenburgh and Hamburgh prohibiting all others not free of that Company by virtue whereof they did trade into those parts and had thereby great Priviledges and Advantages that the Defendant not being free of the said Company did trade into those Parts without their authority and imported Goods from thence into this Kingdom ad damnum c. The Defendant pleaded as to Hamburgh Not-guilty 15 E. 3. c. 3. and as to the other places he pleaded the Statute of Ed. 3. That the Seas shall be open to all Merchants to pass with their Merchandize whither they please The Plaintiff demurred and the Defendant joined in Demurrer This Case was now argued by Councel on both sides The Councel for the Plaintiff in their Arguments made these Points 1. What Power the King had by his Prerogative to restrain his Subjects from trading to particular places 2. Admitting he had such a Prerogative whether an Action on the Case will lie As to the first Point it was said Magna Charta cap. 30. 2 Inst 57. that all Trades must be under some Regulation and that the Subject hath not an absolute power to trade without the leave of the King for it is said in our Books Omnes Mercatores nisi publice prohibiti fuerint habeant salvum securum conductum which is meant of Merchant Strangers in Amity with us and nisi publice prohibiti must be by the King Now if Merchants Strangers may be prohibited from coming into England by the same reason the Kings Subjects may be restrained to go out of the Kingdom and for that purpose the Writ of Ne exeat Regnum was framed F. N. B. 85. 3 Inst 179. which is grounded upon the Common Law and not given by any particular Statute The Kings Prerogative in this and such like Cases is so much favoured by Law 1 Leon. 9. More 172. that he may by his Privy Seal command any of his Subjects to return out of a Foreign Nation or seize their Lands The first Statute which regulates Trade is 27 E. 3. cap. 1. that which confined the Staple to certain places that persons might not go about in Companies to trade without the King's Licence and from thence came Markets and if such were kept without the King 's Grant a Quo Warranto would lie against them who continued it and the People who frequented those Markets were punishable by Fine The Law is plain F. N. B. 125. 2 Roll. Abr. 140. that the King is sole Iudge of the place where Markets shall be kept for if he grant one to be kept in such a place which may not be convenient for the Country yet the Subjects can go to no other and if they do the Owner of the Soil where they meet is liable to an Action at the Suit of the Grantee of the Market A Custom to restrain a Man from the exercising of his Trade in a particular place hath been adjudged good Sir G. Farmer 's Case cired in 8 Co. 127. as to have a Bake-house in such a Mannor and that no other should use that Trade there And as a Man may be restrained by Custom so he may restrain himself from using of a Trade in a certain place 2 Cro. Brown versus Joliffe as if he promise upon a valuable consideration not to use the Trade of a Mercer in such a place And 't is very necessary that Trade should in some measure be restrained so as to be managed only by Freemen because 't is of more advantage to the King that it should be carried on by a Company especially in London who may manage it with Order and Government that is by some power to restrain particular persons from that Liberty which otherwise they would use and therefore such Companies have always power to make By Laws to regulate Trade which is the cheif End of their Incorporation And if such Corporations have power to judge and determine who are fit persons to exercise Trades within their Iurisdiction the King hath certainly a greater Prerogative to determine which of his Subjects are fit to trade to particular places exclusive from the Rest That the Governors of Corporations have taken upon them such Authority appears in Townsend's Case Sid. 107. who served an Apprentiship to a Taylor in Oxford and was refused by the Mayor to be made a Freeman of that City which shews that if a person be not qualified he may be excluded This is a very ancient Company for Cloth was first brought into this Realm in the Reign of Ed. 3. and was always under some Government My Lord Rolls quoting the Parliament Roll of H. 1 H. 5. no. 41. 2 Abr. Roll. 174. placit 39. 5. wherein the Commons pray that all Merchants might import or export their Goods to any place except such as were of the Staple paying the Customs takes notice that this Prayer was made against the Companies which prohibited such Trading This shews that even in those days Trade was under a Regulation King Ed. 34 E. 3. c. 18. 38 E. 3. c. 11. 3. gave Licence to all Merchants Denizens who were not Artificers to go into Gascoigne for Wines
to Sir Edward Biggs against the Countess as Administratrix of the Earl of Plymouth wherein the Plaintiff sets forth a Writing by which the Earl had given power to Sir Edward to be the Collector and Receiver of his Mony and Rents and that he promised to allow him 100 l. per Annum for his pains and in default of payment thereof that Sir Edward should detein the same which Writing was in these Words following viz. I do direct and appoint Sir Edward Biggs to take and receive to his own use 100 l. of lawful Mony of England out of the first Mony which he shall receive of mine The Action was brought for 75 l. being his Salary for three quarters of a year and Iudgment by Nil dicit It was argued this Term and in Easter Term by Councel on both sides It was agreed on all sides that the Earl left sufficient Assets to satisfie all his Bond Creditors but not enough to pay Debts upon simple Contract First it was said for the Plaintiff in the Errors that no Action of Debt will lie against an Executor upon a Mutuatus 11 Co. Godfreys Case because the Testator might have waged his Law but this was not much insisted on 2. That admitting an Action would lye yet this is an erronious Iudgment because the Suit was for 75 l. for three quarters Salary when by the Writing Sir Edward was to serve the Earl a whole year and this being an entire Contract shall not be seperated Therefore he cannot be well entituled to the Actionn unless his Testator had served a year and he had averred it so in his Declaration As where a Covenant was to pay 2 s. Yelv. 133. 7 Co. 10. Allen 9. for copying every Quire of Paper and the Breach assigned that he copyed 4 Quire and 3 sheets for which 8 s. and 3 d. was due to the Plaintiff 't is true he had Iudgment but it was reversed because it was an entire Covenant of which no apportionment could be made pro rata 3. That which was chiefly insisted on was to make these words amount to an Obligation that so it might be satisfied amongst the Bond Creditors But those who argued for the Plaintiff in the Errors said that it cannot be an Obligation for it was only a bare Letter of Attorney and an Authority and no more for there were no words to oblige the Earl or which can make a Warranty and therefore if the Mony was not received the Party to whom the Note was given could not resort back to him who made it had they been both living neither shall the Plaintiff now to his Administratrix Like the common Cases of the assigning of Iudgment if the Assignee doth not receive the Mony he cannot have an Action against the Assignor who only directs and appoints him so to do But on the other side Ex parte Def. the second Objection was thus answered viz. That this being only an Executory thing the Plaintiff may now bring an Action for so long time as his Testator served and this may be apportioned secundum ratam if the Law should be otherwise the Case of all Servants would be bad for they are generally hired for a year and not usually serve so long In an Assumpsit to pay for a years board Sid. 225. and the Plaintiff had declared only for three quarters of a year but yet had Iudgment because as the Book saith if there be any variance in the Agreement 't is for the advantage of the Defendant The 3d. Vaughan 92 93. Pl. Com. 182. Dyer 21. Objection answered viz. When a Man is indebted to another by simple Contract which is aknowledged by Deed an Action of Debt will lie against his Executor for any thing which is under Hand and Seal will amount to an Obligation especially where the Debt is confessed Now there are words in this Deed to shew that Mony was due and that makes it a Bond. But the Court was of Opinion that this was an entire Agreement and therefore the Action not well brought for three quarters Salary and for this reason the Iudgment was reversed Nisi c. Chapman versus Lamphire AN Action on the Case was brought for scandalous words spoken of the Plaintiff Words spoken of a Carpenter where actionable who declared that he was a Carpenter and a Freeman of the City of London and that he got great Sums of Mony by buying of Timber and Materials and by building of Houses and that the Defendant having discourse of him and of his Trade spoke these words viz. He is broken and run away and will never return again There was a Verdict for the Plaintiff and a Motion was now made in arrest of Iudgment for that a Carpenter was not a Trade within the Statute of Bankrupts and a day being given to speak to it again Mr. Pollexfen argued that before the Statutes made against Bankrupts words spoken reflecting upon a man in his Trade were actionable even at the Common Law because it might be the occasion of the loss of his Livelyhood 1 Rol. Abr. 59. pl. 6. Hutton 60. and therefore it was actionable to say of a Scrivener that he is broken and run away and dares not shew his Face and yet a Scrivener was not within the Statutes of Bankrupcy before the Act of 21 Jac. therefore the Action must lie at the Common Law because words disparage him in his Trade But the Councel for the Defendant said that these words were not actionable for they do not tend to his disparagement he may be broke and yet as good a Carpenter as before The Case of one Hill in 2 Car. Latch 114. in this Court was much stronger than this the words spoken of him were viz. Hill is a base broken Rascal and hath broken twice already and I will make him break the third time the Plaintiff had Iudgment but it was arrested A Carpenter builds upon the Credit of other men and so long as the words do not touch him in the skill and knowledge of his Profession they cannot injure him Chief Iustice The Credit which the Defendant hath in the World may be a means to support his skill for he may not have an opportunity to shew his Workmanship without those Materials for which he is entrusted The Iudges were divided in Opinion two against two and so the Plaintiff had his Iudgment there being no Rule made to stay it so that he had his Iudgment upon his general Rule for Iudgment but if it had been upon a Demurrer or Special Verdict then it would have been adjourned to the Exchequer Chamber Goring versus Deering IN an Appeal for the Murder of Henry Goring Esq Auterfoits convict of Manslaughter no good Plea in an Appeal for Murder brought by his Widow The Defendant pleaded that he was indicted for the said Murder at the Sessions-house in the Old Bayly in Middlesex that he was found guilty of Manslaughter
a new Recovery Debt will not lie F.N.B. 122. E. and to prove this there is and Authority in Fitzherbert where a Prior had Iudgment for an Annuity and brought a Scire Fac. upon that Iudgment against the Successor of the parson who was to pay it and obtained a Iudgment upon that Scire Fac. to recover the arrearages and afterwards brought an Action of Debt upon the last Iudgment and the Book says fuit maintein There is another Case in 2 Leon. 2 Leon. 14. 4 Leon. 186. 15 H. 7.16 where 't is held that an Action of Debt will lye upon a Iudgment in a Scire Facias upon a Recognizance Which Objections may receive this Answer First As to the Case in Fitzherbert 't is admitted to be Law but 't is not an Authority to be objected to this purpose because the first Iudgment for the Annuity charges the Successor but the Original Iudgment in this Case doth not charge the Husband so the Cases are not parallel The like answer may be given to the Case in Leonard for a Recognizance is a Iudgment in it self and Debt will lie upon it without a Sci. Fa. upon that Iudgment But on the other side it was argued E contra that the award of execution is absolute against Husband and Wife for 't is a Recovery against both whereas before it was only the Debt of the Wife but now 't is joynt against the one as well as the other The Iudgment upon the Sci. Fa. is a distinct Action It cannot be denied but that if a Woman be indebted and marrieth the Husband is chargable during the Coverture Bro. Ab. tit Baron and Feme pl. 27. 49 E. 3.35 b. which shews that by the Marriage he is become the principal Creditor As to the Sci. Fa. t is true at the Common Law if a Man had recovered in Debt and did not sue forth Execution within a year and a day he must then bring a new Original 1 H. 5. 5. a 43 Ed. 3.2 b. and the Iudgment thereon had been a new Recovery but now a Sci. Fa. is given by the Statute instead of an Original and therefore a Iudgment thereon shall also be a new Iudgment for tho' t is a Iudicial Writ yet 't is in the nature of an Action because the Defendant may plead any matter in Bar of the Execution upon the first Iudgment 1 Inst 290. b. and 't is for this reason that a Release of all Actions is a good bar to it Besides Rast Ent. 193. 4 Leon. 186. Dyer 214. b. an Action of Debt will lie upon a Iudgment on a Sci. Fa. which shews that 't is an Action distinct from the Original and upon such a Iudgment the Defendant may be comitted to Prison several years afterwards without a new Sci. Fa. The Husband may have execution of a Iudgment recovered by him and his Wife after the death of his Wife without a Sci. Fa. 1 Mod. Rep. 179. for the Iudgment hath made it a proper Debt due to him and he alone may bring an Action of Debt upon that Iudgment and it seems to be very reasonable that he should have the benefit of such a Iudgment and yet not be charged after the death of his Wife when there hath been a Recovery against both in her life-time This is like the Case where a Devastavit is returned against Husband and Wife as Executrix Moor 299. 3 Cro. 216. Cro. Car. 603. Sid. 337. and a Iudgment thereon quod querens habeat executionem de bonis propriis the Wife dies yet the Husband shall be charged for the Debt is altered If it should be otherwise this inconvenience would follow that if the Wife should die F.N.B. 121. c. 1 Rol. Abr. 351. 10 H. 6.11 the Husband will possess himself of her Estate and defraud the Creditors so that he takes her but not cum onere But the Law is otherwise for if a Feme being Lessee for years doth marry and the Rent is behind and she dies the Husband shall be charged with the Rent arrear because he is entituled to the Profits of the Land by his marriage To which it was answered that if a Man should marry an Exerecutrix and then he and his Wife are sued and Iudgment obtained against them to recover de bonis testatoris and thereupon a Fi. Fa. is awarded to levie the Debt and Damages and the Sheriff returns a Devastavit and then the Wife dies the Husband is not chargeable because the Iudgment is not properly against him who is joyned only for conformity but if upon the return of the Devastavit there had been an award of execution De bonis propriis that would have been a new Iudgment and the old one De bonis testatoris had been discharged 1 Roll. Abr. 351. and then the Husband must be charged for the new wrong Adjornatur Afterwards in 1 Will. Mar. the Iudgment was affirmed Bowyer versus Lenthal INdebitatus Assumpsit quantum meruit ad insimul computasset Valerent for Valebant good after Verdict The Plaintiff had a Iudgment by default in the Court of Common-Pleas and a Writ of Enquiry was brought and entire Damages given and now the Defendant brought a Writ of Error and it was argued that if any of the Promises be ill Iudgment shall be reversed the Error now assigned was in the second Promise Viz. That in consideration that the Plaintiff would let the Defendant have Meat Drink and Lodging he promised to pay so much Quantum rationabiliter valerent it should have been valebant at the time of the Promise made Sed non allocatur So the Iudgment was affirmed DE Termino Paschae Anno 4 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1688. Wright Chief Justice Holloway Justices Powel Justices Allibon Justices Powis Attorny General Wm. Williams Sollicitor General NOTA Wednesday May 2. being the first day of this Term Sir Bartholomew Shower Recorder of London was called within the Bar. Heyward versus Suppie IN an Action of Covenant which was to make such an Assignment to the Plaintiff Covenant to make an Assignment as Council should advise according to an Agreement made between him and the Defendant as Council should direct and advise and for non-performance thereof this Action was brought the Defendant pleaded non est factum and Iudgment was obtained against him Vpon which a Writ of Error was brought and the common Error assgned It was objected that the Plaintiffs Council should give the advice because he is the person interested This Objection was answered by Mr. Pollexfen who said that the Defendant had likewise an interest in this matter for 't is an advantage to him to make the Assignment that his Covenant might be saved 't is true it had been otherwise if the Covenant had been to make such a Conveyance as Council should advise for then the person to whom the Covenant is made may chuse whether he will have a Feoffment
an Inn-keeper or common Carrier 't is usual to declare secundum legem consuetudinem Angliae for 't is not a Custom confined to a particular place but 't is such which is extensive to all the King's People The word Consuetudo might have been added 1 Inst 182. but it imports no more than Lex for Custom it self is Law If the Custom of Merchants had been left out the Defendant had then pursued his Covenant for if a Man agrees to pay Mony to such a person or his Assigns and he appoints the payment to another a tender to that person is a good performance of the Covenant But the Court were of Opinion that this was not a good Plea Panton versus the Earl of Bath A Scire Facias to have Execution of a Iudgment obtained in the Court of Oliver late Protector of England and the Dominions and Territories thereunto belonging Where the Pleading is good in substance tho' there is a small variation it will not hurt and in reciting the Iudgment 't is said that it was obtained before Oliver Protector of England and the Dominions thereunto belonging leaving out the word Territories And upon a Demurrer Mr. Pollexfen held this to be a variance Yelv. 212. Orde versus Moreton and like the Case where a Writ of Error was brought to remove a Record in Ejectment directed to the Bishop of Durham setting forth that the Action was between such Parties and brought before the said Bishop and seven other persons naming them and the Record removed was an Ejectment before the Bishop and eight others so that it could not be the same Record which was intended to be removed by the Writ E contra E contra It was said suppose the word Scotland should be left out of the King's Title would that be a variance The Iudicature in this Case is still the same and the Pleading is good in Substance and of that Opinion was the whole Court Hyley versus Hyley HYley had Issue W. Where the Reversion in Fee shall pass in a Will by the words viz. Remaining part of my Estate his eldest Son who had Issue Peter Charles John He by Will devised 1000 l. to his eldest Son and several parcels of Land to other Legatees Then he gave to Peter Lands in Tail Male To John a Mansion House now in question in Tail Male He devised another House to his Grandson Charles in like manner And all the rest and remaining part of his Estate he devised to his three Grandsons equally to be divided amongst them that only excepted which he had given to Peter Charles and John and to the Heirs of their Bodies whom he made Executors Then by another Clause he devised viz. That if either of his Executors die without Issue then the part or parts of him so dying shall go to the Survivor or Survivors equally to be divided John the youngest Grandson dyed without Issue and the question was whether the Reversion of his House shall be divided between his surviving Brothers or descend to his Heir And it was adjudged that the Exception in the Will did comprehend the Reversion in Fee and that it did not pass but without such an Exception it had passed * Allen 28. as where a Man devised his Mannor to another for years and part of other Lands to B. and his Heirs and all the rest of his Lands to his Brother in Tail it was held that by these words the Reversion of the Mannor did pass Anonymus NOTA. An Infant having entred into a Statute brought an Audita Querela to avoid it he was brought into the Court and two Witnesses were sworn to prove his Age and then his Appearance and Inspection were recorded he was bound in this Case with two other persons for 1600 l. and had no more than 200 l. for his share Lydcott versus Willows IN Ejectment A special Verdict was found viz. Devise of an Hereditament carries the Reversion in Fee that the Testator being seized in Fee of certain Houses in Bedfor-Bury and in Parker's Lane did by Will devise his Houses in Parker's Lane to charitable Vses then he gave several specifick Legacies to several persons named in the said Will and then he devised his Houses in Bedford-Bury to Edward Harris and Mary his Wife for their Lives then follow these words viz. The better to enable my Wife to pay my Legacies I give and bequeath to her and her Heirs all my Mesuages Lands Tenements and Hereditaments in the Kingdom of England not before disposed of c. The Question was whether this Devise would carry the Reversion of the Houses in Bedford-Bury to his Wife Adjudged that it did not but that it ought to go to the Heir of the Testator who was Plaintiff in this Case It being found that Harris and his Wife were dead and that the Wife who was Executrix had sufficient Assets to pay the Legacies without the Reversion But Iustice Powel was of another Opinion for that the word Hereditament imports an Inheritance and if it had devised thus viz. the Inheritance not before disposed of the Reversion had passed Afterwards a Writ of Error was brought in the Exchequer-Chamber upon this Iudgment 2 Vent 285. and according to the Opinion of Iustice Powel the Iudgment was reversed Nota. A Rule of Court was made that no Certiorari should go to the Sessions of Ely without Motion in Court or signing of it by a Iudge in his Chamber But Mr. Pollexfen insisted that the Sessions there did not differ from other Courts and Franchises for the inferior Courts in London are of as large a Iurisdiction as any and yet a Certiorari goes to them and so it ought to go to Ely for 't is the Right of the Subject to remove his Cause hither Their course in the Royal Franchise of Ely is to hold the Sessions there twice a year viz. in March and September in which two Months the Iudges are seldom in Town and if this Court should deny a Certiorari the Court of Common Pleas would grant it Attorney General contra This Franchise of Ely is of greater Priviledge and Authority than any inferior Court for it hath many Regalia though 't is not a County Palatine A Certiorari will not lie to the Grand Sessions nor to a County Palatine to remove Civil Causes 't is true it lyeth to remove Indictments for Riots and this Franchise being truly called Royal hath equal priviledge with a County Palatine and therefore a Certiorari will not lie But no Rule was made Osborn versus Steward TRespass Distress for an Heriot where it may be taken The Case upon the Pleadings was this viz. A Lease was made of Land for 99 years if Margery and Dorothy Upton should so long live reserving a yearly Rent and an Heriot or 40 s. in lieu thereof after the death of either of them Provided that no Heriot shall be paid after the death of Margery living
on the 29th day of April seize the Goods of the said Toplady that after the seizure and before any Venditioni exponas viz. 4 Maij an Extent which is a Prerogative Writ issued out of the Exchequer against two persons who were indebted to the King and by inquisition this Toplady was found to be indebted to them whereupon parcel of the Goods in the Declaration was seized by the Sheriffs upon the said Extent and sold and the Mony paid to the Creditors but before the said Sale or any execution of the Exchequer Process a Commission of Bankrupcy was had against Toplady and that the Commissioners on the second of June assigned the Goods to the Plaintiff The Question was whether this Extent did not come too late And it was held it did or whether the Fi. Fa. was well executed so that the Assignees of the Bankrupts Estate could not have a Title to those Goods which were taken before in Execution and so in Custodia Legis And it was held that they had no Title Fitzgerald versus Villiers WRIE of Error upon a Iudgment in Dower Infant must appear by Guardian and the Error assigned was that the Tenant in Dower was an Infant and no Warrant was alledged of the admission of any Guardian 29 Assise pl. 67. Bridg. 74. Lib. Entr. 45. Hut 92. 4 Co. 53. Lit. 92. Hetl. 52. 3 Cro. 158. Moor 434. Hob. 5. that it might appear to be the act of the Court 't is true an Infant may sue by Prochein Amy but shall not appear by Attorny but by Guardian because 't is intended by Law that he hath not sufficient discretion to chuse an Attorny therefore 't is provided that he appear per Guardianum which is done by the Court who are always careful of Infancy and a special Entry is made upon the Roll. Viz. Per Guardianum ad hoc per Curiam admissum c. 2. The Appearance is by the Guardian in his own Name Viz. Et praedicta Katherina Fitzgerald per Richardum Power Guardianum suum venit dicit quod ipse c. it should have been in the name of the Party quod ipsa c. Adjurnatur Harrison versus Austin A Settlement was made as followeth Viz. What words amount to a Covenant to stand seised That if I have no Issue and in case I dye without Issue of my Body lawfully begotten then I give grant and confirm my Land c. to my Kinswoman Sarah Stokes to have and to hold the same to the use of my self for Life and after my decease to the use of the said Sarah and the Heirs of her Body to be begotten with Remainders over c. The Question was whether this did amount to a Covenant to stand seised so as to raise an use to Sarah without transmutation of the possession The Objection against it was Sid. 26. Moor 687. Dyer 96. 2 Roll. Abr. 786. Winch 59. Plowd 300. that Vses are created chiefly by the intention of the Parties and that by these words grant and confirm the Feoffor did intend the Land should pass at Common Law so it could not be a Covenant to stand seised 't is like the Case where a Letter of Attorny is in the Deed or a Covenant to make Livery there nothing shall pass by way of use but the possession according to the course of the Common Law and therefore there being neither Livery and Seisin or Attornment no use will pass to Sarah It cannot be a Bargain and Sale for that is only where a Recompence is on each side to make the Contract good besides 2 Inst 672. the Deed is not inrolled To this it was answered 1 Vent 137. that it shall be construed to be a Covenant to stand seised though the formal words are wanting to make it so and for that purpose it was compared to Fox 's Case 8 Co. 93. who being seised in Fee devised his Land to C. for Life remainder over for Life reserving a Rent and afterwards by Indenture in consideration of Mony did demise grant and set the same Lands to D. for 99 years reserving a Rent the Lessee for Life did not attorn in which Case there was not one word of any use or any attornment to make it pass by Grant and the Question was whether this Lease for years shall amount to a Bargain and Sale so that the Reversion together with the Rent shall pass to the Lessee without Attornment Hob. 277. and it was held that by construction of Law it did amount to a Bargain and Sale for the words import as much And in this Case it was adjudged that it was a Covenant to stand seised Hexham versus Coniers IN Ejectment the Plaintiff declared de uno Messuagio sive Tenemento An Ejectment will lye for a Tenement and had a Verdict but Iudgment was arrested because an Ejectment will not lye of a Tenement for 't is a word of an uncertain signification it may be an Advowson House or Land but it is good in Dower so is Messuagium sive Tenementum vocat ' the Black Swan for this addition makes it certain that the Tenement intended is a House Rex versus Bunny A Motion was made for a Melius inquirendum to be directed to a Coroner who had returned his Inquisition upon the death of Bunny that he was not compos mentis when in truth he was Felo de se But it was opposed by Serjeant Pemberton and Mr. Pollexfen who said that the Law gives great credit to the Inquest of a Coroner and that a Melius inquirendum is seldom or never granted tho' it appear to the Court upon Affidavits that the Party had his Senses Mod. Rep. 82. It hath been granted where any fault is in the Coroner or any incertainty in the Inquisition returned That there is such a Writ it cannot be denied Cro. Eliz. 371. but 't is generally granted upon Offices or Tenures and directed to the Sheriff 3 Keb. 800. but never to a Coroner in the case of a Felo de se who makes his Enquiry super visum Corporis DE Term. Sancti Mich. Anno 4 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1688. In Trinity-Vacation last Mr. Justice Holloway and Mr. Justice Thomas Powell had their Quietus and Mr. Serjeant Baldock and Mr. Serjeant Stringer were made Justices of this Court And Mr. Justice Allibon who was a Roman Catholick died in the same Vacation and Sir John Powell one of the Barons of the Exchequer was made a Justice of this Court Sir Thomas Jennor another of the Barons of the Exchequer was made a Justice of the Common-Pleas and Mr. Serjeant Rotheram and Mr. Serjeant Ingoldby were made Barons of the Exchequer Wright Chief Justice Powel Justices Baldock Justices Stringer Justices Shuttleworth versus Garnet Intratur Trin. 1 Willielmi Mariae Rotulo 965. THE Defendant was Tenant of Customary Lands held of the Manor of A. of which Manor B. was Lord
ought to be left out and of that Opinion was the Court and therefore a Rule was made that he might discontinue this Action without Costs Mordant versus Thorold Hill 1 2 Gulielmi Rotulo 340. THE Plaintiff brought a Scire Fac. upon a Iudgment The Case was thus Viz. Ann Thorold recovered in Dower against Sir John Thorold in which Action Damages are given by the Statute of Merton 20 H. 3. c. 1. Sir John Thorold brought a Writ of Error in B. R. and the Iudgment was affirmed Then the Plaintiff in Dower brought a Writ of Enquiry for the Damages and married Mr. Mordant and died before that Writ was executed Mr. Mordant takes out Letters of Administration to his Wife and brought a Sci. Fa. upon the Iudgment and the question was whether it would lie This depended upon the construction of the Statute of King Charles the II. which enacts That in all personal Actions 17 Car. 2. c. 8. and real and mixt the death of either party between the Verdict and the Iudgment shall not hereafter be alledged for Error so as such Iudgment be entred within two Terms after such Verdict Serjeant Pemberton insisted that this was a judicial Writ and that the Administrator had a right to it though the Wife died before the Profits were ascertained by the Writ of Enquiry 't is no more than a plain Sci. Fa. upon a Iudgment which an Executor may have and which was never yet denied though this seems to be a Case of the first Impression The Council on the other side argued that 't is true an Executor may have a Scire Facias upon a Iudgment recovered in the life of the Testator by reason only of such Recovery but this Scire Facias is brought for what never was recovered because the Wife died before any thing was vested in her for the Iudgment will stand so as to effect the Lands but not for the Damages Curia When a Statute which gives a remedy for mean Profits is expounded it ought to be according to the Common Law Now where entire Damages are to be recovered and the Demandant dies before a Writ of Enquiry executed the Executor cannot have any remedy by a Scire Facias upon that Iudgment because Damages are no duty till they are assessed Sed adjornatur DE Term. Sanctae Trin. Anno 2 Gulielmi Mariae Regis Reginae in Banco Regis 1690. Shotter versus Friend Vxor ' Hill 2 Willielmi Rot. 39. THE Plaintiff and his Wife declared upon a Prohibition setting forth Proof by one Witness good in the Spiritual Court that John Friend on the 13th of October 22 Car. 2. made his Will by which he bequeathed to Mary Friend 10 l. to be paid to her within two years after his decease and that he made Jane the Wife of the Plaintiff Shotter Executrix and dyed that the said Executrix whilst sole and unmarried paid the said Legacy to Mary Friend who is since dead that Thomas Friend the Husband of the said Mary did after her death demand this Legacy in the Consistory Court of the Bishop of Winton that the Plaintiff pleaded payment and offered to prove it by one single Witness which Proof that Court refused though the Witness was a person without Exception and thereupon Sentence was given there against the Plaintiff which Sentence was now pleaded and upon Demurrer to the Plea The Question was whether upon the whole matter the Defendant should have a Consultation or whether a Prohibition should be granted because the proof by one Witness was denied by that Court. It was argued that the Defendant should not have a Consultation because Matters Testamentary ought to have no more favour than things relating to Tythes in which Cases the Proof by one Witness hath been always held good So 't is in a Release to discharge a Debt which is well proved by a single Testimony and it would be very inconvenient if it should be otherwise for Feoffments and Leases may come in question which must not be rejected because proved by one Witness A Modus decimandi comes up to this Case upon the Suggestion whereof Prohibitions are never denied and the chief reason is because the Spiritual Court will not allow a Modus to be any discharge of Tythes of Kind The Courts of Equity in Westminster-Hall give Relief upon a Proof by one Witness so likewise do the Courts of the Common Law if the Witness is a good and credible person 'T is true a Prohibition shall not go upon a Suggestion that the Ecclesiastical Court will not receive the Testimony of a single Witness If the Question is upon Proof of a Legacy devised or Marriage or not or any other thing which originally doth lie in the Cognizance of that Court but payment or not payment is a matter of Fact triable at the Law and not determinable there if therefore they deny to take the Evidence of a single Witness a Prohibition ought to go 2 Inst 608. 2. The Sentence is no obstacle in this Case because the Plaintiff had no Right to a Prohibition until the Testimony of his Witness was denied and Sentence thereupon given and this is agreeable to what hath been often done in cases of like nature As for instance Cro. Eliz. 88. Moor 907. Prohibitions have been granted where the Proof of a Release of a Legacy by one Witness was denyed So where the Proof of payment of Cythes for Pidgeons was denied upon the like Testimony Cro. Eliz. 666. Moor 413. 2 Rol. Rep. 439. 2 Rol Abr. 300. pl. 9. 299 pl. 14 17. Yelv. 92. Latch 117. 3 Bulst 242. Hutt 22. So where a Suit was for Subtraction of Cythes and the Defendant pleaded that he set them out and offered to prove it by by one Witness but was denied a Prohibition was granted And generally the Books are that if the Spiritual Court refuse such Proof which is allowed at the Common Law they shall be prohibited There is one Case against this Opinion which is that of Roberts in 12 Co. 12 Co. 65. Rep. but it was only a bare Surmise and of little Authority Those who argued on the other side held that a Consultation shall go E contra and that for two Reasons 1. Because a Prohibition is prayed after Sentence 2. Because the Ecclesiastical Court have an original Iurisdiction over all Testamentary things As to the first Point 'T is plain that if that Court proceed contrary to those Rules which are used and practised at the Common Law yet no Prohibition ought to go after Sentence but the proper remedy is an Appeal 2. It cannot be denied but that that Court had Cognizance of the principal matter in this Case which was a Legacy and Payment or not is a thing collateral Now wherever they have a proper Iurisdiction of a Cause both that and all its dependences shall be tried according to their Law which rejects the Proof by a single Witness
3 Willielmi Judicium Iudgment was given for the Defendant absente Dolbin Iustice who was also of the same Opinion It was held that the Custom was well alledged both as to the manner and matter 't is true all Customs must have reasonable beginnings but it would be very difficult to assign a lawful commencement for such a Custom as this is so it would be for the Custom of Gavelkind or Burrough English which are circumscribed to particular places and since 't is sufficient to alledge a Custom by reason of the place where t is used it may be as reasonable in this Case to say that there hath been an ancient Ferry-Boat kept in this place 't is but only an inducement to the Custom which did not consist so much in having a Right to the Passage as to be discharged of Toll This might have a lawful beginning either by a Grant of the Lord to the Ancestors of the Defendant or by the agreement of the Inhabitants A Custom alledged for all the Occupiers of a Close in such a Parish to have a Foot-way Cro. Car. 419. Co. Lit. 110. b. Cro. Eliz. 746. 1 Roll. Rep. 216. c. is not good the reason is because the Plaintiff ought to prescribe in him who hath the Inheritance but where a thing is of necessity and no manner of profit or charge in the Soil of another but only a thing in discharge or for a Way to a Market or to be quit of Toll in such cases not only a particular person but the Inhabitaints of a Vill may alledge a Prescription This may be as well alledged as a Custom to turn a Plow upon another mans Land or for a Fisherman to mend his Nets there 'T is good as to the matter for 't is only an easment 't is like a Custom alledged for a Gateway or Watercourse and for such things Inhabitants of a Vill Cro. Eliz. 441. or all the Parishioners of a Parish may alledge a Custom or Vsage in the place 2. Point But as to the Plea in Bar 't is not good because the execting of a Bridge is but laying out a Way t is a voluntary act and no man by reason of his own act can be discharged of what he is to do upon the interest he hath in the Ferry If the Defendant had petitioned the King to destroy the Ferry and got a Patent to erect a Bridge and had brought a Writ ad quod dampnum and it had been found by inquisition to be no damage to the People then he might safely have built this Bridge 3. But notwithstanding the Plea is not good yet the Plaintiff can have no advantage of it because he cannot have an Action on the Case for this matter for by his own shewing 't is a common Passage Cro. Car. 132 167. 1 Inst 56. a. Cro. Eliz. 664. 13 Co. 33. Davis 57. which is no more than a common High-way now for disturbing him in such a Passage no Action on the Case will lie unless he had alledged some particular damage done to himself for if he could maintain such an Action any other person is entituled to the like and this would be to multiply Suits which the Law will not allow but hath provided a more apt and convenient remedy which is by presentment in the Leet If Toll had been extorted from him F. N. B. 94. 22 H. 6.12 then an Action on the Case had been the proper remedy but no such thing appeared upon this Declaration Prince 's Case THE Suggestion in a Prohibition was that Prince was seized of the Rectory of Shrewsby ut de feodo jure and that he being so seised de jure ought to present a Vicar to the said place but that the Bishop of the Diocess had of his own accord appointed a person thereunto This Exception was taken to it viz. He doth not say that he was Impropriator but only that he was seised of the Rectory in Fee so it not appearing that he had it Impropriate he ought no to present the Vicar Iustice Dolben replied That in several places in Middlesex the Abbots of Westminster did send Monks to say Mass and so the Vicaridges were not endowed but he put in and displaced whom he pleased That he had heard my Lord Chief Iustice Hales often say that the Abbot had as much reason to displace such Men as he had his Butler or other Servant Curia Declare upon the Prohibition and try the Cause Harrison versus Hayward Pasch 2 Gulielmi Rot. 187. AN Agreement was made to assign a Stock upon Request When a thing is to be done upon request the performance must be when the person requires it and the Defendant cannot plead that he was ready to assign after the promise made and for non-performance an Action was now brought setting forth the Agreement and that the Plaintiff did request the Defendant at such a time c. The Defendant pleaded that he was ready to assign the Stock after the promise made c. and upon a Demurrer it was ruled if the thing was not to be done upon Request then the Defendant was bound to do it in a convenient time after the promise but it being to be done upon request the time when the Plaintiff will require the performance of the Agreement is the time when the Defendant must do it Iudgment pro Quer. Thompson versus Leach WRit of Error upon a Iudgment in Ejectment given in the Common-Pleas Surrender not good without acceptance of the Surrendree 2 Vent 198. the Case upon the special Verdict was thus Viz. Simon Leach was Tenant for Life of the Lands in question with Remainder in contingency to his first second and third Son in Tail Male Remainder to Sir Simon Leach in Tail c. This Settlement was made by the Will of Nicholas Leach who was seised in Fee The Tenant for Life two months before he had a Son born did in the absence of Sir Simon Leach the Remainder man in Tail seal and deliver a Writing by which he did Grant Surrender and Release the Lands which he had for Life to the use of Sir Simon Leach and his Heirs and continued in possession five years afterwards and then and not before Sir Simon Leach did accept and agree to this Surrender and entred upon the Premisses But that about four years before he thus agreed to it Simon Leach the Tenant for Life had a Son born named Charles Lessor of the Plaintiff to whom the Remainder in contingency was thus limited The Tenant for Life died then Sir Simon Leach suffered a Common Recovery in order to bar those Remainders 1. The Question was whether this was a legal and good Surrender of the Premisses to vest the Freehold immediately in Sir Simon Leach without his Assent before Charles Leach the Son of Simon Leach the Surrenderor was born so as to make him a good Tenant to the Precipe upon which the Recovery was
afterwards suffered If so then the contingent Remainders to the first and other Sons is destroyed 2. If the Estate was not vested in the Surrendree till his actual assent such assent shall not relate though after the execution of the Deed so as to pass the Estate at the very time it was sealed and delivered Iudgment being given in the Common-Pleas by the Opinion of three Iustices against Iustice Ventris that the contingent Remainder was not destroied by this Surrender because it was not good without the acceptance and till the actual assent of the Surrendree this Writ of Error was now brought upon that Iudgment This Case depended several Terms and those who argued to maintain the Iudgment insisted that here was neither a mutual agreement between the Parties or acceptance or entry of the Surrendree which must be in every Surrender these being solemn acts in such Cases required to the alteration of Possessions and to prevent Frauds That the Law hath a greater regard to the transmutation of Possessions than to the alteration of Personal things and therefore more Ceremonies are made requisite to that than to transfer a Chattel from one to another In all Feoffments there must be Livery and Seisin Quaere For if Tenant for Life surrender to him in Reversion the Surrendree hath a Freehold in Law before Entry Co. Lit. 266. b. 1 Inst 266. b. so in Partitions and in Exchanges which are Conveyances at the Common Law no Estate is changed until an actual Entry though in the Deed it self such Entry is fully expressed Here the Surrendree is a Purchaser of the Estate and yet did not know any thing of it than which nothing can be more absurd 'T is admitted that every Gift and Grant enures to the benefit of the Donee and Grantee but not where the assent of the Parties is required to compleat the act Assent and Dis-assent are acts of the Mind now 't is impertinent to say that a Man gave his Assent to a thing which he never heard A Lease for years is not good without Entry nor a Surrender without Acceptance Lane 4. 3 Cro. 43. 'T is no new thing to compare a Surrender to a resignation of a Benefice 2 Cro. 198. Dyer 294. Br. Abr. tit Bar 81. Yelv. 61. Sid. 387. now if an Incumbent should resign to the Ordinary and the Patron should afterwards present to that Living such presentation is void if the Ordinary had not accepted the resignation the reason is because a resignation doth not pass the Freehold to the Bishop but puts it only in Abeyance till his acceptance and 't is not an Objection to say that this is grounded upon an Ecclesiastical Right and not at the Common Law or that a Formedon will not lie of a Rectory for tho' 't is of Ecclesiastical Right yet 't is of Temporal Cognizance and shall be tried at Law The president in Rastal may be objected where the surviving Lessee for years brought an Action of Covenant against the Lessor for disturbing of him in his possession Rast Ent. tit Covenant 136. b. Owen 97. Dyer 28. Rast Enttit Debt 183 176. b. 177. a. Br. Sur. 39. Cro. Car. 101. Fitz. Abr. tit Bar 262. Co. Ent. 335. and the Lessor pleaded a Surrender to himself without an acceptance but the Plaintiff in that Case said nothing of a Surrender In the same Book a Surrender was pleaded ad quam quidem sursum redditionem the Plaintiff agreavit so in Fitzherbert 's Abridgment issue was joyned upon the acceptance which shews 't is a material point No inconvenience can be objected that an Assent is made a Legal Ceremony to a Surrender for 't is not inconvenient even in the Case of an Infant who by reason of his non-age is not capable to take such a Conveyance because he cannot give his assent but he may take the Land by way of Feoffment or Grant or any Conveyance of like nature without his Assent By the very definition of a Surrender Co. Lit. 337. b. Bro. tit Surrender pl. 45. Dyer 110. b. Fitz. 39. it plainly appears that there must be an assent to it for 't is nothing else but a yielding up of an Estate to him who hath the immediate Reversion or Remainder wherein the Estate for Life or Years may drown by mutual Agreement between the Parties 'T is true an Agreement is not necessary in Devises nor in any other Conveyances which are directed by particular Statutes or by Custom but 't is absolutely necessary in a Surrender which is a Conveyance at the Common Law 't is such an essential Circumstance that the Deed it self is void without it 't is as necessary as an Attornment to the Grant of a Reversion or an Entry to a Deed of Exchange which are both likewise Conveyances at the Common Law There are various Circumstances in the Books which declare what acts shall amount to an Acceptance or Agreement Cro. Eliz. 488. Owen 97. 31 Ass pl. 26. but it was never yet doubted but that an acceptance was necessary to a Surrender So in the Entries Fitz. tit Debt 149. 9 E 3.7 b. contra Rast Ent. 136. a Surrender is sometimes pleaded without an Acceptance but 't is always that the Surrendree by vertue of the Surrender expulit ejecit the Plaintiff which amounts to an Agreement The Law is so careful in these Conveyances Kelwway 194 195. Dyer 358. pl. 48. that it will not presume an assent without some act done if therefore a Deed cannot operate as a Surrender without an acceptance then in this Case no such shall be presumed because the Iury have found it expresly otherwise then by the birth of Charles Leach the contingent Remainder is vested in him which arising before the Assent of the Surrendree makes such assent afterwards void for there can be no intermediate Estate Besides if an Assent should not be necessary to a Surrender this inconvenience would follow viz. if a Purchaser should take in several Mortgages and Extents and keep them all on foot in a third persons name which is usual to prevent mean incumbrances and the Mortgagor should afterwards Surrender his Estate without the assent of the Purchaser if this should be held a good Conveyance in Law it would be of very mischievous consequence 2. If the Estate is not immediately transferred to the Surrendree at the sealing of the Deed without the assent of the Surrenderor it shall not pass afterwards when he gives his consent and that by way of Relation for if that should be allowed then the Surrenderor might have kept the Deed in his Pocket as well fifty as five years after the execution thereof which would be so prejudicial that no Man could be assured of his Title 'T is true when a Bargain and Sale is made of Land 2 Inst 675. 3 Co. 36. such a day c. and two days afterwards the Bargainor enters into a Recognizance then the Deed is inrolled within
Remainder during her Life 84 2. There must be proof of the Stealing an Heiress either by slight or force to bring the person within the Statute of Phil. Mar. 169 3. There must be a continued disassent of the Parent or Guardian for if she once agree 't is an assent within the Statute though she or they disagree afterwards 169 4. Marriage de facto is triable in the Temporal Courts but de Jure in the Spiritual Court only 165 Mandamus Denied to restore a person to a Fellowship of a College 265 2. Denied to restore a Proctor to his Office in Doctors Commons 332 3. It hath been granted to restore an Attorny 333 4. It will not lye to restore a Steward of a Court-Baron 334 Master and Servant See Robbery 2. Where the Act of the Servant shall charge the Master 323 2. Where the Master may have an Action for a Robbery done upon the Servant 287 Melius Inquirendum Not granted but for a Misdemeanour in the Jury 80 2. It never helps a defective Inquisition 336 3. Whether it may be granted to a Coroner in the Case of a Felo de se who makes his Enquiry super visum corporis 238 Merchants See Custom Pleas and Pleading Misfeazance Not Guilty is a good Plea to any Misfeazance whatsoever 324 Misprision of Clerk See Amendment Mistrial 'T is not a Mistrial where the day and place of the Assises is left out of the Distringas for the Jurata is the Warrant to try the Cause 78 Mortuary 'T is not due but by particular Custom of the Place 268 Monopoly The Definition of it 131 N. Ne exeat Regum IS a Writ grounded upon the Common Law and not given by any particular Statute 127 2. It was brought to prevent a person who had married an Heiress without her Parents consent to go beyond Sea 169 Nolle prosequi Whether it may be entred after the Jury is sworn 117 Non compos Mentis If he releaseth his Right that shall not bar the King but he shall seize his Lands during Life 303 2. Surrender made by him is void 305 3. He may purchase Lands and may grant a Rent-Charge out of his Estate and shall not plead Insanity to avoid his own Acts 309 Notice See Executor 115. A Settlement was made in Trust for A. provided she married with the consent of Trustees Remainder to B. she married without consent Whether the Trustees ought not to give notice of this Settlement before the Marriage or whether the Estate is forfeited without notice 29 30 2. Where Conditions are annexed to Estates to pay Mony notice is necessary but where Estates are limitted upon performance of collateral acts 't is not necessary 30 3. Lapse shall not incur upon a Deprivation but after notice given to the Patron by the Ordinary himself 31 4. The Heir himself ought to have notice of such Conditions which his Ancestor hath put upon his Estate because he hath a good title by descent 34 5. Where it ought to be given of Debts to an Executor 115 Number Where the singular number shall be intended by the plural as by Children is meant Child 63 O. Obligation Obligor and Obligee DEbt upon Bond will not lie before the day of payment is past but it may be released before 61 2. Where the Debt is confessed under and Hand Seal whether that will amount to an Obligation 154 Office and Officer Whether the Office of Marshal of B.R. can be granted in Trust 145 2. It cannot be granted for years ibid. 3. Non-Attendance whether a Forfeiture or not 146 4. Non-Feazance is a Forfeiture ibid. 5. It lies in Grant and cannot be transferred without Deed 147 6. Neither a Judicial or a Ministerial Officer may make a Deputy unless there is an express Clause in the Grant that it may be executed per se vel Deputatum 147 150 7. Marshal of B. R. may grant that Office for Life but cannot give the Grantee power to make a Deputy 147 8. That Office may be granted at will 149 9. Deputy may be made without Deed 150 Ordinary Probate of Wills did not originally belong to him 24 2. He had no power at Common Law over the Intestate's Estate 25 3. An Action lay against him at Common Law if he got the Goods and refused to pay the Intestate's Debts 25 4. Was alone entrusted by the Common Law as to the distribution of the Intestates Estate 59 5. Afterwards by the Statute of W. 2. was bound to pay Debts so far as he had Assets 60 6. Then and not before an Action of Debt might be brought against him if he did dispose the Goods without paying Debts ibid. 7. By the Statute of the 31st of Ed. I. he was bound to grant Administration to the next of Kin ibid. 8. Afterwards by the Statute of 21 H. 8. was compelled to grant it to the Widow or next of Kin or both ibid. 9. Before the Statute of Distributions he always took Bond of the Administrator to distribute as the Ordinary should direct ibid. Outlary See 5 Ed. 6. For Treason cannot be reversed without the Consent of the Attorney-General 42 2. For Treason the Party was taken within the year but because he was apprehended and did not render himself he had not the benefit of the Statute 47 3. For Treason and a Rule of Court for the Execution of the person 72 4. For Murder against three persons it was reversed because it did not appear that the Court was held pro Comitatu 2dly 't is said Non comperuit but doth not say nee eorum aliquis comperuit 90 P. Pardon THE King hath power to pardon by general words as felonica interfectio for Murder 37 2. Where his Power is restrained by Act of Parliament yet a Non obstante is a Dispensation to it 38 3. A Suit was commenced for Dilapidations which is to have satisfaction for Damages sustained 't is not pardoned by these general words viz. Offences Contempts and Penalties 56 4 If an Interest is vested in the King a Pardon of all Forfeitures will not divest it without particular words of Restitution 101 241 242 5. An Exception in a Pardon ought to be taken as largely as the Pardon it self 242 6. A Pardon of all Offences except Offences in collecting of the King's Revenue that must be of the stated Revenue and not what arises by any Forfeiture ibid. Parish See Indictment Parliament Writ of Error upon a Judgment in B. R. returnable in Parliament Prorogued from the 28th of April to the 29th of November whether this was a Supersedeas to the Execution because a whole Term intervened between the Teste and Return of the Writ of Error 125 Pedegree Where persons are named by way of Title and where by way of Pedegree 255 Perjury See Information Pleading In pleading of the Statute of Usury you must set forth what Agreement was made and what Sum was taken more than six pound in the Hundred 35 2.
it self 81 83 2. The Testator had two Sons and four Daughters he devised a House to his eldest Son and if he die then he devised his Estate to his four Daughters and if all his Sons and Daughters died without Issue then to A. and her Heirs this is not an Estate Tail in the Daughters by Implication 105 3. Where a Devise is to several persons by express Limitation and a Proviso if all die without Issue of their Bodies the Remainder over this is no cross Remainder or an Estate by Implication because 't is a Devise to them severally by express Limitations 106 4. Devise to his eldest Son and if he die without Heirs Males but doth not say of his Body then to his other Son c. 't is an Estate Tail in the eldest 123 Tenant in Common A Devise to hold by equal parts makes a Tenancy in Common so that there can be no Survivorship in such case 210 Tenant at Will Cestuy que Trust by Deed is Tenant at Will to the Trustees 149 2. Where a Grant by Tenant at Will though void amounts to a determination of his Will 150 3. Whether Tenant at Will can grant over his Estate ibid. 4. What Act shall amount to the determination of his Will ibid. 5. Any thing is sufficient to make an Estate at Will 196 6. Tenant in Fee made a Lease for 100 years in Trust to attend the Inheritance and continued still in Possession he is Tenant at Will to the Lessee for 100 years and if he make any Lease and levy a Fine Sur Cognizance c. the first Lease is displaced and turned to a Right and the Fine barrs it 196 Trade See Grants 2. Prerogative 3 5. Indictment 12. Information 7. Confinement of Staple to certain places was the first regulation of Trade and from thence came Markets 127 2. The King is sole Judge where Fairs or Markets ought to be kept ibid. 3. Custom to restrain a Man from using of a Trade in a particular place is good 128 4. A Man may restrain himself by Promise or Obligation not to use a Trade in a particular place ibid. 5. Regulation of Trade is the chief end of Incorporations ibid. 6. Such incorporate Bodies have an inherent power to judge what persons are fit to use Trades within their Jurisdictions ibid. 7. Whether Grants of the King prohibiting Trade are void 131 8. Cannot be restrained by any By-Law 159 9. At the Common Law any Man might exercise any Trade he please 312 10. Petty-Chapmen are not within the Statute of 5 Eliz. 315 11. Journymen who work for hire are not within the Statute but the Master who sets them to work and pays their Wages is punishable 316 317 12. Subject hath not power absolutely to trade without the King's Licence 127 Travers See Ieofails 3. Presentment Replication Cannot be to a Return of a Writ of Restitution 6 2. He who traverseth the King's Title must shew a Title in himself 146 3. After a Travers 't is not good pleading to conclude to the Country 203 4. Not concluding with a Travers is but matter of form 't is aided by the Statute of Ieofails upon a Demurrer 319 5. Want of a Travers seldom makes a Plea ill in substance but an ill Travers often makes it so 320 6. It must be taken where the thing traversed is issuable 320 Treason See Outlawry Attainder of Treason reversed because on arraignment or demanding Judgment and because there was Process of Ve. fa. instead of a Capias and likewise for that it did not appear that the Party was asked what he had to say why Sentence c. 265 Trespass For breaking and entring a Free Fishery and taking the Fish ipsius querentis not good for he had not such a Property as to call the Fish his own 97 2. In Trespass Quare vi armis clausum fregit to his Damage of 20 s. an Action lyeth let the Damage be never so little 275 Trial See Appeal 2 3. Election 1. Where the Trial and conviction of a Criminal is had he must be executed in that County and not elsewhere unless in Middlesex by prerogative of B. R. which sits in that County 124 2. Where the Court refused to grant a new Tryal in a Case where excessive Damages are given 101 Trover and Conversion Judgment in Trespass is no Bar to an Action of Trover for the same Goods 1 2. They are different Actions in their very nature 2 3. It lies upon a demand and denial but Trespass doth not ibid. 4. Trover pro diversis aliis bonis hath been held good 70 5. 'T is a good Plea in Trover to say that Damages were recovered against another Person for the same Goods and the Defendant in execution though the mony is not paid 86 6. Whether it lies for taking a Ship after a Sentence in the Admiraly for taking the said Ship 194 7. Brought by two and after Verdict one died whether Judgment shall be arrested 249 V. Variance See Appeal 1. Apportionment 2. BEtween the Original in Trespass and the Declaration that being certified three Terms past and no Continuances for that reason not good 136 2. Between Original and the Declaration not aided by the Statutes of Jeofailes ibid. 3. Sci. fa. to have execution of a Judgment obtained in the Court of Oliver late Protector of England and the Dominions and Territories thereunto belonging and in reciting the Judgment it was said to be obtained before Oliver late Protector of England and the Dominions c. but left out Territories this was held to be good in substance for the Judicature is still the same 227 Venire Facias The Court would not order the Plaintiff to file a Ve. fa. 246 Verdict See Assumpsit 2. Action for a Tort 5. Amendment 1.6 Common 3. Evidence 6. Prescription 4. Reservation 1. Robbery 1. Surrender 3. The true reason why it helps a defective Declaration 162 2. A Promise to pay quantum rationabiliter valerent instead of valebant at the time of the promise good after Verdict 190 3. It cannot be diminished neither can any thing be added to it 205 4. An Hundred was sued for a Robbery and tho' it did not appear that the Fact in the Declaration mentioned was done in the Hundred or that the Robbery was in the High-way or done in the day-time yet good after a Verdict 258 5. The Defendant sold Cattle affirming 'em to be his own ubi revera they were not but 't is not said that he affirmed them to be his own sciens the same to be the Goods of another or that he sold them fraudulenter vel deceptive yet good after Verdict 261 Vicaridge 'T is not sufficient to alledge Seisin in Fee of a Rectory and that he ought to present to the Vicaridge but he must say that he is Impropriator or that he was seised in Fee of a Rectory impropriate 295 Visitor No Appeal lies from his Sentence for he is Fidei