one Richard Manfell his Clerk who upon his Presentation obtain'd the said Vicaridge and was in actual possession thereof and so being in possession a Statute was made the 25th of April 12. of the King for confirmation and establishing of Ministers in their Ecclesiastick Possessions ordained by any Ecclesiastick Persons before the 25th of December then last past And that the said Richard Manfell by vertue of the said Statute was real and lawful Incumbent and Vicar of the said Vicaridge That the said Lord Wootton and Mary his Wife being seised of the said third part of the said Mannor and Rectory aforesaid for their lives with remainder as aforesaid the said Lord Wootton so seised dyed at Burton Basset aforesaid That the said Mary survived him and was thereof sole seised for term of her life by Survivorship And being thereof so seised with Remainder as aforesaid The said Margaret married the said John Tufton and after the 8th day of August 22. Car. 1. By a writing under her hand and seal produc'd in Court by the said John Tufton dated the same day and year appointed that the said Fine leavyed as aforesaid in the 4th year of the King should be and the Conusees therein named should stand seised of the said third part to the use of the said Margaret and of the said John Tufton for term of his life as by the said writing more fully appears By vertue of the said Fine and Statute of uses the remainder of the said third part after the death of the said Mary belong'd to the said John Tufton and Margaret for term of the said Johns life with remainder as aforesaid That the said Mary being seised of the said third Part with remainder over as aforesaid the said Margaret at Burton Basset aforesaid dyed without issue of her body and the said John Tufton surviv'd her That the said Mary afterwards at Burton Basset aforesaid dyed seised of such her Estate after whose death the said third part remain'd to the said John Tufton who was thereof seised for term of his life with remainder over to the Heirs of the Lord Wootton That the said Tufton being so seised in a Statute made at Westminster begun the 8th day of May in the 13th year of his reign and there continued until the 19th of May in the 14th year of his reign It was among other things enacted That Parsons Vicars and other Churchmen being Incumbents of any Ecclesiastical Living should subscribe the Declaration or Recognition set forth in the said Act in manner as by the said Act is recited which is set forth at large in the Pleading upon pain of forfeiting the said Parsonage Vicaridge or other Ecclesiastical Living and to be ipso facto deprived of the same And the said John Tufton in fact saith that the said Richard Mansell was in possession of the said Vicaridge of Burton Basset and did not as by the Act was required subscribe the said Declaration whereby he stood ipso facto deprived and the said Vicaridge became void That such vacancy of the said Vicaridge is the third vacancy thereof after the aforesaid Presentation of the said Lord Wootton and therefore it belongs to the said John Tufton to present a fit Person to the same and that the said Bishop Richard Temple and Chamberlayne do hinder him so to do to his damage of fifty Pounds The said Bishop and Richard Temple plead in Bar. And first the said Bishop That he claims nothing but as Ordinary Then the said Richard Temple saith the said Tufton ought not to have his Action against him and taking by Protestation that the said Tufton was not seis'd in his Demesn as of Freehold for Term of his life of the third part of the said Mannor of Burton Basset and of the third part of the said Rectory of Burton Basset aforesaid for Plea saith That he the said Richard Temple was and yet is seised of the said two parts of the said Mannor and of the Advowson of the Vicaridge of Burton Basset aforesaid as appertaining to the said two parts of the said Mannor in his Demesne as of Fee and right in the time of the King that now is That being so seised the said Vicaridge became void by the said Deprivation of the said Richard Manfell by reason whereof he the said Richard Temple being seised of the said Advowson as aforesaid presented to the said Vicaridge the said Chamberlain as was lawful for him then traverseth absque hoc That one third Part of the Advowson of the said Vicaridge namely to present a fit person to the same Vicaridge every third turn of the said Vicaridge doth appertain to the said one third part of the said Mannor and to the said one third part of the Rectory Impropriate of Burton Basset as the said John Tufton hath alledg'd which he is ready to aver and demands Judgment And the said Chamberlaine the Clerk taking by Protestation that he doth not know any the matters in the Declaration to be true and taking also by Protestation that before the said Vicaridge became void by the Deprivation of the said Richard Manfell and at the time it was so void the said Richard Temple was and yet is seised of the said two parts of the said Mannor and of the Advowson of the Vicaridge of the said Church of Burton Basset as appertaining to the said two parts of the said Mannor in his Demesne as of Fee and right And for Plea saith That he the said Chamberlain is Vicar of the said Vicaridge by the Presentation of the said Richard Temple and was thereto admitted instituted and inducted Then traverseth absque hoc That the said Thomas Lord Wootton after the death of the said John Reignalds so as aforesaid presented to the said Vicaridge being void in his turn the said John Cragg as the said Tufton hath alledg'd and demands Judgment As to the Bishops Plea his excuse is admitted and the Plaintiff hath Iudgment with a cessat executio against him and a Writ to admit idoneam personam to the Vicaridge non obstante reclamatione To the Defendant Temples Plea the Plaintiff demurs and the Defendant Temple joyns in Demurrer To the Plea of Chamberlain the Incumbent the Plaintiff replys That the said Thomas Lord Wootton after the death of the said John Reignalds Incumbent as aforesaid presented to the said Vicaridge then vacant in his turn as aforesaid the said John Cragg as the Plaintiff hath formerly alleag'd Et de hoc petit quod inquiratur per patriam To which the Defendant Chamberlain doth not rejoyn any thing nor joyns in issue and therefore the Plaintiff hath Judgment to recover his Presentation as against him and a Writ to the Bishop non obstante reclamatione and to remove the Defendant Chamberlain from the Vicaridge notwithstanding his Admission Institution and Induction but with a cessat executio until the Plea be determined between the Plaintiff and the Defendant Temple THIS CASE in fact cannot be
is not sufficient by the Rule of the Act of 25. unless confirmed by the King It was otherwise in the Popes case before the Act. There are many Presidents in Mr. Noy's Book where in like Obj. 2 case the King after the death of a Bishop holding in Commendam after his translation to another See and after his resignation hath presented All those Presidents are since the Twentieth of the Queen which Answ 1 cannot alter the Law 2. Who knows in the cases of death whether those Presentations were not by consent of the Patrons and doubtless there are Presidents wherein the Patrons did present else this Question had been earlier But Judicandum est legibus non exemplis Vpon Translation of a Bishop holding a Commendam in the Answ 2 Retinere as long as he continued Bishop there the King ought to present for the Dispensation is determined upon his remove and then is as if it had not been and a Dispensation gives no property to the Living nor takes away any But where property is given to the Living as by Presentation Institution and Induction or by Grant as in Appropriations Hob. Colts and Glovers Case and sometimes otherwise by the King such presenting or granting for a year or six is to grant it during life As an Atturnment cannot be for a time nor a Confirmation nor a Denization or Naturalization and the like but such Acts are perfect Manwarings Case 21 Jac. Crook f. 691. as they may be notwithstanding Restriction to time as is agreed well in Manwaring's Case I shall say nothing of the case of Resignation as not being in the present Question Judgment was given by the Opinion of the whole Court That the Avoidance was by Death not by Cession Hill 19 20 Car. II. C. B. Rot. 1785. Baruck Tustian Tristram Plaintiff Anne Roper Vicountess Baltinglass Vidua Defendant in a Plea of Trespass and Ejectment THe Plaintiff declares That the Defendant vi Armis entred into 20 Messuages 1000 Acres of Land 200 Acres of Meadow and 500 Acres of Pasture cum pertinentiis in Thornbury Shalston Evershaw Oldwick Westbury and Looffield and into the Rectory of Thornbury which Thomas Gower Kt. and Baronet and George Hilliard to the said Baruck demis'd the First of Octob. 19 Car. 2. Habendum from the Feast of St. Michael the Arch-angel last past for the term of Five years next ensuing into which he the said Baruck the same day entred and was ousted and ejected by the Defendant ad damnum 40 l. To this the Defendant pleads Not Guilty And the Jury have found specially That the Defendant is not guilty in all those Tenements besides 5 Messuages 400 Acres of Land 50 Acres of Meadow 100 Acres of Pasture cum pertinentiis in Thornbury Shalston Evershaw Oldwick and Westbury and in the Rectory of Thornbury and besides in one Messuage 100 Acres of Land 50 Acres of Meadow and 100 Acres of Pasture cum pertinentiis in Looffield And as to the Trespass and Ejectment aforesaid in the said five Messuages c. and in the Rectory of Thornbury the Iury say upon their Oath that before the said Trespass and Ejectment suppos'd 22 Junii 12 Jac. Sir Arthur Throgmorton Kt. was seis'd in Fee of the aforesaid Rectory and Tenements last mentioned and of the said Premisses in Looffield and so seis'd A certain Indenture Tripartite was made 22 Junii 12 Jac. between him the said Sir Arthur of the first part Edward Lord Wootton Augustine Nicholls Kt. Francis Harvey Esq and Rowly Ward Esq of the second part and Sir Peter Temple and Anne Throgmorton Daughter of the said Sir Arthur of the third part To this effect That the said Sir Arthur Throgmorton did covenant and promise with the said Lord Wootton and Sir Augustine Nicholls in consideration of Marriage to be had between the said Sir Peter Temple and the said Anne and other the considerations mentioned in the said Indenture by Fine or Fines before the Feast of St. Michael the Arch-angel next ensuing or other good Conveyance to be levied by him and the said Dame Anne his wife to the said Lord Wootton c. The scite and precinct of the Priory of Looffield the Rectory of Thornbury and divers Mannors Lands and Tenements in the said Indenture mentioned several yearly Rents therein mentioned and all other his Lands in the Counties of Northampton Buckingham and Oxford at any time belonging to the said Priory to convey and assure To the use of himself for life without Impeachment of Waste Then to the use of Dame Anne his Wife Then to the use of the said Sir Peter Temple and the said Anne his Wife during their natural lives and the longer Liver of them and after both their Deceases To the use of the first Son of the Body of Anne by the said Sir Peter begotten and of the Heirs Males of the Body of the said first Son so to the sixth Son Then to the use of all other Sons in succession in like manner of the Body of Anne begotten by the said Sir Peter And for default of such Heirs To the use of all the Issues Female of the Body of the said Anne by the said Sir Peter begotten and the Heirs of the Bodies of the said Issues Female For default thereof To the first Son of the said Anne by any other Husband and his Heirs Males and so to the tenth In like manner to the Issues Female of the Body of Anne with divers Remainders over A Proviso That it be lawful for Sir Arthur at all times during his life to lett set and demise all or any the said Premisses aforesaid which at any time heretofore have been usually letten or demised to any person or persons for and during the term of One and twenty years or under in possession and not in Reversion or for or during any other number of years determinable upon one two or three Lives in Possession and not in Reversion reserving the Rents therefore now yielded or paid or more to be yearly due and payable during such Lease and Leases unto such person and persons unto whom the said Premises so to be demised shall come and be by virtue of these Presents if no such demise had been made so long as the same Lessees their Executors and Assigns shall duly pay the Rents and perform their Conditions according to the true meaning of their Indentures of Lease and commit no waste of and in the things to them demised The like Proviso verbatim for Sir Peter Temple and Anne his Wife to make like Leases during their Lives and the Life of the longer liver of them after the death of Sir Arthur and Dame Anne his Wife That a Fine was accordingly levied c. to the uses aforesaid They find that all the Messuages Lands Tenements and Rectory in the Declaration mentioned are compris'd in the said Indenture Tripartite They find the death of Sir Arthur Throgmorton and Anne his Wife 2. Septemb.
to that Issue but may take another This dis-affirms the former Case when the Information is by an Informer the King must maintain his Information Note the close of this Case Ut supra per Attornatum Regis alios legis peritos I shall give the Case here mentioned in this ut supra which will I think determine the Question and clearly establish the Law according to the Difference taken That Case is likewise in Br. and cited to be as in 34 H. 8. whereof there is no Year-book neither some four years before the last Case I mentioned It is thus Br. Prerogative p. 116. 34 H. 8. Nota by Whorhood Attornatum Regis alios When an Information is put into the Chequer upon a penal Statute and the Defendant makes a Barr and Traverseth that there the King cannot wave such Issue tender'd and Traverse the former matter of the Plea as he can upon Traverse of an Office and the like when the King is sole party and intitled by matter of Record for upon the Information there is no Office found before and also a Subject is party with the King for a moiety Quod nota bene Here it is most apparent That upon an Information when the King hath no Title by matter of Record as he hath upon Office found the King cannot waive the Issue tender'd upon the first Traverse though the Information be in his own name which disaffirms the second Case in that point And for the Supernumerary reason That the King is not the sole party in the Information it is but frivolous and without weight but the stress is where the King is sole party and intitled by matter of Record I shall add another Authority out of Stamford Praerogative If the King be once seis'd his Highness shall retain against all others who have not Title nothwithstanding it be found also that the King had no Title but that the other had possession before him 37 Ass pl. 11. as appeareth in 37. Ass p. 35. which is pl. 11. where it was found That neither the King nor the party had Title and yet adjudg'd that the King should retain for the Office that finds the King to have a Right or Title to enter Stamford Praerogative f. 62. b. makes ever the King a good Title though the Office be false c. and therefore no man shall Traverse the Office unless he make himself a Title and if he cannot prove his Title to be true although he be able to prove his Traverse to be true yet this Traverse will not serve him Stamford Prerogative f. 64. b. It is to be noted That the King hath a Prerogative which a Common Person hath not for his Highness may choose whether he will maintain the Office or Traverse the Title of the party and so take Traverse upon Traverse If the King take Issue upon a Traverse to an Office he cannot in another Term change his Issue by Traversing the Defendants Title for then he might do it infinitely But the King may take Issue and after Demurr 13 E. 4. expresly and several other Books 28 H. 6. f. 2. a. or first Demurr and after take Issue or he may vary his Declaration for in these Cases as to the Right all things remain and are as they were at first but this ought to be done in the same Term otherwise the King might change without limit and tye the Defendant to perpetual Attendance Judgment pro Defendente Hill 21 22. Car. II. C. B. Rot. 606. Thomas Rowe Plaintiff and Robert Huntington Defendant in a Plea of Trespass and Ejectment THE Plaintiff declares That Thomas Wise 1. April 21 Car. 2. at Hooknorton in the County of Oxford by his Indenture produc'd dated the said day and year demis'd to the said Thomas Rowe the Mannor of Hooknorton with the Appurtenances 4 Messuages 100 Acres of Land 50 Acres of Meadow 400 Acres of Pasture and 50 Acres of Wood with the Appurtenances in Hooknorton aforesaid As also the Rectory and Vicaridge of Hooknorton and the Tithes of Grain Hay and Wool renewing in Hooknorton aforesaid To have and to hold the Premisses from the Feast of the Annunciation of the Virgin then last past to the end and term of Seven years then next ensuing That by virtue thereof the said Thomas Rowe the Plaintiff into the said Mannor and Tenements enter'd and of the said Rectory Vicaridge and Tithes was possessed That the said Robert Huntington the Defendant the said First of April with Force and Arms into the said Mannor Rectory Vicaridge and Tithes entred and him Ejected against the Peace to his great damage and whereby he is endamaged 100 l. The Defendant Huntington pleads not Culpable And thereupon Issue is Ioyn'd The Jury give a Special Verdict That as to the Trespass and Ejectment in the said Mannor and Tenements and in the said Rectory Vicaridge and Tithes aforesaid excepting 200 Acres of Pasture parcel of the said Mannor of Hooknorton That the Defendant Huntington is not Culpable And as to the said 200 Acres they say that long before the said Trespass and Ejectment That is the 14th day of October 1. Mar. one Robert then Bishop of Oxford was seis'd in his Demesne as of Fee in Right of his Bishoprick of the said Mannor whereof the said 200 Acres are parcel and so seis'd the said 14th of October 1 Mariae at Hooknorton aforesaid by his Indenture of Demise seal'd with his Episcopal Seal Dated the said day and year and shew'd in Evidence to the Jury made between the said Bishop of the one part and John Croker of Hooknorton Esq of the other part for Considerations in the said Indenture of Demise mentioned had demis'd and to farm lett to the said Croker Among other things the said Mannor with the Appurtenances whereof the said 200 Acres are parcel To have and to hold to the said Croker and his Assigns from the end and expiration prioris Dimissionis in eadem Indentur Mentionat for and during the term of Ninety years then next following The tenor of which Indenture of Demise follows in haec verba This Indenture made the Fourteenth day of October 1 Mariae c. Between the said Bishop and the said John Croker c witnesseth That where the said Bishop by the name of the Reverend Father in God Robert King Abbot of Tame and Commendatory of the late Monastery of Oseney in the County of Oxford and the Covent of the same by their Deed Indented Dated 6. April 29 Hen. 8. with the Consent of their whole Chapter Have demis'd and to farm lett All that their Mansion or Farm of Hooknorton with the Appurtenances in the said County and all the Mansion and Farm Demesne Lands Meadows Leasowes and Pastures with all Commodities and Profits to the said Mannor belonging or appertaining and the customary works of all the Tenants not granted nor remitted before the Date of the Deed And the Parsonage of Hooknorton and
the Intestate owing by him at the time of his death The Plaintiff taking by protestation that nothing alledg'd by the Defendant was true Demurrs upon the Plea The Causes offer'd to maintain the Demurrer are these 1. That one of the Iudgments pleaded in Barr obtain'd by William Allington in the Court of London before the Mayor c. against the Defendant for 2670 l. 17 s. 7 d. due to the said Allington by the Intestate Everard was not duly obtained and is insufficient to Barr the Plaintiff 2. That the Defendants special Plea in Barr appearing in any part of it to be false and insufficient the Plaintiff ought to have Iudgment for his whole debt 1. For the first Cause it was urg'd as an Exception to the Defendants Plea That by the Plea it appears that time out of mind a Court hath been held in the City of London before the Mayor and Aldermen of all personal Actions arising and growing within the said City And that the Intestate was at the time of his death indebted to the said Allington at London within the Parish and Ward of St. Mary Bow and Cheapside But it is not alledg'd That the said debt did arise and grow due in London within the said Parish and Ward for wheresoever the debt did arise and grow due yet the debtor is indebted to the creditor in any place where he is as long as the debt is unpaid And therefore to say The Intestate was indebted to Allington in the said Sum apud London c. affirms not that the debt did arise and grow due at London and if not the Court had no Iurisdiction of the Cause The effect of the Defendants Barr is only to shew That such a Judgment was obtain'd in such a Court against him and not to set forth the whole Record of obtaining it for it were vast Expence of time and mony so to do as often as occasion is to mention a Record and referrs to the Record prout per Recordum plenius liquet where the Plaintiff may take advantage of any defect therein But if that were necessary it is well set forth for his Plea is Et praedictus Willielmus Allington tunc ibidem in eadem Curia secundum consuetudinem Civitatis praedictae affirmabat contra praedictum Rolandum Dee ut Administratorem c. quandam billam originalem de placito debiti c. And the Custome being to hold Plea of personal Actions arising within the City if he affirmed a Bill of Debt according to the Custome It must be of a debt arising and growing due within the City 2. A second Exception was That it is not set forth for what the debt was whereby the Court may judge whether it were payable or not by the Administrator To this it was answer'd That the course in London is for the Plaintiff to declare that the Debtor being indebted to him at such a time and place Concessit solvere such a Sum to him at such a time for they enter not there at large as at Westminster all the pleading and the City Customes have been often confirmed by Parliament and if Exception be taken to the Jurisdiction it must come from the Defendant However that will not avoid the Iudgment and is but Error 3. A third Exception was It is not set forth that the Intestate was indebted to Allington in his own right But it must be intended if he were indebted to him by Law that it was in his own right 4. A fourth Exception was That the Defendant pleads Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff quod recuperaret debitum praedictum where the Iudgment should be quod recuperet It is not the Defendants concern to recite the words of the Iudgment as it was given by the Court but the effect of it relating to the Defendant and so it is more proper to say Iudgment was given quod recuperaret The Court say ideo consideratum est per Curiam but he who relates what they did saith ideo consideratum fuit per Curiam But my Book is quod recuperet 5. A fifth Exception was That the Plea sets forth the Action was brought against the Defendant Dee in London as Administrator of the Intestate omitting durante minori aetate Caroli Everard filii That will not avoid the Iudgment Rolls Good Pincents Case Tit. Executors f. 910. 14 Car. 1. B.R. Piggots Case 5 Rep. though the Minor were of Age sufficient to administer himself nor is it of prejudice to any as was resolved in the Case of one Pincent But if an Administrator durante minori aetate brings an Action he must averr the Administrator or Executor to be under the Age of Seventeen years 6. Sixthly it was urg'd as resolv'd in Turners Case Turners Case 8. Rep. f. 132. That the Recital of Allingtons Declaration in London not mentioning the Debt to be per scriptum obligatorium it shall not be intended to be so And it was urg'd as resolv'd in that Case of Turner also That it being a Debt but by simple Contract the Administrator was not chargeable with it That is a Resolution in Turners Case supernumerary and not necessary to support the Iudgment given and consequently no Iudicial Resolution for the Iudgment given in Turners Case was well given because the Iudgments given before the Mayor of Cicester pleaded in barr of the Plaintiffs Action were resolv'd to be coram non Judice because it appear'd not that the Mayor of Cicester had any Iurisdiction to hold Plea by Patent or Prescription But admitting that an Executor or Administrator according to that Resolution is not chargeable if by chargeable be meant compellable at the Common Law in an Action of Debt brought upon a simple Contract of the Testator or Intestate to pay such Debt what would it avail the Plaintiff in that Case or can in this Case unless the Resolution had been That though the Iurisdiction of the Court of Cicester had been well set forth yet a Iudgment there obtain'd against the Executor upon a simple Contract of the Testators had been no Barr in an Action of Debt brought upon an Obligation of the Testators But there is no such Resolution there for a Iudgment obtain'd upon such a simple Contract is as much a Iudgment when had as any other upon Obligations and the Books and use are clear That Judgments must be satisfied before Debts due by Obligation It is true it is a Waste of the Goods of the Dead in the Executor to pay voluntarily a Debt by simple Contract before a Debt by Obligation whereof he had notice and not otherwise in that Case But no man ever thought it a Devastavit in the Executor to satisfie a Iudgment obtain'd upon a simple Contract before a Debt due by Obligation Yet I shall agree the Executor by the Common Law might have prevented this Iudgment by abating the Plaintiffs Writ at first which he had power lawfully to do but he had equal
power lawfully not to abate it and us'd that last lawful power and not the first and wrong'd none in using it To this may be added That the Iudgment upon a simple Contract is the Act of the Court and compulsory to the Executor and he hath then no Election but must obey the Iudgment In conclusion though it were agreed That in the Action of Debt brought by Allington upon a simple Contract Iudgment ought not to have been given against the Defendant being Administrator but the Writ should have abated because the Administrator was not chargeable And though the Iudgment given were erroneous and for that cause reversible yet standing in force unrevers'd It is a good Barr to the Plaintiffs Action But lest this should countenance Iudges abating the Writ ex officio in such Actions brought or Plaintiffs to bring Error upon Iudgments given in such Actions I conceive the Law is clear That Iudges ought not ex officio to abate such Writ nor otherwise than when the Executor or Administrator Defendant in such Action demurrs and demands Judgment of the Writ and that Iudgment given against such Defendants not demurring to the Writ is not Erroneous unless for other cause If it be urg'd further That though a Iudgment obtain'd upon a simple Contract be a barr to an Action of Debt brought after upon an Obligation or to an Action of the Case upon an Assumpsit to pay mony as the present Case is Yet it should not barr if the Action upon which it was obtain'd were commenc'd pending a former Action upon an Obligation or upon an Assumpsit for mony in which the Intestate could not have waged his Law The answer is as before such Iudgment barrs until revers'd if admitted to be reversible as it is not But the Law is setled That wheresoever an Action of Debt upon Bond or Contract is brought against a man he may lawfully confess the Action and give way to a Judgment if there be no fraud in the Case although he have perfect notice of such former Suit depending nor is there any restraint or limit of time for confessing an Action brought upon a simple Contract more than upon a Bond. And to satisfie any Debt upon Obligation 5 H. 7. f. 27. b. Moore Scarleâ— Case f. 678. Crook 38 El. f. 462. Green Wilcocks Case before a Iudgment so obtain'd is a Devastavit in the Executor or Administrator and so it is to satisfie any latter Judgment if there be not assets to satisfie the first also So are the express Books to those points of 5 H. 7. per Curiam and Scarles his Case in Moore and Green and Wilcock's Case in Crook Eliz. Yet in 25 Eliz. when an Action of Debt for 100 l. was brought against an Executor in C. B. and pending that Debt was brought against him in B. R. for 100 l. which latter he confess'd and the Iudgment there had pleaded in Barr to the first Action And upon Question if the Plea were good Fenner and Walmesley held it good but Anderson Mead Wyndham and Periam argued to the contrary and that he ought to have pleaded the first Action pending to the second Action brought The Arguments of both sides you may see in Moore f. 173. Moore 25 El. f. 173. where it is left a Quere the Iudges doubting the Case but since the Law is taken That the Iudgment is a good barr to the first Action It will be still objected That if the Law be that Executors or Administrators may pay debts upon simple Contracts of the deceas'd to which they are not bound and thereby prevent the payment of a debt to which they are bound It is repugnant to Reason and consequently cannot be Law for that is in effect at the same time to be bound and not bound to pay For he who may not pay being bound is not bound at all For clearing this we must know Though Executors or Administrators are not compell'd by the Common Law to answer Actions of Debt for simple Contracts yet the Law of the Land obligeth payment of them For 1. Vpon committing Administration Oath is taken to administer the Estate of the dead duely which cannot be without paying his debts 2. Oath is taken to make true accompt of the Administration to the Ordinary and of what remains after all Debts Funeral Charges and just Expences of every sort deducted 3. This appears also by the Statute of 31 E. 3. c. 11. That Administrators are to administer and dispend for the Soul of the Dead and to answer to other to whom the dead persons were holden and bound which they cannot better do than by paying their debts And as this was the ancient Law and practise before in the Spiritual Court so by the new Act in 22 and 23 of the King for the better settling of Intestates Estates It is enacted accordingly that upon the Administrators accompt deductions be made of all sorts of debts This appears to be the ancient Law by the Great Charter c. 18. and long before by Glanvill in Henry the Second's time and Bracton in Henry the Third's time 4. And by Fitz-herbert in the Writ de rationabili parte bonorum the debts are to be deducted before division to the wife and children And upon the Executors accompt all the Testators debts are to be allow'd before payment of Legacies which were unjust if the payment of them were not due as appears by Doctor and Student Executors be bound to pay Debts before Legacies by the Law of Reason and by the Law of God for Reason wills that they should do first that is best for the Testator that is to pay debts which he was bound to pay before Legacies which he was not bound to give 2. It is better for the Testator his Debts should be paid Doct. Stud. l. 2. c. 11. for not payment of which his Soul shall suffer pain but none for not performing his Legacy The Ordinary upon the accompt L. 2. c. 10. f. 158 in all the Cases before rehears'd will regard much what is best for the Testator And I conceive the Ordinary may inforce the payment of Debts upon Contracts as well as Legacies or Marriage mony and no Prohibition lyes An Executor or Administrator may retain for his own satisfaction a Debt by single Contract due from the Testator or Intestate which he could not do unless the payment were lawful If at the Common Law the Executors payments of Debts upon simple Contracts were not just Why have the Iudges in all Ages given Judgment for the Plaintiffs unless the Defendant either Demurrs in the Commencement of the Plea or avoids the Debt by special matter pleaded and put in issue but he shall never in such case either Arrest the Iudgement or bring Error after Iudgment for that Cause And so it is agreed for Law in Read and Norwoods Case in Plowden where the Iudges had view of numerous Iudgments in that kind as there appears
14 Jac. B.R. Robson and Francis Case which avoids the Exception Now as to the Second Question Admitting the Iudgment in London as pleaded be no sufficient barr of the Plaintiffs Action or if it be that the Recognizance as pleaded is no sufficient barr For if those will barr there is no further Question If then Iudgment ought to be for the Plaintiff upon the Defendants Plea to the whole matter And I conceive it ought not I shall agree That if the Defendant plead several Judgments against the Intestate or himself as Administrator and Statutes entred into by the Intestate and concludes his Plea That he hath not nor at any time had assets in his hand of the Intestates Estate praeterquam bona cattalla sufficient to satisfie those Judgments and Statutes and averrs they are unsatisfied and which assets are chargeable with the said Judgments and Statutes that this is a good Plea in barr of the Plaintiffs Action and so it is admitted to be in Meriel Treshams Case Meriel Treshams Case 9. Rep. and the Plaintiff must reply That he hath assets ultra what will satisfie those Judgments and Statutes as is there agreed But if the Plaintiff reply That any one of those Judgments was satisfied by the Intestate in his life time saying nothing to any of the rest And the Defendant demurr upon this Replication the Plaintiff must have Iudgment for the Plea was false and the falshood detrimental to the Plaintiff and beneficial to the Defendant for having pleaded he had no more assets than would satisfie those Iudgments one of them being satisfied before he hath confessed there is more assets than will satisfie the other Iudgments by as much as the Iudgment already satisfied amounts unto which would turn to his gain and the Plaintiffs loss if his demurrer were good Turners Case 8. Rep. But to plead That he hath not bona cattalla praeterquam bona quae non attingunt to satisfie the said Judgments and Statutes is not good for the incertainty for if the Judgments and Statutes amount to 500 l. 20 l. are bona quae non attingunt to satisfie them so is 40 l. so is 100 l. so is 200 l. and every Sum less than will satisfie so as by such Plea there is no certain Issue for the Iury to enquire nor no certain Sum confess'd towards the payment of any Debt as is well resolv'd in Turners Case So if a man pleads he hath not assets ultra what will satisfie those Iudgments the Plea is bad for the same reason for 20 l. is not assets ultra that will satisfie them nor 40. nor 100. nor 200. nor doth that manner of pleading confess he hath assets enough to satisfie As to say I have not in my pocket above 40 l. is not to say I have in my pocket 40 l. But in this Case the Defendant hath pleaded payment of several Bonds Bills and Judgments and pleads one Recognizance of 2000 l. and one Judgment of 7000 l. wholly unsatisfied and concludes his Plea with plene administravit And that he had not die impetrationis brevis nec unquam postea aliqua bona seu cattalla of the Intestates in manibus suis administranda praeterquam bona catalla ad valentiam separalium denariorum summarum per ipsum sic ut praesertur solutarum in discharge of the said several Judgments Bonds and Bills Et praeterquam alia bona catalla ad valentiam decem solidorum quae executioni recognitionis praedict judicii praedict per praefat Car. Cornwallis recuperat onerabilia existunt Now upon this Plea if Allington's Iudgment of 2670 l. or the Statute of 2000 l. or both be avoided yet the Plaintiff hath no right to be paid until the Iudgment of 7000 l. be so satisfied and that some assets remain after the satisfaction of it in the Administrators hands for before the Plaintiff hath no wrong nor the Administrator doth none nor hath any benefit by not satisfying the Plaintiff That spungy Reason that the Defendants Plea is all intire and therefore if any part be false as either in that of Allington's Iudgment or the Recognizance the Plea is bad is not sense for if the falshood be neither hurtful to the Plaintiff nor beneficial to the Defendant why should the Plaintiff have what he ought not or the Defendant pay what he ought not Suppose the Defendant pleaded a Iudgment obtain'd against the Intestate or himself and that the Intestate or himself were married at the time of the Iudgment obtain'd which in truth was false for that the one or the other was unmarried at that time his Plea being otherwise good Should this falsness cause the Plaintiff to recover surely no for the falsness is not material nor any way hurtful to the Plaintiff Besides the usual pleading as appears both by Turners and Treshams Case is that the Plaintiff must avoid all payments pleaded in barr until some assets appear in the Administrators hands remaining and then he is to have Iudgment Much noise hath been about this Case and without Reason as I suppose though there were no precedent Iudgment in the point but there is a Judgment per Curiam An Action of Debt was brought against Executors 9 E. 4. f. 12. b. who pleaded a former Recovery against them of 200 l. and Execution issued and pleaded likewise another Recovery against them of 100 l. and travers'd that they had no assets but to satisfie that Execution of 200 l. the Plea was adjudged good by the Court and that the Plaintiff must reply They had assets in their hands ultra the said 200 l. and ultra the said 100 l. for before the 100 l. were also satisfied the Plaintiff was not intitled to his Debt as the Book is Hill 18 19 Car. II. C. B. Thomas Price is Plaintiff against Richard Braham Elizabeth White Elianor Wakeman and Richard Hill Defendants In an Action of Trespass and Ejectment THE Plaintiff declares That one Henry Alderidge the First of November 18 Car. 2. at the Parish of St. Margarets Westminster demis'd to the Plaintiff and his Assigns an Acre of Land with the Appurtenances in the Parish of St. Margarets aforesaid Habendum from the Thirtieth of October then last past for the term of Five years next ensuing by virtue whereof he entred and was possessed untill the Defendants afterwards the same day entred upon him and did Eject him to his damage of 20 l. To this the Defendants pleaded That they are not Culpable Special Verdict is found By which it is found That the Defendants are not Culpable of Entry and Ejectment in the said Acre excepting a piece thereof containing One hundred and Eighty Foot thereof in length and Eight and twenty Foot in breadth And as to that piece they find that the same time out of mind was a Pool until within Twenty years last past during which Twenty years it became fill'd with Mudd They find That before
license Ex speciali gratia is good to dispense with a penal Law without a Non obstante 356 Nusance 1. Publique Nusances are not Mala in se but Mala politica introducta 358 2. The King may pardon a transient Nusance 333 3. An Action will not lye for a Nusance for which no man hath a particular damage 335 341 4. If a man have a particular damage by a foundrous way he is generally without remedy because it ought to be repaired by some Township or Vill against whom an Action will not lye but an Indictment only 340 Oath 1. Upon granting of Administration the Administrator is to take an Oath duly to administer the Estate of the deceased 96 Occupant and Occupancy 1. What Natural Occupancy is 188 2. What Civil Occupancy is 189 3. An Occupant shall enjoy whatsoever is belonging to that which he occupies 196 4. No Occupancy begins with the Freehold but begins by possessing the Land and the Law casts the Freehold upon him 195 5. A Claim without actual possession cannot make a man a Natural Occupant 188 6. There can be no Occupancy of any thing wherein another hath a Right 188 189 7. Two cannot have severally possession of the same thing at one time 189 192 8. Of what things there may be an Occupancy and of what not 190 194 198 9. A man cannot be an Occupant but of a void possession or of a possession which he himself hath 192 10. What it is that makes an Occupant 191 11. Tenant for years or at will may be an Occupant 192 12. An Occupant becomes an Assignee in Law to the first Lessee 204 13. The Occupant is lyable to pay the Rent 202 203 14. He hath power to pass over his interest 205 15. If a man die seised pur auter vie of a Rent Tythe c. or other thing whereof there can be no Occupancy either directly or by consequence as adjuncts of something else by the death of the Grantee In all these cases the Grant is determined as if there never had been any 201 202 16. But when those things are granted in the same Deed together with other things of which there may be an Occupancy then they shall be subject to the Occupancy 202 Office before Escheators See Inquisition 1. Principally an Office for the King is as necessary as an Entry for a common person 153 2. It neither determines any mans Right neither doth any party put any Tryal upon them 153 3. An Inquest of Office is not subject to an Attaint they are only to find naked matter of Fact 153 4. Where an Office is found if the Defendant hath no Title then the King hath one by his Office 62 5. No person shall Traverse the Office unless he makes to himself a good Title 64 Office and Officer See Title Statutes 24. 1. All Offices of Trust must be personally occupied unless granted to be occupied by a Deputy 181 2. Offices of personal Trust cannot be assigned for the Trust is not personal which any man may have 180 3. An Office of Trust and Confidence cannot be granted for years 181 4. All Actions brought against the Officers mentioned in 21 Jacobi must be laid in the proper County and if the Plaintiff is Non-suited or Discontinue or a Verdict against him they shall have their double costs 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 Ordinary See Administration Arch-bishop Lapse 1. The Ordinary may enforce the Executors to pay Debts upon Contracts as well as Legacies or Marriage mony 97 2. Where the Ordinary is to supply the Cure until the Patron present 132 3. Where the Ordinary disclaims in a Quare Impedit there is a Judgment with a Cessat Executio quousque c. 6 Pardon See Dispensation King 1. A Pardon frees a man from the punishment due for a thing unlawfully done 333 2. What Offences committed against Statutes the King may pardon and what he cannot 333 334 335 c. 3. The King may pardon a transient Nusance but a continued Nusance cannot be pardoned so as to acquit the Nusance-maker for committing them but the fine or punishment imposed for the doing thereof may be pardoned 333 4. Forestalling the Market Ingrossing or the like which continue not but are over as soon as done until done de novo again may be pardoned like other Offences so as the persons shall not be impleaded otherwise than by the persons who have received particular damage which the King cannot remit ibid. Parliament See Statute  Parson and Patron 1. A Parson is chosen Bishop his Benefices are all void and thereupon the King shall present 19 20 21 2. Where a Benefice becomes void by accepting another without a Dispensation the Patron is bound to present without Notice and where not 131 3. Where the Parson doth not read the Articles according to the Statute he stands deprived ipso facto ibid. 4. Where the Parson doth not subscribe the Articles there he is not Incumbent although he keeps in possession 133 5. A Church-man cannot make a Lease of the possessions of his Church without Deed 197 Perpetuity 1. Every Fee-simple is a perpetuity but in the accident of Alienation and alienation is an incident to a Fee determinable upon a Contingent 273 2. There is no Law simply against perpetuities but against an Entail of perpetuities ibid. Pleading See Traverse 1. If the Falshood in the Defendants plea is neither hurtful to the Plaintiff nor beneficial to the Defendant there it shall not hurt the Defendant 104 2. Where the Defendant pleads a false plea which falshood is detrimental to the Plaintiff and beneficial to the Defendant as by pleading several Judgments and concluding that he hath not Assets ultra there the Plaintiff may Reply That one of the Judgments are satisfied which Replication shall be fatal to the Defendant 103 3. But to plead That he hath not bona catalla praeterquam bona quae non sufficient to satisfie the Judgments is void for the Uncertainty for no Sum being mentioned no good Issue can be taken upon it 104 4. So likewise to say That he hath not Assets ultra what will satisfie c. is void for Uncertainty ibid. 5. But it is good pleading to say That he hath not Assets praeterquam bona catalla ad Valentiam separal denar per ipsum in satisfactione separal indic solut And also besides Assets to the value of Ten shillings which are liable to satisfie the Statutes ibid. 6. It is a good plea for an Executor to plead several Judgment c. and conclude quod non habet nec ad aliquod tempus habuit any Assets of the Testators praeterquam bona catalla sufficient to satisfie those Judgments c. 103 7. To this the Plaintiff must Reply Assets ultra or that any one of the Judgments are satisfied ibid. 8. The pleading of a special plene Administravit 91 9. In pleading of a Judgment it is not necessary to set forth the
28 Eliz. by her Letters Patents under the Great Seal bearing date the said year and day at Westminster to the said Church then being void presented the said James White who was admitted instituted and inducted tempore pacis c. That the said James White being so Rector of the said Church and the said Richard Jervis seis'd of the said Mannor to which the said Advowson pertained c. the said Richard after at Norfield aforesaid died so seis'd After whose death the same descended to one Thomas Jervis Esquire as Son and Heir of Richard and from him descended to one Sir Thomas Jervis Knight who enter'd and was seis'd and so seis'd the said Sir Thomas Jervis 30. March 14 Car. 1. March the 30th 14 Car. 1. by his Deed in writing seal'd at Norfield aforesaid granted to one Phineas White the Advowson of the said Church for the first and next avoidance only whereby the said Phineas was possessed for the next avoidance of the said Advowson and so possessed the said Church became void by the death of the said James White which was the first and next avoidance after the said Grant to Phineas Phineas by virtue of his said Grant presented one Timothy White his Clerk who was thereupon admitted instituted and inducted tempore pacis tempore Car. 1. The said Timothy being Rector and the said Sir Thomas Jervis seis'd as aforesaid The said Sir Thomas died seis'd at Norfield aforesaid and the said Mannor with the Appurtenances descended to Thomas the Defendant as his Son and Heir who enter'd and was and yet is seis'd and being so seis'd the said Church became void by the death of the said Timothy White and the said Thomas Jervis the Defendant presented the other Defendant John Hunckley who was admitted instituted and inducted long before the Writ purchas'd Then Traverseth Absque hoc That the late Queen was seis'd of the said Advowson with the Chappel of Coston aforesaid in gross and as of Fee Jure Coronae suae Et hoc paratus est verificare and demands Judgment si Actio John Hunckley the Incumbent taking by protestation That the late Queen was not seis'd nor presented as by the Declaration is suppos'd for Plea saith That Richard Jervis was seis'd of the Mannor of Norfield with the Appurtenances in Com. praedicto and the Advowson of the said Church appertain'd thereto and pleads the same Plea verbatim as to the Queens Presentation of White and all other things as Jervis the Patron pleaded and the presentation of himself and that he was by the presentation of the other Defendant Jervis admitted instituted and inducted into the said Church Septemb. 15. 1660. and Traverseth Absque hoc that the King was seis'd of the said Advowson and Chappel in Gross as of Fee Et hoc paratus est verificare and demands Judgment The Attorney General replies and as to the Bishop claiming nothing but as Ordinary Demands Judgment and a Writ to the said Bishop and hath it with a Cesset Executio until the Plea determined between the King and the other Defendants And as to the Plea of the said Thomas Jervis the Patron the Attorney maintains the Seisin of the late Queen and of King James King Charles the First and of the King that now is of the said Advowson of the said Church and Chappel as by the Count before is declared And that the said Phineas White of his own wrong by usurpation upon the late King Charles the First to the said Church then void by the death of the said James White presented the said Timothy White and Traverseth Absque hoc That the Advowson of the said Church was or is pertaining to the Mannor of Norfield and demand Judgment and a Writ to the Bishop And as to the Plea of the Incumbent the Attorney replies as before to the Patrons Plea That the late Queen King James King Charles the First and the King that now is were seis'd of the said Advowson in gross as of Fee and that the said Phineas White presented the said Timothy by usurpation upon King Charles the First and Traverseth the appendancy of the Advowson Ecclesiae praedicta to the Mannor of Norfield The Patron Jervis rejoyns and demurs upon the Attorney's Replication as insufficient and assigns for Cause that the Attorney hath Travers'd matter not traversable and that the Traverse ought to have been omitted out of the Replication as also that the said Plea is repugnant in it self and wants form And John Hunckley the Incumbent rejoyns That the said Advowson is pertaining to the said Mannor as he alledged in his Plea before Et de hoc ponit se super Patriam and the Attorney similiter Imperfections in the Pleading 1. Vpon this Quare Impedit brought there is a good Title to present surmis'd for the King but no more and there is much difference between a Title appearing for the King and suppos'd only 2. The Defendant by his Plea in Barr hath not well Travers'd the King's Title for it is travers'd but in part for only the Seisin of the Advowson in the Queen is travers'd whereas properly the Seisin and Presentation of the Queen by reason of her Seisin ought to have been traversed by Absque hoc That the Queen was seis'd of the Advowson in gross and presented 3. The Seisin of the Advowson which makes not a Title alone nor is not either traversable or inquirable by the tender of a demy mark in the King's Case Fitz. N. Br. f. 31. Letter D. Littl. Coke 294. b. in droit d'Advowson is not traversable neither alone in a Quare Impedit But no Demurrer being thereupon nor no Issue taken upon that Traverse no more shall be said of it 4. The King may alledge Seisin without alledging any time as Sir Edward Coke saith in a droit d'Advowson 26 H. 8. f. 4. a. Hob. Digby Fitz. herb f. 102. and Moore and Newmans Case f. 80. and 103. Rice and Harrisons Case Yelverton f. 211. 5. The Defendants Traverse was not necessary because he had confess'd and avoided the Queens Presentation by saying it was by Lapse if the Defendant had rested upon avoiding the Queens Presentation 6. The Attorney General ought to have maintain'd his Count and travers'd the Queens Presentation by Lapse 7. He doth not do so but deserts making the Kings Title appear and falls upon the Plaintiffs Title that the Advowson was not appendant 8. He offers a double Issue that the Presentation of Phineas White was by Vsurpation and the Advowson not appendant to the Mannor Certain Premisses If a man Counts or Declares in a Quare Impedit That he or his Ancestors or such from whom he claims were seis'd of the Advowson of the Church but declares of no Presentation made by him or them such Count or Declaration is not good and the Defendant may Demurr upon it so is the express Book following 1. A man shall not have a Quare Impedit Fitzh Nat. Br.
it do induce that with a Title of mine own that you shall fly upon my Title to impeach it and forsake your own as I said before 4. Though I should being Plaintiff make it appear to the Court That the Defendants Title is not good but no way making it appear that my own Title is good what inducement can the Court have to judge for me and against the Defendant when no more right appears for the one than the other and not only so but no right appears for either For in such Case sure Melior est Conditio possidentis I ought not to be sued by him I have not wrong'd and he which hath no right can suffer no wrong 5. It is to no end the Plaintiff should set forth any Title at all if he be not to make it good but it should serve his turn only to impeach the Defendants Title and conclude so unreasonably That if I can make it appear the Defendant hath not a good Title therefore I have and must have Iudgment for me How far in the King's Case the Law differs not from a Common Persons Case 1. And where the King's Title in a Quare Impedit brought by him appears to be no more than a bare suggestion the King can no more than a Common Person and for the same reasons forsake his own Title and endeavour only the destroying of the Defendants Title for the weakning of the Defendants Title without more can no more make a good Title to the King than it can to a Common Person 2. If the King or his Predecessor hath presented by reason of Wardship of Lapse of the Temporalties of a Bishop in his hands of Outlawry and in many other Cases when the Church becomes void next after the Wards Age and suing his Livery after the death of him presented by Lapse Restitution of the Temporalties and Reversal of the Outlawry In all these Cases if the King brings a Quare Impedit and counts that he was seised of the Advowson in gross and presented When the true Patron shall confess his Presentation and avoid it by shewing in their several Cases That his Presentation was in right of the Ward by Lapse by reason of Outlawry or of Temporalties being in his hands The King shall desert his own Title and controvert the Defendants respective Titles in whose Right he did formerly present and if their Title happen to appear not good recover the second Presentation against those manifest Rules of Law deliver'd 3. If this should be Law generally then though the King have no Title to present nor pretend to any for it differs not not to pretend at all and not to be obliged to make good the Title pretended it were a more compendious way when any Patron presented That the King should by Scire Facias compel him to set forth his Title and Demurr upon it or Traverse it and recover the Presentation if the Patrons Title were any way defective Wherein the Law differs in the Kings Case from a Common Persons Case But it must be agreed there are Cases in which the King may desert his own Title and not joyn Issue upon the Defendants Traversing the King's Title or avoiding it but Traverse the Title made by the Defendant in his Barr which is directly taking a Traverse upon a Traverse which regularly a Common Person cannot do nor I think in any Case Long 5 E. 4. in Waste for cutting so many Trees and selling them f. 100. b. but where the first Traverse tender'd by the Defendant is not material to the Action brought as in the Case of Waste in Long 5. E. 4. Hob. Digby Fitz-herbert's Case Woodroffe Codford's Case 37 Eliz. Hob. f. 105. 13 E. 4. f. 8. a. 3 H. 7. f. 3. Stamford Praerogative f. 64. b. The King counting of a Title to himself by Office found or by other matter of Record which is another thing than only surmising a Title as in the Case at Barr may chuse to maintain his own Title found by Office and Traversed by the Defendant or otherwise appearing of Record and take a Traverse to the Title made by the Defendant The Reason is manifest for the Office of it self is a Title appearing for the King and he shall never lose his Possession having a Title but where the Defendants Title doth appear a better But what is this that the King should Relinquish his own Title only surmis'd and controvert the Defendants So is 13 E. 4. f. 8. and many other Books whose Title though it should appear naught leaves no Title in the King But when an Office is found or a Title for the King appears by other matter of Record if the Defendant have no Title the King hath one by his Office or other Record Some Books prima facie seem to make for that Opinion That the King may generally desert his own Title and take a Traverse to the Defendants Br. Prerogative pl. 65. 7 E. 6. Brook Title Prerogative pl. 65 Where a man Traverseth the Office of the King and makes to himself a Title ut oportet Traversing the Title of the King contain'd in the Office the King may chuse to maintain his own Title or to Traverse the Title alledg'd for the King is not bound to stand to the first Traverse which tenders an Issue but may Traverse the matter of the Plea of his Adversary For this no ancient Book is cited But dicitur Hillar 7 E. 6. quod sic utitur in an Information put by the Subject for the King in Scaccario that where the Defendant pleads a Barr and Traverseth the Information the King may Traverse the matter of the Barr if he will 7 E. 6. and is not bound to maintain the matter contain'd in the Absque hoc This Case as appears in the first part of it was in the Case of an Office and therefore makes not at all against my Diversity In the latter part the Assertion seems more general as if the King could in any Case desert to maintain the matter of his Information and Traverse the Barr of the Defendant but there is nothing in this part of the Case positive enough to over-rule my Difference and is no more but Sic utitur ut dicitur in Scaccario which may be a mistaken Report The other Case is likewise in Brook Br. Travers per sans ceo p. 369. 38 H. 8. but no ancient Book-Case cited but only 38 H. 8. and no more An Information in the Chequer the Defendant pleads and Traverseth a material point in the Information whereupon they are at Issue there the King cannot waive this Issue as he may in other Cases where the King alone is party without an Informer ut supra per Attornatum Regis alios legis peritos This Case seems likewise to conclude That when the Information is only for the King and a material point Traversed upon which Issue is joyn'd that the King is not bound
of that made in 27 H. 8. Therefore it is manifest That the sole Reason why no such lease was admitted to be in 28 H. 8. is no other than because the Jury find no such to have been made but find a suggestion of it only in Rochester's lease And it is the same exactly in our present Case The third thing deducible from the Case is That a Demise by Indenture for a term Habendum from the Expiration of another recited or mentioned term therein 35 H. 6. 34 Br. Tit. Faits p. 4. 12 H. 4. 23 Br. Faits 21. which is not or not found to be which is the same thing is no Estoppel or Conclusion to the Lessee or Lessor but that the Lessee may enter immediately and the Lessor demise or grant in Reversion after such immediate lease There is another Case resolv'd at the same time between the same Persons and concerning the same Land and published in the same Report and specially found by the same Jury Edward Earl of Oxford Son of John the Son of John Earl of Oxford by Indenture between him and Geoffry Morley Dated the Fourteenth of July 15 Elizabethae reciting That John his Father by Indenture the Thirtieth of July 35 H. 8. had demised to Robert Rochester the said Farm or Mannor of Blacon Habendum for Thirty years from the end or determination of the lease made to Anne Seaton the Tenth of February 27 H. 8. which is a false recital for the lease to Rochester was to commence from the end or determination of a lease made to Anne Seaton that is recited to be made the Tenth of February 28 H. 8. and that afterwards the said John Earl of Oxford had granted by Indenture Dated the Six and twentieth of March 35 H. 8. reciting the lease to Anne Seaton the Tenth of February 27 H. 8. to Hamlett Freer the Reversion of the said Mannor of Blacon Habendum the said Mannor and Premisses from such time as the same shall revert or come to the possession of the said Earl or his Heirs by Surrender Forfeiture or otherwise for Sixty years for so is the Case put in one part of the Report but in another part of it it seems to be That the Demise to Freer was when it should revert after the Expiration Surrender or Forfeiture omitting the words or otherwise of the Lease made to Anne Seaton which will nothing vary the Case The said Edward Earl of Oxford 〈…〉 demised the said Mannor or Farm of Blacon to the said Geoffry Morley Habendum from the end of the said Leases for Fifty years The Question was Whether any of these leases made either to Hamlett Freer or Morley be good or were in esse at the time of the lease made by Sir Randolph Crew to the Plaintiff Sir Randolph Crew claiming the Inheritance from the Earl of Oxford and Sir William Norris the Leases from Freer and Morley and under him the Defendant And Iudgment was given in Chester for the Plaintiff And upon a Writ of Error of this Iudgment brought in the Kings Bench wherein the Error assign'd was The giving of Iudgment for the Plaintiff After several Arguments at Barr and at the Bench Seriatim by the Iustices it was unanimously agreed The Iudgment in Chester for the Plaintiff should be affirmed And that neither the Lease to Freer nor that to Morley was good to avoid the Plaintiffs Title As for the lease to Freer it being a grant of a Reversion nominally and by Agreement of Parties there being no Reversion because no lease at the time of the Grant was in esse either of Seatons or Rochesters upon a point of Rasure in Rochester's Demise found in the Case and for that Land in possession could not pass by the name of a Reversion though by the name of Land a Reversion may pass for he who will grant Land in possession cannot be thought not to grant the same if only in Reversion L. Chandoes Case 6. Rep. according to the doctrine of Throgmorton's Case in the Commentaries And for that Morley's lease was to commence after the lease granted to Rochester which was to commence after that granted to Seaton the Tenth of February 27 H. 8. whereas no such lease was granted to Rochester but a lease to commence after one granted to Seaton in 28 H. 8. It was resolv'd None of those leases were in esse and that Morley's lease commenced therefore presently The words of the Resolution are these as to Morley's Lease It was Resolv'd that Morley's Lease was not in esse for that misrecites the former Leases and so hath the same Rule as the former where it recites Leases and there be none such Therefore it shall begin from the Date which being in the Fifteenth of the Queen for Fifty years ended 1623. which was before the Lease made to the Plaintiff for these Reasons Judgment was affirmed The same Conclusions are deducible from this lease to Morley as from the former to Rochester and therefore I will not repeat them But here are two Judgments in the very point of our Case and affirmed in a Writ of Error unanimously in the Kings Bench. And where it is thought material that the Jury have found a half years Rent to have been behind at Michaelmas 1643. and thence inferr'd the Jury have found the leases by which that Rent was ascertain'd namely the leases of 29 H. 8. and 1 E. 6. Surely if a lease be for a term of years to commence from the end of a former term and for such Rent as is reserv'd upon such former Demise that never was as no term can commence from the end of another which never was so no Rent can be behind which cannot appear but by a Demise which was never made that is which is never found to be made Add further That if the Iury had found the Leases of 29 H. 8. and 1 E. 6. to have been made as is mentioned in the lease of 1 Mar. that had not been a sufficient finding of them For a Deed is not found at all nor a last Will when only the Jury find but part of the Deed or Will for the Court cannot Iudge but upon the whole and not upon part It it be found in Assise the Defendant was Tenant and disseis'd the Plaintiff nisi verba contenta in ultima voluntate W. M. give a lawful Estate from W. M. to R. M. and find the words contain'd in the Will but not the Will at large the Court cannot judge upon this Verdict 38. 39 El. B.R. West and Mounsons C. Rolls 696. Tit. Tryal whose Office it is to judge upon the whole Will which is not found 38 39 El. B. R. West and Mounsons Case Rolls 696. Title Tryal So for the same reason finding but part of a recited Deed and not the whole is as if no part were found and it appears by the Deed of 1 Mariae that both Deeds of 29 H. 8. and 1 E. 6. are
the Issue was not found Hill 10 Car. 1. B. R. Wilkinson and Meriams Case Rolls 700. 701. Tit. Tryal If a Jury find that J.S. was seis'd in Fee of Land and posses'd of certain Leases for years of other Land made his Will in writing and thereby devis'd his Leases to J.D. and after devis'd to his Executors the residue of his Estate Mortgages Goods c. his Debts being paid and funeral Expences discharg'd It being referred by the Jury to the Court Whether by this devise the Executor hath an Estate in Fee or not This is no perfect special Verdict because the Jury find not the Debts paid and the Funeral Expences discharg'd which is a Condition precedent to the Executors having an Estate in Fee and without finding which the Court cannot resolve the matter to them referr'd by the Jury Therefore a Venire facias de novo was awarded Judgment was given for the Defendant Trin. 22. Car. II. C. B. Rot. 461. Richard Edgcomb Knight of the Bath Executor of Pierce Edgcomb Esquire his Father is Plaintiff Rowland d ee Administrator of Charles Everard Esquire during the Minority of Charles Everard Son of the Intestate Defendant In an Action of the Case upon an Assumpsit THE Plaintiff declares That the Intestate the Thirteenth of July 1664. at London in the Parish of St. Mary Bow in the Ward of Cheap in consideration that the said Pierce Edgcomb would at his request lend him 500 l. promis'd the said Pierce to repay it within Seven daies after demand with Interest after the rate of 4 l. per Centum That thereupon the said Pierce Edgcomb after at the time and place aforesaid did lend the said Intestate 500 l. That the said Pierce the Testator afterwards the Fourteenth of July 17 Car. 2. at the place aforesaid required the Intestate to pay the said 500 l. with Interest after the rate aforesaid both which amounted to the Sum of 520 l. He lays further That the said Intestate was indebted to Pierce the Testator the Fourteenth day of July 1664. in the Sum of 500 l. for mony before that time to him lent by the said Pierce And in Consideration thereof the said Fourteenth of July 1664. in the said Parish and Ward promis'd to pay when requir'd But that neither the Intestate in his life time nor the Defendant to whom the Administration of his Goods were committed during the Minority of Charles Everard Son of the said Intestate at London in the Parish and Ward aforesaid did pay the said Sums nor either of them amounting to 1020 l. to the said Pierce Edgcomb in his life time nor to the said Richard the Plaintiff after his death Though required by the Intestate afterwards in his life time that is upon the First of August 17 Car. 2. And the said Defendant after the death of the Intestate viz. the Tenth day of March 18 Car. 2. and often after at the said Parish and Ward by the Testator Pierce were requir'd And the said Defendant after the death of the Testator the First day of January 21 Car. 2. was required at the place aforesaid by the Plaintiff to pay the said mony which he did not and still refuses to his damage of 800 l. The Defendant pleads payment after the Plaintiffs Writ purchas'd of several great debts due by Bond and Bills obligatory from the Intestate to several persons at his death in number One and thirty That the Intestate the Two and twentieth of December 16 Car. 2. became bound in a Recognizance in the Chancery to Sir Harbottle Grimstone Baronet Master of the Rolls and to Sir Nathaniel Hobart one of the Masters of the Chancery in 2000 l. And that the said 2000 l. is still due and unpaid and the said Recognizance in its full force unsatisfied or discharg'd He pleads the City of London is an ancient City and that within it time out of mind hath been held a Court of Record of the Kings c. before the Mayor and Aldermen of the said City in Camera Guild-hall ejusdem Civitatis of all personal Actions arising and growing within the said City That the Intestate at the time of his death was indebted apud London praedict in the Parish and Ward praedict to one William Allington in 2670 l. 17 s. 7 d. And who after the purchase of the Plaintiffs Writ the Tenth of March the Eighteenth of the King came to the said Court before Sir Thomas Bludworth then Mayor and the Aldermen in the said Chamber according to the Custome of the said City held us'd and approv'd Et praedictus Willielmus Allington tunc ibidem in eadem Curia secundum consuetudinem praedictae Civitatis affirmabat contra praedictum Rolandum Dee ut Administratorem c. quandam Billam originalem de placito debiti super demand Mille sexcentarum septuaginta librarum decem septem solidorum septem denariorum legalis monetae c. And that it was so proceeded according to the Custome of the said City that the said William Allington had Judgment to recover against the Defendant the said Debt and 85 l. 16 s. for damages c. And that after the Defendant in full satisfaction of the said Judgment paid to the said William Allington the Sum of 2670 l. and 17 s. Then pleads about Four and twenty Recoveries and Judgments thereupon in the Kings Bench in Pleas of Debt without Specialties all satisfied but one of 7000 l. and more due to one Cornwallis Then pleads Plene administravit all the Goods of the Intestate at the time of his death to be administred and that he had not die Impetrationis brevis Originalis praedicti nec unquam postea aliqua bona seu cattalla predict Car. Everard tempore mortis suae in manibus suis administrand praeterquam bona cattalla ad valentiam separalium denariorum summarum per ipsum sic ut praefertur solutarum in exonerationem separalium Judiciorum scriptorum obligatori orum billarum obligatoriarum predict Ac praeter alia bona cattalla ad valentiam decem solidorum quae executioni Recognitionis praedict ac Judicii praedicti per praefatum Carolum Cornwallis versus ipsum ut praefertur recuperat onerabilia onerata existunt Et quod ipse Rolandus modo non habet aliqua bona seu cattalla quae fuerunt praedict Caroli tempore mortis suae administrand praeter praedicta bona catalla ad valentiam praedictorum decem solidorum quae executioni recognitionis praedict ac Judicii praedict per praefatum Carolum Cornwallis recuperat sic ut praefertur onerata onerabilia existunt Et hoc paratus est c. Et petit Judicium Then Averrs the debts so as aforesaid by him paid to be bonâ fide paid pro veris justis debitis owing and unpaid by the Intestate at the time of his death And that the several Iudgments aforesaid against him recover'd were for true and just debts of
did the principal Trespass were convicted And the reason of that Law is very pressing for else a man may be found Culpable of aiding or precepting a Trespass to be done when the doers of the Trespass are acquitted and not Culpable which is to be Culpable of aiding the doing of a thing never done which is impossible It will be said The Law in that Case is since alter'd and otherwise practis'd But who could alter a Law affirm'd by Judgment in Parliament to be the Custome and Law of the Kingdome without an Act of Parliament to alter it which was not or at least an Error in another Parliament if that might be which is not so clear For this is not like a Judgment given in one Court and after contraried in another or in the Chequer Chamber Any Law of the Kingdom might as well be alter'd without Act of Parliament as this 5. However letting that pass but as the Law is now taken no man can be guilty of aid or assistance to a Trespass not done and which is the same whereof the Actors are acquitted But in this Case They that put the Plaintiff in the Stocks are found not Guilty and another Defendant found Guilty for bidding him be put in the Stocks 6. Another reason is That Coxe cannot be Culpable of a Trespass which cannot or must not be proved which is the same But by the Statute no regard or respect is to be had of the Evidence proving the Trespass if the Fact be not proved to be done where the Action is laid Therefore there can be no Evidence against Coxe for Evidence not to be regarded and not at all is the same 7. If the other Defendants cannot by the Statute be found Culpable because they were aiding and assisting the Constable though in an undue execution of his Office no more can Coxe For aid or assistance may be by direction or precept as well as by corporal strength And therefore if they be free for assisting to put the Plaintiff in the Stocks forcibly Coxe is free for advising and bidding him be put there directively 8. Lastly the Statute intends like benefit to the Defendants when the Fact is not proved to be done where the Action is laid as if the Plaintiff became Nonsuit or suffer'd a discontinuance But in case of Nonsuit or Discontinuance all the Defendants were to have their double Costs both by 7 and 21 Jac. for a Nonsuit or Discontinuance cannot be against some of the Defendants for the Nonsuit and Discontinuance are of the entire action Therefore here all the Defendants shall have double Costs And if the Iury had not meant the Defendants equally free or equally faulty they would have added in their Verdict That if upon the whole matter found the Court should think that Actio praedicta would lye in London against some of the Defendants and not others then they found such against whom it might be laid in London Culpable and the rest not Culpable The Record is Et praedictus Richardus Coxe Miles Except accersivit the Constable whereas there is no praedictus Richardus Coxe Miles but Baronettus and there is another praedictus Richardus Coxe Armâ—ger which makes the Verdict incertain in this point Quaerens nil Capiat c. Pasch 21 Car. II. in Banc. William Hayes Plaintiff and Charles Bickerstaff Defendant In Arrest of Judgment CHarles Bickerstaff being possessed of a long term of years in certain Woodlands and Copces in Cobham in the County of Kent Demis'd Sett and to Farm lett the same for Six years parcel of his term to the Plaintiff under a Rent and other Reservations and Covenanted The Plaintiff keeping and performing the Agreements of his part to be kept and performed Quod praedictus Willielmus Hayes legitime haberet teneret gauderet habere tenere gaudere potuisset praedicta dimissa praemissa juxta conventionem praeantea in per Indenturam praedict dimiss absque aliquo impedimento perturbatione evictione vel interruptione quibuscunque de vel per dictum Carolum Bickerstaff Executores Administratores vel Assignatos suos aut aliquem eorum prout per Indenturam praedictam plenius apparet That by virtue of the said Demise he entred and was posses'd and that after the Defendant being possess'd for a longer term granted the Reversion to Charles Duke of Lenox to whom the Plaintiff atturn'd and that afterwards the said Duke and others by his command entred upon the Plaintiff although he observ'd all Agreements of his part and carried away many Loads of Faggots and Wood and kept and still keeps him out of Possession to his Damage of Eight hundred pounds And brings his Action for breach of the Covenant aforesaid The Defendant pleads Enjoyment according to the Demise and Traverseth the Grant of the Reversion to the Duke Modo Forma All Covenants between a Lessor and his Lessee are either Covenants in Law or Express Covenants By Covenant in Law the Lessee is to enjoy his Lease against the lawful Entry Eviction or Interruption of any man but not against tortious Entries Evictions or Interruptions and the reason of Law is solid and clear because against tortious acts the Lessee hath proper Remedy against the wrong doers So are the express Books of 22 H. 6. 22 H. 6. f. 52. b. 32 H. 6. f. 32 b. N. Br. â—45 b. Letter L. where a man leas'd by Deed-poll without express Covenant and 32 H. 6. where the Lease was by Deed Indented If the Lessor seaseth the term by Deed-poll Nat. Br. and outeth the Lessee he shall have a Writ of Covenant upon that Deed-poll although he hath no Indenture of it But if a stranger who hath no right outs the Lessee then he shall not have a Writ of Covenant against the Lessor because he hath remedy by Action against the stranger but if a stranger enter by elder Title then he shall have a Writ of Covenant for he hath no other Remedy This shews the Law gives not Remedy to the Lessee upon the Covenant when he hath a proper and natural Remedy against another who doth the wrong By the same Reason if the Lessee be by express Covenant to enjoy his term or enjoy it against all men which is the same he shall not have an Action of Covenant against the Lessor unless he be legally outed or evicted For if he be outed tortiously by any stranger he hath his Remedy So is the express Book of 26 H. 6. f. 3. b. where it is agreed That the warranty of a Lease for years is but an Action of Covenant which extends not to tortious Entries for the former Reason Yet I agree If the Lessor expresly Covenants that the Lessee shall hold and enjoy his term without the Entry or Interruption of any whether such Entry or Interruption be lawful or tortious There the Lessor shall be charg'd by an Action of Covenant for the tortious Entry of a stranger because no other
meaning can be given to his Covenant Accordingly the new Authorities run grounded upon that sound and ancient Reason of Law That the Lessor shall not be charg'd with an Action upon his express Covenant for enjoyment of the term against all men where the Lessee hath his proper Remedy against the wrong doer Against this Truth there is one Book that hath or may be pretended which I will cite in the first place because the Answer to it may be more perspicuous from the Authority I shall after deliver to redargue that Case Dyer 15 16 Eliz. 328. a. pl. 8. It is the Case of Mountford and Catesby in the Lord Dyer Catesby in consideration of a Sum of mony and a Horse made a Lease to Mountford for term of years Et super se assumpsit quod the Plaintiff Mountford pacifice quiete haberet gauderet the Land demis'd durante termino sine evictione interruptione alicujus personae after Catesby's Father entred upon him and so interrupted him whereupon Mountford brought his Action upon this Assumpsit and Catesby pleaded he did not assume and found against him It was moved in Arrest of Judgment for the Defendant That the entry might be wrongful for which the Plaintiff had his Remedy but disallowed and Iudgment affirmed for the Plaintiff because saith the Book it is an express presumption and assumption that the Plaintiff should not be interrupted And this Case is not expresly denied to be Law in Essex and Tisdales Case in the Lord Hobart as being an express Assumption Though the Lord Dyers Case be an Action of the Case upon an Assumpsit and out Case an Action of Covenant yet in the nature of the Obligation there seems no difference but in the form of the Action For to assume that a man shall enjoy his term quietly without interruption and to covenant he shall so enjoy it seems the same undertaking But if the reason of Law differ in an Assumpsit from what it is in a Covenant as seems implyed in Tisdales Case then this Case of the Lord Dyer makes nothing against the Case in question which is upon a Covenant not an Assumpsit Hob. f. 34 35. 1. Elias Tisdale brought an Action of Covenant against Sir William Essex and declared That Sir William convenit promisit agreavit ad cum praedict Elia quod ipse idem Elias haberet occuparet gauderet certain Lands for Seven years into which he entred and that one Elsing had Ejected him and kept him out ever since Resolv'd because no Title is laid in Elsing he shall be taken to enter wrongfully and the Lessee hath his Remedy against him Therefore adjudg'd for the Defendant Essex Here is a Covenant for enjoying during the term the same with enjoying without interruption for if the enjoyment be interrupted he doth not enjoy during the term the same with enjoying without any interruption the same with enjoying without interruption of any person which is the Lord Dyers Case but here adjudg'd the interruption must be legal or an Action of Covenant will not lye because there is remedy against the Interrupter So is there in the Lord Dyer's Case And a Rule of that Book is That the Law shall never judge that a man Covenants against the wrongful acts of strangers unless the words of the Covenant be full and express to that purpose which they are not in our present Case because the Law defends against wrong Brocking brought an Action upon an Assumpsit against one Cham and declared Brocking versus Cham Cr. 15 Jac. f. 4. 5. p. 10. That the Defendant assumed the Plaintiff should enjoy certain Lands according to his Lease without the lett interruption or incumbrance of any person and shews in Fact That this Land was extended for Debt due to the King by process out of the Exchequer and so incumbred After Verdict for the Plaintiff it was moved in Arrest of Iudgment That no good breach was assigned because he did not shew that the Incumbrance was a lawful Incumbrance for else he might have his Remedy elsewhere and Iudgment was given for the Defendant This Case was upon an Assumpsit as the Lord Dyers was and by as ample words for the Land was to be enjoyed without any lett which is equivalent to the words of quiete pacifice in the Lord Dyers Case which is a Case in terminis adjudged contrary to that in the Lord Dyer and upon the same reason of Law in an Assumpsit as if it had been a Covenant viz. because the Plaintiff had his Remedy against the wrong doer Chauntfloure brought an Action of Covenant against one Pristly and Doctor Waterhouse as Executors of John Mountfitchett Cr. 45 El. f. 914. pl. 4. and declared That the Testator had sold him Nine and twenty Tuns of Copras and agreed That if the Testator faild of payment of a certain Sum of mony upon a day certain That the Plaintiff might quietly have and enjoy the said Copras that the money was not paid at the day and that he could not have and enjoy the said Nine and twenty Tuns of Copras Iudgment was given by Nihil dicit against the Defendants and upon a Writ of Enquiry of Damages 260 l. Damages given Vpon motion in Arrest of Iudgment It was resolved by the whole Court That the breach of Covenant was not well assign'd because no lawful disturbance was alledg'd and if he were illegally hindred or disturbed of having the Copras which he had bought he had sufficient remedy against the wrong doers Dod was bound in an Obligation to Hammond conditioned that Hammond and his Heirs might enjoy certain Copyhold Lands surrendred to him The Defendant pleaded the Surrender and that the Plaintiff entred and might have enjoyed the Lands To which the Plaintiff replyed That after his Entry one Gay entred upon him and outed him It was adjudg'd the Replication was naught because he did not shew that he was evicted out of the Land by lawful Title for else he had his Remedy against the wrong doer This was in an Action of Debt upon a Bond condition'd for quiet enjoyment So as neither upon Covenant upon Assumpsit or Bond condition'd for quiet enjoying unless the breach be assign'd for a lawful Entry or Eviction and upon the same reason of Law because the lessee may have his Remedy against the wrong doers an Action of Covenant cannot be maintain'd Cok. 4 Rep. Nokes's Case To these may be added a Resolution in Nokes his Case in the fourth Report where a man was bound by Covenant in Law That his Lessee should enjoy his term and gave Bond for performance of Covenants in an Action of Debt brought upon the Bond the breach was assign'd in that a stranger had recover'd the Land leas'd in an Ejectione firmae and had Execution though this Eviction were by course of law yet for that an elder and sufficient Title was not alledg'd upon which the Recovery was had
cannot answer it Therefore the parties agree the Fact by their pleading upon Demurrer and ask the Iudgment of the Court for the Law In Special Verdicts the Jury Inform the naked Fact and the Court deliver the Law and so is it in Demurrers upon Evidence in Arrest of Judgments upon Challenges and often upon the Judges Opinion of the Evidence given in Court the Plaintiff becomes Nonsuit when if the matter had been left to the Jury they might well have found for the Plaintiff But upon all general Issues as upon not Culpable pleaded in Trespass Nil debet in Debt Nul tort Nul disseisin in Assize Ne disturba pas in Quare Impedit and the like though it be matter of Law whether the Defendant be a Trespassor a Debtor Disseisor or Disturber in the particular Cases in Issue yet the Jury find not as in a Special Verdict the Fact of every Case by it self leaving the Law to the Court but find for the Plaintiff or Defendant upon the Issue to be tryed wherein they resolve both Law and Fact complicately and not the Fact by it self so as though they answer not singly to the Question what is the Law yet they determine the Law in all matters where Issue is joyn'd and tryed in the principal Case but where the Verdict is Special Hob. f. 227. To this purpose the Lord Hobart in Needler's Case against the Bishop of Winchester is very apposite Legally it will be very hard to quit a Jury that finds against the Law either Common Law or several Statute Law whereof all men were to take knowledge and whereupon Verdict is to be given whether any Evidence be given to them or not As if a Feoffment or Devise were made to one imperpetuum and the Jury should find cross either an Estate for Life or in Fee-simple against the Law they should be subject to an Attaint though no man informed them what the Law was in that Case The legal Verdict of the Jury to be recorded is finding for the Plaintiff or Defendant what they answer if asked to questions concerning some particular Fact is not of their Verdict essentially nor are they bound to agree in such particulars if they all agree to find their Issue for the Plaintiff or Defendant they may differ in the motives wherefore as well as Judges in giving Iudgment for the Plaintiff or Defendant may differ in the Reasons wherefore they give that Iudgment which is very ordinary I conclude with the Statute of 26 H. 8. c. 4. That if any Jurors in Wales do acquit any Felon Murderer or Accessary or give an untrue Verdict against the King upon the Tryal of any Traverse Recognizance or Forfeiture contrary to good and pregnant Evidence ministred to them by persons sworn before the Kings Justiciar That then such Jurors should be bound to appear before the Council of the Marches there to abide such Fine or Ransome for their Offence as that Court should think fit If Jurors might have been fined before by the Law for going against their evidence in matters criminal there had been no cause for making this Statute against Jurors for so doing in Wales only Objections out of the Ancient and Modern Books 1. A Juror kept his Fellows a day and night 8 Ass pl. 35. without any reason or assenting and therefore awarded to the Fleet. This Book rightly understood is Law That he staid his Fellows a day and a night without any reason or assenting may be understood That he would not in that time intend the Verdict at all more than if he had been absent from his Fellows but wilfully not find for either side In this sense it was a Misdemeanor against his Oath For his Oath was truly to try the Issue which he could never do that resolv'd not to conferr with his Fellows And in this sense it is the same with the Case 34 E. 3. where Twelve being sworn and put together to treat of their Verdict 34 E. 3. Bra. Title Jurors n. 46. one secretly withdrew himself and went away for which he was justly fined and imprison'd and it differs not to withdraw from a mans duty by departing from his Fellows and to withdraw from it though he stay in the same Room and so is that Book to he understood But if a man differ in Iudgment from his Fellows for a day and a night though his dissent may not be as reasonable as the Opinion of the rest that agree yet if his Iudgment be not satisfied one disagreeing can be no more criminal than four or five disagreeing with the rest 2. A Juror would not agree with his Fellows for two dayes 41 Ass p. 11. and being demanded by the Judges If he would agree said He would first die in Prison whereupon he was committed and the Verdict of the Eleven taken but upon better advice the Verdict of the Eleven was quasht and the Juror discharg'd without Fine and the Justices said the way was to carry them in Carts until they agreed and not by fining them and as the Judges err'd in taking the Verdict of Eleven so they did in imprisoning the Twelfth and this Case makes strongly that the Juror was not to be fined who disagreed in Iudgment only Much of the Office of Jurors in order to their Verdict is ministerial as not withdrawing from their Fellows after they are sworn not withdrawing after challenge and being tryed in before they take their Oath 36 H. 6. f. 27. Br. Jurors 18. not receiving from either side Evidence after their Oath not given in Court not eating and drinking before their Verdict refusing to give a Verdict and the like wherein if they transgress they are finable but the Verdict it self when given is not an Act ministerial but judicial and according to the best of their judgment for which they are not finable nor to be punisht but by Attaint 3. The Case of 7 R. 2. Title Coronae Fitz. 108. was cited where upon acquittal of a Common Thief the Judge said The Jury ought to be bound to his good behaviour during his life But saith the Book quere per quel ley but that was only gratis dictum by the Judge for no such thing was done as binding them Hob. f. 114. 4. Bradshaw and Salmons Case was urg'd where a Jury had given excessive Damages upon a Tryal in an Action of Covenant and the Court of Star-Chamber gave Damages to the Complainant almost as high as the Jury had given upon the Tryal But the Jury who gave the Damages were not question'd Though saith the Book they might have been because they receiv'd Briefs from the Plaintiff for whom they gave Damages which was a Misdemeanor but the express Book is That the Jury could not be punisht by Information for the excessive Damages but only by Attaint therefore not for their false Verdict without other Misdemeanor which answers some other Cases alledg'd Nor can any man shew
a House Barns and Tithe of Woolney and thereof seis'd in the right of his Prebendary makes a Lease to Astly of the Prebend una cum the Glebe House Barn and Tithe for Three Lives rendring the accustomed and ancient Rent of Five pounds Twelve shillings Astly demiseth to Taverner the House Glebe and Barn for a year reserving Twenty shillings and dies the Cestuy que vies living As I concluded before Taverner is Occupant of the House Barn and Glebe-land and consequently lyable to pay the whole Rent being Five pounds twelve shillings yearly though the Land House and Barn be found of the yearly value of Twenty shillings only but because the Rent cannot issue out of Tithes or things that lye in Grant it issues only out of the House Barn and Land which may be distrain'd on 2. If Taverner being Occupant of the Land shall not have the Tithes which remain'd in Astly according to his Lease for three Lives at the time of his death and whereof by their nature there can be no direct Occupancy It follows that the Lease made by Doctor Mallory is determin'd as to the Tithe for no other can have them yet continues in force as to the Land and House and all the Rent reserv'd which seems strange the Land and Tithe being granted by the same Demise for three Lives which still continue yet the Lease to be determined as to part 3. Though the Rent issue not out of the Tithe yet the Tithe was as well a Consideration for the payment of the Rent as the Land and Houses were and it seems unreasonable that the Lessor Doctor Mallory should by act in Law have back the greatest Consideration granted for payment of the Rent which is the Tithe and yet have the Rent wholly out of the Land by act in Law too which cannot yield it 4. Though Doctor Mallory could not have reserv'd a Rent out of the Tithe only to bind his Successor upon a Lease for Lives more than out of a Fair though it were as the ancient Rent and had been usually answered for the Fair as is resolv'd in Jewel Bishop of Sarum's Case Jewell's Case 5 Rep. Yet in this Case where the Tithe together with Land out of which Rent could issue was demis'd for the accustomed Rent the Successor could never avoid the Lease either in the whole or as to the Tithe only 13 Eliz. c. 10. This seems clear by the Statute of 13 Eliz. cap. 10. which saith All Leases made by any Spiritual or Ecclesiastical persons having any Lands Tenements Tithes or Hereditaments parcel of the Possessions of any Spiritual Promotion other than for One and twenty years or three Lives whereupon the accustomed yearly Rent or more shall be reserv'd shall be void Cokes Litt. f. 142. a. f. 144. a. Whence it is apparent this Statute intended that Leases in some sense might be made of Tithes for One and twenty years or Three Lives and an ancient Rent reserv'd but of a bare Tithe only a Rent could not be reserv'd according to Jewell's Case for neither Distress nor Assise can be of such Rent though an Assise may be de Portione Decimarum as is clear by the Lord Dyer 7 E. 6. and the difference rightly stated Therefore a Lease of Tithe and Land out of which a Rent may issue and the accustomed Rent may be reserved must be good within the intention of the Statute or Tithe could in no sense be demis'd 5. Taverner the Lessee being Occupant here by his possession becomes subject to the payment of the Rent to Waste to Forfeiture Conditions and all things that Astly the Lessee or his Assignee if he had made any had been subject to Also Coke's Litt. 41. He must claim by a que Estate from Astly he must averr the Life of Cestuy que vie so as he becomes to all intents an Assignee in Law of the first Lessee 6. Without question the Occupant being chargeable with the Rent shall by Equity have the Tithe which was the principal Consideration for payment of the Rent when no man can have the benefit of the Tithe but the Lessor Doctor Mallory who gave it as a Consideration for the Rent which he must still have Therefore I conceive the Reason of Law here ought necessarily to follow the Reason of Equity and that the Occupant shall have the Tithe not as being immediate Occupant of the Tithe whereof no occupancy can be but when by his possession of the Land he becomes Occupant and the Law casts the Freehold upon him he likewise thereby becomes an Assignee in Law of Astly's Lease and Interest and consequently of the Tithe An ancient Rent reserv'd within the Statute of 1. or 13. of the Queen upon a Lease of One and twenty years or Three Lives is by express intention of that Statute a Rent for publique use and maintenance of Hospitality by Church-men as is resolv'd in Elsemere's Case Elsmers C. 5. Rep. the 5. Rep. and therefore if the Lessee provide not an Assignee to answer the Rent to the Successors of the Lessor for the ends of that Law the Law will do it for him and none fitter to be so than the Occupant in case of a Lease pur auter vie as this is And if the Occupant being Assignee hath pass'd all his Estate and Interest to the Plaintiff hath good cause of Action for the Tithe converted by the Defendant Pasch 22 Car. II. Judgment for the Defendant Three Justices against the Chief Justice Trin. 20 Car. II. C. B. Rot. 2043. Harrison versus Doctor Burwell In a Prohibition for his Marriage with Jane the Relict of Bartholomew Abbot his Great Uncle The Questions are Quest 1 WHether the marriage of Thomas Harrison the Plaintiff with Jane his now wife being the Relict of Bartholomew Abbot his great Vncle that is his Grand-fathers Brother by the Mothers side be a lawful marriage within the Act of 32 H. 8. cap. 38 Quest 2 Admitting it to be a lawful marriage within the meaning of that Act Whether the Kings Temporal Courts are properly Judges of it because the unlawfulness or lawfulness of it by that Act doth depend upon its being a marriage within or without the Levitical Degrees For if within those Degrees it is not a lawful marriage by that Act. And the right knowledge of marriages within or without those Degrees must arise from the right knowledge ot the Scriptures of the Old Testament specially the Interpretation of which hath been and regularly is of Ecclesiastick Conizance and not of Lay or Temporal Conizance in regard of the Language wherein it was writ and the receiv'd Interpretations concerning it in all succession of time Quest 3 Admitting the Kings Temporal Courts have by that Act of 32. or any other special Conizance of the Levitical Degrees and of marriages within them And though this be no marriage within the Levitical Degrees it being articled in general to be an Incestuous marriage
The first is Haynsworths and Prettyes Case Where a man seis'd of Land in Soccage having Issue two Sons and a Daughter devis'd to his youngest Son and Daughter Twenty pounds apiece to be paid by his eldest Son and devis'd his Lands to his eldest Son and his Heirs upon Condition if he paid not those Legacies that his Land should be to his second Son and Daughter and their Heirs The eldest Son fail'd of payment After Argument upon a Special Verdict It was resolv'd by the Court clearly That the second Son and Daughter should have the Land 1. For that the devise to his Son and his Heir in Fee Hill 41. El. Cr. 833. a. being no other then what the Law gave him was void 2. That it was a future devise to the second Son and Daughter upon the contingent of the eldest Sons default of payment 3. That it was no more in effect than if he had devis'd That if his eldest Son did not pay all Legacies that his land should be to the Legatories and there was no doubt in that Case but the land in default of payment should vest in them Which Case in the reason of law differs not from the present Case where the land is devis'd by devise future and executory to the Nephew upon a contingent to happen by the Testators Son and Daughters having no issue 18 Jac. Pell Browns C. Cro. f. 590. The second Case is that of Pell and Brown the Father being seis'd of certain land having Issue William his eldest Son Thomas and Richard Brown devis'd the land to Thomas and his Heirs for ever and if Thomas died without Issue living William then William should have the lands to him his Heirs and Assigns 1. This was adjudg'd an Estate in Fee-simple in Thomas 2. That William by way of Executory devise had an Estate in Fee-simple in possibility if Thomas died without Issue before him And it being once clear That the Estate of Thomas was a Fee-simple determinable upon a contingent and not an Estate tayl and so in the present case it being clear'd that George the Testators Son had the land descended to him in Fee from the Testator and took no Estate tayl expresly or by implication from the Will it will not be material whether the Contingent which shall determine that Fee-simple proceeds from the person which hath such determinable Fee or from another or partly from him and partly from another as in Haynsworth's Case the Son determined his Fee-simple by not paying the Legacies in Pell and Brown's Case Thomas his Fee-simple determined by his dying without Issue living William the Fee-simple vested in George the Son by descent determines when he and his two Sisters dye without Issue and upon such determination in every of these Cases the future and executory devise must take effect But the great Objection is That if this should be an executory devise to the Nephew upon the contingent of George the Son and both his Sisters dying without Issue It will be dangerous to introduce a new way of perpetuity for if a man have several Children and shall permit his Estate to descend or by his Will devise it to his Heir so as he may therein have an unquestionable Fee-simple which is the same with permitting it to descend he may then devise it futurely when all his Children shall dye without Issue of their bodies to J. S. and his Heirs as long as A. B. and C. strangers shall have any Heirs of their bodies living and then to a third person by like future devise For if he should devise it futurely to J. S. and his Heirs as long as J. S. had any Heirs of his body it were a clear Estate tayl in J. S. upon which no future devise could be but it would be a Remainder to be docked This Objection was in some measure made by Doderidge in Pell and Browns Case and the Iudges said there was no danger Vid. Stiles Rep. Gay Gaps Case 258 275. because the Estate in Fee of Thomas did not determine by his dying without Heir of his body generally but by dying without Issue living William for if the land had been given to Thomas and his Heirs for ever and if he died without Heirs of his body then to William and his Heirs Thomas his Estate had been judg'd an Estate tayl with the Remainder to William and not a Fee upon which no future or executory devise can be So was it adjudg'd in Foy and Hinds Case 22 Jac. Cr. f. 695. 6. and anciently 37 Ass p. 18. 5. H. 5. f. 6. and to be within the reason of Mildmay and Corbets Case of Perpetuities But in Pell and Browns Case the Iudges said it was more dangerous to destroy future devises than to admit of such Perpetuities as could follow from them any way by determinable Fee-simples which is true for a Fee simple determinable upon a contingent is a Fee-simple to all intents but not so durable as absolute Fee-simples And all Fee-simples are unequally durable for one will escheat sooner than another by the failer of Heirs An Estate of Fee-simple will determine in a Bastard with his life if he want Issue An Estate to a man and his Heirs as long as John Stiles hath any Heir which is no absolute Fee-simple is doubtless as durable as the Estate in Fee which John Stiles hath to him and his Heirs which is an absolute Fee-simple Nor do I know any Law simply against a Perpetuity but against Intails of Perpetuity for every Fee-simple is a perpetuity but in the accident of Alienation and Alienation is an incident to a Fee-simple determinable upon a contingent as to any more absolute or more perdurable Fee-simple The Chief Justice Justice Archer and Justice Wylde for the Defendant Justice Tyrrell for the Plaintiff Judgment for the Defendant Hill 21 22 Car. II. C. B. Craw versus Ramsey Philip Craw is Plaintiff and John Ramsey Defendant In an Action of Trespass and Ejectment THE Plaintiff declares That Lionel Tolmach Baronet and Humphrey Weld Esquire January the Twentieth the Sixteenth of the King demis'd to the Plaintiff the Mannor of Kingston with the appurtenances in the County of Surrey one Messuage two Barns one Dove-house two Gardens eighty Acres of Land and ten Acres of Meadow with the appurtenances in Kingston aforesaid and other places and also the Rectory of Kingston aforesaid To have and to hold to the said Philip and his Assignes from the Feast of the Nativity last past for five years next ensuing By virtue whereof he entred into the Premisses and was possessed until the Defendant the said Twentieth of January in the Sixteenth year of the King entred upon him and Ejected him with force to his Damage of Forty pounds To this the Defendant pleads he is not Culpable Vpon a Special Verdict it appear'd That Robert Ramsey Alien Antenatus had Issue 1. Robert 2. Nicholas 3. John 4. George Antenatos
eas in omnibus sequantur In cujus c. T. R. apud Wadestocks ix die Septembris Out of the Close Rolls of King Henry the Third his Time Clause 1 H. 3. dorso 14. The Kings thanks to G. de Mariscis Justice of Ireland The King signifies that himself and other his Lieges of Ireland should enjoy the Liberties which he had granted to his Lieges of England and that he will grant and confirm the same to them Clause 3. H. 3. m. 8. part 2. The King writes singly to Nicholas Son of Leonard Steward of Meth and to Nicholas de Verdenz and to Walter Purcell Steward of Lagenia and to Thomas the son of Adam and to the King of Connage and to Richard de Burgh and to J. Saint John Treasurer and to the other Barons of the Exchequer of Dublin That they be intendant and answerable to H. Lord Arch-bishop of Dublin as to the Lord the King's Keeper and Bailiff of the Kingdome of Ireland as the King had writ concerning the same matter to G. de Mariscis Justice of Ireland Clause 5. H. 3. m. 14. The King writes to his Justice of Ireland That whereas there is but a single Justice itinerant in Ireland which is said to be dissonant from the more approved custome in England for Reasons there specified two more Justices should be associated to him the one a Knight the other a Clerk and to make their Circuits together according to the Custome of the Kingdom of England Witness c. The Close Roll. 5 H. 3. m. 6. Dorso The King makes a Recital That though he had covenanted with Geoffrey de Mariscis That all Fines and other Profits of Ireland should be paid unto the Treasure and to other Bailiffs of the Kings Exchequer of Dublin yet he receiv'd all in his own Chamber and therefore is removed by the King from his Office Whereupon the King by advise of his Council of England establisheth that H. Arch-bishop of Ireland be Keeper of that Land till further order And writes to Thomas the son of Anthony to be answerable and intendant to him After the same manner it is written to sundry Irish Kings and Nobles there specially nominated Clause 7. H. 3. m. 9. The King writes to the Arch-bishop of Dublin his Justice of Ireland to reverse a Judgment there given in a Case concerning Lands in Dalkera between Geoffrey de Mariscis and Eve his wife Plaintiffs and Reignald Talbott Tenant By the Record of the same Plea returned into England the Judgment is reversed upon these two Errors The first because upon Reignald's shewing the Charter of King John the King's Father concerning the same Land in regard thereof desiring peace it was denyed him The second Because the Seisin was adjudged to the said Geoffrey and Eve because Reynald calling us to warranty had us not to warranty at the day set him by the Court which was a thing impossible for either Geoffrey or the Court themselves to do our Court not being above us to summon us or compel us against our will Therefore the King writes to the Justice of Ireland to re-seise Reynald because he was disseised by Erroneous Judgment Clause 28. H. 3. m. 7. The King writes to M. Donenald King of Tirchonill to aid him against the King of Scots Witness c. The like Letters to other Kings and Nobles of Ireland Clause 40. E. 3. m. 12. Dorso The King takes notice of an illegal proceeding to Judgment in Ireland Ordered to send the Record and Process into England It was objected by one of my Brothers That Ireland received not the Laws of England by Act of Parliament of England but at the Common Law by King John's Charter If his meaning be that the Fact was so I agree it but if he mean they could not receive them by Act of Parliament of England as my Brother Maynard did conjecturally inferr for his purpose then I deny my Brothers Assertion for doubtless they might have received them by Act of Parliament And I must clear my Brother Maynard from any mention of an Union as was discoursed of England and Ireland Nor was it at all to his purpose If any Union other than that of a Provincial Government under England had been Ireland had made no Laws more than Wales but England had made them for Ireland as it doth for Wales As for the Judgment Obj. One of my Brothers made a Question Whether George Ramsey the younger Brother inheriting John Earl of Holdernes before the naturalization of Nicholas Whether Nicholas as elder Brother being naturalized should have it from him Doubtless he should if his Naturalizing were good He saith the Plaintiff cannot have Iudgment because a third person by this Verdict hath the Title Answ If a Title appear for the King the Court ex Officio ought to give Iudgment for him though no party But if a man have a prior Possession and another enters upon him without Title I conceive the priority of Possession is a good Title against such an Entry equally when a Title appears for a third that is no party as if no Title appear'd for a third But who is this third party For any thing appears in the Verdict George Ramsey died before the Earl 2. It appears not that his Son John or the Defendant his Grand-child were born within the Kings Liegeance Patient appears to be born at Kingston and so the Daughters of Robert by the Verdict The Acts of Ireland except all Land whereof Office was found before the Act to entitle the King but that is in Ireland for the Act extends not to England If Nicholas have Title it is by the Law of England as a consequent of Naturalization So it may be for the Act of 7 Jac. cap. 2. he that is Naturalized in England since the Act must receive the Sacrament but if no Alien by consequent then he must no more receive the Sacrament than a Postnatus of Scotland Obj. Ireland is a distinct Kingdom from England and therefore cannot make any Law Obligative to England Answ That is no adequate Reason for by that Reason England being a distinct Kingdom should make no Law to bind Ireland which is not so England can naturalize if it please nominally a person in Ireland and not in England But he recover'd by saying That Ireland was subordinate to England and therefore could not make a Law Obligatory to England True for every Law is coactive and it is a contradiction that the Inferior which is civilly the lesser power should compel the Superior which is greater power Secondly He said England and Ireland were two distinct Kingdoms and no otherwise united than because they had one Soveraign Had this been said of Scotland and England it had been right for they are both absolute Kingdoms and each of them Sui Juris But Ireland far otherwise For it is a Dominion belonging to the Crown of England and follows that it cannot be separate from it but by
in time is 11 Jac. in Debt upon a Bond the Action was laid in the County of Hereford upon Nil debet pleaded the Plaintiff had Judgment and Execution and a Writ to the Sheriff of the County of Radnor to levy Execution who did not but made his Retorn That breve Domini Regis non currit there Qu. How an Action of Debt could be laid in Hereford which must be by Original unless the party were in Custodia Mariscal and declared upon a Bond in the County of Hereford Coke the Chief Justice said before the Statute of 27 H. 8. c. 26. which annexed Wales and England doubt might have been in that Case but since the Statute 27 H. 8. it was clear and grounded himself upon a Case in 13 E. 3. of which more anon In this Case the Court did agree That the Writ of Execution did well go into Wales and amerced the Sheriff 10 l. for his had Retorn In this Case Dodridge agreed with Coke and said If the Law should be otherwise all the Executions in England would be defeated This was a Resolution upon some Debate among the Judges of the Court but upon no Argument at Barr for any thing appearing Per Doderidge If Debt be brought against one in London 16 Jac. B.R. Croke 484. and after the Defendant removes and inhabits in Wales a Capias ad satisfaciendum may be awarded against him into Wales or into any County Palatine and this was his Opinion exactly in the former Case But as the course of the Common Pleas was alledged to be contrary to what Mann said was used in the King Bench in the Case of Hall Rotheram 10 Jac. before cited so It was in the same year 11 Jac. wherein the Kings Bench resolved That Execution did well issue to the Sheriff of the County of Radnor of a Recovery in Debt in the Kings Bench and fin'd the Sheriff for his Retorn that breve Domini Regis non currit in Wallia Resolved otherwise in the Common Pleas 11 Jac. Godbolt f. 214. and that by the whole Court That a Fieri facias Capias ad Satisfaciendum or other Judicial Process did not run into Wales but that a Capias utlagatum did go into Wales and as Brownloe Pronotary then said that an Extent hath gone into Wales And it is undoubtedly true as to the Capias utlagatum and Extent but as to all other Judicial Process into Wales upon Judgments obtained here between party and party hitherto there is nothing to turn the Scale The Judgment of the Court of Common Pleas being directly contrary to that of the Kings Bench in the same age and time Vpon occasion of a Procedendo moved for to the Council of the Marches who had made a Decree Bendloes Rep. 2 Car. 1. Term. Mich. f. 192. Beatons Case That some persons living in the English Counties where they at least exercised Jurisdiction should pay monies recovered against him at a great Sessions in Wales he having neither Lands or Goods nor inhabiting in Wales having obtained a Prohibition to the Council of the Marches the Court of the Kings Bench was against the Procedendo No time is mentioned when this Resolution cited by Jones was so as i◠probably preceded the Resolutions of the Judges in Crooke And Justice Jones cited a Case where Judgment was given in the great Sessions of Cardigan against a Citizen of London who then inhabited there and after removed his Goods and Person thence that upon great deliberation it was resolved A Certiorari should issue out of the Chancery to remove the Record out of Wales and that then it should be sent by Mittimus into the Kings Bench and so Execution should be awarded in England of the Judgment had in Wales If this were so for which there is no other Authority but that Justice Jones cited such a Case not mentioning the time I agree it would seem strange that a Judgment obtained in Wales should by Law be executed in England and that a Judgment obtained in England could not be executed in Wales Cr. 2 Car. 1. f. 346. But in the same year in Easter Term before at an Assembly of all the Iustices and Barons it was resolved where Judgment was given in Debt at the great Sessions in Wales against a Defendant inhabiting there and the Defendant dying intestate one who inhabited in London taking Administration This Case is in the point for a Scire facias to have Lands in Wales must be against the Heir inhabiting in England but having Lands in Wales that Execution could not be in Wales because the Administrator inhabited not there nor a Certiorari granted out of the Chancery to remove the Record that so by Mittimus it might be sent to the Kings Bench or Common Pleas to take forth a Scire facias upon it to have Lands out of Wales or Goods in the Administrators hands liable to it there This was the Resolution of all the Justices and Barons for these Reasons First by this way all Judgments given in London or other inferior Jurisdictions would be removed and executed at large which would be of great inconvenience to make Lands or Goods liable to Execution in other manner than they were at the time of the Judgment given which was but within the Jurisdiction Secondly It would extend the Execution of Judgments given in private and limited Jurisdictions as amply as of Iudgment given at the Kings Courts at Westminster By this Resolution a Judgment given in Wales shall not be executed in England out of their Jurisdiction of Wales and à pari a Judgment given in England ought not to be executed in Wales which is out of the Jurisdiction of the English Courts more than a Judgment given in the Kings Bench or Common Pleas ought to be executed in Ireland or the Islands which are out of their Jurisdiction equally and upon the same grounds for any thing deducible from these Cases which was never pretended that it could be done And by that Case of Coke Lands Persons or Goods ought not to be lyable to Judgments in other manner than they were at the time of the Judgment given which was where the Court had Jurisdiction which gave the Judgment Nor is it material to say the Judgments then given are of no effect no more than to say Judgments given in the Kings Courts are of no effect against an Irish-man Dutch-man or Scotch-man that hath no Lands or Goods in England liable to Execution by that Judgment For the Plaintiff commencing his Suit ought to be conuzant what benefit he might have from it Nor are Presidents of Fact which pass sub silentio in the Court of Kings Bench or Common Pleas in such Cases to be regarded For Processes issue out of the Offices regularly to the Sheriffs of the County whereupon the Testator the Person Goods or Lands are said to be without distinction of places within or without the Jurisdiction
recovered in Damages 101 Debt 1. Debts by simple contracts were the first Debts that ever were and are more noble than Actions on the Case upon which only damages are recoverable 101 2. Actions in the debet detinet are actions of property which is not in an action on the Case ibid. 3. Actions upon Bond or Deed made in Wales Ireland Normandy c. where to be tryed 413 4. Wheresoever the Debt grew due yet the Debtor is indebted to the Creditor in any place where he is as long as the Debt is unsatisfied 92 5. It lies not for a Solicitor for his soliciting Fees but for an Attorney it well lies and there shall be no ley Gager in it 99 Declaration See Pleading 1. The Plaintiff must recover by his own strength and not by the Defendants weakness 8 58 60 2. When the Plaintiff makes it appear to the Court that the Defendants Title is not good yet if the Plaintiff do not make out a good Title for himself he shall never have Judgment 60 3. The form of a Declaration in London according to their custome 93 4. The King may vary his Declaration but it must be done the first Term 65 5. In a Quare Impedit the Plaintiff must in his Declaration alledge a presentation in himself or those from whom he claims 7 57 Demand See Request 1. A Demand of Rent is not requisite upon a Limitation because Non-payment avoids it 32 2. But where there is a condition there must be a demand before entry ibid. 3. Where there are several Rents the demands must be several 72 4. If more Rent is demanded than is payable the demand is void ibid. Devastavit See Executors  Devise Devisor Devisee 1. The Law doth not in Conveyances of Estates admit Estates to pass by Implication regularly but in Devises they are allowed with due restrictions 261 262 c. 2. If an Estate given by Implication in a Will be to the disinheriting of the Heir at Law it is not good if such Implication be only constructive and possible but not a necessary Implication 262 263 267 268 3. The necessary Implication is that the Devisee must have the thing Devised or none else can have it 262 263 4. A. deviseth his Goods to his wife and after her decease his Son and Heir shall have the House where they are this is a good Devise of the House to the wife by Implication because the Heir at Law is excluded by it and then no person can claim it but the wife by Implication of the Devise 263 264. 5. A. having issue Thomas and Mary devises to Thomas and his Heirs for ever and for want of Heirs of Thomas to Mary and her Heirs This is an Estate tayl in Thomas 269 270 6. My will is if it happen my Son George Mary and Katherine my Daughters to dye without issue of their bodies lawfully begotten then all the Freehold Lands I am now seized of shall remain and be to my Nephew A. B. The construction and meaning of these words quid operatur by them 260 261 262 263 264 c. 7. If Land is devised to H. and his heirs as long as B. hath heirs of his body the remainder over such latter Devise will be good not as a Remainder but as an Executory Devise 270 8. My son shall have my Land to him and his heirs so long as any heirs of the body of A. shall be living and for want of such heirs I devise it to B. here B. shall take by future and Executory Devise 270 9. A Devise to the son and heir in Fee being no other than what the Law gave him is void 271 10. A Devise that if the son and heir pay not all the Legacies then the Land shall go to the Legatories upon default of payment this shall vest in the Legatories by Executory Devise 271 11. A. had issue W. T. and R. and devises to T. and his heirs for ever and if T. died without issue living W. that then R. should have the Land this is a good Fee in T. and R had a good Estate in possibility by Executory Devise upon the dying of T. without issue 272 12. An Executory Devise cannot be upon an Estate tayl 273 13. I bequeath my son Thomas to my Brother R to be his Tutor during his minority here the Land follows the custody and the Trust is not assignable over to any person 178 179 c. 14. A Devise of the Land during the minority of the Son and for his maintenance and education until he come of age is no devising of the Guardianship 184 Discent 1. Children inherit their Ancestors Estates without limit in the right ascending Line and are not inherited by them 244 2. In the collateral Lines of Uncle and Nephew the Uncle as well inherits the Nephew as the Nephew the Uncle 244 3. In the case of Aliens nothing interrupts the common course of Discents but Defectus Nationis 268 Disclaimer 1. In a Quare Impedit upon the Bishops Disclaimer there is a Judgment with a Cessat Executio quousque c. Dismes See Tythes  Disseisor 1. A Disseisor Tenant in possession may Rebut the Demandant without shewing how he came to the possession which he then hath but he must shew how the warranty extended to him 385 386 Dispensation See Title Statutes 14. 1. The Pope could formerly and the Arch-bishop now can dispense for a plurality 20 23 2. How many Benefices a Bishop may retain by Dispensation 25 3. A Dispensation for years and good 24 4. A Dispensation after the Consecration of a Bishop comes too late to prevent the Voidance 20 5. If a man hath a Benefice with cure and accepts another without a Dispensation or Qualification the first becomes void and the Patron may present 131 132 6. No Dispensation can be had for marrying within the Levitical Degrees 214 216 239 7. A Dispensation obtained doth jus dare and makes the thing prohibited lawful to be done by him who hath it 333 336 8. Freedom from punishment is a consequent of a Dispensation but not its effect 333 9. What penal Laws the King may dispense with and what not 334 335 336 c. 10. Where the Suit is only the Kings for the breach of a penal Law and which is not to the damage of a third person the King may dispense 334 336 339 340 11. Where the Offence wrongs none but the King he may dispense with it 344 12. Where the Suit is the Kings only for the benefit of a third person there he cannot dispense 334 336 339 340 13. Offences not to be dispensed with 342 14. A Dispensation to make lawful the taking from a man any thing which he may lawfully defend from being taken or lawfully punish it if it is taken must be void 341 15. Dispensations void against Acts of Parliament for maintaining Native Artificers 344 16. Where the exercise of a Trade is generally prohibited
Courts upon the insufficiency of the Return only and not for priviledge 154 5. Where a man is brought by Habeas Corpus and upon the Return it appears that he was imprisoned illegally though there is no cause of priviledge for him in the Court yet he shall not be remanded to his unlawful Imprisonment 156 6. The Kings Bench may bayl if they please in all Cases but the Common Bench must remand if the cause of the imprisonment returned is just 157 Heir 1. Children shall inherit their Ancestors without limitation in the right ascending Line and are not inherited by them 244 2. In the collateral Lines of Uncle and Nephew the Uncle as well inherits the Nephew as the Nephew the Uncle ibid. 3. The Heir shall never be disinherited by an Estate given by Implication in a Will if such Implication be only constructive and possible but nor a necessary Implication viz. such an Implication that the Devisee must have the thing devised or none else can have it 262 263 268 4. He that is priviledged by the Law of England to inherit there must be a Subject of the Kings 268 5. The four several ways that a man born out of England may inherit in England 281 6. How long the Heir shall continue in Ward upon the Devise of his Father and a full Exposition of the Statute of 12 Car. 2. 178 7. The Heir of the Conizee of a Fine only shall take nothing by Discent 41 Husband and Wife See Baron Feme  Imprisonment See Title Habeas Corpus  Incest 1. INcest was formerly of Spiritual Conuzance 212 2. The primitive Christian Church could punish incestuous marriages no other way than only by forbidding them communion with them 313 3. The Judges have now full conuzance of what Marriages are incestuous and what not 207 209 210 4. Among the Hebrews there was no Divorce for Incest but the Marriage was void and the Incest punished as in persons unmarried ibid. Incumbent 1. One Incumbent may sue a Writ of Spoliation against the other where the Patrons right comes in question 24 2. If an Incumbent with Cure take another Benefice with Cure the first is void and the Patron may present 21 3. A Bishop may be an Incumbent after Consecration 24 4. The Kings Confirmation of the Commendam transfers no right into the Incumbent 26 5. Where the Incumbent doth not read the Articles according to the Statute he stands ipso facto deprived 131 132 6. And if he had not subscribed the Articles he had been never Incumbent 133 Infant 1. Where the Gardianship of an Infant is devised since the Statute of 12 Car. 2. what passes thereby together with a full Exposition of that Statute from 177 to 186 2. He is capable at Seventeen years of Age of taking Administration in his own name 93 Institution and Induction 1. By Induction into the Rectory the Parson is seised of all the possessions belonging to his Rectory 198 2. Institution and Induction is a good Title until a better appears 7 8 3. Where after Institution and Induction the party inducted may bring his Ejectment and shall not be put to his Quare Impedit 129 130 131 Iointenants 1. There can be no Jointenants in Occupancy 189 2. They may release or confirm to each other and thereupon those priviledges which did belong to both shall pass to one of them 45 Ireland See Alien Error 1. Ireland is a conquer'd Kingdom and appears so by the express words of an Act of Parliament there 292 2. Though Ireland hath its own Parliament yet it is not absolute sui Juris ibid. 3. What things the Parliament of Ireland cannot do ibid. 4. When Ireland received the Laws of England 293 298 5. What Laws made in the Parliament of England are binding in Ireland 293 Issue 1. No Issue can be joyned of matter in Law 143 Iudges of Iustices 1. Where the Law is known and clear although it is unequitable and inconvenient yet Judges must adjudge it as it is 37 285 2. But where it is doubtful and not clear there they must Interpret it to be as is most consonant to equity 38 3. Defects in the Law can only be remedied in Parliament 38 285 4. Judges must judge according as the Law is not as it ought to be but if inconveniences necessarily follow out of the Law the Parliament only can cure them 285 5. An Opinion given in Court if not necessary to the Judgment given upon Record is no Judicial Opinion no more than a gratis dictum 382 6. But an Opinion though erroneous concluding to the Judgment is a Judicial Opinion because delivered under the Sanction of the Judges Oath upon deliberation which assures it is or was when delivered the Opinion of the Deliverer 382 7. When the King hath constituted any man a Judge his Ability Parts and Fitness for the place are not to be reflected upon or censured by any other person being allowed by the King who only is to judge of the fitness of his Ministers 138 8. We must not upon supposition only admit Judges deficient in their Office for so they should never do right Nor on the other side must we admit them unerring in their places for so they should never do any thing wrong 139 9. Judges have in all Ages been complained of and punished for giving dishonest and corrupt judgments 139 10. A Judge cannot Fine and Imprison a Jury for giving a Verdict contrary to his Directions 146 147 148 149 11. Judges ought not to abate Writs ex officio 95 97 12. The Judges direction to the Jury ought to be upon Supposition and not Positive viz. if you find the Fact thus then it is for the Plaintiff if you find it thus then for the Defendant 144 13. The Judge can never direct what the Law is in any controverted matter until he first knows the Fact 147 Iudgment See Error 1. A Judgment is the Act of the Court and compulsory to the Defendant 94 95 2. Where the Plaintiff makes it appear to the Court that the Defendants Title is not good but doth not set forth a good Title for himself the Court shall never give Judgment for him 60 3. An ill Declaration will not avoid the Judgment it only makes it erroneous 93 94 4. An erroneous Judgment is a good barr for an Executor in an Action brought against him 94 5. A Judgment given in England ought not to be executed in Wales 398 6. In a Quare Impedit where the Bishop disclaims and the Parson loseth by Default there shall go a Writ to the Bishop Non obstante Reclamatione to remove the Incumbent but with a Cessat Executio until the Plea is determined between the Plaintiff and Patron 6 Iurisdiction See Courts Prohibition 1. When the Question is of a Jurisdiction in a Dominion belonging to England how to be determined 418 2. Where ever a Debt grows due yet the Debtor is indebted to the Creditor
usually letten Lands which have been twice letten are within this proviso 33 2. Of Lands which have at any time before been usually letten that which was not in Lease at the time of the proviso nor twenty years before is out of the power 34 Possession 1. He that is out of possession if he brings his Action must make a good Title 8 2. Where one man would recover any thing from another it is not sufficient to destroy the Title of him in possession but you must prove your own to be better than his 58 60 3. When a man hath gotten the possession of Land that was void of a Proprietor the Law casts the Freehold upon him to make a sufficient Tenant to the Precipe 191 4. Prior possession is a good Title against him who hath no Title at all 299 5. A separate possession of one and the same Land can never be in two persons at one and the same time 42 47 6. By a Fine the Estate may be changed although the possession is not changed 42 43 7. The Conuzee of a Rent granted by Fine to Uses cannot have any actual Seisin nor be in possession since the 27 H. 8. 49 Quare Impedit 1. WHere in a Quare Impedit the Plaintiff and Defendant are both actors 6 7 8 58 2. The Plaintiff in his Count must alledge a presentation in himself or in those from whom he claims 7 8 17 57 3. So likewise must the Defendant because they are both Actors 7 8 57 60 4. The Plaintiff must recover by his own strength and not by the Defendants weakness 8 58 60 5. Where the King or a common person in a Quare Impedit sets forth a Title which is no more than a bare Suggestion he shall not then forsake his own and endeavour to destroy the Defendants Title 61 6. In all Quare Impedits the Defendants may traverse the presentation alledged by the Plaintiff if the matter of Fact will bear it 16 17 7. But the Defendant must not deny the presentation alledged where there was a presentation 17 8. Where the Presentation and not the Seisin in gross of the Advowson or Appendancy is traversable 10 11 12 13 9. When the Seisin in gross or appendancy is traversable 12 10. An Incumbent is elected Bishop and before Consecration he obtains a Dispensation in Commendam Retinere he is afterwards consecrated and dyes the Patron shall present and not the King 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 11. If a man who hath a Benefice with Cure accepts of another without Dispensation or Qualification the first Benefice is void and the Patron may present and his Clerk who is admitted instituted and inducted may bring his Action of Trespass or Ejectment 129 130 131 12. All Quare Impedits for disturbance to Churches within the Lordships Marchers of Wales shall be brought in England in the next adjoyning County 409 410 13. Judgment with a Cessat Executio upon the Bishops Disclaimer 6 14. Where the Parson Patron and Ordinary are sued in a Quare Impedit and the Ordinary disclaims and the Parson looseth by default the Plaintiff shall have Judgment to recover his presentation and a Writ to the Bishop to remove him with a Cessat Executio until the plea is determined between the Plaintiff and Patron ibid. Rebutter See Title Warranty 1. WWO may Rebut 384 2. The difference between a Rebutter and Voucher 385 386 387 3. Whether the Tenant in possession may Rebut without shewing how he came to the possession 385 4. Whether a Rebutter may be when the warranty is determined 387 5. How many several sorts of persons may Rebut and how those that come in ex institutione dispositione legis may Rebut 390 391 392 Recital 1. The Recital of one Lease in another is not a sufficient proof that there was such a Lease as is recited 74 75 Recognizance See Title Statutes 8. 1. The Chancery and all the Courts at Westminster had before the Statute of Acton Burnel and still have power to take Recognizances 102 2. So likewise may every Judge take a Recognizance in any part of England as well out of Term as in Term 103 3. Where a Recognizance taken before the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas is in the nature of a Statute Staple 102 4. Execution upon such Recognizances are not as upon Statutes but by Elegit ibid. Record 1. How a Record is to be pleaded 92 Recovery and Common Recovery See Title Statutes 13. See Voucher Warranty 1. Where a Recovery against its nature shall be a Forfeiture because it is taken as a common Conveyance 51 2. A Rent may arise out of the Estate of Cestuy que use upon a Recovery which was to have risen out of the Estate of the Recoverer 51 Release 1. Joyntenants may release and confirm to each other 45 Remainder See Title Warranty 1. A Remainder must depend upon some particular Estate and be created at the same time with the particular Estate 269 2. A Remainder cannot depend upon an absolute Fee simple 269 367 3. If Land is devised to A. and his Heirs as long as B. hath Heirs of his body the Remainder over this is good in a Devise not as a Remainder but as an Executory Devise 270 4. A Remainder in Fee upon a Lease for years 46 5. The Statute de Donis restrains not the warranty of Tenant in Tayl from barring him in the Remainder in Tayl by his warranty descending upon him 367 377 Rent 1. By the Common Law there ought to be an Attornment to enable the Distrainor to make a good Avowry upon a Distress for Rent 39 2. Where a Rent is well vested and there is an Attornment when ever the Rent is arrear a Distress is lawful unless the power is lost ibid. 3. An Estate in a Rent-charge may be enlarged diminished or altered and no new Attornment or privity requisite 44 45 46 4. The power to distrain may be lost by a perpetual Union Suspension pro tempore Dying without Heir Granting of it upon Condition and by a granting over 39 5. The several things that a Rent is subject to 40 6. Rent is granted pur auter vie the Grantee dies the Rent is thereby determined 200 201 7. Where Rent is arrear and afterwards it is granted over in Fee and an Attornment thereupon here the Grantor hath lost his arrears and cannot afterwards distrain 40 8. A Rent may arise out of the Estate of Cestuy que use upon a Recovery 52 9. There can be no Occupancy of a Rent 200 Reversion See Title Warranty 1. By the grant of a Reversion Lands in possession will not pass but by the grant of Lands a Reversion will pass 83 2. If Tenant for life alien with warranty which descends upon the Reversioner such alienation with warranty is not restrained by the Statute de Donis 370 3. An alienation with warranty which shall hinder the Land from reverting to the Donor or his
admitted instituted and inducted and the Church becoming void it belong'd to him to present again For which reason be alledging no Seisin in gross of the Advowson but only his Presentation and that his Clerk was received the Defendant formally ought to have traversed the Presentation which was alledg'd and not the Seisin in gross of the Advowson which was not alledged But the Case is the same whether he did or did not alledg in his Declaration that he was seis'd of the Advowson in gross and presented For still the Plaintiffs Presentation was to be traversed by the Defendant and not his being seis'd in gross though it were true that the Defendant making Title by the appendency of the Advowson to his Mannor the Plaintiffs Seisin in gross was absolutely inconsistent with the appendency and therefore speciously to be traversed by the Defendant But that traverse left a Title in the Plaintiff not destroyed and therefore was not good For whether the Plaintiff were seised or not of the Advowson in gross he presenting in the vacancy and his Clerk being admitted instituted and inducted he thereby gained a good Title by Vsurpation to present when the Church became next void And that is the true reason in that Case why the presentation which made the Plaintiffs immediate Title to present again was to be traversed and not his Seisin in gross of the Advowson which was not material when his Vsurpation gave him a Title though he were not seis'd in gross before his Vsurpation Ander 1 Part f. 296. p. 276. The next Case I shall use is as good authority out of the new Books as the other was out of the old It is the Lord Buckhursts Case reported in the first part of the L. Anderson The L. Buckhurst brought a Quare Impedit against the Bishop of Chichester and T. Bickley for disturbing him to present to the Vicaridge of Westfield and declared that the Advowson of the Vicaridge appertain'd to the Rectory of Westfield whereof he was seised in Fee and presented Maurice Sackvil his Clerk who was thereto admitted instituted and inducted that the Vicaridge was a Vicaridge with Cure of the annual value of 8 l. And that the said Sackvil accepted another Benefice with Cure by reason whereof and of the Statute of 21 H. 8. the Vicaridge became void and he presented and was disturbed by the Defendants The Bishop pleaded that before the Writ purchased one Richard Bishop of Chichester his Predecessor was seised of the Advowson of the said Vicaridge in Fee as in gross and collated to the said Vicaridge being void one Maurice Berkley who was inducted thereto and the said Richard dying the present Bishop was made Bishop and became seised of the Advowson and the Church became void by the said Sackvil's taking another Benefice with Cure and he collated the said Bickley the other Defendant and traversed absque hoc that the Advowson of the said Vicaridge pertained to the Rectory of Westfield modo forma as the Plaintiff alledg'd And Bickley the other Defendant pleaded the same Plea Vpon these Pleas it was demurred because the traverse to the Appendency was not good as was alledged and after much Argument and many Cases cited where the Appendency was traversable The Court resolved the appendency was not traversable in the Case nor was it material whether the Advowson were appendant or in gross as the book is express so as nothing could be traversable in the Case then but the Lord Buckhursts Presentation which after the Induction of his Clerk though it were by Vsurpation made him a good Title to present when the Vicaridge became next void Whence it follows that if the Defendant could not traverse the L. Buckhursts Presentation of Sackvil which was his immediate Title the Defendant was remediless but by a Writ of Droit d'Advowson And in the resolution of this Case of the L. Buckhust the Case of 10 H. 7. before cited was principally relyed on as warranting the Iudgment which it fully doth it being adjudged for the same reason there that the Seisin in Fee of the Advowson in gross was not traversable but the Presentation was as it was adjudged in this Case that the appendency was not traversable by the Defendant but the Presentation And by the way I observe Hobart Digbies Case f. 102. that in the Report of the Lord Buckhurst's Case it is admitted that the Plaintiff in the Case of 10 H. 7. did count that he was seised of the Advowson in gross and presented whereas I noted the Original Case in the Book is that he counted only upon his Presentation and probably it was so for the reasons given in Digbies Case by the Lord Hobart that a bare Presentment is only militant when so alledged by the Plaintiff and may be in such a Case as may prove the Defendant to have right of presenting at the present avoidance if no right be alledged by the Plaintiff why he should present Whence I collect that in both these cases of 10 H. 7. and this of the L. Buckhursts though there were a manifest inconsistency in the first Case between the Plaintiffs Count that he was seised of the Advowson in gross and presented and the Defendants Title that he was seised of a Mannor to which the Advowson was appendant for it was impossible it should be appendant for the Defendant and in gross for the Plaintiff And in the L. Buckhursts Case who counted that he was seised of the Rectory of Westfield to which the Advowson of the Vicaridge belong'd and the Defendant made Title that he was seised of the Advowson in gross which Titles were directly inconsistent yet neither the Seisin in gross in the first Case nor the appendency in the last Case were traversable but the Presentation of the Plaintiffs in both which made their immediate Titles to present at the next avoidance whether there were a Seisin in gross or an appendency or not when they first presented As in these 2 Cases the true reason of the Law appears why the Seisin in gross of the Advowson nor the appendency of the Advowson alledged by the Plaintiffs were not traversable but only the Presentation Hob. Digbies Case f. 103. By these Cases the Lord Hobarts scruple in Digbies Case is satisfied where he thinks that if a man hath gained a Title by Vsurpation at the next avoidance he must not declare that he was seised in Fee formerly of the Advowson and presented but must declare specially of the true Patrons former Presentation and then the Church becoming void that himself presented lest otherwise he declaring that he was seised of the Advowson in Fee the Defendant should trice him by traversing his Seisin which was false when in truth he had a right to present by Vsurpation for by these Cases it is clear that the Seisin in gross nor appendenâ—y are traversable though alledged by the Plaintiff when he hath gained a Title by Usurpation but the Presentation
And if such Debts were not justly to be so demanded and paid it had been against the Iudges Oath to pass such Iudgments for the Defendant is not bound to Demurr but leaves the Iustice of the Plaintiffs demand to the Court. In Decimo H. 6. Cotsmore 10 H. 6. f. 24. b. 25. a. who gave the Rule in the Case in question hath these words The Law will not charge Executors with a duty due by a simple Contract made by the Testator Then if such Action be brought against Executors upon a simple Contract made by the Testator and they will not take advantage at the beginning of the Pleas in abatement of the Writ but plead other matter which is found against them they never shall have advantage to shew that before Judgment that is in Arrest of Judgment and that I have known adjudg'd in this place once before this time Here is not only his own Opinion but a Iudgment by him cited in that Court formerly in the point I shall add another Case to this purpose A man brought a Writ of Debt against another 15 E. 4. f. 29. 2. and counted that he sold certain Goods to his Testator for the Sum in demand Littleton caus'd the Attorney of the Plaintiff as printed but should be Defendant to be demanded and so he was and Littleton demanded of him Si'l voyl avoyder son Suite not his own but his who counted against him que dit que voyl and after Littleton said to the Attorney of the Plaintiff The Court awards that you take nothing by the Writ for know that a man shall never have an Action against Executors where the Testator might have wag'd his Law in his life time quod nota It was not proper to ask the Plaintiffs Attorney Whether he would avoid his Clyents Suit and an unlikely answer of his to say Yes but a rational demand to the Defendants Attorney Whether he would avoid his Suit who counted against him and probably he should answer Yes and after Littleton said to the Attorney of the Plaintiff the Court awards you take nothing by your Writ If he had been the person to whom the question was first asked and who immediately before had answer'd Yes the Book had not been that after Littleton said to the Attorney of the Plaintiff but that Littleton said to him who was the same he discours'd with The Print thus rectified this Case agrees with the Law deliver'd by Cotsmore An Executor is sued and declared against in Court for so was the Course then upon a simple Contract of his Testators the Iudge asks his Attorney Whether he had a mind to avoid the Suit who answer'd Yes If the Iudge had thought fit he might have avoided the Suit without making any question but knowing it was not consonant to Law to avoid a Suit upon a simple Contract unless the Executor himself desired it He therefore asked him the Question and finding he did desire it the Iudge presently told the Plaintiffs Attorney He could take nothing by the Writ Else you see the Consequence of this Iudgment That the Iudges ex officio should prevent any Iudgment for the Plaintiff in Debt brought upon a simple Contract against an Executor whether the Executor would or not against former and subsequent usage Brook in Abridging this Case and not reflecting upon it rightly abridges it that Littleton demanded the Plaintiffs Attorney If he would avow his Suit whereas the word is clearly avoid not avow and to what purpose should he ask that Question for sure it was avow'd as much as could be when counted upon at the instant in Court Then Brook makes a Note Br. Executor pl. 80. Nota cest Judgment ex officio And this Note of Brooks mis-led the Lord Anderson once to the same mistake if the Report be right but the like hath not been before or since Rob. Hughson's Case Gouldsboroughs Rep. 30 Eliz. f. 106. 107. An Action was brought against an Administrator upon a Contract of the Intestates who pleaded fully administred and found against him Anderson said that ex officio the Court was to stay Iudgment and did so because the Administrator was not chargeable upon a simple Contract But since that Case of Hughson one Germayne brought an action of Debt against Rolls as Executor of Norwood for Fees as an Attorney in the Common Bench and for soliciting in the Queens Bench Germayne versus Rolls 37 38 El. Cro. 425. pl. 24. and for mony expended about a Fine for Alienation Rolls pleaded Ne unque Executor which was found against him and Judgment given Vpon which Rolls brought a Writ of Error and the Error assign'd was That the Action lay not against an Executor because the Testator could have waged his Law But it was resolv'd That for Attorney's Fees the Testator could not wage his Law but for the rest he might and that the Executor might have demurr'd at first but pleading a Plea found against him it was said he was Concluded some difference of Opinion was But agreed That the Executor confessing the Action or pleading nil debet in such Case and that found against him he hath no remedy And Popham remembred Hughson's Case in the Common Pleas and would see the Roll for he doubted that both in that Case and this of Germayne the Executor had not confessed the Debt in effect But after it was moved again and all the Judges Hill 38 Eliz. Cro. 459. pl. 4. but Gawdy were of Opinion that the Judgment was well given as to that Cause but it was revers'd for a Cause not formerly mov'd which was That an Action of Debt would not have layn against the Testator himself for part of the mony in demand and recovered that is for the mony for soliciting which was not a certain Debt but to be recovered by Action on the Case Some Cases in the Old Books may seem to colour this Opinion That the Judges ex officio in an Action of Debt brought against an Executor or Administrator for a simple Contract of the Testators or Intestate ought to abate the Writ 25 E. 3. f. 40. The first is 25 E. 3. f. 40. where an Action was brought against an Executor upon a Tally struck by the Testator The Iudges said Nil Capiat per breve if he have no better specialty 12 H. 4. f. 23. The like Case is 12 H. 4. f. 23. where a like Action was brought against the Executor or Administrator upon a Tally of the Testators and there it appears the Defendants Council would have demurr'd and the Cause is mentioned That the writing of the Tally might be washed out by water and a new put in the place and the Notches chang'd and the Iudgment was Nil capiat per breve This being the same Case with the former the reason of the Iudgment was the same of grounding an Action upon a Specialty not good in Law Besides it appears in the latter
it was no breach of the Covenant Inconveniencies if the Law should be otherwise 1. A mans Covenant without necessary words to make it such is strain'd to be unreasonable and therefore improbable to be so intended for it is unreasonable a man should Covenant against the tortious acts of strangers impossible for him to prevent or probably to attempt preventing 2. The Covenantor who is innocent shall be charg'd when the Lessee hath his natural Remedy against the wrong doer And the Covenantor made to defend a man from that from which the Law defends every man that is from wrong 3. A man shall have double Remedy for the same injury against the Covenantor and also against the wrong doer 4. A way is open'd to damage a third person that is the Covenantor by undiscoverable practise between the Lessee and a stranger for there is no difficulty for the Lessee secretly to procure a stranger to make a tortious Entry that he may therefore charge the Covenantor with an Action Application of the Reason of Law to the Case in Question 1. When a man Covenants his Lessee shall enjoy his term against all men he doth neither expresly covenant for his enjoyment against tortious Acts nor doth the Law so interpret his Covenant So here when the Lessor Covenants the Lessee shall enjoy against his Assigns he doth not covenant expresly against their tortious acts nor ought the Law to interpret that he doth more than in the other Case 2. It is as unreasonable he should Covenant against the tortious Entries of his Assigns as against the tortious Entries of all other strangers For he hath no prospect who of his Assigns may wrongfully Eject his Lessee more than what other stranger may do it nor any power to prevent the tort of the one more than of the other as being equally unknown to him Nor is there any sensible difference to be found where a man Covenants his Lessee shall enjoy quietly against all the Johns and all the Thomasses in the world than where against all men for though the one Covenant be narrower than the other yet the Covenantor can no more prevent the wrongs may be done by the Johns and Thomasses than he can the wrongs may be done by any man Nor can the Covenantee fear more a wrong to be done by them than by any other person not so named 3. If the Assignee of the Lessor enters tortiously upon the Lessee he hath his proper and natural Remedy equally against him as against any other stranger that so doth 4. If the Lessee may charge the Covenantor with an Action in this Case for his Assignees tortious Entry then he may be doubly satisfied for the same Damage viz. by the Covenantor upon his Covenant and by the Assignee for his Trespass which the Law permits not but in rare Cases and upon special Reasons 5. The Lessee may as well combine with some remote Assignee of the Lessors to make a wrongful Entry to the end to charge the Covenantor therewith upon his Covenant as with any other stranger 6. Lastly by the very words of this Covenant the Lessor cannot be charg'd with breach of Covenant for the tortious Entry or Interruption of his Assignee The words are That the Lessee should lawfully legitime haberet teneret gauderet tenere gaudere potuisset the Premisses without the Lett Interruption c. of the Defendant his Executors Administrators and Assigns If the Lessor were to be charg'd with the tortious Acts of his Assigns there needed no more if those words would do it than to say That the Lessee should have hold and enjoy the Lands demis'd without interruption of the Lessor his Executors Administrators and the word lawfully was useless and sensless in the Covenant also But when it is said That he should and might lawfully have hold and enjoy it against the Lessor his Executors Administrators and Assigns What other meaning can be given the words than that he might according to Law enjoy it and that the Lessor his Executors Administrators or Assigns should not have power lawfully to hinder him For a man then is said to enjoy a thing lawfully when no man lawfully can hinder his enjoying it So as by all the Authorities cited by all the Reasons of Law anciently and modernly and by the particular words of the Covenant in question the Defendant cannot be charg'd with breach of his Covenant for the tortious Entry of his Assignee upon the Plaintiff A Replevin brought and the beasts retorn'd Elongata whereupon there was a Capias in Withernam and Nine Oxen taken the Plaintiff in the Replevin gave the Sheriff's Bailiff a Bond of Ten pounds to save him harmless for those Oxen the Defendant in the Replevin whose Beasts they were brought a Detinue against the Bailiff and thereupon he sued his Bond for his Damage in being distrain'd in the Detinue this appearing to the Court and Judgment demanded in the Action of Debt Brintsley said Quides vous que il doit Defender encounter touts le Mond non ferra ne encounter null Action aut quel vous poies aver droiturel defence sans luy per la ley per que avises vous and so was the general Opinion but it was not adjudg'd The Difference between this Covenant and a general Covenant against all men 1. It is said this is not a general Covenant to enjoy against all men wherein the Law is clear but rather a Covenant against particular men 2. That there is Authority That if a man Covenant for quiet Enjoyment against a particular person that Covenant shall extend to the tortious as well as legal Entries of such particular person The Covenant in question is no particular Covenant though it be not the most general no more is a Covenant to enjoy against all of the names of Thomas and John or against all men now living or against all claiming under the Covenantor yet no man conceives it more rational to charge the Covenantor for tortious Entries done by such than for the tortious Entries of men of any other name And it is as uncertain to the Covenanâ—or and Covenantee who are Assignees or what Assignee of the Lessor will make a tortious Entry as what other man will do it But not so of a particular person who is in the Covenantors prospect to prevent and the Covenantees to fear 1. In a Covenant for Enjoyment against all men a man Covenants for enjoyment against himself Executors Administrators and Assigns for they are a part of all men but not against their tortious Entries more than against all other mens tortious Entries If a man Covenant for enjoyment against his Executors Administrators and Assigns and all others it is not a different Covenant from that of enjoyment against all men for a mans Executors Administrators and Assigns and all others are all men So if a man Covenants for enjoyment against A. B. and C. and all others it is the same as to
the said William to be begotten of her the said Anne Infeoffed James Lane and John Lane Gentlemen of the said Premisses Habendum to them their heirs and assigns for ever To the use of the said William Vescy the Feoffer and his assigns for term of his life without impeachment of Waste and after to the use of the said Anne the Tenant if the Marriage succeeded between them for term of her life for her Joynture and after her decease to the use of the heirs males of his body on her body begotten forever and for want of such issue to the use of the heirs females of him the said William Vescy upon her body begotten and for want of such issue to the use of the right heirs of him the said William Vescy And bound him and his heirs to warrant the premisses as aforesaid to the said Feoffees and their Heirs to the uses aforesaid By vertue whereof and of the Statute of Uses the said William was seis'd for term of his life with the Remainder over as aforesaid And after the said marriage was had and solemnized between him and the Tenant Arine That William died so seis'd without any issue of his body and Anne surviv'd him and entred and by vertue of the said Feoffment and the Statute of Uses is seis'd in her Demesne as of Freehold for term of her life And that the said warranty of the said William descended from him to the said Elizabeth and Sarah as Cosins and Coheirs of him the said William the Son that is to say Daughters and Coheirs of John Vescy Brother and Heir of the said William the Son and demands Iudgment if against the said Warranty the Demandants shall be received to demand and avers her self and Anne Hewett named in the Feoffment to be the same person The Replication The Demandants reply and confess the Feoffment to uses of William as is pleaded in Barr to Lane and Lane and their heirs with warranty But further say That the said William Vescy the Son after that is the Four and twentieth of December 14 Car. 2. at Tickhill aforesaid died without any issue of his body which they are ready to aver and demand Iudgment if they shall be barred of their Action against the said Anne by the said Feoffment and warranty The Rejoynder Anne the Tenant rejoyns that the Replication is insufficient and demurs thereupon The matter of the Replication is all set forth in the Defendants Plea in Barr but only the time of William Vescy's death which was not material upon which the Demandants ought to have demur'd and not to have replyed impertinently The Case upon the Pleading William Vescy seis'd of the Land in question in his Demesne as of Fee held of King Charles the First in free Soccage as of his Honour of Tickhill by his last Will and Testament devis'd the same to John Vescy his eldest Son and the heirs males of his body and for default of such to Robert Vescy and the heirs males of his body and for default of such to William Vescy his Son and the heirs males of his body and for default of such to Matthew Vescy and the heirs males of his body and died Then John entred and died seis'd without issue male leaving two daughters Elizabeth and Sarah now Demandants together with their Husbands After his death Robert entred and died seis'd without issue male Then William entred and was seis'd and Matthew in the life of William died without issue male William by his Deed Indented in Consideration of an intended marriage with Anne the now Tenant and for other Considerations infeoffed James Lane and John Lane Habendum to them and their Heirs to the use of William the Feoffor for term of his life and after to the use of Anne Hewet now the Tenant for her life then to the use of the heirs males of his body upon her begotten and for default of such to the use of the heirs females of his body on her begotten and for default of such to the use of his right Heirs And bound him and his Heirs to warrant to the said Feoffees and their Heirs William by vertue of the said Feoffment and of the Statute of Uses was possessed and after he married the now Tenant and died seis'd as of his Freehold without any issue of his body After his death Anne his wife now Tenant by vertue of the said Feoffment and Statute of Uses entred and was posssessed Against whom Elizabeth and Sarah Daughters and Coheirs of John Vescy and Cosins and Coheirs of William the Devisor bring their Formedon in the Reverter Anne the Tenant in possession would rebutt and barr them by the said warranty of William Vescy the Son whose Cosins and Coheirs they are videlicet the Daughters and Coheirs of John eldest Brother of the said William And whether the said Anne Tenant by the said Feoffment and Statute of Uses can rebutt them by the said warranty is the general Question For Resolution of which I must make these previous Questions The first is If before the Statute of 27 H. 8. to Vses Tenant in tayl had made a Feoffment in Fee to uses with warranty to the Feoffees and their Heirs such Feoffees in a Formedon in the Reverter brought against them by the Heirs of the Donor could have rebutted and barr'd them by the warranty of the Tenant in tayl For if the Feoffees to use in such case could not have barr'd the Heirs of the Donor before the Statute by the warranty it is evident the Cestuy que use since the Statute cannot barr them for he can have no more power since the Statute than the Feoffees to use had before the Statute by the warranty I put the Case before the Statute for clearness sake only for though since the Statute there are Feoffees to use as before yet no question can be made upon their rebutter by a warranty because the Estate is out of them by the Statute as soon as it is in them And as to this the Case in effect is no more than Whether the warranty of Tenant in tayl which must be admitted to be a Collateral warranty descending upon the Donor or his Heirs will barr him or them of the Reversion The second Question I make admitting the Heirs of the Donor to be barr'd by the warranty of Tenant in tayl descending upon them is Whether after the Statute of Uses the Cestuy que use can have any benefit of the warranty granted to the Feoffees to use either by way of Voucher or Rebutter Because the Cestuy que use is not in possession in the per by the Feoffees but by the Statute of Uses The third Question is admitting generally that the Cestuy que use shall have benefit of the warranty made to the Feoffees to use Whether yet in this Case Anne the Tenant being a Cestuy que use shall have benefit of the warranty made to the Feoffees Because neither William
then Vous saves bien que de ley cestuy que demand per Formedon in Reverter ne serra barr per le garranty cestuy à que les Tenements fuerunt done in tayl sil ne eyt per descent tout soit il heire à luy le quel Roy ad per descent ou non ne poiomus enquire And on this Case Sir Edward Coke makes an Observation That the King was not bound by a Collateral warranty for the Reversion of an Estate in tayl no more is any other Donor by that Case So as Sir William Herle's Iudgment who was then Chief Justice of the Common Pleas in three several years and several Cases was directly contrary to what Finchden 41 E. 3. said it was upon Report Besides the contrary of what my Brother Ellis urg'd from this Case may be thus inferr'd out of it This Case admits that the Statute restrains the warranty of the Donee from barring some Donor viz. a Donor stranger in blood as was said for it restrains Alienation without warranty against all Donors but the Statute did not restrain the Donees warranty from barring such a Donor for his warranty could never descend upon a stranger and the Statute did not restrain a thing which could not be Therefore ex concesso the Statute restrained the Donees warranty from barring the Donor of blood to the Donee 7 E. 3. 34. p. 44. 5. The fifth Objection was a Case 7 E. 3. that Tenant in tayl made a Feoffment in Fee and died issuless and the Feoffee rebutted the Donor by the warranty This Case rightly understood is not to the purpose for the Donor was not rebutted by the warranty of Tenant in tayl which is the present question but by the Donors own warranty The Case was That A. gave Land to W. and E. his wife Habendum praedictis W. E. haeredibus inter se legitime procreatis and warranted those Tenements to the said W. E. haeredibus eorum seu assignatis The Heir in tayl made a Feoffment in Fee and died leaving no Issue inheritable and the Donor was rebutted in his Formedon in Reverter by his own warranty having warranted to the Donee his Heirs and Assigns and the Feoffee claimed as Assignee And it was adjudg'd against the Donor after in the same year as appears 46 E. 3. f. 4. b. and there admitted good Law 46 E. 3. f. 4. b. But Sir Edward Coke denies this Case to be Law now saying That the warranty determined with the Estate tayl to which it was first annexed and doubtless it did so as to Voucher but whether as to Rebutter of the Donor the party rebutting having the Land though another Estate in it and deriving the warranty to himself as Assignee is not clear 6. A sixt Objection was made from a Case 27 E. 3. f. 83. of a Formedon in Reverter brought 27 E. 3. f. 83. pl. 42. and the Deed of Tenant in tayl Ancestor to the Demandant shewed forth but the Book mentions no warranty but it is like it was a Deed with warranty and the Plaintiff durst not demurr but traversed the Deed as any would avoid demurring upon the validity of an Ancestor's Deed when he was secure there was no such Deed of the Ancestor 7. 4 E. 3. f. 56. pl. 58. The last Objection was a Case 4 E. 3. f. 56. p. 58. where Tenant in tayl made a Feoffment with warranty and the warranty descended upon him in the Remainder in tayl which barr'd him which is a Case agreed as before For the Statute of Westminster the second provides not at all for hâ—m in Remainder but as to him Tenant in tayls warranty is left as at Common Law In 4 E. 3. a Formedon in the Descender was brought by the Issue in tayl and the Release of his elder Brother 4 E. 3. f. 28. pl. 57. with warranty was pleaded by the Tenant Stoner who gave the Rule in the Case Le statute restraynes le power del Issue in tayl to alien in prejudice of him in the Reversion by express words and à Fortiori the power of the Issue in tayl is restrain'd to alien in prejudice of the Issue in tayl Whereupon the Tenant was rul'd to answer and pleaded Assets descended Here it was admitted 10 E. 3. f. 14 pl. 53. the Issue in tayl could not alien with warranty in prejudice of the Reversioner And in 10 E. 3. soon after a Formedon in Reverter being brought and the warranty of Tenant in tayl pleaded in barr Scot alledg'd the restraint of the Statute as well for the Reversioner as for those claiming by descent in tayl The same Stoner demanding if the Ancestor's Deed was acknowledg'd and answered it was His Rule was That the Iudgment must be the same for the Reversioner as for the Issue in these words Ore est tout sur un Judgment which can have no other meaning considering Scot's words immediately before that the Law was the same for the Reversioner as for the Issue in tayl and Stoner's Opinion in the Case before to the same effect 4 E. 3. Objections from Modern Reports Moore f. 96. pl. 239. In Moore 's Reports this Case is A man seis'd of Land having Issue two Sons devis'd it to his youngest Son in tayl and the eldest Son died leaving Issue a Son the youngest aliened in Fee with warranty and died without Issue the Son of the eldest being within age If this Collateral warranty shall bind the Son within age without Assets notwithstanding the Statute of Westminster the second was the question And the Opinions of Plowden Bromley Solicitor Manwood and Lovelace Serjeants and of the Lord Dyer and Catlin Chief Iustice were clear That it is a Collateral warranty and without Assets did barr notwithstanding his Nonage for that his Entry was taken away And this was the Case of one Evans 12 13 of the Queen as it was reported to me This Opinion makes against me I confess but give it this Answer 1. This Case is not reported by Sir Francis Moore but reported to him non constat in what manner nor by whom 2. It was no Judicial Opinion for Plowden Bromley Solicitor two Serjeants Manwood and Lovelace are named for it as well as Dyer and Catlin who were then Chief Iustices of the several Courts which proves the Opinion not only extra-judicial but not given in any Court 3. The motive of their Opinion was because the warranty was Collateral which is no true reason of the binding or not of any warranty 4. An extra-judicial Opinion given in or out of Court is no more than the Prolatum or saying of him who gives it nor can be taken for his Opinion unless every thing spoken at pleasure must pass as the speakers Opinion 5. An Opinion given in Court if not necessary to the Judgment given of Record but that it might have been as well given if no such or a contrary Opinion had
case of Rebutter the Warranter himself impleads him and in a Voucher he must make his title appear to be warranted Ergo in a Rebutter But he needs not have like Estate in the Land upon a Rebutter as upon Voucher which is for the reason given of recovering in value And the only reason why the person who is to warrant impleading the Tenant of the Land shall not recover but be rebutted by the warranty is because if he should recover the Land the Tenant who is intitled to the warranty must recover in value from him again and therefore to avoid Circuit of Action he shall not recover but be rebutted and barr'd as is most reasonable I shall therefore first make it appear by all ancient Authorities That the Tenant in possession shall not rebutt the Demandant by the warranty without he first make it appear that the warranty did extend to him as Heir or Assignee To prove this are full in the point Hill 8 E. 3. f. 10. tit garranty pl. 48. New Edit f. 283. b. num 28 The Book of 8 E. 3. f. 10. of the Old Edition Hillary Term tit Garranty pl. 48. where upon a great Debate it was rul'd That the Tenant must shew how he was entitled to the warranty and how it extended to him and accordingly did so before his Plea was admitted by way of Rebutter 10. E. 3. f. 42. b. New Edit f. 391. b. num 42 Another Book full in the point is 10 E. 3. f. 42. b. of the Old Edition where in like manner the Tenant was forc'd to shew how the warranty extended to him upon Debate and it is remarkable in that Case That his shewing the Deed of warranty to him whose Assignee he was and the Deed of Assignment to himself was not enough but he was compell'd to plead orally as the manner then was That William who had the warranty assign'd to him by his Deed there shew'd forth and the reason given that the Deed of Assignment could not speak and make his Plea and was but Evidence of the truth of his Plea But in that very Case when it was replyed That he was not Tenant by the Assignment of William but by disseisin of the Plaintiff it was not permitted without traversing the Assignment of William For if he were once intitled to the warranty what Estate soever he had when impleaded he might rebutt though he could not vouch Which Case proves fully both my Positions That a man cannot rebutt without shewing how the warranty extends to him 2. That so doing he may whatever Seisin he hath at that time be it by Disseisin or Abatement c. or otherwise 22 Ass pl. 88. A third Case is when the Tenant being impleaded pleaded the warranty of the Demandants Father to one A. and bound him and his Heirs to warrant to A. his Heirs and Assigns and that he was Assignee of A. and demanded Judgment In that Case because he did not plead that he was Assignee of A. by Deed the Plea was disallow'd which since hath been thought not necessary but à fortiori if he had pleaded no Assignment at all from A. by Deed or without Deed to intitle him to the warranty his Plea had been necessarily disallowed My next Assertion is That the Tenant in possession setting forth how the warranty extends to him needs not set forth by what Estate or Title he is in possession To this I shall cite three Books full in the point 6 E. 3. f. 7. old Edit new Edit 6 E. 3. f. 187 Num. 16. 10 F. 3. f. 42. cited before old Book 45 E. 3. But in all these Cases it is to be noted That the Tenant rebutting though he was in possession of another Estate than that to which the warranty was annex'd yet constantly shew'd how the warranty was deriv'd to him which Sir Edward Coke observ'd not either in Lincoln Colledge Case or his Littleton but cites in Lincoln Colledge Case the Case of 45 E. 3. 45 E. 3. f. 18. and some others I shall mention after to shew a man may rebutt being in of another Estate than that which was warranted which is true but not without intitling himself to the warranty That the Law of rebutting stands upon the difference I have taken besides the Authorities urg'd will be evident for these Reasons As a warranty may be created so may it be determin'd or extinguish'd various ways 1. It may be releas'd as Littleton himself is Sect. 748. 2. It may be defeasanc'd as Sir Edward Coke upon that Sect. 748. 3. It may be lost by Attainder Sect. 745. 4. It may be extinguish'd by Re-feoffment of the warranter or his Heirs by the Garrantee or his Heir In all these Cases if the warranty be destroy'd it cannot be rebutted for there cannot be an accident to a thing which is not and rebutting is an accident incident to a warranty And therefore if the warranty have no being there can be no rebutter Why then admit A. warrants Land to B. and his Assigns during the life of B. after B. releases this warranty to A. and then Assigns to C. C. is impleaded by A. and pleads generally that A. warranted to B. for his life and that B. is still living if C. could rebutt A. by this manner of pleading without shewing when B. assigned to him so to derive the benefit of the warranty to himself A. could never have benefit of the Release of the warranty because it could not appear whether the warranty were releas'd before or after the assignment if before then the warranty is gone and cannot be rebutted but if after it may So if A. binds him and his Heirs to warrant to B. his Heirs and Assigns B. dyes his Heir releases the warranty and dies and then the Heir of the Heir assigns The Tenant is impleaded by A. If he may rebutt by his bare possession without shewing how the warranty extended to him A. can have no benefit of his Release before any assignment was made for the Demandant cannot be suppos'd to know the time of the assignment and consequently cannot know how to plead the Release until the time of the assignment appear which is most consonant in reason with the Authorities before urg'd Another reason is That constantly in elder times when the Tenant pleaded a warranty to rebutt he concluded his Plea that if he were impleaded by a stranger the Demandant was to warrant him which could not be without shewing how the warranty extended to him for he was not to warrant him if impleaded by a stranger because he had possession of the Land only Sir Edward Coke in Lincoln Colledge Case cites the Book of 38 E. 3. f. 26. as adjudg'd to prove that the bare possession of the Land is sufficient for the Tenant to rebutt for that the Assignee may rebutt a warranty made only to a man and his Heirs If that were so it were to his purpose but there is
ratione be tryed in the County next adjoyning whereof there is no Vestigium for the one or the other nor sorts it any way with the rule of the Law 2. This Ordinance of Parliament extended not to all Wales but only to the Lordships Marchers there nor any way comprehended the ancient Shires of Wales or Body of the Principality to which the Ordinance of the Statute of Rutland only extended For Lordships Marchers were out of the Shires as appears by Statute 27 H. 8. 3. It appears by the Case that Gower was not within any County at that time Another Case to the same purpose is in Fitz herbert Fitz. Jurisdiction 13 E. 3. pl. 23. Title Jurisdiction and not in any other Reports 13 E. 3. in a Writ of Cosenage the Demand was of Castle of K. and Commot of J. the Defendant pleaded the Castle and Commot were in Wales where the King 's Writ runs not and it was said that the word was not intelligible in the Courts of England and Judgment was prayed if the Court would take Conizance To give the Court Jurisdiction it was urged pressingly 1. That they had given the Court Jurisdiction by alledging the Court knew not what was meant by Commot which the Court was to determine whether it did or not Therefore Jurisdiction was admitted therein 2. Parning pressed they had demanded the view which gave the Court Jurisdiction 3. For that the Original was directed to the Sheriff of Hereford who by his Retorn had testified the Summons and the Tenant had appeared and so affirmed the Summons 4. For that the view was had Notwithstanding all which to give the Court Jurisdiction it was said to Parning He must say more before the Court would have Jurisdiction Which evidently proves that the Court had no Jurisdiction generally of Land in Wales as I observed from the former Case And no act of the party gives Jurisdiction to the Court by elapsing his time to plead to the Jurisdiction if it appear by the Record the Court hath no Jurisdiction as in this Case it did Then Woodstock said Though the Castle and Commot were in Wales the Court ought not to be outed of Jurisdiction for by Commot a great Signiory was demanded consisting of Lands Rents and Services and that the Castle and Commot were held in Capite of the King as of his Crown and said those so held were to be impleaded here and not elsewhere 7 H. 6. f. 36. b. so is 7 H. 6. f. 36. b. And said the King by his Charter had granted the Castle and Commot to the Tenant in tayl and thereupon pray'd aid of the King and it was granted hereupon But before this was shew'd and that it was a great Signiory and held of the King in Capite by which it was no part of the Principality nor held under it the Court would own no Jurisdiction but when that appeared the Case was the same with the former in 18 E. 2. and the Defendant had no remedy but in the Kings Courts This Case was cited by Sir Edward Coke in the Case before cited 11 Jacobi concerning the Sheriff of Radnor but the difference not observ'd of its being a Lordship in Wales held immediately of the King in Capite nor that the Court owned no Jurisdictions generally concerning Lands in Wales by the Summons and view of the next adjoyning Sheriff William de Cosington and Elizabeth his Wife brought a Writ of Dower of the third part of the Land in Gower against the Earl of Warwick as Tenant and the Writ was Quod reddat ei rationabilem dotem de libero tenemento quod fuit Jo. Moubray quondam viri sui in terra de Gowre in Wallia It appears not in the Case to what Sheriff the Writ was directed though this Case be in the Book at large but it appears that those of the Chancery and the Judges of the Kings Bench had been consulted with concerning the Writ in bringing it for Dower in terra de Gower in Wallia therefore it must issue from the High Court of Chancery and must be directed consequently to the Sheriff of Glocester as the Assise was in 18 E. 2. Br. abridging this Case saith The Action was against the Earl of Warwick as being Lord of the intire Signiory of Gower and then he was to be impleaded by Writ out of the Chancery here equally and upon the same reason for a third part of the Signiory as for the whole according to the Case of 18 E. 2. first cited for the Lord could no more make a Precipe to summon himself to his own Minister or to make Execution against himself for a third part of the Royalty than for the whole And therefore the Ordinance of Parliament then mentioned equally extended to this Case as to that of 18 E. 2. This is not strange that Acts of Parliament are lost sometimes Note the Act of 3 E. 1. by which old Customes were granted not extant but clear proofs of it remain These three last Cases therefore wherein the Tenants were impleaded in the Courts here for Land in Wales and Summons and Execution made by the Sheriff of the next adjoyning County are well warranted by an Act of Parliament not extant being for either the Lordships Marchers themselves or some part of them and against the Lord himself as that Case of 18 E. 2. expresly resolves All these were real Actions The first an Assise of Novel Disseisin the second a Writ of Cosenage the third a Writ of Dower The like Case is cited 19 H. 6. 19 H. 6. f. 12. A. That when the Mannor of Abergavenny was demanded the Writ was directed to the Sheriff of Hereford as Newton urged for this was a Lordship Marcher and held of the King in Capite as appears by Moore 's Reports in Cornwals Case in that the Barony of Abergavenny was held by the Lord Hastings of the King in Capite to defend it at his charge ad utilitatem Domini Regis Exactly agreeing with this Doctrine is the Book of 21 H. 7. f. 33. b. if a Signiory in Wales be to be tryed 21 H. 7. f. 33. B. it shall be tryed here by the Course of the Common Law but if Lands be held of a Signiory in Wales it shall be tryed within the Mannor and not elsewhere As for that expression by the Course of the Common Law 19 H. 6. f. 12. A. it is also in the Book 19 H. 6. that Deeds and all other things alledged in Wales shall be tryed in the adjoyning Countries at the Common Law otherwise there would be a failer of Right And of this opinion seemed most of the Iustices arguendo obiter the Case before them not concerning Wales but the County Palatine of Lancaster Of Churches in Wales a Quare Impedit shall be brought in England yet the Land and other things in Wales 30 H. 6. f. 6. B. shall be determined before the Stewards of
more Books Obj. 3 That by the Statute of 9 E. 3. Pleas of Releases or Deeds dated in Franchises within the Realm shall be tryed where the Action is brought Answ Wales is no Franchise or if it were not within the Realm for the questions concerning a Deed pleaded bearing date there but of Original Process for Causes arising and Tryals of them in the next County adjoyning and not in the County where the Action of a Deed dated in a Franchise of the Realm which do toto coelo differ and concerning Executions and Judgments here to be made in another Dominion The same may be said concerning the Statute of 12 E. 2. when Witnesses to Deeds in Forreign Franchises are to be summoned with the Iury and the Tryal notwithstanding their absence to proceed when the Writ is brought Obj. 4 Presidents of Process issued to the Sheriffs of Wales without a Judicial decision upon Argument are of no moment Many things may be done several ways as Bonds though they have regularly one common form yet they may be in other forms as well Presidents are useful to decide questions but in such Cases as these which depend upon Fundamental Principles from which Demonstrations may be drawn millions of Presidents are to no purpose Besides it is known that Officers grant such Process to one Sheriff or County as they use to another nor is it in them to distinguish between the power of the Court over a Sheriff in Wales from a Sheriff in England especially when they find some Writs of Execution going which are warranted by Acts of Parliament which they know not though they do know Process of Execution in fact runs thither as Capias utlagatum Extents upon Statute which are by Acts of Parliament And that other Mandatory Writs issue thither as well at Common Law as by a particular Clause concerning the Chancellor in the Act of 34 H. 8. c. 26. By the Register upon a Judgment had in the Common Pleas against a Clerk Regist f. 43. B Brevium Judicialium who was after made Archbishop of Dublin in Ireland upon a Fieri Facias issued to execute the Judgment to the Sheriff of Middlesex and his Retorn that he had no Lands or Goods in his Bayliwick but was Archbishop in Ireland upon a Testatum of it in the Common Pleas that he had Lands and Goods in Ireland a Fieri Facias issued in the King's name Justiciario suo Hiberniae to make Execution but it appears not whether this Writ issued from the Common Pleas or especially by the King's Direction out of the Chancery which possibly may be as a special Mandatory Writ of the Kings locum tenens there which varies in stile at the Kings pleasure anciently Justiciario suo Hiberniae at other times Locum tenenti nostro at other times Deputat or Capitaneo generali nostro which stiles are not regularly known to the Officers of the Courts at Westminster And perhaps by special Writs to the chief Officer and the King Execution may be made of Judgments given at Westminster in any of his Dominions which would be enquired of FINIS An Exact and Perfect TABLE TO THE REPORTS and ARGUMENTS OF Sir JOHN VAVGHAN Lord Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas. Abatement of Writs See Writs 1. WHere a Writ is brought against an Executor in Debt upon a simple Contract he may abate it 94 2. Judges ought not Ex officio to abate Writs but it must come before them by Demurrer 95 Act of the Party 1. Every act a man is naturally enabled to do is in it self equally good as any other act he is so enabled to do 333 Actions and Actions upon the Case 1. Actions upon the Case are more inferior and ignobler than Actions of Debt 101 2. Actions of the Case are all Actiones Injuriarum contra Pacem and it is not a Debt certain but damages for the breach of the promise that must be recovered in it 101 3. Wheresoever the Debt grew due yet the Debtor is indebted to the Creditor in any place where he is as long as the Debt is unpaid 92 4. The Plaintiff must recover by his own strength and not by the Defendants weakness 8 58 5. If you will recover any thing against any man it is not enough for you to destroy his Title but you must prove your own better than his 60 6. In life liberty and estate every man who hath not forfeited them hath a property and a right which the Law allows him to defend and if it be violated it gives an Action to redress the wrong and punish the wrong-doer 337 7. There are several penal Laws by transgressing of which the Subject can have no particular damage and therefore no particular Action 341 8. All Actions brought against Officers within the Statute of the One and twentieth of K. James must be laid in the proper County 115 116 117 9. Case and not Debt lies for a Solicitor for Soliciting Fees 99 Ad quod dampnum 1. When the King can license without a Writ of Ad quod dampnum he may license if he will whatever the Return of the Writ be 341 345 2. Where the Writ of Ad quod dampnum informs the King better then a Non obstante 356 3. Though there be a Return upon an Ad quod dampnum that it is not ad dampnum yet there must be the Kings license afterwards 341 Administration and Administrator 1. How they are to administer the Intestates Estate 96 2 An Administrator hath a private office of trust he cannot assign nor leave it to his Executor 182 3. An Administrator must take an Oath to make a true accompt 96 4. An Action will not lye against them upon a Tally because it is no good Specialty 100 5. In an Action of Debt upon Bond or Contract brought against him he may confess Judgment if there is no fraud although he hath notice of a former Suit depending 95 100 6. If an Administrator durante minore Aetate brings an Action he must averr the Administrator or Executor to be under the Age of Seventeen years 93 7. The manner of pleading Plene administravit praeter ultra 154 Advowson See Quare Impedit 1. The rights of an Advowson 7 2. Where the Plaintiff and Defendant must alledge Seisin in an Advowson by a former Presentation 8 Agent and Patient 1. In a Quare Impedit both Plaintiff and Defendant are Actors and may have a Writ to the Bishop 6 7 58 Age See Infant Alien 1. The time of the birth is of the Essence of a Subject born for he cannot be a Subject unless at the time of his birth he was under the Kings Liegeance 286 287 2. Regularly who once was an Alien to England cannot be inheritable there but by Act of Parliament 274 282 3. He that is priviledged by the Law of England to inherit must be a Subject of the Kings 268 in loco 278 286 4. He must be more
whole Record but to say That in such a Court such a Judgment was obtained 92 10. In pleading of a Judgment it may be as well pleaded quod recuperaret as recuperet 93 11. An erroneous Judgment is a good barr until reversed by Error 94 12. How a Recognizance or Statute ought to be pleaded 102 13. Every Defendant in a Quare Impedit may plead Ne disturba pas 58 14. The pleading of a Seisin in gross Appendancy and Presentation in a Quare Impedit 15 15. The Tenant shall never be received to Counter-plead but he must make to himself by his plea a Title to the Land and so avoid the plaintiffs Title alledged by a Traverse 58 16. A Commoner prescribes for Common for Cattel levant and couchant antiquo Messuagio which is not good because Cattel cannot to a common intent be levant upon a Messuage only 152 153 17. See the form of pleading a Custome to have solam separalem pasturam for the Tenant against the Lord 252 253 18. The pleading of per nomen in a Grant and how it shall be taken 174 175 Pluralities See Title Statute 14 22. 1. If a man have a Benefice with Cure whatever the value is and is admitted and instituted into another Benefice with Cure having no Qualification or Dispensation the first Benefice is void and the Patron may present 131 Pope 1. The Pope could not change the Law of the Land 20 2. He could formerly grant a Dispensation for a plurality 20 23 24 3. He did formerly grant Faculties Dispensations for Pluralities Unions Appropriations Commendams c. 23 Prerogative See King 1. By the Common Law all Wrecks did belong to the King 164 2. The extent of the Kings Prerogative is the extent of his power and the extent of his power is to do what he hath a will to do according to that Ut summae potestatis Regis est posse quantum velit sic magnitudinis est velle quantum potest 357 3. The King may take Issue and afterwards Demurr or first Demurr and afterwards take Issue Or he may vary his Declaration but all this must be done in one Term 65 4. He may choose whether he will maintain the Office or traverse the Title of the party and so take traverse upon traverse 62 64 Prebend and Prebendary 1. What a Prebendary or Rectory is in the eye of the Law 197 2. A Prebend or Church-man cannot make a Lease of their Possessions in the right of the Church without Deed 197 Prescription See Modus Decimandi Custome 1. What Prescriptions for Commons are good and what not 257 2. How Copyholders shall prescribe for Common 254 3. The Tenant a Commoner prescribes against his Lord to have Solam separalem pasturam this is a void prescription 354 355 356 4. Inhabitants not Corporate cannot prescribe in a Common 254 5. One Commoner may prescribe to have Solam separalem pasturam against another Commoner 255 Presentation See Advowson Ordinary Parson Quare Impedit 1. In a Quare Impedit the Plaintiff must alledge a presentation in himself or in those under whom he claims 7 8 57 2. So likewise must the Defendant ibid. 8 3. What a bare presentation is 11 4. A void presentation makes no usurpation 14 5. When the presentation shall make an usurpation ibid. 6. Where the King presents by Lapse without Title and yet hath other good Title the presentation is void ibid. 7. Where a Parson is chosen a Bishop his Benefices are all void and the King shall present 19 20 21 8. Where a Benefice becomes void by accepting another without a Dispensation the Patron is bound to present without notice and where not 131 Presidents 1. An extrajudicial Opinion given in or out of Court is no good president 382 2. Presidents without a Judicial decision upon Argument are of no moment 419 3. An Opinion given in Court if not necessary to the Judgment given of Record is no Judicial Opinion nor more than a gratis dictum 382 4. But an Opinion though erroneous to the Judgment is a Judicial Opinion because delivered under the Sanction of the Judges Oath upon deliberation which assures it is or was when delivered the Opinion of the Deliverer 382 5. Presidents of Fact which pass sub silentio in the Court of Kings Bench or Common Pleas are not to be regarded 399 6. New presidents are not considerable 169 7. Presidents are useful to decide Questions but in Cases which depend upon fundamental principles from which demonstrations may be drawn millions of Presidents are to no purpose 419 8. Long usage is a just medium to expound an Act of Parliament 169 Privity See Estate 1. A privity is necessary by the Common Law to distrain and avow between the Distrainor and Distrained 39 2. Such privity is created by Attornment ibid. 3. Where a new Estate is gained the privity of the old Estate is lost 43 4. Where it is not lost between Grantor and Grantee of a Rent after a Fine levied by the Grantee to his own use ibid. 5. Where an Estate in a Rent may be altered and no new Attornment or privity requisite 144 Priviledge 1. Priviledge lies only where a man is an Officer of the Court or hath a prior Suit depending in the Common Pleas and is elsewhere molested that he cannot attend it 154 2. All Officers Clerks Attorneys of the Common Pleas and their Menial Servants shall have their Writ of Priviledge 155 Process 1. No Process shall issue from hence into Wales but only Process of Outlawry and Extent 396 397 2. A Fieri Facias Capias ad satisfaciendum or other Judicial Process shall not go from hence thither 397 3. Process in Wales differ from Process in England 400 Prohibition See Title Marriage 1. Prohibitions for encroaching Jurisdiction are as well grantable in the Common Pleas as Kings Bench 157 209 2. A man was sued in the Spiritual Court for having married with his Fathers brothers wife and a Prohibition was granted 206 207 c. 3. The Judges have full conizance of Marriages within or without the Levitical Degrees 207 220 4. They have conizance of what Marriages are incestuous and what not and may prohibit the Spiritual Court from questioning of them ibid. 5. How the suggestion upon the Statute of 32 H. 8. concerning Marriages must be drawn to bring the matter in question 247 Proof See Witnesses Evidence 1. A witness shall be admitted to prove the Contents of a Deed or Will 77 Property 1. In Life Liberty and Estate every man who hath not forfeited them hath a property and right which the Law allows him to defend and if it be violated it gives an Action to redress the wrong and to punish the wrong-doer 337 2. To violate mens properties is never lawful but a malum in se 338 3. But to alter or transfer mens properties is no malum in se ibid. Proviso 1. A power is granted to make Leases of Lands
of them constituent parts of the Prebendary or Rectory as the Services are of a Mannor for a total severance of the Services and Demesne destroy the Mannor but a severance of the Tithe or Glebe will not destroy the Rectory more than the severance of a Mannor parcel of the possessions of a Bishoprick will destroy the Bishoprick for the Glebe and the Tithe are but several possessions belonging to the Rectory But it is true that in the Case before us and like Cases a Grant of the Prebendary or of the Rectory una cum terra Glebali decimis de Woolney The Tithe which alone cannot pass without Deed doth pass by Livery of the Rectory Browlow part 2. f. 201. Rowles and Masons Case and so pass that though the Deed mentions the Tithe to be pass'd yet if Livery be not given which must be to pass the Land the Tithe will not pass by the Deed because the intention of the parties is not to pass them severally but una cum and together Therefore the Tithe in such Case must pass in time by the Livery which did not pass without it though granted by the Deed. Yet it is a Question Whether in such Case the Tithe passeth by the Livery or by the Deed For though the passing it by Deed is suspended by reason of the intention to pass the Land and Tithe together and not severally it follows not but that the Tithe passeth by the Deed where Livery is given though not until Livery given If a man be seis'd of a Tenement of Land and likewise of a Tithe and agrees to sell them both and without Deed gives Livery in the Tenement to the Bargainee in name of it and of the Tithe I conceive the Tithe doth not pass by that Livery But a Prebend or Church man cannot now by the Statute of 13 Eliz. cap. 10. make a Lease of the possessions of his Prebendary without Deed. 13 Eliz. c. 10. A Prebendary or Rectory is in truth neither the Glebe nor Tithe nor both for the one or the other may be recover'd and might at Common Law have been aliened the Rectory remaining But the Rectory is the Church Parochial whereof the Incumbent taketh the Cure and Seisin by his Induction after his Institution which is his Charge and without other Seisin then of the Ring or Key of the Church-door by Induction into the Rectory the Parson is seis'd of all the possessions belonging to his Rectory of what kind soever But though by the name of the Rectory the possessions belonging to it of what nature soever actually vest in the Incumbent upon Induction and may pass from the Prebendary by Livery of the Prebend or Rectory to his Lessee according to the parties intention Yet it follows not That therefore an Occupant who can be Occupant but of some natural and permanent thing as Land is should by being Occupant of that whereof occupancy may be have thereby some other thing heterogene to the nature of Land and not capable of occupancy as a Tithe is being neither appendant or appurtenant or necessary part of that whereof he is Occupant nor will it follow that because by giving Seisin of the Rectory the Tithe and Glebe belonging to it will pass that therefore giving Livery of the Glebe will pass the Tithe For it is observable That if a man be Tenant in tayl of a Mannor to which an Advowson is appendant or of a Tenement to which a Common is belonging and discontinue the Issue in tayl shall never have the Advowson or Common until he hath recontinued the Mannor or Tenement But if a man be seis'd in tayl of a Rectory consisting of Glebe and Tithe and discontinue it after the death of Tenant in tayl the Heir in tayl shall have the Tithe which lay in grant but must recover by Formedon the Rectory and Glebe This was agreed in this Court in a Case between Christopher Baker and Searl in Ejectment Cr. 37 El. f. 407. p. 19. Baker and Searls Case upon a Demise by the Earl of Bedford of the Rectory of D. de decimis inde provenientibus for Lives of three other persons and that Case seems to admit an occupancy of the Tithe the Question being concerning the Tithe only Quest 3 The next Question will be That if Taverner being Occupant of the House and Land shall not have the Tithe whereof Astly was in possession at the time of his death what shall become of this Tithe during the lives of the Cestuy que vies which is the hard question And as to this Question If a Rent be granted to A. for the life of B. and A. dies living B I conceive this Rent to be determined upon the death of A. equally as if granted to him for his own life I say determined because it is not properly extinguish'd nor is it suspended For Extinguishment of a Rent is properly when the Rent is absolutely conveyed to him who hath the Land out of which the Rent issues or the Land is convey'd to him to whom the Rent is granted And Suspension of a Rent is when either the Rent or Land are so convey'd not absolutely and finally but for a certain time after which the Rent will be again reviv'd The Reasons why it is determined are because a thing so granted as none can take by the Grant is a void Grant that is as if no such Grant had been Therefore a Grant to the Bishop of L. and his Successors when there is no Bishop in being at the time or to the Dean and Chapter of Pauls or to the Mayor and Commonalty of such a place when there is no Dean or Mayor living at the time of the Grant is a void Grant that is as if it had not been though such a Grant by way of Remainder may be good By the same Reason it follows That when any thing is so granted that upon some contingent hapning none can take by the Grant nor possibly have the thing granted both the Grant and thing granted must necessarily determine for what difference is there between saying that Rent can no longer be had when it is determined by his death for whose life it was granted and saying none can longer have this Rent when it determines by the death of the Grantee pur auter vie For there is no Assignee Occupant or any other can possibly have it and it is therefore determined In an Action of Trover and Conversion brought by Salter against Boteler Salter versus Boteler 44 El. Cr. 901. the Defendant justifies for that one Robert Bash was seis'd in Fee of Twenty Acres in Stansted and granted a Rent-charge to another Robert Bash his Executors and Assigns during the life of Frances the Grantees Wife of Sixteen pounds per Annum The Grantee dies and Frances his wife takes Letters of Administration and the Defendant as her Servant and by her command took a Distress in the said Twenty Acres for Rent
arrear and impounded them And Traverseth the Conversion and taking in other manner Vpon Demurrer to this Plea all the Court held the Plea to be bad and gave Iudgment for the Plaintiff 1. Because the Rent was determined by the death of the Grantee because no Occupant could be of it 2. Because the Feme was no Assignee by her taking of Administration 3. None can make title to a Rent to have it against the terr Tenant unless he be party to the Deed or make sufficient title under it Moore 664. p. 907. Salter vers Boteler The same Case is in Moore reported to be so adjudg'd because the Rent was determined by the death of the Grantee and Popham said That if a Rent be granted pur auter vie the Remainder over to another and the Grantee dies living Cestuy que vie the Remainder shall commence forthwith because the Rent for life determined by the death of the Grantee which last Case is good Law For the particular Estate in the Rent must determine when none could have it and when the particular Estate was determined the Remainder took place And as the Law is of a Rent so must it be of any thing which lies in Grant as a several Tithe doth whereof there can be no Occupant when it is granted pur auter vie and the Grantee dies in the life of Cestuy que vie 20 H. 6. f. 7 8. This is further cleared by a Case in 20 H. 6. A man purchas'd of an Abbot certain Land in Fee-farm rendring to the Abbot and his Successors Twenty pounds yearly Rent If all the Monks dye this Rent determined because there is none that can have it It lies not in Tenure and therefore cannot Escheat and though new Monks may be made it must be by a new Creation wholly In vacancy of a Parson or Vicar the Ordinary ex officio shall cite to pay the Tithes Fitz. N. Br. Consultation Lett. G. This Case agrees exactly with the Grant of a Rent or other thing which lies in Grant pur auter vie the Grantee dying the Rent determines though it were a good Grant and enjoyed at first yet when after none can have it it is determined So was the Rent to the Abbot and his Successors a good Rent and well enjoyed But when after all the Covent died so as none could have the Rent for the Body Politique was destroyed the Rent determined absolutely By this I hold it clear That if a man demise Land to another and his Heirs habendum pur auter vie or grant a Rent to a man and his Heirs pur auter vie though the Heir shall have this Land or Rent after the Grantees death yet he hath it not as a special Occupant as the common expression is for if so such Heir were an Occupant which he is not for a special Occupant must be an Occupant but he takes it as Heir not of a Fee but of a descendible Freehold and not by way of limitation as a Purchase to the Heir but by descent though some Opinions are that the Heir takes it by special limitation as when an Estate for life is made the Remainder to the right Heirs of J. S. the Heir takes it by special limitation if there be an Heir when the particular Estate ends But I see not how when Land or Rent is granted to a man and his Heirs pur auter vie the Heir should take by special limitation after the Grantees death when the whole Estate was so in the first Grantee that he might assign it to whom he pleas'd and so he who was intended to take by special limitation after the Grantees death should take nothing at all But to inherit as Heir a descendible Freehold when the Father or other Ancestor had not dispos'd it agrees with the ancient Law as appears by Bracton which obiter in Argument is denied in Walsinghams Case Si autem fiat donatio sic Bract. l. 2. de acquirendo rerum dominico c. 9. Ad vitam donatoris donatorio haeredibus suis si donatorius praemoriatur haeredes ei succedent tenendum ad vitam donatoris per Assisam mortis Antecessoris recuperabunt qui obiit ut de feodo Here it is evident That Land granted to a man and his Heirs for the life of the Grantor the Grantee dying in the life of the Grantor the Heirs of the Grantee were to succeed him and should recover by a Writ of Mordancester in case of Abatement which infallibly proves the Heir takes by descent who died seis'd as of a Fee but not died seis'd in Fee 1. Hence I conclude That if a man dye seis'd pur auter vie of a Rent a Tithe an Advowson in gross Common in gross or other thing whereof there can be no Occupancy either directly or by consequence as adjuncts of something else by the death of the Grantee in all these Cases the Grant is determined and the Interest stands as before any Grant made 2. If any man dye seis'd of Land pur auter vie as also of many of these things in gross pur auter vie by distinct Grant from the Land The Occupant of the Land shall have none of these things but they are in the same state and the Grants determine as if the Grantee had died seis'd of nothing whereof there could be any occupancy But I must remember you that in this last part of my Discourse where I said That if a Rent a Tithe a Common or Advowson in gross or the like lying in Grant were granted pur auter vie and the Grantee died living Cestuy que vie that these Grants were determin'd my meaning was and is where such Rent Tithe or other things are singly granted and not where they are granted together with Land or any other thing out of which Rent may issue with Reservation of a Rent out of the whole For although a Rent cannot issue out of things which lye in Grant as not distrainable in their nature yet being granted together with Land with reservation of a Rent though the Rent issue properly and only out of the Land and not out of those things lying in Grant as appears by Littleton yet those are part of the Consideration for payment of the Rent Cok. Litt. f. 142. a. 144. a. as well as the Land is In such case when the Rent remains still payable by the Occupant it is unreasonable that the Grant should determine as to the Tithe or as to any other thing lying in Grant which passed with the Land as part of the Consideration for which the Rent was payable and remain to the Lessor as before they were granted for so the Lessor gives a Consideration for paying a Rent which he enjoys and hath notwithstanding the Consideration given back again And this is the present Case being stript and singled from such things as intricate it That Doctor Mallory Prebend of the Prebendary of Woolney consisting of Glebe-land