of the Bailment But Haughton being contra therfore Curia advisare vult The same Term in the same Court The Earl of Shrewsburies Case VPon a Verdict a rule was given to have Iudgment and this was upon the Thursday and upon Sâ—â—uâ—day after thâ— party that was Plaintiff died and it was moved to have a Writ of Error because it was said that the party died before Iudgment in as much as of course aâ—ter the Verdict and the â—ule given for Iudgment there are four daies given to speak in Arrest In the diâ—cretion of the chief â—ustice to allow a Writ of Error The entry of a Iudgment how it shall relate of Iudgment â—â—o so as Yelverton Attorney-generall said he died before Iudgment absolutely given and he moved the Court to have a Supersedeas And it was agreed that it wâ—s in the discretion of the chief Iustice Ex officio to allow a Writ of Error but because it was a cause of great consequence he took the advice of the Court and it was agreed that a Writ of Error was a Supersedeas in it self yet it is good to have a Supersedeas also and if the Writ of Error had been allowed the Court could not deny the party a Supersedeas But because the Writ of Error was not allowed and also because no Error appeared to the Court for where Iudgment is entred this shall relate to the time of the rule given It was resolved that no Writ of Error should be allowed nor any Supersedeas granted The same Term in the same Court. Rones Case IN an Ejectione firmae brought by the Lessee of Rone Incumbent of the Church of Dallinghoe in Com. Suff. It was found by speciall Verdict that the King was the true Patron and that Wingfeild entred a Caveat in vita Incumbentis he then lying in Extremis scilicet Caveat Episcopus ne quis admittatur c. Nisi Convocatus the said Wingfeild the Incumbent dies Naunton a stranger presents one Morgan who is admitted and instituted afterwards the said Wingfeild presents one Glover who is instituted and inducted and afterwards the said Rone procure a presentation from the King who was instituted and inducted and then it came in question in the Spirituall Court who had the best right and there sentence was given that the first institution was Irrita vacua inanis by reason of the Caveat then the Church being full of the second Incumbent the King was put out of possession and so his presentment void But it was adjudged and resolved by all the Court for Rone for 1. It was resolved that this Caveat was void because it was in the life of the Incumbent 2. The Church upon the Institution of Morgan was full against all but the King and so agreed many times in the Books and then the presentation of Glover was void by reason of the super-institution and therfore no obstacle in the way to hinder the presentation of Rone and therfore Rone had good right And if the second institution be void the sentence cannot make it good for the Spirituall Court ought to take notice of the Common Law which saith that Ecclesia est plena consulta upon the institution and the person hath therby Curam animarum And as Doderidge Iustice said he hath by it Officium but Beneficium comes by the Induction And although by the Spirituall Law the institution may be disannulled by sentence yet as Linwood saith Aliter est in Anglia who is an Author very well approved of amongst the Civilians And Doderidge put a case out of Doctor and Studient the second Book If a man devise a summ of money to be paid to I. S. when he cometh to full age and afterwards he sues for it in the Spirituall Court they ought to take notice of the time of full age as it is used by the Common Law to wit 21. and not of the time of full age as it is used amongst them to wit 25. So in this case at the Bar for when these two Laws met together the Common Law ought to be preferred And when the Parson hath institution the Arch-deacon ought to give him Induction And see Dyer 293. Bedingfeilds case cited by Haughton to accord with this case The same Term in the same Court Taylors Case JOhn Taylor a Citizen and Alderman of Glocester was put out of his place by the Common Counsel of the City for some misdemeanor and he sued out a Writ of Restitution and for that the cause of his displacing was not sufficient Writ of Restitution for an Aldermans place his Writ was allowed by reason wherof the other Alderman who was elected in his place was to be removed for the number of Aldermen was full But Hazard another Alderman to the end that the new elect who now was Major should not be displaced was contented to surrender his place in consideration of 10 l. a year granted to him by the Corporation for term of his life with which the Wife of Hazard was not content and therfore he would have left his agreement And therupon the question was whether he might surrender or not And it was said by Coventree Sollicitor that he cannot and he cited Middlecots case an Alderman of B. where the opinion of the Court was 13 Eliz. that he cannot surrender Doderidge perhaps they would not except his surrender Mountague said that Alderman Martin of London gave up his Aldermans place and without question any man in such a case may surrender or leave his place to which the Court agreed and therfore it was ordered that Hazard shall have his 10 l. a year and that he shall stand to his first agreement The same Term in the same Court. May and Samuels Case AN action of Debt was brought upon an Obligation the Condition wherof was to stand to the Arbitrement of John S. concerning all matters between them to the time of the submission who arbitrates that the one shall pay 20 s. and that the other shall make a generall release to him of all matters from the beginning of the world to the time of the arbitrement Arbitrement Haughton Iustice this is an arbitrement but of one part and therfore void but if it had been only that the one shall pay 20 s. it may be good for it shall be intended that the other by reasonable construction shall be discharged or acquitted to which Crook and Doderidge Iustices agreed But by Mountague chief Iustice it ought to be specified yet they all agreed and so it was adjudged that this was a void arbitrement for it was of the one part only to wit that he shall pay 20 s. for the other part for the release to the time of the arbitrement was not within the submission so if the arbitrement had been that the one shall make a release or shall be discharged or acquitted without speaking of the other this being on the one part only is a void arbitrement vide
case who agreed that the wife shall not have it The same Term in the same Court. Dennis versus Sir Arthur Mannaring and others IN the great case between Gabriel Dennis Plaintiff in Trespasse against Sir Arthur Mannaring and Brimblecomb and others the Verdict was found for the Defendants And now it was moved in Arrest of Iudgment for the Plaintiff because no Bail was entred for Brimblecomb one of the Defendants A Verdict is given in B â— before any bail entred not good for every Defendant is supposed in Custodia Marescalli and in this case the Venire facias is awarded to try the Issue between the Plaintiff and Defendants where one of the Defendants is no party in Court And Serjeant More put the case of the Lord Chandoys and Sculler and other Defendants where the Iudgment in such a case was resolved to be erroneous Mountague we ought Discernere per legem quid sit justum and here Brimblecomb being no party in Court no Verdict could be given Doderidge I have seen in this Court where upon a Writ of Error brought in such a case we have compelled him to put in his Bail because he should not take advantage of his own wrong and folly But because that here no fraud appeared to be in the Plaintiff he shall not be bound to stand to the Verdict Haughton agreed but Crook seemed to the contrary But it was agreed that if Brimblecomb had appeared at the Suit of any other the same Term it had been sufficient And these Books were cited to be in the point 32 H. 6. 2. 8 E. 4. 5. 21 H. 6. 10. The same Term in the same Court Hide versus Whistler WIlliam Hide made a Lease for years of certain Lands to Whistler excepting Exception of all Wood under-wood Coppices and Hedgerows to the Lessor all his Wood and under-wood Coppices and Hedgerows and in a Replevin the question was whether the Soil shall passe ther by for the Lessee put his Beasts into a Coppice and the Lessor distrained them wherupon c. And the words of the exception were further standing growing and being in and upon the Premisses And the Lessee covenanted to make Fences but if the Lessor made new Coppices that the Lessee should net make Fences about them And it was said that a Coppice signifies a parcell of Land fenced for the safegard of young Trees And it was said for A Coppice what it is the Plaintiff that Premisses are Pre dimissa and by these words growing and being in the Premisses it shall be intended that the Soil did not passe for it is pre-demised But it was resolved that the Soil it self was excepted by the exception of the Wood and Coppice 14 H. 8. 1. The Bishop of Londons case Co. lib. 5. Ives case and lib. 11. Lyfords case And by the reserving of a Coppice the Soil it self is reserved for by Mountague that which is reserved is not demised and so the Distresse well taken Crook agreed and he said the difference was good between Wood and Trees for by the excepting of Wood the Soil it self is excepted otherwise of Trees Haughton agreed that the Soil it self is excepted in this case and so it was adjudged The same Term in the same Court. Talbot versus Sir Walter Lacen IN a Writ of Covenant brought by Margaret Talbot against Sir Walter Lacen upon a Lease made by the Plaintiff to the Defendant of a Park Covenant to leave the Premistes in repatations at the end of the Term. c. for five years if she should live so long in which the Lessee covenants for him his Executors and Assigns to keep the Premisses in good Reparations and so to leave them at the end of the Term and also to deliver to the Plaintiff upon notice given four Bucks and four Does in season during the life of the Plaintiff in every of the said years And after the expiration of the aforesaid term of five years she brought a Writ of Covenant and assigned the breach because that in the end of the term he committed Wast and because that after the end of the term the Defendant refused to deliver the Deer And albeit the words of the delivery of the Deer are during the life of the Plaintiff yet they are also every of the aforesaid years and therforeit was resolved that she shall not have them during her life in this case And for the other point it was objected that in Fine termini was incertain for it may extend after the term but Ad finem termini had been sufficient Old book of Entries 169. for when he covenants that at the end of the term he would leave the Premisses in reparations and Ad finem termini he did wast this ought of necessity to be intended a breach of the Covenant and therfore it was adjudged that the action of Covenant well lies Mich 16. Jac. In the Kings Bench. Havergall and Hares Case IN this Case which see before fol. 1. b. four points were observed 1. Whether Fisher the Assignee of the Rent were such a person who Before fol. 1. b shall take benefit of the entry 2. When 10 l. is only in arrear whether the Rent of 20 l. shall be said in arrear 3. Whether these advantages which were first granted with the Rent may be granted over 4. When the Vse shall rise whether upon the first Indenture of the grant of the Rent or afterwards For the case was that the Grantee of the Rent of 20 l. covenanted by the same Indenture that if the said rent of 20 l. were in arrear for the space of twenty daies after any day of payment that the Grantee shall distrain and if there be not sufficient distresse upon the Land or if there be a Rescous Replevin or Pound-breach that then it shall be lawfull for the Grantee and his Heirs to enter into the same Land and to retain it untill he be satisfied And the said Rent was granted 9 Jac. it was arrear 11 Jac. the Fine for the better assurance of the Rent was levied 12 Jac. and 13 Jac. the Distresse was taken There were four Causes which give an entry and upon the Distresse and Replevin brought the Assignee enters As to the three first points it was resolved by the whole Court 1. That Fisher was such an Assignee who shall take benefit of the Entry 2. When 10 l. is only arrear the Rent of 20 l. shall be said arrear wherupon there shall be a Title of Entry 3. That these advantages granted with the Rent may be granted over And as to the fourth point it was holden by Mountague and Crook that the Vse riseth upon the first Indenture and not upon the entry after the Replevin brought although the words are that then it shall be lawfull for the Grantee and his Heirs to enter wherby the use is only awaked as it is in the principall point in Shelleys case and although a Fine is afterwards
shall it be in the case Doderidge Justice the Servant may have the Action also If the Servant be robbed of wares the Master or Servant may have an appeale 8. E. 2. Tit. Robbery two joynt Merchants one is Robbed both shall joyne in the Action and may also joyn in the appeal But it may be objected as Whitlock Iustice did that the Master is not Hospitans I say this is to no purpose A man put his Horse in the Stable and before he goes to bed or lodging the Horse is gone he shall have an action although he did not lodge there For the word transeuntes although he be at the end of his Iourney yet it is within the custom and he shall have action And by Crew if I send cloath to a Taylor and it is stoln from him the Taylor shall have an action of trespasse or the Owner Jones the case of Hue and Cry is a more stronger case then this is for there the Servant ought to swear that he is robbed and yet the Master shall have an action And for the word transeuntes all agreed that although he be at the end of his journey or at an Inne in London yet he is within the remedy of this Law And if a man stay in an Inne a moneth or a quarter of a year shall not he have an action if he lose his Goods Doderidge agreed that if a man be boarded in an Inne and his Goods are stoln he shall not have an action upon this Law And notwithstanding this objection judgment was given for the Plaintiff upon the Verdict Trin. Term 2 Car. In the Kings Bench. Sir William Buttons Case SIr William Button a Iustice of Peace brought an action for these words Sir William Buttons men have stoln Sheep and he spake to me that I should not prosecute them and it seems that the action did not lye because Words Sir William Buttons men have stoln Sheep and be spake to me that I should not prosecute them Sir William did not aver that he is a Iustice of Peace and it doth not appear in what County the said Felony was done 36 Eliz. One brought an action for these words A. is a cosening fellow and the greatest Pickpurse in Northamptonshire and there is not a Purse picked within 40. miles of Northampton but he hath a hand in it And the action did not lye because he did not aver that there were Purses cut Jones Iustice put this case One saith that A. is as strong a Thief as any is in Warwick Gaol he ought to aver that there is a Theef in Warwick Gaol or otherwise they are not actionable Doderidge put this case There is a nest of Theeves at Dale and Sir Iohn Bridges is the maintainer of them these are actionable because it implies maintenance Note that it appeared upon a motion which the Attorney-generall made against one Lane who is a Recusant in Northamptonshire that a Lease for years made by a Recusant of his own Lands after conviction if it be Bona fide will bind the King but if it be upon fraud and covin then it will not and Whitlock said that it is a common course for Recusants to make Leases after their Indictment and before conviction The same Term in the same Court The Case of the Major Bayliffs and Jurates of Maidstone IN a Quo warranto depending against the Mayor Bayliffs and Iurates of Maidstone in Kent Serjeant Finch of Counsell with them of Maidstone put the case briefly in effect thus In the Quo warranto against them it was ordered by the Court that they should have day to plead untill afornight after Trinity Term and the truth was that they had not pleaded accordingly wherupon Iudgment was entred in the Roll and the Writ of Seisin awarded and execution therupon and afterwards by a private order in the Vacation by the chief Iustice and Iustice Jones it was ordered that the Iudgment should be staid and the truth was that it was never entred amongst the Rules of the Court and therfore he prayed that the Iudgment might not be filed but that the last order might be observed and that they might amend their Plea Hendon Serjeant on the other side said that it could not be for by the Iudgment given the King was intitled to have the profits of Franchises which he shal not lose he cited the case which is in F. N. B. 21. Error in B. R. cannot be reversed the same Term before the same Iustices without a Writ of Error but otherwise it is in C. B. and he said that the same course was observed in Eyre there can be no pleading in Eyre after the Eyre determined and upon this he cited the case of 15 E. 4. 7. before the Iustices in Eyre if the Defendant does not come the Franchises shall be seised into the Kings hands nomine destinctionis and if the party who ought the Franchise doth not come during the Eyre in the same County he shall forfeit his Franchise for ever so here after Iudgement entred there can be no plea per que c. Finch we have order from the Court for stay of Iudgement here no perfect Iudgement was given and this is not without president and he cited one Chamberlains Case where the Iudgement was nigh to perfection c. but he did not put the Case Creve ch Justice in this case there was the assent of the Attorney generall who prosecuted the Quo Warranto and so the cases put by Hendon to no purpose Jones upon F. N. B. 21. J. took this difference true it is that the Kings Bench cannot reverse a Iudgement although it be in the same term without a Writ of Error but this is where error lies in Where the Kings Bench may reverse its owne judgmeÌ„t without Writ of Error and where not the same cause in the same Court as upon outlawry but if no error lies in this Court for the same cause but in Parliament then the Kings Bench may reverse the Iudgement without Writ of Error being the same term And the Iudgement here was ever of Record for the Roll untill it be fixed amongst other Rolls is no Record And for the Case of 15. E. 4. 7. it is not like our case in reason for when When a Roll â—s become a Record the Eyre is determined the power of the Iustices in Eyre is also determined but it is not so here for the Iustices have power from Term to Term But Noy argued further for the King that it is a Iudgement of another Term and Execution awarded upon it and said that it is without president that now it should be avoyded and upon the awarding of execution the King under his seal hath averred that judgement is given which cannot be falsified and for Chamberlains Case he said that there was an assent in it Doderidge the Question which now is moved is but this whether a Iudgement entered in a private Roll
such Estates that the Law allows them to be good against the Lords themselves they performing their Customs and Services and therfore are more commonly guided by the guides and rules of the common Law and therfore as appeareth in Dyer Tr. 12. Eliz. Possessio fratris of such an Estate facit sororem esse haeredem And to say that Estates of Copyhold Land are not warranted but by custom and every Custom lies in Vsage and without Vsage a Custom cannot be is true but in the Vsage of the greater the lesser is alwaies implyed As by Vsage three lives have been alwaies granted by Copy of Court Roll but never within memory two or one alone yet the grant of one or two lives only is warranted by this Custom for the use of the greater number warrants the lesser number of lives but not è converso And so Fee-simples upon a Limitation or Estates in tail are warranted by the equity of the Statute because they are lesser Estates then are warranted by the Custom and these lesser are implyed as before in the greater and none will doubt but that in this case the Lord may make a Demise for life the Remainder over in Fee and it is well warranted by the Custom and therfore it seems to them that it is a good Estate tail to John Gravenor and a good Remainder over to Henry his Brother and if so it follows that the Plaintiff hath a good Title to the Land and that Iudgment ought to be given for him And for the dying seised of Elizabeth they did not regard it for she cannot dye seised of it as a Copyholder for she had no right to be Copyholder of it And by the dying seised of a Copyholder at common Law it shall be no prejudice to him who hath right for he may enter But here in as much as she cometh in by admittance of the Lord at the Court her Occupation cannot be fortious to him and therfore no descent at common Law by her dying seised for it was but as an Occupation at Will But if it shall not be an Estate tail in John Gravenor as they conceive strongly it is yet for the other causes alledged by Gawdy and Clench Iudgment ought to be given for the Plaintiff and the Remainder which is not good shall not prejudice the Fee-simple conditionall granted to John which is no more then if the Surrender had been to the use of Iohn Gravenor and his Heirs the Remainder over because that we as Iudges see that this cannot be good by Law and therfore not to be compared to the case where the Custom warrants but one life and the Lord grants two joyntly or successively there both the one and the other is void And this is true because the custom is the cause that it was void and not the Law and also it is a larger Estate then the Custom warrants which is not here and upon this Iudgment was given that the Plaintiff shall recover And by Popham it hath been used and that upon good advice in some Maâ—nors to bar such Estates tails by a common Recovery prosecuted in the Lords Court upon a Plaint in nature of a Writ of Entry in the Post 2. JUlius Cesar Iudge of the Admiralty Court brought an Action upon the Case for a Slander against Philip Curtine a Merchant-stranger for saying that the said Cesar had given a corrupt Sentence And upon not guilty pleaded and 200. marks Damages given it was alledged in arrest of Iudgment where it was tryed by Nisi prius at the Guildhall by a partiall Inquest because that upon the default of strangers one being challenged and tryed out a Tales was awarded De circumstantibus by the Iustice of Nisi prius wheras as was alledged a Tale could not have been granted in this case for the Statute of 35 H. 8 cap. 6. which give the Tales is to be intended but of commontryals of English for the Statute speaks at the beginning but of such Iuries which by the Law eught to have 40 s. of Free-hold and wills that in such cases the Venire facias ought to have this clause Quorum quilibet habeat 40 s. in terris c. which cannot be intended of Aliens which cannot have Free-hold And it goes further that upon default of Iurors the Iustices have authority at the Prayer of the Plaintiff or Defendant to command the Sheriff or other Minister to whom it appertaineth to make a return of such other able persons of the said County then present at the same Assises or Nisi prius which shall make a full Iury c. which cannot be intended of Aliens but of Subjects and therfore shall be of tryals which are onely of English and not of this Inquest which was part of Aliens And further the Tales was awarded only of Aliens as was alledged on the Defendants part but in this point it was a mistake for the Tales was awarded generally de circumstantibus which ought alwaies to be of such as the principall Pannell was But Per Curiam the exceptions were disallowed for albeit the Statute is as hath been said yet when the Statute comes to this clause which gives that a Tales may be granted by the Iustices of Nisi prius and is generally referred to the former part of the Act for it is added Furthermore be it enacted that upon every first Writ of Habeas Corpora or Distringas with a Nisi prius c. the Sheriff c. shall return upon every Juror 5 s. Issues at the least c which is generall of all And then it goes further And wills that in every such Writ oâ— Habeas Corpora or Distringas with a Nisi prius where a full Jury doth not appear before the Justices of Assise or Nisi prius that they have power to command the Sheriff or other Minister to whom it appertains to nominate such other persons as before which is generall in all places where a Nisi prius is granted and therfore this is not excepted neither by the Letter nor intent of the Law And where it is said such persons by it is to be intended such as the first which shall be of Aliens as well as English where the case requires it for expedition was as requisite in cases for or against them as if it were between other persons And Aliens may well be of the County or place where the Nisi prius is to be taken and may be there for although an Alien cannot purchâ—se Land of an Estate of Free-hold within the Realm yet he may have a house for habitation within it for the time that he is there albeit he be no Denison but be to remain there for Merchandise or the like And by Gawdy where the default was only of strangers the Tales might have been awarded only of Aliens as where a thing is to be tryed by Inquest within two Counties and those of the one County appear but not those of the other the
Prohibition and had it and Noy moved for a Consultation 1. Because that a Prohibition and an Attachment upon it are but one Suit for the contempt of the party in bringing his Suit in another Court and translating this from the Kings Court and when it is once tried for the Defendant the same thing shall not be tried again And as to the Statute of 50 E 3. 4. upon the mistake wherof the mistake is raised he confessed that the Printed Books and also in the Extract of the Parliament one Roll remaining in the Tower is the same Iudge but the Parliament Roll it self and the Petition is Liceatque Iudici Ecclesiastico sive diocess eidem an hujusmodi and the answer to the Petition is one Consultation granted sufficeth in this case And the Parliament Roll it self was brought into the Court and viewed but he said that if it were as it is in the printed Book and Extract the same Iudge shall not be intended the same personall Iudge but the same Iudge of Conusance of the same Iurisdiction or cause for otherwise if another Commissary be made as the Bishop may when he will his Successor may be newly prohibited and also one thing may be infinitely tried for in many places the Suit begins in the Arch-deacons Court and from him an Appeal may be brought to the Bishop The same Term in the Kings Bench. Pack versus Methold in a Writ of Error IN Mich. Term 22 Jac. Methold brought an action upon the case in the Common Pleas against Pack and declared that in consideration that the Plaintiff would pay to Playford 52 l. 14 s. to the use of the said Pack such a day c. Pack promised to deliver to him his Bond in which he was bound to him in the said summ when he should be therunto requested And shews that he had paid c. and the Defendant did not deliver to him the Bond albeit the same to do he was afterwards often times requested and upon non assumpsit pleaded it was found for the Plaintiff and now it was moved in Arrest of Iudgment because the request is not laid specially nor the day nor place therof expressed But the Court to wit Hobart chief Iustice Hutton and Harvey gave Iudgment for the Plaintiff and yet they agreed that if he had demurred upon the Declaration it had not been good and also that if it had been generall Licet saepius requisit it had not been good in as much as it is parcell of the promise and therfore ought to be said substantially viz. That it was after the promise and payment of the 52 l. but the time is supplied by these words Postea and there is no defect but in the place and Postea implies that it was after the promise and payment And Hobart said that all the points of the Declaration which have matter and substance are good only there wants the place where the request was made which by the Issue is moved and the request is here well notified to the Court and the defect of the place is now helped by the Statute Hutton said that if the promise had been to pay so much upon request at Easter there the day ought to have been shewn and Postea had not been sufficient but here the Postea refers only to a thing wherby it is certain and he said that upon this Issue such a request shall be given in evidence Harvey said that the request being here laid as it is the Court may well give Iudgment And it seemed to Hobart that such a request cannot be given in evidence where the Issue is upon an Assumpsit And Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff and afterwards a Writ of Error Hill 1. Car. Where in an action upon the case there ought to be a speciall request and where not was brought in the Kings Bench and the opinion of the Court was strongly that the Plaintiff ought to have alledged the request specially and ceriainly in time and place because it is traversable and parcell of the Assumpsit and not to be done but upon request Jones Iustice remembred divers Presidents in the point and further day was given to bring in Presidents of either side and two Presidents were produced according to the opinion of this Court Scil. Pasch 30 Eliz. Rot. 464. in 1. Court Old and Estgreens case Trin 16 Jac. Rot. 268. Wales case But in Debt Licet saepius requisit is sufficient for it is not materiall nor traversable for the bringing of the action of Debt which is a Precipe is a sufficient demand in it self and afterwards at another day the Court continued of the same opinion and therfore the Plaintiff in the first action brought a new action Quod nota for albeit the Defendant had pleaded non assumpsit and Issue was joyned upon it yet this did not amend the evill laying of the request according to the Presidents abovesaid Pasch 2 Car. In the Kings Bench in t Hill 1 Car. Rot. 135. Constable versus Clobery IN an action of Covenant the question was upon the Traverse the Plaintiff declared upon the Indenture of Covenant and the Covenant was that a Ship shall go with the next fair wind and that the Merchant shall pay so much for fraught the Defendant saith by way of traverse that he did not go with the next wind and it was obiected by Stone of the Temple of Counsell with the Plaintiff that the Traverse was not good but he ought to have traversed that the Ship did not go at all for that which is materiall shall be traversed and that the Ship did not go is the most materiall thing here and this appeareth by 15 E. 4. 2. where a Gift in tail is traversed and not the death of the Tenant in tail 19 H. 8. 7. 36 H. 6. 16. 2 H. 5. 2. 2 H. 7. 12. and there are cases to this purpose Co. lib. 7. 9. Ughtreds case If a man intitles himself to Land by an Estate which cometh by Condition he ought to shew that the Condition is performed A Covenant against a Covenant will not make an Estoppell but he shall bring his action 3 H. 6. 33. Where he ought to shew that he went to Rome because it is a precedent Condition The principall case in Ughtreds case prove other to wit that which is materiall is alledgable And the difference upon the case of 48 E. 3. 3. 4. Where A. Covenant with B. to serve him with three Esquires in France and B. covenant for it to pay him 42. marks he may chuse to covenant in generall or speciall as he will for there was Covenant against Covenant and here there is a Covenant of one part to go with the Ship and on the other part to pay so much for the Fraught and so Covenant against Covenant And it seemed to Doderidge Iustice that the Traverse is not good for the Traverse here is by permission of God And for another thing where Merchants
Iudgement for the Plaintiff The same Term in the same Court NOta by Doderidge and Jones Iustices that upon the principall Iudgement reversed the outlawry is also Ipso facto reversed Also if an Outlawry reversed upon revers all of the principall judgement outlawry be awarded if it be not per Judicium Coronator unlesse it be in London the outlawry is voyd It was demanded by the Iustices when the outlawry and Iudgement are affirmed how the entry is And it was answered by Broome Secondary that the entry is generall Quod judicium affirmetur in omnibus and this sufficeth But if the Iudgement be affirmed and the outlawry reversed then the entry is Quod judicium affirmetur Utlagario cassetur The same Term in the same Court Calfe and others versus Nevil and others AScire facias was brought by Joseph Calfe and Joshua Executors of A. against Nevil Davyes and Bingley and the Case was this they became bayle to one Hall who was condemned in an Action to the Testator of the Plaintiff that the said Hall should either render his body to Prison or that he should satisfie the Iudgement the Defendents Plead that after the Scire facias returned and presently after the Iudgement the said Hall brought a Writ of Error in the Exchequor Chamber hanging which the said Hall reddidit se prisonae in exoneratione manucaptorum suor and there dyed and the Plaintiffe demurred upon this Plea because it was double and Calthorp argued for the Plaintiff that it was double or rather treble 1. That Reddidit se prisonae 2. That he was imprisoned 3. that he dyed in Prison And to prove the Piea double in this Case he cited 13. H. 8. 15. 16. 4. E. 4. 4. 21. H. 7. 10. The second matter that he moved against the former was that pendant the Writ of Error reddidit se prisonae and doth not conclude upon the Record hoc peratus est verificare as he ought to have done and for this he cited 7. H. 8. Kelleway 118. If J. S. bee bound in a Recognizance that A. shall appeare such a day before the Kings Iustices at Westminster if his appearance be not recorded hee shall not have any averment by Bricknell and Conisby and in 30. Eliz. It was one Wicks Case which is ours in effect in case of baile Dyer 27. 6. E. 4. 1. 2. For the matter the Plea is nought 1. Because by the Writ of Error brought the Scire facias against the baile is not suspended because the Bayle is a distinct record and upon this he cited the Case of the Ambassador of Spain against Captaine Gifford which was Trin. 14. Jac. That by the Writ of Error brought the baile was not suspended and he said that it was so resolved also in Goldsmith and Goodwins Case 2. For the render of the principall to prison it is not good because it doth not appear upon Record and for this he cited one Austin and Monkes Case which was in 14. Jac. In Scire facias against the baile it is pleaded that the principall had rendered himselfe to prison and upon the matter it appeared that the render was upon Candlemas day which is not Dies juridicis and so the Court this day had no power to commit him to prison for which the Plea was adjudged voyd 3. For the death it is no Plea the baile by it is not discharged because he hath not rendered himselfe in due time and for this he cited Justice Williams and Vaughans Case which was Mich. 3. Jac. where in Scire facias against the baile they pleaded that the principall was dead and thereupon the Plaintiff demurred and in this Case two points were resolved 1. There was no Capias mentioned to have issued against the principall and yet resolved that a Scire facias would lye against the Baile 2. That the Plea in Bar is not good because it may be that the principal dyed after the Capias awarded or after the return thereof because it appeareth that there was once a default in the principal and so the baile forfeited and no Plea afterwards would discharge it and upon this he put this Case A Prisoner escape out of Prison the Goaler makes fresh suit and before he hath taken him the Prisoner dies this is the act of God and yet because it was once an escape an Action of Escape lyes against the Goaler Jermy for the Defendent and he remembred a Case which was Hil 20. Jac. Cadnor and Hildersons Case that by the Writ of Error the bayle is suspended Nota that it was agréed by the Court in this case that by the Writ of Error brought in the bayle was not discharged because it is incertain whether the Iudgement shall be reversed or not Also it was agreed that if the principal dies before a Capias awarded against him that the bayle is discharged It was also agreed by the Court that the Plea was not double for the first matters are but an inducement to the last and yet by Doderidge if severall matters are pleaded in Bar and there be not any dependency on them the Where a Plea is double and where not Plea is double although none of them be materiall but one Jones Justice cited one Hobs and Tadcasters Case which was 43. Eliz. in B. R. where after a Writ of Error brought a Scire facias issued against the Bayle and upon Nihil returned the Plaintiff in the Scire facias brought in an Audita Quaerela and there the matter came in question whether upon the Iudgement the Principall ought presently render himself to prison or that he should stay until a Capias awarded against him and there it was resolved by Popham and all his Companions that the Principal is not bound to render himselfe to Prison untill a Capias be taken out so that if he dies after the Iudgement and before the Capias awarded against him the Bayle is discharged And in the principal Case here it was resolved that a Scire facias does not lye against the Bayle until a Capias be awarded against the Principal because no Capias in this case was awarded against the Principal which could not be by reason of the Writ of Error before his death And also the Plaintiff in his Declaration ought to have averred and shewn that the Capias was awarded against the Principal for these reasons Iudgement was given quod quaerens nil capiet per Billa The same Term in the same Court. Reynor versus Hallet IN an Action upon the Case for these words viz. Reynor is a base Gentleman Words Reynor is a base Gentleman he hath foâ—â— childâ—en by his seâ—vant Agnes and he hath killed or caused them to be killed he hath four children by his Servant Agnes and he hath killed them all or caused them to be killed and after a verdict for the Plaintiff it was moved in arrest of Iudgement by Jermy that the words were not actionable For 1.
Cleland brought a Writ of error against Baldock upon a Iudgement given in where the Plaintiff declared that the Intr. Hill 22. Iac Rot. 59â— Defendant in consideration that he would do all his commands honestly and truly for the space of a yeare assumed to pay him 10 l. and further declared that he had done all his honest and lawfull commands and this promise being found by verdict Iudgement was given against Doctor Cleland and thereupon he brought this Writ of error and Greene assigned two errors 1. The Assumpsit is that he shall doe all his commands honestly and truly and he hath declared that he hath done all his lawfull and honest commands and he may honest commands and yet not honestly 2. It is said that Jurator Assident dampna and it is not said occasione transgression predict and it is against all Presidents But Nota that there were these words ex hac parte opposita and therefore the exceptions were disallowed by the Court and the first Iudgement affirmed The same Term in the same Court. Secheverel versus Dale THis Case was sent out of Chancery to this Court â—o know the Law therein and in Trespas the case was this Henry Secheverell the Father seised in Fée levied a Fine to A. and B. in Fee to the use of himselfe for life absque impetitione vasti with power to cut and carry away the trees and to make Leases for 21 yeares or three lives the remainder to the use of John Secheverell his eldest Son for life without impeachment of waste with the same powers Henry the Father made a Lease to one under whom the Plaintiff claims for three lives rendring the ancient Rent excepting all the trees unlesse those which shall be for cropping lopping and fewell Henry the Father dyes John the Son in the next remainder cut certain trees Victorin Secheverell who clayms by the lease made by the Father brings trespas and two Questions were moved 1. Whether Lessee for life without impeachment of waste may make a Lease excepting the trees and it was objected by the Councel of the Plaintiff that he could not because this second Lease ariseth out of the first fine and out of the estate of the Conusor But the Court prima facie was of opinion that he might well make such a Lease with such an exception See Co. lib. 11. Lewys Bowls his Case and Doctor and Student lib. 1. cap. 1. and by Doderidge Iustice the Lease ariseth out of both the estates Jones Iustice suppose the Lessee absque impetitione vasti assigne over all his estate might he cut the trees and it was conceived that he might for by Doderidge he hath power to dispose of the trees as it was resolved in Lewys Bowls his case Jones he hath no propriety in the Trees untill they be cut Crew ch Justice Admit a Stranger cut the trees who shall have them By all the Court the Lessee without impeachment of waste shall have them 2. Point Tenant for life without impeachment of waste with power to cut and carry away the trees and make Leases for 21. years or three lives the remainder for life to J. S. without impeachment of waste c. Tenant for life makes a Lease for thrée lives and dyes whether he in remainder for life without impeachment of waste with power to cut the trées may cut the trées and take them during the Lease for thrée lives and the Court séemed to be of opinion that he might And Leving of Councell with the Plaintiff argued that when tenant for life without impeachment of waste with power to cut the trees and to make Leases for 21. years or three lives makes a Lease for thrée lives excepting the trées that this is a voyd exception because he hath no interest but a bare Authority 27. H. 6. Fitz. Wast 8. Statham tit Wast 1. makes this a Quaere which Statham was once the owner of the Land in question A man makes a Lease for life without impeachment of waste a Stranger cuts trées the Lessée brings trespas he shall recover no Damages for the value of the trees because the propriety belongs to him in the reversion he may dispose of them Quaere Dyer 284. Daunsley and Southwels Case Co. lib. 11. Lewys Bowles case that such a Lessee may take trées which are blown down and 3. H. 6. 45. Mich 41. and 42. Eliz. C. B. Leechford against Sanders in an Action of waste upon a Lease made to Sanders for life with a proviso that the Plaintiff might dispose of the trées during the estate and resolved that the Action lies not for notwithstanding this power the trées are demised to the Lessée also so here when the trées are excepted he hath no interest but only an authority 2. The exception is voyd for another reason because when such a Lessée makes such a Lease this is not his Lease but it hath its operation out of the originall fine and he who makes this hath but the nomination and therefore cannot adde a condition or exception to it And if the second Lease shall have its being out of the estate of the Lessee for life then there shall be an use upon an use as appears Co. lib. 1. 134. and that the Law will not allow 15. H. 7. and Co. Lib. 1. Albanyes Case If a man devise that his Executors shall fell his Land they cannot adde a condition or exception to this sale as an attornment upon a condition subsequent is voyd Co. lib. 2. Tookers case 3. This case may be resembled to the case of Copy-holds which is in Co. lib. 8. 63. b. in Swaynes Case If a Lord takes a Wife and afterwards grants Lands by Copy according to the custome and dyes his Wife shall not be endowed of this Land for albeit her title of Dower was before the Grant yet the title of Copi-hold which is the custome is elder then the title of Dower so in our case the title of the second Lessee is derived out of the estate of the Conuzées and therefore shall not be clogg'd with the Exceptions of Lessee for life without impeachment of waste 4. This priviledge to cut the trées is annexed to the estates and goes along with the estate and therefore shall not begin before the Stranger be in possession 3. E. 3. 44. 45. Idles case 28. H. 8. Dyer 10. And it may be resembled to the cases of 16. E. 4. and 27. H. 8. Tenant in taile sold the trées if he dyes before the Party takes them he shall never have them because he hath stayd out his time But it may be objected that upon such a Lease he may reserve a rent as it is in Whitlocks case Co. lib. 8. to which I will offer this difference Lessée for life with power to make Leases for thrée lives reserving rent makes a Lease for thrée lives reserving rent this reservation is good because it is but a Declaration of the Lease and of the rent
a Lease made de Burg. sine Tent. which is not good no more then in Ejectione firmae de Mess sive Tent. 2. Because the Judgement is not quod capitur as it ought to be because it is vi armis 3. The judgement is Ideo concessum est where it ought to be consideratus est and for these Errors the Judgement was reversed And the same day another Judgement between Bell and Margery Strongury was reversed for the same causes The same Term in the same Court. Petit versus Robinson IN Error to reverse a Iudgment given in C. B. in a Replevin there Jermy for the Plaintiff assigned two Errors 1. It appears that after the Writ and before the triall it was coram Justiciar Dic. Domini Regis and there was not any speech of any King but of King James before and there is no speech of his demise and therefore this shall be intended before the Iustices of King James which cannot be 2. Because the Nisi prius is certified to be tried before Francisco Harvey Mill. uno Justiciar c. the Postea returned is before Francisco Harvey Arm. argued so there was no such Iudge of Nisi prius as Francis Harvey Banks for the Defendant I conceive the first errors to be because the adjournment was per br Dom. Reg. and King James was named before so that the objection may be that it shall be intended the Writ of Adjournment of King James which cannot be but I conceive the Writ is generall and shall not be intended â—hat it can be adjourned by the Kings Writ who was dead before and the Clerk of the Assises who certified it is bound to take notice of the Kings death 37. H. 6. 28. and also the Record is not per br Dic. Dom. Regis but per br Domini Regis generally And for the second I conceive it is no error and if it be error then if the Certificate be not according to the Copy out of which the Clerke certifies it shall be amended 22. E. 4 22. 35. H. 6. 23. b. Co. lib. 8. 136. Blackmores case which is a stronger case then this But it hath been objected that the Record is certified by the Iustices and now there can be no averment to the contrary but I conceive that this Court may send to the Clark of the Assizes to amend it and those objections were over-ruled in C. B. in the same case Doderidge Iustice I conceive that notwithstanding these exceptions the Iudgement ought to be affirmed for as to the first the Court is bound to take notice of the demise of the King and therefore it shall be intended the King that now is and so the Writ of adâ—ournment good enough in Dyer King Henry 8. made a Patent and it was Eâ—ricus Dei gratia c. where it should be Henricus and yet the Patent good so in a Writ to the Bishop the subscription is Episcop Norw this is good enough for the Bishop of Norwich is very well known And for the other I conceive it is not well alledged because it is not showne whether he were a Knight at the time of the Certificate or not and so it may well stand together that he was a Knight for he might be an Esquire at the time of the triall and before the Record certified might be made Knight Jones Iustice to the same intent and that we ought to take notice of the demise of the King therefore it shall be intended of the Writ of adjournment of the King which now is and therefore it is no error and yet if it were it were amendable Whitlock Iustice agreed and therefore the Iudgement was affirmed by the whole Court The same Term in the same Court. Crabbe and his Wife versus Tooker IN Covenant betweene Walter Crabbe and Anne his Wife against Tooker the covenant upon which the breach was layd was this Tooker the Defendant covenanted with Tooker his Son and Anne Slade one of the Plaintiffs whom he intended to marry to give them their meat and drink in his house and if any discontent should happen between the Father and Son so that he and his Wife Anne should disagree to dwell with Tooker the Father then they should have 6. Beasts gates c. Tooker the Son died Anne disagree to dwell with Tooker the Father and marries with Crabbe who with hâ—s Wife Anne brings this Action and Taylor argued for the Planitiff that the Action lies for albeit the Covenant be in the conjunctive if they disagree yet it shall have a disjunctive interpretation as where a man covenant to levy a fine to one and his heirs if he dies the Covenantor may levy a fine to his Heirs and Hill and Granges case in Plow Two Tenants in common grant a rent this shall be taken for severall Rents and Co. lib. 5. Slingesbyes case also the Wife is party to this covenant and she must either have remedy upon this covenant after the death of her Husband or not at all for she cannot disagree in the life time of her Husband per que c. And it was agreed on the other side that there ought to be a dislike between all joyntly the Father the Son and the Wife and now one of them being dead the covenant is discharged like to the case put in Brudenels case Co. lib. 5. If Administration be grant during the minority of 3 if one of them dies the administration ceaseth and 31. Eliz. in C. B. A Lease was made to three and the Lessor grants to them to be dispunishable of Wast quamdiu cohabitarent one of them dies and it was resolved that now they shall be liable to wast Also the Bar is not bone for it is pleaded that Discordia orta fuit and doth not shew what manner of discord this was and therefore not good as 3 H 6. In Annuity brought Pro concilio c. he ought to shew for what manner of Councel it was Whitlock Justice was of opinion for the Plaintiff and that this Covenant extends to the Wife and that upon equall construction because it comes in place of the first Covenant and this was intended for the benefit of the Wife as well after the death of the Husband as before Jones Justice was of the contrary opinion and that the second covenant was a severall covenant from the first and that the disagreement is to be made by all three joyntly and that when one dies the Covenant is gone 2. Eliz. Dyer A man will that A. B. and C. his Feoffees shall sell his Land B. dies now the Authority is determined The Lord Gray committed the custody of his Son to four one of them dies the authority is gone and in this case there is no matter of interest but an agreement and in such a case as this is a Feme covert hath a will albeit she hath no legall will but in this case there ought to be a disagreement of both and
case for there by the word Felony it was manifest what Felony he intended by the circumstances of the speech to wit that he ment such felony for which he might lose his life But the words here being generall of Felony it may be intended as well of a Mayhem aâ— of any other Felony for in an appeal of Mayhem he is arraigned as Felo Domici Regis 40. Ass and the other case of 44. Eliz. I do arrest him of flat Felony is not consonant with the reason of this case for there by the arrest his liberty is taken away but in this case there is no restraint and it is very hard to make these cases agree together for words are as variable as the faces of men c. Jones Justice agreed and he took it for a generall rule that where words carry a double sense and there is nothing to guide the sense more one way then another there the words are not actionable for finis est legis dirimire lites And therefore if one faith of another that he hath the Pox because the sense is ambiguous it shâ—ll be interpreted in mitiori sensu and therefore the words are not actionable to if one sayes of another that he hath stolen his Apples or his Corn because they may be Apples from the tree or Corn in the field the taking whereof is no felony but it was adjudged in the Common-Pleas when I was there that these words viz. Thou art a Thief and hast stolen my Corn are actionable by reason of the addition of the word Thiefe So that the speaking of words of a double sense are not actionable unlesse ex antecedentibus or consequentibus it can be collected that the words were spoken in pejori sensu Then the words in this case I charge you with Felony peradventure intend such a Felony for which he shall recover damages only which is Mayhem and therefore no action will lie These words Thou art forsworn are not actionable because forswearing may be in ordinary communication or in a Court of Justice and it shall be taken in mitiori sensu but if he sayes Thou art forsworn in a Court of Record it is actionable and if in this case he had charged him with Felony and sayd further that he had stolen c. they would have been actionable but here he only charges him with Felony which is an ambiguous word and also it is no direct affirmation and therefore not actionable and Iudgement was given Quod quaerens nil capiat per Billam The same Term in the same Court Goods Case GOod and his Wife brought a Writ of Error upon a Judgement given in the Court of the Castle of Windsor in an Action of Debt there which was entered Trin. Mich. 2 Car. Rot. 119. 120. and two Errors were assigned 1. Because the Judgement there is given in these words ideo consideratum ad judicatum assessum est whereas it ought to be onely by the word consideratum and the Judgement being the act of the Court the Law is precise in it and therefore it hath been resolved that a Judgement given by the word concessum is not good but it ought to be by the word consideratum 2. The costs ex incremento are not said to be given ad petitionem quaerentis aâ— it ought to be for beneficium nemini obt ruditur and therefore it hath been resolved in this Court that an alien born shall not have medietatem linguae if he does not request it and as to this it was answered of the other side that costs ought alwayes to be assâ—ssed ex petitione quaerentis and albeit here the request of the Plaintiff was not precisely put to increase of the costs yet at the beginning of the Judgement it is said Ideo ad petitionem quaerentis consâ—â—eratum c. And that costs shall be given ex in cremento so that this request goes to all the Sentence and by the unanimous opinion of all the Court the Judgement was reversed for both the Errourrs for 1. Ideo considerat adjudicat c. is not good the Judgement being the Act of the Court and the Law hath appointed in what words it shall be given and if other words should be suffered great incertainty and confusion would ensue and needâ—esse verbosity is the mother of difficulty 2. The increase of costs ought to be given ad petitionem quaerentis and the words ad petitionem quaerentis being misplaced will not supply this defect and Dammages ex incremento is alwayes given ad petitionem quaerent for as Bracton saith Omne judicium est trinus actus trium personarum judicis actoris rei and if in this case the usuall form should not be observed all would be in a confusion and in as much as the words are misplaced it is as if they had not been put in at all and therefore void like to a case put in Walsinghams case in Plowden where an averrement misplaced is as if there were none In this case the Judgement was reversed and Trin. 3 Car. in B. B. intr Hill 2 Car. Rot 849. a judgement was reversed because it was Ideo concessum consideratum est FINIS THE TABLE OF THE PRINCIPALL MATERS Contained in this BOOK A. ACceptance 113 Of a second Lease determines the first 9 Action 179 Where the Master shall be charged in an Action for the act of the Servant e contr 143 Action upon the case for words 35 36. 139. 140. 128 129. 148. 150. 177. 180. 184. 187. 207. 210. Action upon the case 116. 144. for pulling down a house 15 Against an Officer for his neglect 27 For laying too much waight wherby goods in another mans possession are lost 46 For stopping of a Water-course 166 Accessaries 107 Adjournment 33 Administration  not avoided by Averment 37. granted by a Lay-man 160 Administrators  Of the Wise shall have a Lease setled on the Wife not the Husband 106 Admittance 125 What the Heir may do before admittance 39 upon a surrender by a Disseisor 71 Addition  Of matter of Ornament shall not avoid a grant 57 Advowson 23 Agreement 134 construed according to the intention of the parties 182 Where to be joynt where severall 204 Alien  Where he may purchase where not 36 Amendment 21. 128. 203 204. Of the Postea and made according to the Pannel and the Record 102 Of a Record after the Record removed and Errour assigned 196 Annuity 87. 86 Pro consilio 135 Appropriation 144 145 Appeal  Of Mayhme 115 Plea in it 115 Assesment  by the major part of Parishoners shall bind the rest 197 Assumpsit 148. 182 183. 193. 206 against an Executor of an Assumpsit in the life of the Testator 30 31 32. generall indebitat Assumpsit 31 without consideration is nudum pactum 178 What shal be a good consideration to ground Assumpsit 183 184. Assise 111. Assets where a Lease for years to a Copyholder in the hand of
to the West eighteen foot ten inches which Messuage so newly built stood the day of the Writ purchased and yet stands c. And if upon the whole matter the said Demise of the said John Bradley and Anne be and in Law ought to be adjudged the Demise of the said Messuage newly built upon the said part of land where the Messuage of the said John Bradley and Anne stood then the Iury find that the said John Bradley demised to the said Thomas and Iohn Allen the said house newly erected as aforesaid as the Plaintiff hath alledged and if not then they find that he did not demise And upon this Verdict Iudgment was given there and an especiall Writ of Habere facias seisinam awarded of the said Messuage with the Appurtenances viz. 18 foot of it from the North to the South and 12 foot and an half of it from the East to the West upon which a Writ of Error being brought in the Kings Bench it was alledged for Eror by Coke Sollicitor that upon this Verdict Iudgment ought to have been given for the Tenant and not for the Demandant for what was remaining of that which was of the house is not a house but only a peece of a house and therfore it ought to have been demanded by the name of a peece of Land containing so much one way and so much another for a house wasted and utterly drawn away cannot be demanded by a Messuage but by the name of a Curtilage or so much Land of such contents for a Praecipe lies of a peece of Land containing so many feet in length and so many in breadth And also Land built during the possession of him which hath it by Tort cannot be demanded by the name of Land by him which hath right but by the name of a house nor e contra for every demand of Land ought to be made according to the nature of which it is at the time of the Action brought be it a Messuage Land Meadow Pasture Wood c. And if the Walls of a house be made upon the Land without any covering yet it shall be demanded but by the name of Land for he said that it cannot be a house without its perfection to be habitable which he said is not here because it stands upon the Land of the said Anne which hath not the perfection of a house habitable without the remnant But this notwithstanding the first Iudgment was affirmed for it was said by Popham and other Iustices that that which is erected upon the Land of the said Anne shal be said a house as to the right of the Heir of the said Anne for a house may be such to be demanded by the name of a house albeit it hath not all the perfection of a house as if it hath no doors so if it hath part of the side wals not made drawn away or fallen yet the remainder continues to be demanded by the name of an house so if part of the covering be decayed yet it shall be demanded by the name of an house and the rather here because with that which is upon the other Land it is a perfect house And I may have a perfect house although the side Walls belong to another as in London where a man joynes his house to the side walls of his Neighbours he hath a perfect house and yet the side walls belong to another and this commonly happens in London but it is otherwise if it were never covered or if the covering be utterly fallen or drawn away for without a covering a house cannot be said to be a house for the covering to keep a man from the Storms and Tempests over head is the principall thing belonging to a house And further suppose that a man hath a Kitchin or a Hall upon Land to which another hath right he which hath right ought to demand it by the name of a house suppose then that there is adjoyning to this upon other land a Parlor a Buttery a Shop a Closet and the like with Chambers over them this doth not change the form of the Writ that he is to have which hath right although before it was built by the name of a house and yet as to the rent both the one and the other was but a house but as to the demandant it is otherwise for they are severall so here And the Demise which before was made of the house drawn away shall be now upon the matter a Demise as to this part of it a new Messuage for if a man make a Lease for years of a house and the Tetmor pull it down and erect there a new house or if land be demised and the Lessee build a house upon it in an Action of Wast for Wast done in this new house the Writ shall suppose that he did wast in the Houses c. which were demised to him and yet in the one case it is not the Messuage which was demised to him and in the other the house was not demised but the Land only But he hath no term in the house but by the Demise before made And it seems to Popham that Allen the Defendant cannot pull down this part of the house erect upon his own land to the prejudice of the house which Hayes demands if this which is erected upon the land of Allen be of such a necessity that without it the house of Hayes cannot stand for a house but if he dies after that Hayes hath built it then Hayes shall have an Action upon the case against him for the damages which he sustained by it As if a man agree with me that I shall set the outer wall of my house upon his land and I do it accordingly and afterwards the party which grants me this licence breaketh it down if the Grant were by Deed I shall have an Action of Covenant for it and if but by Paroll yet I shall have an Action upon the case against him And here this being done by him which was then Owner and Possessor of the one and the other land it shall be taken as a licence in Law to the benefit of him which hath right which he cannot pull down after it is once made but he shall be subject to Hayes his Action for it or otherwise Hayes shall be at great mischief and prejudice by the Act of him which did the wrong which the Law will not suffer but rather shall turn this to the prejudice of him which did the wrong then to the prejudice of the other which shall have wrong by the doing of it for Volenti non fit injuria As if I am to inclose between my Neighbour and my self and my Neighbour pull down this inclosure or part of it wherby my Cattell escape into the land adjoyning and depasture there I shall be excused of this Trespasse in the same manner as if he had licenced me to have occupied it and whatsoever hapneth to this Land adjoyning
by my Neighbours means shall be in the same degree as my Neighbours Act for what he does shall be to his own prejudice And upon the Iudgment affirmed the Attorney of the said Hayes made the like Writ of Habere facias seisinam directed to the Sheriffs of London as was done in the Common Pleas wherupon it was affirmed to the Court in Hillary Term next ensuing that the Sheriffs had made their execution by the quantity of the feet comprised in the writ and that in the doing of it there was pulled down the part of another house of the said Allen which was erected two feet upon the land of the said Anne and prayed remedy for it and that this Habere facias seisinam varying from the thing recovered might not be filed To which it was said that this quantity of feet was but a Surplusage in the Writ and that the Writ before this was sufficient and warranted by the Verdict and judgment Sherrey versus Richardson 5. IN Debt upon an Obligation of 50 l. by Lawrence Sherrey against Arnold Richardson the case was this 16 Martii 33 Eliz. the said Richardson was bound to Sherrey in 50 l. with condition to stand to and observe the Arbitrement Award order rule finall end and judgment of one Walter Bolton and Edward Price Arbitrators indifferently elected to arbitrate award and judge of and for all Actions Suits Quarrels and Demands whatsoever betwixt them untill the date of the Obligation so that it be made and done in writing under their hands and Seals ready to be delivered to the parties at or before the last day of this instant month of April and the said Arbitrators the last day of April 33 Eliz. made an Arbitrement in writing under their hands and Seals that within four daies next ensuing the award either of the said parties shall release each to other all Actions Suits and Demands before the date of the said Obligation with this Proviso that if either of the said parties shall be discontented with the said Award or any part of it within twenty daies after the Award that then upon the payment of 10 s. by the party which thinks himself agrieved with the Award to the other within the twenty daies the Award shall be void either of them to be at liberty against the other as before the Award and by the whole Court if the Award shall be said made within the time comprised in the Oâ—ligation where the Proviso had been to be performed after the four daies it had been good and a finall Award because that the Proviso to make the Award void after the time limited for making of Releases is repugnant to that which was to be executed before to wit that either of them shall release each to other vvithin four daies for every Avvard ought to be reasonable and indifferent betvvixt the parties in all appearance and so that the one part of it ought not to impugn or encounter the other and here to what purpose shall it be to make the Award void and to put out at liberty against the other when they have made Releases each to other and vvhat indifferenty or reason should there be that vvhen one hath released the other may dissolve the Arbitrement by the Proviso and hovv may the Obligation vvhich had been once forfeited by the not making of the Release vvithin the four daies be helped and become not forfeited by dissolving of the Arbitrement by the Proviso But by Popham Gawdy and Clench if the Releases had been limited to have deen made at a day to come as ten daies after and that the Proviso had been to have been performed in the mean time before these ten daies then the Avvard had been void because they had not pursued the submission for it vvas no finall end of the controversie in as much as it is not certain by reason of the Condition whether it shall be an end or not But it seems to Popham that the Award here is not made within the time that it ought to have been made by the Condition for the Obligation is alledged to be made the 16 of March 33 Eliz. and then no month can be the instant month but March and therfore this word April is but a meer negation and if it should not be so to what April shall it refer for there is no matter to guide it more to one April then another but the generall intendment which happily shall guide it to the next April for avaiding of incertainty if it had not been for the words this instant moneth and the words within this moneth shall not be said to be frivolous vain where they may have a good and plain intendment but rather the word April which is repugnant to it shall be said to be void and a meer negation but it seems to him that as the Award is the case being that at any time within 20 daies after the Award made the one or the other disliking the Award might have been defeated upon the payment of 10 s. if the 10 s. had been paid within four daies as it might have been and before the Releases made the party by the intent of the Award had not been bound to have made the Releases because that by it within the time before the Releases made the Arbitrement shall be defeated by the Condition if it had been a good Award and therfore it shall not be said to be a finall Award at the time of the Award made because that instantly upon it before the four daies are passed there was power in the said parties to have defeated the Award upon the payment of the said 10 s. and therfore it seems to himself also that the Award was void and by consequence the Plaintiff shall be barred 6. KIng Richard the 3. by his Letters Patents granted to the Burgesses of Glocester and to their Successors that the Town of Glocester c. shall be a County of it self several and distinct from the County of Glocester for ever and no part of that County and shall be called the County of the Town of Glocester neverthelesse saving and reserving to himself and his Heirs that the Iustices of Assise in the County of Glocester the Iustices of Goal-delivery and of the Peace in holding of their Sessions and also the Sheriff of the County of Glocester in holding of his County-Courts and every of them may freely enter into the said Town and keep the said Sessions and County-Courts of and for any thing and matter arising out of the said County of the Town aforesaid and within the said County of Glocester as before time they had accustomed to hold them there the said Grant or any other thing notwithstanding And grants further that they shall have a Major two Sheriffs and one Recorder within the same County of the Town of Glocester and that the Ministers of the Sheriff of the County shall not afterwards enter to do or execute any thing
one part at one time and another part at another an Action of Wast may well lye Albeit Fitzherbert and Brook seem therin to be of a contrary opinion and that severall Actions of Wast ought to be in that case And the exception was taken because the Iudgment was entred that he shall recover the place wasted Per visum Jurator praedict wheras they had not the view of it in this case for this should be where it is given upon a Writ awarded to enquire of the Wast upon default made at the grand Distresse whereas here the Wast is not denied but acknowledged But as to this severall Presidents were shewn the one upon Demurrer for part Hill 1. Mariae Rot. 301. and another Tr. 31. H. 8. Rot. 142. in an Information in both which Cases the Iudgment was entred as here to wit Per visum Jur. praedict and yet in these the Wast was as acknowledged Whereupon it was ordered that the Iudgment should be affirmed 3. In an Ejectione firmae brought by Sir Moyle Finch Knight Plaintiff against John Risley Defendant for a Messuage and a Mill in Raveston in the County of Buckinghamshire the case for the matter in Law appeared shortly to be this The King and Queen Philip and Mary by their Letters Patents dated the eight of July 3. 4. of their Raign made a Lease of the Reversion of the Mannor of Raveston of which this was parcell to Sir Robert Throgmorton for seventy years from such a Feast after the death of the Countesse of Ormond who then had it for her life rendring yearly 73 l. 13 s. payable at the Feasts of Saint Michael the Arch-angel and the Annunciation of our Lady at the receit of the Exchequer by equall portions with a Proviso that the Lease shall cease if the said Rent or any part therof were arrear and not paid at the said Feast or a certain time after the Reversion descend to the now Queen and the said Countesse died 7 Eliz. part of the Rent then payable was not paid at the day nor within the time limited by the Proviso afterwards Queen Elizabeth by her Letters Patents dated 30. May 30 Eliz. granted the said Mannor to the said Sir Moyl and one Awdeley and their Heirs in Fee with a clause in it that the Letters Patents shall be good notwithstanding there be not any recitall of any Leases or Grants at any time before that made by her or any of her Progenitors after which an Office is found for the Queen that the Rent was arrear and not paid as before after which the said Sir Moyl and Awdeley assured the said Mannors by bargain and sale to Sir Thomas Hennage who demised the said Messuage and Mill to the said Sir Moyl upon whom the said Risley entred in right of the said Lease made by the said King Phillip and Queen Mary under Thomas Throgmorton who then pretended to have the term of the said Lease from Sir Robert his Father The case was well argued at the Bar and now at the Bench where Fennor moved first Whether it were a Condition 2. Whether an Office were requisite 3. Whether this Office found comes soon enough for time For the first he conceived that it was a conditional Limitation for a Limitation is that which limits an Estate certain oâ— doubtfull as Quandiu in manibus nostris fore contigerit quamdiu amicus sit or dummodo solverit And there dummodo was a Condition as appeareth 5 Ass plit 9. 2. Ass a Grant made to J. S. and his Heirs tam diâ— as the Grantor and his Heir shall enjoy such a Mannor this is a Limitation and a Limitation alwaies determines the Estate but a Condition albeit it be broken during the Estate yet it doth not determine the Estate and so it is of a conditional Limitation and therfore t is not in the King untill an Office be therof found for the King submits himself to the Law for Bracton saith Quod non debet judicare sed secundum legem and his Prerogative is so excellent that he cannot take a part with any thing but by matter of Record neither can he draw the Right or Possession of any one in question upon a bare surmise but by Office or other matter of Record for a Record alwaies carries credit with it And there is no diversity where two matters are limited in Deed and where one is limited in a Deed and the other by the Law And the contrary objections are easily answered for when the Tenant in tail of the King dies without Issue it is in the King without Office because the Law does not help them which contemn it But in case of an Office which is forfeited it is in the King to dispose without Office because the King is not to have the Office it self but the disposition of it and yet it is to be defeated by Scire facias in the Chancery If a Mill be demised for life upon condition that he shall not let it but to a Milner and he breaks the Condition in case of the King there must be an Office to avoid it and there the Office entitles the King to the Condition and not to the Entry for after the Office it is not in the King untill Entry And here the Rent may be paid to the Kings Bayly in the Country which is matter in fait and therfore shall not be defeated without Office And here the Office comes too late to give any advantage to the Patentee for the King cannot grant a Title of Entry before Office no more then the Assignes of a common person can take advantage of a Condition broken in the time of the Grantor of which the Grantor did not take advantage in his time And if the Queen makes a Lease durante beneplacito the Patentee shall not avoid it as it appears in the Lord Burgleighs case and therfore the Office herâ— shall not help the Patentee but the Queen for the mean profits for although nullum tempus occurrit Regi yet the Patentee shall not take advantage of this Prerogative Clench agreed cleerly that it was a Limitation but yet that it is at the Queens liberty to avoid or make it good for perhaps the Rent is better then the value of the Land and upon this reason a Lease from the King Probiâ— hominibus de dale or to a Monk rendring rent is good which otherwise had been meerly void And by the Office found the Election of the Queen appeareth without which the Lease is to continue and therfore the Patentee shall not defeat that which happened in the Queens time before Popham to say that the Office helps the Queen for the mean Profits and that now the Patentee shall not take advantage to avoid the Lease is too absurd for the Queen cannot take advantage to have the mean Profits but in respect of the avoidance of the Lease And if the Lease were made void or determined against the Queen it shall not
Tales might be of the other County only Davies versus Gardiner 3. AN Action upon the case for a Slander was brought by Anne Davies against Iohn Gardiner That wheras there was a Communication of a Marriage to be had between the Plaintiff and one Anthony Elcock the Defendant to the intent to hinder the said Marriage said and published that there was a Grocer in London that did get her with Child and that she had Vide this case reported Cook lib. 4. 16. b the Child by the said Grocer wherby she lost her Marriage To which the Defendant pleaded not guilty and was found guilty at the Assises at Aylesbury to the Damages of 200. marks And now it was alledged in Arrest of Iudgment that this matter appeareth to be meerly spirituall and therfore not determinable at common Law but to be prosecuted in the spirituall Court. But per Curiam the Action lies here for a woman not maried candot by intendment have so great advancement as by her Marriage wherby she is sure of maintenance for her life or during her Marriage and Dower and other benefits which the temporall Laws gives by reason of her Marriage and therfore by this slander she is greatly prejudiced in that which is to be her temporall advancement for which it is reason to give her remedy by way of Action at common Law As if a woman keep a Victualling house to which divers of great credit repair wherby she hath her livelyhood and one will say to her Guests that as they respect their credits they take care how they they use such a house for there the woman is known to be a Bawd wherby the Guests avoid her house to the losse of her husband shall not she in this case have an Action at common Law for such a slander It is cleer that shee will So if one saith that a woman is a common Strumpet and that it is a slander to them to come to her house wherby she looseth the adâ—antage which she was wont to have by her Guests she shall have her Action â—or this at common Law So here upon these collaterall circumstances wherby it may appear that she hath more prejudice then can be by calling of one Harlot and the like And Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Hillary Term 36 Eliz. in the Kings Bench. IN Michaelmas Term 33 34 Eliz. Rot. 181. William and Joane his wife Administratrir of Andrew Stock brought an Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit made to the Intestate for the payment of 5 l. to William Stock who imparled untill Tuesday next after Octa. Hillary next which was the 24th day of January and then the Defendâ—nt demanded Oyer of the Letters of Administration which were entred in haec verba Wherby it appeareth that the Letters of Administration were committed to the said Joane by Thomas Taylor Batchelor of Law Commissary to the Bishop of London c. wherby the Defendant pleaded that after the last continuance â—he said Letters Patents of Administâ—ation sealed with the Seal of the Vicar Generall of the said Bishop which he useth in this behalf and brought here into Court bearing date the 27th day of January 1591. which was three daies after the continuance committed the Administration to the said Defendant And pleaded further the Act of 37 H. 8. which sayes that it shall be lawfull hereafter for any person being a Doctor of the Law to be Chancellor Commissary or to exercise Ecclesiasticall Iurisdiction albeit he were a meer Lay person so that such a person be a Doctor as aforesaid and avers that at the time of the committing of the Administration to the said Joane the said Thomas Taylor was a meer Lay person and not Doctor Legis civilis nec minister allocatus according to the Laws of the Church of England wherby he had no lawfull power to commit the Administration Vpon which it was demurred generally and by all the Court the Plaintiff had Iudgment to recover for we are to consider what our Law was in this case before this Statute of 37 H. 8. And albeit a Doctor then affirmed that the Canon Law was that there was a meer nullity in such Administration so although the party that did it not being a Clark nor Doctor according to the Stat. of 37 H. 8. yet all the Iustices agreed that the Administration so committed will be adjudged in our Law to be of force and effect being shewn under the Seal of the Officer and committed by him who is reputed the Officer who ought to do it and is invested in the Office untill it be avoided by sentence and yet such an avoidance shall not make a mans act to be made void no more then if a meer Lay-man be presented to a benefice albeit this be a meer nullity in our Law and void yet we adjudge the Church full according to the publike admission constitution and induction and not according to the capacity of the person which is a thing secret untill such a one be deprived for it by sentence in the spirituall Court and yet the Church shall be in our Law void but from the time of deprivation of which notice ought to be given to the Patron So here he remains as to our Law an Officer untill his authority be defeated by sentence of the spirituall Court otherwise great mischief will happen for an infinite number of Administrations may be drawn in question by Averment that he who granted them was a meer lay person and so make such Garboils in the Common-wealth which is not to be suffered for the inconveniency which will happen by it and therfore our Law which is founded upon reason shall judge of it according to the open appearance of the Officer to wit that he hath a grant made to him and not according to the private capacity of the person and this is not altered by the said Statuts which is made in affirmation of it and makes the authority of a Doctor of Law absolute not to be defeated by the Civill or Canon Law which is not in the other case But yet it doth not make this case of worse condition then it was at Common Law And by all the pleading of the Administration committed to the Defendant is not good because it appeareth by the date of it that it was made after the day of the last continuance and therfore could not have been pleaded untill a new continuance after And by the Doctor the last Administration does not avoid the first but in case where there is an especial revecation of the first But they did not speak of the doublenesse because the Demurrer was generall and not speciall and also because the other matters were so cleer 2. IN Trespasse for carrying away certain Loads of Hay the case hapned to be this The Plaintiff pretending Title to certain Hay which the defend had standing in certain Land to be more sure to have the Action passe for Property him
disguised For the wholness and closness of your Garments they do signifie integrity to be used in your advices and secrecy in your councels And in that the Garments being single and unlined it betokeneth that you should be sincere and plain in your advises and not double carrying your opinion to your self one way and you advise it your Client clean another way The two Tongues do signifie that as you should have one Tongue for the Rich for your Fee as a reward for your long studies and labours so should you also have another Tongue as ready without reward to defend the Poor and Oppressed And therin to shew your seves thankfull to God for all that which he hath bestowed upon you And for the Rings you give as Gold is amongst all Mettals the purest so should you be of all others of your Profession the perfectest both in knowledge and in the other Virtues before remembred And in that it is a Ring and round without end it betokeneth that you have made a perpetuall Vow to this your Profession and Calling and are as it were wedded unto it And therfore I heartily wish you may alwaies walk therin according as appertaineth to your Calling And this done the ancienst Serjeant beginneth to recite his pleading and so each after other in order And that done the ancientest kneeleth down before the chief Justice of England and so the rest before the Justices and Barons as they are in ancienty and had severally by the said chief Justice their Coifs put upon their heads and then their red Hoods upon their shoulders and then the Serjeants return to their Chambers and put on their party colourd Garments and so walk on to Westminster the one after the other as they be in ancienty bare-headed with all their Coifs on and so are in their turn presented the one after the other by two of the ancientest Serjeants And after their pleadings recited they give their Rings in the Court by some friends and so are therupon set in their place at the Bar according to their ancienty And all this done they return to their Chambers and there put on their black Gowns and red Hoods and come into the Hall each standing at his Table according to his ancienty bare-headed with his Coif on and after setteth himself upon the Bench having a whole mess of meat with two courses of many Dishes served unto him And in the afternoon they put on their Purple Gowns and then go in order to Pauls where it hath been accustomed that they heard Service and had a Sermon Edwards versus Halinder 4. IN an Action upon the Case by Rice Edwards against Edward Halinder The Plaintiff declared by his Bill that one Edward Banister was seised in his Demesne as of Fee of a Messuage in such a Parish and Ward in London and being so seised did let to him the Cellar of the same house the 23. day of April 32 Eliz. for a week from the same day and so from week to week so long as the parties should please at such a Rent by the week wherby he was possessed And further that the said Edward Banister being seised of the said house as is aforesaid afterwards to wit 29. July in the 32. year aforesaid gave to the said Defendant Officium Anglice the Warehouse of the said Messuage being right over the said Cellar for a week from thenceforth and so from week to week so long as the parties should please paying such a Rent wherby the Defendant was therof possessed accordingly And the Plaintiff being possessed of the said Cellar and the Defendant of the Warehouse as aforesaid and the Plaintiff then having in the said Cellar three Butts of Sack to the value of 40 l. c. The Defendant the 30 day of July in the 32. year aforesaid put such a quantity of weight and burthen of Merchandize into the said Warehouse and therby did so overburthen the floor of the said Warehouse so that by the force and weight of the said burthen the said floor the said 30. day of July was broken and by force therof did fall and that therby the Merchandize that were in the said Warehouse did fall out of the said Warehouse into the said Cellar upon the said Vessels of Wine and by force therof brake the said Vessels of Wine wherby the said Wine did flye out of the said Vessels and became of no value to the Plaintiffs damage of a hundred pound c. To which the Defendant saith That within a small time before the Trespasse committed the floor of the said Warehouse sustained as great a burthen of Merchandize as this was And that the Warehouse was demised to him as the Plaintiff hath alledged to lay in it 30. Tun weight wherby he was possessed and so possessed the said 30. day of July did put into the said Warehouse but 14. Tun weight of Merchandize and that the damages which the Plaintiff had by the breaking of the floor was because the floor at the time of the laying of the merchandise upon it also before the lease made to him therof was so rotten and a great part of the Wall upon which the said floor lyes so much decayed that for default of Reparations and supporting therof by those to whom the reparations did belong before the Lease therof made it suddainly brake which matter he is ready to aver Wherupon the Plaintiff demurred and Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff in the Exchequer upon which a Writ of Error was brought in the Exchequer Chamber and the Error assigned was that the Iudgment ought to have been given for the Defendant because that now it appeareth that there was not any default in the Defendant for he was not to repair that which was so ruinous at the time of his Lease and therfore if it did bear so much lately before it cannot fall by the default of the Defendant in the weight put upon it but by the ruinousnes of the thing demised And yet by the advice of the Iustices the Iudgment was this Term affirmed for the Plaintiff hath alledged expresly that the floor brake by the weight of the Merchandize put upon it which ought to be confessed and avoided or traversed wheras here he answers but argumentatively to wit that it did bear more before therfore that he did not break it by this weight or that it was so ruinous that it brake Ergo not by the weight wheras here it is expresly alledged that it brake by the weight put upon it and if lesser weight had been put it would not have broken And he who takes such a ruinous house ought to mind well what weight he put into it at his perill so that it be not so much that another shall take any damage by it But if it had fallen of it self without any weight put upon it or that it had fallen by the default only of the posts in the Cellar which support the floor with which the
resolved by all the Iustices as he said that it shall passe and he said that himself was of this opinion also And to say that by grant of Land at Common Law the use had been raised out of the possessions of the Land which the Grantor then had and by it passe to the Bargainee and that it shall not be raised and passed to another by grant of Land in consideration of marriage which is a more valuable consideration then money is absurd and against all reason And for the solemnity Vses in such cases in respect of marriage were the cause that they alwaies were left as they were at Common Law and not restrained as the case of bargain and sale is which by Common intendment may be made more easily and secretly then that which is done in consideration of marriage which is alwaies a thing publike and notorious but it is not reasonable that every slight or accidentall speech shall make an alteration of any Vse As if a man ask of any one what he will give or leave to any of his Sons or Daughters for their advancement in marriage or otherwise for their advancement this shall be but as a bare speech or communication which shall not alter or change any Vse But where there is upon the Speech a conclusion of a Marriage between the friends of the parties themselves and that in consideration therof they shall have such Lands and for such an Estate there the Vse shall be raised by it and shall passe accordingly to the parties according to the conclusion which Fennor granted But by Popham If it may be taken upon the words spoken that the purpose was to have the Estate passe by way of making of an Estate as by way of Feoffment c. then notwithstanding the consideration expressed the use shall not change nor no Estate by it but at will untill the Livery made therupon And therfore if a man make a Deed of Feoffment with expresse consideration of marriage although the Deed hath words in it of Dedi Concessi with a Letter of Attorney to make Livery therupon there untill Livery made nothing passe but at will because that by the Warrant of Attorney it appeareth the full intent of the parties was that it shall passe by way of Feoffment and not otherwise if it be of Land in possession And if it be of Land in Lease not untill Attornment of Tenants which was granted by all the Iustices But if a man in consideration of money makes a Deed of Gift Grant Bargain and Sale of his Lands to another and his Heirs by Deed indented with a Letter of Attorny to make Livery if Livery be therupon made before Inrolement there it hath been adjudged to passe by the Livery and not by the Inrolement But by Popham where Land is to passe in possession by Estate executed two things are requisite The one the grant of the said Land the other the Livery to be made therupon for by the bare Grant without Livery it doth not passe as by way of making of an Estate And this is the cause that such solemnity hath been used in Liveries to wit if it were of a Messuage to have the people out of it and then to give Seisin to the party by the Ring of the door of the House and of Land by a Turff and a Twig and the like which may be notorious Yet I agree it shall be a good Livery to say to the party Here is the Land enter into it and take it to you and your Heirs for ever or for life or in tail as the case is And albeit Livery by the View may be made in such manner yet by the sealing of the Deed of Grant upon the Land or by grant of it upon the Land without Livery nothing passe but at will But if therupon one party saith to the other after the Grant or upon it Here is the Land enter upon it and take it according to the Grant this is a good Livery But he ought to say this or somthing which amounts to so much or otherwise it shall not passe by the bare Grant of the Land although it be made upon the Land Clench said That when Thomas said to Eustace Stand forth here I do give to thee and thine Heirs these Lands this amounts to a Grant and a Livery also and by the words of the Reservation of the Estate to himself and his wife for their lives in this the Law shall make an use in the said Thomas and his wife for their lives so that by such means it shal enure as if he had reserved the use therof to him and his wife and so it shall enure to them as it may by the Law according to his intent without doing prejudice to the Estate passed to the said Eustace And afterwards Term Mich. 36 37 Eliz. the Case was again disputed amongst the Iustices and then Popham said That the Case of Baâ—gains and Sales of Lands in Cities as London c. as appeareth in Dyer 6. Eliz. are as they were at Common Law To which all the Iustices agreed and therfore shall passe by Bargain by parole without writing And by Bayntons Case in 6 7 Eliz. it is admitted of every side that an Vse was raised out of a Possession at Common Law by Bargain and Sale by parole and otherwise to what purpose was the Statute of Inrolements and by the same case it is also admitted now to passe by parole upon a full agreement by words in consideration of Marriage or the continuance of Name or Blood For it is agreed there that the consideration of nature is the most forceable consideration which can be and agreed also that a bare Covenant by writing without consideration will not change an Vse therfore the force therof is in the consideration of which the Law hath great respect And therfore the Son and Heir apparant ex assensu patris onely may at the door of the Church endow his wife of his Fathers Land which he hath in Fee and this is good by Littleton although the Son hath nothing in it wherby an Estate passe to the wife which is more then an Vse Nature is of so strong consideration in the Law And therupon after advice Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff the Roll of this appeareth in Banco Regis 1 Hill 35. Eliz. Rot. 355. And upon this Iudgment a Writ of Error was brought and the Iudgment aforesaid reversed in the point of Iudgment in the Exchequer by the Statute of 27 Eliz. Kettle versus Mason and Esterby 6. IN a second deliverance between Joh. Kettle Plaintiff and George Mason Vide this case Coke lib. 1. 146 c. and Francis Esterby Avowants the case appeared to be this Thomas May was seised of the Mannor of Sawters and Hawlin in the County of Kent in his Demesne as of Fee and being so therof seised enfeoffed Thomas Scot and John Fremling and their Heirs
dies and afterwards John his Son and Heir dies without Issue the reversion by this descends to the said Christopher who dies leaving Issue And upon this Case made in the Court of Wards the two chief Iustices Popham and Anderson agreed first That upon the devise and death of the Father the said Christopher and William were Joynt-tenants of the Land and not Tenants in Common notwithstanding the word severally because it is coupled with the said word joyntly But yet they agreed also that by the descent from John to Christopher the Fee-simple was executed in the said Christopher for the Moyety in the same Mannor as if he had purchased the Reversion of the whole or of this Moyety and that it is not like to the Case where Land is given and to the Heirs of one of them in which case for the benefit of the Survivorship it is not executed to divide the Ioynture because the Estates are made at one and the same time together and therfore not like to the case where the Inheritance cometh to the particular Estate by severall and divided means And a Decree was made accordingly Trin. 36. Eliz. In the Kings Bench. 1. IT was agreed by all the Iustices and Barons of the Exchequer upon an Assembly made at Serjeants-Inn after search made for the ancient Presidents and upon good deliberation taken If a man have two houses and inhabit somtimes in one and somtimes in the other if that House in which he doth not then inhabity be broken in the night to the intent to steal the Goods then being in his house that this is Burglary although no person bee then in the House and that now by the new Statute made such an Offender shall not have his Clergy for before the Statutes were made which take away Clergy in case of Burglary where any person was put in fear no mention was made in the Inditements of Burglary that any person was in the House But it was generall that the house of such a one Noctanter fregit and such Goods then there Felonice cepit And the breaking of a Church in the night to steal the Goods there is Burglary although no person be in it because this is the place to keep the Goods of the Parish And in the same manner the house of every one is the proper place to preserve his Goods although no person be there And that the Law was alwaies so it is to be collected by the course of the Statutes therof made for first the Statute of 23 H. 8. doth not take Clergy from any in case of Burglary unlesse some of the same Family be in the house and put in fear And in 5 Eliz. 6. The Offendor shall be ousted of his Clergy if any of the Family be in the house be they sleeping or waking And these Statutes were the cause that it was used of late time to put in the Inditements of Burglary that some person of the Family was then in the house to put them from their Clergy But this doth not prove that it shall not be Burglary but where some person was in the house and by 18 Eliz. Clergy is taken away in all cases of Burglary generally without making mention of any person to be there which enforce the resolution aforesaid and according to it they all agreed hereafter to put it in Execution Finch versus Riseley 2. IN this Term the case betweeen Finch and Riseley was in question before all the Iustices and Barons for this assembled at Serjeants-Inn in Fleetstreet where after Arguments heard by the Councell of the parties upon this point only If the Queen make a Lease for years rendring Rent with a Proviso that the Rent be not paid at the day limited that the Lease shall cease without making mention that it was to be paid at the receit whether the Lease shall cease upon the default of payment before Office found therof And by Periam and some of the Iustices the Lease stall not cease untill an Office be found of the default because it is a matter in Fait which determines it to wit the not-payment And by Gawdy it shall be taken as if it had been for the not-payment that the Proviso had been that the Lease shall be forfeited In which case it is not detennined untill Re-entry made for the forfeiture which in the Queens case ought alwaies to be by Office which countervails the re-entry of a common person As where the Queen makes a Lease rendring Rent and for default of payment a Re-entry albeit the Rent be not paid yet untill Office found therof the Rent continues Popham Anderson and the greater part of the Iustices and Barons resolved that it was cleer in this case that Ipso facto upon the default of payment the Lease was determined according to the very purport of the contract beyond which it cannot have any beeing and therfore there needs no Office in the case But where it is that it shall be forfeited or that he shall re-enter there untill advantage taken of the forfeiture in the one case or untill re-entry made in the other case the Term alwaies continues by the contract And where in the case of a common person there is need of a re-entry to undo the Estate there in the case of the King there needs an Office to determine the Estate for an Office in the Kings case countervails an entry for the King in person cannot make the entry And upon this resolution of the greater part of the Iustices in Mich. Term 31 32 Eliz. the same case was in question in the Office of Pleas in the Exchequer between the said Moil Finch Plaintiff and Thomas Throgmorton and others Defendants and there adjudged by Manwood late chief Baron and all the other Barons unanimously after long argument at the Bar and Bench that the Lease was void upon default of payment of the Rent according to the Proviso of the Lease and this immediatly without Office for the reasens before remembred upon which Iudgment was given a Writ of Error was brought before the Lord Keeper of the great Seal and the Lord Treasurer of England where it long depended and after many arguments the Iudgment given in the Exchequer by the advice of Popham and Anderson was affirmed and that upon this reason for the Proviso shall be taken to be a limitation to determine the Estate and not a Condition to undo the Estate which cannot be defeated in case of a Condition but by entry in case of a common person and but by Office which countervails an entry in the case of the Queen And this Iudgment was so affirmed in Mich. Term 36 37 Eliz. Smiths Case 3 IT was found by Diem clausit extremum after the death of Richard Smith that in consideration of a marriage to be had between Margaret Smith and William Littleton a younger Son to Sir John Littleton Knight and of 1300. marks paid by the said Sir John to the said
35 E. Rot. 258. And Popham said further in this case that to erect an Hospitall by the name of an Hospitall in the County of S. or in the Bishopprick of B. and the like is not good because he is bound to a place too large and incertain But a Colledge erected in Accademia Cantabrig or Oxon. is good and sâ—me are so founded because it tends but to a particular place as a City Town c. King versus Bery and Palmer 2. IN an Ejectione firmae brought by William King against John Bery and William Palmer Defendants for two Messuages and certain Lands in Halstead in the County of Leicester upon a Demise alledged to be made by Dorothy Pool and Robert Smith the case upon a speciall Verdict was this The said Dorothy was Tenant for life of the said Tenants the Remainder over to the said Robert Smith and his Heirs and they being so seised made the Lease in the Declaration upon which the Action was brought And per curiam the Lease found by the Verdict doth not warrant the Lease alledged in the Declaration for although they joyned in the Demise yet during the life of the said Dorothy it is her Demise and not the Demise of the said Robert Smith but as his confirmation for that time for he hath nothing to do to meddle with the Land during the life of the said Dorothy but after the death of the said Dorothy then it shall be said to be the Domise of the said Robert Smith and not before because untill this time Smith hath nothing to do to meddle with the Land And in a more strong case If Tenant for life and he in the Reversion in Fee make a Gift in tail for the life of Tenant for life it shall be said to be his Gift but after his death it shall be said the Gift of him in the Reversion and if the Estate tail had expired during the life of the said Tenant for life he shall have the Land again in his former Estate and there shal be no forfeiture in the case because he in the Reversion of the immediate Estate of Inheritance had joyned in it and therfore hath dispensed with that which otherwise had been a meer forfeiture of the Estate for life wherby it was awarded by the Court that the Plaintif take nothing by his Bill in 33 34 Eliz. Rot. And the Judgment is entred Hill 34. Eliz. Ret. 72. 3. In this Term I hapned to see a Case agreed by the Iustices in 3. 4. Eliz. which was this If a man make a Lease of two Barns rendring Rent and for default of payment a Re-entry if the Tenant be at one of the Barns to pay the Rent and the Lessor at the other to demand the Rent and none be there to pay it that yet the Lessor cannot enter for the Condition broken because there was no default in the Tenant he being at one for it was not possible for him to be at both places together And upon this Case now remembred to the Iustices Popham Walmesley and Fennor said That perhaps also the Tenant had not money sufficient to have been ready to have paid it at either of the said places but it is sufficient for him to have and provide one Rent which cannot be at two places together And by the Case reported here also If Lands and Woods are demised together the Rent ought to be demanded at the Land and not the Woood because the Land is the more worthy thing and also more open then the Wood And therfore by the three Iustices aforesaid Rent ought not to be demanded in any private place of a Close as amongst Bushes in a Pit or the like nor in the open and most usuall passage therof as at a Stile Gate and the like 4. Vpon a Prohibition sued out of the Kings Bench the Case appeared to be this The late Lord Rich Father to the now Lord Rich devised to his Daughter for her advancement in marriage 1500. upon condition that she marry with the consent of certain friends and deviseth further that if his Goods and Chattels are not sufficient to pay his Debts and Legacies that then there shall be 200 l. a year of his Lands sold to supply it and dies making the now Lord Rich his Executor his Goods and Chattels not being sufficient to pay the Debts of the Testator as was averred the said Daughter married with a Husband against the will of those who were put in trust to give their assents and the Husband and the Wife sued in the Spirituall Court for the Legacy And it was surmised that they would not allow the proofs of the said now Lord Rich exhihited to prove the payment of the Debts of his Testator and further that they would charge him for the sale of the Land upon which matter the Prohibition was granted to the Delegates before whom the matter depended and now consultation was prayed in the case Vpon which it was affirmed by a Doctor of the Civill Law that they will allow the proofs for the payment of the Debts according to our Law and that the Legacy shall not be paid untill the Debs are satisfied But he said that by the Law if the Executor do not exhibit his Inventory but neglect it for a year or more that then if any omission or default be in the true value of the Inventory exhibited that then such on Executor for this default shall pay all the Legacies of his Testator of what value soever they are not respecting the Debts or the value of the Goods or Chattels how small soever the omission or default be in the Inventory And so he said was the case of the now Sir Richard S. who did not bring in the Inventory for four years after the death of the Testator and that in the Inventory exhibited the values of every thing were found to be too small and therfore to be charged by their Law albeit he hath not Goods and Chattels sufficient of the Testators To which it was answered that this was quite without reason for by such means every Subject of the Realm may be utterly defeated if he take upon him the charge of an Executorship And if this shall be admitted no man will take upon him the Execution of the Will of any and by such a means none will have their Wills performed which shall be too inconvenient And they said further that in as much as Debts are to be proved by the Common Law of the Realm those of the Ecclesiasticall Courts ought to admit in the proof therof such proofs as our Law allows and not according to the precisenesse of their Law And although by their Law such a Condition as before being annexed to a Legacy is void because that marriage oughr to be free without Coercion yet where we are to judge upon the point as we are here if the Execution happen to be charged because of the sale of Land and for
in his custody and offered to the said Sheriff to put him in the Indenture amongst his other Prisoners delivered to the new Sheriff but would hâ—ve had the said old Sheriff to have sent for the said new Sheriff to have taken him into his custody but the new Sheriff refused to receive him unlesse Dabridgecourt would deliver him into the common Gaol of the County which was in the Town of Warwick wherupon afterwards the Prisoner escaped And Dabridgecourt was charged with this Escape and not the new Sheriff for he is not compellable to take the Prisoners of the delivery of the old Sheriff but in the common Goal of the County and the old Sheriff remains chargeable with the Prisoner untill he be lawfully discharged of him and if the Sheriff dies the party shall be rather at a prejudice then the new Sheriff without cause charged with him And in such a case the party who sued the execution may help himself to wit by the remaining of the body by a Corpus cum causa wherby he may be brought to be duly in execution and this under a due Officer And Anderson Periam and other Iustices were also of opinion that the said Skinner and Catcher are to be charged with the escape in the principall case wherupon Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff which was entred Hillar 34 Eliz. Rot. 169. in the B. R. Fulwood versus Ward 2. IN a Writ of Annuity brought in the Common Pleas by George Fulwood Plaintiff against William Ward Defendant the Case was thus The Queen was seised of a Barn and Tithes of Stretton in the County of Stafford for the life of the Lord Paget and being so seised demised it by Letters Patents dated 21. June 29 Eliz. to the said William Ward for 21. years wherupon the said Ward by Writing dated 30. Iune 29 Eliz. granted to the said Plaintiff an Annuity or yearly Rent of 10 l. out of the said Barn and Tithes for 15. years then next ensuing payable yearly upon the 8. day of November with clause of Distresse The Lord Paget died the first day of March 32 Eliz. and for the Arrearages after his death the Plaintiff brought this Writ of Annuity and for the difficulty therof in the Common Pleas the Case came this Term to be argued before all the Iustices and Barons at Serjeants-Inn in Fleetstreet where it was agreed by Walmsley Fennor and Owen that the Annuity was gone by the determination â—â— his Estate in the Land who made the Grant for they said that presently upon the Grant made as before it was a Rent-charge for by such a Rent granted in Fee the Fee shall be in his Heirs albeit the Grantee dies before any Election made and such a Rent is payable from the beginning at the Land as appeareth by 12 E. 4. And by grant of Omnia terras tenementa hereditamenta such â— Rent will passe ergo it is a Rent-charge and not an Annuity untill the Election made and by the determination therof in the nature of a Rent the Election is gone as by Babington and Martin 9 H. 6. by the recovery of Lâ—nd charged with such a Rent by elder Title the Annuity is gone as it seeâ—s by their opinion and by them and by Littleton upon a Rent-charg◠〈◊〉 with Proviso that he shall not charge the person of the Grantor 〈…〉 exclude the charge of the person which proves that the Land is charâ—â—â— Originally and not the person for otherwise the Proviso would be void for the repugnancy And if so whensoever the Land is discharged as by 〈…〉 â—â—â—cent or the like the person therby is also discharged and therfore â—he Iuâ—gment here shall be that the Plaintiff shall be barred But by the chief Iustices chief Baron and all the other Iustices and Barons the Plaintiff ought to have Iudgment in this case to recover the Annuity for the Law gives him at the beginning an Election to have it as a Rent or an Annuity which matter of election shall not be taken from him but by his own Deed and folly as in case where he purchase part of the land charged in which case by his own Act he hath excluded himself of his Election But if a Feoffee upon condition grant a Rent-charge and presently break the Condition wherupon the Feoffor re-enter shall not the Feoffee be charged by Writ of Annuity surely it shall be against all reason that he by his own act without any folly of the Grantee shall exclude the Grantee of his Election which the Law gives at the beginning And they denied the opinion of 9 H. 6. to be Law But if the Disseisor grant a Rent-charge to the Disseisee out of the Land which he had by the Disseisen by his re-entry before the Annuity brought the Annuity is gone for this was his own act yet in effect all of them agreed that Prima facie it shall be taken as a Rent-charge of which the Wife shall be endowed as hath been said which passe by grant of Omnia hereditamenta and which is payable at the Land but the reason is because it is expresly granted out of the Land and also for the presumption of Law that it is more beneficiall for the Grantee to have it in such a degree then in the other But neither the presumption of Law nor the expresse Grant therof as a Rent shall not take away from the Grantee the benefit of his Election where no default was in him but that upon his Election he may make it to be otherwise as ab initio And therfore by Popham If a Rent-charge be granted in tail the Grantee may bring a Writ of Annuity and therby prejudice his Issue because that then it shall not be taken to be an Intail but as a Fee-simple conditionall ab initio And if a Termer for two years grant a Rent-charge in fee this as to the Land is but a Rent charge for two years and if he avow for it upon the determination of the Term the Rent is gone but by way of Annuity it remains for ever if it be granted for him and his Heirs and assets descend from him who granted it And if a Rent-charge be granted in fee and doth not say for him and his Heirs if the Grantee brings his Writ of Annuity the Heir shall never be charged therwith yet if he had taken it as a Rent-charge the Land had been charged with it in perpetuity And by him the cause why the Proviso that he shall not charge the person of the Grantor upon the grant of a Rent-charge is good is because the person is not expresly charged by such a Grant but by operation of Law But in such a case a Proviso that he shall not charge his Land is meerly void for the repugnancy because there the Land is expresly charged by precised words and therfore if it be expresly comprised in such a Grant that the Grantee may charge the Land or the person of the
Sheriff of another County then where the occasion brought or by Warrant of a Iustice of Peace of another County for matter of the Peace and the like which are not like to the case of Partridge who was beâ—ten in the County of Glocester by Sir Henry Pole for which he brought his Action in London And Sir Hen. Pole would have justified by Assault of the Plaintiff in the County of Glocester with a trâ—verse that he was not guilty in London But it was then ruled in this Court that he could not do it to oust the Plaintiff to sue in London but in such a case he might have alledged that the Assault was done in London because it was also a thing transitory of which they shall take notice there and so help himself if the matter had been true But in the case at the Bar if the speciall matter alledged in the forraign County be false as here the Plaintiff may maintain his Action and traverse the special matter alledged by the Defendant And so a traverse in such a case may be upon a Traverse when falsity is used to oust the Plaintiff of that benefit which the Law gives him Hillary Term 38 Eliz. Wood versus Matthews 1. IN a writ of Error brought by Owen Wood against Griffeth Matthews upon a judgment given in the common Pleas the case was briefly thus The Issue in the Common Pleas was whether one were taken by a Cap. ad satisfaciendum or not and upon the triall therof at the Nisi prius the Jury found for the Plaintiff in this Action to wit that the party was not taken by the said Capias and upon the back of the Pannell entred dicunt per Quer. but on the back of the Postea the Clark of the Assises certified the Pannell thus to wit That the Jury say that no Capias was awarded which was otherwise then was put in Issue or found by the Jury and the Roll of the Record was according to the Postea and upon this Judgment given for the said Matthew then Plaintiff upon which amongst other Errors this variance between the Issue and Verdict was assigned for Error and after deliberation had upon this point and this matter alledged by the Defendant in the Writ of Error and certified out of the Common Pleas the Court awarded as to this point that the Record sent up out of the Common Pleas by the Writ of Error shall be amended according to that which was endorsed on the back of the Pannell for the endorsement upon the Pannell is the Warrant for the certifying of the Postea aâ—d so this Warrant over to him that makes the Entry in the Roll And therfore wheras it was alledged that the Postea was amended in the Common Pleas aftâ—r the Record removed it was holden to be well done there for although the Record were removed by the Writ of Error yet the Nisi prius the Postea and the like remain still there as it is of the Warrant of Attorney and the like And if the Postea had not been amended there but sent up with that which was endorsed upon the Pannel all shal be amended here according to that which was indorsed upon the Pannel and according to this there was a Presidâ—nt shewn Tr. 35. H. 8. between Whitfeild and Wright where the Issue was whether a quantity of Grain were delivered between two Feasts and endorsed upon the Pannel Dicunt pro quaer and yet the Postea certified and the Rolls also made that the delivery was made ad festa and upon this matter alledged in Banco Regis and the Error in this point assigned and certified out of the Common Pleas the Record removed by the Writ of Error was by award of the Court amended and the word Ad razed out and the word Inter written in lieu of it according as it appeareth it ought to have been by the Note upon the back of the Pannel And the like amendment was made lately in the Checquer Chamber upon Error brought there upon a Iudgment given in Banco Regis where the Iudorsment upon the back of the Writ was pro Quer. and the Postea and Roll was that the Plaintiff was guilty and there amended the last Term. Slanings Case 2. NIcholas Slaning of Bickley was seised in his Demesn as of Fee of the Mannor of Bickley and of a Mill in Walkhampton in the County of Devon called a blowing Mill and of another Mill there called a knocking Mill and of an acre of Land there also and of divers other Mannors and Lands in the said County of Devon the said Mills and acres of Land in Walkhampton then being in the possession of one Peterfeild and Atwill of an Estate for divers years then to come and being so seised he with Margaret his Wife levied a Fine of the said Mannor of Bickley and of other Lands omitting the said Lands in Walkhampton to certain Câ—nuzees who rendred the same back again to the said Margaret Slaning for her life with the remainder over to the said Nicholas and his Heirs After which the said Nicholas by Indenture daied 30. Octob. 21 Eliz. gave and enfeoffed all the said Mannors and Premisses to John Fits and others and the Heirs of the said Fits to the Vses Provisoes and Limitations mentioned in the said Indenture which was to the use of himself and the Heirs Males of his body by any other Wife the remainder to Nicholas Slaning of Newton Ferries and the Heirs Males of his body with divers remainders over with this Proviso to wit Provided and it is the intent of these presents and of the parties therunto that the said John Slaning and the Heirs Males of his body or the said Nicholas Slaning of Newton-ferries and the Heirs Males of his body in whomsoever of them the Inheritance in tail of all the Premisses shall happen to be by force of these presents shall pay to Agnes the Daughter of the said Nicholas Slaning of Bickly 200 l. or so much therof as shall be unpaid at the time of the death of her said Father according to the intent of his last Will with a Letter of Attorney to it by which he ordains John Hart and Robert Fort joyntly and severally his Attorney to enter into the said Mannor of Bickley Walkhampton c. and all other the Lands Tenements and Hereditaments in the said Indenture mentioned and possession for him to take and after such possossion taken for him and in his name to deliver full possession and seisin of the Premisses to the said John Fits c. according to the form and effect of the said Indenture wherupon possession and seisin was given of all but that which was in possession of the said Peterfield and Atwill And the said Pererfield and Atwill nor either of them never attorned to the said Grant After which Nicholas Slaning of Bickly made his last Will by which devised to the said Agnes his Daughter 200 l. to be paid in form following
it shall not be taken by intendment that the Messuages had such a Curtilage to it if it be not specially named Fennors Case 5. IN Trespasse brought by Fennor in the common Bench against for breaking his Close in c. the Defendant pleads a Bar at large to make the Plaintiff assign the place in certain where he supposeth the Trespasse to be done the Plaintiff therupon alledgeth that the place where he complaineth is such c. and sheweth in certain another then that in which the Defendant justifies the Defendant avers that the one and the other are all one and known by the one name and the other and therupon the Plaintiff demurs and adjudged there for the Plaintiff because that in such a case upon such a speciall assignment it shall be taken meerly another then that in which the Defendant justifies in as much as the Plaintiff in such a case cannot maintain it upon his evidence given if the Defendant had pleaded not guilty to this new Assignment that the Trespasse was done in the place in which the Defendant justifies although it be known by the one and the other name and that the Plaintiff hath good Title to it because that by his speciall Assignment saying that it is another then that in which the Defendant justifies he shall never after say that it is the same in this Plea for it is meer contrary to his speciall Assignment And upon this a Writ of Error was brought in the Kings Bench and the Iudgment was there affirmed this Term for the same reason Quod nota Scot versus Sir Anthony Mainy 6. IN Debt upon an Obligation of 200 l. brought by John Scot Gent. against Sir Anthony Mainy Knight the Condition wherof being to perform the Covenant comprised in an Indenture of Demise made by the said Sir Anthony to the said Plaintiff of his Capitall Messuage in Holden with the Lands to it belonging c. amongst which Covenants one was that wheras by the same Indenture he had demised it to him for 21. years that the said Sir Anthony covenanted with the said John Scot that the said Sir Anthony from time to time during the life of the said Sir Anthony upon the surrender of this Demise or any other Demise hereafter to be made by the said Sir Anthony of the said Messuages and Lands and to be made by the said John Scot his Executors or Administrators and upon a new Lease to be made ready ingrossed to be sealed and offered by the said John Scot his Executors or Administrators to the said Sir Anthony for the like tearm and number of years in the aforesaid Indenture comprised for the same Rent c. to seal and deliver to the said John Scot his Executors and Administrators And the said Sir Anthony as to this Covenant pleaded did not surrender nor offer to surrender to him the said Demise nor offer to him any new Demise of the Premisses ready engrossed for to seal it for the like Term c. as it is in this Covenant And for the other Covenants he pleads performance of all To which the Plaintiff replies that the said Sir Anthony after the Obligation and before the Action brought had rendred the said Messuages and Lands by Fine to one Walter Savage and William Sheldon their Executors and Assigns for eighty years from the Feast of Easter next before the Fine which was Pasch 36 Eliz. wherby he said that the said Sir Anthony had disabled himself to renew his Lease according to the Covenant upon which it was demurred in the Commen Bench and the Iudgment given for the Plaintiff as appeareth Trin. 37. Eliz. Rot. 2573. And upon this Iudgment a Writ of Error was brought in the Kings Bench and agreed this Term. And it was moved that the Iudgment given was erroneous in as much as the first act was to be done by John Scot before the new Lease was to be made to wit the surrender of the former Lease and the drawing of the new one ought to have been done by the Plaintiff which not being done on his part the said Sir Anthony is not bound to make the new Lease And also it was moved that as the case is here the said John Scot might surrender to the Defendant notwithstanding the intervening of this Lease between the Lease of the Plaintiff and the Inheritance of the Defendant as if a man make a Lease for years in possession and afterwards make another Lease to a stranger to begin after the end of the former Lease this shall not hinder but that the first Lease may be surrendred to him who was the Lessor notwithstanding the said Term intervening To which it was answered by the Court that the Plaintiff here need not to make any offer of the surrender of his Term to the said Sir Anthony in as much as the said Sir Anthony hath disabled himself to take the Surrender or to take the Lease according to the purport of the Condition and by this disabling of himself the Obligation is forfeited Come per 44 E. 3. 8. and by Littleton also If a man make a Feoffment upon condition to re-enfeoff him this is not to be done untill request therof be made by the Feoffor yet if in the mean time the Feoffee suffer a fained recovery of the Land grant a Rent charge acknowledgeth a Statute taketh a Wife or the like the Feoffor may re-enter without request made to re-enfeoff him and the reason is because that by any of these the Feoffee hath disabled himself to perform the Condition in the same plight as he might have done at the time of the Feoffment in the same manner here for by this render by the Fine the Reversion passe in right so that the Termor in possession attorning to it they shall have the Rent reserved upon the first Lease and therfore the Plaintiff cannot now surrender to the said Sir Anthony but to the Grantees of the Reversion and therfore there shall be no prejudice to the Plaintiff because the Defendant was the cause of disabling the Plaintiff to make the Surrender to him And suppose it be but a Term to begin at a day to come yet by this the Obligation is forfeited because the Obligor hath therby disabled himself to perform the Condition in such a plight as he might have done it when the Obligation was made wherby the Obligation is presently forfeited albeit the Plaintiff never surrender nor offer to do it And therfore the Iudgment there was affirmed Mounson versus West 7. IN an Assise brought in the County of Lincoln before Gawdy and Owen by Thomas Mounson Esquire Demandant against Robert West Tenant for Lands in Sturton Juxta Stu. The Defendant West pleaded Nul Tenant del Frank-tenant named in the Writ and if that be not found then Nul tort nul Disseisin And the Assise found that the said Defendant was Tenant of the Tenements now in Plaint and put in view to the Recognitors of
the Assise in manner and form as the Writ supposeth And further that the said West therof disseised the said Mounson namely of the Tenements in the will of one Mounson And did not find either the words of the Will nor the Will it self what it was c. And the Iustices of Assise upon this Verdict upon advice with the other Iustices gave Iudgment that the Plaintiff shall recover c. upon which a Writ of Error was brought in the Kings Bench where it was moved that the Iudgment was erroneous First because the Iury have not found that the Defendant was Tenant of the Free-hold agreeing with the form of the Plea for the Writ of Assise doth not suppose him to be Tenant of the Free-hold and therfore the Verdict in this point not fully found The second Error is that the Seisin of the Plaintiff is not required of according to the charge given to them as well as the Disseisen for the charge was that they should enquire of the Seisen of the Plaintiff c. But to both these the Court answered that the Verdict is well enough notwithstanding these exceptions for every Assise brought supposeth that there is a Disseisor and a Tenant named in it then this Assise being brought against a sole person supposeth him to be a Disseisor and Tenant also and therfore the Verdict saying that he was Tenant as the Writ supposeth is now as strong in this case as if they had found that he was Tenant of the Free-hold for the Tenant of the Free-hold ought to be named in the Writ But if the Assise had been brought against two or more such a Verdict had not been good for it sufficeth if any of them be Tenant of the Freehold and then the Writ doth not suppose one to be Tenant more then another but supposeth one Tenant to be named in the Writ And therfore in such a case the finding ought to be speciall to wit that such a one is Tenant of the Free-hold or that there is a Tenant of the Free-hold named in the Writ But where one only is named in the Writ to be Disseisor and Tenant it is sufficient to find as here for by this it is certainly found that he is Tenant of the Free-hold And for the other point although it be a good direction for the Iudges to the Iury wherby they may the better perceive that there ought to be a Seisin in him or otherwise there cannot be a Disseisen by the other yet in Deed he cannot be a Disseised who was not then seised But the Assise having found the Disseisen the Seisen in Law is found included in the Disseisen But for the point moved that the Verdict was not perfect in as much as they found the Disseisen with a Nisi it seemed to Gawdy that the Iudgment upon this Verdict was erronious as where a Verdict in another Action is imperfect a Venire facias de novo shall be awarded to try the Issue again And if Iudgment be given upon such a Verdict it is error so here the Verdict in this point being incertain there ought to have been a Certificate of Assise to have this better opened But the three other Iustices held as the case is that the Verdict in this point is certain enough for that which cometh before the Nisi as it is placed is meerly nugator as in the case of the Lord Stafford against Sir Rowland Heyward the Iury found Non assumpsit but if such Witnesses say true as they believe they did Assumpsit c. it was but a meer nugation But it seemed to Popham that if the Verdict had been if the words of the Will do not passe the Land then that he disseised and if they passe then that he did not disseise there if the words of the Will be not found the Verdict had been all imperfect but here the Verdict is full and perfect before the Nisi c. and therfore the Iudgment was affirmed Holme versus Gee 8. A Formedon in Descender was brought by Ralph Holme Demandant against Henry Gee and Elizabeth his Wife Tenants and the Case wâ—s thus Ralph Langley and others gave two Messuages and a Garden with the Appurtenances in Manchester to Ralph Holme the great Grandfather of the Demandant and to the Heirs of his body begotten after which the same great Grand-father by Deed indented dated 20. September 14 H. 7. enfeoffed Iohn Gee of one of the said Messuages and of the said Garden rendring yearly to the said great Grand-father and his Heirs 13 s. 4 d. a year at the Feasts of S. Michael and the Annunciation by equal portions after which the said Iohn Gee died seised of the said Messuages and Garden and it descended to Henry Gee his Son and Heir after which the said great Grand-father by his Indenture bearing date 6. Martii 12 H. 8. enfeoffed the said Henry Gee of the other Messuages rendring also to him and his Heirs yearly 13 s. 4 d. at the said Feast aforesaid by equal portions after which Holme the great Grand-father died Stephen Holme being his Son and next Heir who was seised of the Rents aforesaid and afterwards also died seised Robert Holme being his Son and Heir after which the said Henry Gee died seised of the said two Messuages and Garden and they descended to Eliz. his Daughter and Heir who took to Husband one Richard Shalcroft and had Issue the said Elizabeth wife of the said Henry Gee Tenant in the Formedon after which the said Richard Shalcroft and his wife died after which and before the marriage had between the said Henry Gee and Elizabeth now Tenants in the Formedon the said Elizabeth enfeoffed one Richard Greensearch of the said Messuages and Garden after which to wit at the Feast of the Annunciation of our Lady 3 Eliz. the said Henry Gee husband to the said Elizabeth paid 13 s. 4 d. for the said Rent reserved as is aforesaid to the said Robert Holme after which to wit on Munday next after the Assumption of our Lady at Lancaster before the Justices there a Fine was levied with Proclamations according to the Statute between Thomas Aynsworth and Thomas Holden then being seised of the Tenements aforesaid Complainants and the said Henry Gee and Eliz. his wife Deforceants of the Tenements aforesaid wherby the Conusance was made to the said Thomas and Thomas who rendred them to the said Henry Gee and Eliz. his wife and to the Heirs of their bodies the Remainder to the right Heirs of the said Henry the five years past after the Proclamations in the life of the said Robert Holme after which the said Robert died and Ralph his Son and Heir brought the Formedon upon the Gift first mentioned and the Tenants plead the said Fine with Proclamations in Bar and the Demandant replyed shewing the severall discontinuances made by the great Grand-father as aforesaid and the acceptance of the said Rent by the said Robert by the hands of
Anglice Copie des except according to any custom of the said Mannor of Yeatminster and that the Obligation was made for the payment of the same Rent reserved by the said Articles and demands Iudgment c. wherupon the Plaintiff demurred in the Common Bench and there Iudgment was given that the Plaintiff should recover his Debt and Damages as appeareth there Mich. 36 37. Eliz. Rot. 312. upon which a Writ of Error was brought in the Kings Bench and there moved that the Iudgment was erroneous in as much as upon the matter he ought to have been barred of his Action for if an Action of Debt had been brought upon the Demise by the Articles the Defendant might have pleaded as here and the Plaintiff should be cleerly barred As if a man be bound to make an Estate or to assure to another all the Lands which he hath by descent from his Father or all the Lands which he hath by purchase from such a one or the like And of this opinion Gawdy was saying in as much as the Obligation is that he shall be paid according to the true intent of the Articles the intent of them is not that the Rent shall be paid if any Land be not passed by them for it should be paid as by 22 H. 6. if a man be bound to pay a Rent which is reserved upon a Lease made to him he ought to pay it at his peril But if it be to pay it accordingly to the Lease there he said it is not payable but upon the Bond and is to be paid as a Rent And if the Land be evicted in the interim before the day of payment the Obligor shall help himself by pleading of it upon such an Obligation to discharge the Bond so here But it seemed to Popham that the Iudgment was well given and yet he agreed the Cases that were put but he said there was a diversity where the Obligation goes in the generality and where it tends to a speciality for as by 2 E. 4. If a man be bound to be Non-suit in all Actions which he hath against such a one or to assure to another all his Lands in Dale he may say that he hath not any Suit or that he hath no Land in Dale But if it be that he shall be Non-suit in a Formedon depending or to enfeoff him of White acre there it is no plea because he refers to a special point And by 18 E. 4. If a man be bound to another to pay him 10 l. for which a stranger is bound to the said Obligee it is no plea for him to say that the stranger is not bound to pay him 10 l. for when the Condition refers to such a speciall matter this cannot be denied of him who is bound And therfore in this case the Defendant cannot say that there were not any such Articles contrary to that which is specially comprised in the Condition as by 28 H. 6. A man was bound to perform the Covenants comprised in a certain Indenture of Covenants he shall not say that there was not any such Indenture because it resorts to a speciall So I think if a man be bound to pay the Rent of 10 l. a year reserved upon an Indenture of Demise made of Lands in D. payable at such a Feast he shall not say against it that there was no such Demise made nor no such Rent reserved upon the Demise but is estopped of the one and the other And in Hill 3. Eliz. A man was bound thâ—t he shall pay to A. or the Obligee all such summs of mony as T. S. deceased stands bound to pay by his Obligation to the said A. and of one R. P. to the behoof of the Children of such a one according to the Will of the said party and in Debt upon this Obligation he saith that the said T. S. was never bound by any such Writing Obligatory to the said A. and R. P c. to pay c. Pro usu filiorum c. as in the Condition and per Curiam adjudged no good Bar because he is estopped to deny the speciall matter which is matter of Writing and not a bare matter in Deed. Kirton versus Hoxton and others 10. IN an Appeal of Mayhem brought by Kirton Plaintiff against Appeal of Mayhem Rob. Hoxton Esq and divers other Defen the one of the Defen plead Nul tiel in rerum natura as another of the Appellees and if it be not found then as to the Felony and Mayhem not guilty Agreed by the whole Court that such a manner of pleading is not to be suffered in an Appeal of Mayhem because no life is put in danger by the suit And yet it was objected that there are presidents that such form of pleading hath been admitted in Appeals of Mayhem But the Court had respect to it that the reason in all the Books of Law in which it hath been admitted in an Appeal of death and the like is that it stands in Favorem vitae and therfore it is admitted to be good or otherwise by the Books it shall not be admitted to be so for the doublenesse of it But no life is to be put in â—eâ—pardy in this case and therfore such a plea shall not be admitted but the Not guilty shall stand by which the other plea is waived Hillary Term 38 Eliz. Henry Earl of Pembrook versus Sir Henry Backley IN an Action upon the Case between Henry Earl of Pembrook Plaintiff See this Case Coke lib 5. 76. a. and Sir Henry Backley Knight Defendant the case upon the pleading appeareth to be thus The said Earl was seised in his Demesn as of Fee of the Mannor of Stocktrift in the County of Somerset to which Mannor the Office of the custody of the Forest of Selwood in the same County belongeth and also that there was before time of memory an Office within the same Forest called the Lievtenant-ship or Custody of the said Forest belonging to the said Mannor of which also the said Earl was seised in his Demesn as of Fee And that there was one part of the said Forest called the West part of the said Forest in which there were two Walks or Bayliwicks the one called Staverdale walk and the other Brewick walk And that the said Lievtenant had the charge of the Deer and the disposition and appointment of the Keepers of the said Forest And that the said Earl being so seised by his Writing bearing date 5. Novemb. 12. Eliz. reciting that his Father had granted the Office of Lievtenant-ship and Deputy-ship of the said West part of the said Forest Cum vadiis c. quando acciderit and the Keeper-ship of Brewick-walk aforesaid to the said Sir Maurice Barkley Knight and the Heirs Males of his body and instituted and ordained him and the Heirs Males of his body Lievtenant and Deputy therof to the said Earl and his Heirs confirmed the Grant aforesaid And further by the
voluntary killing of Bucks cutting of Trees Wood or the like but otherwise it is of things done or suffered by his negligence if it be not common or often And albeit the Trees here were not many or that it was not averred that the Game was to be hurt therby yet it cannot be intended but that it is so much impaired by it as it should be by the killing of a Buck in the Forest by which the Office shall be forfeited because the Game is therby the worse and yet there may be Game sufficient without this Buck but he hath voluntarily done a thing contrary to his Office and therfore it is a Forfeiture of his Office and so it shall be in this case And for the other point they said it was a Condition and also a Covenant and it was for good purpose to have it to be so For suppose that the Game had been destroyed by the said Sir Henry shall this he a sufficient recompence or satisfaction to enter for the Condition broken No and therfore the Covenant was made to recompence him for Damages And when uâ—on the Habendum a Proviso is added for a thing to be done by When a Proviso makes a Condition him to whom the Deed is made or to restrain him to do any thing this is a Condition as well as if it had been a Condition which shall make or shall restrain to do such a thing for they are in this case the words of the Grantor to restrain the Grant in some manner and to shew in what manner he shall have it and it is alwais to him who passeth the Estate and to no other Then suppose here that the Proviso had been Provided alwaies that the Grantee shall not cut any Tree And the Grantee covenant also that he will not cut any Tree this is plainly a Condition and also a Covenant then it is as plain in the case in question which is Provided also and the Grantee covenant c. that he will not cut any manner of Wood distinguish the sentence by his proper distinction and it is cleer that it is a Condition as well as a Covenant And to say that there is a diversity between this case and the case upon Serjeant Bendloes Lease because there it is Provided alwaies and it is covenanted and agreed between the parties In which case it is alledged that the agreement which is the Plaintiffs goes to the Proviso to make it a Condition for him as well as it shall go to the Grantee to make it to be a Covenant from him they understand no difference because the Proviso as it is placed is of it self as spoken by the Plaintiff and the agreement between the parties that such a thing shall be done by the Lessee makes it a Covenant on his part only all being to be performed by him as plainly as in the case in question And to say that the last Proviso shall not be a Condition because the first cannot enure as a Condition because that which is to be done may lawfully be done with it or without it or because that the matter to which the Proviso is annexed is repugnant to the nature of the thing granted yet this is not because of the nature of the word it self but by reason of that to which the Proviso is annexed and therfore the Proviso following hindred in its operation by meanes of the word also And therefore if a man makes a Lease for yeers provided alwayes that the lessor may enjoy and hold the Mannors of D. which is other Land or that the Lessee shall kill I. S. these are void of Conditions But grant then that it is further provided also that he shall not alien his Terme is not this a good Condition although that which was Precedent was no Condition It is cleer that is not And they said for Hamingtons Case that it was but of the nature of a declaration with what wood the Lessee shall meddle because it depends upon the Covenant of the Lessor and it is generall to wit that he may cut any manner of underwood provided that he do not cut any manner of Timber and Popham was of councell with Hamington in this case and the Court at the beginning insisted much that it was a Condition and that for the reason then alledged that it depended upon the Covenant of the Lessor which was general for all manner of under-wood because that Standels growing between great Trees might be taken within the generall words of all manner of underwood for to make it plain it was well put in that he shall not cut any manner of Timber Trees and therfore in this point it was but a Declaration with what wood he should meddle although in truth it was of another thing then was comprised in the Covenant before And then the adding of a Covenant to such a Proviso shall not make the Proviso of another nature then it was before the Covenant made or if no Covenant had been added to it and upon this reason the Court then gave Iudgment for Hamington And by him if I am seised of the Mannor of D. in D. and of Black acre in D. and so seised I covenant with I. S. that he shall enjoy the said Mannor for ten years Provided and the said I. C. covenant that he shall not enjoy Black acre this Covenant is not a Condition but a Declaration deduced out of my Covenant to make a plain Declaration that it is not my intent that Black acre shall passe be it parcel or not parcel of the said Mannor Then the Covenant following will not alter the nature of the exposition of the Proviso which the Law shall make of it self if it had stood of it self without a Covenant following And for the Proviso here he put this case suppose it had been Provided and the Grantee covenants that he shall not cut any Trees None will deny but that this had been a Condition and a Covenant also And what diversity is there where the word is at the conclusion and so couple the Condition and Covenant together And we are not to alter the Law for the ignorance of Scriveners who do they know not what by their ignorance shall be corrected by the Law And they agreed that where a principall Officer is by his Office to make inferior Officers under him and the inferior Officer commits a forfeiture the superior Officer shall take advantage therof and shall place a new Officer as was done in 39 H. 6. for the Office of the Marshall of the Kings Bench put in by the great Marshall of Englang Easter Term 39. Eliz. Overton versus Sydall 1. IN Debt between Valentine Overton Clark Prebendary of the Prebend of Tervin in the County of Chester founded in the Cathedrall Church of Litchfeild in the County of Stafford against Thomas Sydall Executor of William Sydall the case appeared to be this Henry Sydall Clark Prebendary of the Prebend 26 Maij 5.
thing that is uncertain certain but shall serve as a Predict yet the words import that he had a Master and that his Master had a Cook to which all the Court agreed and Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff And another Action was brought for these words Scil. Thou hast sacrificed Thou hast sacrificed thy child to the Devill thy Child to the Devill and adjudged that the words were actionable Mich. 15. Iac. In the Kings Bench. Lee versus Brown IN an Ejectione firmae brought by Lee against Brown the Case was this Whether copyhold Lands may be intailed Tenant in Tail of Copyhâ—ld Land surrendred the same into the hands of the Lord to the use of I. S. wherupon two points did arise 1. Whether Copyhold Land be within the Statute of Donis conditionalibus so that iâ— may be intailed 2. Whether the Intail may be cuâ— off by the surrender Doderidge Iustice said as to the first point that it hath been a great doubt whether it may be intailed but the common and better opinion was that by the same Statute co-operating with the custom it may be intailed and with this agrees Heydons case in my Lord Cokes 3. Report and so was the opinion An Intail of copyhold lâ—nd nâ—t to be cut off by â—urrender unlesse by speciall custom of the Court. And for the second point their opinion also was that it could not be cut off by surrender unlesse it were by speciall custom and they directed the Iury accordingly And it was said to maintain this custom it ought to be shewn that a Formedon had been brought upon such a Surrender and Iudgment given that it doth not lye yet it was agreed that it was a strong proof of the custom that they to whose use such Surrenders had been made had enjoyed the Land against the Issues in Tail And it was said by the Counsell of the Defendant that there was a Verdict for them before in the same case which they could prove by witnesses but the Court would not allow such a proof because it was matter of Record which ought to be shewn forth In the same Term in the Common Pleas. May versus Kett. AN Action upon the Case was brought for these words viz. Thou hast Words Thou hast stoln my Corn out of my Earn stoln my Corn out of my Barn And it was moved in Arrest of Iuâ—gment because he had not said how much he had stoln and perhaps it was of small value and yet it was adjudged that the Action would lye for it is at least petit Larceny But if he had said that he had stoln his Corn generally it had not been actionable for it might have been growing and then it had been but a Trespasse The same Term in the Star Chamber Riman versus Bickley and others IOhn Riman exhibited a Bill in the Star Chamber against Thomas Bickley and Anne his Wife Dr. Thorn Mr Goulding and others Defendants the said Anne was first married to Devenish Riman the Plaintiffs Son and between them were many â—ars and disâ—greemâ—nts and the said Devenish was much given to drinking and other Vices and divers times did beat and abuse his Wife and was also jealous of the saiâ— Thomas Bickley and his Wife being at a certain time at Supper with Dr. Thorn Goulding and others spake such words as these having communication thâ—t her Husband did beat and abuse her to wit That she heard that his Father had that quality and being once whipt for it was the better ever after and that if she thought it would do her Husband any goâ—d she would willingly bestow 40 s. on some body to give him a whipping wherupon Gâ—ulding said that he would give him a Medâ—cine for his Mâ—lâ—dy and within two daies after he came in the night in womâ—ns apparrell with a Weapon under his Cloak and with a Rod and wenâ— into the House and Chamber of the said Devenish and would have whipped him and in striving together there was some hurt done on either side but Gâ—ulding not being able to effect his purpose fled and this was conceived to be by the procurement of Anne his wife And not long after Devenish fell sick and sent to his said wife for certain necessaries which she would not send him and presently after Devenish died and she refused to come to his buriall And although it were much disliked that Devenish should abuse his Wife in such uncivill manner as to strike and beat her and as Coke late chief Iustice said it is not lawfull by the Act Military for one man to strike another in the presence of Ladies yet it was resolved by the whole Court that it was a great misde meanor in the Wife and uncivill and undutifull carriage in her to do so to her Husband as they use to do to Children or fools to wit to give them the Whip and so to disgrace and take away the good name of her Husband which viz. A mans good name and his Childrens are the two things which make a man live to Posterity as was said by Sir Francis Bacon Lord keeper and the Court fiâ—ed the Wife 500 l. and it was said that Thomaâ— Bickley her noâ— Husband well deserved to pay this Fine because he was too familiar with her in the time of his Predecessor and as the Bishop of London said Devenish Rimon lay upon her hands and Thomas Bickley upon â—eâ— heart And to aggravate this matter a Letter was shown whiâ—h Devenish Rimon wrote to his Wife in which he called her Whoor and told her somwhat roundly of her faults and she wrote back to him in the Margeâ—t that he lyed and wished him to get a better Scribe for his next Lâ—â—ter for he was a Fool that wrote that wherin she called him Fool by craft And Goldings offence was accâ—vnted the greater because he was a Minister so that he was fined 500 l. also And Coke said that the course of this Court was that if any were fined who is not able to pay it Respondeat superior he that is the principall and chief agent therin must answer it for otherwise poor men might be made Instruments of great mischief who are not able to answer and the greater Offenders shall escape which the Lord Keeper confirmed And as to Doctor Thorn he was acquitted by all And the Bishop of London said that they had thought to have troad upon a Thorn and they gat a Thorn in their foot And by Coke if Devenish Rimon had died upon it it had been capitall in the Wife who procured it for it was an unlawfull Act. The same Term in the Kings Bench. Wescot versus Cotton THe case was this An Infant Executor upon an Action brought against Where an Infant Executor may declare by Attorney but not defend by Attorney but by Guardian him appeared by Attorney where he ought to appear by Guardian and it was resolved by the Court that this was Error for this
doth much concern the Infant in as much as by his false plea he shall be bound to â—nswer of his own Goods if he hath no Goods of his Testator and therfore in a 11 E. 4. 1. he hath remedy against his Guardian for pleading a false Pâ—ea And by Doderidge if he hath no Guardian the Court shâ—ll appoint him a Guardian And if an Infant bring an action as Executor by Attorney and hath Iudgment to recover this is not erronious because it is for his benefit so per Curiam the difference is where he is Plaintiff and where he is Defendant And there is another difference where he is Executor and where not for being Executor his Plea might have been more prejudiciall to him and Coke lib 5. Russels case was agreed for good Law for an Infant may be Executor and may take money for a Debt and make a Release and give an Acquittance but not without a true consideration and payment of the money The same Term in the same Court. Thomas Middletons Case THomas Middleton alias Strickland was condemned for a Robbery at the Where a Felon is condemned and elcapeth and is re-taken upon confession that he is the same party execution may be awarded The Sheriff of Middlesex fined for not attending the Court. Assises in Oxford after which he made an escape and being taken again he was brought to the Bar and upon his own confession that he was the same party who did the Robbery and that he was condemned for it the Court awarded execution And Mountague chief Iustice said thâ—t was no new case for it had been in experience in the time of E. 3. and 9 H. 4. and 5. E. 4. that the Court might so do upon his own confession And because the Sheriff of Middlesex did not give his attendance upon the Court in this case nor came when he was called the Court fined him 10 l And Mountage said that it shall be levied by proces out of the Court and also all other Fines there assessed and not estreated into the Exchequer for then the party might compound for a matter of 20 s. and so the King be deceived The same Term in the same Court. Gouldwells Case IOhn Gouldwell seised of Land in Socage Tenure devised them to his Wife for life the Remainder to John Gouldwell his Son and his Heirs upon Condition that after the death of his Wife he shall grant a Rent-charge to Steven Gouldwell and his Heirs and if John Gouldwell dye withâ—ut Heirs of his body that the Land shall remain to Steven Gouldwell in Tail the Wife dieth John Gouldwell grants the Rent accordingly Stephen Gouldwell grants the Rent over John Gouldwell dies without Heir of his body and the second Grantee distrains for the Rent arrear and Stephen Gouldwell brings a Replevin And it was urged by the Counsell for the Plaintiff that this Rent shall not have continuance longer then the particular Estate and cited 11 H. 7. 21. Edriâ—ks case that if Tenant in Tail acknowledge a Statute this shall continue but during his life and Dyer 48. 212. But it was agreed per Curiam that the Grantee was in by the Devisor and not by the Tenant in Tail and therfore the Grant may endure for ever But for the second point this being to him in Remainder the intent of the Demisor is therby explained that he shall have the Rent only untill the Remainder come in possession for now the Rent shall be drowned in the Land by unity of possession 3. It was agreed and resolved that by the granting of the Kent over this was a confirmation And Mountague said that it was a confirmation during the Estate Tail and shall enure as a new grant afterwards And Haughton and Doderidge said that they would not take benefit of the grant over by way of confirmation for as Haughton said this enures only ought of the Devisor and he hath power to charge the Land in what manner he pleaseth and it is like to an usuall case as if a man makes a Feoffment in Fee to the use of one for life the Remainder over with power to make Leases and after he makes a Lease this is good against Tenant for life and him in the Remainder also And I have considered what the intent of the Devisor should be in granting of this Rent and it seems to me that in as much as the Land is limited in Tail and the Rent in Fee that by this the Grantee shall have power to grant or dispose of the Rent in what manner he would but if the Land had been in Fee I should have construed his intent to have been that the Grantee should have the Rent only untill the Remainder fall to which Doderidge agreed who said that we are in the case of a Will and this construction stands with the intent of the Devisor and stands with the Statute which saies Quod voluntas Donatoris est observanda The same Term in the same Court. Baskervill versus Brook A Man became Bail for another upon a Latitat in the Kings Bench and before Iudgment the Bail let his Lands for valuable consideration Difference between baile in the Kings Bench and the Common Pleas. And how a bail shall relate And afterwards Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff And now it was debated whether the Land Leased shall be liable to the Bailment and it was said by Glanvill of Councell with the Lessee that it ought not to be liable and he put a difference between a Bailment in this Court and a Bailment in the Common Pleas for there the Suit cometh by originall and the certainty of the debt or demand appeareth in the declaration and therfore then it is certainly known from the begining of the Bailement for what the Bail shall be bound But in this Court upon the Latitat there is not any certainty untill Iudgment given before which the Land is not bound and now it is in another mans hands and therfore â—ot liable and he puts Hoes case Co. lib. 5. 70. where iâ— was resolved that where the Plaintiff releaseth to the Bail oâ— the Defendant upon a Suit in the Kings Bench before Iudgment all Actions Duties and Demands that this Release shall not bar the Plaintiff for there is not any ceâ—tain duty by the Bail before Iudgment and therfore it cannot be a Release and he citeâ— the case of 21 E. 3. 32. upon an account and said that it was like to a second Iudgment in that which reduceth all to a certainty and therfor c. But it was said by Mountague and Crook that the Lessee shall be bound for otherwise many Bailments and Iudgments shall be defeated which will bring a great Inconvenience And Mountague said that it was like to the case of a bargain and sale of Land which after it is Inrolled within six moneths shall relate to the beginning of the Bargain so upon the Iudgment given relation is made from the time
grants over the Reversion the first Lessee dies and the Grantee of the Reversion brings a Writ of Covenant against his Executors In which case there were two points 1. Whether these words And the said Lessee his Executors Administrators and Assigns shall from time to time c. make a Covenant or Whether Covenant lies against the Executor of a Lessee after assignment no. 2. Whether as this case is it will lye against the Executors of the Lessee As to the first point it was agreed that it is a Covenant for being by Indenture it is the words of both parties and it is more strong being in the case of the Queen Haughton laid that 25 H. 8. Tit. Covenant Covenant will lye against a Lessee after assignment but Debt lyeth not for Rent after the Lessee hath accepted the Assignee for his Tenant and therfore it seems that by the expresse words of the Covenant that the Action lies Doderidge Iustice contra for between the Queen and the Lessee there is privity of Contract and also of Estate so that the Queen her Heirs and Successors might have had an action against the Lessee or his Executors upon the privity of Contract and where the Lessee â—ssigns over the privity of Contract remains but the privity of Estate is gone to the Assignee and now when the Queen grants over the Reversion the privity of Contract is utterly determined wherby the Action of Covenant cannot be maintained against the first Lessee or his Executors who are more remote to which Mountague chief Iustice agreed see 2 H. 4. 6. 6. H. 4. 1. and Co. lib. 3. Walkers case and the Iudgments there cited Et adjournator The same Term in the same Court. Bennet versus Westbeck THe Case was thus Tenant for life Remainder for life Reversion in Fee he in Remainder for life gives his Deed of Demise with the assent of the first Tenant for life upon the Land to a stranger in the absence of the Lessor and said that he surrendred to him in Reversion And it was said that this Surrender being without Deed was not good to him who was absent and to confirm it the case was put out of 27 H. 8. Where Mountague chief Iustice said that if a Feoffment be made to four and Livery is made to one in the absence of the other but in name of all if it be by Deed this shall enure to all but if it be without Deed then only to him to whom the Livery was made So here this Surrender doth not enure to him in the Reversion being absent Whether Tenant for life in Remainder may surrender without Deed. But Non aliocatur for the sole point now in question was whether he in Remainder for life can surrender without Deed and as to it this Rule was taken viz. That that which cannot commence without Deed cannot be granted without Deed as a Rent Reversion common Advowson c. as 19 H. 6. 33. 14 H 7. 3. 1 2. Ph. Mar. 110. 22. Ass Pl. 16. But in this case this took effect by Livery and not by Deed and therfore might be determined without Deed. Mountague and Haughton agreed that it might be surrendred without Deed because it had its beginning without Deed but it could not be granted over without Deed. Doderidge Iustice said that it could not be surrendred without Deed but he said that Tenant in possession may or Tenant for life and he in Remainder together may surrender to him in the Reversion but this shall innure as two severall Surrenders first of him in Remainder to the Tenant for life and then by the Tenant for life to him in the Reversion Crook Iustice agreed with Doderidge for the Estate of him in Possession is an Estoppell to the Surrender so that it could not be surrendred without Deed. The same Term in the same Court. Thurman versus Cooper IN an Ejectione firmae brought by John Thurman against William Cooper upon the whole matter the case was thus Lands were given to a man and woman who afterwards inter-marry and to their Heirs and Assigns Habendum to them and to the Heirs of their two bodies engendered the remainder to them and the Survivor of them with warranty to them and their Heirs and Assigns for ever And the question was what Estate this shall be whether an Estate-tail or Fee-simple or a Fee-tail with a simple Expectant And it was said that this shall be an Estate-tail only for the Habendum qualifies the generall words precedent and with this agrees Perkins 35. b. and Co. lib. 8. 154. b. Althams case But it was answered and resolved by the whole Court that this is a Fee-tail with a Fee-simple expectant and they observed these Rules 1. That every Deed shall be taken most strong against him that made it 2. That every Deed shall be construed according to the intent of the maker so that all the parts may be effectuall if they can stand together with the Rules of Law 40 E. 3. 5 Percy saith that it is a Fee-simple 21 H. 6. 7. that it is an Estate-tail with a Fee-simple expectant Dyer 160. and Plow Paramore and Yardleys case the Law shall make an order of words where there is no order put by the parties and the words after the Remainder limited are Tenendum de Capitalibus Dominis feodi c. and therfore it ought to be a Fee-simple for if it were a Fee-tail he should hold of the Donor as it is in Co. lib. 6. Sir John Molins case and other Books And although the Warranty cannot inlarge an Estate yet this expresses his intent to passe a Fee-simple and the Law shall make a construction that the Fee-tail shall precede upon which the Fee-simple shall be expectant according to that which is before said in Paramore and Yardleys case Doderidge If the Habendum had been to a stranger the Premisses had been but a Tail as 7 H. 4. for otherwise the Habendum shall be void But if Land be given to one and his Heirs viz. In Tail or if the said Donce dye without Issue of his body this had been but an Estate-tail only because it immediatly checks and confirms the Premisses to which Haughton agreed Et adjournator The same Term in the same Court. Powels Case POwel an Vtter-Barister of the Temple and also Town-Clark of Plimoth brought an Action upon the Case against for these Words That he was a Puritan Knave a precise Knave a bribing Knave a corrupted Knave c. words The Defendant supposing that the Plaintiff had wronged him in the Court of Plimoth said that he was a Puritan Knave a precise Knave a bribing Knave a corrupted Knave and that he would make him answer for that which he had done in another place And after Verdict for the Plaintiff it was now moved in Arrest of Iudgment that the words were not actionable because he doth not scandalize him in his Profession by which he acquires his
levied yet the Vse shall be directed by the originall Indenture and therfore 6 Rich. 2. A Feoffment is made to two and their Heirs and afterwards a Fine is levied upon it for further assurance to the use of them and the Heirs of one of them yet it shall go to the use of both for it shall be respected according to the original agreement where there are divers assurances for the perfecting of one and the same thing 16 E. 3. tit Age. A Daughter had a Seigniory by descent a Tenancy Escheats a Son is born he shall have the Land see Sharoes case in 4 Mar. Dyer and in Chadleighs case all looks to the originall agreement and therfore variance of time shall not hinder the originall agreement as 33. Ass the Servant inâ—ends to kill his Master and afterwards the Master puts him out of his Service and then he kills him this shall be petty Treason in the Servant 28 H. 6. Two are bound in a Bond at severall times and yet he shall declare against both as upon the first delivery 11 H. 7. it is adjudged that if a Deed be delivered by an Infant and afterwards it is again delivered when he comes of full age And see Mallories case Finches case and Borastons case Nunc tunc quando are a demonstration of the time and not of the matter and so they concluded that the Vse shall rise upon the first Indenture and not upon the Fine or Replevin brought but Doderidge and Haughton Iustices contra Trin. 17. Jac. In the Kings Bench. Silvesters Case JOhn Silvester promised to John B. that if he would marry his Daughter that he would give with her a Childs part and that at the time of his death he would give to her as much as to any of his Children excepting his eldest Son and afterwards he made his Executors and died I. B. brought an action upon the case against the Executors upon this Promise and shewed that the Executor had not given him a Childs part and that such a younger Son of the Testators had a 100 l. given him And it was resolved by the Court that the promise of a Childs part is altogether incertain but being so much as any of his Children had and then shewing that the younger Son had a 100 l. this was certain enough and therupon Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff The same Term in the same Court. Godfrey and Owen COrnelius Godfrey was Plaintiff in an action upon the case for Words He is a very Varlet and seeks to supâ—res his brothers Will c. words against Owen Defendant and the words were these to wit He is a very Varlet and seeks to suppresse his Broâ—hers Will he makes shew of Religion but he is a very Hypocrite And the words were spâ—ken of a Merchant to one who gave him much credite in his Trade Mountague chief Iustice said that the words which are actionable in such a case ought to touch the Plaintiff in his Profession which these do not do Et relata ad personam intelligi debent secundum conditionem personae for in the suppressing of his Brothers Will the case might be such that he might well do it for perhaps there may be an after Will made And for calling him Hypocrite lies not in the conusance of the Common Law for GOD only can judge of the heart of man and therfore these words do not touch the Plaintiff as he is a Merchant Doderidge Iustice Words ought to tend some way to the ruine of the party or otherwise they are not actionable and Iudgment was given Quod quere nil capiat per billam Mich. 17. Jac. In the Star Chamber Sis John Bingleys Case IN Sir John Bingleys case in the Star Chamber it was resolved by the two chief Iustices Mountague and Hobart and agreed by the Lord Verulam Lord Chancellor and Sir Edward Coke that if an Information be exhibited there which begins with divers particular misdemeanours and conclude in the generall that 1. The matter included in the generall charge ought to be Ejusdem generis 2. They ought to exceed the particulars expressed in number 3. They ought not to be greater or more capitall wherupon Mountague cited the Statute which speaks of Deans and other Spirituall persons upon which it hath been resolved that Bishops are not within it for they are of a higher degree and the principall reason of these rules was because that a man cannot possibly make a defence because he knews not what will be objected against him and upon this Sir John Bingley was discharged at this time for the most transcendent Offence that was objected against him to wit concerning Captain Baugh and other Pirates to whom the King of his grace and bounty had given 200 l. to make them Loyall Subjects But Sir John Bingley Colore officii had defrauded them of almost An Officer â— his own wrong all of it for the want wherof some of them died miserably and the rest became Pirates again But Sir John Bingley made many protestations of his innocence in this mâ—tter And it was holden also that one might be an Officer of his own wrong as their might be an Executor of his own wrong And this was Sir John Bingleys case for somthing in the information for he committed Extortion Colore officii The same Term in the Star Chamber THe Attorney-generall put in an Information against divers Dutch Merchants for buying and transporting of many great summs of Gold and Silver Bullion And it was said by the Court that divers Statutes had been made for redresse of this mischief as the Statute of 5 R. 2. the Offenders wherof ought to forfeit all they may and by another Statute in 17 E. 4. this Offence was made Felony to continue for seven years But the Court would not now punish them upon any Statute for it was an offence at common To carry Gold and Silver out of the Realm punishable at Common Law Law and therfore punishable in this Court And Sir Edward Coke said that if any be to be punisht upon a penal Statute it ought to be within two or three years at least after the offence committed for the Informer hath but a year to sue and the King two years for the most part The Statutes of 37 E. 3. and 5 E. 6. Prohibite the buying of Coin and that it is so at the Common Law see 21 E. 3. 60. and Plow 215. and not only he that buyes but he that sels also offends in it for it is a Prerogative only belonging to the King and it is his Coin and none can put a value upon it but himself which is a Flower of his Crown Hobart chief Iustice of the Common Pleas as one shall be punished for ingrossing any Commodity a Fortiori one shall be punished for ingrossing and buying of a great quantity of money all other Commodities being thereby ingrossed for money is the Mistresse of commerce Pecunia
est rerum omnium vendendarum mensura Bracton 117. 18 E. 3. Hollinghead 109. 50 E. 3. Rot. Pat. Memb. 7. And for transportation 17 E. 3. 19 E. 3. Rot. Pat. 24. De monetis non transportandis 19 R. 2. Rot. Pat. The Dutches of obtained licence to melt Coin to make Plate And divers of the Defendants were within the Kings generall pardon but in as much as they pleaded it in their Rejoynder and not in their answer as it ought to be the Court over-ruled their Plea so that they could have no advantage therby But in as much as they were strangers and not coâ—usant of our Laws and relyed only upon their Counsell the Court had consideration therof in their censure Hillary 17 Jac. In the Kings Bench. Serle versus Mander SErle brought an action upon the case against Mahder for these words to Words I arrest you upon Felony wit I arrest you upon Felony and after Verdict for the Plaintiff it was moved in Arrest of Iudgment by Richardson that the words were not actionable for he doth not say that the Plaintiff had committed Felony But it was rescived by the Court and so adjudged that the action lieth The same Term in the same Court A Iudgment was obtained against one of the Servants of the Lord Hay Iudgment against a Defendant when beyond Sea with an Ambassador reversed Viscount Doncaster when he was Ambassador in Bohemia and attending upon him there And this matter being disclosed to the Court by the Counsell of the Defendant they would not suffer the Plaintiff to have execution upon the said Iudgment but ordered the Plaintiff to declare De novo to which the Defendant should presently answer Memorand It was said to be against the course of the Court to have an Imparlance Imparlance before the Declaration entred The same Term in the same Court The King against Briggs A Quo warranto was brought by the King against Briggs for exercising A Subject cannot have a Forest of certain Priviledges who justified by virtue of a Forest granted to him And by Bridgeman this is the first Quo warranto which he knew that had been brought against any Subject for a Forest for a Subject cannot have a Forest but he may have a Chase which peradventure may passe under the name of a Forest And there are divers incidents to a Forest which a Subject cannot use nor have there ought to be a Iustice of a Forest which a Subject cannot have and such a Iustice ought to be a man of great Dignity 2. There ought to be Verderors who are Iudges also and by 34 E. 1. Ordinatio Forrestae ought to be by Wait but a Subject cannot award a Writ Also there are three Courts incident to a Forest 1. A Court of Attachments which may be without Verderors 2. The Swanimate Court 3. The Iustice seat and this appeareth in 1. E. 3. cap. 8. 21 E. 4. cap. 8 But by the Statute of 27 H. 8. cap. 7. There are some other incidents to a Forest 2. Admits that a Subject may have a Forest yet it fails in this case because he hath shown the exemplification and not the Letters Patents and see Co. lib. 5. Pains case that neither an exemplification or constat are pleadable at Common Law and Co. lib. 10. Dr. Leyfeilds case The same Term in the same Court Sir William Webb versus Paternoster THe case was this Sir William Plummer licensed Sir William Webb to lay his Hay upon the Land of the said Sir William Plummer untill he could conveniently sell it and then Sir William Plummer did make a Lease of the Land to Paternoster who put in his Cattell and they eat up the Hay And it was two years between the license and the putting in of the Cattell and yet Sir William Webb brought an action of Trespasse against Paternester for this Mountague chief Iustice 1. This is an Interest which chargeth the Land into whosoever hands it comes and Webb shall have a reasonable and convenient time to sell his Hay 2. The Lessee ought to give notice to Notice Sir William Webb of the Lease before he ought to put in his Cattell to which Haughton Iustice agreed in both points But Doderidge Iustice said that Sir William Webb had no certain time by this license yet he conceived that he ought to have notice But it was resolved that the Plaintiff had Convenient time a convenient time to wit two years for the removing of his Hay and therfore Iudgment was given against him But admit that there had not been a convenient time yet the Court was of opinion that the Plaintiff ought to have inclosed the Land at his perill for the preservation of his Hay And it was agreed that a license is countermandable although it be concerning A license whether for profit or pleasure countermandable profit or pleasure unlesse there be a certain time in the license as if I license one to dig Clay in my Land this is evocable and may be countermanded although it be in point of profit which is a stronger case then a license of pleasure see 13 H. 7. The Dutches of Suffolks case for a license The same Term in the same Court SIbill Westerman brought an action upon the case against Eversall and had Error Sibell for Isabell Iudgment and in the entry of the Iudgment she was named Isabell 1 Ass and 3. Ass A Fine was levied by Sibill when her name was Isabell and it was not good for it doth not appear to be the same party so in the case at the Bar And for this the Iudgment was reversed The same Term in the same Court JEne as Executor of brought an action upon the case against Chester An Infant chargable for necessary Apparrell because the Defendant made request to the Testator of the Plaintiff to buy for him certain silk Stuffs for Apparrel and to make him a Cloak the Defendant pleaded that he was within age and George Crook said that the Defendant should not be charged because it is not shewn that the Apparrell was for the Infant himself but he was over-ruled in this for it is sufficiently expressed to be for him And it was agreed by the Court that it ought to be shewn that it was Pro necessario vestitu and it ought to be suitable to his calling and as Doderidge said that there was a case adjudged in this Court between Stone Withipole that where Withipole had taken of Stone certain Stuffs for Apparrel being within age and afterwards he promised payment if he would forbeare him some time and the Assumpsit adjudged not good because he was not liable for the Debt at first for the reason aforesaid Trin. 17. Jac. In the Common Bench. Gilbert de Hoptons Case AN action upon the case was brought for those words viz. Thou art a Words Thou art a Theef and hast stoln my Furze Theef and hast stoln
Execution shall be sued against him as Ter-tenant 2. There is not any lien as Heir for the Iudgment doth not mention the Heir and therfore he cannot be charged unlesse he be expresly bound and in the Record of the Recovery it doth not appear that the first lien shall bind the Heir for he declares that he bound himself and not that he bound himself and his Heirs 3. If the Heir were bound in the Obligation so that he were once bound as Heir yet the Iudgment determines the specialty so that now he is not bound and in the Iudgment the Heir is not mentioned as in 10 H. 4. 21. 24. If an Abbot contract to the use of the house without consent of the Covent this shall bind if he dies but if he takes an Obligation of the Abbot and then he dies this shall not bind the house for the Contract is determined by the Obligation and this is the reason that in the time of E. 3. in a recovery upon debt the Obligation was cancelled 4. Here he cannot be charged as Heir for it appeareth by the Record Where a debt is recorded upon bond the Obligation was cancelled that his Father is living for it is brought against him as Heir apparant which he cannot be but during the life of his Father And as to the objection that in this case he shall have his age and therfore shall be charged as Heir Non sequitur for if execution be sued against the Heir of a Purchasor he shall have his age and yet he is not Heir neither can charged as Heir to the Conusor But because it is a rule in Law that the Heir which hath by discent shall not answer where his Inheritance may be charged during his Nonage Whitlock to the same intent because the Heir is not charged here as Heir but as Ter-tenant wherby his false Plea shall not hurt him with which Jones also agreed and said that he here considered three things 1. That the lien of the Ancestor binds the Heir 2. How the Heir shall behave himself in pleading 3. Our point in question For the first there are two things requisite to bind one as Heir 1. A lien expresse for if one bind himself and not his Heir this shall not bind his Heir in any case 2. A discent of Inheritance for without this he shall not be bound by the act of his Ancestor and he is bound no longer then Assets discend for he alien before the Writ purchased the lien is gone 2. He ought to behave himself truly and plead truly and confesse the assets discended to him when debt is brought against him as heir otherwise his own Lands shall be charged with the debt as it is in Pepys case in Plow Com. But where it is said in Pepys case that upon a Nihil dicit or Non sum informatum c. If the Iudgment passe upon them that it shall be generall I am not of that opinion for the common experience of the Courts is that such a generall Iudgment shall not be given against the Heir unlesse it be upon a false plea pleaded with which agrees Lawsons case Dyer 81. and Henninghams case Dyer 344. where the Iudgment passed by Nihil dicit so that the saying in Plow 440. a. that what way soever the Heir be condemned in debt if he do not confesse the Assets c. that it shall be his proper debt is not now taken for Law And I also hâ—ld that if the Heir plead falsly and there is found more Assets Where upon a false plea by an Heir the Plaintiff may elect to take the Assets in execution or an Elegit of all his Land that yet it is in the election of the Plaintiff to charge him and to take execution of the Assets only or to take an Elegit of all his Land and he is not bound to take an Elegit of all his Land in this case for otherwise this inconvenience may arise If the Heir hath a 100. acres by discent and two by purchâ—se if upon the false Plea of the Heir the Plaintiff cannot have any other execution but an Eligit of the Moyety of his Lands then he by this is prejudiced for otherwise he might have all he Assets in execution and so the Heir by this way shall take advantage of his false plea. 3. He held as Whitlock before and for the same reason Doderidge Iustice How the Heir shall be bâ—und by the act of his Father is worthy of consideration upon which Prima facie the Books seem to disagree but being well considered accord with excellent harmony I have considered this case it was moved at Reading Term and because my Notes are not here I will speak more briefly and will consider 1. Hâ—w an Heir shall be charged upon the Obligation of his Father and as to that in debt against an Heir he is charged as Heir so that at this day it is taken as his proper debt wherby the Writ is in the Debet and Detinet How an Heir shall be charged upon the Obligation of his Father but in the Detinet only against Executors But in former time from the 18. of Ed. 2. till 7 H. 4. if an Executor had Assets the Heir was not chargable but in 7 H. 4. the Law changed in this point for now it is accounted his own debt and debt will lye against his Executor as it is said in Plow Com and so against the Heirs of the Heir to many generations albeit of this Plowden makes a doubt and his plea that he had nothing at the day of the Writ purchased nor ever after is good for if he alien the Assets he is discharged of the debt in regard he is not to wait the action of the Obligee 2. The Heir shall be châ—â—ged upon or Recognisance not as Heir but as Ter-tenant for he is not bound in the Recognisance but only the Conusor grant that the debt shall be levied of all his Lands and Tenements but not against his Heirs And here he is not meerly as Ter-tenant for he shall not have contribution agâ—â—st â—her Ter-tenants but only against those who are Heirs as himself is but to all other intents he is Ter-tenant and so charged Why an Heir is not chargable for debt after he hath fold the assets as 32 E. 3. and 27 H. 6. aâ—â— 3. That upon a Iudgment as our case is the Heir shall be charged as Ter-tenant and not otherwise The Book which hath been cited viz 33 E. 3. Execution 162. is expresse in the point the broken years of Fitzherbert are obsâ—urely reported but by comparing of cases it will appear to be our case exâ—resly 4. That albeit an Heir shall be charged upon the Obligation of his Ancestor where he is particularly bound yet upon his false plea no execution shall be but upon the assets So it seems to me that in the principall case the Iudgment shall be speciall and it seems to be a
Abbys and yet their priviledge is not mentioned in all the Books as the Cistertians is 2. They complained to Gregory the nineth that they were not suffered to put it in ure and notwithstanding this complaint and command of the Pope to the Clergy to allow them this priviledge yet 24 H. 3. Complaint was made against them in Parliament for claiming this priviledge But the Statute of 2 H. 4. cap. 4. put this cut of doubt for this put the Cistertians in a premunire for purchasing and putting in execution Bulls of exemption of their Lands purchased afterwards Now if the Praemonstratenses had the same priviledge they should not have been omitted â—ut of this Statute then comes the Statute of 7 H. 4. cap. 6. which terrifies all from putting in execution Bulls of Exemption of their Lands not put in execution before upon which it is not to be presumed that it was put in execution afterwards But admit that the Praemonstratenses had this priviledge I say that the Plaintiff hath not applied this priviledge to himself for he hath not averred in fact that at the time c. Propriis manibus excolebat nec ad firman demitâ—ebat And this he ought to have done if he would take advantage of the priviledge as in Dickensons case Novel lib. intr 542. there it is expresly alledged in the like case as ours is here and where the same priviledge as here is claimed Quod manibus propriis excolebat True it is that it is said here that after the Feoffment to him made he was seised Et gavisus fuit in propria manutenor but he doth not say that at the time of the Tithes due gavisus fuit c. as he ought expresly to have done as appeareth by other cases If one prescribe to have common in arable Land when the Corn is reaped or in Meadow where the Hay is carried away and justifie by reason therof he ought to aver that the Corn or Hay was carried away when he put in his Cattell otherwise he hath not applied the prescription to himself So if one justifie for Common Quandocunque audia sua jerint he ought to aver that his Cattell then went in the place where c. as 17 Ass 7. So if the King pardon all but those who adhere to M. he who plead it ought to aver that he did not adhere to M. so here the priviledge is Quamdiu propriis manibus c. and therfore at the time he ought to aver that he had it propriis manibus c. Also where upon the surrender to H. 8. and the Statute they conclude that the Queen held it discharged this cannot be for this ought to be in such manner as the Abbot held it discharged but this was quamdiu c. and the King cannot be bound to such an unbeseeming condition and therfore he shall hold it dischâ—rged Like to the case where the Abbey hath the presentation and another the nomination the Abbey surrender he who hath the nomination shall have all for the King shall not present for him it being a thing undecent for his Majesty and so he concluded for the Defendant Banks contra 1. That it is a good cause of Prohibition 2. That it is well applied to us 1. That the order of Praemonstratenses is discharged of Tithes that they had once this priviledge hath been allowed by the other party by the Bulls of the Pope and that it was allowed and taken notice of he proved by this that this Bull was confirmed by King John in the 24. year of his Raign the Charter wherof he said he had under Seal and 22 E. 1. membran 5. there were 26. Abbeys of this order and the King took them all into his protection with their Immunities and 22 Rich. 2. John de Gant having Jura Regalia in Lancashire where the Abbey is confirmed to them this Bull and also this hath been divers times allowed and decreed to them in Court Christian for suit of Tithes as in the case of the Abbey of Bigham which was of the same order And as to that which was objected that if the Praemonstratenses had such a priviledge as the Castertians in 2 H. 4. that the like provision would have been against them As to this I answer that such a provision is not against the Templars nor Hospitalars and yet they have such a priviledge 2. It may be that they never enlarged their priviledged above their grant And for the Statute of 7 H. 4. our Priviledge was not then new and it was afterwards allowed in 22 R. 2. And also I conceive that if the Abbey were discharged at the time of the dissolution although not De jure yet this is a sufficient discharge within the Statute of 31 H. 8. as it is taken Co. lib. 11. 14. 2. I hold that they may here prescribe to be discharged of Tithes because they are Spiritual persons and capable of cure of Souls and capable of tithes in Pernamy as if an Appropriation be made to them 3. It is not now to be argued whether they have such a priviledge for they have demurred which is a confession of all matters in Fait c. 4. If there be a matter wherupon the Prohibition may be grounded it will serve vide Dyer 170 171. Co. lib. 11. 10. And 5. The priviledge is well applied because it is shewn that they were once discharged 6. He needs not to shew how he is discharged 22 E. 4. 4. 5 E. 4. 8. 20 E. 4. 15. Also the discharges are temps dont c. and therfore not pleadable so he prayed that the Prohibition might stand Pasch 1. Car. In the Kings Bench. Bowry versus Wallington NOte that in this case upon the Statute of 50 E. 3. 4. it was agreed by the Court that if there be a Suit in the Ecclestasticall Court and a Prohibition awarded and afterwards Consultation granted that upon the same Libell no Prohibition shall be granted again but if there be an Appeal in this case then a Prohibition may be granted but with these differences 1. If he who appeals pray the Prohibition there he shall not have it for then Suits shall be deferred in infinitum in the Ecclesiasticall Courts Where severall Prohibitions may be granted in the same case and where not 2. If the Prohibition and Consultation were upon the body of the matter and the substance of it for otherwise he shall be put many times to try the same matter which is full of vexation And the case was moved again and argued by Noy which was thus Wallington livelled in the Ecclesiasticall Court against Bowry for tithes of Wool and Lamb and Bowry upon suggestion of a Modus derimandi obtained a Prohibition and had an Attachment and declared upon it and are at Issue upon the Modus which is found for the Defendant and Consultation granted wherupon Iudgment was given in the Ecclesiasticall Court against Bowry upon which Bowry appealled and prayed a new
given in Cities and Towns Corporate and not where Iudgment is given in this Court or the Common Pleas and Executions are only there and this seems to be a reasonable construction Executions in Towns corporate to wit Executions upon Iudgments given in Towns corporate If the Sheriff make execution at the Town side he shal have for his fees as the Statute limits therfore he shall have it if within the Town if this should not be so this mischief would ensue that presently when an Execution issues out against a man he wil shelter himself in a Town corporate as in a Sanctuary and the Sheriff will not do execution there because he shall not have so great a Fee for doing it as if it were in another place and so execution which is the life of the Law shall be undone Jermy for the Defendant and first if the summ exceed a 100 l. he shall have but 6 d. for every 20 s. of all It is considerable that at Common Law the Sheriff ought to do execution freely without any recompence In Both and Sadlers case lately in this place an action upon the case was brought by a Bailiff that wheras a Warrant for taking such a man was directed to him the Defendant promised him 40 s. for his pains he took the man and brought an action for the 40 s. and it was agreed that he should not have it The Law abhors that great Fees shall be given for executions Co. lib. 3. 7. in Heydons case In the exposition of the Statute three things are considerable 1. What the Common Law was before the making of it 2. What the mischief was at the Common Law 3. The remedy which the Statute gives 4. The true reason of the remedy The Common Law was that the Sheriff shall not take any Fee for execution Ergo now he shall take as small a fee as may be because this is nighest to the common Law And the first words are declarative what Fees he shall take and the subsequent words affirmative what Fees they may now take to wit where the summ doth not exceed a 100 l. 12 d. for every 20 s. 14 Jac. It was objected that the Sheriff is not bound to do execution before he hath his Fee and then it was resolved that he might have an action of Debt and so it seems that the party is not bound to give levying money before that the execution be done and otherwise the party Plaintiff may be at great mischief if the other be not taken And it hath been agreed lately in the Common Pleas that if the summ exceed 100 l. he shâ—â—l have but 6 d. for every 20 s. And as to the second point he endeavoured to maintain that the Proviso extends to executions in Towns corporate although the Iudgments upon which the executions issue are given in other Courts and this is the constant practise of the City of London The Iudges delivered their opinion with a protestation that they might recall them if afterwards better reason appeared Crew chief Iustice was of opinion that he shall have but 6 d. for every 20 s. if the summ exceed 100 l. and the summ shall not be divided but if the summ be under a 100 l. then 12 d. for every 20 s. and this is the reason of the Law And for the second point although the Iudgment be given in the superior Court yet if the Sheriff does execution there he shall have his levying money and this is within the intention of the Proviso Doderidge Iustice the first question is upon the exposition of the Statute the second upon the Proviso For the first two expositions may be made as hath been remembred then we will enquire of the interpretation This Statute was made for the benefit of Sheriffs that as they are in hazard by taking of men because many times resistance was made 2. When the Sheriff had taken a man and in the carriage of him to prison he had escaped an action upon the case did lye against the Sheriff and when he had him in prison he ought to have great care in keeping of him for an action lies against him if he escape and therfore although on the one side there was a great mischief by reason of great Fees that the Sheriff took for execution so on the other side the Law tendred Sheriffs in respect of the hazard â—â—d care which they had of men in execution and therfore the Law in an indifferency provides that the Sheriff shall have a good Fee for execution and also it provides against his extortion and so it is indifferent between the oppression of the Sheriff and covetousnesse and we are not to judge according to the intent but according to the equity of the Law for equality to prevent the covetousnesse of Sheriffs and the oppression of the people then in this case if he shall have but 6 d. for every 20 s. for 200 l. he shall have no more for execution of 200 l. then if it were a 100 l. But I think this was not the intent of the Act. For the second point I take it that this Statute did not extend to Suits within Towns corporate and executions upon them for they are not at any great trouble for doing of execution within their Towns nor hazard But if a Sheriff does execution in a Town corporate then he shall have according to the Statute for it may be that the Prison is far distant And I upon the suddain conceive that this Proviso extends only to Towns corporate which are Counties Jones Iustice three questions have been made upon this Statute 1. For the nature of the action which the Sheriff is to have upon this Statute and for that it hath been many times resolved that he shall have an action of Debt for when a remedy is given by a Statute and no action is given by the same Statute wherby the penalty shall be recovered there he shall have an action of Debt 2. Who shall have the Fee when the Sheriff makes a Warrant to a Bayliff of a liberty the Bayliff of the liberty or the Sheriff The second branch of the second question is thaâ— when one Sheriff makes the extent and another Sheriff makes the Liberate who shall have the Fee 3. The third question hath been in debate in the Common Pleas and there was some opinion that if the summ be above a 100 l. and under 200 l. that the Sheriff shall have 12 d. for every 20 s. of the first 100 l. for otherwise the Sheriff shall have a lesse for execution of 199 l. then he shall have for 100 l. But if it be above 200 l. he shall have 6 d. ab initio My opinion on the suddain is that for every 20 s. of the first 100 l. he shall have 12 d. and for the residue he shall have 6 d. for every 20 s. and the other shall not be altered And for the second point I hold that this
Proviso extends only to Iudgments originally commenced in Towns corporate and not to executions upon Iudgments given in superior Courts for then the Sheriff does execution as an Officer to these Courts And the Sheriff of the County is at as great pains as if he were Sheriff of another County and shall not be bound by the Proviso Whitlock Iustice was for the Plaintiff in both the points to wit that the Sheriff shall have 1 s. for every 20 s. of the first 100 l. and 6 d. for every 20 s. of the residue And by him the Sheriff may refuse to do execution untill the levying money be paid to him And for the second point the Sheriff of the County of the City is not within the Proviso but shall have the Fees by the Statute provided as well as the Sheriff of the County shall have for the words are generall and the exception goes to all Towns corporate and Cities but doth not say Cities which are Counties and therfore this Sheriff is within the benefit of this Law And in Michaelmas Term next following the case was moved again by Whitlock for the Plaintiff and he said that he would not speak to the second point because the Court had delivered their opinion that the Proviso in the Statute that this shall not extend to executions in Towns corporate it is to be intended of executions in Towns corporate upon Iudgments there given But for executions there upon Iudgments given in this Court or any other superior Court the Sheriff shall have such Fees as are limited by this Statute And the Court said to him that were agreed of it And as for the first point he conceived that the Sheriff shall have 12 d. for levying of every 20 s. of the first 100 l. and 6 d. of every pound more and this appears cleerly by the Letter of the Statute And the case in Mich. 19 Jac. in C. B. between Empson and Bathirst doth not make against it for the resolution of the said case was upon other matters The case being a man was bound in a Statute of 120 l. the Sheriff extends and before the Liberate takes double Bond of the party for payment of his Fees and afterwards brought Debt against the party who pleads the said matter in Bar and the Statute of 23 H. 6. cap. 10. And in the case were three points 1. Whether the Sheriff may take a double Bond for the payment of his Fees and it was resolved that the Bond was void for the Sheriff might have Debt upon the Statute for his Fees 2. Whether the Sheriff shall have his Fees before the Liberate and resolved that he shall not 3. Was this very question and two Iustices were against one that where the summ exceed 100 l. he shall have but 6 d. for levying of every 20 s of the first 100 l. But the Iudgment was given upon the other points All the Court seemed to be of opinion that he shall have 12 d. for every 20 s. of the first 100 l. and 6 d. for every 20 s. of the residue The same Term in the same Court. Awdeley versus Joye AWdeley being put out of the Town-Clarkship of Bedford moved for a Writ of Restitution to the place and it seemed to Doderidge Iustice that the Iustices of this Court have power to grant restitution in this case and he cited a case in 16 Eliz. in this Court where restitution was granted in such a case and 43 Eliz. by warrant of Fennor Iustice a Writ of Restitution was granted One who was Town Clark of Boston for life was made Alder-man and put out of his Clarkship and was restored This Court hath power not only in judiciall things but also in some things which are extrajudicial The A Writ of Restitution to a Town-Clark being ousted of his Office Major and Commonalty of Coventry displaced one of the Alder-men and he was restored And this thing is peculiar to this Court and is one of the flowers of it Crew chief Iustice doubted whether restitution could be made to Awdeley or no because the Office was granted to him in Reversion when it was expectant upon an Estate for life and when the Officer for life died Joye was elected and he said that all the said Writs remembred are where he had once possession Whitlock Iustice in the case of one Constable 10 Eliz. It was resolved that this Court hath power to grant restitution in such a case where he was put out of his Office And by Jones Iustice this Court hath power to grant Restitution and he remembred one Mittlecots case And Noy being of Counsell with Awdeley said that there are Presidents to prove this in the times of E. 2. E. 3. and H. 6. And it was said by the Iustices that they are the chief Conservators of the Peace within the Realm and therfore have power for the preservation of the Peace in such factious Towns to grant restitution The same Term in the same Court Dabborne versus Martin THomas Dabborne brought an action upon the case against Martin for Words Thou art a Knave of Record these words Thou art a Knave of Record and a forgering Knave And it was argued by Jermy for the Defendant that the words were not actionable for a Knave signifies a Male-child so that it is no more then to say Thou art a Male-child of Record And for forgering Knave the action will not lye for Forger is a generall word and may be applied to divers Trades as forgering Smith forgering Goldsmith and when he called him forgering Knave there was no communication of his Office 18 Jac. Sir William Brunskill brought an action upon the case and declared that he was well discended and was a Gentleman of the Chamber to Prince Henry and he brought an action for these words Thou art a Cosener and livest by cosenage and adjudged not actionable Co. lib. 4. 16. Action upon the case doth not lye for these words Thou art a corrupt man if there were no communication touching his Profession And it was argued for the Plaintiff that the words were actionable for it lyeth for these words Thou art an Out-putterer if they were spoken in Northumberland where they are understood but not here because they have no signification And the words here are speciall and shall have reference to his Office and shall have such an interpretation as is now used and now Knave hath no signification of Male-child Jones Iustice said that if one saith that such a one is a corrupt Iudge action lies or if one saith of a Clark that he is a forging Clark action lies And in 28 Eliz. the opinion of Iustice Fennor was that for these words Thou hast forged my Fathers Will action lies Crew said that he did not understand the word Forgering but for calling one Knave of Record action lies And Doderidge Iustice said that he never gave way to these actions upon the case for words And no opinion
was given this day The same Term in the same Court. Goodwin versus Willoughby GOodwin brought an action upon the case against Joane Willoughby wife of Thomas Willoughby and upon non Assumpsit pleaded it being found for the Plaintiff it was moved in Arrest of Iudgment 1. That the Plaintiff shews that Thomas Willoughby was indebted upon account and doth not shew that Joane Willoughby is Executrix or Administratrix and yet that she promised to pay wheras in truth she hath no cause to pay for there is no consideration and so Nudum pactum Jermy for the Plaintiff for the first because it doth not appear for what cause he accounted I answer that this is but a meer conveyance And for the second that she does not suppose that the Feme is executrix c. But here is a good consideration which is that she shall not sue or molest and that he gave day for payment this is a sufficient consideration But Stone of counsell with the Defendant said that the first is the ground of the action and therfore he ought to shew for what he accounted Crew chief Iustice two exceptions have been taken 1. For the alledging the manner of the account which I conceive is good enough and he need not shew the cause of the account And as to the second because it doth not appear that she is Executrix or Administratrix and so no consideration and so no Assumpsit But here she assumes to be Debtor and makes a promise to pay which is an acknowledgment of the Debt by inference and therfore he conceived that the Assumpsit was good Doderidge Iustice for the first it is good enough yet Cum indebitatus existit is no good Assumpsit but here he shows a speciall way of Debt and it would be long and tedious to describe his account For the second there is no cause of action because it doth not appear that she is Executrix or Administratrix or Executrix of her own wrong If I say to one do not trouble me and I will give you so much this is not actionable for there ought to be a lawfull ground and for this cause the Declaration Where forbearance without cause of action is no ground of an Assumpsit is void for it is only to avoid molestation Give me time c. this is no good Assumpsit for forbearance is no ground of action where he hath no cause to have Debt Jones Iustice agreed in the first with them because a generall action upon the case sufficeth and in truth it is but an inducement to the action but for the other part he doubted and he cited one Withypools case an Infant within age promised to pay certain money he makes an Executor and dies within age the Executor saith to him to whom the promise is made forbear and I will pay you and there an action upon the case did lye against the Executor upon this promise and yet it was a void Contract but there was colour of action forbear till such a time now the other hath lost the advantage of his Suit But he gave no opinion Crew It is a violent presumption that he is indebted But by Doderidge here is no colour to charge her but only by inference that she is Executrix If a stranger saith forbear such a Debt of J. S. and I will pay it it is a good consideration for the losse to the Plaintiff and in this case it appears not that there is any cause and Broom Secondary said that Withypools case before cited was reversed in the Exchequer Chamber Jones If an Infant makes a promise it is void and he may plead non Assumpsit which Doderidge did not deny But upon his Obligation he cannot plead Non est factum for he said that he shall be bound by his hands but not by his mouth The same Term in the same Court Drope versus Theyar IN Debt by Drope against Theyar an Inne-keeper upon Issue joyned and a Verdict for the Plaintiff Bolstred moved in Arrest of judgment for the Defendant and the matter was that one Rowly who was servant to Drope lodged in the White Heart at S. Giles and there had certain Goods of his Masters which were stoln from him in the night and Drope the Master brought an action therupon and it was moved by Bolstred that the Plaintiff was without remedy 1. Because it was in an Inne in London for the Register 105. is Quando quis depraedatus euns per patriam which as he said could not be extended to an Inne in London 2. It ought to be an Inne as Inne-keeper 3. He ought to be as a Guest lodging and this appeareth in Culeys case in 5 Jac. in Celly and Clarks case which was entred Pasch 4. Jac. Rot. 254. It was adjudged that where the Guest give his Goods to his Host to deliver to him three daies after and the goods are lost that an action is not maintainable against the Inne-keeper for them and this was in an Inne in Uxbridge And in one Sands case where the Guest came in the morning and his Goods were taken before night he shall have an action against the Inne-keeper 4. The Goods ought to be the Goods of the party who lodgeth there for the words are Ita quod hospitibus damna non eveniunt and here the Master who brought the action was not Guest But admit the Master shall have the action yet he ought to alledge a custom that the Master shall have the action for the Goods taken from his Servant Trin. 17 Jac. Rot. 1535. Bidle and the Master brought an action for Goods taken from the Servant and there it was resolved that he ought to conclude that Pro defectu c. and apply the custom to him being Master Sec Co. Book of Entries 345. And that a custom that for other mens Goods in the custody of Guests the Owner shall have an action against the Inne-keeper if they be stollen Ob. This is the Common Law and therfore ought not to be alledged Answ Where a man takes upon him to shew a custom he ought to shew it precisely he cited Heydons case Co. lib. 3. 28 H. 8. Dyer 38. And it was said for the Plaintiff that Goods are in the possession of the Master which are in the possession of his Servant and so here the Master might have had action well enough 8 E. 4. my Servant makes a Contract or â—â—ies Goods to my use I am liable and it is my act By the Court an Inne in London is an Inne and if a Guest be robbed in such an Inne he shall have remedy as if he were Enns per patriam But the cheife point was whether the master shall have the action in the case where the Servant lost the goods and by Jones Justice in 26 Eliz. in C. B. upon the Statute of Hue and Cry it was resolved that if the Servant be robbed the Master may have the Action and so by him
there ought to be a dislike of the Father also and in the Declaration it is also said that she dis-agreed Doderidge agreed with Jones that â—he Declaration is not good and that it is not warranted by the Covenant and that the breach is not well assigned The case is grounded upon the second covenant which consists upon a contingency which contingency is if there happen any discord between the Father and the Son c. the words are joynt and all ought to disagree True it is that in some cases a conjunctive shall be taken for a disjunctive but this is according to the matter and circumstances of the fact but in our case it shall not be taken disjunctively If the Father the Son and the Wife had disagreed then it is cleer that an Action of covenant lies but this is casus omissus and no provision for it Also it is only alledged in the Declaration that she disagreed whereas a mutuall disagreement between all ought to be alledged and therefore Judgement was given Quod quaerens mil. capiat per bellam But all agreed that the Wife might have boarded with Tooker the Father if she would but her new Husband could not AT thowe Sergeant took divers exceptions to an Inditement of forcible entry upon the Stat. of 8. H. 6. against Ployden and others for expelling one Syms from his Copi-hold and the principall exception was because disseisivit was not in the Inditement and in truth it cannot for albeit the Stat. of 21. Jac. cap. 15. gives power to Iudges and Iustices of Peace to give restitution of possession to Tenants for yeares and Copy-holders in which there shal be an entry or detainer by force yet the Stat. does not give an Inditement of forcible entry of copy-hold Noy a Copy-holder shal now have an Iditement of forcible entry but disseisivit shal not be in it for no Iury will find that because it is not possible because a Copy-holder hath no Frée-hold and yet a Copy-holder shall have a Plaint in nature of an Assize against a stranger but not against the Lord And at last the opinion of the Court was that the Inditement was good UPon a Capias directed to the Sheriff of London to take the body of J. S. the Capias was returnable die Jovis which was the day of All-souls and thereupon the Sheriff took the party but he returned that because the return of the Writ was upon a day that was not Dies Juridicus he suffered the party to go at large And the return was holden insufficient for by Doderidge the Writ was good and the taking and detaining of the party by vertue thereof was lawfull but yet he could not have the party there at the sayd day and therefore the Sheriff was compelled to bring the party into Court which the same day he did accordingly The same Term in the same Court A Man granted a Rent charge of 12 l. to one of his Sons out of the Mannor of D. by Déed and died the Grantée lost his Deed the Land is extended to I. D. by vertue of a Recognizance acknowledged by the eldest Son of the Grantor the Grantée sue for his Annuity before the Councell of York to be relieved in equity for that in respect of the losse of the Déed he could not have remedy at the common-Law and J. D. the Conuzée obtained a prohibition out of this Court upon this surmize that although the Councel of York should make a Decree that he should pay the said Annuity yet it should be no discharge for so much against the Conuzor because their Decrée was no legall eviction Now came Smith of the Temple and prayed a Precedendo for the Grantée to the Councel of York and the opinion of the whole Court was that a Decrée there being no legall eviction shall not be a discharge for so much against the Conuzor Doderidge the Grantée of the Rent-charge having now lost his Déed can have no remedy in equity for in this case Equitas sequitur legem and of the same opinion were Jones and Whitlock but by Doderidge which was not denied if the Grantee had lost the Deed by a casuall losse as by firâ— c. in such a case he shall have remedy in equity and he sayd that in the beginning of King James when Egerton was Lord Chancellor there was such a Case in Chancery A Grantee of a rent-seck had seisen of it so that he might have an assize and he devised it to J. S. the Devisée sued in Chancery to have his Rent and seizen of it and he could have no remedy for it in Chancery And this was one Malleryes case The same Term in the same Court ONe Hebborne was indited for stopping a way c. and it was mooved that the inditement was insufficient because it is not layd that it was communis via but only that it was a way to the Church and per Curiam it was good enough and by Jones Iustice the Inditement is good enough although there wants vi armis because he who is supposed to stop the way is owner of the Land The same Term in the same Court AN Action upon the Case upon a promise was brought in the Town of Northampton and the Consideration alledged was that if the Defendant here in the Writ of Errour would discharge Bagnot of Execution c. that then the Plaintiff here in this Writ of Errour promised to pay him eleven pounds and there the Defendant pleaded quod exoneravit illum de Executione relaxavit And Bolstred for the Plaintiffe moved this for Errours that the Plaintiffe in the inferiour Court did not shew by what manner of release it was nor that it was by writing for this being the Consideration upon which the Action is grounded ought to be put in certain Mich. 15. Iac. Staple and King Execution of a consideration ought to be shown 35 H. 6. 19. a discharge ought to be shown in certain 22 E. 4. 43. the Lord Lisles Case and Mich. 16. Iac. in this Court Liverel and Rivets Case which was entred Trin. 16. Iac. Rot. 32â— in an Action upon the Case upon a promise upon issue joyned it was found for the Plaintiffe and it was moved in arrest of Judgement because the Consideration was that the Plaintiffe should discharge one Ogle and he declares that he did discharge him and thereupon he brought this Action and because he declared but generally quod exoneravit the Judgement for that very cause was stayed and 36 Eliz. one covenanted to make an assurance and pleaded generally that he had assured and resolved that it was not good and in Rosse and Harvies Case this Term which was entred Trin. 2 Car. Rot. 1408. In Covenant the Defendant covenanted to give security the Defendant pleaded that he offered security and resolved that it was not good per que c. Jermy for the Defendant that the plea is good enough for a Release by Peroll is sufficient I
that it was good enough for although it were a joynt command yet the parties commanding having severall titles it shall be taken as severall commands reddendo singula singulis and for the third it is good enough being in a Plea otherwise if it had been in a Writ But for the second Exception the bar is not good enough because incertain so that although upon other Exceptions moved by the Defendant the Replication of the Plaintiff was not good yet the Defendants Bar being ill the Plaintiff shall have Iudgement upon tâ—e Declaration And the Plaintiff had Iudgement accordingly The same Term in the same Court Risley versus Hains IN an Action upon the Case upon an assumpsit the Plaintiffe declared upon the Sale of several parcells of Tobacco to wit for one parcell so much for another parcell so much and so forward and in the Conclusion he saith quae quidem separales summae in toto se attingunt to 55. l. which being computed is lesse then the pariculars and upon non assumpsit it was found for the Plaintiffe and now Andrewes moved in arrest of Judgement for that the particulars and the summing up of them differs and this being in a Declaration which ought to contain truth it is not good and so there appears to be no cause of action 35. H. 8. Dyer 55. And Grices Case in the very point Mich. 17. Jac. in this Court but by Jones and Whitlock Iustices onely present the Declaration is good enough for there is a particular promise for every parcell and the summing up of particulars is only surplusage and officiousness of the Clark therefore the Iudgement was affirmed And nota that Jones said obiter in this Case that upon a contract the Party to whom payment is to be made need not make request and afterwards it was agreed by the whole Court that it should be amended otherwise it had been more The same Term in the same Court A Great multitude of Welsh-men were Indited for the death of a man by an Inquisition taken before the Coroner in the County of Mountgomery in Wales and Littleton of Councel with the Welsh-men took some Exceptions to the Inquisition as 1. That the Coroner cannot take any Inquest unlesse it be super visum corporis and to this purpose he cited Britton 6. Ric. 2. Coron 107. 21. E. 4. 70. 2. Ric. 3. 2. This also is the reason that if a man drown himselfe and cannot be found the Coroner cannot enquire of the death of this man but for the King to have a forfeiture of his Goods an Inquisition ought to be taken before the Iustices of Peace as it was resolved in this Court Trin. 13. Jac. upon which the first exception was that the Inquisition was taken at D. in the time of King James super visum corporis in D. in the time of this King and for this he cited two presidents out of Cookes Booke of Eâ—tryes Another Exception was because the Inquisition was per Sacramentum probor legal hominum Com. predict whereas by the Stat. of 4. E. 1. this inquest ought to be by men of the four Towns next adjoyning and this ought to appear in the Inditement also Hill 10. Jac. Rot. 3. Co. lib. Intr. 354. And day was given to the Attorney General to maintain this Inquisition But afterwards Pasch 3. Car. the Inditement was quashed especially for the first exception The same Term in the same Court King versus Merrick In an Action upon the Case for these words I charge you King with Felony and you Constable inuendo Thomas Legat to apprehend him And a verdict for the Plaintiff It was moved in arrest of Iudgement by Bacon that the words are not actionable The first words are not because they are not an expresse affirmation and for this he cited Mich. 11. Jac. in this Court Powel and Bauds case where an action was brought for these words I have arrested Powel of Felony for stealing sheep of mine and adjudged not actionable Also the Plaintiff did not shew in his Declaration what kinde of felony this was and it may be such a felony for which an Action will not lie for there are divers kinds of felony and a Mayhem is one kind as appears in 40. Ass Pl. 4. 6. H. 7. 1 and in this case it shall be taken in mitiori sensu and it shall not be intended such a felony for which he may be hanged If one charge another with felony because he hath committed a Mayhem it is cleer that an action will not lye And the other words I charge you Constable to apprehend him are not actionable and the words are onely spoken to the Plaintiff Also the words are layd to be spoken in London and it appears that the Constable was of a Town in Norfolk who cannot apprehend any one in London Earle for the Plaintiff It hath been argued that the words are not actionable because felony is a generall word and contains in it selfe a mayhem also But I conceive that in this case felony shall be taken according to the general and common acceptation which is such a Felony for which a man may loose his life and for this he cited Co. lib. 4. 15. b. Yeomans charged Hext for my ground in Allerton Hext seeks my life and if I could find Iohn Silver I do not doubt but within two dayes to arrest him upon suspition of Felony and it was adjudged that for the last words the Action lies because he shall be imprisoned for suspition of felony and felony is there taken according to the common acceptation of the word It hath been objected that there is no expresse affirmation of the Felony but I conceive that there is 39. Eliz. Action was brought for these words I will call him in question for poysoning my Aunt and adjudged that it lyes and Mich. 37. and 38. Eliz. Woodrofe and Vaughans case for these words I did not know Mr. Woodrofe was your Brother I will prove him perjured or else I will bear his charges and adjudged actionable And Hill 44. Eliz. Rot. 351. This man inuendo Iohn Latham hath cut my Wives purse and his Father knowing of it received it of him and the Money and Rings theein and therefore I charge him of flat Felony and resolved that for these words did cut my Wife's purse no action lies for the cutting of ones purse only is not felony unlesse it be taken from the person and to receive one is not Felony but resolved that the last words were actionoble and then it was agreed that if one say that I. S. did see such a one that had committed felony and did suffer him to slip away I charge him of Felony these words are not actionable and Mich. 20. Jac. in this Court that these words beare witnesse I arrest him of felony are actionable and therefore he prayeâ— judgement for the Plaintiff Doderidge Iustice the words are not actionable And Hexts case comes not to this
one he would pay it where good where not this he may implead him presently Mich 12. Jac Kebles Case A man promiseth to pay so much in consideration of a Lease at Will and it was holden no good consideration for by the same breath that he creates it he may defeat it Pasch 8. Jac. Austins Case A man promise that in consideration he would forbear another he would pay it and no time was limited and therefore it was holden no good consideration Trin. 38. Eliz. Rot. 523. A man promise quod non implacitabit and avers quod non implacitavit and because of the uncertainty it was holden no valuable consideration Doderidge Justice If there be no consideration at the time or no cause of Action the forbearance afterwards will not make it actionable and he said that it had been adjudged in this Court that a consideration to forbear for a little time is not good but by some to forbear for a reasonable time is good But in the principall Case upon the hearing of the Declaration read it appeared that it was that he should never implead him upon the said obligation so that if the Plaintiff brings an Action upon the obligation the Defendant here may have an Action upon the Case against him Also it was non implacitabit and this shall be taken indefinitely quod nunquam implacitabit and therefore the Iudgement was affirmed for otherwise the Plaintiff shall both take advantage of this promise and of the bond also and here he hath in a manner forsaken the benefit of his bond and hath betaken himselfe to the benefit of this Assumpsit By Jones and Whitlock Iustices if A. be bound to me and I enter into bond to him that I will not sue this Obligation I cannot sue him upon the first Obligation without forfeiture of my bond and by Doderidge if an Obligation be forfeited and I say to the Obliger do not sue the Obligor or do not implead him an Action upon the case lies against me The same Term in the same Court. Arnold versus Dichton IN an Action upon the Case and Non-Assumpsit pleaded it was found for the Plaintiff and Noy mooved in arrest of Iudgement that there was no consideration to maintain this Action the Case being thus Arnold having married the Daughter of the Defendents Testator the Testator promised to give him 40 l. and meat â—nd drink for a year and a Featherbed and Bolster and afterwards the Testator in consideration that the Plaintiff would Assumpsit forbear to sue him all his life for it promised that he should have as good a portion at his death as any of his children and the Plaintiff declares that he gave to one Tho. P. one of his Sons 200 l. and that he left him at the time of his death but 30 l. but when he gave to Tho. P. the 200 l. appeares not peradventure it might be in his life time and this promise doth not extend to that which he had given before as if a man be bound to keep a Goale and that no prisoner shall escape this only extends to a future keeping and future escapes and not to other escapes which were before True it is that sometimes the Law will alter the sense as in the Case of 32. H. 6. where a man is bound that his Feoffees c. And at another day Doderidge said that the first promise was but an inducement to the second and the Defendant hath pleaded Non Assumpsit to the last promise and then comes the Plaintiff and shews that he gave to such a one 200 l. and doth not shew when this was given and this may be before the promise and therefore I conceive the Declaration is not good Jones agreed that the Declaration is not good for admit that in this case he had given to all his children but one great portions before the said promise and had given a small portion to one after the promise the Plaintiff now shall have but according to the said promise and it is alledged here that he gave to such a one 200 l. which may be before the promise and therefore the breach not well laid Whitlock contra and that the Plaintiff shall have according to the best gift in this case whether it were before or after the promise and that upon the intention of the promise for the intention is that the Plaintiff should have as good a marriage or portion with his Daughter as any other of his children should have But by Doderidge this construction cannot be made without offering violence to the words for then daret should be for dedisset and for any thing which appeareth he had a portion before and this was but a superaddition Jones put this case I am bound to enfeoff J. S. of so much Land as I will enfeoff J. D. this extends not to a Feoffment which I have made to J. D. before but only to a Feoffment which I shall make to him afterwards which was not denied by Whitlock and it was adjourned The same Term in the same Court. Barker versus Ringrose BArker brought an Action upon the Case against Ringrose and declared that whereas he was of good fame and exercised the Trade of a Wool-winder the Defendant spake these scandalous words of him that he was a Words Thou art a bankrupt Rogue Bankrupt Rogue and it was moved in arrest of Iudgement that those words were not actionable for the words themselves are not actionable but as they concern an Office or Trade c. and it appeareth by the Statute of 27. E. 3 that a Wool-winder is not any Trade but is but in the nature of a Porter so that the Plaintiff is not defamed in his function because he hath not any also it is not averred that he was a Wool-winder at the time of the words speaking Jones Justice If one saith of a Wool-winder that he is a false Wool-winder action upon the Case lieth and it was demanded by the Court A Wool-winder wâ—at he is what a Wool-winder was and it was answered that in the Countrey he is taken to be a Wool-winder that makes up the fleece and takes the dirt out of it and a Wool-winder in London opens the fleeces and makes them more curiously up and in London they belong to the Mayn of the staple Doderidge If one saith of a Sher-man that he is a Bankrupt Action lyes and so it hath been adjudged of a Shoo-maker and note that if one saith of any man who by his Trade may become a Bankrupt within the In what case to call a man Bankrupt is actionable Statutes that he is a Bankrupt an Action lies as of a Taylor Fuller c. And the Court seemed to incline that in this case being spoken of a Wool-winder in London the Action lies But Mich. 3. Car. the Case being moved again the Court was of opinion that the Action could not lye and would not give
will is wrong to him and the performance of Wills is much favoured because it is the last desire of the Partie who is dead and it is for the publick-weale because by this means debts shall be payd And many cases are within the equity of the Statute that are not within the letter as those Cases which have been put all which he agreed Jones Iustice on the sudden was against it and that this Case is not within the equity of the Statute of 4. E. 3. There are divers Actions which are not helped by this Statute as Trespasse for cutting of Trees Battery and the like for the Statute is de bonis Catallis asportat in vita testator An Executor shall have a Replevin of Goods taken in vita testator for by this he recovers the thing it selfe and shall have Detinue but shall not have treâ—passe for he cannot punish the wrong done in the life of the Testator The Statute of 4. E. 3. is much inlarged by equity as the cases which have been put and extend also to usurpation in the life time of the Testator as appears in Russels Case Co. lib 5. 32. 33. Eliz. in C. B. in the Bishop of Chichesters case that if the Testator dyes within 6 months after the usurpation the Executor shall have a Quare impedit And the Case of Trover and Conversion in vita Testator was maintained by Executors and it was so resolved 41. and 42. Eliz. in the Countesse of Rutlands Case in both the Benches because this is in nature of a Writ of Detinue Now for the Case in question I conceive that it is not within the Statute of 4. E. 3. because it is neither bona nor catalla Whitlock Iustice contra and that this Statute is very much taken by equity praeter literam though not contra literam But Nota that all agreed if it were upon an escape after Iudgement that the Action would lie by the Executors according to the Case of F. N. B. 121. a. But the principall Case was adjourned And afterwards Trin. 3. Car. It was argued again by Jermy for the Plaintiff and the sole point was A man taken by latitat and being in the custody of the Sheriff escape the Party at whose suit he was arrested dies whether his Executor shall have an Action upon the Case upon the Escape and he conceived that he might It hath been objected that it is a personall wrong and as an Action doth not lye against Executors upon an Escape in vita Testator so not by Execucutors To which I answer that it is not meerly personall but mixed with an interest At the Common-Law an Executor could not have trespas for Goods taken in vita Testator but yet he should have a Replevin 34. E. 3. Fitz. Avoury 257. and Executors 106. So at Common-Law a Successor should not have Trespas for Goods carried away in the life time of his Predecessor but he shall have a Replevin 9. H. 6. 25 but this was remedied by the Statute of Marlebridge cap. 28. and so upon the Statute of 4. E. 3. de bonis asportat c. Trover and Conversion hath beene adjudged within the said Statute for the Statute hath alwayes been liberally expounded 7. H. 4. 2. Fitz Executor 52. An Executor shall have ravishment of Gard taken away in vita Testator and also other Statutes which do not name Executors have beene eâ—pounded to extend to them as the Statute of 23. H. 8. which gives attaint 3. Eliz. Dyer 201. Co. lib. 6. 8. Executors shall take benefit of the pardon of Trin. 14 Jac. Pâ—obe and Maynes Case if the party escape being a rested upon mean Proces the Sheriffe is not liable for the Escape otherwise if upâ—n an Execution 43. Eliz. and 6. E. 6. Bendloes Reports which is cited there Executors shall have restitution upon the Statute of 21. H. 8. and Co. lib. 5. 31. and 27. Russels Case an Executor shall have Trover upon Goods lost in vita Testator and this is in manner and nature of a promise to have the party in Court at the day and it is cleer that upon an expresse Assumpsit to the Testator an Executor shal have an action upon the Case and it hath been in manner agreed by the Court that if it had been an escape of one in execution that the action would have lyen by the Executor and I see no difference between that and our case And it was adjourned The same Term in the same Court UPon an Information by Heath the Kings Attorney against two men of the County of Huntington in the name of all the County that they ought and used to repaire the Bridge of S. Eedes in the County of Huntington Issue was joyned by the County whether they ought and used to repaire this Bridge and the Attorney gave no evidence but put it upon the other side for he said by the Statute of 22. H. 8. cap. if it doth not appeare that any particular person or Towne ought to repaire a Bridge by reason of Tenure or otherwise that then the County where this is ought to repaire it But Nota that the issue was whether they ought to repaire the whole Bridge and yet upon the evidence it appeared that onely two Arches and a halfe of the Bridge was in the County of Huntington and two Aâ—â—hes and a halfe in the County of Bedford and the Iury found generally that onely two Arches and a halfe of the Bridge were in the County of Huntington and say nothing where the rest was for they could not find a thing in another County And also they found that the County of Huntington ought to repaire all but not that they used to repaire it And at another day Hedley Serjeant moved for the County that the Verdict was not good because the issue was whether they ought to repaire and a tempore cujus contrarium c. had repaired c. And the Iury hath found that they ought to repaire which is but the halfe of the issue and also they find that they ought to do it which is a Question in Law and therefore voyd 8. H. 6. 3. 4. Secondly the issue is whether they ought to repair the Bridge and the Iury hath found that they ought to repair two Arches and a halfe onely c. and the Bridge is an entire thing The Attorney answered that for the first exception the case of 27. Ass Pl. 8. is against it And for the last the very case of 43 Ass Pl. 37. is against it and therfore the Court conceived the Verdict good notwithstanding these exceptions Doderidge Iustice By the common Law before the Statute of 22. H. 8. if no man by reason of tenure or otherwise ought to repaire a Bridge the County ought to do it like to the case of 8. E. 4. Fishers by the Law of Nations may dry their Nets upon the Land of any man The same Term in the same Court DOctor