adjudged in the Exchequer chamber and in this case the scire facias ad audiendum errores and all the writ and this scire facias in our case ought to have been made against the said Julian as against a married woman and the writ of execution which is the warrant to the Sheriff is not in such words as the judgement in the Kings Bench is upon which it is founded viz. that he should take the aforesaid Julian c. but that he take the said Julian Goddard then the Sheriff shall not say in his defence that all the proceeding in the writ of error was against the person and aided himself by entrie in the roll of the Court viz. quod praedict Julianum capiat c. but he ought to rely only upon the writ and if in this case he would save himself then he should have inquired upon the delivery of the writ unto him by Lovies who was that Julian Goddard and if thereupon Lovies had informed him that it was Julian Doillie then the Sheriff should have an action upon the case against Lovies upon this false information viz. if A. prosecute a replevin to replevy his Cattle and thereupon he cause the Sheriff to deliver unto him the Cattle of B. for this here B. hath his remedy against the Sheriff and the Sheriff against A. for this false information also he said that if a fieri facias cometh to make execution of the goods of B. if the Sheriff take others goods in execution a Trespass lieth and therefore to secure himself he ought to impannel an inquest to finde if they be the goods of B. or not and then as he conceived it is good but the opinion of the Iudges in the Kings Bench in Mich. 5. Jac. in Trespass between Rookwood and Beal was to the contrary for there a Trespass was brought by Rookwood and the Defendant justified the taking and so forth as Sheriff by vertue of a fieri facias as of the goods of Edward Rookwood father of the Plantiff and upon the execution of this writ the Defendant impannelled a Iury who found the goods to be the goods of the said Edward Rookwook for which c. the Plantiff in the replication Traversed that they were his goods absque hoc that the Iury found that they were the goods of Edward Rookwood c. whereby it seemeth that the finding of the Iury in this case is not material and so the Court then conceived therefore quaere the opinion of Tanfield chief Baron in that point and see the 17. E. 2. pl. 373. and 31. E. 3. Assise pla 378. and 7. H. 4. fo 27. Trespass pla 279. what acts a Sheriff may justifie by reason of a commandment and authoritie from the Court which commanded him Snig Baron seemed that the action did lie for the writ of capias ad satisfaciendum maketh no mention that Julian Doillie is the same person against whom judgement was given in the Kings Bench by the name of Julian Goddard and although that the entrie in the Roll is against the said Julian c. yet the writ is directed that he should take Julian Goddard and then the Sheriff had not done according to the writ in the taking of Julian Doillie and he said that if A. binde himself by the name of I. and judgement is given against him by the name of I. without appearing in person and execution is granted against him by the name of I. in this case an action lies against the Sheriff if he take the said A. in execution for it appears not to him that it is the same person but for the other cause it seemeth that the Plantiff shall not have judgement for the Sheriff is no such person who ought to be priviledged here and therefore the Plantiff should have his remedy else where and he said that such a case hath been reversed in the Exehequer Chamber for error for the under-Sheriff is but an Attorney for a partie priviledged that is for the Sheriff but all the Clarks of the Court and the other Barons were against him in that and also all the presidents Altham Baron had never heard it argued before and therefore he respited his opinion till another day at which day he said that the arrest is not justifiable and so for the matter an action well lieth for by him the arrest ought to be in this case with a special recital that whereas judgement was given and so forth as in the 1. and 2. H. 6. if an Abbot hath judgement to recover and after he is deposed a scire facias lieth not against him as Abbot to reverse this judgement and see 10. E. 4. a capias against A. the son of R. c. see the 19. of H. 6. fo 12. Summons against Iohn S. c. see 18. H. 8. fo 1. a replevin was brought in the Countie Palatine against A. widdow and after she married D. and the plaint was removed into the Common Pleas mentioning her marriage c. and so here the scire facias ought to mention all the special matter and thereupon the writ of execution upon the reversal of the judgement ought to be against Iulian Doillie and not being so the Sheriff is punishable c. but it seemed to him that in this action the wife ought to have joyned with her husband for the false imprisonment or at the least if the husband had brought the action alone there ought to have been a special mention of the loss which the husband particularly had sustained as per quod consortium uxoris suae amisit or otherwise clearly it lieth not for the husband alone and he resembled this case to the cases in the 9th of E. 4. fo 51.22 Assise pla 87.46 E. 3. fo 3. where husband and wife ought to joyn in an action or at the least the declaration ought to be special as aforesaid and so are the books of the 20. H. 7. and Kellaway to be intended and for this cause he thought the Plantiff shall not have jugement here Tanfield chief Baron as I conceived said unto him that the writ ought to have been with a special averment but a surmise ought to have been made against Iulian Doillie as she now is for as the writ is the Sheriff may safely return she is not to be found and thereupon c. quaere if he intended the writ of scire facias ad audiendum errores or the writ of execution awarded upon the judgement in the Kings Bench for he did not mention any particularity of the writ but it seemeth that he intended the writ of execution and then the surmise whereof Tanfield spoke ought to be made upon the roll of the judgement given upon the writ of error and Tanfield chief Baron said as to the joyning in action that clearly for a battery made upon the wife the husband and wife ought to joyn in the action as the books are cited before by Baron Altham and so
Slade and Morleys case a case was put which proves it to be according Snig Baron agreed that Iudgement ought to be given for the Plantiff and by Tanfield if I take your goods and detain them until I have caused you to pay me 10. l. a general Action of Trespass lieth and not an Action upon the case and it is cited 7. H. 4. or 7. E. 4. to be accordingly but yet he agreed that judgement should be entred and so it was appointed to be done but then Chibborn for the Defendant said that here is a mistrial for if this trust be not material because it is not effectually shewed in the Declaration as you have argued then the Venue shall come only from the parish where the Wares were laid upon the land and not from the parish also where the appointment or trust was made by the Plantiff and therefore the trial also being from both parishes is a mistrial and the Court agreed that this is a mistrial upon that reason for now the appointment or Trust is but an inducement and therefore needs not to be shewed within what parish it was made and therefore a new Venire facias was granted and upon that a new trial and damages more then before and judgement was given accordingly Arden against Darcie NOta a good case of Attornament which was decreed in the time of Baron Manwood betwixt Arden and Darcie and it was this one Arden was seised in fee of divers lands in the County of c. and made a lease for years and after made a feofment with words of Grant of those lands to A. and B. to the use of the feoffor and his wife for their lives the remainder to Arden his son in tail and after the feoffor said to the Lessee that he had conveyed his land which the Lessee held in lease to the uses aforesaid and the Lessee said I like it well and after he paid his rent to the feoffor generally and it was decreed in the Exchequer Chamber that this is no Attornament because the Attornament ought to be to the feoffees and it appeareth not that the Lessee had notice of the names of the feoffees and therefore it cannot be said to amount to an Attornament but notwithstanding that Decree Arden the same to whom the remainder was limited had his Action depending in the Kings Bench to trie the point again as he said to me also this Term a point concerning the said Decree was in question upon another Bill exhibited in the Exchequer Chamber by Sir Edward Darcie against Arden and the case was as followeth Sir Edward Darcie exhibited his Bill here in the nature of a scire facias against Arden to shew cause wherefore the said Edward Darcie should not have execution of a Decree made in the time of Baron Manwood and the Defendant shewed that Darcie in his first suit supposed by his Bill that he had a grant of the land then and now in question from Queen Elizabeth rendring rent as it appears by the letters Patents and in facto there was no rent reserved upon the Patent and that the Defendant gave answer to the said Bill and admitted the Iurisdiction of the Court and after a Decree was made against the Defendant and the Defendant now having shewed this special matter demurred upon this Bill in respect that by his pretence the Court had not jurisdiction to hold plea in the first suit and here it was shewed that the first decree was made upon a matter in Law not properly examinable by English Bill and that in facto the Law was therein mistaken and therefore the Defendant prayed that the decree may be re-examined Tanfield chief Baron it is usual in the office of Pleas that if an action be brought as a debtor of our Lord the King this is good although that de facto no suggestion be made thereof if it be not shewed on the other side and therefore a writ of Error for this falsity shall not cause the judgement to be reversed as it was resolved in a case in which I was of Councel and so here as it seemeth Altham Baron here we are in equity wherein we are not tied to so strickt a course as if it were in the office of pleas Brock of the Inner Temple for the Defendant in a Court of equity it is in the discretion of the Court to deny Execution of a decree if good cause be shewed and in 18. E. 4. fo 1. judgement was given against a married wife by the name of a feme sole and reversed although she did not shew in the first suit that she was married and in 8. E. 4. judgement was given in the Kings Bench in a suit and by writ of error was reversed although the Defendant had admitted the Iurisdiction of the Court and the chief Baron and all the Court inclined that Arden may exhibit a Bill to reverse this Decree made against him and may shew what point in Law the Iudges mistook in the Decree or otherwise we should not do as Law and Iustice requireth for it is not expedient to be examined by way of Bar to this Bill in the nature of a scire facias and after Arden according to the Decree of the Court and their direction did exhibit his Bill in the nature of a writ of error Comprising how the first decree was erroneously made and prayed that the said decree might be reversed and in his Bill he shewed the point in Law which was decreed and that upon divers long conveyances appears to be thus and so it was agreed by Councel on both parties that Arden the father was seised of the Mannor of Cudworth in the County of c. and was also seised of the Mannor of Parkhal in the same County and of Blackclose c. which was parcel of the Mannor of Cudworth but lying neer unto Parkhal and alwayes used and occupied with it and reputed parcel thereof but in truth it was parcel of Cudworth and that Arden the father made a Conveyance of the Mannor of Parkhal and of all the lands thereunto belonging and reputed as parcel thereof or occupied with it as part or parcel thereof and of all other his lands in England except the Mannor of Cudworth to the use of Arden his son that now is Plantiffe here and if Blackclose will pass to the son by this conveyance or if by intendment it shall be excepted by the exception made it was the question here and was decreed in the time of Baron Manwood that it is excepted by the exception but all the Barons now thought it to be a strong case that Blackclose is not excepted by the exception of the Mannor of Cudworth and so the first decree was upon a mistake out of the Law and Tanfield chief Baron said that the point is no other but that I infeoffe you of Blackacre parcel of the Mannor of D. exceyt my Mannor of D. this doth not except the King
by express terms quaer if in this case there was any land occupied with Parkhal which was not parcel of Cudworth nor of Parkhal for if so then it seems that Blackclose will be within the exception in regard that the words and lands occupied therewith viz. Parkhal are well satisfied Harris Serjeant said that the case is to be resembled to the point in Carter and Ringsteeds case concrrning the Mannor of Odiam where a man was seised of of a Mannor within which the Mannor of D. did lie and is parcel thereof and he by his will devised the Mannor of D. excepting the Mannor of Odiam where the Mannor passeth by the devise and is not excepted Snig and Altham Barons agreed that this proves the case in equity but by the chief Baron Tanfield because this is a rare case that we should reverse or undo a decree made by our predecessors in the very point decreed by them it is good to be advised and therefore they directed Arden to finde presidents if he could by search made for them in the said case and therefore the Attorney general who was of Councel for Darcie had demurred upon the Bill which was exhibited by Arden and that he being not present day was given until another term to hear Councel on both parts at which day the Attorney said that he conceived it a strange case and without president that a Court should impeach and reverse the decrees given in the same Court and that if it should be suffered the subjects would be vexed and troubled without any end or quiet and this stands with the gravity of every Court to maintain their own judgements and therefore several Statutes were made to reverse judgements upon erroneous proceedings and judges of other Courts constituted to examine them which proveth that before the Statutes aforesaid and without aid of them the Iudges would not reverse their own Iudgements and so here Harris to the contrary it is not without presidents that in a Court of equity one and the same decree in the same Court hath been reversed by decree of the same Court upon some consideration had of the erroneous misprisions of Law and it is no dishonour to a Court of justice so to do for matter in Law but otherwise it were for matter of fact for then that betrayeth an Ignorance in the Iudges which would be a dishonour to the Court but for Law men are not Angles and for that point there may be errour to prove that the Court of equity may do so he vouched the Book of 27. H. 8. fo 15. Martin Dockwraies case which is our very case ruled in the Chancery and so he said that in this Court 3. Jac. a decree made in the time of Baron Manwood was reversed upon the like reason and Tanfield chief Baron said to Serjeant Harris that if it appear by your president that if the same matter in Law which was decreed was reversed in the same point in Law then this proveth for you but if it were for matter of fact otherwise it is and therefore we will see your president Kent and Kelway KEnt and Kelway entred Hil. 6. Jac. Rot. 722. in the Exchequer in the case between Kent and Kelway which was debated Pasc 8. Jac. the Iudges pronounced in the Exchequer Chamber that judgement ought to be affirmed notwithstanding their opinion before to the contrary as it appeareth and therefore I demanded of Mr. Hoopwel Clark of the Errors what was the reason of their opinions and he told me that the case was debated by them this Term at Serjeants Inne and then they resolved to affirm the Iudgement and the reasons as he remembred were as followeth and he also delivered unto me the case as he had collected it out of the Records and delivered it to the Iudges which was that the Plantiff in the Kings Bench declared that one Benjamin Shephard was indebted to him in 300. l. and that he sued out of the Kings Bench an Alias Capias directed to the Sheriffe of N. to the intent to compel the said Benjamin Shephard upon his appearance to put in Bail according to the custome of that Court for the Recovery of his debt which writ was delivered to John Shaw Sheriffe of the said County to be executed the Sheriffe made his warrant to the Bailiffe of the liberty of the Wapentake of Newark and the Plantiffe himself delivered it to James Lawton Deputy of the Lord Burley the Kings chief Bailiâ—e of that liberty to be executed and the Deputy Bailiffe by vertue of the said warrant arrested the said Benjamin Shephard whereupon the Defendant with others made an Assault and rescued the said Benjamin Shephard out of the custody of the said Deputy Bailiffe whereby he lost all his debt and damages were assessed at 172. l. and cost 10. l. and in this case the Iudges agreed that notwithstanding the Defendant had rescued the said Benjamin Shephard out of the hands of c. when the said Benjamin Shephard was arrested upon an Alias Capias out of the Kings Bench which writ is only in nature of a plea of Trespass yet the party who rescued him shall answer in this action damages for the debt because the Plantiffe by this means had lost his debt And yet it is not shewed that the Rescuer knew that the Plantiffe would declare for his debt but if in this case the Sheriffe or Bailiffe had suffered a Negligent escape they should be charged only with the damages in the same plea as the writ supposeth and no for the debt and so a diversity also they agreed that the Declaration is good enough to say that he was rescued out of the hands of the Deputy Bailiffe and the course in the Kings Bench was alwayes so upon the return of a rescue notwithstanding the Book of the 7. Eliz. Dyer fo 241. also it was resolved that the Declaration was good saying that he sued an Alias Capias without mention of any latitat before sued also it was agreed that the arrest was good made by the Deputy Bailiffe by vertue of a warrant delivered to the Sheriffe but quere if they should not examine if the Bailiffe had a power given to make a Deputy by his Patent for this appears not in the case Bently and others against Leigh in Trespas Hill 45. Eliz. Rot. 1231. Trin. 7. Jac. in the Exchequer TPe Iudges affirmed a Iudgement this Term between Leigh Plantiffe in a writ of Error and one Bentley and others Defendants and the matter assigned for Error was because the Trespass was brought in the year 45. Eliz. for a Trespass made in the 42. Eliz. and the judgement upon the verdict was against the Defendant and the Margent of the Roll it was entred quod Defendens capiatur where it ought to be pardonatur as he pretended for the general pardon which was in 43. Eliz. had pardoned the fine to the King for the Trespass and this is a thing whereof the Iudges
impedit praesentare to the Church of D. the Defendant saith that there is no such Church 22. E. 4. fo 34. an action was brought against I. S. Maior of D. and he Traversed that there is no such Corporation Tanfield chief Baron said that if in an action of Trespass the Defendant saith that I. S. was seised in fee and infeoffed him without that c. and the Plantiff saith that I. S. was seised in fee and infeoffed me without that that there was any such person as I. S. in being this is no good Traverse Hern Baron seemed that this Traverse is good in the principal Case but he was once of Counsel with the Plantiff and it was moved that the Case should be Compounded An Information against Page IN an Information against Page and another upon the Statute of 3. 4. E. 6. cap. 21. for buying of Butter and selling of the same by retail contrary to the form of the Statute upon not guiltie pleaded the Iury found one of them only guiltie both of buying and selling and the other not guiltie and it was moved that no judgement may be given in this Case in asmuch as the action is conceived upon a joynt buying by two and it appeareth that this is but by one but it was argued that judgement ought to be given for it cannot be intended in Law as to this purpose a joynt buying for the wrong is several and in proof thereof was cited 36. H. 6. fo 27. the 11. H. 4. Dyer fo 194. or 195. accordingly also this action is for a wrong done to the Common-wealth which is a several wrong by either and to this purpose was cited 40. E. 3. fo 35. 36. H. 6. cited before and 5. H. 5. fo 3. where an action de malefactoribus in Pareis was brought against three and one only was found guiltie and judgement was given against him and there is no difference as to this purpose between this Case and an action of debt upon a joynt contract made by two as appeareth by 21. H. 7. and Partridges Case in Plowden where it is said that the bargaining is but matter of conveyance to the action and according unto this was cited 33. H. 8. Brook tit issue and also 28. H. 6. fo 7. and 36. H. 6. fo 29. and a Case was adjudgeed in Mich. 35. 36 Eliz. in the Kings Bench which proves the same also where an information was brought supposing the Defendant to have bought Cattle of two contrary to the form of the Statute and it was found that he bought them but of one and yet judgement was given Hitchcock to the contrary and he argued that no judgement ought to be given for he said that if an information be brought against two upon the Statute of usury and one only is found guiltie yet no judgement may be given in this Case to which the Court agreed and he cited Dyer 160.5 Ma. where two sued in the Court of Admiraltie one for an offence triable within the bodie of the Countie contrary to the Statutes of 13. 15. of R. 2. and an action was brought against one of them only and good and he vouched also 22. Eliz. Dyer fo 370.2 R. 3. fo 18. where three brought an account against one he pleads he was never their receiver and the Iury found c. and he cited a case to this purpose an information was brought against two for buying of Cattle of one B. and for selling of them contrary to the form of the Statute and in this Case the Iury found the Defendant not guiltie for the buying them of B. but that he bought them of one P. and upon an attaint of the Iury the opinion of the Court was in this case that though the verdict was affirmed yet no judgement ought to be given thereupon and this was the true Case of Lidwood and Pearpoint cited before on the other side as George Crook said York and Allein A Man recovered damages in an action upon the Case against B. who at the time of the judgement was joyntly seised in fee with C. and that after B. and C. aliened the partie who recovered is outlawed the King eight years after this outlawry extends the moitie of this land for these damages recovered against B. and it was moved if he shall have them in extent for them or not also if he shall have it without a scire facias and the Barons were clear in opinion that he shall have it in extent for it was liable to the extent of the partie outlawed before the Alienation and then when it comes to the King by the outlawry although it be after the Alienation it continueth extendible for the King although the Alienation was before the outlawry It was admitted by all the Barons that if a Coppiholder surrender to the use of a younger son and dies that this younger son cannot bring an action until admittance but if the Copihold had descended to the heir he may have an action before admittance see Cook Coppihold Cases lib. 4. fol. 22. and also it was said that all Coppiholders of the Kings Mannors may now have admittance into their Coppihold estates well enough and the order for the stay of their admittances which was made heretofore is now dissolved and quashed Dennis against Drake DEbt was brought by Dennis against Drake Sheriff for an escape a man had judgement in the Kings Bench and a writ of error was brought within the year and after the year passed the judgement was affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber and within a year after the affirmation a Capias issued to the said Drake the Sheriff who took the partie and suffered him to escape and this being the Case upon the declaration in this action the Defendant demurred and all the Barons said that there is no question but a Capias may well issue within the year after judgement affirmed without a scire facias though it be more then a year after the first judgement and it seemed to them that there was no difference though that the writ of error was not brought untill after the year of the first judgement given although in such case there be an apparant neglect in the partie who had not sued his execution within the year and therefore he was enforced to a scire facias thorough his neglect whereas if error had been brought within the year he had never been driven to his scire facias in this Case yet for asmuch as when the judgement is affirmed this is all one as a new judgement they conceived it made no difference and Tanfield chief Baron said that it had been often so judged in the Kings Bench. It was said here that if a man be instituted to a benefice he ought to pay the first fruits before induction by the Statute but by the Common Law it was otherwise for he is not to have the temporalities until induction and therefore he could not pay the first fruits
be construed to be conditionall because the consideration intended is executed viz. that he hath assumed c. Dyer 76. and 44. Eliz. in the Kings Bench Sir William Lees case in consideration that he had assumed to make a release another promised to pay him 10 l. an action may be brought for the 10 l. without averment of making the release because the consideration is a thing executed viz. the Assumpsit c. but if Executory then the Grant is conditionall as 9. E. 4.19 15. E. 4.9 If an Annuity be granted pro concilio impendendo this makes the Grant conditionall and void for not giving counsell but otherwise it is if it be pro consilio impenso 4. But admitting that here it was conditionall yet the Queen cannot avoid it without Office and so the Plaintiff had no title to enter for an avoidance which was before his grant and so the lease is in esse at the time of the Grant made to the Plaintiff your Grant is without recitall thereof and therefore is void see Knights case Coo. lib. 5. If there be a condition to re-enter for non-payment an Office ought to be found but if it be upon condition to cease for non-payment then it is void to the King without Office as it was agreed in this Court in Sir Moyle Finches case and he vouched Cook lib. 1. Altonwoods case to prove that the lease ought to be recited in the Grant of the reversion or future interest and here although there be a non abstante in your Patent this doth not aid you because it is not found in the speciall Verdict Also for another cause the Plaintif shall not have judgement here for it is not found that the Queen died seised neither that it came to the King that now is and so it cannot come to the Plaintiff and although a fee-simple shall be intended to continue in the same person yet without shewing it shall not be intended to come to the heir 7. H. 7. 3. and so he prayed judgement for the Defendant Tanfield chief Baron said that the case here is by Verdict therefore we ought to intend such circumstances if they be not expressed to the contrary also the seisin of the Queen is shewed to be in Jure Coronae and therefore the intendment that it may be devised by disseisin or abatement between common persons holdeth not here Carew against Braughton Mich. 7. Jacobi in the Exchequer THomas Carew Exequetor of William Carew brought debt against Morgan Broughton Sherif of the County of Cardigan and the case was that John Wyner was in execution upon a Iudgement for William Carew and that after William Carew dyed and that John Wyner brought an Audita querela against Carew Executor of William Carew and upon that Writ he had a venire facias against Thomas Carew and thereupon as the Stat. apoints of 11. H. 6. cap. 10. he put in baile by recogni-zance in the Chancery to the said Thomas Carew and one of the parties for his baile was Thomas Wyner and after upon the Audita Quaerela Iudgment was given against the said Wyner and a Scire facias awarded issued against Thomas Wyner as Bail and after the said Thomas Winer was in execution upon this Recognizance as Bail to the said Thomas Carew and the said Morgan Broughton being Sheriff suffered him to escape upon which escape Thomas Carew brought debt against the Sherif in the debet and detinet and had a verdict to recover and now in arrest of judgement it was moved by Jefferies that the action ought to be brought in the detinet only and he said that if an Action be brought as Executor this alwaies ought to be in the detinet only and he vouched Hitchcock and Browns case remembred at the end of Hargraves case lib. 5. where the case was that one Anthony Brown Executor brought debt against one Lister and that Lister being in execution the wife entermarried the said Lister escaped the Husband and Wife brought debt for his escape in the debet and detinet and there it was resolved that it ought to be in the detinet only and so here and see the custome to plead mentions that the Recognizance acknowledged was to the use of the Executor and not to the use of Thomas Carew by his name but Wild of the Inner Temple prayed judgement and said that the Action is well brought in the debet and detinet and he vouched 9. H. 6. and 20. H. 6. if an Executor recover and after upon the Iudgement he brings debt it ought to be in the detinet but if an Executor sels goods of the Testator and takes an Obligation in his name as Executor yet here the Action upon this Obligation ought to be in the debet and detinet because it is upon his own contract and 1. E. 3. Brooke Executor pla 287. although it appears there and so by 9. H. 6. fo 11. That is good either way and 41. E. 3. Brook pla 545. that if a debt be brought against the Executor upon a contract made by them it ought to be in the debet and detinet or otherwise the Writ shall abate and as 9. H. 6. is at his pleasure to name him Executor or not and therefore c. Snig the second Baron if the Executors bring an Action of goods carried away in the life of the Testator c. and hath judgement to recover 20 l. and dammages for them and upon this judgement he brings debt this shall be in the detinet Altham 3. Baron if an Executor sells the goods of the Testator and an Obligation is made to him for the money for which they were sold without doubt this action shall be in the debet and detinet for the action concerns him in his person and so if he with his own money redeem goods which was pawned by the Testator c. and the Stat. of the 11. H. 6. cap. 10. is that upon an Audita Querela the party who sueth it shall put in Bond to the party c. and the Testator is not party at the time of this Audita Querela but Thomas Crew who is the Executor and it is not as a Proces of execution pursuant c. but is a new thing and so for his opinion suddenly it is good in the debet and detinet Bromley the 4. Baron seemed cleer that if a Bond be made to an Executor upon a simple Contract made with him for the goods of Testator there the action ought to be brought in the debet and detinet but this account is conceived upon a dependency of a duty to the Testator and therefore it ought to be detinet only Tanfield chief Baron the case is doubtfull and therefore it is good to be advised but for this time it seemeth there is a diversity where the Recognizance is Legally forced and where it is voluntary for in our case the Law compels this Recognizance upon the suite which the
certain place from whence the Venue should come c. Walter of the Inner Temple it seemeth that the plea is good First this plea although it is but to the writ yet it is peremptory as other pleas to writs are see l. 5. E. 4. fol. as to the conclusion of the plea it is but matter of form which the Clark ought to amend and therefore upon your general demurrer you shall not take advantage of it and by the Court this is but matter of form and not being alledged for one of the special causes agreed that notwithstanding the demurrer be special yet the Court ought to apply the conclusion alwayes as the matter of pleading will bear it and therefore if a man plead to the Iurisdiction of the Court and demand judgement of the writ yet it is good by Newton 7. H. 6. for if the Bar be good the writ is not maintainable and it was said by Popham in a case in the Kings Bench 34. Eliz. that one c. had two issues in one plea. First if one thing be once repeated in a plea repetition thereof will supplie all the residue for avoiding infiniteness in repetitions Secondly one c. will serve to supplie the defect in matter of form as here and as to the Objection that the plea is not good because no certaintie is shewed where the entrie was it seems to me the plea therein is good because here is no need in our case to mention the certainty in the Declaration for here by our plea we offer two things issuable viz. the entrie or not entrie Secondly if it be parcel of the premises or not and when divers things issuable are specified it is not necessary to shew the place of any for it is time enough to shew it in the rejoynder 3. H. 7.11.3 H. 6.8.41 E. 3.8.10 H. 6.1.14 H. 6.31 And therefore it was agreed in the Kings Bench that if one pleads in Bar divers matters issuable the Replication ought not to take issue upon any of them but leave it to the rejoynder to the intent that the place may be shewed therein and so here Secondly here a place is sufficiently shewed by awarding of a venire facias for it is certain enough to shew it to be parcel of the Mannors as it was resolved in Bailies case Trin. 7. Iac. in the Court of Wards then by the same reason it is good enough to shew it to be parcel of all the three Mannors for the Venue shall come from all as it shall be to trie the issue of all and by the demurrer here it is admitted to be parcel of all and therefore c. Thirdly he said that the omission of the place is but matter of form and such a thing is within the Statute of 27. Eliz. and ought to be specially set down or otherwise the partie who demurreth shall take no advantage thereof and to prove that it is but matter of form he vouched the case of Hall and Goodwin in the Kings Beuch Hill 31. Eliz. and he said that a Replication makes not the plea good which is evil in matter of substance and yet a Replication made to a Bar which wanteth a place maketh the plea good which proveth it to be but form also he vouched the case of 34. H. 6.2 in debt the Defendant pleads the receipt of parcel hanging the writ and 34. Eliz. in the Kings Bench between Noy and Midldeton such a plea was in Bar. Stephens the plea is not good in matter for the place where the entrie was made after the last continuance ought to be shewed for alwayes the most certainty ought to be observed for the Venue to arise as 6. H. 7. if Trespass be brought upon the Statute of R. 2. for entring into the Mannor of D. in D. the Venue shall come from the Ville and so here if the place be not parcel of any Mannors yet if it lieth in any Towns mentioned in the Declaration the Venue shall come from the Ville and not from the Mannor 32. H. 6.15 three several places are mentioned and one pleaded a deed dated at the place aforesaid it is not good also here it seemeth if the party will plead and not demur the want of place ought to be shewed in the rejoynder as it hath been conceived on the other side but if he will not replie but demur upon the Bar the plea in Bar is not good Trin. 40. Eliz. in B. R. Rot. 1023. an Action of Covenant was brought by a Bishop of a Lessee and no place alledged where the assignment was made and a demurrer thereupon and adjudged that the plea was not good and there it was also agreed that it was not matter of form and so here see after Tanfield chief Baron excepted to the form of an entrie for the King which was that Postea the Iustices of Assise Deliberaverunt Tenorem placiti c. for by him the Presidents in the Kings Bench are quod deliberaverunt recordum praedictum which as he thought was the best but after upon the view of a President shewed where an exception was taken in Baron Manwoods case upon a writ of error in the Exchequer Chamber after judgement given here and the entrie then allowed to be good and upon the view also of divers Presidents shewed by Turner Master of the pleas the chief Baron and all the Court agreed and resolved that the entrie of Tenorem placiti or Tenorem recordi is as good or better then recordum praedictum c. and therefore nothing was spoken to that exception see the President of pleading in Stradling and Morgans case Plowden where it is Tenorem placiti Sir Anthony Ashleys case IT was agreed by all the Court in Sir Anthony Ashleys case that if the King be intitled to the profits by an outlawry and after B. assigns a debt to the King and the King had granted the profits which accrued by the outlawry to Ashley yet the lands of Ashley may be extended for this debt for the King had no interest in the land but only the profits for the outlawry and therefore it may be extended for debt per Curiam quaere if so for a common person Hill 8. Jac. in the Exchequer Ewer against Moil Hill 8. Jac. in the Exchequer THe case was this that a Commission issued out of the Chancery to Baron Sotherton and others and this was in 7. Iac. to inquire what lands and Tenements the late Prior of Bister in Com. Oxon. had in Caversfield in the County of Bucks and to inquire if a rent reserved upon a grant made to Banbury of the lands of the Priory be arrere or not and by vertue thereof the Iury of the County of Bucks found that the Church of Bister in the County of Oxon. was founded by the name of the Church of Saint Mary and Saint Egbert and that Thomas Banbury Prior in the year c. made a lease to one Banbury of the moitie of
was in a Formedon in remainder and it was moved now by Serjeant Harris if the partie against whom it was given may sue in the Exchequer Chamber by Bill or petition to the King in the nature of a writ of false judgement for the Reversal of that judgement Tanfield seemed that it is proper so to do for by 13. Rich. 2. if a false judgement be given in a base Court the partie grieved ought first to sue to the Lord of the Mannor by petition to reverse this judgement and here the King being Lord of the Mannor it is very proper to sue here in the Exchequer Chamber by petition for in regard that it concerneth the Kings Mannor the suit ought not to be in the Chancery as in case a Common person were Lord and for that very cause it was dismissed out of the Chancery as Serjeant Harris said and Tanfield said that he was of Councel in Pettishals case in the time of the Lord Bromley where it was debated at large if such a judgement ought to be reversed by petition in the Chancery in case where a Common person was Lord and at last it was decreed that it should be as in that case of Patshal and for the same reason here the King being Lord and therefore day was given till the next Term to shew their errours and Serjeant Harris said that the errors are in effect no others then were in the case 9. Eliz. Dyer fo 262. and in Godmanchesters case and it was adjourned Scot and his wife against Hilliar SCot and his wife Plantiffs against Hilliar for these words spoken of the wife viz. she would have cut her husbands throat and did attempt to do it Hutton Serjeant in arrest of judgement said that these words are not actionable for the will or attempt is not punishable by our Lawe and he vouched Cockains case Cook lib. 4. cited in Eaten and Allens case but by the Court an Action lies for the attempt is a cause for which the husband may be divorced if it were true and it is a very great slander and Baron Snig said that in the same Term a judgement was given in the Kings Bench and was affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber upon a writ of error for these words He lay in the high way to rob me and therefore let judgement be entred for the Plan̄tiffe but it was adjudged in the principal case that for the words she would have cut her husbands throat no Action would lie Gooches Case A Coppyholder surrenders into the hands of the Customary Tenants to the use of Anne his Wife and after before any Court the said Coppyholder surrenders the Land into the hands of other Customary Tenants to the use of the said Anne for her life the remainder to Percie in Fee upon condition that he in remainder his Heirs should pay 20. s. per annum at Michaelmas for ever the first payment to commence immediacely after the death of the said Anne viz. at the next feast of St. Michael and this to be paid in the Church Porch or D. to the Church Wardens of D. in the presence of four discreet Parishioners or otherwise that a stranger should re-enter and at the next Court both these surrenders were present and the Steward admitted the said A. according to the second surrender and she dyed and now upon pretence that the rent of 20. s. was not paid by the Heirs of him in remainder the Heir of Gooch who made the surrender had entred and thereupon an Action was brought and upon the evidence the Jury to the County of Bedford now at the Bar These matters were moved by Serjeant Nichols That a surrender into the hands of Customary Tenants cannot be Countermanded and therefore the second surrender void and the admittance shall work to such uses as the first surrender was made as in Anne Westwicks Case Cook Lib. 4. And to prove that a surrender into the hands of Customary Tenants is not countermandable he said that it is not countermandable by death nor surrender Cooke lib. 4. in his Coppyhold Cases That a presentment in the Court may be after the death of the surrenderer and the admittance thereupon is good and he compared it to the Case of the delivery of a Deed as an Escroll which may be delivered as his Deed after the death of the Maker as it is in Jennings and Braggs case Cook lib. 3. which was not denyed by the Court Serjeant Dodderidge said that when a surrender is made upon condition that he shall pay a summe of money to a stranger these words make an estate conditionall and give power implyedly to the Heirs of the party who did surrender to re-enter for non-payment and the words which give power to a stranger to re-enter are meerely void neverthelesse the precedent words shall stand and make the estate conditionall Tanfield Littleton saies that such a re-entry is void for a re-entry cannot be limited to a Stranger Nichols Serjeant said that if a surrender be made that he shall pay so much money that this makes the estate conditionall and gives a re-entry to the Heirs of him who did surrender But when it goes further and doth not leave the condition to be carried by the Law in such case all the words should be void because it cannot be according to the intent as in the case of a reservation of rent the Law will carry it to the Reversion but if it be particularly reserved then it will go according to the reservation or otherwise will be void and so here Tanfield Admit that here was a conditionall estate by vertue of the Surrender last made and this condition is also to be performed to a stranger which generally ought to be taken strictly yet as it is here he who will take advantage thereof ought to prove a voluntary neglect in the party in the not performance of the Condition and inasmuch as there is no certain time appointed when the payment of this Annuall rent should be made but generally at Michaelmas next after the death of the said Anne thereby in this case the Chuch-wardens ought to notifie the death of the said Anne before the first day of payment by reasonable space or otherwise the condition is not broken and also it is appointed here to be paid in the presence of four discreet Parishioners by the party who should perform the condition yet by intendment he hath no notice who are discreet or who are not especially he being an Infant as in our case he is and therefore although the condition is to be performed to a stranger which generally ought to be performed strictly according to 12. E. 3. Yet this is to be intended only in such cases where the party had certain notice of all circumstances requisite for payment thereof and therefore he directed the Iury that for want of knowledge of such circumstances they should give a Verdict that the condition was not broken And Dodderidge
and Hall the Dean and Canons of Windsor 22. E. 4. were incorporated by the name of Dean and Canons of the Kings free Chappel of St. George the Martyr within his Castle of Windsor adjudged the variance of the Kings and Queens free Chappel was material although the lease was made in the time of Philip and Marie And he vouched also 44. E. 3. fo 3. and 38. E. 3. fo 28. and he said that it seemed to him that this presentation by another name had gained an usurpation by the Provost in his natural capacitie also it seemeth that notwithstanding it is not found that Doctor Airie was presented instituted and inducced yet the special verdict is good enough to have judgement of his part but he agreed that if the truth of the Case had been discovered by the pleading then it ought to be precisely shewed that such exact finding is not necessary in a special verdict as in pleading and he vouched Allens Case 33. Eliz. Banco Regis where the Iury found that Tenant for life made a lease for years and found not the lessor living nor dead and yet in this Case he was intended living and he cited also Haydons Case Cook lib. 3. and Hunts Case 5. Ma. Dyer 153. and he voucht the Case of West against Munson in a writ of error in the Kings Bench wherein the first action being an Assise in the Common Pleas it was alledged for error that the Iury did not finde the Plantiff was disseised but only the Defendant disseised him and yet the judgement was affirmed Dodderidge the Kings Serjeant for the Defendant he agreed that the name of a Corporation is essential to be alwayes used in their grants for thereby they are distinguished from other Corporations but he conceived that in this Case here is a sufficient supplying of that part of the name which is omitted and he said that although the special verdict in one place mentions the name of Queens Colledge yet when they nominate the Corporation it cals them the Provost and Scholers of the Hall omitting the words Queens Colledge and then they finde that the Provost and Scholers by the name of c. and he said that in so much the Iury found precisely that the same Corporation made the demise it is not material by what name they made it and therefore he said that if a Iury finde that I. S. had made a feofment by the name of R. S. this is good enough as it was holden in Shotbolts Case 10. 11. Eliz. and so in 13. E. 2. fitz tit Bastardy pl. 25. a Iury found that two daughters were heirs and that the Defendant was born in espousals a non suit and so 20. Eliz Dyer 361. the Iury found that Executors received rents incident to the reversion and so assets in their hands and he cited also Dyer 372. to the second matter he thought that the omitting of the name precisely of Doctor Airie made the special verdict vitious and will inveigle the Iudges so that they cannot give Iudgement for it may be that Doctor Airie was presented by the same name of Corporation as the other presentee was for he said in truth the Case was so also the special verdict is vitious because they found not any time of the Presentation of Doctor Airie for peradventure he was presented by the said Colledge when he was Provost thereof and then his presentation is not good by 22 E. 4. and to this purpose he cited Heckers case in 12. H. 8. and one Fuljambes case in 6. E. 6. in Bendlows and then admitting that Doctor Airie should be intended an usurper if he shall avoid this lease it was also moved that if a Corporation by a false name present and admission institution and induction is made by a true name if this make a Plenartie and Boswel and Greens case Cook lib. 6. was cited See more after fol. The Maior of Lincolns Case Huddleston and Hills case IN an Attachment against the Maior of Lincoln and the Steward of the Court there being Colshil it was said that if a writ of error be directed to an inferiour Court they ought to execute it in all things although that their fee be not paid nor tendered to them and Mr. Man Secondarie to Roper said that the fee which is demanded by them ought to be indorsed upon the return of the writ of error so that the Iudges may judge of it if it be reasonable and divers presidents warrant that accordingly Huddleston and Hill against Bows an Elegit upon a judgement issued at the suit of Hill and after Hill died and his eldest son sued a scire facias upon the said judgement and holden that it lieth not If a man sue in the Ecclesiastical Court for Tithes of Headlands the Defendant may have a Prohibition but by some he ought to suggest that they are but small Headlands and that there is a custome of discharge in consideration that he paid Tithes in kinde of Meadows and in this case Williams said that if a man keep sheep in one Parish until Shearing time and then sell them into another Parish in this Case the Vendee shall pay the Tithe wool to the Parish where they were depastured in the greater part of the time of the growing of the wool See the Tithing Tavle the fifth question Skelton against the Lady Airie IN a Prohibition the Plantiff saith that was seised of the Mannor of Calthrop and also of the Rectory of Haughton Calthrop and that the land whereof the tithe is demanded is Coppihold and holden of the said Mannor and that this was also found by special verdict accordingly and that it had been always discharged of payment of Tithes and it was argued that the Prohibition did lie for it was adjudged Mich 34. 35. Eliz. that a perpetual union of the Parsonage and the land charged is a sufficient discharge of the Tithes and a prescription may be well enough to be discharged of the payment of Tithes as it appears by a Case put in the Arch-Bishop of Canterburies Case Cook lib. 2. George Crook of Counsel on the other side and he conceived that a perpetual unitie was no perpetual discharge and he said there was no judgement given in the Case cited before and he also said that the Iury in this Case found not a discharge of payment of Tithes but only a new usage to pay by unitie of possession and he cited 10. H. 7. or 6. where the manner of Tithing is set down also he cited the Bishop of Winchesters Case Cook lib. 2. and he cited the Prior of D. Case to be resolved in 40. Eliz. that a Coppiholder may prescribe to be discharged of Tithes by pleading that he was alwayes Tenant by Copie to a spiritual Corporation also he cited the Case of Pigot and Hern mentioned in Cook lib. 2. in the Bishop of Wintons Case fol. 45. and he said that it was adjudged in Sheddingtons Case that if a
and there bought Currants and imported them into England and he recited the Statute of the first of King James cap. 33. which grants 2. s. 6. d. for Poundage and he said that he had paid that and therefore he had refused to pay the 5. s. because it was imposed unjustly and unduly against the Lawes of the land whereupon the Kings Attorney demurred in Law this matter had been divers times argued at the Bar and at the Bench by Snig and Savil Barons and now by Clark and Flemming chief Baton whose arguments I only heard and Clark who argued first this day said that this Case being of so great consequence great respect and consideration is to be had and it seemeth to me strange that any subjects would contend with the King in this high point of Prerogative but such is the Kings grace that he had shewed his intent to be that this matter shall be disputed and adjudged by us according to the antient Law and custome of the Realm and because that the judgement of this matter cannot be well directed by any learning delivered in our Books of Law the best directions herein are presedents of antiquitie and the course of this Court wherein all actions of this nature are to be judged and the Acts of Parliament recited in arguments of this Case prove nothing to this purpose the best case in Law is the Case of Mines in Mr. Plowden Com. where this ground is put that the precedents of every Court ought to be a direction to that Court to judge of matters which are aptly determinable therein as in the Kings Bench for matters of the Crown in the Common Pleas for matters of inheritance and Civil contracts and in the Exchequer for matters of the Kings Prerogative his revenues and government and as it is not a Kingdome without subjects and government so he is not a King without revenues for without them he cannot preserve his dominions in peace he cannot maintain war nor reward his servants according to the state and honor of a King and the revenue of the Crown is the very essential part of the Crown and he who rendeth that from the King pulleth also his Crown from his head for it cannot be separated from the Crown and such great Prerogatives of the Crown without which it cannot be ought not to be disputed and in these cases of Prerogative the judgement shall not be according to the rules of the Common Law but according to the Presidents of this Court wherein these matters are disputable and determinable as for Example an action of accompt lies not by the Common Law against him who had the land of the accomptant by mean conveyance but if one be an accomptant to the King and had land in fee and alien it unto A. who alien it unto B. B. by reason of this land shall be charged with this accompt in 14. E. 3. a Coroner was elected by the Kings writ as he ought to be by the Countie and after be was amerced and because he was not sufficient to answer the Amercement the Countie was charged therewith and that appears of Record here and in 30. E. 3. Rot. 6. as appears also of Record in this Court one William Porter was Magister monetae and had received Bullien of divers Merchants and Coyned it in the Kings Mint and did not restore the Coyne to the Merchants but was insufficient and the King paid the Merchants and inquired of the suerties for the Coyne and it was found that he had none then it was inquired who recommended him unto the King and it was found by whom he was recommended and they who only recommended him as friends were charged with the Debt and if one be outlawed in a personal action and Debt is due to him upon a contract this shall be forfeited to the King and this is ordinary by the Presidents of this Court and yet this seems to be contrary to Law and is against our Books and the Kings Debtor shall have a quo minus against Executors upon a simple contract and therein he cannot release nor be non-suited and I put these cases to prove that the presidents of this Court ought to be pursued and observed although they seem to cross the Common Law and the Books thereof a case was here betwixt the King and Jourden Jourden was receiver and sold his office to one D. and he not being able to pay Jourden for his office at the day limited it was agreed that Jourden should come to the next receipt and when D. received the Kings money that Jourden should take it for his office which was done accordingly after D. was indebted to the King and this matter appearing as above c. Jourden was charged with the money which he had received and as Stamford in his first cap. of Prerogative saith that the King is the most worthy part of a Common-wealth so is he the preserver nourisher and defender of the people and true it is that the weal of the King is the publick weal of the people and he for his pleasure may a forrest the word of any subject and he thereby shall be subject to the Law of the Forrest and be may take the provision of any man by his Purvieour for his own use but at reasonable prizes and without abuse the abuse of which officer hath been restrained by divers Statutes and the King may take wines for his provision and also Timber for his Ships Castles or houses in the wood of any man and this is for publick benefit and the King may allay or inhaunce Coyne at his pleasure for the plentie of the King is the peoples peace and these imposts are not only for the benefit of the people and for the Kings profit but are also imposed many times for the increase of Merchandise and Commerce as the Statute of Aulnageors made in the 2. E. 3. cap. 14. which was made principally to make cloathes more Vendible and so Corporations are granted by the King with immunities and priviledges and to seclude other subjects from them are well limited and good for it is for the increase of the peoples wealth and thereby the Kings revenue is increased and sometimes there is contained in grants a Prohibition to other subjects that they usury not upon the priviledges of such Corporations upon a pain as in the custome of Forraign bought and Forraign sold in London and York and divers customes are permitted to such Corporations as in the Chamberlain of Londons Case Cook 5. and the breach or violation of these customes is a decay of the Corporations and so an impairing of the revenues of the Crown and therefore the King may make them and also give them priviledges and make inhibitions to others not to Vsurp upon them King Edward the third in the sixteenth year of his Raign proclaimed that no man should sell Wool-fels or Leather under such a price so that these staple commodities might not be
the world if he will or inflict a pain upon any who shall Trade into such place inhibited so may he do upon any commoditie either inhibit it generally or upon a pain or Impost and if a subject use the Trade after such inhibition or import his wars and pay not the impost it is a contempt and the King shall punish him for it at his pleasure and as to that which is said that it is a burthen to the Merchant that is not so for the burthen layeth it only upon the better part of the subjects and if it were a burthen it is no more then they themselves imposed which was in their hands by commission in the time of Queen Eliz. and they have raised the prices to subjects more then the value of the Impost and it is not to be intended that the King by any Impost will prejudice the cause of Merchants for the Trade in general is to him more beneficial then any particular Impost the case of the 11. and 14. H. 4. of Aulnageor is not to be compared to this Case for there the King had made a grant to a subject and it was also of a thing which was granted before to a Maior and also of a commoditie within the land and not transported and for the case of Darcy for the monopoly of Cards it is not like for that is of a commoditie within the land and betwixt the Patentee and the King and not between the King and the subject and as to the exception taken to the Information that it is Vsitar and doth not prescribe this needeth not for it is a prerogative wherein lieth no prescription for every prerogative is as antient as the Crown and as to the conclusion of the Information it was objected that it is not good for the informer ought to pray the forfeiture but this belongs to the Court to Iudge of what shall be lost or forfeited the offence being a contempt and therefore the conclusion good enough and so for all these reasons judgement shall be given for the King Flemming chief Baron touching the exceptions to the Information they are of no force for the first Vsitat c. it hath been well said that the King needs not prescribe in any prerogative for it is as antient as his Crown is 2. E. 3. and for the conclusion viz. that he in contempt c. that deserves no other answer but that which hath been given before for it is enough without doubt warranted by infinite presidents but for the Bar it is an increase of the Defendants contempt and no sufficient matter to answer an indigested and confused tale with an improper and disobedient conclusion and there is in it multa non multum but the conclusion is without president or example for he saith that the imposition which the King had laid is indebite injuste et contra leges Angliae imposita and therefore he refused c. in the case of Smith for Allom the conclusion was moderate and beseeming a subject judgement if he shall have Impost by his grant and in the case of Mines the Defendant being a great Peer of the Realm concluded upon his grant and interest in the soyl and that he took the Mettal as it was lawful for him and did not confront his Soveraign with terms of injuste indebitè and the like and the King as it is commonly said in out Books cannot do wrong and it the King seise my land without cause I ought to sue to him in humble manner Humillimè supplicavit c. and not with such terms of opposition in the Information and all his matter had been saved to him then as well as now or he might have pleaded his matter and said wherefore he refused as it was lawful for him but for the matter it is of great consequence and hath two powerful objects which it principally respecteth the one is the King his power and prerogative his Treasure and the Revenues of his Crown and to impair and derogate from any of these was a part most undutiful in any subject the other is the Trade and Traffick of Merchantdise transportation in and out of the land of commodities which further publick benefit ought much to be respected and nourished as much as may be the state of the question is touching a new custome Impositions or customs are duties or summs of money newly imposed by the King without Parliament upon Merchantdise for the augmentation of his revenues all the questions arising in the case are aut de personis de rebus vel de actionibus viz. form and proceeding the persons are first the King his power and authoritie Secondly not Bates the Defendant nor the Venetians but all men who import Currants the imposition is properly upon Currants and for them and is not upon the Defendant nor his goods who is a Merchant for upon him no imposition shall be but by Parliament The things are Currants a forraign commoditie and a Victual the 5. s. for impost which is said to be great the action formed or Process is the command by the great Seal and the word therein are Petere et recipere if they be sufficient and if good without Proclamation or other notice and how notice shall be given and if it be good without an ad quod damnum and the case of Mines in Plowden which is the sole case in the printed Books of Law to this purpose hath in it foure reasons of the judgement First the excellency of the King or his person Secondly the necessitie of Coyn for his state Thirdly the utillitie of Coyn for commerce Fourthly the inconvenience if the subject should have such royal possessions and these reasons are not extracted out of the Books of Law but are only reasons of policy for Rex est legalis et politicus and reasons pollitick are sufficient to guide Iudges in their arguments and such cases and presidents are good directions in cases of judgement for they are Demonstrations of the course of antiquitie where upon my judgement shall consist upon reasons politick and presidents the case in Dyer 1. Eliz. fo 165. was not like to the case in question but only a conference and the case there was for an impost upon cloath a domestick commoditie in this case are recited their Grievances but it was paid and it is denied here but there was no resolution thereof at the same time was the impost of Wines increased and paid and no petition or complaint thereof and the custome of Englands commodities were at the first imposed by the Kings will for no Statute giveth them viz. for Wool Woolfels and Leather and it was called the great custome and that it was paid it will not be denied and yet now it is doubted if the King can impose it upon forraign commodities the King may restrain the person as it is in Fitz. Nat. Br. à fortiori he may restrain the goods there was no custom for home Commodities
it seems to me it is apparant by the Statute of the 26. H. 8. Cap. 10. which gives power to the King by his letters Patents to limit the time for importing of Wines against the Statute of 23. H. 8. Cap. 7. which was no more but a restoring of his power abridged before and so was the Statute of 31. E. 3. for otherwise the Parliament would never have given him Authoritie to contradict an Act of Parliament by his letters Patents or to revive these Acts Impositions are meerly a new custome and so are they stiled in the Margent of the Roll of the 3. E. 1. in this Court where it is Recorded that the King had assigned Merchants to receive using the same words which are used here half a Mark for every Sack of Wool and a Mark of every Last of Leather and that if the Merchant who is so appointed Transport any after that it shall be forfeited and out of this record I observe that three hundred Pelts make a Sack of Wooll from the 21. Ed. 1. unto the 28. E. 1. the customs for Wools was 40. s. a Sack and in 25. E. 1. the Imposition of Maletolt was repealed by Act of Parliament which Maletolt was an increase of Impost upon staple commodities and therfore was given to the King a great subsidie with this cause that it should never be drawn into president which shews that this Maletolt was rightly imposed otherwise the Parliament would never have given him so great a Recompence for the Abrogation of it but after in the 13. of E. 3. because it was a thing of so great consequence to the Crown it was revived and made 40. s. for Wool and Woolfels and 3. l. for Leather for denizens and double for strangers in the 14. Ed. 3. a Petition in Parliament to abate it and for a great subsidie it was released and in the 18. of Ed. 3. it was again revived and a new petition was made in Parliament and this petition was continued until the 36. of Ed. 3. and then it was abated and also by the 45. E. 3. it was again abated so that it seem that between these times it was revived but after it did not continue long for in 48. E. 3. it was again revived and for Wool the Impost was 50. s. et sic de singulis and in 1. R. 2. after it was answered to the King as it appears in the accompts here and in 5. R. 2. it was again suppressed by Parliament for a subsidie granted to the King with a saving of antient rights all these Statutes prove expresly that the King had power to increase the Impost and that upon commodities of the land and that he continually used this power notwithstanding all Acts of Parliament against it and so much for commodities of this land but for forrain commodities it appears by no Act of Parliament or other president that never any petition or suit was made to abate the Impost of forrain commodities but of them the Impost was paid without denial as for example for Wines in the 16. E. 1. as appears in this Court upon Record it was commanded to the Bailiff of Dover to levie and Gollece of every Tun of Wine of a stranger 4. s. and in the 22. E. 1.2 s. thereof was released at the suit of the French Ambassador in the 26. of E. 3. the King granted priviledges to Merchants strangers but there was given for it an increase of custome and this was answered as it appears upon accompt in the times of E. 1. and E. 2. the case of Allom was as it hath been recited by my brother Clark it is objected that the Merchant ought to have free passage upon the Sea but that both not conclude the King but that he shall have his Impost if he cometh into his Ports and here the question is for Merchandise after that they are brought into the Port but it is said that they cannot come into the Port but by the Sea that is true but if this reason should hold then the King could not grant Murage Pontage and the like because the common Channel to them is free and Average is for securitie aswel as Ports another objection that the Defendant here is not restrained but that is answered for if a pain be inflicted upon them who import this is an inhibition upon a pain to all another objection was that there was no consideration of the Imposition and if it be demanded what differences between the cases I answer as much as is between the King and a subject and it is not reasonable that the King should express the cause and consideration of his Actions for they are arcana Regis and no satisfaction needeth for if the profits to the Merchant faileth he will not trade and it is for the benefit of every subject that the Kings Treasure should be increased an objection was made against the form of proceeding because it was by the great Seal to the Treasurer and that he by the customers Peteret et reciperet and this could not be better as it was answered before it was objected that it should be by Proclamation and that needs not for it toucheth not all the subjects but only those who are Traders in Merchandising the best and aptest means to give them notice by the customers and it is alledged by the information expresly that he had notice It was lastly objected that there ought to be a quod damnum in the case before the grant that is not so for that shall be only when the King granteth any thing which appertaineth to his prerogative and not when he maketh Charters to his servants to levy his duties due to his Crown wherefore I think that the King ought to have judgement which was after given accordingly 6. Jac. in the Exchequer An Information against Sir Edward Dimock THe Bishop of Carlisle called John May in A. 26. Eliz. made a lease in reversion to Queen Eliz. of the Mannor of Horncastle whereof the Bishop was seised in right of his Bishoprick and this was for 4. years and it was acknowledged before Commissioners appointed for this purpose and the Bishop prayed it to be inrolled and this prayer is indorsed but not inrolled and in 37. Eliz. this lease was confirmed by the Dean and Chapter in the life of the lessor and in 44. Eliz. the successor Bishop leased this land to Sir Edward Dimock the Statute of the 43. of Eliz. hath a proviso that it shall not extend to any lease before made by the Bishop of Carlisle to Queen Eliz. then not inrolled and after the death of the Queen viz. 5. Jac. this lease in 26. Eliz. is returned and certified to be acknowledged and is then also inrolled and Sir Edward Dimock had entred and was in possession by vertue of his lease in the 3. Jac. and the information was for entrie and intrusion in 3. Jac. and upon the Bar all this matter was discovered and a
a place priviledged for Venison and not a place certain from whence a Venue may come and it was said that in the 16. Eliz. in Banco Regis in the Lord Padgets Case a Trespass was brought of 3. Acres of land in Beer-wood and the venire facias was awarded de vicineto de Beer-wood and the chief Baron Tanfield said that in this case the venire facias was not well awarded and so it was holden in the Kings Bench and therefore he would be advised in this Case and after at another day it was moved and then the chief Baron said that he had perused the Books touching the Case in question and that it appears by the 47. E. 3 fo 6. by Fuchden that a forrest is many times out of any Parish and therefore shall not be intended to be within any Parish and he said that the Defendant in this case ought to have pleaded that the forrest was within such a Parish and demanded judgement if he shall be answered without alledging it to be within a Parish and that otherwise judgement ought to be given for the Plantiff and so he said that it was now lately adjudged in the Kings Bench where a man was indicted for Hunting in a forrest and a venire facias was awarded de Foresta and good and he vouched also the 8th of H. 8. in Savages Case and the 7. of E. 3. and Baron Altham Accorded and he vouched also the Book of the 18. of E. 3. fo 36. where it is said expresly that if shall not be intended to be within a Parish except it be shewed in the pleading on the other side and he vouched also 27. H. 8. fo 12. and then all the Barons agreed that judgement shall be given for the Plantiff Airie and Alcock THe Case was argued again between Airie and Alcock concerning the misnaming of Corporations which was argued before as appeareth fo and Thomas Stephens the Princes Attorney argued that the lease is void by the reason of the misnosmer and he observed the Misnosmer to be principally in these two material things First where the foundation was by the name of the Hall or the Colledge of the Queen c. the presentation of the Parson and also the confirmation of the lease made by the name of the Queens Colledge c. omitting the word Scholers which should immediately precede the word Aulae Reginae which he held a material variance the second variance he observed to be thus that where the foundation was by the name of the Hall or Colledge of the Queen in Oxford the presentation and confirmation of the lease was by the name of Provost of Queens Colledge in the Vniversitie of Oxford so that the word Vniversitie was added which was not in the foundation and to prove that these variances were material for the avoiding of leases he cited the case often remembred in the argument before which conceived Merton Colledge in Oxford and the parties to this case were Fish and Boys which was in Trin. 30. Eliz. Banco R. Rot. 953. wherein the case was that the said Colledge was incorporated by the name of Warden and Scolers of the house or Colledge of Scholers of Merton in the Vniversitie of Oxford and that they made a lease by the name of the Warden and Scholers of the house or Colledge of Merton Colledge in Oxford so that the word Scholers which did immediately preceed the word Merton in the foundation is omitted in the lease as in the principal Case also where the word Vniversitie was added in their Corporation the same was omitted in the lease whereas on the other side this was not mentioned in Airies Case to be contained in the foundation but added in the lease and he said that for these variances in Merton Colledge Case the lease was holden to be void which he held to be all one with our case but he agreed that in divers cases variances in addition of surpluage shall not be hurtful in a lease as appears by 21. and 22. E. 4. and therefore though in the principal Case the word fellows was added in the lease which was not in the foundation he would not argue that this should be any variance to hurt the lease Hern Baron seemed that the verdict is not sufficient to move him to give judgement for the Plantiff for he said although it be admitted that the lease by reason of the variance is not good yet the verdict doth not sufficiently finde that Doctor Airie is a person who may take advantage of the invaliditie thereof for it appeared not of whose presentation Doctor Airie came to have the Parsonage for although that it should be admitted as it is said in Heckers Case 14. H. 8. that here might be Parson of his own presentment yet it is not found that he did so here and he said that in every quare Impedit it ought to be expressed what person made the presentation to the variance he thought the lease to be good notwithstanding that for he said that the word Scholers is not added in the foundation as a part of the name of a Corporation but only to express what kinde of Colledge this should be viz. to distinguish it from a Merchants Hall or Colledge and therefore though the word Scholers be put in yet we properly call it the Queens Colledge and not the Queen Scholers Colledge for it is not of necessitie that the Scholers of the said Colledge should he the Queens Scholers but that they are Scholers of the Queens Colledge and he vouched 2. H. 7. Fitz. Titles Grants and as to the case of Merton Colledge cited by Stephens he said that in that Case there was a main imperfection in the verdict which as he thought might move the said judgement to be given as it was and not the matter in Law for they did not finde that the lessor was warden of the Colledge at the time of the lease made also he vouched Cook lib. 6. Sir Moil Finches Case and he vouched Sir Peter Seawels Case where in a lease made by a Corporation that these words ex fundatione Regis E. 6. which were part of their foundation were omitted and yet the lease good and he cited also the case of the Bishop of Peter Bourough where the Corporation was by the name of Episcopi de Burgo Sancti Petri and a lease was made by the name of the Bishop of Peter Bourough and the lease good and that no difference in substance and if a Corporation were made by the name of Scholers and fellows and in a lease the word fellows is omitted yet it is good and therefore in the principal Case it seemeth that the omission of the word fellows is not material also he said that the addition of the word Vniversitie which is no part of the Corporation is not fatal to the lease for in the Lord Norths Case 36. 37. Eliz. the addition of the word Vniversitie or the omission thereof was holden
of no force to avoid the lease Altham Baron Contra for the matter in Law but for the insufficiency of the verdict he thought that there ought to be a new venire facias for no judgement may be given for any partie for the insufficiency of the verdict for it is not found that Doctor Airie was presented And therefore he cannot have an action for it cannot be intended that his presentation was by a better name then the other presentation was and he cited the 11. H. 7. fo 8. and 17. E. 3 title quare impedit he who will avoid a presentation ought to intitle himself Secondly it is not found here that the Church is void sufficiently he said that if a Provost present himself this is void meerly and he cited Heckers Case it is not found here that Doctor Airie entred post inductionem for it is said that he entred ante praedictum tempus quo c. but not that he entred after induction and therefore it may be he entred before and then it is not good but for the matter of Misnosmer it seemeth that this avoids the lease contrary to Baron Herns opinion wherefore the chief Baron Tanfield advised the parties to agree to have the true case rightfully found by a new special verdict for he said to Doctor Airie that no judgement can be given for him what opinion soever himself and Baron Snig should hold the which they would not deliver for Snig Baron said that by 40. Assise that if a man be indebted to the King and deviseth all his goods to A. and the Executor assenteth and after this debt is demanded the Legatee in this Case shall be charged for this debt and so was it ordered by him and Tanfield as reasonable and equal but Hern and Altham contrary for it was the folly of the Executor to assent to the Legacie and they said that it was so adjudged and resolved in Sir William Fitzwilliams Case in the Exchequer Chamber by an English Bill Upon a motion made by Walter it was shewed by him out of a Record in the Tower that in the 31. E. 1. a Statute was made to discharge Merchants strangers from the payment of Prisage of Wine and allowed by the Court that no Merchant shall be chargable for the prisage of Wines see more of this Case in the Tit. of Doublin in Ireland An Information against Sir Edward Dimock THe Case of the Information against Sir Edward Dimock which was the fast Term was now argued again by Thomas Crew for the King but his argument I have not written Walter for the Defendant said that the Commission for taking of the acknowledgement of the lease was not returned in the life of the Queen nor the case was not put in this case in the Queens life time as it was in divers of the cales cited of the other side and therefore it differs from them in this case he observed foure points First if this lease should be good if it were never inrolled Secondly admitting that it cannot if here be such an inrolment as is requisite Thirdly admitting that the fease is good without inrolment or with this inrolment then if this can avoid the lease made in the Interim Fourthly if no lease be good until inrolment then if the confirmation being made before the inrolment can be a good confirmation And as to the first he conceived that the Cases put of personal Chattels vested in the King without Record are good Law but here it is of a real Chattel and he said that there are three reasons to prove that personal Chattels are in the King without Record First they are in judgement of Law trivyal Secondly they are perishing and of no continuance Thirdly the Records would be infinite if they should be of Record but there are no such reasons to prove that real Chattels should not be of Record for in the judgement of Law they are of greater value and are also more permanent and therefore Thrope saith in the 18. E. 3. that it had been adjudged that Livery ought to be made upon a lease for 100. years also lessee for years shall have aid but lessee at will shall not also it appears by Cook lib. 4. in Sir Andrew Corbets Case that a Gardian shall not avoid a lease for years also the Statutes regard leases for years and it was holden in Gravenors Case in the 23. Eliz. in the Court of Wards that a woman shall forfeit her joynture for making of a lease for 40. years by acceptance of a fine and reservation of a rent also lessee for years may falsifie a recovery also it is agreed of the other part that the King cannot take an use without Record and 6. E. 6. Dyer Bourchers Case the King cannot take an use without record also he said that in every case where a Deed or Record is requisite for a freehold the same conveyance is also requisite for a lease for years and therefore if a freehold be conveyed to a body politick it ought to be by Deed the same Law if a lease for years be conveyed to them and so if a lease for years be made of a hundred or rent this ought to be by Deed by 15. H. 6. fo 38. also in Bayes and Norwoods Case 41. Eliz. it was adjudged that a lease for years cannot be made to a corporation without Deed 2. E. 6. Brook Tit. Recognizance 19. a man cannot make a surrender to the King without Record the second point he said that the inrolment being made after the death of the Bishop Lessor or of the Queen Lessee is no sufficient matter of record for in judgement of Law nothing shall pass out of the Lessor until the inrolment and therefore the inrolment is the thing which maketh the estate and not only which perfecteth it and in all cases as appears in Say and Fullers Case the thing which maketh the estate or which perfecteth it ought to be in the life of the Lessor and therefore if a reversion be granted attornament ought to be made in the life of the grantor 40. Assises pla 19. 16. Assises pla 15. and Cook lib. 2. in Tookers Case and to prove further that the thing which ought to perfect the estate ought to be in the life of the grantor or feoffor he vouched 31. E. 3. tit abbe 10. and 41. E. 3. and temps H. 8. tit feofments if a feoffe enter not by force of a livery within the View this is not good and if a Bishop make a lease and the Chapter do not confirm it until after his death it is not good by 31. E. 3. tit Abbe 10. also here to prove that in respect of the Queen Lessee died before inrolment that the lease is not good for this purpose he vouched 24. E. 3. and the 11. E. 4. and the 7. H. 4. and 21. E. 4. that Chattels granted to the King shall go to the successor and not to the Executor and
Earl of C. now dead and found that by fine and recovery he conveyed an estate in this land to the use of his brother that now is Earl of C. in tail the remainder over to c. and died having a daughter now Countess of Dorset who moved by Dodderidge the Kings Serjeant in the Court of wards that this office was insufficient for by the pretence of the said Countess the first estate given to the Cliffords by E. 2. was a general tail and then the fine levied and the recovery suffered by the last Earl her father is no Bar but that it may discend to this Countess as his heir in tail and therefore Serjeant Dodderidge said to the Lord Treasurer then present in Court that if this should be allowed that Iurors may finde generally a grant made and shew no quallitie of the conveyance nor any place or time but if this were a grant of reversion or of a possession he said that many men by such offices should have their lands given away whereunto they had no means for uncertainties to take a Traverse and as to insufficiency of this office he said that the insufficiency therein consisted first in matter Secondly in form for the insufficiency of the matter is two fold First because that the office findes only that King H. 6. by sufficient conveyance not limited any manner of conveyances nor any qualitie thereof which ought to be shewed and it is material because we may give a different answer thereunto for against letters Patents we may plead one thing and against an other conveyance we may plead another thing and so our answer differeth according to the qualitie of the conveyance Secondly it is insuffient in matter because it is found that H. 6. granted the possession and that he granted the reversion nec non manerium which is repugnant for if the King grant a reversion then no possession passeth and if he pass a possession then no reversion passeth and therefore it is repuguant to say that he granted Reversionem nec non manerium which implieth a possession also he said that his exceptions to the office as to the Mannor of it are two-fold First the office doth finde any time of the grant made by H. 6. and this is material for the grants upon Record take their force from the time of their date as appears by Ludfords Case in Plowdens Commentaries and he said that at this time the case is material to be exprest in respect that H. 6. was for part of his reign deposed and after restored and it might be in the time that he was deposed by Edward the fourth but unto that it was answered by the attorney of the wards that the office found that H. 6. granted c. that it was not in the time when he was deposed the second insufficiency in the Mannor is because it is not found at what place H. 6. made the said grant and that this is material to be found by office he vouched 36. H. 6.32 and he said that it is very requisite that in such offices all circumstances ought to be expressed in as ample certaintie as in a declaration so that the partie prejudiced by the office may know where to search for the conveyance but the Attorney general said that there needs no such express finding of all circumstances by a Iury as it ought to be in pleading for it shall be taken by intendment in divers cases but yet he said that it appears by 1. Eliz. Dyer 174. it is a good plea to say that A. granted a reversion c. to the King without shewing how much more in office which is the Act of the Iurors and therefore Serjeant Harris cited the Book of 14 15. H. 7.22 where an office found an estate tail without mention of the Donor and yet good and the Attorney general said also that it appears by the finding of the Iury in Fulwoods Case Cook lib. 4. that the Iury need not precisely to finde all circumstances for if there be convenient certaintie the residue shall be supplied by intendment as it is there said and the Attorney said that whereas it hath been objected that the issue is evil because it is found that H. 6. granted the reversion and also the Mannor and Castle aforesaid and doth not limit incertaintie that the King granted a reversion or that he granted a Mannor in possession to that he said that it is clear that the King may after recital of a particular estate grant the reversion nec non terras sive manerium and then be the land in lease or be the lease void in Law yet the land shall pass and this is his course alwayes in granting the Kings lands to others and therefore the Iury did well to finde the truth without determining what should pass for admit that there were no estate precedent in being yet by this finding it appears plainly that the Mannor and Castle should pass by the grant in the time of H. 6. to which the Lord Cook agreed for Law and so he said it was his use when he was Attorney general to which also the Lord Treasurer Flemming chief Justice and Tanfield chief Baron agreed and the Attorney general said that his use was if A. had a lease from the King of B. acre which by effluction is to determine in Anno. 1612. and the said A. doubting that this lease was not good in Law prayed to have a new lease that in this case he recited the first lease in the new letters Patents and thereby granted the land for twentie years from c. which shall be in Anno 1612. or from the sooner determination of the former lease and the Iudges allowed it to be good and Dodderidge Serjeant said that after the difference taken between the pleading and the finding of the Iury it seemed to him that there is a great difference between them but after the finding of the Iury upon an office as our case is and a pleading there is no difference for the office is a thing to which an answer may be made but a verdict given upon issue joyned between the parties hath no other proceeding but to judgement immediately and therefore such a verdict shall be divers times supplied by the construction of the Iudges but a verdict upon an office ought to be as certain as an indictment because the partie may Traverse and to prove that upon such uncertain offices there is no remedy by Traverse he vouched the case of 3. H. 4 5. upon an insufficient office after the outlawry of A. and no time is found of the outlawry and he observed out of the said book that the partie outed by the said insufficient office had no remedy by Traverse but was compelled to make a motion to the Court and after this case for difficultie was referred to the two chief Iustices and the chief Baron to consider upon who the said Term at Serjeants Inne appointed it to be
Baron answered that he should have them of right see Bartues case in Dyer but the Lord Treasurer said that he saw no reason to satisfie himself thereof Doillie against Joiliffe DOillie Plantiff against Joiliffe in an Action upon the case for false imprisonment of the Plantiffs wife the case was that Leonard Lovies was formerly Plantiff in an action in the Common Pleas against Julian Goddard a feme sole and in this action the Plantiff and Defendant were at issue and a venire facias was awarded and before the return thereof the said Julian took to husband Doillie now Plantiff and after upon a special verdict found in the suit judgement was given in the Common Pleas for the said Julian against th◠said Leonard upon which judgement Leonard brought error in the Kings Bench and a scire facias was awarded against Julian by the name of Julian Goddard as a feme sole and she appeared by Attorney as a feme sole and this as the Defendant said in his answer was by the consent of her husband now Plantiff and after judgement was given to reverse the judgement in the Common Pleas and the entrie of that judgement as it was pleaded by the Defendant here was quod praedict Leonard Lovies recuperet c. versus praedict Julianam c. and costs and damages were taxed c. upon which judgement the said Lovies sued a Capias ad satisfaciendum against Julian Goddard and by vertue of that writ the Defendant here the Sheriff or Devon took the said Julian being the Plantiffs wife and imprisoned her until the Plantiff paid 10. l. which was the cost taxed by the Kings Bench for her deliverance upon which imprisonment the husband only hath brought his action against the Defendant being Sheriff Davenport of Grayes Inne argued for the Defendant and first he thought that between the parties to the error and the first action in the Common Pleas there is an estoppel and admittance that the said Julian continued a feme sole for the process in all the proceedings ought to be as it was in the Original and he vouched 18. Assise pla 16. by which book it appears that if a man bring an assise for lands in the Countie of O. and the Tenants plead a Common recovery of the same land in the Common Pleas this doth conclude the partie to say that the lands did lie else where c. also if an original be depending and before the first Capias or process awarded the Defendant intermarrieth and after a capias issueth against her as a feme sole this is well awarded lib. 5. E. 4.16 and also 5. E. 3. fo 9. and 10. also he said that such a thing as is done between the plea and not after the judgement is not material to alter the proceedings in that course it was begun for the same partie against whom judgement is given shall error have against him for whom the judgement is given except she had married after the judgement for then he agreed that the writ of error shall be brought by the husband and wife in case judgement had been given against the wife while she was sole 35. H. 6. fo 31. and 12. Assise pla 41. and it also appears by 18. E. 4. fo 3. if Trespas he brought against a married wife as against a feme sole and she appears as a feme sole and judgement is given and execution accordingly this is good until it be reversed by error and the Sheriff in such case never ought to examine if it be evil or nor no more then if Trespas be brought against A. my servant by the name of B. and A. is taken in execution the Master shall not take benefit of this misnaming admitting that A. should punish the Sheriff for it also he vouched one Shotbolts case 10. and 11. Eliz. Dyer and 15. Eliz. Dyer 318. in the Earl of Kents case which prove that the Sheriff is to be excused for taking me by a false name and if the Iudges admit this false name yet this judicial writ ought not to be examined by the Sheriff and it was adjourned Shoftbey against Waller and Bromley SHoftbey brought an action upon the case against Waller and Bromley and declared that the Defendants conspired that the said Bromley should commence a suit against the Plantiff and that the Plantiff was then worth 5000. l. and that he was then dwelling in Middlesex and that the Defendants knowing thereof maliciously and falsely agreed that the said Bromley should lay his action in London and prosecute it until the Plantiff were outlawed in the said suit to the intent that his goods should be forfeited to the King and after in performance of the agreement aforesaid the Plantiff suggested that he was dwelling in London and laid his action here which was prosecuted until the Plantiff here was outlawed to his damage c. Tanfield chief Baron thought that if the suggestion was by Bromley to make the process into a wrong County it seemed that the Action should lie against him only but in regard it is shewed in the Declaration that the said suggestion was made by him in performance of the precedent agreement that the action lieth against both which the Court granted Godfrey in this action moved in arrest of judgement and that for two causes the action lieth not upon the matter here it appears by the 4. Eliz. Dyer 214. that a man may say his action wherein an outlawry lies in London and then by the Statute of 6. H. 8. cap. 4. proclamation shall issue into the Countie where he dwelleth therefore the suing of him in another Countie is no such act wherefore an action should be brought no more then if before the Statute of W. 2. cap. 12. a man had brought an appeal Maliciosè yet no remedy before the said Statute as appears in the 13. H. 7. in Kellawaies case because it was lawful to bring an appeal and so notwithstanding the said Statute no action did lie against him who brought an appeal if it abated 9. H. 5. cap. 1. also the Statute of the 18. H. 6. provideth remedy for false appeals or judgement in another Countie maliciosè c. by action of the case whereby it appeareth that in such case the Common Law allowed no action also the Statute of the 18. H. 6. provideth another remedy then that Statute and therefore no action lies against us no more then in the case aforesaid at the Common Law Secondly here is no issue joyned if the Defendants be guiltie of the execution of this practice but only if they be guiltie of the agreement and this is found for the Plantiff but clearly such agreement without execution giveth no cause of action and the word Practizatione comprehends only the going about and not the executing of this conspiracy and therefore the issue should have been general if the Defendants be guiltie or not and therefore he prayed judgement might be stayed and he cited Owen
Woods case in Cook lib. 4. Tanfield chief Baron it is true that the issue should be better if it were general not guiltie of the Trespass aforesaid but yet it is good enough in this case for the special words comprehend as much as the words not guiltie of the practice and agreement aforesaid c. and the word Practizatione comprehends aswel the subsequent Acts of execution as the precedent combination and therefore Tantamounts a general issue and it was good by the Court and as to the action Altham Baron conceived that it lieth although it be for a lawful cause for the Law abhoreth fraud and conspiracy as if two conspire to vex me for my land by suit an action lieth F. N. B. yet it is lawful for every man to sue me without title and he vouched 16. Assise and here it is laid that the Defendants indeavoured to make the Plantiff forfeit his goods which are worth 5000. l. and this is reasonable that it should lie and 9. E. 2. Fitz. discents 52. is our case directly upon the matter and therefore it seemeth to me that it lies Tanfield chief Baron said that 9. E. 2. crosseth this case in part and yet he thought that the action lies to which Snig agreed and it seemed the cases of appeal put by Godfrey did lie well enough without aid of the Statute of W. 2. if there be such a conspiracy Tanfield chief Baron accordingly if it be legally thought without cause yet if without conspiracy the action lieth not for it as it appears in Owen Woods case Cook lib. 4. and in all cases where strangers have nothing to do with the suit brought for the conspiracy and yet combine with the Plantiff in the suit an action upon the case lieth for this vexation and judgement was entred for the Plantiff by the Court. An inquisition for the King was returned here and it was found that Fleet-wood the Kings debtor for his office of receiver for the Court of Wards did purchase a certain Term and interest of and in the rectory of Yeading for divers years then to come and that being so possessed he became indebted to the King and that this term is now in the hands of the Lady Edmonds and by colour of this inquisition the land is extended for the Kings debt Harris Serjeant moved that this inquisition is insufficient to extend the land but good to sell a term and he vouched Palmers case Cook lib. 4. to which the Court inclined but it was adjourned If a Bishop becomes indebted to the King for a subsidie and dieth his successors shall not be charged upon the lands of the Bishoprick but the executors of the predecessor or his heir and if they have nothing the King shall lose it as chief Baron Tanfield said which the Court granted upon the motion of Bridgman for the Bishop of Saint Davids Trallops case A Scire facias issued against Trallop the father and Trallop the son to shew cause wherefore they did not pay to the King 1000. l. for the mean profits of certain lands holden by them from his Majesty for which land judgement was given for him in this Court and the mean rates was found by inquisition which returned that the said mean profits came to 1000. l. upon which inquisition this scire facias issued whereupon the Sheriff returned Trallop the father dead and Trallop the son now appeared and pleaded that he took profits but as a servant to his father and by his commandment and rendred an accompt to his father for the said profits and also the judgement for the said land was given against his father and him for default of sufficient pleading and not for the truth of the fact and he shewed the Statute of the 33 H. 8. cap. 39. which as he pretended aided him for his equitie whereupon the King demurred Hitchcock for Trallop seemed that the Statute did aid him by equity and he moved two things the one that if here be such a debt that the Statutes intends to aid it the other if the Defendant hath shewed sufficient matter of equitie within the intent of the Act and he thought that it is such a debt as the Statute will aid for although that here be au uncertainty of the time of the judgement given for the King that being reduced to a certainty by the inquisition after it shall be within the intent of the Statute for id certum est quod certum reddi potest and the words of the Statute are if any judgement be given for any debt or duty c. and here although that there was no certainty unto how much these mean rates extended at the time of the judgement given yet it is clear that it was a duty at the time of the judgement and then it is within the Statute also he said that the words in the proviso of that Statute explain that the intent of the makers of the Act was so for the words are for any thing for which the partie is chargable and the mean rates are a thing for which he is chargable see Cook lib. 7. fo 20. and the Lord Andersons case there fo 22. as to the point of equitie there seem to be two causes First he shewed that he was but a servant to his father and had given an accompt to him Secondly the judgement was given against him upon a point of mispleading Tanfield chief Baron said that the matter in equitie ought to be sufficiently proved and here is nothing but the allegation of the partie and the demurrer of Mr. Attorney for the King and if this be in Law an admittance of the allegation and so a sufficient proof within the Statute it is to be advised upon and for that point the case is but this a scire facias issueth out of this Court to have Execution of a recognizance which within this Act ought by pretence and allegation of the Defendant to be discharged for matter in equitie and the Defendant pleads his matter of equitie and the King supposing this not to be equity within this Statute demurreth in Law whether that demurrer be a sufficient proofe of the allegation within the Statute or not and it was adjourned Trin. 7. Jac. in the Exchequer Doillie and Joiliffs case again Trin. 7. Jac. in the Exchequer CRessey for the Plantiff said that the Plea in Bar is not good because the Defendant justified by force of a Capias ad satisfaciendum and pleads no return thereof and moved that it is not justifiable without returning of the writ but the Court seemed the plea to be good notwithstanding that but if it were a mean process then it ought to be pleaded to be returned see Cook lib. 5. Hoes case fol. 19. according to this diversitie Tanfield chief Baron thought that the Plantiff shall recover for first the writ of error here is not a writ but a commission and therefore false lattin shall not abate it as it hath been
and therefore he vouched a case between Scockwood and Sear where a man devised part of his land to his wife for life and another part of his land until Michaelmas next ensuing his death and further by the said will he devised to his younger son all his lands not devised to his wife and adjudged that by the said words the younger son shall have only that parcel which was devised to the wife for life and not that which was devised unto her till Michaelmas and yet by Popham it appeareth that his intent was otherwise viz. that all that should go to his younger son so there ought not to be a strained construction made against the heir and so in our case the words being that if he die without issue c. that then it shall go to his wife herein as much as he had issue at the time of his death it cannot be said that he died without issue but that he is dead without issue and this appeareth by the pleading in the Lord Bartleys case in Plowden and he vouched also a case in the Kings Bench 4. Jac. between Miller and Robinson where a man devised to Thomas his son and if he die without issue having no son there it was holden that if the devisee had issue a son yet if he had none at the time of his death the devisee in the remainder shall have it yet he was once a person having a son and so in our case there was a person who did not die without issue and he vouched also the case of Bold and Mollineux in 28. H. 8. Dyer fo 15.3 when a man deviseth to his wife for life paying a yearly rent to his sister and that if the rent be not paid that the sister may distrain it seems to me that this is a conditional estate in the wife notwithstanding the limitation of the distress and he vouched 18. Eliz. in Dyer 348. which as he said proved the case expresly for there in such a case it is adjudged that the devisee of the rent may after demand thereof distrain and yet the heir may enter for the not payment of the rent although it were never demanded so that the subsequent words of distraining do not qualifie the force of the condition although there be there an express condition and in our case but a condition implyed and he said that it seemed reasonable that such a construction for the distress and condition also shall stand as appeareth by divers cases that upon such words the Law will allow a double remedy and therefore he vouched Gravenors case in the Common Pleas Hill 36. Eliz. Rot. 1322. where a lease was made by Magdalen Colledge to husband and wife so that if the husband alien that the lease shall be void and provided that they do not make any under-tenants and to this purpose he vouched the case of the Earl of Pembrook cited in the Lord Cromwels case Cook lib. 2. where the words amounted to a covenant and a coudition and if this word paying should not be construed to be a condition then it were altogether void and idle and such a construction ought not to be made in a will and he conceived that this rent ought to be paid by the wife without any demand upon the pain of the condition and therefore he vouched 22. H. 6. fo 57.14 E. 4 21. E. 4. by Hussey and 18. Eliz. Dyer 348. vouched before and so it was resolved as he said in the Court of Wards in Somings case where a man made a devise paying a rent to a stranger this ought to be paid without demand and he said that the Common case is proved when a feofment is made upon condition that the feoffee shall do an act to a stranger this ought to be done in convenient time without request by the stranger and so here it seemeth although a demand ought to be made by the sister yet the wife ought to give notice to the sister of the Legacy so that she may make a demand and therefore he vouched Warder and Downings case where a man devised that his eldest son upon entry should pay to the younger son such a summe of money here the eldes brother ought to give notice at what time he will enter to the intent that the younger brother may be provided to make a demand Edwards of the Inner Temple contrary First it seemeth that by this limitation the wife ought to retain the land until the issue of the devisor should have come to the age of 18. years for this a time certain and as it is construed upon such words in Borastons case Cook lib. 3. that the Executors there have an interest certain so it should be construed here to refer to a certainty which is until the time by computation that the issue should have attained to 18. years and the rather in this case in respect the devisor had otherwise disposed of the land until the son should have accomplished the said age Secondly it seemeth that the wife hath an estate for life not conditional in so much as the words are not joyned in the case the 18. Eliz. Dyer hath been vouched but that was upon an express condition but here it is by implication and then the clause of distress taketh away the force of the implication which otherwise might be thereupon inferred and therefore in 5. Eliz. Dyer it appeareth that the word Proviso annexed to other words makes it no condition in judgement of Law and so in 14. Eliz. Dyer 311. and he vouched also 18. Eliz. Dyer Greens case that if a man deviseth lands to his friends paying to his wife with a clause of distress this is no condition as it is adjudged Thirdly it seemeth that this summe to be paid to the sister is a rent and therefore ought to be demanded or otherwise in judgement of Law the condition shall not be broken and the 21. E. 4. the case of an obligation to perform covenants c. and a case between Wentworth and Wentworth 37. Eliz. that a demand ought to be made for a rent which is granted in liew of Dower for the wife brought a writ of Dower for the land of her husband the Tenant pleaded that she accepted a rent out of the land in liew of her Dower and the wife replied that the said rent was granted upon condition that if it were not paid at certain dayes that it should be void and that she should have Dower of the land and she said that the rent was not paid at the dayes c. but shewed not in her pleading any demand to be made and therefore it was holden evil pleading for such a rent ought to be demanded or otherwise the condition is not broken and so here Nota that this case was appointed to be argued again but after as I heard the Barons amongst themselves resolved to give judgement for the Defendant upon one point only which was that the estate
of the wife of the devisor is not determined until the issue should have come to the age of 18. years and so none of the other points came now in question and judgement was given as above-said Nota that in Mich. 6. Jac. upon a motion made by Mr. Nicholas Row of the Inner Temple it appeared that an inquisition was returned in this Court by force of a commission whereby it was found that one A. was seised of the Mannor of D. and so being seised of the said A. was attainted of Treason in the Kings Bench and of this should be a double matter of Record to intitle the King so that the owner of the land shall be forced to his Petition it was the question and by the Court in regard that the record of the attainder is not in this Court here is not in judgement of Law a double matter of Record but if the attainder he removed into this Court then that and the inquisition would make a double matter of Record and the Attorney general moved that when an office findes the attainder that the party ought to plead no such record Worselin Mannings case AN Information of intrusion was brought against Worselin Manning and others and upon the opening of the evidence at the Bar it appeared that Worsely Manning was an alien born and that he was made a denizen by the King and the Charter of Denization had this Proviso usual in such Charters of Denization that the Denizen should do legal Homage and that he should be obedient and observe the Lawes of this Realm and after by vertue of a Commission under the great Seal an office found that the said Worselin after the Denization purchased the land in question and it was found also by the same office that the said Worselin never did legal Homage and that he was not obedient to all the Lawes of this Realm and there was an offer of demurrer upon the evidence if the Prviso makes the Patent of Denization conditional and so for the not performance thereof the Charter of Denization shall be void and Harris thought clearly that this proviso for the performance and observation of the Lawes doth not make the Patent conditional but the intent only was that if he do not observe them then he shall forfeit the penalties therein appointed to which the Court inclined and after resolved accordingly At another day it was moved in Mr. Rowes case that the possession shall be awarded to the King and in this case Tanfield gave a Rule that Mr. Row ought to plead to the inquisition but no possession should be taken from him for although that the attainder make a double Record yet if the indictment of Treason be taken before Iustices of the peace more then a year after the Treason committed as in this case it was and the partie is outlawed upon this indictment and the inquisition findes this outlawry generally yet this is no double matter of Record for the outlawry is meerly void upon the said indictment because the indictment it self is void and to prove that when an indictment is void that is void as to all purposes be vouched Vauxes case Cook lib. 4. fo 44. and 11. R. 2. and after in this case the Barons awarded proces to plead but not to dispossess the partie Vaux against Austin and others AN Information by Vaux against Austin and others that they did ingross a 1000. quarters of Corn upon not guiltie the Iury found one of the Defendants guiltie for 700. and not guiltie for the residue and found the others not guiltie for all Prideaux moved that judgement may be given to acquit the Defendants in this case and he vouched the 9th of E. 3. fo 1. and 14. E. 4. fo 2. where an Information was brought for forgery and proclaiming false deeds and he was found not guiltie of the proclaiming and 3. Eliz. Dyer 189. in the Lord Brayes case put by the way and therefore he said that if there be an information upon the Statute of Vsury against two and the Iury found the contract to be but with one of them both shall be acquitted and also he vouched Treports case in lib. 6. where a man declared of a lease made by two where in Law it was only the lease of one and the confirmation of the other and therefore evil 8. R. 2. tit brief and if judgement in this case should be given against one being in a joynt information he could not plead it in Bar of another information for the same thing and then he should be twice punished for one fault Hitchcock to the contrary the Defendants plead that they nor any of them are guiltie and issue was joyned thereupon and by him this case is not to be resembled to the cases which have been put of joynt contracts for here the parties commit several wrongs and he said if in a decies Tantum against divers if one be acquitted the other shall be condemned and so in an action of Trespas 37. H. 6. fo 37. touching maintenance and if in Trespas against two one is found guiltie for one part and the other found guilty for the other part and 40. E. 3. fo 35. and 7. H. 6 32. in trespas the Defendant pleads that John S. infeoffed him and R. S. and the Plantiff saith that he did not infeoffe them and the Iury found that be infeoffed the Defendant only in this case judgement ought to be given if either of them be guiltie and therefore there is a difference between that and Wain-wrights case for the information was for the joynt buying of butter and Cheese but here the information is for ingrossing by way of buying and so he prayed that judgement may be given for the King Tanfield chief Baron if upon the Statute of Champertie a man declares upon a joynt demise by two and it is found that one only made the demise it was adjudged good and by him this proves the case in question and the Barons agreed it to be clear that if a contract be alledged to be made with one of them no judgement for usury ought to be given but in the principal case all but Tanfield agreed that several judgements may be given for it is like unto a Trespass and accordingly judgement was given in the principal case against him who was found guiltie Nota by Tanfield chief Baron and all the Court that where the Statute of the 23. Eliz. appointeth that if any will inform against A. Recusant and the Recusant be thereupon convicted that the informer shall have one moitie and the King shall have another yet if a recusant be convicted according to the form of the Statute of 28. Eliz. by indictment an informer can never have any advantage upon an information exhibited after for the Statute of the 28. Eliz. altereth the course of Law which was upon 23. Eliz. and no informer can have any advantage upon a conviction of Recusancy by indictment after the Statute
of the 28. Eliz. according to this opinion there was a judgement now lately in the Common Pleas as the chief Baron Tanfield said but if a Recusant be not convicted of Recusancy an informer may have advantage against him according to the Statute of the 23. Eliz. notwithstanding any thing in the Statute of the 28. Eliz. Jacksons Case UPon a motion made by Sir John Jackson in a suit by English Bill between Jackson and another Tanfield said that it had been decreed in the Chancery betwixt one Gore and Wiglesworth that if A. agree with me to lease black-Acre for certain years to me and after before he makes my lease according to his promise he infeoffes B. of that Acre for a valuable consideration and B. had notice of this promise before the feofment made unto him now B. should be compelled in the Chancey to make this lease to me according to the promise and by reason of his notice and so the Court agreed upon a motion made in the like case by the said Jackson for as before the Statute of 27. H. 8. a feoffee upon valuable consideration should be compellable in the Chancery to Execute an use whereof he had notice so here Sir Edward Dimocks Case argued before BRomley the puisne Baron thought judgement should be given for Sir Edward Dimock against the King for the matter in Law he argued but three points First that the lease made to Queen Elizabeth in the year 26. is not good clearly without a matter of Record for although that he agreed that personal Chattels may be conveyed to the Queen without matter of Record yet Chattels real can not for they participate in divers qualities with inheritances and freeholds and therefore if a man possest of a Term for years demiseth it to A. for life the remainder over to B. that this is a good remainder adjudged now lately in the Common Pleas but otherwise it is of Chattels personal as it appears by 37. H. 6. the case of the devise of a Grail Secondly the acknowledgement of the lease before Commissioners and the prayer of the Bishop to have it inrolled makes it not a record before inrolment for it appears by the 21. H. 7. that if the Sheriff by vertue of a writ doth any thing yet it is no matter of Record until it be returned and so is the 9th of Ed. 4. fo 96. that if the Phillizer of a County enter Process of outlawry in the room of a Phillizer of another County this is not a Record in judgement of Law although that it be a thing recorded and so he conceived that it was no sufficient Record in regard the Commissioners have not certified this recognizance and the prayer of the Bishop Lessor in the life of the Lessee and Lessor whereby as he said he admitted that if this were certified by the Commissioners in the life of the Lessor and Lessee that then without inrolment this had been a sufficient record to intitle the Queen who was Lessee Thirdly he argued that the inrolment subsequent in this case in time of the King that now is maketh not the lease good which was made to the Queen for he thought that the interruptions hindred the operation of this lease by interruptions he meant the death of the Bishop Lessor and of the Queen Lessee as it seemeth and the lease in possession of Sir Edward Dimock by force thereof without inrolment and therefore he said it was adjudged if a man covenant to stand seised to the use of his wife which shall be and there he makes a lease of the land and then takes a wife this lease by him is such an interruption that the use shall not arise to the wife but in Wintors case in Banco Regis 4. Jac. and also in Russels case although it seemed to be there agreed that the lease for years should be good yet it was not resolved but that the wife may have freehold well enough by vertue of that Covenant and he also vouched and agreed to Bret and Rigdens case in Plowden Com. where the death of the devisce before that the devisor died did frustrate the operation of the will and so of the death of the Queen being Lessee also he vouched the Duke of Somersets case 19. Eliz. Dyer 355. First as to the exceptions taken to the Bar by the Attorney general which were two it seemed to him that notwithstanding them the Bar is good for whereas it was objected that the Bar is that the Commission and acknowledgement of the lease were not returned by Hamond and Porter who were the two Commissioners who returned it to that he answered that the information mentions the acknowledgement and the return before them two and therefore there needeth no answer to more then is within the information also it cannot be intended to be returned by the other two Commissioners in regard that they were only to the connizance Secondly as to the other exception viz. that where the information saith that May Bishop of Carlisle by his certain writing of demise had demised c. for the Bar is that the said Bishop made a certain writing purporting a demise c. that this shall not be intended the same writing mentioned in the information and 6. E. b. Dyer 70. Ishams case for Ilebrewers Park vouched in maintenance of this exception and he said that it cannot be intended but that the Bar intends the same demise mentioned in the information for here the lease mentioned in the information and the lease mentined in the Bar agree in eight several circumstances as it was observed by the Councel of Sir Edward Dimock see the argument of Bandrip and 1. H. 6. fo 6. where a scire facias was brought against I. S. the Sheriff returned that according as the writ required he had made known to I. S. and doth not say the within named I. S. Altham Baron accordingly as to the matters in Law there are five points to be considered in the case First he said that the making of the lease to the Queen without acknowledgement is not good nor matter sufficient to intitle the Queen and he vouched 5. E. 4. fo 7. and 7. E. 4. fo 16.4 H. 7. fo 16.21 H. 7. fo 18.1 H. 7.17 and 3. H. 7.3 the same Law when awardship is granted and so an use cannot be granted to the King without matter of Record 6. E. 6. Dyer 74. that the Kings Lessee for years cannot surrender without matter of Record Secondly it seemeth that the confirmation of the Dean and Chapter is good notwithstanding it wanteth inrolment and notwithstanding the confirmation made before the inrolment and so before the being of the lease for here is only an assentor the Dean and Chapter for the Bishop hath his land in right of his Bishoprick and an assent may be aswel before the lease as after insomuch no interest passâ—th so also may an attornement be good before a grant of the reversion
avoidance and after confirms the lease here the lease is not good in respect the next avoidance interrupts it for his life but after the death c. the term will be good as it was here lately adjudged and so he thought that in this case the confirmation is not good and also that the Commission not being returned is not good and after one of the Commissioners die before the return it cannot be recurned and by the inrolment here made the lease cannot take his effect with any relation and so be concluded that judgement ought to be given against the King Tanfield chief Baron the Commission for the acceptance of the acknowledgement of the Bishop touching that it is to be known whether this makes it the Deed of the Bishop and that the Commissioners should return c. the confirmation in this case was made in the life of the Bishop Lessor and of the Queen Lessee although that some of my brethren conceive the Record to be otherwise also in this case Dimock entred by vertue of his lease before the inrolment of the lease made to the Queen as the Record purporteth to the points First I conceive that nothing resteth in the Queen without inrolment but if Lessee for years be outlawed the King shall have this lease by the outlawry for the outlawry is intended to be upon Record but of a wardship for land that is not in the Queen by the death of the Queens Tenant without an office because there is no matter of Record if an Alien hath a lease of land this is forfeited yet he shall have personal Chattels and as to the Book of 18. E. 3. cited on the other side where the King brought a quare impedit c. this may be well agreed for the Prior of Durham confessed by Record that he had made a grant and this is a sufficient Record and as to the book of 20. E. 4. where the Patron was outlawed and before the outlawry the Church became void that the King shall present it may be well agreed although that no office be found for this presentation is but a thing personal and transitory and therefore those Books prove nothing in this case Secondly he said that when this lease was acknowledged before Commissioners yet that was not sufficient to make a record to intitle the King and it is here expresly denied in the Bar that this lease was certified into the Chancery in the life of the Queen and therefore he thought that here was no Record to intitle the Queen and to this purpose he cited a case in 19. Eliz. Robins and Greshams case if a Recognizance were acknowledged before a Master of the Chancery and not inrolled this is no Recoâ—d and an Action of debt lieth not thereupon and the 34. Eliz. in Brock and Bainhams case in this Court a Recognizance was taken before a Baron of this Court yet this was no Record without inrolment and therefore the bare acknowledgement in our case is no Record also he denied the opinion of Davers in 37. H. 6. to be Law but only for personal Chattels and the 12. Eliz. Brook and Latimers case was adjudged against the opinion of Davers for land or leases Thirdly he said that the successor of the Bishop comes in paramount the lease made to the Queen and the new Lessee entring before any inrolment hath made the successor of the Bishop as in his remitter and when an antient right comes this prevents the relation which otherwise might be by the inrolment and he said that the first lease here made to the Queen is meerly dead until inrolment and he vouched the 11. E. 4. fo 1. Vactons case the discontinuor enters upon the discontinuee after the discontinuee dieth his heir within age the discontinuor dieth this causeth a remitter and so by him if the disseissee enter upon the heir of the disseissor being an infant and dieth this avoids the descent by reason of the antient right which the disseissee had and by 7. H. 7. and 11. H. 7. Eriches case it appears that an Act of Parliament will not revive a thing that is meerly dead by reason of any inrolment and much more here an inrolment cannot revive this lease which is meerly void by the death of the Lessor and the entrance of the Lessee of the Bishops successor and there is a great difference betwixt the inrolment in this case and the inrolment of a bargain and sale in regard that the sale is dead before the inrolment and yet in the case of bargain and sale it was adjudged in the Common Pleas Pasch 2. Jac. in Sir Thomas Lees case called Bellinghams case that if a man bargain land to A. and before inrolment of the Deed A. bargaines the land to B. which second bargain is inrolled this inrolment makes not the bargain good to B. for the relation of the first is only to perfect and make good the conveyance to A. from all incumbrances after his bargain but not to make the second Deed good which was void before also in 36. Eliz. in Sir Thomas Smiths case if the Bargainee suffer a recovery before the Deed inrolled yet that doth not make the recovers good and he said that in this case until an inrolment of the lease made to the Queen there is no Lessee and a lease cannot be without a Lessor and Lessee and before an inrolment of the lease the Lessor is dead so that there never was a Lessor and Lessee in life together and therefore the inception of this lease was altogether imperfect before the consummation came and so it leemeth by him that the death of the Bishop Lessor intervening before the inrolment is the principal cause that the first lease is not good as to the 4 th point of confirmation it seems to me in regard that the Bishop was seised in right of his Bishoprick and the Dean and Chapter have no interest in the land so that an assent is only sufficient in this case it seems to me that the confirmation as you call it is good enough for it is clear that an assent may be aswell before the lease as after for it passeth no interest no more then an Attornment Cook lib. 5. Foords case proveth this diversity plainly and by the same reason also it seems to me that this assent of parties who have no interest is good enough without inrolment but otherwise it should be if a confirmation were required in the case and as to the pleading I think the Bar is good and as to the exceptions which have been made viz. if the lease supposed to be made to the Queen be answered and he said it was good enough for the purpose of the Defendant is to bring the matter in Law before the Iudges and the matter in Law is if it were any lease or not as the information supposeth and therefore the Defendant ought not to agree with the information for the matter in Law and
the profit and comoditie of his Master the Plantiff and it is shewed that he intended to deceive his Master and the Queen also and where a wrong is made to another in my name whereby I am damnified there I shall have an Action and if in this case the Defendant had left the goods in the ship then the Plantiff had suffered no loss and therefore his taking them out of the ship is the cause which occasions the loss to the Plantiff and therefore it is reasonable that he should render us damages and he vouched the writ of deceipt in F. N. B. and divers cases therein put and 21. E. 4. that if a man bring an Action in London and the Defendant to delay my Action brings a writ of priviledge be shall have an Action upon the case and he vouched the like case to be adjudged in the Kings Bench 40. Eliz. between Byron and Sleith upon an Action of the case brought by the Defendant because he sued a scire facias against a Bail in a Court where he ought Bromley Puisne Baron said that the Plantiff shall have judgement First it shall be intended that the Plantiff was beyond the Seas at the time in respect of the Minute of time between his departure and the landing of the goods Secondly he said that it needs not be expressed that the Master had left moneys wherewith to discharge the custome for it shall be intended in this case because the Defendant had taken upon him to meddle according to the appointment of the Plantiff wherefore c. and so he departed to the Parliament Altham second Baron agreed that the Statute for the paying of custome appointeth that if the goods of any man be laid upon the land the custome not paid that then the goods shall be forfeited and therefore here he shall not lose his goods by reason of this Act made by the Defendant so that if the Defendant be a meer stranger to the Plantiff without question an Action of Trespass lies for this taking then in the principal case by reason of this trust an action of the case lies and if a stranger drives my Cattle upon your land whereby they are distrained by you I shall recover against the stranger for this distress by you in an action against him for by reason of this wrongful Act done by him I suffer this loss and he vouched 9. E. 4. fo 4. a case put by Jenney Snig third Baron to the contrary I agree that if a stranger put in my Cattle to the intent to do hurt to me a Trespass lieth but here is an Action upon the case and that lies not because it appears not sufficiently that the Defendant was servant to the Plantiff to Merchandise but generally his servant and therefore an Action of Trespas rather lieth generally for in an Action upon the case he ought to hit the bird in the eye and here it is not shewed that the goods were for the same voyage nor that the Defendant is a Common servant in this imployment also the Declaration is not good because he doth not shew that the Defendant had moneys or means from the Master to pay the custome and he is not compellable to lay out money of his own besides he cannot dispose of the goods until the custome be paid wherefore c. Tanfield chief Baron there are two matters to be considered in the case First if here you charge the Defendant as your special servant or if as a stranger Secondly if as a stranger then if an Action upon the case or a general Action of Trespass lieth and as to the first if in this case you have shewed him to be such a servant as a Bayliff or Steward and he hath misbehaved himself in such a thing which belongs to his charge without any special trust an Action upon the case lieth but if he be taken to be your general servant then he is to do and execute all Acts and lawful commands and against this general servant if his Master command him to do such a thing and he doth it not an action upon the case lieth but yet this is with this diversitie viz. if the Master command him to do such a thing which is in his convenient power or otherwise not and therefore if I command my servant to pay 100. l. at York and give him not money to hire a horse an Action lieth not for the not doing of this command but if I furnish him with ability to do it and then he doth it not an action lieth well against him and in the principal case it is shewed that the Plantiff appointed the Defendant being his servant generally to receive c. and to pay all customes c. then it is examinable if the Plantiff sufficiently inabled this Defendant to do this command and the woâ—ds of the command seem to be all one as if he had commanded the Defendant to receive the Wares paying the custome and therefore the Defendant needs not to receive them if he had not money to pay for the custome and so it is not within the Plantiffs command to receive the Wares and then if he doth receive them not paying for the customes this is another thing then the command anâ— therefore it is no misfeazance as my particular servant but being my general servant he had done another thing then I commanded him whereby I receive some damage and by consequence is in case of a stranger for if my general servant who is not my horse keeper take my horse out of my pasture and ride him this is a thing which he doth not as a servant but as a stranger then as to the second matter the Defendant being as a stranger if an action upon the case or a general action of Trespass lieth for this is as if my general servant take my horse and rides him without my appointment a general action of Trespass lieth but if by reason of his riding my horse die an action upon the case lieth and so it is in the case here the Defendant had laid the goods upon the land by reason whereof they were forfeited it is collourable that an Action upon the case lieth but if a man take my goods and lay them upon the land of A. a Trespass or an Action upon the case lieth against him who took them by the better opinion but it is good to be advised and it was adjourned and at another day Altham Baron said that an Action upon the case or a Trespass generally did lie well enough and he vouched F. N. B. that if a Bailiff arrest one without any warrant I shall have Trespass generally or an Action upon the case at my election and so in the like case 18. E. 4 fo 23. Trespass or Action upon the case lies also by F. N. B. if Executors be outed by the Testators Lessor there they may have an Action upon the case if they will or Trespass generally and in
ought to take notice as it was said by Damport who was of Councel with the Plantiffe in the Error for this word capiatur is of course entred in the Roll for the Kings fine which is due by him who is convicted of Trespass as it appears by Cook lib. 3. in Sir William Harberts case and in this case the fine was pardoned therefore pardonatur ought to be entred as it was in Vaughans case Cook lib. 5. but the Iudges resolved that of these general pardons they are not bound to take notice without pleading for in regard there are divers exceptions in them the partie ought to shew that he is none of the parties excepted as the Book is in E. 4. but if they will they may take notice thereof without pleading as it seems by Vaughans case and so said the Iudges in the Common Pleas this Term and so here the judgement was affirmed Calvert against Kitchin and Parkinson Trin. 7. Jac. in the Exchequer IN Trespas by Calvert against Kitchin and Parkinson upon a special verdict these points were moved and argued by the Councel at Bar and first â—â—e case in substance was that one Parkinson was a devisee of the next avoidance of the Parsonage of D. the which Church became void by the death of the Incumbent and after one A. and the said Parkinson Simoniacally agreed that the said Kitchin should be presented by the said Parkinson to the said Church aforesaid and that after Kitchin not knowing of this Simoniacall agreement was presented instituted and inducted to the Church aforesaid and all this was after the Statute of 31. Eliz. cap. 6. and after Queen Eliz. intending that this presentation belonging to her by reason of this presentation for Simonie by force of this Statute of the 31. Eliz. presented one D. and before that B. was admitted and instituted the Queen died and now the King presented Calvert with out any recital or mention of the presentment made by the Queen and without any Revocation actually made of the said first presentation and thereupon Calvert is admitted and instituted and for the Tithes as Parson he bâ—ought Trespass Hitchcock intended three questions as he said but moved also other things First if a devisee of the next avoidance be a Patron within the intent of this Statute of the 31. Eliz. cap 6. Secondly it within the said Statute here be Simonie in the Patron and not in the Parson if this ought to prejudice the Parson or not Thirdly if the King ought to present by this laps after the Queen had made presentment without recalling of the former presentation or if the presentation of the Queen ought to be adjudged a Turn to the first matter he said that a next avoidance is a thing devisable well enough within this Statute for the truth is it is not a thing of any value in the accompt of Law and therefore it is no prejudice although that the third part do not descend to the Patron for the Common Law intends it to be of no value and he said that the form of conferring to a benefice was ad ecclesiam c. as appears by 7. E. 3. fo 5. and he vouched Bracton to prove that the Patron had nothing but to provide that the Church should be full c. and to prove that this is a thing devisable he said that it was so adjudged in the Common Pleas Mich. 33. and 34. Eliz. Rot. 2122. but admitting that here was not any Patron by reason of any devise then if he who presented be a disturber and had acquired this Patronage hac vice by Vsurpation then that also is given to the King within the intent of this Statute by reason of this agreement for Simonie and therefore he said that if he who had but a nomination corruptly agree to make a presentation or nomination this nomination shall be forfeited to the King within this Statute as it is said in Plowden in Hare and Bickleys case he who hath the nomination hath the effect of the Advowson and also he observed the words of the Statute which say that if any person do for money c. present any one c. that every such persons presentation shall be void and it shall be lawful for the King to give the same benefice for that turn c. so that if he had title or not yet this turn is forfeited to the King as by the Statute of 1. Jac. cap. 33. it is provided if any goods which ought to pay subsidie be laid on the land the subsidie not paid c. the same goods shall be forfeited it hath been agreed that if a stranger who had nothing to do with these goods cause them to be laid upon the land that they shall be forfeited against the owner as it was admitted in Levison and Kirks case in 7. Jac. and so here in respect that the true Patron suffers a Vsurper to present and his presentee to be admitted and inducted this turn shall be forfeited to the King by reason of the Simonie against the rightful Patron and he conceived that although that the Presentee in this case was not partie to this corrupt agreement yet he shall be prejudiced by it although not so prejudiced thereby but that he may be capable to be presented again to the same benefice but hac vice the presentation of him is void for as Littleton saith the presentee ought to accept the Parsonage subject to such charges as the Patron pleaseth who in the time of Vacation hath power to charge it and so by his Act had made it subject to the forfeiture and therefore the person who cometh under him shall be prejudiced and therefore he vouchâ—â— the case in the 19. H. 8. fo 12. if a stranger agree to disseise an infant to the intent to infeoffe the Infant although that the Infant were not knowing of the Coven yet he shall not be Remitted because he came in under a wrong deer To the third matter he said that the King may revoke his presentation and by the same reason he may present another before his Presentee is instituted and to prove it he said that a Common person may recal his Presentation before the institution c. and he vouched the Book of the 31. E. 1. Tit. quare impedit 185. the Abbot of Leicesters case although that Dyer citing of it 12. Eliz. fo 292. conceives the Book contrary but it seems to be in reason that the Law is cleere that a Lay person may change although that a Spiritual person cannot and the reason is because a Lay person did not know his sufficiency peradventure at the first but a Spiritual person by intendment may inform himself thereof wel enough and therefore he vouched 18. H. 7. and 1. H. 8. Kelloways Reports which proves that diversity plainly as he said then he thought by the same reason if the King present one and dye or vary before institution that here he himself or
Queen here the Queen can have no remedy upon this promise without matter of Record and this is proved by 26. E. 3. fo 20. and without question the King intended by this Assumpsit that she might have remedy for the not performance thereof and although the Iury finds a Covenant in the Patent for repairing yet this is no sufficient performance of the consideration for the words super se assumpsit imploy a thing precedently done and not to be done or contained in the same Letters Patents as if the King recite in consideration that A. had surrendred he grants the same laud supposed to be surrendred although the very acceptance of the new grant is a surrender yet this is not the surrender intended nor this is not the consideration which moved the King for he intenedeth a precedent surrender and the very words and intent ought to be performed in the point of consideration or otherwise the grant is meerely void although it be not of a thing beneficiall to the King as appears by Cooke lib. 6. in the Lord Chandos case and although the consideration be but of a personall thing and not of a reall as the difference is taken by our Books and although that the consideration be of a thing executed and not Executory as also some Books take a diversity yet as it seemes to me the falcity herein avoids the Patent for this is of a thing which sounds to the Kings commodity and he vouched Barwicks case Cook l. 5.94 and 3. H. 7. that if the King for money paid makes a grant c. there it ought to be averred that the money was paid and in 21. E. 4. fo 48. if the King in consideration that A. had released a debt wherein truth there was no such debt c. this faâ—city avoids the grants Also if the King in consideration that A had surrendred his Letters Patents of an Estate Taile Grants him c. although that by the surrender the King was to have benefit notwithstanding because the estate yet continueth therefore this falsity avoids the Patent as appears in the Lord Chandos case Cook Lib. 6. Altonwoods case Cooks lib. 1. fo 43. and in our case the consideration is of a thing beneficiall to the King to be performed therefore the falcity much more avoids the Grant Also the Covenant found here to be made doth not aide the matter at all for it is not proper to be called a Covenant in Letters Patents because he did not seale unto it and it cannot be called his deed but yet shall be bound thereunto for his estate but not by way of action as the consideration intends Also it seemeth notwithstanding the construction here was that in consideration the Lessee would repaire c. yet as our case is the Patent is void because it is not repaired according as appears by Barwicks case Cook lib. 5. fo 94. that if the consideration in the case of the King be not duly performed and that prejudice may accrew to the King by reason of the not performance thereof this avoids the Patent Also if the case be so this would be an estate conditionall between common persons 38. H. 6. and the 6. E 6. Dyer 72. and 21. E. 4. by Hussey pro quod Relaxabit c. and so in Sir Thomas Wrothes case Plowden and 15. E. 4 for the King had no other remedy to compell the thing to be done except to seise the land for the not performance therefore it appears by 21. E. 4. and Cook in Altonwoods case that the Grantee ought to plead this consideration to be performed on his part which also appears by Sir Thomas Wrothes case if it be of a thing Executory and so for all these causes I pray that Iudgement may be given for the Plantiffe Crook George at another day argued to the contrary and he answered three points First it hath been agreed that the lease is void upon a false consideration imployed viz. the mis-recital Secondly admit that it is not void for that yet here part of the express consideration is not performed Thirdly the lease made to Hitchmore was in Iudgement of Law conditional and the condition not being performed makes an avoydance of the lease To the first point it seemeth that this false recital doth not avoid the Patent yet I agree the cases and Books which have been cited out of 9. H. 6. fo 27. and 29. E. 3. Grants 58 for in these Books it appears that the King is deceived both in point of suggestion and in point of interest but our case is not upon a false suggestion which doth prejudice the King in interest and in our case the King expresseth another thing to be the Consideration of his grant and the suggestion is not the consideration and therefore there is a great diversity and to warrant this to be a material diversitie he vouched the Rule of the case in 21. E. 4. fo 49. in Sir Thomas Wrothes case in Plowden for in 21. E. 4. it is agreed that the mis-recital that it was the Kings free Chappel is not material for the King is not deceived in point of interest and although that the book 3. H. 7. fo 6. is that if the King relase to a Prior a Corody because that the Priory was of the Kings foundation whereas it was of another mans foundation and therefore the release should be void because of the falsitie although that it be a falsitie in the consideration and so more strong then in our case yet in the said case it was adjudged to be a good release as appears in Plowden 331. put in the case of Mines and so is 3. H. 7. fo 7. and that this is not Law see Altonwoods case Cook lib. 1. accordingly and as to the book 15. E. 3. there cited he did agree unto it for if the King hath the title to present and he presenteth one not according to this title this presentation is void see Greens case in the Kings Bench 44. Eliz. accordingly and now reported by the Lord Cook lib. 6. fo 29.8 H. 7. fo 3. if the King grant the Mannor of D. of the value of 10. l. and this is of the value of 20. the King is deceived in the matter of value by the Information of the party and therefore the grant is void which was agreed in point of judgement in the Kings Bench 2. lac between Mason and Chambers but there it was adjudged that if the King will grant to A. the Mannor of D. which Mannor is of the value of 10. l. yearly whereas it is worth 20. l. yet the Grant is good because the words which Mannor is worth c. are words but of the Kings recital and in our case here is but one express Consideration and therefore the recital is not material see 37. H. 8. Brook Patents 100. that book maketh a quaere if a false consideration doth not avoid a Patent aswell as false suggestion but
Executor prosecureth as Executor c. and for the Testator and there it ought to have a resemblance of the Regionall debt and although that the Statute appoints that the sayl shall be to the party as Altham Baron remembred yet here as the pleading purports the Bayl is to the aforesaid Executor which implies a legall dependency upon the first suit Then it hath been granted and the Law is so that if an Executor recover a debt which was due to the Testator and hath judgement for it now if you will have an action upon this judgement this ought to be in the detinet because it is a legall pursuance of a thing given to the Testator and not voluntary as a bond for further security or assurance and so here the Bayl being pursuant and compulsory but by 5. E. 3. if it be voluntary then it ought to be put in the Kings Bench to an Executor which is to be resembled to our case if an Executor bring debt upon a Bayl it ought to be as Executor and not as I. S. cleerely Altham the Bayl in the Kings Bench is upon the originall suit and so it is not here wherefore c. to which it was not answered but for that matter it was adjourned see H. 6. in the Kings Bench if a Feme c. take Husband and one of the Debtors of the Testator promise the husband if he will forbear his suite to pay the debt if the Husband will commence his action upon this promise it ought to be in the name of his Wife also because the action pursueth the Originall debt Williams contr it was agreed that if the Law were such that the Action ought to be in the detinet only then the bringing of it in the debet and detinet is such a Ieofaile as is not aided by the Statute of 18. Eliz. Nichols case and Chamberlains case Cook lib. 5. Tanfield chief Baron said in this case that it is proper that the Action ought to be brought in the detinet only but as our case is here is no issue joyned because here is not a negative and an affirmative for the declaration is that he oweth and detaineth and the Bar whereupon the issue is joyned is that he oweth not so where if his Action ought to be in the detinet then there is not any Nâ—gative and so no issue which was not denyed at another day they agreed that the action ought to have bin in the detinet only and therefore judgement was given that the Plaintif take nothing by his bill Sir Henry Browns case touching the Countesse of Pembrook SIR Henry Browns case wherein Hawkins and Moore were parties was this the Plaintif declared of an ejectment of the Mannor of Kiddington Dâ—le Sale and doth not mention them to be adjacent to any Ville and also of an 100. Acres of Land lying in the same Ville of S. and that upon not guilty pleaded the Iury at the Assises at Oxon were ready and then the Defendant pleaded that the Plaintif after the last continuance had entred into a Close called Well Close parcell of the Tenements mentioned with conclusion and this in the Declaration he is ready to aver and demanded judgement if it c. and this was before Yelveton Iudge of Nisi Prius there and now the Plea here was debated And 1. in this case it was upon conference with all the Iudges allowed that this plea may be pleaded at the Assises well enough and the Iudge there accepting of it had done well but as Tanfield chief Baron said the Iudges may allow it or not for if they perceive that it is Dilatory they may refuse it for it is in their discretion and therefore c. But by Dodderidge the Kings Serjeant the Iudge of Nisi prius is not Iudge thereof if it be well pleaded or not but is to give day to the Parties in Court where the Suit depends to maintain this Plea for he is only appointed Iudge to take the issué and upon such Plea he ought to discharge the Iury of the matter in issue and record the Plea and this is all his duty and by him in this case here is a Discontinuance for the parties have no day given upon the Roll as it ought to be for the day in bank in judgement of Law is all one with the day of Nisi prius and this is of course given to the Parties to hear Iudgement only concerning the matter in issue and here is other matter and therefore the Iudge c. Nota that in all Cases where a thing is pleaded triable before other Iudges the Iudge before whom it depents ought to give day to the Parties to be before the Iudges where the matter is tryable 12. E. 3. Voucher 115. and Title Day 25. and 34. and Assise pla 14. a Lord demands Cognizance of Pleas day ought to be given to the Franchises or otherwise it is a discontinuance of the Nisi prius for there ought to be a speciall day for the parties here to hear judgment in this Plea 10. H. 7. fo 26. so if at the Nisi prius a protection be cast the Iudges shall give day to the Parties in Bank to hear judgment if this protection shalve allowed or not for the Iudg of Nisi prius is no Iudg therof Also the Iudg in this case ought to have discharged the Iury it appears not here that he had done so therefore upon the whole matter it is a discontinuance but admitting that here was no discontinuance it seemeth that the plea was good and I agree that in all cases of Pleas issuable the plea ought to be expresly shewed or that which Tantamounts and here is shewed that which Tantamounts for when the Plantiffe in his Action had shewed the names of the Mannors and the Towns in which the acres lies then the Venue to try it for every parcel shall come de vicineto from all together and by consequence it is reasonable that the Venue for the trial of one particular to be parcel or not parcel shall come from all for if the plea in this case were that the Plantiff hath entred into the premises this had been good and then if it be good for the general it seemeth it should be good for every particular also it is clear that two may be parcel of all the three Mannors as in this case it is admitted to be parcel of all the premises by the demurrer if so c. Coventry the plea here is not good for the plea is to the writ and the conclusion ought to be pursuant to the premises of the plea or otherwise the plea is not good 36. H. 6. if a man plead to the writ and conclude to the Action it is evil 20. Eliz. Dyer 361. also the plea is not good because it is not shewed where the land lies wherein the entrie is alledged and therefore if the Plantiffe had denied it then is there no
the Mannor of Caversfield rendring rent and that this rent was arrear and thereupon an Inquisition returned and a scire facias issued to Moil who occupied the land to shew cause wherefore the King should not have this land whereupon he pleaded as Ter-tenant and upon this plea the Kings Attorney demurred but it was misentred as see hereafter but for divers great imperfections aswell in the Kings Commission as otherwise the Defendant ought to have judgement as all the Barons agreed as by the arguments of every Baron upon mature deltheration appeareth but for the reasons of the Barons to the exceptions taken by the Councel see after for they are very good Bromley Puisue Baron whereas the Inquisition purporteth that the Iurors in the County of Bucks have found a foundation of a Priory in the County of Oxon. that is not good by course of Law for if a thing be local the Iurors of another County cannot finde it and here the Commission giveth power only to inquire of things in the County of Bucks and he vouched Plowden in the Earl of Leicesters case upon a Commission directed to White Lord and Maior c. also the Inquisition is that Thomas Banbury Nuper Prior was seised and made a conveyance as is affirmed that is not good also the word Nuper may be intended a 100. years before and so no certainty as appears in Wrothesly and Adams case in Plowden Altham 2d Baron there are three faults in the Commission First is to inquire of a Mannor and lands of the late Priory of Bister in Caversfield in the County of Bucks and by these words no power is given to inquire of any thing concerning the Priory which is in the County of Oxon. and the words in the County of Bucks do defer to all the sentence precedent and not to the word Caversfield only 19 E. 4. fo 16 7. H. 6. fo 8. if A. B. and C. be insula de D. it shall be construed that the word insula hath reference to all the three Towas but if it were in A. B. and C. insula and not in insula then it is otherwise a Commission to inquire of lands of the Prior of Bister is evil without question where Bister is and he said that this may be proved by Pages case Cook lib. 5. also the Commission doth not propose any end wherefore the Iury should be but generally to inquire of the lands of the Priory at the time of the dissolution so that it may be certified to the King by the Inquisition the first fault which is found is that the Priory was founded by the name of the Church of Saint Mary and Saint Egbert without saying the Prior and Covent of c. and without finding of the place of the foundation viz. Bister and this cannot be without assignmend of the place of the foundation viz. Bister also the finding is that one Thomas Banbury then Prior as is affirmed made a feofment c. and this is not good because it ought to be absolutely found or otherwise it is not material also the intent of the feofment is found to be made by the Prior but no livery is found thereupon as it ought although that livery shall be intended in the case of a feofment pleaded by a common person yet it ought to be found expresly in the case of a Corporation and the finding here and that by vertue whereof he was seised as the Law requireth doth not aide the case Snig Baron it seems to me that this Commission was only to inform if the matter had been sufficient to us to give judgement to the King but here being to intitle c. it is not good the Commission is to inquire for the King of the lands of the Prior and this meerly incertain without saying certainly of what Prior and therefore they have no power to inquire of the lands of the Priory also the Iury of the County of Bucks cannot inquire of the name of the foundation of a Corporation in the County of Oxon. for the foundation is matter Local but it seems to me here that the finding by vertue whereof he was seised prout c. shall be intended that livery was made being by a verdict Tanfield chief Baron here is not any demurrer being mis-entred and therefore we have power to proceed to any matter in Law for the purpose in this case was that whereas the Statute of the 27. H. 8. of lesser Monasteries under the yearly value of 200. l. giveth them to the King and this Mannor of Caversfield within this Statute is to be seised as is pretended in this case whereupon this Commission issued to inform the King of this Mannor as parcel of these Revenues for I deny that it is an office of intitling it is only an office of instruction for the Statute of 27. H. 8. dissolves the smaller Monasteries and vests them actually in the King and this is the difference from the Statute of the 31. H. 8. for this Statute is only an Act to Abolish the lands of dissolved Monasteries and therefore this Statute is only to inform for the Statute of 27. H. 8. had intitled the King and he said that the land shall be in the King without office so that it being but an office of instruction this may be good notwithstanding divers incertainties therein contained but the plain and apparant fault herein is because it is not to inquire what lands the Prior had at the time of the dissolution as it ought to be for the words are to inquire what lands the late Prior had but it seems to me in this case that the Iurors of the County of Bucks may inquire of the foundation in another County without doubt this being but to inform and not to intitle and this is not alike mischief to the party for otherwise all Commissions to inform would be quashed and I have seen a Record in this Court where a man of a good family was found to be the Kings Villain regardant to a Mannor in Norfolk and this was done by a Iury in Suffolk and therefore in such cases God defend but that a Iury may finde a matter local in another County also a gross defect is in the Inquisition viz. because it doth not mention that the Mannor of Caversfield came to the King by the Statute of the 27. H. 8. but that the Priory came to the King by that Statute and doth not say that this Mannor was part of the possessions of the Priory at the time of dissolution and for these last matters it is apparent that the Inquisition and Commission are vitious although it be not proper for us as the case is to adjudge it for here is no demurrer joyned for the demurrer is joyned as if it were upon an Information of intrusion and here is no intrusion laid to the charge of the Defendant and yet after the plea pleaded by Moil the Attorney prayed that he may be
the Plantiffe shall be outed to take advantage of a bad plea and so upon the whole matter it seems that judgement shall be given in the ejectione firme for the Plantiffe Altham second Baron to the same purpose there needs no special day to be given by the Iudge of nisi prius although that it be upon a Collateral matter or plea for by the record in this Court a day is given to the Iurors conditionally viz. if the Iustices of nisi prius at the Assises do not come c. but to the parties it is given absolutely fee 6. Assises pla 7. and L. 5. E. 4. fo 2 3 and 4. where there are several cases to this purpose see 9. E. 3.21 H. 6. fo 10. if the Defendant make default at nisi prius a new distress shall issue to the same Iurors to be here in Bank and 3. H. 6. fo 8. and 9. if a man appear and plead he shall never take advantage of any discontinuance Also it seemeth that the plea is not good and to say that the word Tenementorum refers only to the odde acres and not to the Mannor it seemeth that it refers to all but if it shall be taken to refer only to the odde Acres yet this is not good and this is proved by the Book in L. 5. E. 4. fo 110. for a plea to the writ ought to be alwayes certain and this case also answereth that which hath been said that the demurrer confesseth the matter against the Plantiffe for I say if you plead a release in Bar of a debt and shew no place where the release was made this demurrer is no confession of the release except that the cause of the demurrer fall out against me wherefore in respect that the plea is not good and is peremptory to the Defendant as other pleas to the writs are for this cause I conceive Iudgement shall be given for the Plantiffe Snig Baron accordingly that the plea is not good for the not shewing of a place certain wherein the entrie was as by the matter of discontinuance it seemeth that the day of nisi prius is all one with the day in Bank and therefore there needs no day to be given and for that the death of any of the parties after the verdict and before the day in Bank shall not stay the judgement the Books which were cited on the other parts are different from our case for there the suit was adjourned into another Court and the Courts in the Country are not as the Courts here and therefore it was necessary that in such cases a day ought to be given for the manner of pleading we ought to give judgement against him who pleads the plea notwithstanding the matter admitted by the Plantiffe wherefore judgement shall be given for the Plantiffe Tanfield chief Baron accordingly the plea whereupon the issue was joyned was for three Mannors and lands in three Towns and entrie is alledged to be in two Closes called c. parcel of the premises in Bar of the Action if the Defendant in liew of not guiltie plead an affirmative plea and at nisi prius he pleads another plea then the entrie ought to be that the Defendant relicta verificatione c. but in our case such an entrie needs not the plea here ought to be more certain then others for two reasons First it is pleaded in abatement of the writ Secondly it is in delay of the Plantiffe and to which no rejoynder can be made as to the plea it seemeth it is not good for by 10. H. 7. fo 16. a quare impedit was brought by an Administrator of a grantee of a next avoidance and shewed that the Bishop of Sarum granted Administration to him the Defendant saith that the intestate had bona notabilia in divers Diocesses and so the Administration void and shewed in what Diocesses the goods were but shewed no place where they were and therefore it was adjudged that the plea was not good because he did not shew a place c. see 2. R. 3. and 5. H. 7. accordingly and this plea shall not be amended by a rejoynder as is 21. H. 7. also to say parcel of the premises this cannot be intended that parcel of three Mannors or of the three Towns in certain and therefore the plea cannot be good because there is no place from whence the venue should come and it is inconvenient that the venue should come from all if the place where c. lies but in one Town for as it appears in Arundels case Cook lib. 6. if a Mannor be alledged to be within a Town the venue shall come from the Town because it is a place more certain as to the general demurrer that the plea aforesaid is lesse sufficient in Law c. in 18. E. 4. it appears that in debt upon an Obligation the Plantiffe doth not shew a place where the Obligation c. and the Defendant confessed the Action yet notwithstanding this fault Iudgement ought to be given against the Defendant but this differeth from our case because here is an express confession and in our case here is not also here needs not to be shewed any special cause of demurrer but advantage may be taken well enough upon the general demurrer but if the demurrer were that the plea amounted to the general issue only there ought to be shewed a special cause or otherwise no advantage to be taken and he cited the agreement of seven Iudges to be at Serjeants Inne in Fleetstreet this Term in a writ of Error in Dickensons case the case intended was between White and Priest parties in an Action upon Trover and conversion and the Record thereof is in the Kings Bench Trin. 7. Jac. Rot. 843. as to the matter in Law touching the discontinuance for want of a doy given by the Iudge of nisi prius it seemeth there is no discontinuance in this case for there needs not to be any day given as our case is yet in some case the Iudge of nisi prius ought to give day but that shall not be a new day but only the day within contained and that but in special cases viz. if the issue be joyned and at the shewing of the evidence there is a demurrer here the Iudge giveth to the party the day within contained as it appears in 10 H. 8. Rot. 835. and Hill 11. H. 8 accordingly in the Common Pleas but Hill 36. Eliz Rot. 448. upon non-suit at the Assises no day given so if the party confess the Action and so if there be a bill of exceptions yet no day shall be given Hill 38. Eliz. Rot. 331. in the Kings Bench but peradventure it will be said that these Authorities do not match with our case because it is upon a material plea but I say it is all one and therefore in case of a release pleaded after the last continuance this is recorded and yet no day given as appears Hill 4. H. 8.
Rot. 906. in the Common Pleas and this was upon a new and Collateral matter as our case is Trin. 20. H. 8. Rot. 247. or 2447. upon an Arbitrament pleaded and he vouched divers other precedents upon the same point Trin. 3. H. 8. 446. or 466. and 14 H. 8. Rot. and 11. H. 8. Rot. 446. and Mich. 31. H. 6. Rot. 141. and. Hill 33. H. 6. Nota that here it was admitted without any doubt that an Ejectione firmae lyeth of a Mannor although it was said at the Bar that Williams Iustice was of opinion to the contrary the last assises at Norwich and so by all Iudgement was entred for the Plaintiff immediately and a Writ of Error was brought but never prosecuted for the Countesse of Pembrook had day given to remove her goods out of the Mansion House and so she relinquished the possession of all the premisses as I heard Trespasse against Gibson and others VPon evidence to a Iury an Action of Trespass against Gibson and others it appears that the Defendant was Deputy to the Duke of Lenox upon his Patent of Vlnage and that by vertue thereof he pretended to make search of certaine Stuffs called new Drapery which the Plaintiff were carrying to London and at the Town of Ware two or three strangers affirming themselves to be servants of the said Gibson did unpack the said Drapery and laid it in the dirt whereby the Plaintifs were hindred of the sale c. And in this case it was agreed if they as Servants to Gibson without his precedent appointment doe seise the Plaintifs goods and the said Gibson approve them to be seised although his Servants without his consent abuse the goods yet Gibson shall be Trespasser ab initio Also they agreed without any scruple although that the first seisure of these goods be admitted to be lawfull as by the pretence or licence in Law yet the abusing of them makes the originall seisure to be wrongfull and trespass lyeth and therefore in this case although it were not proved that Gibson himself appointed or was privy to the misusing aforesaid yet he shall be charged in dammages and so he was for severall seisures in an Action to 32. pounds viz. 30. l. for one seisure and 2. l. for another seisure and so severall dammages for severall Trespasses in one Action and although that by the abusing of an Authority or licence in facto a man shall not be a Trespassor ab initio but an Action upon the Case lyeth yet for misusing of an Authority in Law Trespass lyeth ab initio for if he who hath power to seise Estrayes will labour the Estray a Trespas lyeth for the seising thereof Bagshews case Hill 4. Jacobi in the Kings Bench. Bromleys Case Hill 8. Jacobi in the Exchequer HUtton Serjeant came to the Bar and shewed that one Bromley had before this time made a Lease for years in County Palatine of Durham of certaine Cole-mines in that County rendring rent 100. l. per annum which rent is arreare for divers years and that Bromley became outlawed here in the Common Pleas for debt at the Suit of Cullamour a Merchant and that the King had granted this debt due upon this Lease for years as forfeited for outlawry unto him And Hutton for the Bishop said that it belongs to him because he had all the goods of men outlawed within his County and if this debt belongs to the King or the Bishop it was the doubt the party being outlawed in the County of Northumberland which is out of the County Palatine of Durham Tanfield chief Baron said that the debt shall follow the person and he said that in 21. Eliz. Vere and Jefferies case it was a question if debt upon a Bond shall be forfeited to him who had such a priviledge where the Bond is and he said that in this case it was resolved that he shall have the Bond and debt who had Bona utlagatorum where the Bond is and so it was resolved as he said in a Case referred out of the Realm of Ireland but here is a bebt which accrueth by reason of a reall contract of goods in the County Palatine and he who is Debtor is the party outlawed but not in the County Palatine of Durham And Hutton Serjeant said that he dad the Rolle of a Case in this Court in the time of E. 3 that the Bishop of Durham was allowed a debt in a more strong case then this is for there a Creditor was outlawed in London and his Bond was also in London and the Creditor was only an Inhabitant within the County Palatine yet the Bishop was allowed this debt Curia put in your Claime and we will allow that which is reasonable and it was adjourned Isabell Fortescues case VPon a motion it was shewed by Coventry that upon a penalty imposed upon Isabell Fortescue for her Recusancy and Inquisition issued and it was found by the Iury that the said Isabell was seised of no Lands but those mentioned in a Schedule to the Inquisition annexed and then expresseth divers particulars in the Schedule without expresse finding that she was seised of them this is no good Inquisition nor finding of any seisin by the whole Court And so by the Court where an Inquisition or Schedule saith that the said Isabell was seised of the Mannor of D. as by information this is not good cleerely for it may be she is seised without information but where it was shewed that upon this insufficient Inquisition divers summes of money were levied and paid into the Kings Coffers that this may be restored The Court answered it doth not appear but that the King may by a new Inquisition have this money justly therefore it shall not be delivered out of the Kings Coffers but if you mone good matter in equity to be discharged in your English Bill you shall have restitution c. Brockenburies case THe Kings Debtor suffered A. to manure his Land and therefore the Sheriff seised the goods of A. for this debt whereupon A. to the intent to have his goods again paid the Fees to the Sheriff and made a Bond to the King to pay the Summe due And now upon a motion and Affidavit that the Debtor himself had sufficient to satisfie the debt due it was ordered by the Court that the Fees taken by the Sheriff shall be restored to A. and that the Bond remaine in the Office here and if this debt can be levied of the lands or goods of the Debtor the Bond shall be delivered to A. but if it fall out that it cannot be levied of the Debtor then the King shall resort to A. upon this Bond and he shall have the assistance of this Court for his reliefe against the said Brokenbury the Debtor Robert Beckets case touching Recusancy RObert Backet seised of divers Lands in Fee in the County of Cornwall upon an Indictment in 28. Eliz. was convicted of Recusancy for 10. moneths next before and died
in 1. Jacobi and no other conviction ever was and yet de facto he continued a Recusant untill his death and his Land viz. two parts thereof were seised in his life and the King answered of 200. l. thereof which incurred in the moneths contained in the Indictment and now a Writ is issued which supposeth the said Robert to be indebted to the King in 20. l. for every moneth be lived after 28. Eliz. untill 1. Jacobi for his Recusancy which amounted to 4000. l. which Writ also commands to enquire what Lands the said Robert Becket had at the time of his death and thereupon it was found that he had divers Lands c. and upon a Scire facias to the Terretenants to shew cause wherefore two parts of the Lands of the said Robert Becket should not now be seised for the debt of the Recusant aforesaid one Henry Becket as Terretenant or Tenant of the Premisses pleaded that the King is satiefied of all the 20. l. and for all the moneths that the said Robert was convicted to be a Recusant and he vouched the Constat thereof under the hand of the Deputy of the Pipe Office and for the residue he said that by 28. Eliz. cap. 6. it is amongst other things enacted that if any person which hath not repaired or shall not repaire to some Church Chappell or usuall place of Common Prayer but hath forborne or shall forbeat the same contrary to the Tenor of the Statute of 23. Eliz. cap. 1. and hath been heretofore convicted for such offence shall forfeit c. provided that it he hath made submission and been conformable according to the true meaning of the said Statute or shall fortune to dye that then no forfeiture of 20. l. for any moneth or for seisure of the Lands of the same offender from and after such submission and conformity or death and full satisfaction of all the arrerages of 20 l. monethly before such seisure due or payable shall ensue or be continued against such Offendor and traverseth without that that there is any Record besides this Writ to charge the said Robert Becket deceased of or for the summe of 4000. l. towards our said Lord the King c. and so prayeth to be discharged thereof Vpon which Plea the Kings Atturney Generall demurred and Coventry argued that the Plea is good he said that there are three Points to be considered First that if a man be convicted of Recusancy in 28. Eliz. for 10. moneths then passed and de facto continueth a Recusant untill his death in 1. Jac. without other conviction if now the King can claim 20. l. a moneth for more moueths then are contained in the Indictment whereupon he is convicted Secondly admit that the King may have the forfeiture for every moneth whereof no conviction was as well as if a conviction had been then if the King can seise the Lands for the payment thereof after his death no seisure being had for it in his life by the Stat. of the 28. Eliz. or if the power of seisure be altogether gone by the death of the Recusant Thirdly admitting that the King shall have more then is contained within the Indictment if the Debt it self be not gone by the death of the Recusant To the first Point there is no President to be found that any man convicted before 28. Eliz. was charged to the Payment of more then that which was within the Indictment and the words of the Statute of 28. Eliz. contained within this Clause which provides for the payment due since the Conviction do not inforce any construction to the contrary and in this Clause the words being do yet remain unpaid are not proper words but for a thing payable before this Statute for so many moneths whereof he was convicted of Recusancy and the words without any other conviction are to be understood for so much as was unpaid of that contained in the Indictment and the last Clause of this Branch of the Statute hath not the words without any conviction and the other Clause provides that by expresse words for the future time every person who shall be once convicted shall forfeit c without other conviction and it was resolved Hill 4. Jacobi in the Kings Bench between Grinstone and Oliver that the Statute of 28. Eliz. alters and adds three things to the Statute of 23. Eliz. 1. That all the money due for Recusancy shall be paid into the Exchequer 2. This limits a time for payment thereof yearly viz. in the four Terms of the year 3. This giveth a penalty viz. power to seise all the goods and two parts for non-payment but all that is only for that which was payable before the conviction and therefoâ—e the words in the Branch which contains our Case have apt words of construction that he shall pay all due for the paine of seisure for 23. Eliz. gives no seisure but imprisonment if payment be not made within three moneths after judgement and so in our case Conviction ought to precede the duty To the second Point it seemeth that the power of seisure within this Statute is gone by the death of the Recusant for before the Statute of 1. Jacobi the power for seisure was but a penalty that if the party fail in payment of 20. l. a moneth then c. and in all cases upon penall Laws if the party die before the penalty inflicted this shall not be inflicted at all and that this is but a penalty he vouched one Grayes case in 1. and 2. Jacobi to be adjudged accordingly Also the words in this Statute which give the seisure of Land appointeth a levying to be of the 3. part for the maintenance of the Offendor his Wife Children and Family and after his death he hath no Wife so that if it be demanded when the seisin must be the answer is then when a third part may be left for his use which cannot be but in the life of the Recusant Also it appoints that the seisure ought to be by Processe which ought to be in the life of the party by intendment Also the Proviso of the Statute of 28. Eli. saith that if any person shall dye no seisure shall insue or be continued aâ—d out case is within those words for in regard there hath been no seisure in his life therefore after his death no seisure ought to insue and the words which purport another semblance of construction viz. and satisfaction of all arrerages are to be understood only in case where there was a former seisure that is in the life of the party and have reference to the words to be continued and that the intent is so he said that the words are so that the Heir shall pay no more but so much as the Land was seised for To the third it seemeth that in this case the debt it self is gone by the death of the party At the Common Law a penalty shall never be recovered against the
words of a fee to be in the feoffor and the Bar confesseth only as of a fee gained in an instant but I agree that if the Bar had been that the Feoffor was Tenant for years and made a Feofment this had been good without Traverse but when Tenant in tail makes a Feofment it shall not be intended that he gained a Fee because it may be he hath purchased the remainder and thereby had lawfully acquitted it as an addition to his estate and here the saying in the Deelaration that Edward Stanley was seised in Fee as a thing material and of necessitie and not superfluous as the pleading in a Declaration for debt upon an Obligation to say that the Obligor was of full age or as a Repetition of the writ which needs not be Traversed and that it appears in 15. Ed. 4. in some case a Surplusâ—ge ought to be Traversed and 7. Ed. 6. Title Formedon the Declaration as in our case ought to be special and 21. H. 7. if a man will maintain debt upon a lease he ought to shew how he was in titled to make the lease also although that in our case the lease for years is the effect of the suit yet I say that the seisin in Fee is the effect of the plea 27. H. 8.50 H. 7.14 in a replevin the Defendant avows as seised in Fee the Plantiffe sayes that he was seised for life and doth Traverse c. and 14. and 15. Eliz. was our very case Dyer 312. and there it is said that the sure way is to take a Traverse as it is also said in 11. Eliz. Dyer also where the Bar saith that one R. was seised in Fee and gave it to the Father of the Feoffor and the heirs of his body he ought to say that the land descended to the Feoffor as son and heir of the body c. also where the Plantiffe declareth of a lease for years made by force of a feofment made the 30. day of August 6. Iac. the Bar saith generally that the 30. day of August 6. Iac. the said Feoffor made a Feofment of the same land to the same persons c. but he doth not say that it is one and the same with the Feofment mentioned in the Declaration so he answereth not our title and for that cause not good and therefore he prayed Iudgement for the Plantiffe Jones of Lincolns Inne to the contrary it seemeth as to the first matter moved that in this case the resioue of the use shall result back to the Feoffor 34. Eliz. Balfores case if Tenant in tail make a Feofment to the use of himself for life without more by Popham the residue of the use shall be to the Feoffee for otherwise the estate for life would be drowned but otherwise it is when a remainder of an use is limited to another in Fee for this saves the drowning or confounding of the estate for life as to the point of remitter it seemeth that it is no other but that Tenant in tail makes a Feofment to the use of himself and his heirs and dies if the issue shall be remitted or not and as to that he said that the Statute of 27. H. 8. cap. 10. hath by express words a saving of all antient rights and therefore the antient right of the estate tail is saved and therefore the issue shall be thereunto remitted and so should the Tenant in tail himself if he had not been within the words of the Statute as it is resolved in Amy Townsends case in Plowden and the authorities of my part are 33. H. 8.54 in Dyer expresly with me and without any quere as to the point of remitter but there it is said that he ought to avoid the lease by entrie as in our ease it is pleaded and as to the pleading it seems there needs no Traverse First because it is matter in Law Secondly we have confessed a Fee in an instant as to the first reason the Declaration is generally of a seisin in Fee and not expresly of a Fee simple and therefore it is matter in Law 5. H. 7. and 11. H. 7.21 the Fee not Traversed 46 Ed. 3.24 in Dower the Defendant pleads a special tail made by one who was seised in Fee the other saith that the Dower had but an estate tail at the time of the gift without Traversing that he was seised in Fee 2. Ed. 4.11 that a seisin in Fee tail is sufficient to maintain an allegation of a seisin in Fee to the second reason it is not alledged expresly that he was seised in Fee but quod cum talis seisitus fuit c. and 34. H. 6.48 he needed not in his Declaration to say that he was seised in Fee Pasch 34. et 35. Eliz. Taylors case if the Plantiffe in a quare impedit alledgeth seisin in Fee and the Defendant confess the seisin by Vsurpation this is a sufficient confession of the seisin in Fee Fitzherbert Title Travers 154. a good case to this purpose and in Moils case cited before on the other side the Plantiffe doth not mention in his Declaration a seisin in Fee absolute and the Defendant saith that A. was seised and gave to the Plantiffe as long as A. had issue of his body he needs not Traverse the absolute Fee Pasch 33. Eliz. in the Common Pleas where there was a stronger case to the replication the Defendant said that the Countess of Devon was seised and leased for life the remainder to her self for life the other saith that the Countess was seised in tail and Traverseth that she was not seised in Fee it is there said that the Countesses estate in Fee need not to be Traversed and yet it was there agreed that in regard it was but matter of form it was aided by the Statute of Jeoffales for that was moved in arrest of judgement Tanfield chief Baron in the principal case the issue of the Feoffor is remitted without entrie notwithstanding the lease because it is not in possession but a lease in remainder and therefore the title of the Lessees is distrained before entrie by the Defendant and therefore the Defendant hath not answered the entrie upon the Lessees for you by your plea destroy the title to this Term which you have allowed them before they were ever in possession thereof and the Declaration is that they were possessed of a Term for years and that you ejected them and to this you give no answer upon the matter for clearly if Tenant in tail make a lease to commence at a day to come and dieth before the day this is meerly void by his death ad quod non fuit responsum see Plowden in Smith and Stapletons case for there it is made a quere and notwithstanding that Tanfield chief Baron with the assâ—nt of the whole Court pronounced that judgement should be entred against the Plantiffe immediately and so it was done Bents case IN a suit depending in this Court between
Bent and another for a Close it was ordered and an Injunction accordingly awarded that the Defendant should suffer the Plaintiffe to injoy the said Close with the appurtenances until c. and contrary to this order the Defendant had put his Cattle into the Close and thereupon an Attachment issued to answer this contempt and he said that he put in his Castle for a title of Common and it was ruled that this was no breach of the Injunction because the Common was not in question in the Bill but only the title of the Close wherefore he was discharged of the contempt and with the appurtenants doth not include the Common to be taken in the said Close Henry Clares case UPon a motion made by Serjeant Barker it appeared that one Henry Clare was indebted to the King and was seised of a third part of certain lands in Norfolk and that Mr. Richardson of Lincolns Inne was seised of other two Acres of the same laud as Tenant in Common and the beasts of Mr. Richardson pastured promiscuously upon all the land and Henry Clare put more Cattle in and upon proces to levy this debt for the King the Sheriffe took the Cattle of Mr. Richardson and sold them and it was now ruled that in regard it was lawful for a Tenant in Common to put in his Cattle upon all the land and that if they depasture all the grass the other hath no remedy and for that cause the Sheriffe could not take those Cattle for the debt of another Tenant in Common but otherwise it would be if the Cattle had been levant and Couchant upon the land of the Kings debtor and in the principal case the Sheriffe was ordered to restore the monie to Richardson for which they were sold and that if they were worth more yet the Sheriffe should not be charged therewith except it could be made appear some fraud in the sale or that sufficient suerties were to pay and discharge the dutie but if my Cattle are levant and Couchant upon the land of the Kings debtor the King may distrain them damage Feasant but he cannot distrain them for the debt by Tanfield chief Baron and Altham clearly to which Baron Bromley consented but Snig said beware of that Smith and Jennings case VPon evidence to a Iury it was said by Tanfield that if a man make Charter of Feofment of lands in two Towns and a Letter of Attorney to make livery and before livery made by the Attorney the Feoffor himself maketh livery of the land in one Town this is a Countermand of the Letter of Atturney and so livery cannot be made by the Attorney in the other Town and quere if the Towns were in several Counties Bacon the Kings Solicitor said that if a man make a Charter of Feofment of two several Acres whereof one is in lease for years and the other in demeasne and the Feoffor makes a Letter of Attorney to make livery and before that be executed the Feoffor himself makes livery now although that one Acre cannot pass by this livery because it is in lease yet this is a Countermand and revocation of the authoritie given by the Letter of Attorney for his intent is manifest so to be to which Tanfield and all the Court agreed Hobert Attorney general said that in this case although that one of the Acres was in lease yet in regard it appeareth not that the Lessee was in actual possession therefore he conceived that it should be construed that the Lessee was not in actual possession at the time of the livery made by the Lessor in the name of all and in respect there was no house upon the Acre in Lease it may be intended that the Lessee should be in actual possession but for that cause he rather conceived that it should be construed that the Lessee was not in possession and so the livery might well operate to pass it Tanfield and all the Court denied that the livery was good to pass it although that the Lessor was in actual possession but where Mr. Atturney alledged further that before the livery made an Infant had a Term for years in this Acre in lease and that the Feoffor at the time of the livery was gardian to the Infant and thereby had a possession therein and therefore the livery made in the other Acre in the name of all should be good to pass all to which the Court agreed and thereupon directed the Iury to finde the livery and seisin to be made of all and in this case the Court inclined that because this Feofment was made but ten dayes before that the Feoffor committed Treason and in asmuch as it was made to the use of the son being an Infant and not upon consideration of marriage that therefore the Feofment should be fraudulent and void as to the King but the Atturney general said that this Feofment was made in performance of a precedent agreement viz. it was agreed that the Feoffor should make such a conveyance to an use c. and that the wife of the Feoffor also being an Inheritrix should make such a conveyance of her land which was done accordingly and upon proofe of this agreement the Court inclined that it was no fraud and in this case it was ruled by the Court if parties have matter of evidence by the Records of this Court they ought to produce the Records themselves for Copies of them are not allowable It was said by Altham and agreed by the Court that if an Information be exhibited for intruding into a Close the 24th day of March and for the asportation of 9. Cart Loads of Wheat betwixt the 24th of March and the first of October the which the Detendant converted c. and upon not guiltie pleaded the Jury found that the Defendant took three Cart Loads of the said Corn upon the 24th day of March and after before the first of October they took also three Cart Loads more and damages were assessed for all that here no judgement shall be given upon this verdict for the Information doth not charge the Defendant with the taking of any part upon the 24th day of c. and then in regard that damages are more judgement can be given for no part of it see Cook lib. 5. Plaisters case but this case being moved at another day Tanfield said that he having inspected the Record he found the verdict insufficient for another cause because the Jury found that as to one Cart Load of Wheat to the value of 20. l. the Defendant was guiltie and doth not mention to what damage viz. to the damage of 100. s. or otherwise and by him ad valentiam is not sufficient without shewing also to what damage and for that cause by him a venire facias de novo ought to be awarded and so it was done by the Court. Edwards case EDwards case was that an erroneous judgement was given in a Coppihold Court where the King was Lord and this
Serjeant moved that this matter might be specially found Tanfield said the Iury knows our opinion and therefore leave it to them and the Verdict was given that the condition was not broken See Term Pasch that proofes by deposition taken here in a former suite shall be allowed in this notwithstanding all the parties be alive and it was adjourned Note that in Staffords case in the Court of Wards this Term Flemming and Cook were of opinion with Tanfield here viz. That notice ought to be given to the Infant in the Case above-said I. S. was Parson of D. as appropriate and A. is Vicar and the King is Patron of the said Vicaridge and debate was between the Parson and the Vicar this Suite ought to be in the Exchequer for these Tithes and by the Court it may be commenced accordingly by English Bill in the Exchequer or by Action to the Office of Pleas for it is apparant that the King is Supreme Ordinary this was Pasch 9. Jacobi Sir Stephen Leazures case IN Sir Stephen Leazures case upon a charge upon Sir Thomas Gresham deceased Process issued to the Sheriffs of London to inquire what Lands the said Sir Thomas had in London at the time of the debt accrewed and to whose hands c. And the Inquisition found that the said Sir Thomas was seised of divers Messuages in London in four severall Parishes viz. in c. And now the Maior and Comminaltie of London came as Tenants of the premisses and demanded Oyer of the Inquisition and then demurred thereupon and by the Court the Inquisition is insufficient for the words of divers c. are so generall that no exception thereupon may be made nor the party can give no answer thereunto so of an Office found in the Court of Wards as it hath been divers times here used see Carters case Pasch 8. Jac. in the Court of Wards Kitchin against Calvert SEe the Case before fo many Arguments therein at the Bar by Bridgeman Ireland Serjeant Hutton and the Atturney Generall in Michaelmas and Hilalry Jac. And now the Barons argued and first Bromley Puisne Baron argued for the first matter which is when a Church being void the Patron contracts with Parkinson for money to be given to present Kitchin the money to be given by Parkinson and Kitchin not knowing of this Symonie is presented instituted and inducted thereunto whether this be void or not The 2d Matter is admitting that this is void that the Queen presented Covell who died before Institution or admission if this presentation be good to Calvert without a Repeal of the Presentation made by the Queen and it seems to be in both points for the Plaintiff To the first point be said That the intent of the Statute was to cradicate all manner of Symonies and therefore the words are not if any man give money to be presented but they are if any present for money and the Iutors here found 20. l. to be given and nothing for what it was given or to whom it was given for if money be the meede a Presentation is void and therefore if I. S. be Patron of the Church of D. which is void and a stranger saith to me procure the Presentation for A. and you shall have 100. l. and he procured A. to be presented here if the Patron had notice of the money given to me this Presentation is void but otherwise not and in our case without notice of the Parson the Admissor and all which ensued thereupon is void by reason of the Symonie in the Patron and it is void as to the Parson also and if in this Case we are not within the words of the Statute yet we are within the intent cleerely as upon 1. Ed. 6. of Chanteries an estate made for years or for life to Superstitious uses shall be within the intent although not within the words of that Statute as it appears in Adams and Lamberts case Cooke lib. 4. So the Statute of 11. H. 7. should be construed to meet with Cases of like mischief as it appears in Sir George Browns case Cooke Lib. 3. and Panormitane saith that Simonia est Studiosa voluntas emendi vel vendendi aliquid Spirituale vel Spirituali annexum cum opere subsequente To the second Point it seems that the Presentation made by the King to Calvert is good without aid of the Statute of 6. H. 8. cap. 15. for Covell who were the Presentee of the Queeen had nor interest no estate and yet if he had it would be void by the death of the Queen for the presentation is but a commendation and therefore if the Patron present his Villaine this maketh no infranchisement and so if Lessee for years of a Patronage be presented this doth not extinguish his Term. And whereas it hath been said that the Kings Grant cannot be construed to two intents true it is if it be to the Kings prejudice but otherwise it is if it be for his benefit as plainly appears in Englefieldss case Cook lib. 7. See 17. Ed. 3. fo 29. Also it is without question that the King may actually revoke his Presentation as it appears by 28. Ed. 3.47 And this implied Revocation is as good being for the Kings benefit as an actuall or expresse Revocation Dyer 18. Eliz. 348. And it was adjudged in Pasch 3. Jac. in the Common Pleas Rot 1722. one Williams case that an Actuall Revocation or Repeale is not necessary And so it was adjudged Trin. 8. Jac. Rot. 1811. in the Bishop of Chichesters case and therefore the King may make a Presentation to a Church which belongs to him by reason of Wardship under the Seale of the Court of Wards because the presentation is only a Commendation as it was there said and so it was agreed also Trin. 8. Jac. at Serjeants June by Flemming Cook and Tanfield in the Lord Windsors case referred unto them out of the Court of Wards and there it was said by Cook that the King may present by Parol as it appears by 17. Eliz. Dyer and that a Second Administration may be well granted without Repeal of the first and also it seemes that the Statute of 6. H. 8. cap. 15. doth not extend to a Chaplain for he is not a Servant within that Statute nor a Presentation is not a thing within that Statute and moreover in this Case Covel who was the Queens Presentee is not in life and therefore this Case cleerely is out of the Clause of the Statute of 6 H. 8. and so he concluded on the whole matter that Iudgement ought to be given for the Plaintiff Altham the second Baron accordingly The Presentation made to Kitchin is void and the Admission and all subsequent thereupon is void also for the words of the Statute are that if a Presentation be made for monie it shall be void and that the King may present that Turne and therefore the want of privity in the Incumbent is nothing to the
purpose as to the avoiding of the Benefice but his want of privitie availeth to excuse him of being Simoniacus yet because he is Simoniace Promotus the presentation is void and the King shall have it by the expresse words of the Statute and therefore as it seems if in this Statute there had been an expresse saving of the interest of the Incumbent by reason of his innocency yet such a saving of Interest had been void and repugnant in respect that it was expresly given to the King before as it is in Nichols case in Plowden upon the Stat. of 1. H. 7. See 1. Mar. Dyer and 7. Eliz. Dyer 231. such a saving doubted if it be void and in Cook lib. 1. Altonwoods case a saving Repugnant to the expresse words of the Premisses is void and so in our Case the Presentation is given to the King expressely and therefore if there were a saving in the words subsequent this were void much more in our Case where there is no saving And to prove that by the Symonie in the Patron that the Patron shall be prejudiced he vouched 42. E. 3. fo 2. It goods be given to B. by A. this is by fraud in A. to the intent that he may defraud another although B. is not knowing of this friend yet the gift is void as to him 34. E. 1. Title Garranty accordingly and Burrells case Cook lib. 6. upon the Statute of 27 Eliz cap. 4. to the same purpose To the second matter it seems that by the Queens death her Presentation is determined cleerely and so in case of a common person for if an Admission c. should follow after the death of the Presentor this is without any Authority of the instrument of Presentation for although there were no Admission there is no Presentation and he said that the Presentation passeth no interest but is as a Commendation and therefore he compared it to the Case of Say and Fuller in Plowden Com. If a Lease be made for so many years as a stranger shall name there ought to be certainty of years appointed in the life of the parties or otherwise it will be void and in 38. E. 3.3 If a Bishop present and die before c. Now the King shall present anew and also there it appears that the King may present by Paroll well enough and so it is said in 34. E. 3.8 tit Quare impedit 11. That a Presentment made by the Bishop becometh null and void by his death and therefore it appeareth in Fitzh Office of Court 29. that licence to alien granted to the King is void by the Kings death there needeth no actual Repeal or recital of the new presentation yet I agree that the King may make an actual repeal if he will as it appears by divers cases which have been cited before but that is of necessity to be done and as it seems the words of the Statute 6. H. 8. prove that before this Statute a second Grant made the first void without actual repeal in case where the thing passed by the Grant and by 38. E. 3. fo 3.4 it appears that a second Presentation made by the King was good without a repeal of the first and by Gascoigne 7. H. 4.32 if the King make a Presentation to one and then presents another without recitall or repeal of the first yet the Bishop ought to receive the latter Presentee for it is good without actual repeal wherefore judgement ought to be given for the Plaintiff Snig Baron said that as the Action is brought judgement ought to be given for the Plaintiff but if the Plaintiff had brought a Quare impedit peradventure I should have been of another opinion And as to the point of Symonie by the Civill Law it was punishable by deprivation and the guilt of the Patron should prejudice the Parson as to matter of Commodity in the Parsonage and at the Common Law if the Parson will pleade such Presentment he should be prejudiced as appears by our Books and hereby the incumbency the words of the Statute will not be satisfied for then the Queen should not Present if an usurper present and the Presentee is in by six moneths this gives Title of Presentation to the King against the rightfull Patron also it seemeth That if I. S. hath an Advowson and A. purchase the next avoidance to the intent to present B. and the Church becomes void and A. presents B. this is Symonie by averment as by good pleading the Presentation of B. shall be adjudged void To the second Point in respect that the Plaintiff had the possession by induction it is no question but he may retaine a possessorie Action for the Titles But if it were in a Quare impedit it would be materiall whether a Repeal should be in the case or not according to the Presidents in the Booke of Entries fo 303 304 305. for if a Licence be Granted to purchase in Mortmaine this may well be executed after the death of the Queene as it appeareth by Fitzherberts natura brevium expresly and so in Dyer a license of Transportation doth not cease by the Kings death 7. H. 4. in the Countess of Kents case it appears when the King makes a grant which is void yet there shall be no new grant without an actual repeal but it seems we are out of the intent of the Statute of 6. H. 8. because the words during his pleasure are not in the grant or Patent and so upon the whole matter judgement shall be given for the Plantiffe Tanfield accordingly the case is that the Defendant had prioritie of the possession of the Corn for which the action is brought and yet it seems judgement ought to be given for the Plantiffe and first as this case is here is Simonie by the Civil Law and the partie had his benefice by Simonie although he be not conusant thereof Secondly admit that here was not Simonie by the intendment of the Civil Law yet the Statute hath made an avoidance of the benifice in this case although it be not Simonie for the Statute speaks not one word of Simonie throughout the Act and yet by express words it doth avoid such presentations as this is and as to the Civil Law such benefice is to be made void by sentence declaratorie but it is not void ipso facto as it seems in the case where a common person was consenting to the Simonie but the text of the Civil Law sayes expresly that the Church ought not to be filled Corruptivè or by corruption and the Civil Law expresseth such a person as is in our case by Simoniace promotus and calls him who is particeps criminis Simoniacus and he who is Simoniacus is by the Civil Law deprived not only of the benefice ipso facto but also is deprived to be a Minister and adjudged guiltie in Culpa et poena Petrus Benefieldus a late writer of good authoritie saith that if a friend
give money to a patron to make a promise to him c. and the incumbent payes it such an incumbent is Simoniacus by the Civil Law and so if the incumbent pay the mony not knowing it untill after the induction yet he is Simoniacus and by him if a friend gives money and the Parson is thereupon presented though the Parson if he knew not of the money given yet he shall be deprived of the benefice and this difference was certified by Anderson and Gawdey to the Councel table upon a reference made to them by the King touching the filling of benefices by corrupt means and the Statute of purpose forbears to use the word Simonie for avoiding of nice construction of that word in the Civil Law and therefore the makers of the Act sets down plainly the words of the Statute that if any shall be promoted for money c. so that by these words it is not material from whom the money comes and then in such cases for the avoiding of all such grand offences a liberal construction ought to be made as hath been used in such cases and therefore he remembred the large construction which was made upon the Statute of fines in the Lord Zouches case lib. Cook 3. and so upon the Statute of usurie it hath been adjudged that if money be lent to be re-paid with use above 10. l. in the hundred at such a day if three men or one man so long live in these cases all such bargains and contracts are void within the intent of the Statute as it hath been adjudged in the Common Pleas and so it is in Gooches case Cook lib. 5. upon the Statute of fraudulent conveyances and secret Ioyntures also upon the Statute of Simonie it was adjudged although some of the Common Pleas doubted of it in regard a father is bound to provide for his son and Rogers and Bakers case in this Court was an antient case and adjudged for the Plantiffe and as to the other point it is found by the verdict that the presentation made by the Queen to Covel is not revoked nor admitted which words implie that Covel is still living in case of a special verdict and therefore to argue to that point as if it were found that Covel was living yet he conceived that the presentation without institution and Induction is determined by the Queens death and therefore in 2. Ed. 3. a license of Alienation clearly is not good in the time of another King for the license saith which are holden of us c. and by the death of the King they are not holden of him Fitzherberts natura brevium contra 16 H. 8. the nature of a presentment is explained where an Infant would avoid his presentation and in the principal case the Bishop cannot make any admission upon this presentation of Covel after the Queens death for he cannot do that in any manner according to the presentation because that is determined by the Queens death and therefore it seems clearly there needs no repeal in such a case although it appears by some presidents that repeals have been used in such cases and as to the case 17. Eliz. Dyer 339. that proveth not that there ought to be any repeal for it appears there that judgement was given upon a reason altogether different from our case and that was because a presentation was obtained of the Queen a quare impedit depending by her of which suit she had no notice and for that cause her second presentation was void and that was the true reason of that judgement as it is also put in Greens case Cook lib. 6. and I was present Mich. 17. Eliz. when this case was adjudged and the sole reason which they gave for the judgement was because the presentation by intendment could not take away the Action attached by the Queen for then the Queens grant should enure to a double intent which the Law will never tollerate without express words purporting so much but in our case there is no such double intendment and therefore c. but if there had been an admission and institution pursuing the presentation of Covel although no induction yet peradventure in such case there ought to have been an appeal because in such case it is not only the Queens Act but of the ordinary also interposing which is a Iudicial Act also without question we are out of the Statute of 6. H. 8. for here is no grant made by the Queen and a presentation clearly is not within that Statute and for that other reason the presentation of Calvert is good without recital of the Queens presentation also clearly if there ought to be a repeal in the case yet it is not examinable in this Action of Trespass which is possessorie and for the profits only but it may be examinable in a quare impedit and as to Greens case Cook lib. 6. which hath been used as an authoritie in this case that differs much from our case for there the thing which made the Queens presentation void was contained within the very Charter of the presentation and therefore differed from our case wherefore he commanded judgement should be entred for the Plantiffe and so it was Halseys case touching Recusancy THe case in the Exchequer Chamber touching the payment of the Kings Majesties debt due for the Recusancy of John Halsey as Recusant convict deceased with the lands and goods bought in the name of John Grove and Richard Cox Defendant in this Court that John Halsey was indicted and convicted for Recusancy the 18. day of July Anno 23. Eliz. and so remained convicted without submission till his death who died the last day of March 3. Iac. and after his conviction viz. after the 40. year of the Raign of the late Queen Elizabeth did purchase with his own money divers leases for years yet to come of lands in the Countie of Worcester and Warwick in the name of Richard Cocks for himself in trust and likewise did with his own money purchase certain leases for years yet to come of lands in the County of Hereford in the name of the said John Grove all which purchases were in trust for the Recusant and to his use Margaret Field is his next heir who is no Recusant Iohn Halsey hath not paid 20. l. a moneth since his conviction nor any part thereof these lands and leases were seised into the Kings hands for the satisfaction of the forfeitures due for the Recusancy of the said Halsey 14. August 5. Iac. Thomas Coventrie argued for the Defendant the question is whether these lands which were never in the Recusant but bought in the name of the Defendants in manner aforesaid be liable to the payment of his Majesties debts by the said Recusant as above said or not there are three points considerable in the case First if lands purchased by the Recusant in the name of others in trust are liable to his debt Secondly if the land of a
Recusant may be seised after his death Thirdly if they shall be charged by the Statute of 1. Iac. as to the first it seems they are not wherein I shall endeavour to prove three things First that such land was not liable to debt by the Common Law Secondly that they are not liable to debts by the general words of the Statute Law Thirdly that they are not liable to debt by any word within the Statute of primo Iac. as to the first he observed that here is no fraud put in the case but that these lands and leases were never in the Recusant so that before that they were conveyed to the Defendants they were not liable to this debt and I alwayes observed that which the common law calleth fraud ought to be of such nature as shall be tortious and prejudicial to a third person and put him in a worse estate and condition then he was before and then he who is so prejudiced in some cases should avoid such conveyances by the common Law 22. Assises 72.43 Ed. 3.2 and 32. the Defendant in debt after judgement aliens his goods and he himself takes the profits yet the Plantiffe shall have them in execution so that if a man binde himself and his heirs in an Obligation and dies and assets descend to his heir who by Covin aliens those assets yet he shall be charged in debt for in these cases the Plantiffe had a lawful debt and such lands and goods before the alienation were liable and that former interest was intended to be defeated by those alienations and therefore they are void but of the other side where no former interest of the partie is wronged there no fraudulent conveyance was void at the Common Law and therefore if Tenant in Knights service had made a fraudulent Feofment to defraud the Lord of his wardship this was not aided by the Common Law until the Statute of Marlebridge for the title of the Lord was not prejudiced or wronged by this Feofment because it was subsequent to the Feofment also after the said Statute the Lord was without remedy for his release for it is agreed in 17. Ed. 3. fo 54. and 31. Ed. 3. Collation 29. and therefore at the Common Law if cestuy que use had bound himself and his heirs in an Obligation and died if the use descended to his heir none will say this use was assets to the heir and so was Rigler and Hunters case 25. Eliz. as to the second point it seems that the general words of a Statute shall be expounded according to the rule and reason of the Common Law and by the Common Law such confidence is not extendible therefore c. Westmin 2. cap. 18. which gives the elegit hath these words medietatem terrae and within those words an use was never extendible by that Statute 30. Ed. 3. because it was not an estate in him and so if a man be indebted for Merchandise or money borrowed and makes a gift of his lands and Chattels to defraud Creditors and takes the profits himself and flieth to the Sanctuary at Westminster or Saint Martins and there abideth by conclusion to avoid the payment of his debts it is thereby enacted that Proclamation shall be made at the Gate of the Sanctuary where such person resideth by the Sheriffe and if such person doth not thereupon appear in person or by Atturney judgement shall be given against him 2 Rich. 2. Stat. 2. cap. 3. 1. Rich. 3. cap. 1. and execution awarded aswel of those lands and goods given by fraud as of any other out of the same Franchise these words are more particular then the Statute of Westminster the second and yet it was doubted if it did extend to executions for debt as it appears by 7. H. 7. and 11. H. 7.27 and therefore in 19. H. 7. cap. 15. an Act of Parliament was made that execution for debts Recognizances and Statutes should be sued of lands in use As to the third it seems that that Statute doth not make lands in use liable to debts the words of the Statute are that the King shall seise two parts of the lands Tenements and Hereditaments leases of Farms of such offendors so that they are as general as the words of the Statute of Westminster 2. cap. 18. and here those lands and leases were not the Recusants for he had but a confidence in them the first clause of the Statute doth not extend thereunto for two causes First in regard that it never was in the Recusant and this clause extends only to such conveyances which are made by any man which hath not repaired or shall not repair to some Church for the disjunctive words do not extend throughout that branch but to the last part thereof viz. that which cometh after the word and for otherwise this would extend to conveyances made at any time without limitation which should be against the meaning of the Act. Secondly this Branch provides what shall be done concerning the King touching the levying and paying of such summes of money as any person by the Lawes of the Realm ought to pay of else to forfeit c. and by the Statutes before made nothing was forfeited but for such time as is mentioned in the Indictment which in our case is but 6. moneths but out of this branch a strong argument may be made in respect that the Statute avoids all conveyances made by Recusants in trust by express words but saith nothing to conveyances made by others to the use of Recusants and therefore this Statute doth not extend unto it if Tenant by Knights service infeoffs his heir within age and dies the Lord may enter upon the heir without suing an action but if a Feofmenche made to a stranger there he cannot enter but ought to bring his Action according to the provision of that Statute because it may be to the use of the Feoffee but no such provision is made for the heir the Statute of 3. Jac. cap. 4. provides by express words that the King shall seise two parts of all the lands Tenements and Hereditaments Leases and Faims that at the time of such seisure shall be or afterwards shall come to any of the hands of the said offendors or any other to their use or in trust for him or her or at his or her dispose or disposition or whereby wherewith or in consideration whereof such offendors or their families or any of them shall or may be relieved maintained or kept c. the different penning of these Statutes proves the diversitie of the meaning thereof this Statute is a new Law which gives to the King this penalty which he had not before and in new manner for it appoints that the partie shall be convicted by Proclamation and that being so convicted he shall alwayes pay the said penaltie until his submission without any other conviction 3. Jac. cap. 4. and also limits a manner how this new penaltie shall be levied viz.
by seisure of two parts of the land c. then when a Statute gives a new thing which was not at the Common Law and limits a course and means whereby it shall be levied that course ought to be pursued and it cannot be done in any other manner the Statute of 8. H. 6. cap. 12. makes the imbesting of a Record Felony and that this shall be inquired by Iury whereof one halfe shall be Clarks of some of the same Courts and that the Iudges of the one Bench or of the other shall hear and determine it and the case was that part of the offence was done in Middlesex and part in London so that the offence could not have such proceeding as the Statute appointed and therefore it was holden that it should not be punished at all Mich. 41. et 42. Eliz. Betwixt Aggard and Standish the Statute of 8. Ed. 4. cap. 2. inflicts a penaltie upon him that makes a retainer by parol and moreover it is thereby ordained that before the King in his Bench before the Iustices of the Common Pleas Iustices of the Peace Dyer and Terminer every man that will may complain against such person or persons doing against the form of this ordinance shall be admitted to give information for the King and it was holden that the informer could not sue for himself and the Queen upon this Statute for an offence done in any Court not mentioned in that Statute the Statute of 35 Eliz. cap. 1. appoints that for the better and spedier levying and Recovering for and by the Queens Majestie of all and singular the pains duties forfeitures and payments which at any time hereafter shall grow due or be payable by vertue of this Act and of the Act made in the 23 d. year of her Majesties Raign concerning Recusants that all and every the said pains duties c. may be recovered to her use by Action of debt Bill plaint or information or otherwise in any of her Courts of her Benth Common Pleas or Exchequer in such sort in all respects as by the ordinary course of the Common Lawes of this Realm any other debt due by any such person in any other case should or may be recovered wherein no essoin c. Note that this Statute extends not to any penaltie upon the Statute of 28. Eliz. cap. 6. also the Common Law doth not give any means to levie a debt upon a trust and as to the general point it seems that no land can be seised after the death of the Recusant 23. Eliz. cap. 1. enacteth that every person of the age of 16. years which shall not repaire to some Church c. but forbear the same contrary to the Tenor of the Statute made in the first year of her raign for uniformity of common prayer and being thereof lawfully convicted shall forfeit to the Queen for every moneth which he or she shall so forbear 20. l. And that statute doth give no forfeiture at all for Lands And also it giveth no penaltie without conviction so that the death of the party before conviction dischargeth all and so without question it was at that day This last Point seems to be remedied in part by the Statute of 28. Eliz. cap. 6. for thereby if the party be once convicted he shall alwaies pay after without other conviction and this Statute gives also a Seisure but before any seisure Three things ought to concur 1. Recusancy 2. Conviction 3. Default of payment And the last of these was the tâ—ue cause of the seisure viz. That is the contempt of not payment Therefore it was adjudged in Sir William Greenes case that this seisure shall not go in satisfaction of such debt but the King shall hold it as a penalty for the contempt untill the debt be paid so that when a Statute imposeth a penaltie for a contempt as the contempt is personall so is the penalty And therefore the death of the party before that it be excuted or turned in rem judicatam dischargeth all and I shall prove it by the different plea in an Action upon a penall Statute and other common Actions and therefore in debt not guilty is no plea but in debt upon a penall Law it is a good Plea for in truth untill it be adjudged it is no debt but a contempt Michaelmas 41 42. Eliz. betwixt Car and Jones and in debt upon the Statute of 2. Ed. 6. not guilty was adjudged a good plea Trin. 42. Eli between Morley Edwards 2. It may be proved by the different forms of judgment for in common actions the judgment is Quod quaerens recuperet c. But in informations the usuall form is Quod defendens foris faciet 41. Ass which implies that it is not perfect untill the Iudgement and before it is only a contempt and if so then by the death of the party it is discharged Thirdly I shall prove it by Authority that the death of the parties before Iudgement dischargeth aswell the contempt as the penaltie of a penall Law 40. Ed 3. Executor 74. debt lies not against the Executors of a Iaylor who suffers Prisoners to escape 15. Eliz. Dyer 322. in the like Case the opinion of the Court was that an Action did not lye against the Executors of the Warden of the Fleet. but there ought to have been a Iudgement against him in his life time for the Offence is but a Trespass by negligence which dies with the Person 18. Eliz. Dyer An Action brought against the Heire and ruled that it doth not lie for it is a Maxime that no Law or Statute chargeth the Heir for the wrong or trespasse of his Father Also it is to be observed in the Principall Case that the Statute limits the seisure to be by Proces out of the Exchequer so no seisure can be without Proces as it may be upon some other Statute But a judiciall course is hereby prescribed whereupon the Partie may plead with the King for his Land and therefore if that course be not pursued in the life of the party it is too late to pursue it after his death Also the words are that he shall seise all the goods and two parts of the Lands of such Offendors But after his death the goods are not his but his Executors and the Lands are not his but his Heirs and a seisure by way of penalty relateth no higher then to the time of the seisure also the words of the subsequent Proviso explame it further for it it be demanded when the King shall seise two parts it is answered at the same time when he leaveth the third part and when must be leave the third part it is auswered in the life of the Recusant That it may be for the maintenance of his Wife Children and Family and after his death he hath neither Wife Children nor Family for in a Writ of Dower the Demandant shall say that she was Wife and not that she is Wife As to the
will speak to such things which in my opinion will not avoid the Patent First it seems that this want of not assuring doth not vitiate the Patent for the word Assumpsit supposeth matter of Fact executed and whether it be true or false it cannot be now examined no more then in the Cases put 21. Ed. 4. and 26 H. 8. In consideration of service done although there was no service done yet that shall not avoid the Patent Sir Hugh Cholmlies case Cook lib. 2. Recitall of a matter in Pais and not of Record which is not materiall nor valuable doth not vitiate the Patent 37. H. 6.27 The King in his Privie Seale suggests a matter in Fact this doth not destroy the Patent also although that the consideration is aswell for that he assumed to repair as c. and it is found that he hath not repaired yet this fault shall not avoid the Patent for as it seems here it is not in nature of a conditionall estate or Grant as if it had been in consideration he shall repaire for as the words are here placed it is intended that the Queen will relie upon the Assumpsit and not upon the condition and grant and it seems that the Patent is void only upon the misrecitall and the false suggestion which is the first Point for it appears by the misrecitall that the Queen was deceived in a thing materiall and valuable and therefore the Patent void and yet I agree that every false ricitall or suggestion doth not avoid a Patent as in 9. Ed. 4. Baggots Ass 29. Ed. 3.7 if the King recite in his Patent that he had made a precedent Grant upon a Petition yet this falsity doth not avoid the Patent and in 27. Ed. 4. although that this falsity be in point of consideration yet if it be not for matter of profit and valuable to the King it doth not avoid the Patent but if it appear that the Kings intention was grounded upon a matter of value and substance and that he was therein deceived the Patent is for that cause void as in 9. H. 6. fo 2.8 H. 7. fo 3.21 Ed. 4.9 H. 7. fo 2. and 11. H. 4. fo 1. and this is all one as if it should appear in the Recitall or consideration that the Kings intention was grounded upon a matter of value and the King therein deceived therefore in Altonwoods case Cooke lib. 1. If the King recite that A. is indebted unto him as Executor of B and he release to him all demands generally yet nothing shall be released but that which he owed as Executor and so if the King recite that whereas an Advowson is holden of I. S. and he gives Licence to appropriate if the Advowson be holden of the King this is void 19. E. 3. Fitzh Grants 58. It seems cleerly that if it appear by the Patent expresly that the intent of the King was deceived and abused the Patent shall be void although it be not in matter of recitall or in matter of consideration neither as in 9. Ed. 4. fo 6. and 8. by Neale 21. Ass pla 15.40 Ass pla 36. The King gives Licence to his Tenant to aften in Fee and afterwards it appears that this Tenant was but Tenant in Lail and so in the case of the Market or Fair of Torrington cited in Altonwoods case and in our Case the Queen is deceived and misinformed in two Circumstances materiall and of value First for that she conceived that a greater quantity of the thing demised to Potter is surrendred then in truth there was and therein she is deceived for part of the thing is not come to her hands by the surrender Secondly the Queens intent was to make an intire Lease of all in possession and this cannot be for part of the thing it enures but as a Lease in reversion or future interest and therefore void as it is in Altonwoods case Cook Lib. 1. and the Queen hath a double prejudice hereby First because she cannot distrain for her rent reserved in that part which is not surrendred Secondly she cannot enter therein for the condition broken wherefore c. Tanfield accordingly that judgement should be given for the Plaintiff The Patent recites That all the Term-which Potter had surrendred c. where in truth it was not so and therefore it is cleere that the Queen is deceived therein and the Grant void for it was the very inducement which procured the new Patent and this recital is grounded upon the words of the deed of surrender so yâ— the surren is grounded upon the information of Hitchmore contained the surrender And if in that Clause Hitchmore had been well advised the Lease to him ought to have been A. having of the Mills in possession and A. having the Messuage and Garden after the Term which Wilkinson had should be expired and the reservation of the Rent ought to have been expressed accordingly for as it is shuffled together the condition cannot avoid the surrender nor the rent cannot issue out thereof Therefore it was adjudged in 9. Eliz. in the Common-Bench in the Bishop of Salisburies case B. seised of two Acres one whereof was in Lease to A. for years B. makes a Lease of both to a Stranger to have yâ— one in possession the other in reversion rendring 20. s. rent entirely now this rent shall issue out of that in possession during the Term in A. and after it shall issue out of the whole as one intire rent and so it is in our Case for default of severall reservations for this is one intâ—erent and then the Queen cannot distrain upon all the Land as she intended so in our Case wherefore I adjudge the Patent void not upon the point of recitall that is not for the not recitall of a Subjects Lease viz. the Lease of one Wilkinson but it is for the cause of misinforming the Queen in the matter of value and by consequence as hath been said Nemo tenetur informare qui nescit sed quisquis scire quod informat And where Snig hath said that this Patent is made Ex certa scientià mero motu And for this it cannot be intended that the Queen was gull'd upon the information of the party I say that there are not any words in the Grant to prove that it was Ex mero mortu c. And for that it seems Snig had no true Copy of the Case yet if these words were in the Patent it is not void for a triviall and petry mistaking yet in matter substantiall it will not help it as if the King be misinformed of his estate in such a thing to be granted or of estates which are in Lease for these are matertall things 21. Ed. 4. by Huffey and Briant if the King recite that whereas I have given my Land of 100. l. value to him or whereas I have given to him the Mannor of D. and he grants to me the Mannor of S. if this recitall be
Greyhound and è conversò and this was ruled to be an imployment for it was whereby or wherewith a Priest was maintained although it was not whereof and Mich. 21. Eliz. the Kings head in Breadstreet now Fishstreet was given to finde a Priest and a rent-charge granted in performance of the Will and this was adjudged an imployment of the house and so where the assignment is good a small thing will make an imployment And it seems that the Liverie is good and as to that that no Livery can be made without ousting of the Lessor and by his consent and therefore 9. Eliz. It is ruled that a Feoffement with a Letter of Atturney to the Lessee to make livery is good and no surrender and Eides and Knotsfords case 41. Eliz. Lessee for years remainder for life remainder in fee he in remainder in fee makes a Feoffement to the Lessee for years and makes Livery and it was adjudged a good Feoffement because it was not a surrender in respect of the meane estate for life and no ouster nor consent will serve for then it would be a disseisin which cannot be upon the possession of the Lessee for years for his possession is also of him in the remainder for life and I put these Cases that there ought to be a consent or ouster but I agree that the Queens possession cannot be defeated by entry or ouster as it is 4. Mar. Dyer 139.8 Ass 21.18 H. 8.16 But the Kings Ward may make an estate 1. H. 7. But if the King be not in possession but a remainder only in him and the Lessor makes a Feoffement rendring 12. d. rent this estate in the King doth not priviledge any other in possession and so judgement was given for the Plaintiff against the opinion of Altham Mrs Chamberlains case IN 22. Eliz. York recovered by Indicement in the Kings Bench against Allen upon an Assumpsit York being thus interessed of the debt after that is in May 26. Eliz. was outlawed upon a mean Proces at the suit of I. S. and in the same year and moneth was outlawed after judgement at the suit of the same I. S. and after a generall pardon came 27. Eliz. in which pardon after the pardon of all contempts for outlawrie there are words also purporting a Grant bounty and liberality whereby the Queen granted all montes forfeited or come unto her hands by reason of any such outlawry with other words in the same pardon and Provisoes therein contained necessary to be observed And after in 28. El. York was outlawed again after judgement at the suit of I. S. and then Yorke died but he lived a full year after the pardon 27. Eliz. and did not sue any Scire facias against the party at whose suit he was outlawed after Iudgement and after the death of Yorke another pardon came 29. Eliz. to the same effect with the pardon in 27. And after the Queen grants this debt to Anger for the benefit of Mrs Chamberlain who was the Wife of Yorke and Anger sued in the Queens name to have an extent out of this Court against Allen who was the party against whom Iudgement was given and all this was drawn into a Case and delivered to the Barons of the Exchequer to consider upon viz. If execution may be sued in the Queens name against Allen and this case was argued at the Barre at which I was present And now it was argued at the Bench by Bromley Puisne Baron and concluded that Anger may well sue execution in the Queens name but he had almost made an end of his Argument before I came into the Court and three points seemed to be considered of in the Case The 1. was unanimously resolved and agreed by all the Barons that either of the pardons will advantage Allen who was debtor to the party outlawed for although that the words of the pardon unport a pardon of all debts and sums of money accrued to the Queen by reason of the outlawry yet comparing all the parts of the pardons together it will plainly appear that the intent of the pardon was only for the advantage of him who had committed the forfeiture by the contempt and extends only to him by way of restitution And another construction would be repugnant to all the Causes contained in the Act By Tanfield as a Will ought to receive construction by due consideration of the intention of the Testator collected out of all the parts thereof so the meaning of an Act of Parliament ought to be expounded by an examination of the intention of the makers thereof collected out of all the causes thes therein so that there be no repugnancy but a concordancy in all the parts thereof and therefore if a man by will devise Bacre to A. and his heirs and by another cause in the same Will he devises B acre to B. and his assignes it shall not be void in any part insomuch that if both had been placed together A. and B. should be Ioyntenants and therefore the Law will make such a construction and so if a man devise B. acre to A. and after he devises a Rent out of it to another both shall stand Brett and Rigdens case Plowden Also this Debt was due by Allen 2. It was resolved by Tanfield and Bromley that Yorke should take no advantage by the Pardon in 27. Eliz. to have his goods restored which were forfeited by the outlawry after judgement for by them all the Statute for the pardon of the outlawry after judgement was penued in such a form as it is but conditionall for it is in effect provided that the pardon shall not extend to the party outlawed after judgement untill he shall pay or agree with the party at whose suit he was outlawed and this payment ought to be in the Court or in such manner that the Court may be satisfied by the suing of a Scire facias and an acknowledgement of the party at whose suit c. for a bare payment in the Country is not sufficient But when the party outlawed hath once lawfully satisfied the party at whose suit he was outlawed then the pardon will relate ab initio to avoid all intervenient matters if the satisfaction be made in convenient time and therefore if the King had granted the goods forfeited by outlawry after judgment meane between the pardon and the suing of the Scire facias yet if the party outlawed sue this Scire facias within convenient time the pardon shall have such relation as it shall defeat the grant of the goods and therefore Tanfield compared the words in the pardon of the outlawry after judgement to the words in the Statute of 27. H. 8. of intolments for there it is provided that nothing shall passe by bargaine and Sale except the Deed be inrolled within six moneths after but if it be not inrolled otherwise it is Beckets case R. B. seised of Lands in fee 36. Eliz. levies a fine c. and
declares the use to be to himself for life and after to T. B. with power of revocation and to limit new uses and if he revoke and not declare then the use shall be to the use of himself for life and after to Henry Becket with power in that indenture also to revoke and limit new uses and that then the fine shall be to such new uses and no other and after 42. Eliz. by a third Indenture he revoked the second Indenture and declared the use of the fine to be to the use of himself for life and after to Hen. Becket in taile the remainder to I. B. c. R. B. dies and T. B. his brother and heire is found a Recusant and the lands seised and thereupon comes H. B. and shews the matter as above and upon that the Kings Atturney demurreth Bromley and Altham Barons that the Declaration of the uses made by the third Indenture was good and he having power by the first to declare new uses may declare them with power of Revocation for it is not meerly a power but conjoyned with an interest and therefore may be executed with a power of Revocation and then when he by the third Indenture revokes the former uses now it is as if new uses had been declared and then he may declare uses at any time after the Fine as it appears by 4. Mar. Dyer 136. and Coke lib. 9. Downhams case and in this case they did rely upon Diggs case Cooke lib. 1. where it is said that upon such a Power he can revoke but once for that part unlesse he had a new power of Revocation of Vses newly to be limited whereby it is implyed that if he had a new power to appoint new uses he may revoke them also Snig Baron to the contrary and said that he had not power to declare 3. severall uses by the first contract which ought to Authorise all the Declarations upon that Fine and then the Revocation by the third Indenture is good and the limitation void and then it shall be to the use of R. B. and his heirs and so by the death of R. B. it doth descend to T. B. the Recusant and also he said that such an Indenture to declare uses upon uses was never made and it would be mischievous to declare infinite uses upon uses Tanfield held that the uses in the second Indenture stand unrevoked and the new uses in the third Indenture are void and then H. B. ought to have the Land again out of the Kings hands The power in the second Indenture is that he may revoke and limit new uses and that the Fine shall be to those new uses and no others and then if there be a Revocation and no punctuall limitation he had not pursued his Authority for he ought to revoke and limit and he cannot doe the one without the other Also he said that after such Revocation and limitation the fine shall be to such new uses and no other then if there be no new uses well limited in the third Indenture the former uses shall stand void Nota it seemeth that if a man make a Feoffement and declare uses and reserve a power to revoke them without saying moe he cannot revoke them and limit new for the use of the Fine being once declared by the Indenture no other use can be averred or declared which is not warranted thereby for he cannot declare the fine to be to new uses when it was once declared before Cook lib. 2.76 That no other use can be averred then that in the conveyauce Cooke lib. 9 10 11. Although that the first uses are determined as if a man declare the use of a Fine to be to one and his Heires upon condition that he shall pay 40. l. c. or untill he do such an Act if the first use be determined the Fine cannot be otherwise declared to be to new uses And therefore it seemes that all the uses which shall rise out of the Fine ought to spring from the first Indenture which testifieth the certain intention of the parties in the leaving thereof and then in the Case above the second Indenture and the limitation of new uses thereby are well warranted by the first Indenture and in respect that this is not a naked power only I conceive that they may be upon condition or upon a power of Revocation to determine them But the power to limit the third uses by a third indenture after revocation of the second uses in the second indenture hath not any Warrant from the first Indenture and without such Warrant there can be no Declaration of such new uses which were not declared or authorised by the first Indenture which Note for it seems to be good Law FINIS AN EXACT TABLE of the Principall Matters contained in this BOOKE A. AN Action of false impriprisonment for taking his wife in execution she appearing as a Feme sole 48 52 An Action upon the Case for conspiring to outlaw a man in a wrong County 49 Amerciament for a By-law 55 An Action upon the Case where against a Servant for breach of trust much good matter 65 66 67 68 Amerciament where well levied by the Sheriff 74 Action by an Executor against a Sheriff in the debet and deâ—â—net where good 80 81 Authority in fact and authority in Law abused a difference 90 Action for these words against I. S. spoken of the Plaintifs wife she would have out her husbands throat and did attempt to doe it 98 C. Custome for Pirates goods if payable 15 Coppy hold surrendred to the use of a younger Sonne he can have no Action before admittance 20 Churchwardens if elected by Vestry-men where good and capable to purchase Lands 21 Conspiracy see Action Collector of a fifteenth leviable upon one Township 65 Commissioners of inquiry and their power 83 84 D. DEbt against the Sheriff for an escape a good Case 20 Distresse for a By-law upon the Kings Tenant he must bring his Action in the Exchequer 55 Devise to the wife until the issue accomplish 18. years endeth not by death of the issue before 56 57 Decree where execution thereof may be stayed 68 69 E. ERror a Writ directed to an inferiour Court ought to be executed without fee paid or tendered 16 Elegit the party who sued it dieth no scire facias for the Heire 16 Equity where releviable in the Exchequer 54 Estreats where they may be discharged for insufficiency in the Indictment or not mentioning the offence 55 Estoppell in the Kings case 65 Exception in a Grant 69 Escape a difference where caused by a rescous and where by the Sherif or Bailif 70 71 Executor see Action 80 81 Erroneous judgement given in the Kings Mannor reversed in the Exchequer by Petition 98 F. A Feoffement to the use of the Husband and Wife for their lives and after to the heirs of the body of the wife begotten by the Husband what estate 17 First fruits ought
to be paid before induction 20 Forfeiture by Tenant for life by what Acts 38 Forfeiture by a contempt for not returning upon a command by Privy Seale and what and how long the forfeiture continueth an excellent Case 42 43 False imprisonment see Action Fine if void for uncertainty 55 Where it shall be directed by the Covenant ibid G. GRant of the King what shall be a good surrender thereof 1 And what shall be a good consideration therein 4 Where such a Grant is aided by 43. Eliz. cap. 1. ibid Grant by the King of a reversion nec non manerium de Skipton 39 I. INformation upon 3. 4. E. 6. for buying of Butter against two and one found guilty 19 An information against one for refusing to pay Impost for Currants a famous Case 23 An information for ingrossing 1000. quarters of Corne one Defendant found of 700. only 59 Informer where he shall have a moity upon 23. Eliz. but not upon 28. Eliz. against a Recusant 60 Judgement must be paid before a debt to the King 65 Judges if bound to take notice of a generall pardon 71 Injunction to enjoy possession no hindrance to him that claimeth Common therein 96 Information of intrusiion into a Close and for asportation of 9. Cart loads of wheat between the 24. of March and 1. of October the Jury found him guilty of 3. loads the 24. of March and dammages taxed for all no judgement can be given for any part 97 98 Indentures severall with severall powers therein to declare uses how to be expounded 118 119 K. THE King where he may extend for outlawry after alienation 20 The King where he may take without inrolment and what Acts amounts to an inrolment 31 35 60 The King where he shall have his rent of the Assignee in trust in the Interim before a reassignment made 39 The King where he may extend a Term conveyed in trust 50 51 The King shall not charge the successors of a Bishop for a subsidie but the Executor or the heire 51 The King where he shall be ordered in equity to perform a trust by an English Bill 54 King see Judgement 65 King what interest he hath by an outlawry 83 King where he shall have his debt of his Debtor or Trustee 91 King cannot distrain the Cattell of one Tenant in Common for the debt of the other 96 97 King may charge the debtor of his debtors Debtor 112 113 L. LIvery and seifin of Lands in 2. Towns by Letter of Atturney countermanded by livery in one by the Lessor himself 97 Livery if it can be made upon the Queens Lessee 114 M. A Memorandum in the Exchequer and the operation thereof 5 Misnomer of a Corporation where it voids a Grant 15 33 Mistriall and a venire facias de novo awarded 68 Misnomer of a Corporation 35 N. NOtice of an use or promise maketh a man lyable to execute the same 60 Notice see Judges 71 Notice of payment upon a condition ought to be givea to an infant 100 101 O. OYer of a Deed must be demanded the same Term in the Common Pleas but otherwise in the Kings Bench note the diversity 39 Outlawry in Northumberland for a debt in Durham if the King or the Bishop be intitled 90 P. PAtent of Denization what words therein make it conditionall 58 59 Patent where void for false recitall or want of consideration 75 76 and 108 109 Pleas before a Justice of Nisi prius what allowable and what not 81 82 86 Plea discontinued for want of a day given 89 A Parliament pardon the debt being agreed withall relates ab initio 118 R. A Remainder where contingent 22 Rent where it must be demanded and where not 56 57 Record what makes a double matter of Record to make the party sue by Petition 58 59 Recusancie see S. Remitter in what cases 93 94 c. Recusant if chargable for lands bought in trust and if seisible after his death and if liable by 1. Jacobi 104 105 S. THe Statute of 43. Eliz. cap. 1. well expounded 5 c. The Statute of 33. H. 8. cap. 39. well explained 51 Simony in what Cases and excellent matter thereof 71 72 100 Statutes of 23.28 Eliz. and 1. Iacobi expounded concerning Recusants 91 92 Surrender where countermandable 99 Statute of 1. Ed. 6. of Chantries and the meaning thereof amplie debated by the Barons 113 114 T. TIthes where due for Head-land 16 Tithes where discharged by unity of possession 17 Traverse where good 18 Trust where a Recusant convict is capable thereof 39 Tithes a prescription therein for the Kings Coppyholder it must be tried in the Exchequer 39 Trust where forfeitable 54 55 The tenth according to the Statute leviable only upon part of the lands out of which c 56 Tenorem platiti or Tenorem recordi as good as Recordum praedictum 83 A trust in a Term by the Wife belongs not to the Husband after her decease 113 V. USes where fraudulent against a Purchasor 22 Venire facias de Vicineto of a forrest 33 Vses see Indentures 118 119 A Catalogue of LAVV BOOKES and such as appertain to the LAVV. AShes Tables 2. Volumes Folio Ashes Tables to Cooks Reports Epeciea or table of equity Fasiculus Florum Arguments on the Writ of Habeas Corpus Assise of Bread Atturnies Guide Atturney of the Common Pleas. BRooks Abridgement Readings on Magna Charta Cases Reading on the Stat. of Limitations Boultons Justice Bulstrodes Reports Bracton Brownlows Reports 2. parts Pleadings in 2. parts Judiciall Writs Lord Bacons Elements of the Law Cases of Treason Ordinances Reading of the Statute of Uses Britton Book of Oaths Bollewes Reports of R. the 2d Blunts Glossographia expounding Terms of the Law Boones Examen Legum Angliae Cooks Reports 11 parts French 12th Report English Entries on Littleton the first part of his Institutes 1. on Magna Charta 2. Pleas of the Crown 3d. Jurisdiction of Courts 4th Compleat Coppyholder of Baile and Mainprise Cragge de Feudis Customes of Normandie Mr Cooks Vindication of the Law Pooremans Case City Law Cromptons Justice Iurisdiction of Courts Cowells Interpreter Institutes Callis Readings on Sewers Ignoramus Crook and Hultons Arguments on Ship-money Compleat Clerk and Scriveners Guide Calthrops Relation of Mannors and Coppyhold Cases about the customes of London Conference about the liberty of the Subject Clerks Vade Mecum Presidents Clerks Guide in 2. parts Collins Summary of the Statutes Compleat Justice Caries Reports in Chancery Claytons Reports Topick of the Law Compleat Atturney 2. parts Charter of Rumney Marsh Chancery Orders Court Leet DAvis Reports of Impositions abridgement of Lord Cooks Reports Daltons Justice Office of a Sherif Abridged Dyers Reports Abridgement in French Abridgement in English Doderidges English Lawer Principality of Wales Compleat Parson Deggs proposals Declarations and Orders 4º Dr and Student in Lattin idem in English Abridged Davenports Abridgement of Cook on Littleton Deerehams Mannuall Dallison
Heir except that judgement be given against the Ancestor and for that see 40. E. 3. Executors 74. and 41. Ass pl. 15. and 15. Eliz Dyer 322. And also if a Recusant had been convicted upon the Sat. of 23. Eliz. and dyed before judgement cleerely this forfeiture shall never be charged upon the Heir for the words are that a Recusant shall forfeit 20. l. a moneth and if he doe not pay it then appoints the recovery by Bill Plaint or Information and this ought to be alwaies in the life of the party then the Stat. of 28. Eliz. maketh not a new debt or Forfeiture but gives a penalty for the non-payment of that which was a debt within 23. Eliz. and that the intent of the Stat. of 28. Eli. was but such this is proved by the Title of the Act. viz. for the more speedy and due execution c. 2. It is proved by the first words of the Act for the avoiding of all delaies c. so that it appears that this Act is but as a penalty meerly Also he said that this Stat. of 28. Eliz. dispenceth with the conviction as to the penalty but doth not take away the Conviction also he said that conviction without Iudgement maketh not a Debt Also he who is convicted by proclamation and dieth is discharged Also he said that our Case hath been compared to a Debt upon an Obligation but this is not like for the Stat. stands not indefinite but hath reference to 23. for otherwise a Recusant may be doubly charged that is upon both the Statutes for there is no means to recover the Debt but by this Statute of 23. Eliz. See Sir Edward Walgraves case Dyer 231. Wentworth and others against Stanley WEntworth and his Wife and Rich and his Wife brought an Ejectione firmae against Stanley and shewed in their Declaration how one Edward Stanley was seised in Fee and infeoffed the Earl of Darby others to the use of himself for life the remainder to the use of the Plantiffs wife for 100. years and died and the Plantiffs entred and the Defendant ejected them c. and this Feofment was made in 40. Eliz. the Defendant saith that long before one Richard Stanley was sesed in Fee and gave it to the said Edward Stanley in tail and that he so seised made a Feefment to the uses as is alledged and died and the Plantiffs entred and the Defendant as issue of the Feoffor re-entred and so by his pretence his is remitted whereupon it was demurred and upon the opening this case the Barons were clear of opinion that the issue in tail is remitted and came paramount the lease and so the lease for years is gone also by the chief Baron and Baron Snig there needs no Traverse to be alledged by the Plantiffe because it was but of a fee gained in an instant by the feofment of a Tenant in tail and a fee-simple gained in an instant needeth not to be Traversed 5. H. 7. and 2. E. 4. wherefore the Court said that judgement ought to be given against the Plantiffs but yet at the desire of the some the Court gave day to the Councel on both parts to argue the case at which day came Heneag Finch for the Plantiffs and he argued to the matter in Law and therein he said that by the feofment of Tenant in tail the use to himself for life the remainder to his daughters for years without limiting the residue of the use that in this case the residue of the use shall be in the feoffes and not in the feoffor for by him there is a difference between a feofment by him who had a fee with limitation of an use as above and a feofment made by him who derives an estate out of a fee for when Tenant for life or Tenant in tail makes a feofment and limits an use for part of the estate as above there the residue of the issue shall be to the feoffee and he vouched Castle and Dods case adjudged in the Common Pleas 8. Iac. that if Tenant for life grant over his estate without limiting of an use it shall be to the use of the grantee more strong here in a tortious act as our case is but if Tenant in tail will levy a fine with limitation of uses as above there the residue of the use shall be to the use of the Conusor Secondly admit that the residue of the use in this case shall he to the feoffor yet he shall not be remitted to the use as it seemeth the words of the Statute of 27. H. 8. are that cestuy que use shall have like estate in the land as he had in the use and therefore it is clear that the first taker of the use shall not be remitted as it is resolved in Amy Townsends case in Plowden and although the words of the Statute mention not heirs or issues yet by the intent of the Statute they are in equal degree but the Books which are against this opinion are two viz. 33. H. 8. Dyer fo 51. but there it is not expresly said that the issue is remitted but 34. H. 8 Br. remitter 49. is expresly against me but the same year in Dyer fo 54. it is there made a quere and in Bevils case it is only said that the first taker of the use cannot be remitted but of my opinion was Baldwin and Shelley in 28. H. 8. Dyer 23 24. and in Sanages case and 29. H. 8. it is resolved that if a man hath land by Act of Parliament there shall be no remitter and so here wherefore c. and he said if Tenant in tail be the remainder in fee and Tenant in tail makes a feofment to the use of himself in tail the remainder to him in remainder in fee in this case he in the remainder in fee shall not be remitted for then the first taker should be remitted to the pleading it seemeth that the bar is not good and first the general demurrer here doth not confess the matter of fact no more then in Gawins case in 29. H. 8. fo 40. by Brown a demurrer upon account in an appeal is no confession of the fact and in 44. Eliz. in Crisp and Byrons case accordingly see Sir Henry Browns case before a good case to this purpose then as to the Bar it seems it is not sufficient for want of a Traverse of a seisin in fee alledged in the feoffor who was Edward Stanley for it is a rule that two affirmatives cannot be allowed in a Declaration and the Bar without Traverse of that which is mentioned in the Declaration is not good except there be cause of some impossibilitie or inconvenience but yet this is to be understood where the affirmatives are express and not by implication as in Moiles case if the Defendant in his Bar confess a fee determinable he needs not Traverse the fee alledged by the Plantiffe but in our case here is an allegation made by the