Deposition Literature Profession and the like It 's enough if so much be alledged that they may write to know whether the Fact be so or no and upon a Return thereof that 't is so they can give Judgment Now if his Grace my Lord Archbishop in this Case upon Examination had returned that this Presentee was in Literatura minus sufficiens as undoubtedly he would and so the Plaintiff thought otherwise he would have joyned Issue and so ea occasione inhabilis then unquestionably Judgment must have been for the Plaintiff in Error for default of Learning is a good cause of Refusal and must be agreed to be so The Rule laid down by my Lord Anderson 3 Leon. 200. is That in Matters triable by our Law all things issuable ought to be specially alledged in order to have a convenient Trial but in Matters Spiritual the Law is otherwise because there 's no peril in the Trial and therefore if certain enough to ground a Certificate it 's sufficient My Lord Hob. 296. in Slade and Drake's Case saith That in pleading a Divorce you must shew before whom it was 11 Hen. 7.27 but you need not shew all the Proceedings as you should of a Recovery at Common Law and the Reason why you must shew before whom is only that it may be known who is to try and certifie it In Burdell's Case 18 Edw. 4.29 30. 't is clear that in all Spiritual Acts triable by the Spiritual Law it is necessary to plead no more than what may give the Court ground to write to the proper Ecclesiastical Officer and to judge by his Certificate Now here is ground enough in this Case for the Archbishop to examine this ignorant Person for so he must be taken to be for so he is found by one Ordinary and he refuses to be examined by the Archbishop he is pleaded not to have Learning enough to capacitate him for a Cure of Souls and that by one whom the Law hath constituted his Judge 'T is true this is traversable and triable by the Archbishop but all those Instances of his Insufficiency that were taken in the Bishops Court would be Evidences of the same before the Archbishop proceeding in an Ecclesiastical manner tho' not so proper tho' not possible to be set forth in the Temporal Court this is not a General Return of a Person inhabilis which might occasion an Enquiry into all sort of Disabilities but a Special Plea of inhabilis quia insufficienter Literatus and therefore no further Enquiry is necessary then into the Learning of the Party as Capacitates him for a Rector It was in the third place argued from the Presidents of Pleading in this Case and other Cases of Pleading upon like Occasions and those both Ancient and Modern 40 Edw. 3.25 In a Quare Impedit as this is the Bishop pleads as here That he Examined the Clerk presented and found upon Examination que il ne fuit sufficiens Letter'd and thereupon alledges Notice to the Patron per lapsum temporis he justifies his own Presentation Upon this there 's no dispute but that thus far it was well pleaded but the only doubt was whether the words and so disabled should be added to the Issue and they were ordered to be part of the Issue in that Case and so they ought to be in this Case and so they are ea ratione inhabilis this Case is exactly parallel to that in question and upon this Plea there was Issue joyned and the Trial was directed to be by the Guardian of the Spiritualities vacante Sede Cantuariensi nothing can be offered against this only that 't is Ancient and the Law is changed but by what Authority is hard to know there is no Act of the Legislature to alter it much hath been done to help against Niceties in Pleading nothing to require more And Bro. Quare Impedit 168. they were compelled to joyn Issue able or not able in that respect 39 Edw. 3.1 2. The Earl of Arundel versus the Bishop of Chester says the Book tho' it appears plainly to be a mis-print from the name of the Church and the Trial per pais and the Antiquity of the Bishoprick it self it must be the same that in the Abridgments is called the Earl of Arundel versus the Bishop of Exeter the Bishop pleads as here That he examined the Clerk presented and found him persona inhabilis to have a Benefice in the Church and Issue is joyned upon that which is stronger then ours and a Trial by Jury is directed out of the County of Cornwall because the Clerk was dead Here are two Cases in which all the different Trials are taken that can be had by the Guardian where the Presentee was living and by Jury when dead because he could not be examined And in both these Cases Issue is taken upon this Plea and that in great Cases and after long Debate And according to the Lord Coke in this Reign the Law was pure and uncorrupt and flourished Then were urged Modern Precedents Mich. 15 16 Eliz. Rot. 1941. Molineux versus Archiepiscopar ' Ebor ' in a Quare Impedit in which the Plea of the Archbishop is the same in totidem verbis as here Persona in Literatura minus sufficiens seu habilis ad habend ' praed ' Ecclesiam and there is no Exception taken to the Plea but only Issue joyned upon notice or no notice before the Lord Chief Justice Dyer Another Precedent there is Hill 6 Eliz. Rot. 646. Bodenham versus Episcopor ' Hereford ' there is the same Plea in Bar as here That the Person presented was Persona in Literatura minus sufficiens seu habilis ad habend ' aliquod Beneficium Sanctae Ecclesiae and then avers notice to the Patron and no Exception taken to the Plea but Issue upon notice Pasch 6 Eliz. Rot. 714. Paschall versus Episcop ' Lond ' Quare Impedit the Ordinary pleads an Examination de habilitate honestate doctrina ejus pro eo quod idem Episcopus invenit praed ' Christopherum fore criminosum de non sana Doctrina ideo recusavit and notice and even to that general Plea there 's no Demurrer but Issue upon notice 'T is no Answer that here was no Solemn Judgment upon this very Point for it doth rather inforce the Authority of the Precedents it argues that the Law was taken to be so clear for the validity of this Plea that no Lawyer would venture upon a Demurrer but rather would trust to a Jury upon the Evidence of notice it argues it so constant a Course and Method of Pleading in these Cases that none was so hardy as to dispute it 38 Edw. 3.2 Perjurius was alledged by the Bishop in the Presentee and held to be well enough but nothing of manner time and place nor any Conviction of it mentioned and yet this was admitted a good Plea 2 Rolls Abridg. Presentment 356. and so says Rolls it
afterwards the 20 Aug. 25 Car. 2. he being so seized did Make Seal and as his Deed deliver a certain Writing purporting a Surrender of the said Lands to the said Sir Simon Leach which Writing was prout c. Then they find that the said Simon Leach the Brother non fuit compes mentis sue tempore confectionis sigillationis deliberationis scripti illius c. That afterwards viz. 10 Nov. 25 Car. 2. the said Simon the Brother had Issue of his Body on the Body of the said Anne his Wife Charles Leach that the said Simon died and Charles Leach the Lessor of the Plaintiff is eldest Son and Heir of the said Simon c. Et si videbitur Cur ' quod c. Upon this Verdict there was Judgment for the Plaintiff And now it was argued That the said Judgment was Erroneous and said that in the Case there were two Queries 1. If this were a good Surrender there being no Acceptance or Agreement by Sir Simon before the Birth of the first Son Charles But this was not insisted on before and therefore waived here the same having been adjudged by the Lords to be a good Surrender even to an Infant without Acceptance in another Action between the same Parties which you may see reported in 2 Ventris 198 208. Then it was argued on the second Query That the Lessor of the Plaintiff in the Ejectment being a Remainder Man in Tail cannot take any Advantage of his Father's Lunacy That in this Case he could claim no Title as Heir at Law to his Father or Uncle because of the intermediate Remainder to the Defendant in Tail so that quoad this Estate he is as a meer Stranger and not as Heir and tho' he were able to avoid it by Writ or the like yet it being once good the particular Estate of Simon the Father of Charles was determined before the Contingent Remainder to the first Son could take place and consequently it can never after revive Then the Question is Whether this Surrender by a Non compos being an act done by himself and not by Attorney be void or only voidable There 's no express Case that a Surrender by one who is Non compos to him in Remainder is void Perhaps 't will be said as it hath been That the Acts of a Madman are meer Nullities by all Laws in the World But to this 't is an Answer That the Laws of England have made good and honest Provisions for them so as to avoid their Acts for the Benefit of the Party of the King and of the Heir But it was repeated that this was a Contingent Remainder and if it could not vest when the particular Estate did determine whether by Death or Surrender it never could vest at all for a future Right to defeat the Surrender as Heir cannot support such a Contingency a present right of Entry would but if no such present right the Remainder is gone for ever and here was no such in Charles If Tenant for Life make a Feoffment with condition of Re-entry the Contingent Remainder shall never arise again tho' the Condition be broken and a Re-entry were made So is the Case of Purefoy versus Rogers 2 Saund. 380. Wigg versus Villers 2 Rolls Abridg. 796. and then Charles cannot avoid this Deed for the avoiding of a Deed is to take somewhat out of the way in order to the revesting of somewhat but here was nothing to work upon for if the Surrender were good for a Moment the particular Estate for Life was once gone and consequently for ever and this must hold unless the Act were totally void Then 't was argued That during the Life of the Party 't was only voidable for the King by Office no Man can Stultifie himself and so is the great Resolution in Beverly's Case 4 Rep. and 1 Inst 247. and Whittingham's Case 8 Rep. and if it be not void as to himself it cannot be void as to others And tho' Fitzh in his N. B. says that he himself may have a dum non fuit compos that is not agreeable to the received Law for Beverly's Case was never shaken till now and Fitzh supposes it only voidable by saying that Writ doth lye There is also a Reason for this Rule of Law that a Man shall not disable himself by pretence of Distraction because if the Pretence were true he had no memory and consequently could not know or remember that he did such an Act and therefore 't is as it were impossible for him to be able to say that he was so distracted when he did it 't is for him to say what 't is not possible for him to know But they would compare this to the Case of an Infant yet even there all his Acts are not void his Bond is only avoidable he cannot plead that 't is not his Deed 'T is true that Acts apparently to his prejudice cannot be good as 1 Cro. 502. Suppose a Non compos Signs Seals and Delivers such a Deed and after recovers his Senses and agrees to it would not this be a good Surrender from the first Perkins sect 23. 1 Inst 2. and if it can be made good by a subsequent Agreement 't was not totally void and if not totally void 't is with the Plaintiff in Error The Law besides is very tender in case of Freeholds to make Conveyances void by bare Averments and this would be of dangerous Consequence if when there was no Inquisition or Commission of Lunacy during Life that thirty or forty years after a Conveyance it should be in the power of a Stranger to say that the Vendor was mad 't will make Purchasors unsafe Acts solemnly done ought to have a solemn Avoidance The 1 Hen. 5. cap. 5. Fine to be void 't is void as a Bar but yet it makes a Discontinuance and must be solemnly avoided Lincoln Colledge Case 3 Rep. Stroud and Marshal 3 Cro. 398. Dett sur Oblig ' The Defendant pleads that at the time he was of non sane memory and on demurrer adjudged no Plea and the Opinion of Fitzh held not to be Law And 3 Cro. 622. 50 Assis 2. Fitzh Issue 53. a Release by a Non compos which is much the same with a Surrender only one works upwards and the other downwards and after Recovery the Party agrees to it the same is binding 39 Hen. 6.42 and 49 Edw. 3.13 Then was mentioned the Provision of the Law in these Cases besides the Care of the Court of Chancery which protects the weak and unwary by Rules of Equity There 's a Writ de Ideota Inquirend ' and the express direction of the Writ is to enquire quas terras alienavit which shews that 't is not void The Statute of Prerogativa Regis is express Authority for it the Reason given is that such Persons Lands should not be aliened to their hurt or the King 's It must be agreed that before Office found the King cannot avoid
it Then as to the other Matter of the Damages which should have been inquired of upon the Demurrer 't was said That they were released upon Record and 't is plain that the Jury have found nothing upon that because the Conclusion of the Verdict doth shew that they inquired and found Damages only as to the concessit or assignavit they assess Damages for nothing else for if the Deed did pass the term then they find for the Plaintiff and assess Damages and if the term did not pass they find the Defendant Not guilty c. the Damages cannot therefore be for both for if they had found any for the Matter demurred upon it must have been with a si Contingat here 't is not so And tho' the Special Fact found had been against the Plaintiff it might have been for him upon the Demurrer and consequently the conditional finding of the Damages here can never be as to that Then it was further said That this might be supplied by an Inquest of Office in case it had not been released and there was cited Cheyney's Case Mich. 10 Jac. 1. 10 Rep. 118 119. Writ de Valore maritagij Issue on the Tenure and Verdict for the Plaintiff and no Value found of the Marriage and held ill because they say an Attaint lyes upon it that being the Point of the Writ and there the Rule is taken generally that where an Attaint lyes upon the finding the omission of finding such Matter cannot be supplied by a new Writ of Inquiry because such Writ of Inquiry would prevent the Party of the Benefit of his Attaint Then the Book says further That the Rule is that the Court ex Officio ought to inquire of such thing upon which no Attaint lyes and there the omission of its being found in the Verdict may be supplyed by a Writ of Inquiry of Damages as in the case of a Quare Impedit Poyner's Case Dyer 135. Issue found for the Plaintiff but the Jury per negligence were not charged to inquire of the four Points Plenarty ex cujus Presentatione si Tempus Semestre and the yearly Value of the Church there a Writ of Inquiry lyes de novo because upon them no Attaint lyes as is the 11 Hen. 4.80 because as to them 't is only an Inquest of Office and the Book says further That all the Cases to the contrary of that Rule have passed sub silentio without due Advisement and were against the Rule of Law So in the Case of Detinue the omission of the Value in the finding is fatal because an Attaint lyes upon a false Verdict in that particular So that by the Case cited it may be only an Inquest of Office as to part which is the present Case In that Case of a Quare Impedit in Dyer is cited a President for it in the Old Book of Entries 110. which is a false Folio for 't is in 93. b. and there is the very Entry of the Writ setting forth a Recuperavit presentation ' virtute Breais de Nisi prius Et quia nescitur utrum Ecclesia plena c. And as the Case is in Dyer the Plaintiff did there as the Plaintiff doth here release his Damages and had a Writ to the Bishop Now in Heydon's Case 11 Rep. 6. 't is held that no Attaint lyes upon an Inquest of Office and therefore 't is that if in a Trespass against divers Defendants some plead to Issue and one suffers Judgment to go by Default the Damages found on the Issue shall be chargeable upon all and the Inquiry of Damages on the Judgment by Default shall stay because no Attaint lyes upon that 'T is there also said that attaint lyes only on a Verdict on the mise of the Parties In Trespass three Issues Non culp ' to one part Prescription for a Common to another part and the Cattle raptim momorderunt in going to take Common to another c. The Jury find one for the Plaintiff and another for the Defendant and inquire not of the third Issue at all the Plaintiff relinquishing his Damages on the third Issue prays Judgment on the Verdict for the first and held that this prevented all Error Mich. 13 Car. 1. B. R. Brown and Stephens adjudged 1 Rolls Abridg 786. Then as to the Case of Vastuman and Row 11 Car. 1. B. R. in 2 Rolls Abridg. 722. Trespass for an Assault Battery and taking Corn Special Plea to the Battery and Demurrer thereupon and Non culp ' to the taking the Corn the Jury find no Damages upon the Demurrer said there That when Judgment is for the Plaintiff on the Demurrer the Damages for it cannot be assessed on a Writ of Inquiry but a Venire Facias de novo for the whole 'T was now argued that that was expresly against the Rule in Cheyney's Case and that in the Case in Rolls 't is put with the addition of a dubitatur But if that be Law there needs no Writ of Inquiry in this Case because the Damages as to that part are released and for this there is the express Case of Bentham 11 Rep. 56. In Annuity the Parties descended to Issue found for the Plaintiff as to the Arrearages but no Damages and Costs 't was held an imperfect Verdict and that it could not be supplyed by Writ of Inquiry of Damages yet the Plaintiff releasing the Damages and Costs had Judgment for him and a Writ of Error was brought and the Insufficiency of the Verdict was assigned for Error but the Judgment was affirmed because the Plaintiff had released it Dyer 369 370. Ejection ' custod ' terre hered ' and ill because intire Damages and for the beres no Ejectment lyes yet the Damages being released he had Judgment for the Land And 't was said to be there held That insufficient finding of Damages and finding of none are all one If a Release of that which is ill found will help where such thing released is directly in Issue much more it should do so where the thing released is but obliquely inquired of and was not put in Issue to the Jury and then 't was repeated what was said before that the Special Conclusion helps and prevents the General Intendment which otherwise would be had as to the Damages being intire and therefore 't was insisted that this made no Error but the Judgment in the Kings Bench stood good notwithstanding this Exception Then the Counfel for the Defendant did likewise wave this as not being the Cause of the Reversal in the Exchequer Chamber Wherefore it was argued for the Plaintiff That this Assignment or Grant found in the Verdict is void and passed nothing for that either it passed the whole Term or no part of it and that immediately that this must be agreed Then 't was said that it could not pass the whole for so to do was contrary to the Intention of all the Parties to the good will of the Grantor and even to the hopes of
haberi decrevit and then he adjourns 't is no Argument to say that he was hindred for he might have proceeded in absentia and if the 16th of June be tacked to it 't is longer than the time There needed no formal adjournment for that he is Authorized to proceed in a Summary way 't is no such absurdity to call that a Visitation which was in some sort hindred since notwithstanding the obstruction some Acts were done and more might have been by adjourning to another place 3. Here was no such cause as could warrant a Deprivation it was not one of the causes mentioned in the Statutes which are not directions merely but they are the constituent Qualifications of the Power and Contumacy is none of the causes nay here is no Contumacy at all The Offence of the Suspended Fellows was only a mistake in their Opinions and the Doctors was no more and 't is not a Contumacy for refusing to answer to or for any Crime within the Statutes for there was none of the Crimes mentioned in the Statutes laid to the charge of the Rector if the Crime charged had incurred Deprivation perhaps a Contumacy might be Evidence of a Guilt of that Crime and so deserve the same Censure but Contumacy in not consenting to a Visitation can never be such especially when the consenting to a Visitation is not required under pain of Deprivation 4. Admitting the Visitor legally in the Exercise of his Office that here was cause of Censure that the Cause or Crime was deserving of that Punishment which was inflicted that Deprivation was a congruous Penalty for such an Offence yet t was argued That this Sentence was void for that the Visitor alone was in this Case minus competens judex because his Authority was particularly designed to be exercised with the consent of others which was wanting in this Case This was the same as if it had required the concurrence of some other Persons Extra Colleg ' then that such a concurrence was necessary appears from the words of the Statute his meaning seems plain upon the whole to require it A greater tenderness is all along shewn to the Rector then to the Scholars 't is sine quorum consensu irrita erit hujusmodi Expulsio vacua ipso facto and the Sentence it self shews it necessary because it affirms it self to be made with such consent and it cannot be thought that the Rector should be deprivable without their consent when the meanest Scholar could not Then here 's no such consent for 't is not of the four Seniors but of the four Seniors not Suspended now this doth not fulfil the Command of the Statute for the Suspension doth not make them to be no Fellows a Suspended Fellow is a Fellow though Suspended a Suspension makes no vacancy the taking off of the Suspension by Sentence or by Effluxion of time doth make them capable of acting still without the aid of any new Election and they are in upon their old choice and have all the priviledges of Seniority and Precedency as before If they ceased to be Fellows by the Suspension then they ought to undergo the Annum probationis again and to take the Oaths again In case of Benefices or Offices Religious or Civil Ecclesiastical or Temporal 't is so a Suspension in this Case is only a disabling them from taking the Profits during the time it continues And 't is no Argument to say That their Concurrence was not necessary for that they had withdrawn themselves and were guilty of Contumacy for that a Man guilty of Contumacy might be present if withdrawn from the Chapel he might be in the Colledge or in the University and 't is not found that they were absent and then their Consent not being had the Sentence was void and null and consequently no Title found for the Lessor of the Plaintiff in the Action below It was replied in behalf of the Plaintiff much to the same effect as 't was argued before and great weight laid upon the Contumacy which hindred the observance of the Statutes that by allowing such a Behaviour in a Colledge no Will of the Founder could be fulfilled no Visitation could ever be had and all the Statutes would be repealed or made void at once that tho' this Crime was not mentioned 't was as great or greater than any of the rest that here was an Authority and well executed and upon a just Cause and in a regular manner as far as the Rector's own Misbehaviour did not prevent it and therefore they prayed that the Judgment might be reversed And upon Debate the same was reversed accordingly Note That in this Case there was one Doubt conceived before and another after this hearing The first was If a Writ of Error lay in Parliament immediately upon a Judgment in the King's Bench without first resorting to the Exchequer Chamber but upon perusing the Statute which erects that Court for Examination of Errors it appeared plainly that that Act only gives the Election to the Party aggrieved to go thither that it did not take away the old Common Law method of Relief in Parliament and so hath the Practise been but upon Judgments in the Exchequer Court the Writ of Error must first be brought before the Lord Chancellor and cannot come per saltum into Parliament because the Statute in that case expresly ordains That Errors in the Court of Exchequer shall be examined there and so held in the Case of the Earl of Macclesfield and Grosvenor The other Doubt was raised by a Motion in B. R. for the Court to give a new Judgment upon the Reversal above and insisted on that it ought so to be as was done in the Case of Faldo and Ridge Yelv. 74. entred Trin. 2 Jac. 1. Rot. 267. Trespass and Special Plea and Judgment in B. R. for the Defendant and upon Writ of Error in the Exchequer Chamber the Judgment was Reversed and upon the Record returned into the King's Bench they gave Judgment that the Plaintiff should recover contrary to the first Judgment for otherwise they said the Law would prove defective and a Precedent was shewn in Winchcomb's Case 38 Eliz. where the same Course was taken and the like Rule was made Mich. 1 W. Mar. upon the Reversal of the Judgment inter Claxton vers Swift which is entred Mich 2 Jac. 2. B. R. Rot. 645. the like between Sarsfield vers Witherley 'T was argued on the other side That the Court which reverses the Judgment ought to give the new Judgment such as ought to have been given at first that in the Exchequer Chamber it may be otherwise because they have only power to affirm or reverse for yet in the Case of King and Seutin the Exchequer Chamber gave a new Judgment tho' they cannot inquire of Damages and that is a kind of Execution which must be in B.R. In Omulkery's Case 1 Cro. 512. and 2 Cro. 534. the Court here sends a Mandatory Writ to
command them in Ireland to do Execution there St. John vers Cummin Yelv. 118 119. 4 Inst 72. If Writ be abated in C. B. and Error brought in B. R. and the Judgment be reversed shall proceed in B. R. and 1 Rolls 774. to the same effect Green vers Cole 2 Saund. 256. The Judges Commissioners gave the new Judgment 'T is true in Dyer 343. the opinion was that he was only restored to his Action and then Writs of Error were not so frequent The Judgment may be erroneous for the Defendant and yet no reason to give a Judgment for the Plaintiff as in Slocomb's Case 1 Cro. 442. the Court gave a new Judgment for the Defendant therefore it properly belongs to the Court which doth examine the Error to give the new Judgment the Record is removed as Fitzh Nat. Brev. 18 19. on false Judgment in ancient Demesne v. 38 Hen. 6.30 and Griffin's Case in Error on a quod ei deforceat in 2 Saunders 29 30. new Judgment given here In the Case of Robinson and Wolley in 3 Keeble 821. Ejectment Special Verdict Judgment reversed in the Exchequer Chamber and they could never get Judgment here the Court of Exchequer Chamber not having given it and in the principal Case after several Motions in the Court of King's Bench the Remittitur not being entred there a Motion was made in Parliament upon this Matter and a new Judgment was added to the Reversal that the Plaintiff should recover c. Dr. William Oldis Plaintiff Versus Charles Donmille Defendant WRit of Error to Reverse a Judgment in the Court of Exchequer affirmed upon a Writ of Error before the Lord Chancellor c. The Case upon the Record was thus Donmille declares in the Exchequer in placito transgr ' contempt ' c. for a Prosecution contra regiam prohibit ' and sets forth Magna Charta that nullus liber homo c. that the Plaintiff is a Freeman of this Kingdom and ought to enjoy the free Customs thereof c. that the Defendant not being ignorant of the Premisses but designing to vex and aggrieve the Plaintiff did in Curia militari Henrici Ducis Norfolk ' coram ipso Henrico Com' Mareschal ' Exhibit certain Articles against the Plaintiff c. that Sir Henry St. George Clarencieux King at Arms was and is King at Arms for the Southern Eastern and Western Parts of the Kingdom viz. from the River of Trent versus Austrum and that the Conusance Correction and Disposition of Arms and Coats of Arms and ordering of Funeral Pomps time out of mind did belong to him within that Province and that the Plaintiff having notice thereof did without any Licence in that behalf had and obtained paint and cause to be painted Arms and Escutcheons and caused them to be fixed to Herses that he provided and lent Velvet Palls for Funerals that he painted divers Arms for one Berkstead who had no right to their use at the Funeral and did lend a Pall for that Funeral and paint Arms for Elizabeth Godfrey and marshalled the Funeral and the like for Sprignall and that he had publickly hanging out at his Balcony Escutcheons painted and Coaches and Herses and other Publick Processions of Funerals to entice People to come to his House and Shop for Arms c. That the Defendant compelled the Plaintiff to appear and answer the Premisses c. The Defendant in propria persona sua venit dicit That the Court of the Constable and Marshal of England is an ancient Court time out of mind and accustomed to be held before the Constable of England and the Earl Marshal of England for the time being or before the Constable only when the Office of Earl Marshal is vacant or before the Earl Marshal only when the Office of Constable is vacant which Court hath time out of mind had Conusance of all Pleas and Causes concerning Arms Escutcheons Genealogies and Funerals within this Realm and that no other Person hath ever intermeddled in those Pleas or Affairs nor had or claimed Jurisdiction thereof and that the Suit complained of by the Plaintiff was prosecuted in the said ancient Court of and for Causes concerning Arms Escutcheons and Funerals That by the 13 Rich. 2. 't was enacted that if any Person should complain of any Plea begun before the Constable and Marshal which might be tried by the Common Law he should have a Privy Seal without difficulty to be directed to the Constable and Marshal to Supersede that Plea till discussed by the King's Counsel if it belongs to that Court or to the Common Law prout per Statut ' ill ' apparet and that the said Court time out of mind hath been tant ' honoris celsitudinis that it was never prohibited from holding any Pleas in the same Court aliter vel alio modo quam juxta formam Statut ' praed ' Et hoc parat ' est verificare unde non intendit quod Curia hic placitum praed ' ulterius cognoscere velit aut debeat c. The Plaintiff demurs and the Defendant joyns From the Exchequer Court this was adjourned propter difficultatem into the Exchequer Chamber and afterwards by advice of the Judges there the Court gave Judgment for the Plaintiff which was affirmed by the Chancellor and Treasurer c. And now it was argued on the behalf of the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error that this Judgment was erroneous and fit to be reversed And first to maintain the Court as set forth 't was insisted on 1. That when there was a Constable and Marshal the Marshal had equal Power of Judicature with the Constable as each Judge hath in other Courts 2. That the Constable had in that Court power of Judicature alone when there was no Marshal And 3. That the Marshal had the like when there was no Constable That they had both equal power of Judicature appeared by all their Proceedings by their Libels or Bills in the Case of John Keightley Esq against Stephen Scroop The Libel is In the Name of God Amen Before you my Lords the Constable and Marshal of England in your Court of Chivalry and prays that the said Stephen by their Sentence definitive may be punisht 1 pars Pat. 2 Hen. 4. m. 7. And the same Stephen libelled against Keightley to the thrice Honourable Lords the Constable and Marshal of England So the Libels were directed to both and both sate judicially The same appears by the Sentence or Judgment given in that Court Bulmer libelled against Bertram Vsau coram Constabulario Mareschallo qui duellum inter partes allocaverunt assignaverunt locum tempus Rot. Vascor ' 9 H. 4. m. 14. It doth likewise appear to be so by the Appeals from their Judgments to the King they are both sent to to return the Rolls of their Judgments Rot. Claus 20 Edw. 1. m. 4. In the Appeal brought by Sir Robert Grovesnor against Richard Scroop 't is upon
of the greatest Members of the House Selden Hollis Maynard Palmer Hide c. that the Earl Marshal can make no Court without the Constable and that the Earl Marshal's Court is a grievance Rushworth 2 Vol. 1056. Nalson's 1 Vol. 778. Spelman in his Glossary verbo Mareschallus seems to say 't was officium primo Servile and that he was a meer Servant to the Constable and gives much such another account of it as Cambden doth and pag. 403. is an Abstract or rather Transcript of all that is in the Red Book in the Exchequer about the nature of this Office and there 't is said that if the King be in War then the Constable and Marshal shall hold Pleas and the Marshal shall have the Amerciaments and Forefeitures of all those who do break the Commandments of the Constable and Marshal and then it was further alledged by the Councel for the Defendant in the Writ of Error that they knew of no Statute Record or Ancient Book of Law or History that ever mentioned the Earl Marshal alone as having Power to hold a Court by himself So that taking it as a Court held before an incompetent Judge a Prohibition ought to go and the Party ought not to be put to his Action after he has undergone imprisonment and paid his Fine since it hath the semblance of a Court and pretends to act as such and if it be a Court before the Earl Marshal alone in case it exceeds the Jurisdiction proper to it a Prohibition lies either by force of the Common-Law which states the boundaries and limits of that Jurisdiction or by force of the Statute of 8 Rich. 2. which is not repealed by the subsequent Law in that Reign and if such Prohibition do lie in any Case that here was cause for it the subject matter of the Articles being only a wrong if any to a private Officer who had his proper remedy at the Common-Law and therefore it was prayed that the Judgment should be affirmed and it was affirmed Smith Vx ' Versus Dean and Chapter of Paul 's London and Lewis Rugle APpeal from a Decree of Dismission made by the Lord Jeffreys the Bill was to compel the Dean and Chapter as Lord of the Mannor to receive a Petition in nature of a Writ of false Judgment for Reversing a common recovery suffered in the Mannor Court in 1652. whereby a Remainder in Tail under which the Plaintiff claimed was barred suggesting several Errors in the proceeding therein And that the said Lord might be commanded to examine the same and do Right thereupon To this Bill the Defendant Rugle demurred and the Dean and Chapter by Answer insisted That 't was the first Attempt of this kind and of dangerous consequence and therefore conceived it not fit to proceed on the said Petition unless compelled thereto by course of Law That Rugle being the Person concerned in interest to contest the sufficiency of the Common-recovery they hoped the Court would hear his defence and determine therein before any Judgment were given against them and that they were only Lords of the Mannor and ready to Obey c. and prayed that their rights might be preserved This demurrer was heard and ordered to stand And now it was insisted on by the Council with the Appellant that this was the only Remedy which they had that no Writ of Error or false Judgment lies for Reversing of a recovery or Judgment obtained in a Copyhold Court that the only method was a Bill or Petition to the Lord in nature of a Writ of false Judgment which of common right he ought to receive and to cause Errors and defects in such recovery or Judgment to be examined and for this were Cited Moore 68. Owen 63. Fits N. B. 12. 1 Inst 60. 4 Rep. 30. is such a Record mentioned to have been seen by Fenner where the Lord upon Petition to him had for certain Errors in the proceedings Reversed such Judgment given in his own Court 1 Roll's Abridg. 600. Kitchin 80. 1 Roll's Abridg. 539. Lanc. 98. Edward's Case Hill 8. Jac. 1. by all which it appears that this is an allowed and the only remedy Then it was argued That in all Cases where any Party having a Right to any Freehold Estate is barred by Judgment Recovery or Fine such Party of common Right may have a Writ of Error if the same be in a Court of Record and a Writ of false Judgment if in a Court Baron or County Court and reverse such Judgment Recovery or Fine for Error or Defect and there can be no reason assigned why a Copyholder especially considering the great quantity of Land of that Tenure in England should be without remedy when a false Judgment is given and the rather for that in Real Actions as this was the Proceedings in the Lord's Courts are according to those in Westminster-hall and now tho' a Common Recovery be a Common Assurance yet it was never pretended that a Writ of Error to Reverse it was refused upon that pretence and if the Lord of a Mannor deny to do his Duty the Chancery hath such a Superiour Jurisdiction as to enjoyn him thereto 'T is the Business of Equity to see that Right be done to all Suitors in Copyhold Courts Fitsh Abridg. Subpena 21. 2 Cro. 368. 2 Bulstr. 336. 1 Rolls Abridg. 373. If an Erroneous Judgment be given in such Court of a common Person 's in an Action in the Nature of a Formedon a Bill may be in Chancery in nature of a false Judgment to Reverse it and Lanc. 38. Tanfield says that he was of Counsel in the Case of Patteshall and that it was so decreed which is much more then what is here contended for and tho' Common Recoveries are favoured and have been supported by several Acts of Parliament yet no Parliament ever thought fit to deprive the Parties bound by such Recoveries of the benefit of a Writ of Error On the other side 't was urged in defence of the Dismission That the Person who suffered this Recovery had a power over the Estate that she might both by Law and Conscience upon a Recovery dispose of it as she should think fit that she hath suffered a Recovery and that it was suffered according to the custom of the Mannor tho' not according to the form of those suffered in Westminster-hall That the suffering of Recoveries in any Court and the Methods of proceeding in them are rather notional then real things and in the Common Law Courts they are taken notice of not as Adversary Suits but as Common Assurances so that even there few Mistakes are deemed so great but what are remedied by the Statute of Jeofailes or will be amended by the Assistance of the Court And if it be so in the Courts at Westminster where the Proceedings are more solemn and the Judges are Persons of Learning and Sagacity how much rather ought this to stand which was suffered in 1652. during the Times of
not against him here 's no Fraud or ill Practise c. Then if the nature of the thing be considered the Demand is of a Right not arising by Agreement of Parties but by Operation of Law if the former Chancery might perhaps construe and enlarge it so as to fulfil the utmost Intention but here her title is the Marriage the Seisin and Death of the Husband And there never was a time when if her Lord had died she could have had immediate Dower for even the Term had been pleadable by an Heir of Law to a Writ of Dower Now what doth give her an Equity against the Respondent Her Claim is by from and under her Husband as having a Right to a Proportion of what he had that is a Right by the Law where is the Equity that should improve or mend this Right Perhaps it must be agreed That if the Husband had just before Marriage made a long Lease on purpose to prevent Dower and the Woman expecting the Priviledges which the Common Law gives to Women married had surviv'd him Equity might have interposed and yet even this was practised by a Reverend Judge of Equity Mr. Serjeant Maynard who made such Lease to his Man Bradford the day before his last Marriage but here is no such Action 't was an old Term created by the old Earl of Warwick As to the Case of the Mortgages The Feme intituled to Dower is let in because the Person who is the Mortgagee hath no Interest but to have his Money and Equity is to execute all these Agreements but never where there is a Purchaser or where the Interest of the Mortgage is assigned to the Heire Between her self and the Mortgagee she comes in place of her Husband and the Husband could redeem and so may the Wife but against a Purchaser she has no more Equity then her Husband had and that is none at all If she hath a Legal Title antecedent to the Purchasers as Marriage and Seisin where there 's no Term standing out that shall prevail and Equity shall not help the Purchaser against her so where the Purchaser hath a Legal Title as by a Term precedent Equity cannot relieve her And whereas it was objected That there was no Case adjudged in Chancery against the Appellants pretence the Answer is plain The Common Law is against it and if no Precedent in Equity the Common Law ought to stand 'T is nothing but Precedent that Consecrates half the Decrees in Equity And no Man will say that ever any Woman was endowed in Equity of a Trust Estate If a Man hath a Term for Ten thousand years and be entirely and properly owner of it tho' the same be equal in value to a Feesimple for the Reversion after it is worth little or nothing yet no Dower can be claimed in Equity nay If the Husband be seized together with another Person and not sole seized yet no Dower even in Chancery can be claimed against the Survivor So that Equity doth not exceed the Rules of Law in advancing the Right of Dower 'T is true unless Fraud be in the Case according to the Case of Nash and Preston in Cro. Car. 190 191. Relief in Equity shall not be given against a Legal Title to Dower yet 't is as true that where the Law doth not give Dower Equity will not unless there be Fraud and Covin used to prevent it and then common Reason enjoyns a Court of Conscience to Relieve If any Allowance had been in the Purchase upon Consideration of the Title to Dower the same would have been a very material Argument but in this Case there was none And therefore 't was prayed that the Dismission might be affirmed and it was so Dominus Rex versus Baden WRit of Error to Reverse a Judgment given in the Court of Exchequer and affirmed upon a Writ of Error in the Councel Chamber before the Chancellor with the Assistance of the two Chief Justices The Case upon the Record was only this One Allen outlaws one Clerk in Debt on a Bond in Mich. 1690. on the Seventh of Jan. 1690. by virtue of a Special Capias utlagatum and inquisition thereupon seizes Clerk's Lands into their Majesties hand In Hillary Term following the Outlawry and Inquisition are certified into the Exchequer and Allen obtains a Lease under a Rent In Mich. 1692. Baden comes and pleads that in Mich. 4 Jac. 2. he recovered a Judgment against Clerk for 1080 l. that in Trinity Term 1691. he took out an Elegit and had a Moiety of the Lands extended and therefore prays that an amoveas manus may be awarded Mr. Attorney replies That the Lands were seized by virtue of the Outlawry and Inquisition long before the Elegit was sued and therefore c. Baden demurs and Judgment for the King It was argued on behalf of the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error that this Judgment was Erroneous for that there 's a vast difference between an Outlawry in a Civil and one in a Criminal Process That in a Civil Action 't is only a Civil Process for the benefit of the Party and 5 Edw. 3. cap. 12. the King cannot pardon an Outlawry at the Suit of a private Person that 't is only to help one Subject to his Debt from another that the King hath no Advantage by it and so no need of a Preference by reason of the Prerogative that at Common Law no Man could be outlawed that now it is purely given for the sake of the Plaintiff that the common Practise is to make a Lease or grant a privy Seal to the Party That by this Outlawry the King hath no Interest in the Land he cannot cut down the Trees 9 H. 6.20 that he cannot Plow or Sow but only collect and receive the Profits which arise out of the Land Bro. tit Outlawry 36. tit Patents 3. that the King hath not the possession of the Land which shews it not to be a Forfeiture to the King but it remains the Parties still in respect of Ownership he may make a Feoffment 21 Hen. 7.7 2 Inst 675. Hob. 122. by the Judgment the Lands were bound tho' the Title was not compleat till the Elegit was sued out a monstrans de droit or Petition did lye and now the same Matter may be pleaded 'T was further argued That great Mischief must follow if an Outlawry upon Civil Process may defeat a Judgment that Judgments with release of Errors are taken and used as common Securities that this is most plainly a device to avoid them that this can be no Security if an Elegit may not be sued but prevented by the Party himself for here it is his own default not to avoid this Outlawry by Appearance that no act of the Debtor could alter the Security and there 's no reason why his neglect should that this Contest is between Baden and Allen and not between Baden and the King Allen's Suit was but just begun and this is
meerly upon his Suit If the Person had been taken upon this Capias he had been the Plaintiff's prisoner and if he Escapes the Plaintiff had an Action for it Yelv. 19. and the supposed Forfeiture is only for his Interest 3 Cro. 909. And by this practise the King's Prerogative is to assist one Subject to deceive another By the Law a Judgment is preferrable to a Bond and binds the Land which a Bond doth not till Judgment upon it now here the first is to be postponed by reason of the King 's supposed Prerogative which is only a Right in the King for the use of the Party to have the Profits 2 Rolls Abridg. 808. vide Stamford 57. 1 Inst 30. Hardres 101 176. 1 Inst 202. Latch 43. That the Elegit hath Relation to the Judgment and so becomes Prior to the King's Title like the Relation of a Bargain and Sale to an Inrolment and as a strong Argument for it the words in the Writ of Elegit were repeated and enforced quo die Jud ' reddit ' fuit which shewed a relation to that day and consequently did affect the Lands at a time when the King had no Interest in it On the other side it was argued with the Judgment That this was the common Practise of the Court of Exchequer in this Case that the Course of a Court is the Law of that Court and to be taken notice of by all other Courts that 't is time out of mind and consequently of equal duration with the Common Law and always deemed to be parcel thereof that the Records and Experience of the ancient Clerks were both concurring to prove it the common Usage in the Exchequer that when Lands are seized into the K's hands by virtue of an Outlawry and Inquisition it was never known that the King's hands were removed by force of an Elegit sued afterwards tho' upon a Judgment precedent that it hath been their constant practise to continue the pernancy of the Profits in the King notwithstanding such Elegit that 't would be of dangerous Consequence to alter the same by a new Opinion that 't is not so very material whether this practise be more reasonable then another but whether it be certain and known for if it be so 't is much better to have it continued then changed because of the Confusion which must follow by shaking the Rights and Possessions enjoyed under the former Practise That 't is not in many Cases so considerable what the Rule is as that it be fixed and understood and therefore no reason to alter it or at least not without the use of the Legislature for by the same colour that some Judges of Parts and Segacity shall think fit to swerve from their Predecessors others of less capacity may pretend to do the same and so nothing but uncertainty would ensue But besides this is not meerly a Course of the Court 't is also agreeable to the Rule and Reason of the Laws Baden hath no interest in the Land 'till he sues his Elegit whereas the King's Title to the Land was compleat by the Outlawry and Inquisition which was prior to the Elegit and a Judgment of it self doth not affect the Land till Election made a Judgment at Law is only an Award of the Court ascertaining of the Debt and declaring that the Plaintiff shall recover In it self it doth no more assect the Land then a Bond 't is true when the Suit is ended by a Judgment the Party may resort to an Elegit for his Execution if he thinks fit and can find any thing subject thereto At the Common Law before the Statute of Westminst 2. cap. 18. a Subject upon his Judgment for Debt or Damages could not have Execution by taking away the Possession of his Adversary's Land because that would hinder the Man's following of Husbandry and Tillage which then was reckoned beneficial to the Publick So is 2 Inst 394. and Sir William Herbert's Case 3 Rep. 11 12. nothing but a Levari or Fieri facias then by the Statute sit in Electione illius and Coke in his Comment on those words saith After the suing of an Elegit he can't have a Capias So that by him the suing out of the Writ is the determining of his Election 2 Inst. 395. Foster and Jackson's Case Hob. 57. Even the Elegit it self doth not when sued out immediately touch the Lands for if that the Chattels be sufficient to pay the Debt and it so appears to the Sheriff that thereby he may satisfie the Plaintiffs Demand then he ought not to extend the Land and this appears by the frame of the Writ as 't is in the Register 299. 2 Inst 395. which shews that no Title can be acquired to the Land till the same be Extended The Elegit cannot by Law have relation to the Time of the Judgment so as to avoid the King's Title for relation is only a Fiction and Fiction shall never bind or prejudice the King in his Right much less in his Prerogative and no Case can be shewn where a Relation shall conclude the King nor is it any Objection That this is a Prerogative for the Benefit of a Subject for in truth all the Prerogatives are for the Advantage and Good of the People or else they ought not to be allowed by the Law Besides Practise and Reason there 's express Authority in our Books for it as the Case of Masters versus Sir Herbert Whitfield 1657. Hardres 106. And if there were no Book for it the Practise is enough for the printing of a Case doth not alter or change the nature of it 't is as much Authority if it be not published as when it is so Masters recovered a Judgment against Sir Herbert Whitfield and after the Judgment Sir Herbert was outlawed at another Man's Suit and his Lands seized into the Protector 's hands and afterwards Masters took out an Elegit and the whole Court was of Opinion that the Lands being seized into the Protector 's hands before the Elegit was sued out there could not be an amoveas manus awarded altho' the Judgment was prior to the Outlawry this is the same with the Case at Bar and tho' it may be surmised That this was an Opinion vented in Evil Times yet 't is well known that excepting their Criminal Proceedings in those Times the Law flourished and the Judges were Men of Learning as Mr. Justice Twisden hath often affirmed upon the Bench. 'T was further urged That Prerogative was to be favoured that 't was a part of the Law 2 Inst 296. especially when 't was used as in this Case to help an honest Man to his Debt that confessing of Judgments was oftner practised by Fraud to cover Mens Estates then Outlawries were to defeat just Judgments That if this Judgment was just and honest 't was his own default not to sue an Elegit immediately Then were cited many Cases to prove the King's Prerogative as Fleetwood's Case
yet then they would have over-ruled the Plea and not have wrote to the Arch-Bishop at all This is the sole cause of that Judgment and then the consequence will be as was observed before But their own reason fails in this Case for here the sufficiency of Learning is Traversable for as hath been shewn it hath often been Traversed and as to the ea Ratione inhabilis no Objection can be to that for the old Authorities Cited do warrant nay require it and all Pleas of Special non est fact ' as by breaking of a Seal and the like are in the same manner Then besides the very words of the Law of Articuli Cleri are very much worthy of consideration it impowers the Bishop to refuse a Clerk propter defectum scientiae alias Causas rationabiles now all these Causes of Refusal mentioned in their cases comes under the causas Rationabiles and causa vaga in certa estnon Rationabilis now want of Learning is not included by intendment but by express words and therefore need not otherwise be set forth take it for granted that as they would have it the Temporal Judges are to Judge what is a reasonable cause of Refusal yet they are not to Judge if defect of Learning be a cause or not for in that the Statute is positive then if said to be deficient in Learning ea ratione inhabilis they had nothing to Judge upon they were only to write to the Arch-Bishop to know if the Fact were true if he were deficient and therefore it need not be set forth any otherwise then as the Statute expresses it tho' in that case they say there are divers sorts of Schisms and Heresies in Doctrines on which the Bishop might warrant his Refusal yet 't is not so much as once pretended there are any Opinions delivered in those cases that deficiency of Learning is subject to the same Rules of Pleading Then the Plea is in the Negative as was shewed before which is more than enough to make a good difference and Negatives in a Bar are always allowed to be more general because most favoured and especially here where the matter and person to which the words are applied do sufficiently restrain and determine the seeming uncertainty of it Nothing can be pretended to reduce this to a greater certainty but the Canons or the Statute of 13 Eliz. cap. 12. or other Laws of the same nature 1 Canons of King Jac. 1. made in 1602. and they were made pursuant to Canons made 1562. by which no Man was to be admitted nisi rationem fidei juxta Articulos Religionis in Synodo Episcoporum Cleri Anno 1562. approbatos Latine reddere eandem Scripturae testimonio Corroborare possit Can. 3 4. Conditiones in ordinandis requisit ' this is merely a Negative injunction on the Bishop never to confer Orders upon any Man that cannot do this it is not mandatory upon him to ordain every Man that can do this nor does it any way lessen or diminish the Authority or Judgment of the Ordinary in Examination of the fitness and Learning requisite So is the Statute of 13 Eliz. the same induces an incapacity on those that shall not subscribe the Articles but it leaves all things else to the Ecclesiastical Law neither the Canon nor the Statute are Derogatory from the Old Ecclesiastical Law they both leave it in Statu quo to the Ecclesiastical Judges no Man will pretend that these are a Repeal of the Statute of Articuli Cleri so that the Law remained as it did with more Latitude indeed to the Bishop but not with more favour to the Clerk They objected that here was not convenient notice to the Patron and the usual pleading of it is the same day But surely that 's well enough and so was it held by all the Judges that favoured their side in this case and 't is apparent that he had above four Months time to have presented another besides the Judges declared below that if not a convenient time it ought to have come on their side but they admit notice by their Replication and insist upon his Orders as an Estoppel to say that he was Illiterate They pretend That he is still under the Bishop's Jurisdiction and that he may deprive him for the same Cause if sufficient after Institution but that 's a great mistake for there may be a cause of Refusal which is not of Deprivation for he may become Learned that was not so and besides the Rule is false after induction they would then be discoursing about Freehold c. a Man may be refused because non compos but he cannot be deprived for that Cause though the Bishop may provide a Curate c. As to the pretence of six Months notice from the time of the Refusal 't was never insisted on at the Bar in C. B. or B. R. and the Judge who doubted did only say he was not fully satisfied with the current Opinion of the Books his doubt arose upon this That the cause of Refusal was not within the Partron's knowledge Suppose the Man had not Episcopal Orders but pretended to them and the Patron knew nothing of the matter should this Presentation prevent lapse and the rest were all of another Opinion and the Books are full to this effect for the Patron ought to present a Man qualified otherwise 't is as no Presentation and then lapse in course Suppose he had presented a mere laicus 't is as none suppose he had presented a Woman as idonea persona 't is as none and these instances may seem Trivial but our Books do mention them 2 Roll's Abridg. 364. Kelway 49.59 34 Hen. 7.21 14 Hen. 7.21 and Dyer 227. and Sir Symon Degges Parson's Gounsellor Upon the whole the Question is whether a Court of Law shall Repeal the Statute of Articuli Cleri whether the Plea shall be adjudged ill which is in the very words of that Statute when the same Fact was never pleaded otherwise nay when it hath been pleaded thus often times and never excepted against till now Wherefore it was prayed that the Judgment might be Reversed On the other side 't was argued That the Bishop's Plea below was too general and the Plaintiffs Replication good that his being Ordained a Priest and a Licensed Preacher is enough that this is an Answer to the Allegation of the Minus Literatus his being a Priest is a kind of a supersedeas to his Examination that there was no Learning requisite to his having a Cure of Souls which was not Antecedently necessary to his receiving of Orders That he ought not to be admitted into Orders unless he be assured of or named to some Curacy all which supposes the Qualifications Requisite for a Benefice with Cure of Souls then 't was urged that here was not notice sufficient for 't is not till many days after the Refusal for this might have put Hele the Patron beyond the possibility
behalf of the Appellants That the half Blood ought to have but a half share That in the Case of Inheritances the whole Blood was preferred and that tho' such Rule could not govern intirely in this Case yet it shewed which ought to have the preference that the true Reason of Distribution was this The Law was to give in like manner as he might reasonably be supposed willing to have given his Estate in case he had made a Will and had not been surprised by a sudden Death that every Man was supposed to favour his next of Kin that the Statute of Distributions did the same thing and then that the whole Blood was nearer of Kin because did partake of both the Stocks from whence he came that the Relation or Kindred in this Case intirely came from the Parents that this was not an Alliance by his own Contract as Marriage or the like that the Inclination was supposed to arise to them from the Natural Love he bore to the Common Ancestors that such Inclination could never be supposed equal where the Party was only of the half Blood And much to this effect and many Arguments drawn from the Civil Law were urged in favour of the Appellant and several Presidents cited where it had been judged since the Statute for the half Blood to have but a half share by Sir Richard Lloyd On the other side it was argued That the half Blood is as near a Kin to the Intestate as the whole Blood and ought to have an equal Share of the Personal Estate with the whole Blood that the Party must be presumed equally inclined to each Parent that the Brother of the half Blood was as much a Brother as one of the whole that the whole Blood was preferrable in Descents but that was only upon account of a Maxim in the Law whereas here they are equally of Kin the whole Blood is no more a Brother than the half in the same Relation there can be no difference or degree it might as well be pretended to have a difference allowed upon the account of Seniority that Opinions and Practise had been with the Decrees that this hath been taken to be the Law in Westminster-hall Before the Statute 't was held that a Sister of the half Blood is in equal degree with the whole Brown versus Wood Allen's Rep. 36. and so cited in Smith's Case Mod. Rep. 209. So in the Case of Milborne and Milborne 30 March 1671. before the Lord Keeper Bridgman W. M. had by Will devised all his Lands in Trust to pay every Brother and Sister he had living 40 l. per Annum each and he had several Brothers and Sisters both of the half and whole Blood the Brothers of the whole Blood did oppose the payment of the 40 l. per Annum to those of the half Blood but 't was adjudged and decreed that they are equally entituled to the 40 l. per Annum a piece and enjoyed accordingly Farmer versus Lane and Nash in Chancery 26 Octob. 1677. declared and adjudged by the Lord Chancellor Nottingham That the half Blood are in equal degree of Kindred with the whole Blood and ought to have an equal Share of the Personal Estate The like was in the Case of Stapleton and the Lord Merion against the Lord Sherrard and his Lady in Chancery by Judge Windham 13 June 1683. the Case was thus Robert Stapleton had a Sister of the whole Blood and a Brother and Sister of the half Blood and died Intestate Administration was granted to his Wife the Lady Sherrard who claimed a Moiety of the Personal Estate by the Custom of the Province of York and a quarter of the other Moiety by force of the Act for Distribution of Intestates Estates and adjudged that the Wife should have only one Moiety and the other Moiety to be divided equally between the Brothers and Sisters both of the whole and half Blood This Cause was Reheard the Seventh of May 1685. by the Lord Guilford upon the Certificate of his Grace the Lord Archbishop to whom it was referred to certifie the Custom of the Province of York who certified that the Wife shall have only a Moiety and the other Moiety shall be divided amongst the next of Kindred and adjudged that the half Blood shall have an equal Share with the whole and so the former Decree was confirmed The same was adjudged by Mr. Justice Charlton June 30. 1685. in the Case of Pullen and his Wife against Serjeant in the Court of Chancery The like was amongst other things declar'd and decreed by the Lord Jessryes Febr. 19. 1686. in the Case of the late Lord Winchelsea against Noraliff and Wentworth upon which Hearing were present and assisting the then Lord Chief Baron Atkyns and Mr. Justice Lutwich and so was it Nov. 20. 1689. between Stephens and Throgmorton in Chancery It hath likewise been held so in the Ecclesiastical Court and accordingly adjudged by Sir Richard Raynes upon Solemn Argument by the most eminent Counsel both of the Civil and Common Law in the Case of James Storey Febr. 26. 1685. and in the Case of George Hawles by the same Judge upon June 1. 1687. Then it was urged That the Statute of Jac. 2. for reviving and continuance of several Acts of Parliament therein mentioned proves this for 't is enacted That if after the Death of the Father any of his Children shall die intestate without Wife or Children in the life time of the Mother every Brother and Sister and the Representatives of them shall have an equal share and that a Brother of the half Blood is a Brother to the Intestate as well as a Brother of the whole Blood and therefore ought to have a share and an equal share with the rest And upon consideration of all those Presidents and there being no Practise against it except that of Sir Richard Lloyd's it was prayed that the Decree might be confirmed and it was confirmed Lee Warner Versus William North. APpeal from a Decree of the Lord Chancellor which over-ruled the Exceptions taken by the Appellant to a Decree made by Commissioners for Charitable Uses concerning a Gift by Bishop Warner's Will and the same was received and the Parties ordered to answer And each side being heard by their Counsel the Decree was affirmed Vide the Statutes concerning Charitable Uses and the Delegates and query how they differ And whether an Appeal doth not lye upon a Sentence by Delegates as well as on a Decree of Chancery upon a Decree of Commissioners for Charitable Uses Briggs versus Clarke WRit of Error on a Judgment in B. R. affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber upon a Verdict in Debt for the Escape of one Cook and none appearing for the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error the Judgment was affirmed with the increase of Forty pounds in Costs Vide the Case of Ellison and Warner Mich. 18 Car. 2. B. R. 2 Keeble 91. Whether a Writ of Error lyes in Parliament
cum aggravatione pene corporalis somewhat more than Death Then this being a Common Law Punishment and not prescribed by any Statute the knowledge of it must be fetcht from our Law-Books and from Presidents for the General Practise of the Realm is the Common Law 't is describ'd with an ipso vivente in Smith's Republica Anglic. p. 28. lat Edit pag. 245. Stamf. 182. en son view which is tantamount and Stamford wrote 2 Eliz. In Coke's 3 Inst 210. 't is ipsoque vivente comburentur Pulton de Pace Regni 224. and many other Books were cited to the same effect And 't was affirmed that there was no Book which recited the Judgment at large but had this Particular in it Several Books do in short put it That for Treason the Party shall be Drawn and Hanged and Quartered but those are only Hints of the Chief Parts not Recitals of the Judgment it self In the English Book of Judgments printed 1655. pag. 292. 't is mentioned particularly as the Kings Bench have adjudged it should be The Duke of Buckingham's was so 13 Hen. 8. Stow's Chronicle 513. shews that he was the Person Then 't was said they have been thus in every Age without interruption 'till 26 Car. 2. Humfrey Stafford's Case 1 H. 7.24 which was per consensum omnium Justiciariorum tho' quoted on the other side as shortly stated in the Year-Book yet on the Roll which hath been seen and perused 't is with an ipso vivente Plowden 387. and Rastal's Entries 645. the same Case is thus Coke's Ent. 699. is so likewise John Littleton in 43 Eliz. Coke's Ent. 422 423 and 366. is so In the Lord Stafford's Case 33 Car. 2. by the Direction of this House and with the Advice of all the Judges was the Judgment so given by the Earl of Nottingham then Lord High Steward In the Lord Preston's Case 't is so which was drawn by Advice of the then Attorney and Sollicitor the present Keeper and Chief Justice of the Common Pleas. As to the Objection That vivens prosternatur doth imply it and that 's enough It was answered That ipso vivente comburentur implies both but not e contra and all the Presidents shew the latter to be requisite And as to the Case of David Prince of Wales mentioned in Fleta there 's only a Relation of what was the Execution not of what was the Judgment And Coke 2 Inst 195. says That the Judgment was in Parliament and therefore the same can be no President to this purpose and any one that runs over Cotton's Records will find the Judgments in Parliament to be different as the Nature of the Case required No Argument can be drawn from the Acts of the Legislature to govern Judiciary Proceedings however John Hall's Case 1 Hen. 4. Cott. 401. is as now contended for Before the 1 Hen. 7. there were some Erroneous Attainders and the 29 Eliz. takes notice of them as so errneous The Judgments against Benson and Sir Andrew Helsey cited below are plainly erroneous they dispose of the Quarters which they ought not but leave the same to the King's pleasure Sir Andrew's President is a monstrous arbitrary Command by Writ to Commissioners of Oyer and Terminer ordering them to Examine him and to give Judgment in manner as in the Writ is directed that therefore is not to be justified and 't was before 25 Edw. 3. Henry Ropers 21 Rich. 2. doth dispose of the Quarters and hath other Errors in it and so have William Bathurst's and Henry South's which were in 3 Hen. 4. But from that time to 26 Car. 2. there 's none which do omit it The four Presidents at the Old Baily were against Popish Priests and what private politick Reasons or Commands might occasion the omission is unknown and Hampden was not Executed but his Judgment was upon a Confession and his Life saved the reason of which is also unknown So that there have been none Executed upon such Erroneous Judgments And that there are no more Presidents with the Omission is a good Argument that those many which have this Particular in them are good and legal the constant Current having been this way proves the same to be the Common Law And this is the most severe part of the Punishment to have his Bowels cut out while alive and therefore not to be omitted As to the Earl of Essex's Case in Moore and Owen's Case in Roll's Rep. the first is only a Report of the Case and the last a descant upon the Judgment but neither do pretend to recite the whole Judgment Then to pretend that this Judgment cannot be Executed is to arraign the Wisdom and Knowledge of all the Judges and Kings Counsel in all Reigns And Tradition saith that Harrison one of the Regicides did mount himself and give the Executioner a Box on the Ear after his Body was opened c. Then 't was argued That if it be a necessary part of the Judgment and be omitted it is a fatal Error and doth undoubtedly in all Cases give a good reason for the Reversal of such Judgment as in the Common Case of Debt where dampna are omitted in the Judgment tho' for the Advantage of the Defendant as is Beecher's Case and Yelv. 107. Besides if this be legal then all those Attainders in which this Particular is inserted must be illegal for 't is impossible that both the Judgments should be right for either those are more severe than they should be or this is more remiss To say that 't is discretionary is to give the Judges a power which they themselves have disclaimed and to Reverse this Reversal is to tell the Court of Kings Bench that they are not obliged to follow the General Practise of their Predecessors that they are obliged to no form in their Judgment for Treason that nothing but Death and being Drawn to it are essential and according to that Doctrine a Woman might receive the Judgment of Quartering and a Man might be Burnt and both according to Law But the Constitution of this Kingdom hath prescribed and fixed Rules and Forms which the Executive Power is obliged and bound to follow that as nothing can be made or construed to be an Offence at the Pleasure of the Court so no Judgment can be given for any known Offence at Pleasure But the Law either Statute or Common hath established what is an Offence and what is its Punishment and there is nothing of Arbitrary Power allowed in respect of either Wherefore upon the whole it was prayed that the Reversal might be affirmed and it was affirmed accordingly Sir Evan Lloyd Baronet and Dame Mary his Wife and Sidney Godolphin Esq and Susan his Wife Appellants Versus Sir Richard Carew Baronet an Infant the Son and Heir of Sir John Carew Baronet deceased Respondent APpeal from a Decree of Dismission in Chancery The Case was thus Rice Tannott died seized in Fee of several Lands in the several Counties of Salop
be affirmed and it was affirmed Sir Edward Hungerford and John Hill Executors and Devisees of Sir William Basset deceased Plaintiffs versus Edward Nosworthy Defendant WRit of Error to Reverse a Judgment in B. R. upon a Special Verdict in Ejectment by Hitchins the Lessee of Nosworthy against Sir William Basset Defendant for the Mannor of Lanrock and other Lands in Cornwall wherein upon Not Guilty pleaded and a Trial at Bar the Jury find That Sir Henry Killegrew was seized in Fee of the Lands in question and on the 12th of November 1644. made his Will in writing which follows in these words I Henry Killegrew c. and so they set forth the Will whereby Sir Henry Killegrew devised the Premisses to Mrs. Jane Berkley his near Kinswoman for Life with Remainder over to Henry Killegrew alias Hill Sir Henry's Natural Son in Tail and makes Mrs. Berkley sole Executrix They further find that after the making of that Testament and before the time when c. viz. about the Feast of St. Michael in the Year 1645. Condidit fecit aliud Testamentum in scriptis sed quid fuit content ' in eodem ult ' mentionat ' Testamento vel quale fuit purportum sive effectus inde juratoribus praed ' non constat And that Sir Henry on the 29th of September 1646. died seized of the said Lands that Mrs. Jane Barkley Devisee of the said Will in 1644. by Lease and Release conveyed to Mr. Nosworthy's Father and that the Father died in 1684. that Mr. Nosworthy is Son and Heir to him that Sir William Basset is Cosin and Heir to Sir Henry viz. Son and Heir of Elizabeth Basset Daughter and Heir of Sir Joseph Killegrew elder Brother of Sir Henry the Testator that Nosworthy the Lessor of the Plaintiff entred and made the Lease in the Declaration c. But upon the whole Matter whether the Said Testament made in writing 1645. was a Revocation in Law of the said Devise of the said Lands to Mrs. Berkley they are ignorant and pray the Judgment of the Court Et si And upon this Judgment was given for the Plaintiff in the Ejectment And now it was argued That the Judgment was Erroneous that this last Will could not be taken to be a duplicate of the former but must be deemed a Revocation that no Will is good but the last that every Will is revokable till death that the making of another doth import a Revocation of all former ones tho' it be not so expresly declared in writing for it must be the last or nothing that this Conveyance by Will was anciently a Priviledge by the Civil Law for People in Extremis who had not the time or assistance necessary to make a formal Alienation and chiefly intended for Military Men who were always supposed to be under those Circumstances and therefore the Ceremonies and number of Witnesses required of others were dispensed with as to Soldiers but now the Rules for Military Testaments as they are called are allowed in most Cases that as to Lands by our Law was a Priviledge only given to some Boroughs and Places within the Kingdom and particular Custom gave the liberty of disposing Lands or Houses by Will and that by nuncupative Will or Parol without writing so is Bracton lib. 4. fol. 272. Fleta lib. 5. cap. 5. Potest legari catallum tam hereditas quam perquisitum per Barones London Burgenses Oxon 1 Inst 111. that then came the Statute of Hen. 8. and impowers a Devise by a Man's last Will and Testament in writing but still 't is by his last Will. And so is Littleton sect 168. If divers Wills the latter shall stand and the others are void 1 Inst 112. In truth 't is plain Law the first Grant and the last Testament In Swinb 1 part sect 5. p. 14. no Man can die with two Wills but he may with divers Codicils and the latter doth not hinder the former so long as they be not contrary Another difference there is between Wills and Codicils If two Testaments be found and it can't be known which is first or last both are void but the latter countermands the first tho' there be a Clause in the first that it shall not be revoked and tho' an Oath were taken not to revoke because the Law is so that the very making of a latter doth revoke the former So is Liuwood's Provincial ' de Testamentis Justice Dodderidge's Office of Executor published by Wentworth 29. A verbal Will revokes a former written Will Forse and Hembling 4 Rep. 60 61. Plowd 541. Perkins sect 178 179. and sect 478. The 2 Hen. 5.8 is full to this purpose There 's an Action by an Executor against two Executors and they plead a Testament whereby they are made Executors and the Plaintiff replys that he afterwards made another and himself Executor and held that by the second the first became void Now the meaning of these Books cannot be that a Will expresly revoking is the only Will that can make a Revocation nor is it that a Contrariety or Repugnance between the one and the other is necessary to make a Revocation for tho' there be no new Will made yet a Revocation may be by word of Mouth as 2 Cro. 49.115 1 Cro. 51.3 Cro. 781. nay a void Bequest shall revoke a Will so shall a Deed that hath no effect as Feoffment without livery a Devise to J.S. or to a Corporation when there is no such will do it so that 't is not the Contradiction between the disposal which revokes for that which is no disposition at all will do it wherefore the meaning of the Authors cited is somewhat else and it can only be this That there is somewhat particular in a Will to that Instrument of Conveyance more than to any other that even the making of a new Will is a sufficient Revocation the words are plain by the making a new Will the former are all destroyed for there can be but one last And when a Man makes and declares a new Will that new Will must be presumed to contain his whole Mind concerning the disposition of his Estate declaring his Will imports thus much and excludes all other When a Man would alter part of his Will there 's a proper Instrument for it called a Codicil which is known in the Law as well as that of a Will here 's nothing found of a reference to the former to judge it otherwise would confound the use of Wills and Codicils and the difference between them 'T is true that a Man may make partial Wills of several parts of his Estate and all may stand together but then they must be declared to be Wills concerning particular things and they are but several pieces of the same Will tho' written in different Papers but then in pleading one of them you must not generally say he made ult ' voluntatem but ultimam voluntat ' of such a thing but here 't
only the signification of a Man's purpose how his Estate shall go after his death and tho' it be solemnly made in writing signed published and attested yet if he do any intermediate Act whereby it must be necessarily inferred that such Purpose and Intention of his did not continue the Consequent must be that what was done before as to such Will is totally defeated and unless it be set up anew by a Republication 't is as no Will. The Case of Mountague and Jeffryes 1 Rolls Abridg. 615. and Moore 429. proves this If a Conveyance at Law shews an Intent different from the Will as to Lands 't will be a Revocation tho' such Conveyance be not perfect to all purposes Hodgkinson versus Wood Cro. Car. 23. 'T is a Revocation tho' the Owner should be in again as of his old Reversion The Case of Lestrange and Temple 14 Car. 2. reported in Sid. 90. 1 Keble 357. is stronger but this is stronger yet because 't is not to the old use but limited in a different manner 't is a qualified Fee and to be determined upon the qualifications taking effect and so cannot be the old Estate and if it were yet 't is a Revocation and there 's no Circumstance in the Case that can direct a Court of Equity to differ from the Law and therefore it was prayed that the Decree of Dismission might be affirmed and it was affirmed John Fox Gen ' Plaintiff Versus Simon Harcourt Arm ' Defendant WRit of Error on a Judgment in B. R. The Case was upon a Special Verdict in an Action of the Case upon an Indebitus Assumpsit for Moneys received to the Plaintiff's use brought there by Harcourt versus Fox which Verdict finds the 37 Hen. 8. cap. 1. intituled a Bill for Custos Rotulorum and Clerkship of the Peace Then they find that 1 Will. Mar. intituled An Act for enabling Lords Commissioners for the Great Seal to execute the Office of Lord Chancellor or Lord Keeper and several Clauses therein concerning this Matter Then they find that John Earl of Clare was by Letters Patents dated the 9th day of July Anno 1 Will. Mar. according to the 37 Hen. 8. made Custos Rotulorum for the County of Middlesex and set forth the Letters Patents in haec verba Then they find that the Office of Clerk of the Peace for this County being void the Earl of Clare by writing under his Hand and Seal dated 19 July Anno primo did nominate appoint and constitute the Plaintiff Mr. Harcourt to be Clerk of the Peace for Middlesex for so long time only as he should well demean himself therein and the Instrument was found in haec verba Then they find him to be a Person resident in the County capable and sufficient to have and execute the Office that he took upon him the execution of the said Office and before he did so he at the Quarter Sessions for the said County in open Sessions took the Oath required by the late Act of this King and the Oath of Clerk of the Peace and did do and perform all things necessary to make him a compleat Officer and that during all the time he did execute the sald Office he demeaned himself well Then 't is found That on the fifth of February Anno tertio the said Earl of Clare was in due manner removed from being Custos and William Earl of Bedford by Letters Patents dated the sixth of February was made Custos according to the 37 Hen. 8. and those Letters Patents are also found in haec verba Then they find an Appointment in Writing dated the fifteenth of February by the said Earl of the said Fox to be Clerk of the Peace for the said County to hold the said Office for and during the time the Earl should enjoy and exercise the said Office of Custos so as he well demean himself therein They likewise find Fox to be a Person capable c. and that he took the Oath and did the other things requisite to qualifie himself for the said Office that he did thereupon enter on the Execution of the said Office and during the time that he executed it he well demeaned himself therein and did take the Fees belonging to the said Office which they found to be to the value of five shillings Sed utrum c. Et si c. Et si c. Upon this Judgment was given for the Plaintiff below And it was now argued for the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error That this Judgment ought to be Reversed And first it was said that whatsoever the Common Law was as to ancient Offices could be no Rule in this Matter Many and most of those were for Life but my Lord Coke says That the Office of Chancellor of England could not be granted to any one for Life because it was never so granted the like of Treasurer So that Custom and nothing else can govern in those Offices But here can be no pretence of its being a Common Law Office for the Common Law knew no such thing as Justics of the Peace to whom they say he is a Clerk That the first Statute which makes Justices hath no mention of Clerk but 't was meerly an Incident some Person of necessity was to officiate in that kind And where he is called the Justices Clerk it can only be that he was one appointed by them to make and write their Records for them and 't is probable that in ancient time he that was their Clerk was Custos Rotulorum and intrusted with the keeping of the Records then it coming to be an honorary thing to be Custos he that was the most eminent for Quality amongst them was appointed to that Trust and then he appointed his Clerk under him For there 's no ancient Statute or Law that empowered the Chancellor to make a Custos but he making out the Commission of the Peace might very well name one of them to be Keeper of the Records and to have the first place amongst them And such Person might very well appoint his Deputy or Servant who in time came to be Clerk of the Peace We have no certain but this is the most probable Account of the thing Then the Statute of 37 Hen. 8. recites That the Chancellor had much perverted the Institution by assuming to make Custos's for Life and so the Clerks of the Peace were for Life likewise The end of that Act was not only to remove ignorant Persons for the Common Law it self would turn any such out of Office if he be not able to perform the Duty of it but the Grants for Life were the great Grievance and therefore to remedy that Mischief the Custos must be appointed by Bill signed with the King 's own hand and at his pleasure removeable and the Clerk of the Peace to be appointed by the Custos and to continue only during the time of the others continuing to be Custos This tho' not
the Plaintiffs Title or Charge This is no more then if they had traversed the Grant which they could not do In the Case of a common Person suppose the Defendant's Title not full yet if he traverses the Plaintiffs that 's enough Form requires an Inducement to a Traverse but the latter is only material for the Plaintiff to answer to for nothing can be traversed but what is material now why should it not have been a good answer to their Declaration to have said that Car. 2. presented by Lapse absque hoc that Car. 1. died seized for by this the Seisin or Presentation of Car. 2. had been avoided and there 's nothing else material in the Declaration for the Seisin of Queen Elizabeth and Jac. 1. are not to the purpose and if answered by the Defendant it must have been against him there had been a good Title for the King without it then supposing it necessary to shew how it came out of Car. 1. the Attorney General can only take Issue on the Traverse of his dying seized for that denies the whole Title that is material to be answered to Now whatsoever shews that the Plaintiff hath no right to the thing in demand is a good Plea let who will have the true right The true Title upon this Declaration is that Car. 1. presented and thereby became seized and died seized and the denying him to dye seized is a denial of this Title for if K. Car. 2. did present by Lapse and K. Car. 1. did not die seized 't is with the Defendant no Man is bound to answer that which if he do 't will still be against him but if a Man makes such an answer as if true the present Plaintiff hath no Title 't is enough Then if it be true that no Right descended from Car. 1. to Car. 2. and that Car. 2. presented only by Lapse what Right can his present Majesty have and all this is confessed by the Demurrer if well pleaded and 't is no Objection to say that the dying seized ought not to be traversed but only the Presentation for that is a mistake in case of Land 't is good and an Advowson is an Inheritance descendible in like manner and Mr. Attorney thinks it a good Traverse for he all along in his Declaration alledges a dying feized from Queen Elizabeth downward and there are several Presidents thus Winch's Ent. 661 662. and Winch. 912 686 692. and Buckler and Symonds Winch. 911 912. is of an Advowson in gross and in the same Book 35 59 are thus A man may die seized of an Advowson as well as of Land and if he doth not dye seized it doth not descend and the Seisin in gross is not to be traversed as is 1 Anderson 269. and Hob. 102. ' Then 't was said that the true Reason and Nature of a material good Traverse is well explained in Vaughan's first Case of Tufton and Sir Rich. Temple and 1 Saund. 21 22. and it is this especially in a Quare Impedit If any thing in the Count be travers'd it must be such Part as if true is inconsistent with the Defendants Title and if false or found against the Plaintiff doth absolutely destroy his Title nay if the Traverse leaves no Title in the Plaintiff then 't is good whatsoever comes of the Defendants Then the Difficulty is If the King by his Prerogative may waive his own Title which is traversed and insist upon the Deficiency of that which the Defendant alledges and in the Case of the King and the Bishop of Worcester and Jervis in Vaughan 53. there 't is said That the King ought to maintain his own and not to question the Defendants he cannot desert that which he hath alledged for himself and fall upon the Defendants Title and Reason warrants such Rule for tho' the King hath no Damages in a Quare Impedit notwithstanding his laying it ad dampnum Hob. 23 yet the Suit supposes an Hindrance and Damage to the King and if the Right be not his he hath no Cause to complain of the Defendant tho' another hath Every Man is to recover by his own Strength and not by the Weakness of the Defendants Pretensions and if the Law be thus then how can Mr. Attorney-General take Advantage of this upon Demurrer after Oyer for now upon Oyer 't is as they say become Part of the Defendants Plea and consequently it must be part of the Inducement and if so he ought in that Case to have taken Issue upon the Traverse which denied his Master's Title Wherefore upon the whole Matter it was prayed That the Judgment should be reversed On the other side 't was argued for the King That this Judgment ought to stand and as to the last point 't was said That taking it for granted the King could not traverse any Point of the Defendants Plea yet certainly he might demurr upon the whole in case it were insufficient That now Oyer was craved and had the Deed did become part of the Defendants Plea and must be taken as such That tho' there had been no need of a Profert yet when 't is produced 't is such as he hath pleaded and upon the whole the Court is to judge there being a Demurrer That as the Case stood the King might take advantage of both the Exceptions That the Declaration of it self was good and if the Plea be naught the King ought to have Judgment for him That every Plea is to be taken most strongly against the Party that pleads it That here the Defendant had admitted K. Car. 1. well seized that he ought to shew it out of him otherwise the Plea was ill that every Traverse must have an Inducement That if upon the whole Plea it did not appear that King Car. 1. parted with this Advowson 't is naught That if by the Parties own shewing it was manifest to the Court That the King continued seized and what he doth further shew no ways contradicts it he could not traverse the dying seized and therefore a Demurrer was most proper and consequently upon this Demurrer they were let in to affirm that nothing passed from the King by these Letters Patents of Car. 1. Then it was argued That this Grant was void because it was to a Person then Esq that Tunc Armigero can have Reference only to the time of the Letters Patents that a Man cannot be a Knight and an Esq at the same time that Knight is part of his Name and the Title of Esq is drowned in that of Knight that the old Books are thus 7 Hen. 4.7 14 Hen. 6.15 21 Edw. 4.72 2 Inst. 594. 666. Hutt 41. Bro. Tit. nosme 33. 1 Cro. 372. That 't is true if a Deed of Feoffment be made to a Man by a wrong Name and Livery be thereupon had 't is good but all the Books make a difference between that Case and where it is by Deed where the Operation is altogether by Deed Then was cited
CASES IN PARLIAMENT Resolved and Adjudged UPON Petitions and Writs of Error Quicquid sum Ego quamvis Infra Lucili censum ingeniumque tamen me Cum Magnis vixisse invita fatebitur usque Invida Horat. LONDON Printed for A. and J. Churchill at the Black Swan in Pater-noster-Row MDCXCVIII TO THE READER NO Collection of Cases adjudged in Parliament having been yet published a Preface seems necessary to bespeak the Reception of that which is now presented to the World To commend or excuse the Collector will not perhaps be a method to introduce it most to advantage what may be spoken in favour of his diligence or capacity will be censured vain and if any excuse be offered for his inability to have done it better some will be ready to take him at his word and think the Performance comes from a careless or unskilful Hand Whatever the Author is there needs no Apology to be made for the nature or design of the Work it self for the Subject Matter will be useful and entertaining to all Ranks of English Men to whom Books are so that is to all such as understand and love Literature Here is our Municipal Law and the reason of it Equity and the Law of Nations interspersed here is the manner of arguing and the language of the Bar briefly toucht here are the Forms of Proceedings sometimes mentioned but then again those Forms are superseded by the Original and Eternal Rules of Justice By the Debates and Arguments here reported you may be acquainted in some measure with the Rights of the Peers and their incapacity to alien such their Rights with the nature of Slander and some Rules concerning it the Course of Equity in respect of Penalties and Costs The Law of Average in the Case of Partial Losses at Sea the Circumstances upon which Relief may be had in Equity against hard or unreasonable Agreements the Construction of Wills to charitable Uses where the Estate intended is greater in value then the particular Bequests amounts unto the Power of a Council of State to commit with variety of Matter concerning Pleading and the Plantations belonging to England and the Priviledges and Birthrights of the English Subject by the Common Law and how far that Law extends The nature of Colledges Hospitals and other Elemosynary Foundations and the Authority and Power of Visitors and the Methods of their Proceedings the Court of Chivalry or Honour the extent and boundaries of its Jurisdiction before whom held and when and in what Cases a Prohibition lyes to it the power of Lords of Copyhold Mannors to refuse Petitions for the Reversal of Recoveries in their Courts and the Judgment of Equity upon such occasions the right of Dower and the efficacy of a Term attending the Inheritance to prevent its enjoyment and the opinion of Equity thereupon The Preference of an Outlawry upon mesne Process to a Judgment not extended and the practise and reason of the practise of the Court of Exchequer in that case the Consideration which a Court of Equity ought to have of Bonds Bills or Promises made or given upon Condition or Consideration of promoting and procuring Matches The dependency which Ireland hath upon England and her subordination to it and the Authority of the House of Peers in This over the Proceedings in the Chancery of That Kingdom the opinion of Equity upon Conditional Limitations and what will be a Performance of such Conditions and to whom the Profits shall go during the intermediate time c. The qualification requisite in a Presentee to a Benefice and the power of the Ordinary to refuse for defect of Knowledge and how that defect is to be tried the Construction of Law upon a Deed leading the Uses of a Fine of the Wives Land to the Heirs of the Husband's Body the Husband dying afterwards before the Wife the right of the half Blood in the distribution of an Intestates Estate and unto what Share the right of nominating to the Office of chief Clerk for inrolling of Pleas in B.R. and to whom it belongs the nature of a Bill of Exceptions and the Proceedings thereupon and in what Cases the same may be refused and if any Authority in the Lords over the Judges in case of such refusal The Punishment of Treason by the English Laws and the Form of Judgments in that case the nature of contingent Limitations after a Fee and if they may be allowed upon Contingencies to happen at any time after the decease of Persons then in being the manner of declaring the Uses of a Fine and by what Deed or Writing the nature of Wills and of the revocations of them and if a Will whereof the Contents are unknown may revoke a former the efficacy of the acts of one that is Non compos mentis and if and how far void what Deeds altering the Estate of a Testator shall revoke a solemn Will The nature of the Office of a Clerk of the Peace and by whom grantable and for what Interest and how removeable the Prerogative of Presenting to Benefices made void by Promotion and if such Prerogative be served or fulfilled by a Commendam and whether it can operate upon a new created Parish or Rectory the formal reason and essence of Treason and wherein it consists and what is necessary to be alledged in Indictments for that Offence the right of Tythes for Herbage or Agistment of Cattle grazed and fed for Sale tho' formerly used to the Plough The Exposition of a Will of a Native of France and by what measures a Judgment ought to be made of the meaning of Phrases used by such Persons in that Language upon such an occasion the Construction of the word Share in a Will concerning the New-River Water the force or validity of a Grant or Assignment of Land in which the Grantor had a very long term to hold from and after the Grantor's decease the Title of Knight if and how part of the Name and what Allegations in a Count in a Quare Impedit are not needful to be answered to and what may be traversed and what Grants of the Crown shall be good notwithstanding some and what Misrecitals These and many other Particulars worthy of most Mens notice are here debated and it may reasonably be supposed that none will be Enemies to the Design and Publication but those who mislike the small Remainders we have left us of the Aristocratical part of our Government the Gentlemen who do so must be unacquainted with the Grecian and Roman Story as well as with our own or else have read it but superficially for even the most perfect of the Grecian Common-wealths were somewhat Aristocratical That which may be called such is Sparta which tho' it had some Laws we cannot account for yet during several Centuries it maintained its own Liberty and assisted its Neighbours to preserve theirs And notwithstanding some Men may think the contrary Democracy was not the only Favourite Model of the
Feodary and Officiary as Earl Marshal of England which have a Relation to an Office or Land for such are Transferrable over and such Dignities as are only Personal Inherent in the Blood and only favour quasi of the Reality of which no Fine can be levied as 't is of an Annuity to a Man and his Heirs no Fine can be levied 2. A Dignity was neither subject to a Condition at the Common Law nor intailable by the Statute de Donis c. nor barrable by the Statute of Fines Indeed in Nevil's Case something which favours of the contrary Opinion is said but the Question there was Whether 't was forfeitable by Treason And therefore the present Question is very forreign to the Matter there debated A Dignity differs from other Inheritances being an Honour Personal affixed to the Blood cannot be forfeited by a Non-performance of a Condition except that Tacite Condition in Law and consequently cannot be intailed and tho' the Title of a Viscount be of a Place yet it is only Titular for it is often taken from the Sirnames of Families 3. The Title of Viscount c. is not so much a private Interest as a publick Right for Peers are born Counsellors of State and one part of a Senatory Body and therefore cannot be renounced without the Consent of all those who have interest in it they cannot without the Consent of the whole Body whereof they are so considerable Members cut themselves off from the Body and so the Objection of quilibet potest Juri suo renuntiare is easily answered 'T was further argued on the same side That 1. An Honour goes not according to the Rules of the Common Law nor is it governable by them it is not therefore pertinent to argue from those Rules which hold in Cases of other Inheritances for a Dignity descends to the Half-blood there is no Coparcinership of it but the Eldest takes the whole a Fee-simple will go to a Noble-man without the word Heirs 1 Inst 27. It differs from Estates in Land in the Intrinsick Matter as well as the Manner of the Limitation because it is given for two Reasons for Counsel and Defence and it is a Civil Interest appointed by the Civil Constitution of the Realm which goes with the Blood and is inherent in the Blood insomuch that it is agreed on all hands that it can't be transferred to a Stranger and till Nevil's Case 't was doubted whether forfeitable for Treason if a Lord die his Son shall be introduc'd without the Ceremony usual at the first Creation a Peer's eldest Son and all Minors sit behind the Chair of State to prepare them for the Sitting in the House as Members and because they have some Title to the Honour they are called Nobiles Nati for the first time they fetch breath they have Nobility in them So that he that Surrenders by Fine must not only extinguish his Estate in the Honour but also the Nobility of his Blood 2. Every Lord is not only a Lord for himself but also hath a Right of Peerage and is a Peer of the Realm and therefore a Peer for every one of the House and therefore hath the Priviledge to demand his Writ Ex debito Justitiae and is to be tried by his Peers in Capital Crimes and that appears farther from a Matter which happened in this House 16 Car. 2. There was an Order mentioning the Bishops to be Lords of Parliament not Peers at which the Lords wondering ordered a Committee to examine the reason of it which proves that Lord is not so high nor inclusive as Peers So that if the Fine have any Operation it takes away not only his Right but also the Right of the House of Lords 3. The trial of Baron or no Baron upon Issue in any Court of Judicature is by the Records of Parliament but if a Fine may be levied in the Common Pleas the Trial is drawn ad aliud Examen and must then be by the Records of that Court The Clerk of the Parliament always certifies if he be a Baron because he hath the Record before him but he cannot certifie he is no Baron because he hath not the Record thereof before him 4. No Fine can be levied of a thing Personal as an Annuity to a Man and his Heirs but a Dignity is a thing Personal and so he took notice of the difference betwixt the Honours of Peerage which are Personal and the Honours that are Feodary and Officiary which have reference to an Office or Land 5. He did argue ab inconvenienti that this Opinion can be no Inconveniency to the Crown but the contrary makes Nobility a meer Pageantry by putting it into the Hands of a weak and angry Father to dispossess an hopeful Son of that which is his Birth-right The Titles of Esquire and Gentleman are drowned in the greater Dignity of that of a Peer and when the greater are gone the other must go with it And then from being a Nobleman to day he and the rest of his Family must be below all Nobility and be called Yeomen or Goodman Villers to morrow which may bring great Confusion to a Noble Family and all its Relatives and surely this House will not put such a publick Disrespect on such a Family by agreeing to so unjust an act of one Man And that which was most relied upon was a Resolution of this House in Stafford's Case Anno 1640. which no Man without Indecency can question it passed not sub silentio or obiter but upon debate neither could it be any way invalid upon account of the Times for it was in the Infancy of that Parliament and that wherein a Peer's Case who sits now in this House was judicially before them and therefore there is no reason to shake that Judgment more than any other Judgment of that time My Lord Cooke in his 4 Inst Chapt. of Ireland is of Opinion that Honours cannot be extinguished but by Act of Parliament Then as to the Precedents that have been urg'd on the other side there are none directly to the Point for as to Nevil's Case there are very few Cases cited there aright and are not to be look'd upon as Law The Case of my Lord of Northumberland in 3 4 Phil. Mar. was by way of Creation and so was the Case of Dudley And Dugdale in his Baronage of England pag. 270. gives an account of it and the rest of the Precedents are above Two hundred years old which passed sub silentio and are not to be vouched unless they were disputed The first is Bigod's who in the time of Edw. 1. surrendred the Honour of Earl-Marshal of England to the King who granted it to him in Tail This Honour is Officiary and therefore nothing to the purpose and the Surrender was made thro' fear Walsingham 95. The next is the Earl of Pembroke's Case who in 8 Edw. 4. was made Earl in Tail and by this he had the
and yet ' t is there in the power of the Ancestor by good Pleading to have supported the Patent and by bad pleading to destroy it and therefore when the Foundation which is the Patent fails the Honour and whatever it be that is erected upon it shall fail also Every Estate by the consent of all Persons interested and concerned in the thing may be taken away for the Law is so set against Perpetuities that a Clause intimating it is void and tho' an Honour is not Jones Rep. 109 123. assignable yet it may be extinguished It 's true if a Man hath but a part of an Estate as only an Estate for Life he can't alone pass away the whole Estate but none who hath the Inheritance in Tail or in Fee but he may destroy the whole and tho' any one have but part yet by the concurrence of all that are concerned the whole may be destroyed It is admitted if he commit Treason and is attainted thereof he loseth the Honour for himself and his Posterity now 't was in his power to do this act overt and if by an act unlawful he hath power to defeat the descent of the Intail upon his Issue there is the same reason that by a lawful act he should part with it there are two Acts of Parliament in force which fortifie the Fine it must be granted that those Honours are within the Statute de Donis and then there can be no reason they should not be within the Statutes of Fines 4 Hen. 7. 34 H. 8. which say that Tenant in Tail may levie a Fine of all things that are intailable within the Statute de Donis whatever therefore is within the one is within both and it is not sufficient to alledge that it is inconvenient that it should be within the Statute of Fines for there is an Act of Parliament and without an Act of Parliament to exempt it it can't be exempted It may be proved by great variety of Precedents to have been the practise in former times anciently nothing more frequent than to release Hoours See Selden's Titles of Honours 730. it was as frequent as to grant them In latter times Delaval's Case 11 Rep. 1. it hath been the Judgment of the Lords that Honours may be extinguished which in 1668. was certified by all the King's Counsel Learned in the Law to be good Authority But to go a little higher Andrew Gifford Baron Pomfret in Fee 4 Hen. 3. Rot. 100. surrendred to the King so 23 Hen. 3. Simon Mountford Esq Earl of Leicester having a Mind to take an Honour from his eldest Son and confer it upon his younger and so it was surrendred and regranted accordingly Selden seems to construe this to be by way of Transmission and not Surrender yet others of later Authority as Cambden's Britan. Title Earl of Leicester say expresly that he did Surrender it and Selden himself says it was by Concurrence of the King King Hen. 3. Rot. Cr. 24. men E. 1. created one Earl of Richmond and he surrendred to the King Cambden's Brit. Title Earl of Richmond Roger de Bigod surrendred not only the Office of Earl Marshal but also the Earldom of Norfolk William Duke of Juliers whose Father came in with Edw. 3. was created Earl of Cambridge 40 Edw. 3. m. 21. in Fee his Son surrenders to the King which Record we have here So Edward the Third made his Son John of Gaunt See Cambden's ubi supra Earl of Richmond who surrendred it to the King And lastly in the Years 1639 1679. Roger Stafford whom the King intended to make a Viscount by the Advice of the Learned Men levied a Fine thereof by which 't is now enjoy'd Lastly he argued ab inconvenienti for no Lord in the House will be in safety if it should be other ways there being many sitting in this House by virtue of Surrenders from other Lords in former days and perhaps some of their Heirs are alive and so if these Surrenders be adjudged invalid it would shake your Lordships own Possessions and make it dubitable whether Forreigners and Persons unknown may not come and thrust them out but if not so it may cause Confusion amongst themselves their former Honours having been surrendred to accept of others and perhaps some not thinking their Titles secure will stick to the former and so occasion Dispute and Confusion about Precedency and lastly it will put a great Disgrace upon your Ancestors proceedings who deemed this Course legal and those must show very good Precedents that it hath been disavowed if they will encounter such constant Practises In the next place 't was answered to their Arguments and Objections and as for that first Argument That an Honour is inherent in the Blood he answered That this Inherency in the Blood is not essential to Honours for an Honour may be created for Life and then none of the Posterity or Blood of the Peer is thereby enobled It may be limited to the Heirs Males of the Body so that an Honour may touch and enter far into the Blood and yet not run with it and farther it may be limited to the Heirs by such a Wife there the Issue by the second Venter shall never inherit the Dignity and yet is as near to the Father as those that are by the first so that 't is no true ground that they go upon that Nobility is inherent in the Blood and for what was alledged as to the Inconveniency of Surrendering Dignities he answered That there may be necessary Reasons for the extinguishment of an Honour and it may be for the benefit and advantage of the Party and his Posterity as if it do happen that the Family do fall into Poverty and be not able to support the Honour of Peerage with decency and so this Honour would perhaps be a Disgrace to the rest of the Lords and in a Child's Case it may happen to a Noble Family to have those Afflictions that to continue the Honour would expose the Family to Infamy and therefore some times to prevent the Son of Adultery from his succeeding to the Dignity it may be convenient to surrender it and yet this cannot be without the concurrence of the Prince who being the Source of Honour can best judge of the Reasons for stopping the Stream and it cannot seem an harder Case to disinherit him of the Honour then of the Estate which he may do and if he leave his Honour without his Estate it will be a Burden on his Shoulders which he will be unable to bear and seeing it 's necessary that there be a concurrence of the Prince it is undecent to suppose so vile a thing of the Crown as to comply with the Peevishness and Simplicity of the Parents where there is no reason for it And as for what hath been alledged for the Invalitity of those Precedents that they were in Cases of New Creations and were in nature of Transmissions he answered That when an
Honour is Surrendred and a new Honour granted the former is either extinguished or not before the other takes effect if not then the Party hath both together against the will of the Donor and perhaps the new Honour may be of that Name and Place and those Persons may be concerned in it that will not permit it to be effected and if it be in the power of the Ancestor for the advantage of his Posterity by the Surrender of one Honour to take a greater it may be also in his power to do it for his prejudice As to the Objection That by the same Reason an Honour may be extinguished it may also be Transferred he answered That there was a great disparity betwixt them for as to Alienations of Honours there 's a great reason they should be disallowed for they all flow from the Prince and therefore 't is not fit they should be conferred on any but by the Prince tho' the King 's of England have granted power to a General to give the Honour of Knighthood c. in the Field for the Reward and Incouragement of Valour yet this granting of Nobility is a Prerogative peculiar to the King's Person alone no Man else can ennoble another Time was indeed when the Earls of Chester having Counties Palatine by virtue of their Jura Regalia did create Barons yet they never sate in Parliament as Peers because Peerage being a thing of so high a nature cannot be given by any but a Soveraign and is given as a Trust and Obligation so that common Reason saith they are not transferrable It is said in our Law that where Offices are granted to a Man in Fee See Jones 122 123. he may grant it over yet in some Cases they are so near to the Crown that they cannot be transferred but must descend with the Blood upon the same Reason no Man can ever transfer an Honour for the near Relation which it hath to the Crown but in case of Extinguishment that Relation and Trust ceaseth and so they are different Cases Then lastly as to the great Objection of the Judgment of the House of Lords in Roger Stafford's Case Anno 1640. he answered That notwithstanding that Case their Lordships had given him leave to argue it and therefore they intended not that should be any Impediment 2. That is no Judgment for they being a Court of Judicature do as other Judges judge of the Matter before them only Then the Question was Whether an Honour could descend to the half Blood They refetred it to the Judges who were of Opinion that it should Thereupon ariseth another Question Whether a Man might Convey or Transfer his Honour to another 'T was resolved he might not This drew another Question whereupon they resolved that a Lord could not Surrender his Dignity the Original Cause was about a Descent to the half Blood the Resolution is he cannot Surrender how then can they pretend that to be a Judgment when the Question in point of Judgment was not before them Suppose it had been resolved and it 's a wonder it had not all that time that a Lord could not forfeit and that had been a third step to have made it a perfect Business for considering the times it had been a most convenient Resolution But besides all that the King's Counsel were never heard in the point and the rejecting the Opinions of Learned Men shows it was no Resolution of the whole House tho' entred upon the Journal and therefore he prayed Judgment against the Petitioner The Earl of Shaftsbury spoke in the House for the Petitioner The stress of the Argument for the King in this Case is founded upon these two Assertions 1 That Honours are taken to be within the Statute de Donis c. and the general Rules of that Statute 2. And then secondly That Honours are to be governed as other Inheritances by the Rule of the Common Law As for the first it hath not been proved for the Resolution in Nevil's Case 2 Jac. was Extrajudicial and no Judgment of any Cause before them and in such Cases the Judges do not hold themselves to be upon Oath and if there be two or more of another Opinion they do not refuse to sign the Resolution of the major part and so it goes under the denomination of all the Judges but if it were a Judgment of them altogether they could neither alter nor make new the Law neither could they make that intended within the Statute de Donis c. which was not in being till many Ages after Beauchamp in Richard the Second's time being the first Honour that was entailed by Patent 2. The second Assertion is contrary to the Opinion of the most Learned Men the Honour and Dignity of the House the constant practise of Westminster-hall and the direct Evidence of the thing it self Justice Berkley a very learned Judge declared his Opinion Febr. 6. 1640. as appears by the Records of this House That Honours descend from the first that was seized of them contrary to the Rules of other Inheritances and that Honours are not governed by the Rules of the Common Law Justice Dodderidge in Jones 207. is of opinion That Honours are Personal Dignities which are affixed to the Blood the Lords never yet suffered their Honours to be tried at any Court at Law or any other where save before themselves tho' their other Inheritances are tried there as well as other Mens So possessio fratris holds of Lands but not of a Dignity which is not disposed of as other Inheritances nor will it be guided by the strict Rules of Law The Lord Coke is of Opinion in Bedford's Case That an Honour could not be taken away but by Act of Parliament therefore it will be allowed that the concurrence of all Parties concerned may extinguish this as well as other Inheritances but the Concurrence of all can't be without Act of Parliament for the whole Kingdom have an Interest in the Peerage of every Lord It is a dangerous Doctrine to say our Judicature and Legislature is our own only The House of Lords is the next thing to the Crown tho' that be far above them yet those that reach at that must take them out of the way first they were voted useless and dangerous before the Crown was laid aside and as in Descent of the Crown the whole Kingdom hath such an Interest in it as the King cannot Surrender or alien it so in a proportionable degree tho' far less the King and Kingdom have an Interest in their Lordships and Dignities and Titles It is true they may be forfeited but it doth not follow that they may be extinguished by Surrender There be two Reasons for the Forfeiture 1. There is a Condition in Law that they shall be true and loyal to the Government 2. Honours are inherent in the Blood and when that is corrupted that which is inherent is taken away but in case of a Surrender these Reasons do
not hold there is no Breach of any Condition in Law nor any Corruption of the Blood for these Reasons Felony without Clergy forfeits Honours whereas other Inheritances tho' Fee-simple are lost but for a year and a day and so are Freeholds for Lives which is another clear Instance that Honours are not governed by the Rules of Law It is pressed as a known Law that Honours are grantable for Lives a Point of greater Consequence than the Thing in debate It 's not a fair way of arguing nor to be allowed of As for the Precedents that are Selden 730. is expresly against them for it saith that the Honour of Baronages were in Abbots only in right of their Abbies not inherent in them So that 't is plainly inferred that other Honours are Personal Dignities The Lord Delaware's Case 11 Rep. makes nothing for them for it doth not follow that because he could not Surrender that which was not in him therefore he might Surrender that which was in him As to the other Precedents he gave these three Reasons 1. They were bare Surrenders no Fines 2. All those were made by Persons that had advantage by them having greater Honours granted unto them or such whose Interest was beyond the Seas and therefore were willing to quit their Dependencies here upon good Considerations that pleased them Et volenti non sit Injuria 3. All these Surrenders passed sub silentio and never admitted of any Dispute But as for the sole melancholy Precedent of Roger Stafford 1638. which was condemned in Parliament 1640. 't is to be observed that Resolution can't be condemned because of the Times for the Affront to the Lords in taking such a Fine was in 1638. and when could it be more properly remedied then in 1640. except it be expected there were a Prophetical Spirit of Judgment against a thing not in being there were 94 Lords present and the Vote was Nemine Contradicente which gives it as great an Authority as any Resolution that ever was The King's Counsel were not heard in the Case of Ship-money nor Knighthood-money where they had more right to claim to be heard than in this Case To conclude a Fine is a Judgment in the Common Pleas and your Lordships Honours are not triable in that Court below in Westminster-hall but if this Fine be allowable they must be triable there as well as other Inheritances And as to what has been said That some of your Lordships sit here by Remainders and they are in danger if Honours be not allowed to be intailed it 's denied and if they be intailed it 's not of the same nature with other Inheritances neither doth any Lord sit here by Title of a Remainder but by Virtue of a new Grant in the same Patent 'T was afterwards declared That the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament assembled upon a very long Debate and having heard his Majesty's Attorney General are unanimously of Opinion and do resolve and adjudge that no fine levied or at any time hereafter to be levied to the King can bar a Peer's Title of Honour or the Right of any Person claiming such Title under him that levied or shall levie such Fine Duval versus Price WRit of Error on a Judgment in the Court of Exchequer affirmed on a Writ of Error before the Keeper of the Great Seal c. in an Action of the Case for Slander The Writ was to this Effect Gullelmus Maria c. Thes Baronibus de Scaccario suo salutem quia in recordo processu ac etiam in redditione judicij loquelae quae fuit in Cur ' nostra de Scaccar ' coram Baronibus nostris praed ' de Scaccar ' nostro praed ' per Billam inter Edward ' Price Arm ' debitor ' nostr ' Johan ' Duvall Arm ' de quadam transgression ' super casum eidem Edwardo per praefat ' Johannem illat ' super quo judicium in Curia nostra de Scaccar ' reddit ' fuit pro praefat ' Edwardo versus dict' Johann ' qua quidem record ' process ' causa Erroris intervenient ' in Camera Consilij juxta Scaccar ' vocat ' le Councel Chamber coram Domino Custod ' Magni Sigilli Angliae vobis praefat ' Thes venire facimus jud ' inde versus praefat ' Johann ' coram c. affirmatum est quia in affirmatione judicij praed ' versus praed ' Johannem coram c. Error ' intervenit manifestus ad grave dampn ' ipsius Johannis sicut ex quaerela sua accepimus quos Error ' si quis fuerit modo debito Corrigi eidem Johanni plenam Celarem justitiam fieri volentes in hac parte vobis Mandamus quod si judicium coram praefat ' c. affirmatum est tunc record ' process ' tam judicii quam affirmation ' praed ' cum omnibus ea tangentibus quae coram vobis jam resident ' ut dicitur nobis in Parliament ' nostro viz. 17 die Septembris prox ' futur ' distincte aperte mittatis hoc Breve ut inspectis record ' processu praedict ' ulterius inde de assensu Dominor ' Spiritualium Temporalium in eodem Parliamento Existent ' pro Errore illo Corrigend ' fieri faciamus quod de jure secundum legem consuetudinem Regni nostri Anglie fuerit faciend ' Teste nobis ipsis apud Westm ' 8 Maii Anno 6. Record ' Process ' de quibus in Brevi de Errore huic Schedule annex ' specificat ' fit mentio sequitur in haec verba Placita coram Baron ' de Scaccar ' c. Midd ' Memorand ' quod alias scilicet c. And by the Bill Price complains of Duvall praesent ' hic in Cur ' eodem die de placito transgr ' super casum pro eo viz. quod cum he was a good Subject and free from all Suspicion of Treason and was a Justice of Peace in Radnor and Montgomery-shire and well performed his Duty and well-affected to the King and Queens Government and ready to oppose all their Enemies c. the Defendant maliciously designing to prejudice the Plaintiff and to bring him into the Displeasure of his Prince c. did tali die anno apud Westm ' in Com' Midd ' habens colloquium of the said Plaintiff say these English words of him He meaning the Plaintiff is disaffected to the Government the Government of the King and Queen meaning and having other Discourse of the Plaintiff and of the Government of the King and Queen did say of the said Plaintiff these other words viz. He meaning the Plaintiff is disaffected to the Government the said Government of the King and Queen meaning By pretext of which said words he was injured in his Credit and fell into the Displeasure of their Majesties and his Office aforesaid by reason thereof did totally lose and remain'd hitherto daily
in danger of a severe Prosecution as an Enemy to the King c. ad damp ' mill ' librar ' quo minus He can satisfie the King and Queen the Debts he owes them Et inde producit sect ' c. pleg ' c. The Defendant pleads Non cul Jury find pro quaerent ' and assess Damages 200 l. and Judgment accordingly posteaque scil 6 Julij Anno 5. iidem Dominus Rex Domina Regina Mand ' hic Breve de Errore Corrigend ' sub Magno Sigillo Anglie Thes Baron ' de Scaccar ' suo direct ' in haec verba directed Thes Baronibus suis de Scaccar ' suo quia in recordo processu c. Error ' intervenit manifestus ad grave damp ' c. sicut ex querela sua accepimus ac cum in 31 Edw. 3. inter cetera concordat ' stabilit ' fuit quod in omnibus casibus Regem aut al' personas tangent ' ubi quis queritur de Errore facto in Scaccario Cancellar ' Thes Venire fac ' coram eis in aliquam Cameram Consilij juxta Scaccar ' record ' process ' hujusmodi extra dict' Scacc ' assumptis sibi justic ' al' peritis tal ' qual ' sibi videbitur fore assumend ' vocari fac ' coram eis Barones de Scaccar ' praed ' ad audiend ' Informationes suas causas judicior ' suor ' super hoc negotium hujusmodi debite facer ' Examinari Et si quis Error ' invent ' fuer ' illum corrigend ' rotulos Emendari ac postea eos in dictum Scaccar ' ad Execution ' inde faciend ' remitti fac ' sicut pertinet prout in eodem Statuto plen ' Continent ' Nos igitur volentes errorem si quis fuit ' juxta formam Statuti praed ' corrigi partibus praed ' plenam c. Vobis mandamus quod si judicium inde reddit ' sit hinc record ' process ' praed ' cum omnibus ea tangentibus coram Domino Custod ' Magni Sigilli Anglia vobis praefat ' Thes in Camera Consilij juxta Scaccar ' praed ' vocat ' le Councel Chamber die Martis viz. 31 Octobris prox ' futur ' Venire fac ' ut idem Dominus Custos Magni Sigilli Angliae vos praefat ' Thesaur ' Visis Examinatis c. ulterius in hac parte de Concilio Justiciar ' al' peritor ' hujusmodi Fieri fac ' quod de jure secund ' formam Statut ' praed ' fuit faciend ' Test ' nobis ipsis apud W. c. Ad quem diem Martis viz. 31 die Octobris coram Johanne Somers Mil ' Domino Custode Magni Sigilli Angliae nullo Thesaur ' adtnuc Existent ' hic scil ' in Camera Consilij apud Westm ' praed ' venit ' praed ' Johannes Duvall per S. A. Attorn ' suum Et praed ' Thesaur ' Barones record ' process ' praed ' cum omnibus ea tangentibus tunc hic Venire faciunt Et super hoc the said J. Duvall assigns the General Error and the said Price pleads In nullo est Erratum and after several Curia advisare's and days given super hoc visis intellectis omnibus singulis praemissis per praefat ' Dominum Custodem Magni Sigilli praed ' nullo Thesaur ' adtunc Existent ' maturaque deliberatione inde habita assumptis sibi J. Holt Mil ' Capital ' Justiciar ' c. G. Treby Mil ' c. Vocatisque coram eo Baronibus de Scaccar ' praed ' auditisque rationibus Baronum praed ' Visum est praefat ' Custodi Magni Sigilli praed ' nullo Thesaur ' adtunc Existent ' de Concilio Justiciar ' praed ' quod in record ' aut processu praed ' vel redditione jud ' praed ' in nullo est Erratum Ideo consideratum est per praed ' Custodem Magni Sigilli Anglie nullo Thesaur ' adtunc Existent ' quod judicium praed ' in omnibus affirmatur c. Upon the General Error assigned here in the Judgment and Affirmance aforesaid the single Query was If these words He is disaffected to the Government be actionable And it was argued by the Counsel for the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error that they were not because they are general and uncertain do not import any particular Crime which exposes to any particular Penalty and they carry no Reference to his Office and tho' he be alledged to be a Justice of the Peace yet there 's no Colloquium laid concerning his Office To make words actionable they must either tend to the Scandal and Discredit of the Party or such if true as must bring Damage to the Party of whom they are spoken otherwise without special Damage laid and proved there 's no reason for the Jury to give Damages because he suffers none In ancient time these Actions were rare the Year-Books are little acquainted with them and tho' latter Ages have countenanced them yet it hath been under certain Rules and Limitations as that they ought to be particular and clear for if they are so general as to be ambiguous no Action is warrantable upon them and therefore they must be of a single and known Sense and such against which no other Intendment can reasonably be admitted Slander raised by Argument or Implication or Inference only is not enough to maintain an Action And tho' the Causa dicendi be not inquirable now after a Jury hath found them spoken as laid viz. maliciously yet if the words themselves do not imply Malice and Damage the use of those Adverbs which are commonly mention'd in such Declarations will not alter the Case for Men are to be answerable only for their own words and not for words expounded or described in another manner than the Speaker intended Here the word disaffected is none of the plainest nor is the word Government much plainer the first is only a Negative and to say He is not affected to the Government goes only to a want of Zeal or an indifference of Temper and doth not carry in it any treasonable Intent or Purpose much less any Act done And as to the pretended Special Damage in the loss of his Prince's Favour or incurring his Displeasure that is such an Allegation as should not have been made 't is neither mannerly nor justifiable in the Plaintiff to affirm such a thing upon Record And as to the loss of his Office that can be no Damage the same being no Place of Profit but meerly of burden and trouble 'T was further urged That if these words were allowed to be actionable Tory Whig or Jacobite or any other common rude uncertain Terms in Discourse might pretend to it according to the respective Turn of Times and consequently no Body would know what Discourse is allowable As ill Tongues were to be corrected so care is to be
Court recommitted which is the same Assault Taking and Imprisonment and Traverses absque hoc that he was guilty of the Assaulting Taking or Imprisoning him within the time last mentioned at London or elsewhere then in the Isle of Barbadees or otherwise or in other manner then as before The Plaintiff demurred and the Defendant joyn'd in Demurrer and Judgment was given for the Plaintiff and a Venire awarded tam ad triand ' exitum quam ad inquirend ' de dampnis c. and the Issue was found pro quaerent ' and 6 d. Damages and on the Demurrer 500 l. Damages and Judgment for Damages and Costs amounting in the whole to 590 l. The Plaintiff Sir J. Witham dying Trin. 2 Wil. Mar. the Judgment was revived by Scire Facias brought by Howel Gray and Chaplain Executors of Sir J. W. quoad omnia bona catalla sua except one Debt due by Bond from Henry Wakefield And at the Return of the Scire Fac ' the Defendant appears and demurs to the Scire Facias and there is an Award of Execution and thereupon a Writ of Error is brought in the Exchequer Chamber and the Judgment was affirmed Then a Writ of Error is brought in Parliament and the General Error assigned And here it was argued on the behalf of the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error that this Action did not lye against him because it was brought against him for that which he did as a Judge and so it appeared on the Record according to 12 Rep. 25. that the Rule seems the same for one sort of Judge as well as for another that this Person was lawfully made a Governour and so had all the Powers of a Governour that this was a Commitment only till he found Security tho' not so Expressed that this is not counsable here in Westminster-hall that he was only censurable by the King that the Charge is sufficient in that Sir J. W. had not taken the Oaths that male arbitrarie executus fuit is Charge enough to warrant a Commitment that this was a Charge before a Councel of State and there need not be all the Matters precisely alledged to justifie their Acts and by the same reason Actions may lye against the Privy Counsellors here and enforce them to set forth every particular which would be of dangerous Consequence the Plea might have been much shorter as only that he was committed by a Counsel of State and the addition of the other Matters shall not hurt and that the Charge was upon Oath shall be intended no Presumption shall be that the Supream Magistracy there did irregularly 't is a power incident to every Council of State to be able to commit This action cannot lye because the Fact is not triable here the Laws there may be different from ours Besides no Action lies unlefs 't were a malicious Commitment as well as causeless and that no Man will pretend that an Action can lye against the chief Governour or Lieutenant of Ireland or Scotland and by the same reason it ought not in this Case he had a power to make Judges and therefore he was more than a Judge and they have confessed all this Matter by the Demurrer The Statute of Car. 1. which restrains the power of our Councel of State supposes that they could Commit that in case of Crimes there they are punishable in that place and in Sir Ellis Ashburnham's Case there was a Remanding to be tried there and if so it can't be examinable here and if not this Action will not lye And further that what was done here was done in a Court for so is a Councel of State to receive Complaints against State Delinquents and to direct their Trials in proper Courts afterwards that there was never such an Action as this maintain'd and if it should it would be impossible for a Governour to defend himself First For that all the Records and Evidences are there 2. The Laws there differ from what they are here and Governments would be very weak and the Persons intrusted with them very uneasie if they are subject to be charged with Actions here for what they do in those Countries and therefore 't was prayed that the Judgment should be reversed On the other side 't was argued for the Plaintiff in the Original Action That this Action did lye and the Judgment on 't was legal That supposing the Fact done in England the Plea of such Authority so executed at Plymouth or Portsmouth or the like had been ill for that Liberty of Person by our Law is so sacred that every Restraint of it must be justified by some lawful Authority and that Authority must be expresly pursued That here was no Authority to commit for that must be either as a Court of Record or as Justices of Peace Constable or other Officer constituted for that purpose that the Letters Patents are the only Justification insisted on and that gives none 't is true the power of Committing is incident to the Office of a Court here 's only the Government of the Place committed to Sir Richard Dutton with a power to erect Courts and appoint Officers but none to himself He in Person is only authorized to manage and order the Affairs and the Law of England takes no notice of such an Officer or his Authority and therefore a Court of Law can take notice of it no further or otherwise then as it doth appear in pleading The Councel is not constituted a Court they are by the Letters Patents only to advise and assist the Governour and the Governour hath no power to commit or punish but to form and establish Courts to do so which imports the direct contrary that he had no such power The Ends of appointing the Councel as mentioned in the Letters Patents are quite different viz. to aid the Regent by their Advice not to act as of themselves and if neither the Governour of himself nor the Councel of it self had such a power neither can both together have it A Court of Justice is not to be intended unless the same be specially shewn Excepting the Case of the common known general Courts of Justice in Westminster-hall which are immemorial if any thing be justified by the Authority of other Courts the same must be precisely alledged and how their Commencement was either by Custom or Letters Patents Here it appears by the Plea it self that they had Justices of Oyer and Terminer appointed It doth not appear that he or the Councel were Judges of things of this kind Besides when a Councel is constituted as here was Twelve by Name that must be the Majority as is the Dean and Chapter of Femes Case Davis's Rep. 47. and that 's Seven at least which are not in this Case There must be a Majority unless the Erection did allow of a less Number The practise of the Courts of Westminster-hall do not contradict this for there 't is a Court whether more or less and so
it hath been time out of Mind But here 's a new Constitution and the Rule holds so in Commissions of Oyer and Terminer if the direction be so as is the Case in Plowden 384. the Earl of Leicester's Case If a Mayor and three Aldermen have Conusance of Pleas what a Mayor and two does is null and void And if there be no direction in particular for the number the Law requires the majority So that here was no Councel because but five of them present The Councel have not the power but the Governour with the Advice and Assent of the Councel and so ought their pleading to have been according to their Case That if a Man justifies as a Judge to excuse him from an Action he must set forth his Authority and the Cause must appear to be within his Conusance and so are multitudes of Cases 3 Cro. 130. 2 Leon. pl. 43. and 1 Cro. 153 557 579 593. 12 Rep. 23 25. Mod. Rep. 119. But taking it as a Councel neither Person nor Thing are within its Jurisdiction for if their Doctrine be true that by being Governour he is so absolute as to be subject only to the King then what Sir John Witham did being while and as Deputy Governour which is the true Governour to all purposes in absentia of the other is not examinable by a Successor But admitting for the present that by the Law one Magistrate may be punishable before his Successor for Miscarriages which were committed colore Officii yet here are no such Miscarriages sufficiently alledged to be charged on him 1. There 's no pretence of an Oath nor Circumstances shewing a reasonable Cause of Suspicion one of which ought to have been 2. In pleading no Allegation is sufficient if it be so general as the Party opponent can't in reason be supposed capable of making an Answer to it and that is the true Cause why our Law requires Certainty He did male arbitrarie execute the Office to the Oppression of the King's Subjects No Man living can defend himself on so general a Charge as this is for if Issue had been taken thereon all the Acts of his Government had been examinable which the Law never allows Then the Particulars are as general 1. That he did not take the usual Oath and it doth not appear what Oath or if any was requirable of a Deputy Governour nor who was to administer it so that non constat whether 't was his Fault or the Governours besides that 's no cause of Imprisonment for any thing which appears in the Plea 2. Assuming illegally the Title of Lieutanant Governour that is so trivial as it needs no Answer for Deputy Governour and Lieutenant Governour are all one locum tenens is a Deputy è contra 3. Altering of Orders at his Chamber ad libitum which were made in Court not said that there was any such Court or what Orders or where made non tantum without etiam or verum etiam is not a sufficient positive Allegation not said that he was guilty but only charged and not said how charged whether with or without Oath in writing or by parol nor said to be in any such manner as that the Councel ought or might receive it tho' Oath be not necessary to be mentioned in the Commitment yet it ought to be alledged in pleading because 't is necessary to warrant the Commitment as was held in the Lord Yarmouth's Case in B.R. It could not be to secure his answering the same for not so expressed and 't is not said that Sureties were demanded or denied or that he had notice of the Charge and surely this was bailable As to the Query If conusable here 't was argued That they had not pleaded to the Jur ' nor any Matter to oust the Court of its Jur ' If they intended by this Plea to have done that they should have given Jur ' to some other Court in some other place but this is not done for if an Injury 't is relievable somewhere in the King's Dominions and whether it be so or not is examinable somewhere Now here is a Wrong complain'd of as done by one English-man to another English-man and a Jur ' attacht in the King's Bench both of Cause and Person by the Bill filed and his Defence to it besides Jur ' could not be examined in the Exchequer Chamber because both the Statute and the Writ of Error expresly provide against it and. this Writ of Error is founded upon that Affirmance and therefore questionable whether that could be insisted on here But supposing it might 't was argued that the Action lies for that 't is a transitory Action and follows the Person wheresoever he comes under the power of the Common Law Process and that a Man may as well be sued in England for a Trespass done beyond Sea as in Barbadoes or the like place as for a Debt arising there by Specialty or other Contract that no Body but Prynne ever denied it and he did so only in case of Bonds dated there That many Actions have been maintained and tried here for Facts done in the Indies notwithstanding special Justifications to them and the Trials have been where the Actions were laid There was quoted Dowdale's Case 6 Rep. 47 48. and 7 Rep. 27. and if otherwise there would be a failure of Justice in the King's Dominions 32 Hen. 6.25 vide Jackson and Crispe's Case Sid. 462. 2 Keeble 391 397. 'T was then argued That whatsoever question might be made about the Trial of the Issue if one had been joyned yet now Demurrer being to the Plea if that Plea be naught then the Plaintiff is to have Judgment upon his Declaration and that is all right It was further said That the Justification of such a tort or wrong ought to be according to the Common Law of England for that Barbadoes is under the same Law as England and if 't were not upon his pleading it must be intended to be so and tho' they should be intended different yet the Defendant in the Action was obliged to the same Rules of Pleading for tho' the Matter may justifie him for an Act done there which would not justifie him for the same Act done here yet he must shew that he hath pursued the Rules of Law in that place or in case of no positive Laws the Rules of Natural Equity for either the Common Law or new instituted Laws or natural Equity must be the Rule in those places 'T was agreed That according to Calvin's Case 7 Rep. 17. upon the Conquest of an Infidel Country all the old Laws are abrogated ex instanti and the King imposes what he pleases and in case of the Conquest of a Christian Country he may change them at pleasure and appoint such as he thinks fit tho' Coke quotes no Authority for it yet 't was agreed that this might be consonant to reason But 't was denied that Barbadoes was a Conquest 't was
a Colony or Plantation and that imports rather the contrary and by such Names these Plantations have always gone in Letters Patents Proclamations and Acts of Parliament But whatsoever may by some be said as to Statutes in particular binding there the Common Law must and doth oblige there for 't is a Plantation or new Settlement of English-men by the King's Consent in an uninhabited Country and so is the History of Barbadoes written by Richard Ligon Printed at London 1673. pag. 23. says he 'T was a Country not inhabited by any but overgrown with Woods And pag. 100. They are governed by the Laws of England And Heylin in his Geography lib. 4.148 says The English are the sole Colony there they are called the King's Plantations and not his Conquests and he neither could nor can now impose any Laws upon them different from the Laws of England 'T was argued that even our Statutes do bind them and many of them name these Plantations as English they have some Municipal Rules there like our By-laws in the Stanneries or Fenns but that argues nothing as to the general which shall prevail when the one contradicts the other may be a Query another time By the 22 23 Car. 2. cap. 26. against the planting of Tobacco here and for the Regulation of the Plantation Trade the Governours of those Plantations are once a Year to return to the Custom-house in London an Account of all Ships laden and of all the Bonds c. And they are throughout the whole Act called the King's English Plantations Governours of such English Plantations to some of the English Plantations And Paragr 10. 't is said Inasmuch as the Plantations are inhabited which his Subjects of England and so 't is in 15 Car. 2. cap. 7. sect 5. and in 12 Car. 2. cap. 34. they are called Colonies and Plantations of this Kingdom of England From all which 't is natural to infer That the Rules in case of conquered Places cannot prevail here Conquest est res odiosa and never to be presumed besides 't is the People not the Soil that can be said to be conquered The reason of a Conquerour's Power to prescribe Laws is the Conqueror's Clemency in saving the Lives of the conquered whom by the strict right of War he might have destroyed or the presumed Chance of Subjection which the conquered Prince and People threw themselves upon when they first engaged in the War But this is not pretended to here tho' all the Cases about this Subject were put below stairs Then taking it as the truth is certain Subjects of England by consent of their Prince go and possess an uninhabited desert Country the Common Law must be supposed their Rule as 't was their Birthright and as 't is the best and so to be presumed their Choice and not only that but even as obligatory 't is so When they went thither they no more abandoned the English Laws then they did their Natural Allegiance nay they subjected themselves no more to other Laws than they did to another Allegiance which they did not This is a Dominion belonging not only to the Crown but to the Realm of England tho' not within the Territorial Realm Vaughan 330. says That they follow England and are a part of it Then 't was argued further If 't were possible that it should be otherwise when did the Common Law cease On the Sea it remained in all Personal Respects If Batteries or Wounds on Ship-board Actions lay here Then the same held when they landed there and no new Laws could be made for them but by the Prince with their consent Besides Either the Right of these Lands was gained to the Crown or to the Planters by the Occupancy and either way the Common Law must be their Rule It must be agreed that the first Entry gained the right and so is Grotius de jure Belli Pacis lib. 2. cap. 8. sect 6. and these Lands were never the Kings tho' they afterwards submitted to take a Grant of the King 'T is true in case of War what is gained becomes his who maintained the War and doth not of right belong to that Person who first possessed it Grot. lib. 3. cap. 6. sect 11. But in case it be not the effect of War but only by force of their first Entry it must be considered what Interest they did acquire and certainly 't was the largest that can be for an Occupant doth gain an Inheritance by the Law of Nations and the same shall descend then by the Rules of what Law shall the Descent be governed it must be by the Laws of the Country to which they did originally and still do belong But then supposing the Lands gained to the Crown and the Crown to distribute these Lands the Grant of them is to hold in Soccage and that is a common Law Tenure why are not their Persons in like manner under the Common Law When a Governour was first received by or imposed upon them 't was never intended either by King or People that he should Rule by any other Law than that of England And if it had been known to be otherwise the number of Subjects there would have been very small In these Cases their Allegiance continues and must be according to the Laws of England and 't was argued that ex consequenti the protection and rule of them ought to be by the same Laws for they are mutual and reciprocal unum trahit alterum and that Law which is the Rule of the one should be the Rule of the other besides 't is the Inhabitants not the Country that are capable of Laws and those are English and so declared and allowed to be and consequently there 's no reason why the English Laws should not follow the Persons of English-men especially while they are under the English Government and since the Great Seal goes thither And further a Writ of Error lies here upon any of their ultimate Judgments so says Vaughan 402. and 21 Hen. 7.3 that it doth so to all Subordinate Dominions and tho' the distance of the Place prevents the common use of such Writ yet by his Opinion it clearly lies and he reckons the Plantations part of those Subordinate Dominions Now a Writ of Error is a remedial Writ whereon Right is to be done and that must be according to the Laws of England for the King's Bench in case of a Reversal upon such Writ is to give a new Judgment as by Law ought to have been first given Vaughan 290 291 says It lies at Common Law to reverse Judgments in any inferiour Dominions for if it did not inferiour and Provincial Governments might make what Laws they please for Judgments are Laws when they are not to be reversed It lay to Ireland by the Common Law says Coke 7 Rep. 18. tho' there had been no Reservation of it in King John's Charter Then 't was inferred that the lying of a Writ of Error proves the Laws
to be the same i.e. in general the Common Law to govern in both places from the difference assigned between Ireland and Scotland it lies not to Scotland because a distinct Kingdom and governed by distinct Laws and it lies to Ireland because ruled by the same and consequently if a Writ of Error lies on the final Judgment there it 's a good Argument that the same Law prevails there These Plantations are parcel of the Realm as Counties Palatine are Their Rights and Interests are every day determined in Chancery here only that for necessity and encouragement of Trade and Commerce they make Plantation-Lands as Assets in certain Cases to pay Debts in all other things they make Rules for them according to the common Course of English Equity The distance or the contiguity of the thing makes no alteration in the Case And then 't was said as at first That this then was the same case as if the Imprisonment had been in England or on Shipboard as to the Rules of Justification that if there were another Law which could justifie it the same ought to have been certainly pleaded As to the Instructions those do not appear and therefore are not to be considered in the Case and they should have been set forth and no extraordinary Power is to be presumed unless shewn for every Man in pleading is thought to make the best of his own Case and consequently that if 't would have made for him the same would have been shewn and because they are not shewn they must be thought directive of a Government according to the Laws of England since 't is to a Subject of this Realm to govern other Subjects of this Realm living upon a part of this Realm and from the King thereof who must be supposed to approve those Laws which make him King and by which he reigns Then 't was argued Suppose this Governour had borrowed Money of a Man in the Island and then had returned to England and an Action had been brought for it and he had pretended to ustifie the receipt of it as Governour he must have shewn his Power the Law and how he observed that Law the like for Goods the same reason for Torts and Wrongs done vi armis Now the Court below could consider no other Power or Law to justifie this act but the Common Law of England and that will not do it for the Reasons given and if it be justifiable by any other it must be pleaded and what he hath pleaded is not pursued c. As to the Commitment by a Council of State what it means is hardly known in the Law of England and that Authority which commits by our Law ought to be certain and the Cause expressed as all the Arguments upon the Writ of Habeas Corpus in old time do shew but here 's no Councel and 't is not said so much as that he was debito modo onerat ' And as to the Demurr ' that confesses no more then what is well pleaded And as to Consequences there 's more danger to the Liberty of the Subject by allowing such a Behaviour then can be to the Government by allowing the Action to lye And therefore 't was prayed that the Judgment might be affirmed It was replyed on behalf of the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error That notwithstanding all that had been said the Laws there were different tho' the Foundation of them was the Common Law that they would not enter into that Question What sort of Title at first gave Right to these Lands but that this was a Commitment by a Councel of State And as to the Objection of too general Pleadings in male arbitrarie exercendo c. tho' the inducement of the Plea was so There were other Matters more particularly pleaded the altering the Decrees in his Chamber which was sufficient And as to the Objection That 't is not alledged in the Pleadings that the Charge in Councel against Wytham was upon Oath they answered That 't is not effential tho' prudent to have the Charge upon Oath before Commitment Matters may be otherwise apparent And as to the Objection That the Warrant of the Councel for the Commitment was not shewn they said that it lay not in their power because 't was delivered to the Provost Marshal as his Authority for the Capture and Detention of him and therefore did belong to him to keep And that the Councel tho' they were not a Court yet they had Jurisdiction to hear the Complaint and send him to another Court that could try the Crime and tho' it did not appear that the King gave any Authority to the Governour and Councel to commit yet 't is incident to their Authority as being a Councel of State the Councel here in England commit no otherwise and where the Commitment is not authorized by Law the King's Patent gives no power for it But the Government must be very weak where the Councel of State cannot commit a Delinquent so as to be forth-coming to another Court that can punish his Delinquency And therefore prayed that the Judgment should be reversed and the same was accordingly reversed Philips versus Bury WRit of Error to reverse a Judgment given for the Defendant in the Court of King's Bench where the Case upon the Record was thus Ejectione firme on the Demise of Painter as Rector and the Scholars of Exeter Colledge in Oxon for the Rector's House The Defendant pleads specially That the House in question is the Freehold of the Rector and Scholars of the Colledge but he says That he the said Dr. Bury was then Rector of that Colledge and that in right of the Rector and Scholars he did enter into the Messuage in question and did Eject the Plaintiff and so holds him out absque hoc That Painter the Lessor of the Plaintiff was at the time of making the Lease in the Declaration Rector of that Colledge hoc paratus est verificare c. The Plaintiff replys That the Messuage belongs to the Rector an Scholars but that Painter the Lessor was Rector at the time of the Lease hoc petit quod inquiratur per Patriam c. and thereon Issue is joyned and a Special Verdict The Jury find that Exeter Colledge is and was one Body Politick and Corporate by the Name of Rector and Scholars Collegij Exon ' infra Vniversitat ' Oxon ' that by the Foundation of the Colledge there were Laws and Statutes by which they were to be governed and that the Bishop of Exeter for the time being and no other at the time of founding the Colledge was constituted by virtue of the Statute concerning that Matter hereafter mentioned ordinary Visitor of the same Colledge secundum tenorem effectum statut ' eam rem concernent ' That the Bishop of Exeter who now is is Visitor according to that Statute Then they find the Statute for the Election of a Rector prout c. Then they find
Suspended were Seniors to the Consenting Scholars Then they find that after this Sentence Painter was elected into the Rectorship Concurrentibus omnibus requisitis si praedict ' Officium Rectoris eo tempore fuit vacans and that Dr. Bury 1 June Anno Jac. 2. semper postea usque sententiam praedict ' si sententia in contrar ' non valeat semper postea fuit adhuc est verus legitimus Rector Collegij praedict ' That William Painter as Rector and the Scholars of the said Colledge did make the Demise in the Declaration and thereon the Plaintiff entred and Dr. Bury enters on him and holds and yet doth hold him out modo forma prout in nar ' c. sed utrum super totam materiam praedict ' locus Rectoris per privation ' praedictam praed ' Arthuri legitime vacavit nec ne the Jury are ignorant si per inde locus praedict ' legitime vacavit tunc pro quaerent ' si non tunc pro Defendent ' It was argued on the behalf of the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error That this Judgment was illegal and the general Question was Whether this Sentence of Deprivation thus given by the Visitor against Dr. Bury did make the Rectorship void as to him and so consequently gave a Title to the Lessor of the Plaintiff But upon this Record the Questions were two 1. Whether or no by the Constitution of this Colledge the Bishop had a Power in this Case to give a Sentence 2. Supposing that he had such a Power Whether the Justice of that Sentence were examinable in Westminster-hall upon that Action And 1. 't was argued That the Bishop had such a Power to give a Sentence and it was agreed that he could make his Visitation but once in five Years unless he be called by the Request of the Colledge and if he comes uncalled within the five Years his Visitation would be void But yet the Visitation of the 24th of July was a good Visitation and consequently the Sentence upon it is good that there was no colour to make Dr. Masters's coming in March to examine Colmer's Appeal upon the Visitor's Commission to be a Visitation and that because it was a Commission upon a particular Complaint made by a single expelled Fellow for a particular Wrong and Injury supposed to be done to him and not a general Authority to exercise the Visitatorial Power which is to inquire into all Abuses c. Colmer complains that he was expelled without just Cause and seeks to the Visitor for redress they having expelled him for an Offence of which he thought himself innocent and the Visitor sends his Commissary to examine this particular matter Then 't was urged That tho' a Visitor be restrained by the Constitutions of the Colledge from visiting ex officio but once in five Years yet as a Visitor he had a constant standing Authority at all times to hear the Complaints and redress the Grievances of the particular Members and that is part of the proper Office of a Visitor to determine particular Differences between the Members and thus is Littleton's Text sect 136. that complaint may be made to the Ordinary or Visitor praying him that he will lay some Correction and Punishment for the same and that such Default be no more made c. And the Ordinary or Visitor of right ought to do this c. and so was it held in Appleford's Case in the Court of King's Bench who was expelled upon a like occasion as Colmer was he appealed to the Bishop of Winton who was Visitor and he confirmed the Expulsion and held to be good upon the Appeal for the hearing of Appeals is a standing fixed constant Jurisdiction Visiting is one Act or Exercise of his Power in which he is limited as to time but redressing of Grievances is another and his proper Office and Business at all times 'T is the Case of all the Bishops of England they can visit by Law but once in three years but their Courts are always open to hear Complaints and Determine Appeals so that here tho' but one Visitation can be in five years without request yet the Power and Authority to hear and examine any difference between the Members and to relieve against any particular Injury that 's continual and not limited Then 't was argued That tho' what was done upon the 16th of June was with an Intention to Visit yet being denied to enter the Chappel where the Visitation was appointed to be held it was none and his Calling over the Names was only to know who hindred the Visiting and his making an Act of it afterwards or administring an Oath at the time can never be called one tho' it hath been below said to be a tacking that of June to that of July but that cannot be for then it continued much longer than was intended nay much longer then it can by the Statutes of the Colledge for that is to cease in three days It turns rather the other way having been hindred in June he makes an Act of it in July in order to call them to an account for it as for a Conturnacy and to bring them to Judgment at his Visitation 'T was no more then taking an Affidavit of the Service of a Citation The appointment of a Visitation in the Hall was occasioned by the Obstruction met with at the Chappel and 't would be a very strange Construction that when he designed a Visitation and was hindred that the Hinderance and his Inquiry about it should be called a Visitation and a former Contumacy in opposing an intended Visitation should prevent their being subject to an actual true one Then 't was argued That there was no necessity that there should be the Consent of the four Senior Fellows to the Deprivation of the Rector and by one of the Counsel 't was owned that if such Consent had been necessary the Sentence had been a Nullity But as this Statute is framed 't was argued that the Bishop might deprive tho' they did not concur for these Reasons 1. By the Statutes the Bishop for the time being is made the ordinary Visitor of Exeter Colledge and that where any one is Visitor of a Colledge he hath full and ample Authority to Deprive or Amove any Member of the Colledge quatenus Visitor 2. There is an express Power given to the Bishop to proceed to the Deprivation of the Rector or the Expulsion of a Scholar and this in his Visitation And 3. The qualifying words do not restrain it to be with the Consent of the four Fellows the word is Deprivatio as to the Rector and Expulsio as to the Scholar tho' they are synonymous as to real Sense yet by this Statute they are differently applied Then it says If the Bishop do proceed c. that only relates to the Case of a Scholar because the word there used is Expulsio which is never applied but to the amotion
and he may Expel and as it is 8 Assis ' 29 30. he may deprive the only Query is if he were Visitor at this time for it hath been and must be agreed on all hands that Quatenus Visitor he might deprive if he be a Visitor as Ordinary there lieth an Appeal from his deprivation but if as Patron there 's none and then that deprivation whether right or not must stand As to the Objection that 't is not the Sentence of a Court and therefore not Conclusive 't is not material whether it be a Court or not but the Query is if he had jurisdiction and conusance of the Person and thing and if he had then his sentence holds and where the Founder hath not thought fit to direct an Appeal no appeal lies nay not to the Common-Law Courts the Founder having put all under the Judgment of the Visitor it must continue so He might have ordered it that the Rector should continue only during the pleasure of the Visitor but now he hath left it to his wisdom according to the Statutes He is a Judge not only in particular by appointment but as he is Constituted a Visitor in general then in pleading of a Sentence of deprivation there is no necessity of shewing the cause the cause is not traversable even in a Visitation so is Rastal 1.11 Hen. 7.27 7 Rep. Kenne's Case 9 Edw. 4.24 Suppose this Rectory had been a sole Corporation and not part of a Corporation aggregate as it is Consisting of Rector and Scholars and Dr. Bury had brought an assize and this deprivation had been pleaded it had been good to have said that the Visitor certis de Causis ipsum adinde moventibus had deprived him every thing that is traversable must be expressed with certainty but the cause need not be so in this Case Now 't is strange that pleading a Sentence without a Cause should be good and the finding of a Sentence in like manner in a special verdict should not be good If in Pleading it be not traversable 't is the strongest Argument that the Cause is not to be inquired into the having no Appeal doth not lessen the validity of the Sentence it doth only shew the Rector's place not to be so certain and durable as in other cases they are where Appeals are allowed The Case of Caudrys in the High Commission Court is as strong a Sentence of deprivation no Appeals and the Sentence found and no cause shewn yet held good 't is no Answer to say that that was by the Ecclesiastical Law how is it the Ecclesiastical Law that a Man shall be concluded by one Sentence without Appeal no it was because 't was by a Court that had Jur ' and the Sentence was not the weaker or the cause of it more inquirable because there 's no Appeal 'T was by the Ecclesiastical Constitution that the Commissioners had that Power but that was established by the Law of the Land and so is the Visitatorial Power the one Authority is as much derived from the Law as the other Bird and Smith's Case in Moore 's Rep. deprivation for not conforming to the Canons held good in like manner As to the Case of Coueney in Dyer 209. and that in Bagges's Case 11 Rep. 99. they are the same as to this matter though in Two Books an assize because no Appeal he quotes Books for it but upon a perusal they will not warrant the distinction for the party is as much concluded in the one Case as in the other 't is reasonable to suspect that Case not to be Law because that is impracticable which it is brought to prove The Head of a College cannot maintain an Assize for his Office of Headship He hath not such an Estate as will maintain that writ therefore to give that instance against us is hard the Rector hath no such sole Sezin the whole body of the College have an interest therein He hath no Title to the Money in his own Right till by consent they are distributed and after such distribution 't is not the Rector's Money but Dr. Bury's He is the only visible head of the Body in deed but has no single right In Appleford's Case the like Argument was drawn from this Case for a Mandamus and insisted that he might have an assize but said by the Lord Hales that that was impossible and in truth there 's no difference between this Case and that of a Mandamus there was a return that he was removed pro crimine enormi and Appealed to the Bishop of Winton who confirmed the amotion and the particular cause was not at all returned and held good because there was a local Visitor who had given a Sentence and all parties were concluded by it the same being done by the Power of that Government which the Founder had thought sit to put them under Now 't was argued from hence That this was an express Case If the Cause of the Deprivation be examinable in the Courts of Common Law why not upon a Mandamus as well as in an Ejectment The Lord Hales in that Case of Appleford took it for clear Law That the Sentence was as binding as a Judgment in an Assize He is made a Judge and his Person particularly designed by the Founder but he hath his Authority from the Law and since the Founder hath trusted the Matter to his Discretion 't is not to be suspected that he hath done or will do otherwise than right Then in the next place 't was argued That there doth not appear any Injustice in the Sentence and consequently it ought to be presumed Just Credence is to be given to a Person that exerciseth Judicial Power if he keep within his Jurisdiction The Law hath respect not only to Courts of Record and Judicial Proceedings in them but even to all other Proceedings where the Person that gives his Judgment or Sentence hath a Judicial Authority and here 's no Fault found in the Sentence the Jury have not so much as found the Matter and Ground of it to be untrue in Fact or insufficient in Law Then 't was urg'd That the Cause of Deprivation here was just it being for Contumacy If the Bishop had power to visit in June as he had and was hindred by their shutting the Doors whereupon he went away without doing any thing and came again in July when he held his Visitation and they behaved themselves Contumaciously and refused to submit to his Authority this was contra officii sui debitum 't is reasonable that both Head and Members should submit to the Visitor Contumacy is a good Cause of Deprivation and upon good reason because it hinders an Inquiry into all other Causes 'T was held so in Bird and Smith's Case and in Allen and Nash's Case quia fuit refractarius Now tho' Contumacy be not one of the Causes mentioned in the Statutes yet 't was certainly contrary to their Duty turning their Backs upon the
notice that such Process did not lye and if any Man hath by our Law any Estate Right or Priviledge by any particular means he is bound to take notice of all the Conditions and Qualifications annexed thereto And the Reason is just because the same means by which he had notice of the Benefit gives him notice of the restrictive Limitation and Penalty and so was it held in the Case of Fry and Porter By our Law no Benefit can accrue to a Man by a Judgment given on a Thing arising extra potestatem Curiae in case of a particular and limited Jurisdiction as in the Case of Kingston upon Hull March 8. which held Plea of Debt upon a Bond made extra Jur ' c. and a Jud ' and Capias executed and an Escape and no Action lay for the Escape because all was void and coram non Judice In the same Book March 117 118. Dye and Olive's Case in False Imprisonment Plea that he was Serjeant at Mace belonging to a Court of Record and that a Warrant was directed to him to Arrest the Plaintiff pro quodam Contemptu and held not good because not shewn in what Action and how within the Jurisdiction and if not within it 't was coram non judice and void argued by Rolls and Maynard Then 't was argued That this was a limited qualified Power that the Visitor was a Creature of the Founders and if it had been the Heir of the Founder he had been as much bound and restrained by the Statutes as a Stranger and tho' the Law should be agreed to be as is pretended that it appoints a Visitor yet still whether he be the Heir or Nominee of the Founder he is an Officer only within the Limits and Rules of the Foundation and the Statutes made thereupon As he hath a Visitatorial Power only over this Colledge so he hath it only after the manner in which 't is given to him If the Founder had made no particular Visitor but yet had appointed that the same should be visitable at such a time and in such a form he himself had been bound by these Rules and if he would have been so confined with much more or at least with the same Reason ought his Nominee for cujus est dare ejus est disponere and every Argument which hath been urged for the Rector's being subject to the Rules of the Foundation may likewise be applied to that of the Visitor He that made the Visitor may restrain shape and modifie the Power which he gives him He might have made him Visitor only once in his Life or only upon Request and have left all other Jurisdiction to the Rector and Fellows But further here he is found to be Visitor only secundum formam statut ' vigore statut ' and to execute those Statutes and that which makes him a Visitor makes him such thus and thus qualified and no otherwise whatsoever Power or Authority the Name or Office of a Visitor may import ex vi termini no Man can say but this Visitor is controuled by the Statutes which make him so now had there been no Statutes he had never been Visitor then these Statutes making him a Visitor upon particular Terms and Conditions Times and Occasions extra these Terms and Conditions he is no Visitor at all this seems plain and natural So that if he exceeds the Bounds prescribed to him as Visitor he doth not act as Visitor for all Powers Authorities and Jurisdictions especially such as are created by private Persons must be executed according to the express Institution or plain meaning of the Party that created them and according to the Circumstances with which he hath circumscrib'd them So is the Rule in Berwick's Case 5 Rep. 94. and 1 Inst 113. and 258. An Executor is an Officer or Person instrusted which is taken notice of by the Law yet in his Creation he may be limited quoad the Estate in one Country or quoad one Particular and he can't intermeddle any further but Administration shall be granted as to the rest Then 't is observable That this Statute Visitor is not a Court of Record nor any Court at all but rather like an Arbitrator under certain Directions he can neither meddle at another Time or with other Matters or in other Manner then what is prescribed But admitting it a sort of Judicature here 's no Appeal or Writ of Error or Prohibition or Mandamus lies nay the Visitor himself cannot relieve against his own Sentence or restore the Party deprived the next day but the Place being vacant a right of Election accrues to the Fellows 't is therefore unreasonable to suppose him not restrained or that his Acts if exceeding the Limits and Rules set him shall be conclusive and binding This is like a Lay-Hospital 't is not a Religious Body tho' some call it mixt and in case of Temporal Lay-Offices there must be some Remedy at Law as is 13 Rep. 70. so is Dyer 209. and 3 Inst 340. Where no Appeal is allowed another Examination must be admitted and thus seems the 8 Assis pl. 29. tho' it hath been quoted on the other side If the Warden of an Hospital be irregularly deprived he shall have his Remedy at Law and 13 Assis 2. to the same effect Bagges's Case 11 Rep. repeats the same Case which shews Coke's Opinion to concur with it and tho' an Assize doth not properly lye yet the meaning is he shall have Relief i. e. such Suit at Law as is proper to his Case The same Distinction is allowed in Dr. Sutton's Case Latch 229. And that a Remedy is given by the Law in this Case of a Temporal Property seems to be plainly affirmed in the Statute of 24 Hen. 8. cap. 12. And further Tho' strictly and properly it were not of Common Law connusance yet it falling incidently to be a Question upon trial of a Title the Court before whom that Suit depends must examine that incident as in case of an Issue lawfully joyned in Marriage or not the Trial shall be by Certificate of the Ordinary but if it be a Question upon the Trial of a Title to Land the Matter shall be tried and judged without Certificate The wisdom of our Law hath been such as very rarely to trust any of the Courts of Justice with the final determination of matters of Law in the first Instance and 't would be strange that this Case of a Visitor should stand single by it self Besides to prevent a failure of Justice the Law doth of necessity admit of several other provisions and methods of Examination or Tryal than what the subject matter or person would properly in their own nature require especially in point of remedy and relief as appears in Dormer's Case 5 Rep. 40. and 1 Inst 54. 2 Roll's Abridg 587. now here is no other remedy nor other way of trial for Deprivation is not triable by Certificate but only in case of an Ecclesiastical
person As to the Objection from Appleford's Case Sid. 71. there that Writ was fully answered and they could not Examine into the truth and falsity of that Answer but must leave the party to his Action and it doth not thence follow That in an Action there 's no remedy But the strongest Objection is that in pleading a Deprivation you need not shew the Cause and it must be taken sor just and good as Moore 781. Jones 393. Moore 228. 2 Roll's Abridg. 219. 9 Edw. 4.25 that need only shew by whom All these stand upon the same foundation they were by Authority Ecclesiastical and must stand till Repealed and even those Cases of the High Commission Court they were by the course of the Ecclesiastical Law which was saved to them by the Proviso in 1 Eliz. and therefore shall be intended so till the contrary appear and even there 't was debito modo privatus which implies all due requisites but here the whole is disclosed upon a special Verdict 't is not found here that he was duly deprived but that he was deprived after such a manner which if it appears to have been without Authority must be null As to Ley's Opinion in Davis 47. that a Sentence of Deprivation in case of a Donative by an Ordinary was effectual in Law till Reversed that 's not Law for 't was all coram non judice Bro. Praemunire 21. Nat. Br. 42. the Ordinary cannot visit a Benefice Donative Then they Object That this is an Elemosinary interest and the Rector took it under those terms of subjection to such a Visitor but that is the Question what those terms are and the consequences of such an Opinion may be dangerous to the Universities those Nurseries of Learning and good Manners 't is to make them too precarious and dependent upon will And as to the pretence that the Land was the Founders and he might dispose of it at pleasure it was answered that before the Gift the Lands and the Profits and the Ownership were all subject to the Common-Law and the Owner could not give such a Power as is pretended no more than he could oblige all differences about his Estate to be finally determined by a particular person and his Heirs or Successors no Absolute Power can be fixed in this Nation by Custom but rather then the same shall be allowed the Custom shall be void 1 Inst 14. Davis 32. 2 Roll's Abridg. 265. Copyholds were Anciently at mere will and pleasure but the Lord is now obliged to and by certain Rules by our Law the Power of Parents over Children is qualified and restrained 't is no Argument to say that the Visitor comes in loco or vice fundatoris for the Alienation and the Statutes did oblige even himself and though perhaps if no Statutes had been made his Visitatorial Power had been much larger yet since 't is limitted to once in five Years and his Acts to be with others consent 't is as much as if he had given the Colledge a priviledge of exemption by Words Express from any Visitation at all other times and in all other manners than those which are mentioned then was Cited the Case of Terry and Huntington in Scaccar ' Trin. 20 Car. II. in Hardres's Rep. 480. before Sir Matthew Hale Trover for Goods seized by Warrant of the Commissioners of Excise the Query was when they adjudged low Wines to be strong Wines perfectly made upon 12 Car. II. cap. 23. whether it might be drawn in Question again by an Action in Westminster-Hall and held it might though they were Judges and though the Statute gave an Appeal and the reasons given there seem to reach this Case because they had a stinted limitted Jurisdiction and that implies a Negative viz. that they shall not proceed at all in any other Cases and that special Jurisdictions might be and frequently were circumscribed 1. with respect to place as a Leet or a Corporation Court 2. with respect to persons as in the Case of the Marshalsea 3. with respect to the subject matter of their Jurisdiction And if Judgment be given in another place or upon other persons or about other matters that all was void and coram non judice and though 't was objected that strong Wines were within their Jurisdiction and that 't was only a mistake in their Judgment yet it appearing upon the special Verdict that they were low Wines the Action was held maintainable this is so plain it needs no Application Then it was argued that this Sentence was void 1. because there was no Authority to visit at this time there having been a Visitation by the Commissary within five Years before that no words in the Statute make him a Visitor generally but only secund ' stat ' i.e. upon request or without request a quinquennio in quinquenium Semel now here 's no request found then the Act of Dr. Masters as Commissary is an exercise of the Visitor's Office Colmer's Appeal was to the Bishop as Visitor Semel implies a negation of having it more frequent according to Grammar it signifies once and not often er or once for all If Semel comes alone without any other Particle then 't is but once and if with another as ne Semel 't is not once or never and the liceat Semel can have no other Construction it can't mean once at the least as was argued below especially as opposed to request and no Argument can be drawn from the necessity of frequent Visitations for that Evils are not to be presumed and over inferior Members there 's a Power in the Rector and four Seniors now Dr. Masters was not requested by the Colledge nay they protest against it in some Degree i. e. so far as relates to Colmer's restitution the Oath of a Scholar being against Appeals and the Oaths and the Contents of them are to be deemed part of their Constitution But supposing that Business might be examined as a thing proper for Consideration when an inquiry is made into the State of the College and the admission continuance and removal of the Members is certainly one Article of such inquiry yet that must be done in Visitation and as Visitor for there 's no other Power found in the serdict but that 2. Admitting that no Action of Dr. Masters to be Visitation yet this Sentence is void because it held above three days and the Statutes say after three days it shall be taken pro terminat ' dissolut ' On the 16. of June he comes with intention to visit doth an Act proper to his Office and Business examines the Summoner about the Citation if he had come and only examined and made no Decree it had been a Visitation and either 't is a quinquennial one of it self or it is a Commencement of one and either one way or other it makes the Deprivation void 't is afterwards entred as a Visitatorial Act Eundem actum pro parte hujusmodi negotii Visitationis
Inst 125. though the Statutes of Hen. VIII impower Commissions for trial of Treasons Committed beyond the Seas yet this Court doth and may still take Conusance of such Causes 4 Inst 124. Its Sentences are only reversable by and upon Appeal to the King no Writ of Error or false Judgment lies upon any of them which shews the greatness of the Court and the difference of its Jurisdiction from other Courts which may be some of thereasons why no Prohibition was ever granted to it and why the Parliament of Rich. II. gave the Remedy of a Privy Seal wherefore it was prayed that the Judgment should be Reversed On the other side it was argued by the Council in behalf of the Plaintiff in the Original Action that this Judgment ought to be affirmed and it was after this manner there seem three Queries in the Case 1. If any Prohibition lies to that Court 2. If any Cause here for a Prohibition and 3. If there be any such Court as that before the Earl Marshal but another doubt was raised whether any of these Questions could be such upon this plea which is concluded to the Jurisdiction for that seems to make only one doubt whether the Court of Exchequer could hold Plea of an Action for proceeding contrary to a Prohibition already granted but this was waved and then it was argued 1. That a Prohibition doth lie to this Court of Chivalry in case it exceeds the Jurisdiction proper to it and it was agreed that the Office of Constable is Ancient and by Cambden is held to have been in Ure in this Kingdom in the Saxon's time though the Office of Marshal is but of a puisne date but however Great and Noble the Office is however large and Extensive the Jurisdiction is yet 't is but limitted and Coke in 4 Inst 123. says that 't is declared so by the Statute of Rich. II. where 't is said that they incroached in great prejudice of the King's Courts and to the great grievance and oppression of his people and that their proper Business is to have conusance of Contracts and Deeds of Arms and of War out of the Realm which cannot be determined or discussed by the Common-Law which other Constables have heretofore duly and reasonably used in their time now by this Act 't is plain what the Jurisdiction is Contracts and Deeds of Arms and War out of the Realm are the subject matter of it and by Coke 't is called curia militaris or the Fountain of Marshal Law which shews it a Court that hath its boundaries a Court that may incroach nay which hath incroach'd in diverse instances belonging to the Common-Law And that 't is a Court that ought to meddle with nothing that may be Determined in Westminster-Hall then there must be some way of restraining this excess and these incroachments and if the Statute of Rich. II. had not been made it must be agreed that a Prohibition would have lain for else there had been no remedy which is absurd to affirm 'T is no Objection that Prohibitions are only grantable to Inferiour Courts and that this is one of the greatest Courts in the Realm for if a Court Marshal intermeddle with a Common-Law matter ea ratione it becomes inferior and may be controwled There needs no contest about the Superiority of Courts in this matter 't is the same here as among private Persons he that offends becomes inferior and subject to the Censure of his equal by offending though that Court should be reckoned so noble and great as hath been represented yet 't is only so while it keeps within its Jurisdiction Prohibitions are grantable to almost all sort of Courts which differ from the Common-Law in their proceeding to Courts Christian to the Admiralty nay to the Delegates and even to the Steward and Marshal upon the Statute of Articuli super Chartas Cap. 3. That they shall not hold Plea of Freehold or of Trespass Fits ' N.B. 241 242. is an express Writ of Prohibition though the Statute gave no such Writ but only did restrain the Jurisdiction of the Court which in truth is the Case in Question antecedent to the Statute pleaded No Argument can be raised from the subject matter of the Jurisdiction of this Court that 't is different from the Common-Law for so is the Admiralty and the Prerogative Courts nor is it any Objection that upon any Grievance in this Court the Appeal must be to the King for that holds in the other Courts with equal reason Nay Prohibitions lie from Westminster-Hall to hinder proceeding in Causes which the Courts that grant such Prohibitions cannot hold Plea of as to the Ecclesiastical Court which grants probate of a Will made within a Mannor to the Lord whereof such probate belongs 5 Rep. 73. to the Marches of Wales if hold Plea of what belongs to Court Christian 2 Roll's Abridg. 313. are several Cases to this purpose there were also Cited 1 Roll's Rep. 42. 2 Roll's Abridg. 317. Sid. 189. 1 Brownl 143 144. and Herne 543. 't was further urged that there neither was nor could be any reason assigned why a Prohibition should not be grantable to the Court of Chancery when by English Bill it meddles with the Common-Law in other manner than its Ancient and proper Jurisdiction doth allow and several Authorities were Cited to countenance that Assertion Then was considered the reason of Prohibitions in general that they were to preserve the right of the King's Crown and Courts and the ease and quiet of the Subject that 't was the Wisdom and Policy of the Law to suppose both best preserved when every thing runs in its right Channel according to the Original Jurisdiction of every Court that by the same reason one Court might be allowed to incroach another might which could produce nothing but confusion and disorder in the Administration of Justice that in all other Writs of Prohibition the suggestion is and with Truth in prejudicium corone Regis Gravamen partis and both these are declared to be the consequent of this Courts excess or incroachment of Jurisdiction even by their own Statutes and when the reason is the same the remedy ought to be so But it hath been pretended That the Statute appoints a Privy Seal for to supersede c. and therefore no Prohibition to this it was answered That this Act doth not take away the force of the 8 Rich. II. mentio ned in 4 Inst 125. which restrains the Constable and Marshal from medling with any Plea which concerns the Common Law and if it had a limitted Jurisdiction by the Common-Law or by that Statute the subsequent Statute which gave a further Remedy for to restrain them did not take away that which they had before and every Body must agree that where an Act of Parliament restrains a Jurisdiction such Act warrants a Prohibition in case that restraint be broken or exceeded 't is so in case of a limited Power at
without the assent of the Dominion Superiour And 2. Judgments or Decrees might be there made or given to the disadvantage or of lessening that Superiority which cannot be reasonable or to make the Superiority to be only in the King not in the Crown of England as King Jac. 1. would have had it and consulted Selden upon the point Now though the Writ of Error be only mentioned yet the same reason holds to both and the true cause why we have not so many Ancient precedents of Equity Cases as of Law ones is for that in Ancient time the Equity Courts were not so high meddled with few matters and in a Summary way but since their Authority is so advanced and their Jurisdiction so enlarged that most questions of property are become determinable there and almost every suit begins or ends with them to the entire subversion of the Old Common-Law It is and must now be reasonable to have the Examination of their final Sentences in the Parliament of England as well as of the other Suppose non-residence in Ireland should be pretended a Forfeiture of the Estate to the next remainder Man or to the King Can it be safe for to intrust them with a conclusive Opinion in this matter When Calais was in our hands Writs of Error lay thither 21 Hen. 7. fol. 3. As to the pretence that the orders of this House cannot be executed there 't is very vain for if the King's Bench Command their Judgments to be executed there this House may order theirs and in like manner as they do to the Chancery here In 15 Rich. 2. numb 17. in the Abbot of St. Osithe's Case the Lords here made an Order and charged the Lord Chancellor that he see it performed and this hath been constant practice It hath been imagined That the Jurisdiction of this House in matters of this kind is dated from the 21 Jac. 1. as to the proceedings in Chancery but that is not now to be disputed for the Commons in Parliament Assembled did agree it to be the Right of this House in the Case of Skinner and the East-India Company and in the Book about it supposed to be written by that Noble Lord the Lord Hollis 105. 't is said that where the King 's Sovereigntydoth not reach the Jurisdiction of this House cannot the contrary is implied that where the King of England's Sovereignty doth extend the Jurisdiction of this House doth so too and no Man will affirm That Ireland is out of or beyond the limits of the Sovereignty of the English Crown And as to the exercise of this Judicature by the Lords here nothing can be stronger for it then the 1 Hen. 4. numb 79. So 't is in the Record though in Cotton's Abridg 't is 80. the Commons declare that all Judgments Appertain to the King and Lords and not to them Skinner's Case 199 200. 4 Inst 349 353 354. It was further argued That Protection commands a due Subjection and that these people who insisted upon this independency had forgot the English Treasure and Bloud which had been spent for their preservation That they are part of England and subject to its Laws appears from the common Case of an incumbency here being made void by acceptance of a Bishoprick in that Colony Besides that in Ancient time the Arch-Bishop of Canterbury was Primate of Ireland and had the Confirmation and Consecration of Bishops there Cambden's Britt pag. 735. and 765. 4 Inst 360. then 't was urged that the Question now was whether it were a Dominion inferiour or equal to and independant upon the Realm of England That the constant practice had been for the Lords here to examine the Decrees in their Court of Chancery that the refusing of this Appeal would shake all those Cases thus determined that every Appeal-here from their Equity Sentences which have been very many was an Argument against the Order of their Lords and for the receiving of this Appeal here That this thing hath been acknowledged even by the Rebels there for in Sir John Temple's History of the first Progress of the Irish Rebellion written 1641. pag. 141. amongst the several propositions made by the Irish then in a general Rebellion these two are mentioned 1. That by several Acts of Parliament to be respectively passed in England and Ireland it should be declared that the Parliament of Ireland had no subordination to the Parliament of England but should have supreme Jurisdiction in that Kingdom as Absolute as the Parliament of England here hath 2. That the Act of 10 Hen. 7. called Poyning's Act and all other Acts expounding or explaining that Law should be Repealed both which with their other dangerous propositions were justly rejected however it shews their Opinion that at that time the Law was or was taken and deemed to be against them in this point and there is as much reason for keeping the final Judicature here as there is for maintaining the Superiority and Obligatory Power over them in the legislature 'T was farther urged That the with holding the Irish Lords from having the like Jurisdiction in their Parliament as the Lords in England have in Judging upon Appeals and Writs of Error was absolutely necessary for the preserving of the Possessions of the English in Ireland for those of that Country must be suppos'd to incline to their own interest and cannot be suppos'd so much inclined to love and affect the English amongst them And that this Power of Judging here is Co-eval with the very Constitution of the Government 'T was further urged That their Precedents returned did or concern the point in Question except the two or three Cases in 1661 and 1662. and two Appeals lately in 1695. that their Case of the Prior of Lauthony in 8 Hen. 6. Prynnes Animadversions 313 314 was against them the Prior having removed a Judgment in the King 's Bench in Ireland into the Parliament there which affirmed it did bring a Writ of Error in the King 's Bench in England and they refused to meddle with it the reason was because the Writ of Error before the Lords there did not lie and that it ought to have come hither immediately and all the rest of their Quotations in their Printed Case either prove nothing at all or too much for they are against the allowance of Writs of Error in the King 's Bench in England and against the Legislature of England's being able to oblige the people of Ireland both which have been approved by constant practice and therefore it was prayed that the Appeal here might be allowed and the Order of the Irish Lords might be vacated On the other side it was argued from 1 Inst 141. Prynne's Animadversions 286. and 4 Inst 12. that their Parliaments had the same Authority there in respect of making Laws for that Country as the Parliaments have for England that they have ever since 10 Hen. 7. Re-enacted there such subsequent Acts of England as they thought
Ordinary thought him able to take Orders and Preach in his Diocess therefore another must deem him able and sufficiently Learned tho' he knows the contrary to accept a Benefice in his Diocess 't is Absurd that upon a Presentation he is to be Examined but not refused tho' found inhabilis and this because he was in Orders and he could not be Presented unless in Orders and yet tho' in Orders if he be Presented he must be Examined but to what purpose passeth all understanding if his Priesthood or Orders presumes him to be qualified 'T is likewise to suppose Learning and Ability to be an inseparable quality That an ordinary Scholar can never become less so By the Old Law the Bishop had two Months time to Examine 2 Roll's Abr. 354. by Hob. 317. He hath a convenient time and by Can. 1 Jac. 1 cap. 95. the two Months is reduced to 28 Days And the Ordinary both in Conscience and by the Obligations which his very Order doth import is obliged to Judge for himself as well as to Examine the contrary is repugnant to his Office of a Judge to be forced or compelled to institute every Presentee fit or unfit Besides the Ordinary pro Tempore hath the particular care of all the Diocess and during a vacancy is to take care of supplying every particular Cure within his District then when he admits and institutes the very form of Words is Accipe curam meam tuam which renders it more Absurd that nolens volens he must transfer his Cure to a Man not able in his Judgment to execute it 'T is against the Rule of Law for that the Words of it are express articuli Cleri cap. 13. and this Cooke declares to be Affirmative of the Common-Law Item petitur quod personae Ecclesiast ' quas Dominus Rex ad beneficia presentet Ecclesiastica si Episcopus eas non Admittat ut puta propter defectum Scientiae vel aliam causam rationabilem non Subeant examinationem Laicar ' personar ' in casibus antedictis prout his temporibus attentetur de facto contra Canonitas sanctiones sed adeant Judicem Ecclesiasticum ad quem de jure pertinet pro Remedio prout justum fuerit consequendo respons ' de Idonietate persone presentate ad beneficium Ecclesiasticum pertinet Examinatio ad Judicem Ecclesiasticum ita est hactenus usitatum fiat in futurum Here is Idoneitas persone praesentate and the words of the Writ are quod permittat praesentare Idoneam personam And if the Presentee were not a fit person no such Writ can be maintained Then my Lord Coke in his Comment upon that Statute in 2 Inst 631 632. saith that there may be diverse Exceptions to Persons presented as Bastardy Villenage Outlawry Excommunication Laity Under age or Criminal and Lewd in his Conversation or inability to discharge his Pastoral duty as if he be Unlearned and the Examination of the Ability and Sufficiency of the Person presented belongs to the Bishop who is the Ecclesiastical Judge and not a Minister and may and ought to refuse the Person presented if he be not Idonea persona And if the cause of refusal be default of Learning Heresie or the like belonging to the knowledge of the Ecclesiastical Law then he must give notice to the Patron so that default of Learning is by him who was no great friend to the Jurisdiction of Court Christian agreed to be Subject to the Ecclesiastical inquiry and then in Pleading he must show the cause of refusal and the Party may deny the same and then the Court shall write to the Metropolitan or to the Guardian of the Spiritualities sede vacante to certifie if the cause be thus and his Certificate is conclusive if the Presentee be Dead it shall be tried by a Jury 15 Hen. 7.7 the Bishop is declared to be a Judge and not a Minister in this case of Examining a Man's Ability he is a Judge in this case as he is in case of a Resignation for an Ordinary may refuse it and without his acceptance 't is no Resignation and must be so Pleaded Noy 147. Bro. tit Bar. 81. 2. Cro. 197. and so agreed even in the Case of Leach and Thompson in Reg. 53. is a Consultation upon this very surmise that inability ad Retinend ' beneficium propter Crimina belongs to Court Christian and that the Ordinary is Judge thereof which is much stronger than our case because there was a Freehold vested by induction But this hath been agreed by that Court from whose Judgment the present Appeal is that a refusal may be upon insufficiency appearing upon an Examination upon a new Presentation and constant practise proves it The greater if any doubt is upon the Plea if good it says that he was Examined and upon Examination was found incapable The Exception taken to it is that it doth not set forth the particular parts of Learning in which he is deficient that the Temporal Court may Judge if it were a sufficient cause of refusal which is to change and turn it ad aliud examen that Learning is requisite for a Presentee to be Benefic'd they would not have the Ordinary to determine what Qualifications a person ought to have in order to take a Benefice but the Judges in Westminster-Hall They can have no colour for this pretence but that the Ordinary may have refused when competently Learned in their Opinions and they cannot say that the Law hath settled any Rules or measures of Learning requisite Some say Latin is not requisite since the Liturgy is now in English and therefore they would Judge of it others say the less Learning the better Preacher if can Read and Pray and Preach and be indued with Spiritual Gifts and so is their Replication others say that the Ordinary's Judgment must be submitted to the Judge's Opinion of the proportion of Knowledge necessary then they have a Popular pretence that this will give the Bishops too great a Power of refusal and so restrain Patrons from their privilege of Presenting and thereby make themselves Collators But there 's no danger of that because there must be notice and a convenient time for another Presentation and the danger of this restraint is as much the other way for then the Temporal Courts are to do it and it s much at one to the Patron which is to declare the inability the Ordinary or the Temporal Courts On both sides it must be agreed that default of Literature is a good and just cause of refusal the Question is who shall judge of it it is said minus Sufficiens in Literatura ca ratione inhabilis i.e. it being indefinite in omni Literatura necessaria But they Cavil at the Word minus sufficiens as if that agreed him somewhat Learned and forget that 't is said ac perinde incapax And minus sufficiens is in Lawyer 's Latin totally insufficient and so 't is used in all
shall be tho' in a Suit between the Ordinary himself and another Dyer 293. 't is cited Bro. Quare Impedit 170. Justice Rhodes 3 Leon. 100. vouched a Case in 30 Edw. 1. out of a Manuscript of the Lord Catlins wherein upon a Quare non Admisit the Defendant pleaded that the Presentee was Schismaticus Adulter and the Court commanded that he should hold to one or other of them for which he said Adulter from hence 't is manifest that the Court did not dislike the Plea for the generality but the doubleness And then it was said That after all these Presidents on this side and many others which might be Cited of the like generality in other cases 't will be difficult to shew one single Instance or Case in which this matter of general defect of Learning was ever pleaded otherwise or any one Judgment against any Bishop whatever upon such a Plea for tho' in some Cases which they say are parallel and similar tho' in truth they are not as Criminosus and Schismaticus hath been adjudged too general yet this Plea of Minima in Literatura sufficiens ac ea ratione incapax as it has always been used without alteration of words so has it never yet been excepted against and in these Presidents of Edw. 3. before cited hath been thought good and Issue joyned thereupon This was the ancient form of Pleading and as all those ancient Pleas were founded upon Reason being such as the Subject Matter is capable of In the Case of a Coroner it 's a good Cause to remove him quia fuit minime idoneus ad exequendum officium istud and no charge of any particular insufficiency assigned Fitzh Nat. Brev. 163. and there is no question but that 't would be a good Cause and sufficiently certain in a Scire Facias to repeal vacate or cancel Letters Patents for an Office in the Law to say in Legibus hujus Regnt Angliae minus sufficient ' instructus without assigning any particular Case or Statute that a Man blundered at or was ignorant in Suppose an Office in the Law to which the King or a private Person hath the Nomination and the Court refuses to admit a Man so named and an Action brought for that Refusal c. would it not be a good Plea to say the Party was minus sufficiens in Scientia Legum ea Ratione inhabilis and particular Instances are Evidences This is in the Negative like a non fuit dampnificatus and there you never need to shew how unless 't were a particular Incumbrance at the time of the Contract otherwise 't is always a good Plea In Non Compos 't is never shewn in particular wherein or what Feats of Frenzy Non compos implies that he had a general Defect disabling him at that time to do an Act obligatory and valid and that resembles this for you need not shew wherein but the Particulars are Evidence The Reason of the thing proves the Convenience and Solidity of the distinction between Pleading a Negative and Affirmative For instance in this Case the Negative pleaded implies an entire denial of sufficient Learning to qualifie him for a Cure of Souls and that justifies the Ordinary and our Law Books are full of this Distinction Mode and other Circumstances of Quality Time and Place are requisite in Affirmative Pleas none of which are necessary in Negatives There might be cited infinite numbers of Cases to that purpose as Mauser's Case 2 Rep. 4. Broughton's Case 5 Rep. 24. Aston and Hill 3 Cro. 253. Hutchinson versus Lowson 3 Cro. 393. Wild and Dowse Latch 159. And as the Foundation of all those is the 40 Edw. 3.30 which is the ground of all these and many more subsequent Authorities to the like effect But besides there 's one modern Case 't is Church versus Brunswick Sid. 334. Bond to pay from time to time a Moiety of all such Moneys as from time to time he should receive and payment of a Moiety generally without shewing the particulars in certain was held a good Plea and the reason of that Judgment maintains the Rule now contended for which was because 't is of what he should receive from time to time otherwise if those words had been omitted because in that Case there would be a stuffing of the Rolls with a multiplicity of Particulars and the same Reason holds in the Case at Bar. Then 't is considerable and deserving of a Thought That if Learning be requisite to an Office Temporal for a Slander in which an Action lies there these very words would bear an Action As to say of a Judge or the like the very words here mentioned with reference to his Office 't would be deemed Scandalous and Actionable Now our Law will not allow uncertain doubtful and ambiguous words to be so Even in Affirmatives our Law allows of general Pleading where Particulars would be many As in Bond for performance of Covenants upon an Apprentices Indenture for finding him Meat Drink Washing Lodging and other Necessaries held that invenit Meat Drink Washing Lodging alias res nocessarias is a good Plea tho' intirely uncertain what or how much and the Reason is not only because 't is in the words of the Covenant for that Reason doth not always hold for many times you must shew how and are forced to vary from the words of the Covenant in the Breach as in case of quiet Enjoyment Breach must alledge how and by whom and under what Title the Man was disturbed but there 's another Reason because the Particulars would be many Cryps versus Sir Henry Baynton 3 Bulstrode 31. Case sur assumpsit That J. S. being a Friend of the Defendants and coming to the Plaintiffs House he fell sick the Defendant in consideration that the Plaintiff would provide for him such Necessaries as he should want he would bene fideliter solvere proinde The Plaintiff shews that he lay there two Months that the Plaintiff provided him Necessaries amounting in value to c. and held good without shewing the Particulars to avoid a multiplicity of Reckonings so 't is for a Surgeons or Apothecary's Cure Another Rule in Pleading there is That a Certainty or a Generality in Pleading shall be required according to the nature of the Subject Matter pleaded In pleading of Breach of a Statute Law it 's enough to use the Negative of the words of such Statute as it is in Case of a Covenant and by the same reason in this Case where a Statute says the Bishop may refuse propter defectum Scientiae it 's enough to say in Literatura minus sufficiens especially when 't is added ac perinde inhabilis Then were urged the Mischiefs and Inconveniences which must ensue and follow upon the Construction which they would make that this Plea is uncertain for their Reason only can be as was said before that the Court may judge if it be such a Deficiency of Learning as disables
to hold a Curacy of Souls and this is the Reason all their Cases go upon and the Reason insisted upon below i. e. in effect that they must try it not the Archbishop The same Pretence is applicable to any other defect and 't will in Consequence confound Jurisdictions 't will make an Enlargement of the Temporal and Diminution of the Ecclesiastical Jurisdictions tho' both are founded upon the same English Laws and of equal Age and Authority Nor is it any Answer which they have alledged against this That the Judgment at Law is not that this Hodder shall have Institution but that a Writ shall go to the Metropolitan to require him to admit a fit Person upon Mr. Hele's Presentation and that if Mr. Hodder be presented the Archbishop may refuse him as insufficient and so the Archbishop is still Judge of the Sufficiency This looks plausible but they omit or forget the Consequence that if this Judgment stand then if the Archbishop refuse the Temporal Courts must Judge upon another Writ Whether the Cause of Refusal were in a point of Learning which they think requisite for he must not plead a general Defect of Learning but mention Particulars that they may judge of them this is to subject even his Grace the Metropolitan to their Opinion in an Affair within his own Jurisdiction and Conusance It is at last to enforce the Episcopal Judges to contradict their own Opinions and to admit Persons which they think not sufficiently Learned tho' the first Judgment doth not directly place in Hodder yet the next will if the Archbishop prove of the same mind Now this is apparently the Consequence from the pretended Reason of the Judgment for them and it is in effect to deny the old Law that a defect of Learning is a sufficient Cause of Refusal and that the Ordinary is Judge of that Defect and not the Temporal Court And then as to the Cases objected Dyer 254. the Bishop of Norwich's Case in a Quare Impedit which is likewise in 2 Rolls Abridg 355 where the Bishop pleads that the Presentee was a common haunter of Taverns and other Places and Games unlawful ob quod diversa alia Crimina consimilia praed ' the Presentee fuit Criminosus sic inhabilis non idonea persona and this was held an ill Plea But the Grounds and Reasons of that Judgment were not for the generality of the Plea but because the defects specially declared before were not sufficient to make the Presentee sic Criminosus as being not Mala in se but prohibita by particular Laws under certain Penalties Nay the Argument they would make from the general word Criminosus will not hold in the Case in question but is clearly distinguishable from it because one single Act one Crime specially set forth would disable the Man but in this case Ignorance that works a Disability must not be of any one particular thing whatsoever but a general defect of Knowledge And another Reason against their Inference from these and the like Cases is this they belong to a different Examen and upon that they require as was said before a different pleading The great Case and the only one that can be pretended to come near this is Speccot's Case mentioned in every contemporary Report of that Age as a new Case and a new one it is and the Reasons of it are differently reported in divers Books and in truth the Reasons of the Judgment do not warrant it nor make it applicable to the Case at Bar. The Authority of it is questionable for they agree Schism or Heresie which the Judges there take to be all one a Cause of Refusal and others said they did not know what was Schismaticus inveteratus but they did not consider that the Archbishop might tho' they did not but perhaps the Ordinary may judge that to be Schism which is not and therefore the Temporal Courts are to judge what is Schism and in the enforcing of this Case below they said the Ordinary is Judge only of Matters of Fact not if the Fact be Schism which is somewhat strange The Reports of that Case are 5 Rep. 57. 1 Anderson 189 190. Gold 36 and 52. and 3 Leon. 198 199 and 300. in that Case the Bishop pleaded that the Presentee was Schismaticus inveteratus ideo non habilis upon the validity of this Plea there were divers Arguments Two of the Judges says my Lord Anderson were for the Plaintiff and two for the Defendant and for the Decision of the Matter the Opinion of the other was asked and by the greater Opinion Judgment was given pro quer Then were repeated my Lord Anderson's words fol. 189. the Instances that were urged were says he Criminosus Perjurus but they are Matters triable both by Law Spiritual and Temporal and the Coment or how is necessary to be shewn to determine the Trial but Schismaticus in the principal Cause shall be tried only by the Spiritual Court and not by the Temporal as that of an Heretick may be generally pleaded And divers Cases were put to prove General Pleas and Issues triable at Common Law and yet says he Judged pro Quer ' This is my Lord Anderson's Opinion of that Case and whether the Ancient Authorities vouched in that Case do warrant that Judgment must be submitted Besides by our Law 't is not any one Opinion tho' judicially delivered that can make or alter the Law nay it doth not oblige any further than the reason of it is considerable and agrees with the constitution and the Rules of Law my Lord Vaughan always declared in favour of Reason and Authority and that in Honour of our Law for the contrary is to say 't is founded upon no Reason then 't was urged that this Judgment was when the Courts below were in struggle with the Ecclesiastical and the then High Commission Courts Erected by 1 Eliz. had given some provocation which with frequent Prohibitions gave occasions to the Disputes between the Bishops and the Judges in the beginning of the Reign of K. Jac. 1. But admitting the Case to be Law the same is easily distinguishable from this and founded upon different Reasons which cannot govern or influence this 'T was urged first in that Case there was some possibility for the Bishop to have set out the Heresie certainly and particularly for all Heresie must be founded upon some particular Tenet that is Repugnant to the common received and Orthodox Doctrine Now in this Case say they the Heresie ought to be Assigned that the party may Traverse it and purge himself and the Arch-Bishop not to be inveighled and obliged to run over all the species of Heresie which say they may be almost impossible but may have only one particular Opinion to Examine whether the Presentee did obstinately maintain it for if the Temporal Court had been of Opinion that such Tenet in particular was not Heresie tho' the Ordinary thought it so
of making a new Presentation And in all pleadings of this sort the notice is generally alledged to be the same day or within a day or two at the most That certainly it ought to be with convenient notice But then it was urged That the six Months ought not to be from the Death of the last Incumbent if there be a person Criminal presented which the Patron doth or may know as well as the Bishop there the six Months must be from the Death but if it be upon a refusal for a Cause which lies only in the Bishop's knowledge then it must be only from the notice and that notice ought to be personal but if the Months incur from the Death the notice should be in conveient time and what that is the Court must Judge Then it was urged from Speccot's Case That this Plea is too general and uncertain that a Temporal right being concerned the Bishop ought to have set forth more particularly and distinctly the cause of his Refusal 8 Rep. 68. the certain cause of a Divorse must be shewn 11 Hen. 7. 27. 2 Leon. 169. The Ordinary is a Judge only of the matter of Fact if true not if this matter pretended be a cause of Refusal he ought to alledge that so particularly as to manifest it to the Court in which the Suit depends That 't is a legal cause of Refusal He is not a Judge whether Hodder's insufficiency in any one point of Learning be a good cause of Refusal for if it should be so the Temporal Right of Patronage would be very precarious The Court ought to have enough before them whereon to Judge of the Cause as well as that on Issue may be joyned and tried here 't is only said that he is less sufficient not that he is altogether illiterate this will put it in the Power of the Ordinary to refuse for want of knowledge in any Learning as he thinks fit as Mathematicks or Anatomy without which a Man may be well Qualified to be the Rector of a Benefice and the consequence of such Opinion will be much to the prejudice of Lay Patrons that certainty in Pleading ought to be encouraged for the prevention of the exercise of Arbitrary discretionary Power that the Wisdom of the Common-Law is to reduce things to single Questions that the Determination upon them may be plain and certain and known and the reasons of such Determinations may appear which cannot well be done if general Allegations or Pleadings be countenanced for which and other Reasons urged by the Counsel who argued with the Judgment 't was prayed that the Judgment might be affirmed It was replied on behalf of the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error that the Books were very plain that the six Months were to incur from the Death of the Incumbent and then if there were not notice in convenient and due time in order to enable the Patron to present again that this ought to come on the other side That to require Learning in Presentees to Benefices would promote the Honour of the Church nay of the Nation in general That every Man who knew this Presentee and his Ignorance even as to the Latin Tongue must acknowledge that the Reverend Prelate who refused him had done worthily and becoming the Character of his Order Family and Person and therefore 't was prayed that the Judgment should be Reversed and it was Reversed Robert Davis versus Dr. John Speed WRIT of Error on a Judgment in Ejectment in the King 's Bench for certain Lands in Hamp-Shire the Declaration was upon the Demise of Francis Cockey The Verdict finds that William Horne and Ann his Wise were seized of the Lands in Question in their Demesne as of Fee in Right of the Wife that they made and executed a Deed Covenanting to Levy a Fine thereof to the use of the Heirs of the said William Horne lawfully begotten and to be begotten on the Body of the said Ann his Wife and for default of such Issue then to the use of the right Heirs of the said William Horne for ever and a Fine was Levied accordingly to these uses that William and Ann were seized prout Lex postulat that they had Issue William Horne their Son who Died without Issue in the Life of William and Ann that she Died and William the Father and Husband Survived her that then he Died without Issue that the lessor of the Plaintiff is Sister and Heir of the said William Horne that after his Death she entred and was seized prout Lex postulat that Elizabeth Joanna and others were Co-heirs of the said Ann that their Estate and Interest came by mean conveyances to the Defendant Speed That he was seized prout Lex postulat that the Lessor of the Plaintiff entered and Ousted the said Speed and made the Demise in the Declaration and that the Plaintiff entered and was Possessed till the Defendant entered upon him and Ousted him And if it shall appear to the Court that the Desenant's entry was lawful they find the Defendant not Guilty and if c. upon this special Verdict Judgment was given in B. R. for the Defendant And now it was Argued on the behalf of the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error that this Judgment was Erroneous and ought to be Reversed for that these Lands belonged to the Heirs of the Husband by force of this Deed and Fine that this was in the Case of an Use which was to be construed as much according to the intent of the Parties as a will That if by any construction that intent could be fulfilled it ought That the intent of the parties here was plain to give this Estate to the Husband and his Heirs that uses are to be governed by Equity and that therefore the meaning of the persons concerned was to be pursued That the Woman intended to take nothing her self nor to reserve any thing but to part with the whole That here was an use by implication in the Husband tho' none could result back to the Husband because he had none before but that in this case as in that of a Will an use might by implication very well be raised to the Husband and then this might be good by way of Remainder after the Death of the Husband or create an Estate Tail in him by coupling the use implied to him for Life with that to the Heirs of his Body and that if it were not so then that it was good as a springing contingent use to the Heirs of the Body of the Husband c. and that in the mean time till that Contingency happened the same was to the use of the Wife and her Heirs And that this Construction contradicted no Rule of Law That it was no more than was allowed in case of a Will by way of Executory Devise according to Pell and Brown's Case in 2 Cro. that the Estate should remain in the Wife and her Heirs during the Life of the Husband
that this was never designed to take effect as an use to be vested immediately and it was no more then if the Deed had declared the use to be after the expiration of twenty Years or at other future time to the Heirs of the Body of William Horne and for default of such Issue to his right Heirs and that such time had happened the use would have vested in the Heirs of his Body or in his right Heirs if he had Died before that time That 't is true there must be a person capable of taking at the time when the Contingency happens and so there was here at the time of his Death That it could never be intended that the Heirs should take immediately for that then there was no such person in being there could be no Heirs during his Life That this was like the Case of Webb and Sir Caesar Cranmer where the Trust of the Estate during the Life of the Duke of Southampton was adjudged to remain in the Heirs of the Devisor the Duke himself not being capable to take it That here being no person able to take under this Deed and Fine during the Husband's Life it shall be construed to remain as it was before till that Life ends and then the use ought to take effect for otherwise both the Deed and Fine are to no purpose they are all in vain and the intent of the parties to it is defeated And there were Cited the Lord Paget's Case in 1 Anderson and Woodlett and Denny 2 Crook 439. and 1 Leon 256. On the other side it was argued with the Judgment that this Deed and Fine can raise no use to the Heirs of the Husband according to the Rules of Law It was insisted That if Husband and Wise do levy a fine of the Wife's Land and no uses are declared or such uses are declared as are void and can never take effect such Fine is to the use of the Wife and her Heirs that in such case the Estate remins ' as it was or if the Fine Operates any thing it shall be for the benefit of the party to whom it did belong before Then it was urged That this was designed to raise an use immediately to the Heirs of the c. and that there was no person capable of taking at the time of levying this Fine the common Maxim in the Law proving it quod nemo est heres Viventis that the name and nature of an Heir import a successor after Death that this being designed to raise an use ex presenti and no person being capable of taking at that time the same must be void That this is the case of a Deed executed in the Life-time of the parties and not a Will where large allowances are often made in favour of supposed intentions by reason that persons are often surprized by Sickness and presumed to want the assistance of Counsel but the Rules of Law are always allowed to govern in Construction of Deeds Then it was urged that nothing was ever designed to the Husband himself by this that no words in the Deed can favour such a presumption that this must either work as an Estate in present or by way of remainder if the latter then by the known Rules of Law there must be a particular Estate to support it and such particular Estate must be either expressed or implied here is none expressed and if implied it must be in the Wife and if in her then she dying before the Husband her particular Estate did determine before the remainder could take place and consequently by all the Rules of Law it can never take place and no particular Estate can be implied in or for the Husband for that there is nothing said shewing such intent and if the Construction of Law be to prevail then as was urged before that is in favour of the Wife But here it was plainly designed to take effect immediately and therefore void because there was no person in being capable of taking at the time the Estate was intended to vest and no uses are to be executed by the State which are limitted against the Rules of the Common-Law Chudleigh's Case 1 Rep. 129. if the limitation of an use be at this day to A. for Years and afterwards to the use of the Heirs or Wife of B. which shall be this is void because 't would have been void if limitted in possession Dyer 190. the Earl of Bedford's Case in Popham 3 4. and 82. resolved in like manner to be void because would have been so in an Estate conveyed at Common-Law And all that can be objected is that then this is all void which is no more than may be pretended upon every imperfect conveyance but here the Case is in a Court of Law and the Defendant is a Purchaser who hath been Thirty Years in Possession tho' that doth not appear in the Case And it was said That as to the Notion of a springing contingent use 't is hardly intelligible in it self and by no means applicable to this Case because here are no words in this Deed that carry any relation to a future time or Contingency and the Objection is only this That the Conveyancer was mistaken in his Judgment or that the parties knew not what they meant or that they meant to create such an Estate and in such a manner as the Law will not allow and neither of these are Reasons sufficient to prevail for the Reversing of a Judgment given according to the Rules of Law by which Men's Inheritances have all along been governed and upon which many Estates do now depend 'T was further urged That the contrary Opinion which must be advanced to annul this Judgment would reder the Law and Men's Conveyances as doubtful and uncertain as last Wills and Testaments and submit Men's Titles to the Arbitrary Power and Will of those that shall Judge of them It is to impower them to suppose intentions where not expressed and to raise uses by Implication where they were never designed And in short 't will destroy all the difference between good and bad Conveyances and enable Men to limit uses and raise Estates contrary to and in different manner from what the Law hath hitherto allowed it will render Purchases more uncertain than they are at present and that 's more than enough already and the consequence must be to produce a confusion in property c. wherefore upon the whole it was prayed That the Judgment might be affirmed and it was affirmed accordingly Watts al' versus Crooke APpeal from a Decree in Chancery The Case in short was this That Peter Crooke and Elizabeth his Wife who was Sister of the half Blood to George Watts claimed to have an equal share with John Watts and Elizabeth Camfield who were Brother and Sister of the whole Blood to the Deceased of his Personal Estate and a Decree was made in Chancery in favour of Crooke and his Wife It was argued on
receive the Allegations and Matters given in Evidence for the Plaintiff as sufficient to maintain his Title whereas they were given in Evidence and considered and if it be meant as a sufficient Evidence to controul and over-rule all other that doth not belong to the Court in Trials to determine unless referred to them upon demurrer to Evidence but is the proper business of the Jury and if the Party be aggrieved the Remedy is an Attaint Nor can it be pretended that the Defendants Evidence was admitted to over-rule the Record produced because no Objection was made to the Defendants Evidence at the Trial and the same was all given before the Record of 15 Ed. 3. was produced and consequently the Jury must consider the force of it for Evidence on both sides being given by the Law of England the Decision of the Right belongs to the Jury and the Act of Edw. 3. being repealed 't is no Matter of Law but the most which could be made of it was that it was Evidence which must be left to the Jury together with the Defendants Evidence But no Bill of Exception will lye in such a Case by the Statute when the Evidence given is admitted as Evidence and left to a Jury and where no Opposition was made to the Defendants Evidence as here in this Case and therefore in this Case a Bill of Exception could not be warrantable because the Plaintiff's Evidence was not refused or over-ruled nor was the Defendant's Evidence fit to be rejected or so much as opposed by the Plaintiff And as to the Allegations made by the Counsel and not proved those never could be an Exception And for these and other Reasons the Judges refused to Seal their Bill Upon this a Writ of Error is brought and a Petition was exhibited to the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament assembled in the Name of the Lady Isabella Dutchess of Grafton and William Bridgman her Trustee showing that King Charles the Second granted the Office in question to W. B. for the Lives of Henry Earl of Arlington Henry Duke of Grafton and of the Petitioner the Lady Isabella in Trust for the Duke his Executors and Administrators to commence after the Death of Sir Robert Henly that upon the death of Sir Robert Henly the Petitioner by virtue of the said Grant was well intituled to the said Office but was interrupted in receiving the Profits by Rowland Holt Esq Brother to the Lord Chief Justice Holt and by Edward Coleman Gent. who pretended to be admitted thereto by some Grant from the Chief Justice that thereupon an Assize was brought for the said Office which came to Trial and the Petitioners Counsel insisted upon an Act of Parliament proving the King to have the Right of granting the said Office which the Judges would not admit to be sufficient to prove the King's Right to grant the same That the Petitioners Counsel did thereupon pray the benefit of a Bill therein to be allowed and sealed by the Judges according to Law And the Petitioner's Counsel relying upon the said Act of Parliament as sufficient proof of the King 's Right duly tendred a Bill of Exceptions before Judgment in the Assize which the Judges upon the Trial said they would Seal yet when tendred to them in Court before Judgment would not Seal the same Thereupon Judgment was entred against the Petitioners Title in the Assize by default of the Judges not allowing and sealing the said Bill according to the Duty of their Office by Law whereby they are hindred from making the Matter of the said Bill part of the Record of the said Judgment now brought and depending before your Lordships upon a Writ of Error in Parliament for reversing the said Judgment in the Assize and so are precluded from having the full benefit of the Law by the said Writ of Error to examine reverse and annul the said Judgment Wherefore the Petitioners prayed that their Lordships would be pleased to order the said Judges or some of them to Seal the said Bill of Exceptions to the end the said Case might as by Law it ought come intirely before their Lordships for Judgment c. Upon reading this Petition 't was ordered that the Lord Chief Justice and the rest of the Judges of the Court of King's Bench should have Copies of the Petition and put in their Answer thereunto in Writing on ..... next At the Day appointed there was deliver'd an Answer in these or the like words The Answer of William Dolben William Gregory and Giles Eyre Knights three of their Majesties Justices assigned to hold Pleas in their Court of King's Bench at Westminster to the Petition of the most noble Isabella Dutchess of Grafton and William Bridgman exhibited by them to your Lordships THese Respondents by Protestation not owning or allowing any of the Matters of the Petition to be true as they are therein alledged and saving to themselves the benefit of all the several Statutes herein after mentioned and all the Right they have as Members of the Body of the Commons of England to defend themselves upon any Trial that may be brought against them for any thing done contrary to their Duty as Judges according to the due Course of the Common Law which Right they hold themselves obliged to insist upon in answer to the said Petition think themselves bound to shew and offer to your Lordships consideration That the Petition is a Complaint against them for refusing to Seal a pretended Bill of Exceptions contrary to a Statute in that behalf as the Petition pretends without setting forth the tenour of the said Statute or what that pretended Bill was whereas that Statute is the Statute of Westminster 2. cap. 31. and doth enact That if any impleaded before any Justices doth offer an Exception and pray the Justices to allow the same and they refuse so to do the Party offering the Exception is thereby to write it and pray the Justices to Seal it which they or one of them are thereby enjoyned to do So that if the pretended Bill was duly tendred to these Respondents and was such as they were bound to Seal these Respondents are answerable only for it by the Course of the Common Law in an Action to be brought on that Statute which ought to be tried by a Jury of Twelve honest and lawful Men of England by the Course of the Common Law and not in any other manner And the Respondents further shew and humbly offer to your Lordships consideration That the Petition is a Complaint in the nature of an Original Suit charging those Respondents with a Crime of a very high Nature in acting contrary to the Duty of their Office and so altogether improper for your Lordships Examination or Consideration not being any more triable by your Lordships then every Information or Action for breach of any Statute Law is all which Matters are by the Common Law and Justice of the Land of Common Right to be
tried by a Jury And the Petition is wholly of a new Nature and without any Example or Precedent being to compel Judges who are by the Law of the Land to act according to their own judgments without any Constraint or Compulsion whatsoever and trenches upon all Mens Rights and Liberties tending manifestly to destroy all Trials by Jury And it is further manifest That this Complaint is utterly improper for your Lordships Examination for that your Lordships cannot apply the proper and only Remedy which the Law hath given the Party in this Case which is by awarding Damages to the Party injured if any Injury be done for these are only to be assessed by a Jury And they these Respondents are so far from apprehending they have done any wrong to the Petitioners in this Matter that they humbly offer with your Lordships leave to wave any Priviledge they have as Assistants to this Honourable House and appear gratis to any Suit that shall be brought against them in Westminster-hall touching the Matter complained of in the Petition And they further with all humility offer to your Lordships Consideration That as they are Judges they are under the Solemn Obligation of an Oath to do Justice without respect of Persons and are to be supposed to have acted in this Matter with and under a due regard to that Sacred Obligation and therefore to impose any thing contrary upon them may endanger the breaking of it which they humbly believe your Lordships will be tender of And they further humbly shew to your Lordships That by a Statute made in the 25th of Edw. 3. cap. 4. it is enacted That from thenceforth none shall be taken by Petition or Suggestion to the King or his Councel unless by Indictment or Presentment of good and lawful People of the Neighbourhood or by Process by Writ Original at Common Law and that none shall be put out of his Franchise or Freehold but by the Course of the Common Law And by another Statute in the 28th of Edw. 3. cap. 3. it is expresly provided that no Man shall be put out of his Lands and Tenements nor imprisoned or disinherited but by due Process of Law And by another Statute made in the 42 Edw. 3. cap. 3. it is enacted That no Man shall be put to answer without Presentment before Justices or Matter of Record on due Process and Original Writ according to the old Law of the Land And the Respondents further say That inasmuch as the Petition is a Complaint in the nature of an Original Cause for a supposed Breach of an Act of Parliament which Breach if any be is only examinable and triable by the Course of the Common Law and cannot be so in any other manner and is in the Example of it dangerous to the Rights and Liberties of all Men and tends to the Subversion of all Trials by Juries these Respondents conceive themselves bound in Duty with regard to their Offices and in Conscience to the Oaths they have taken to crave the benefit of defending themselves touching the Matter complained of in the Petition by the due and known Course of the Common Law and to rely upon the aforesaid Statutes and the Common Right they have of Free-born People of England in Bar of the Petitioners any further proceeding upon the said Petition and humbly pray to be dismissed from the same Then it was after Debate ordered That Counsel be heard at the Bar of the House on the said Petition And afterwards upon the Day appointed for the hearing of Counsel it was insisted on in the behalf of the Petitioners That here was a Right and a Right proved and no ways to come at it but this that if a Bill of Exceptions be tendred and refused this House can command them to do it that this proceeding of the Judges is to stifle the Matter of Law the Writ upon the Statute must be returnable here and cannot be otherwise that this follows the Judgment into Parliament that this House is to judge of every thing belonging to that Judgment that if this cannot be done there will be a failure of Justice that there have been Writs of Error upon Judgments with the Bill of Exceptions annexed that Damages to be recovered in an Action gives no Reparation for the Office that the Action must be brought before the Judges and so it must be a Dance in a Circle that as to the Judges Oaths the Justices of Peace are upon their Oaths and yet they may be committed that this is not fit for a Jury to try Whether the Judges have done well or ill in refusing to Seal this Bill of Exceptions This Refusal is the way to keep the Law within the Bounds or Walls of Westminster-hall and effectually to prevent its ever coming hither that this was not a Complaint of the Judges that as yet they would not accuse them of a Crime they only said fac hoc vive that the Court of King's Bench below doth the same thing to the Judges in Ireland they command others and ought to be commanded that they themselves send Mandatory Writs as the Cases are in Yelvert ' Cro. Car. That the Lords had directed the Judges in many things and so they did in Jeffrey Stanton's Case that by Command under the Privy Seal things have been done which otherwise would not and my Lord Shaftsbury was remanded to the Tower upon the Authority of that Case 15 Edw. 3. the Statute says that the Peers shall Examine for by great Men are meant the Peers Then were urged certain Cases where the Lords had commanded the Chancery to proceed speedily and to give Judgment c. Earl of Radnor's Case Englefield and Englefield and other like Cases were quoted and from thence they argued the Power of the Lords to command the Judges to do the thing desired 'T was argued on the other side against the Petition to this effect That this was a Cause of great consequence in respect of the Persons concerned as also of the Subject Matter it being the Complaint of a Noble Peeress against three of the Judges before whom she was lately a Suitor and concerning the Jurisdiction of this House That this Petition was the most artificial which could be contrived to hinder the Justice of the Law and to procure a Determination in prejudice of Two hundred thirty five years enjoyment that it is designed to get a Cause to be heard and adjudged on a Writ of Error by the Evidence onone side only or rather by that which was no Evidence at all if the Copy produced at the Trial was true for now upon the return of what they desire nothing of the Defendants Evidence would or could appear When a Bill of Exceptions is formed upon the Statute it ought to be upon some point of Law either in admitting or denying of Evidence or a Challenge or some Matter of Law arising upon Fact not denied in which either Party is over-ruled by the
upon grievous pain sometimes before the King himself sometimes before the King's Council sometimes to the Parliament to answer thereof anew to the grievance of the Parties and in Subversion of the Common-Law of the Land 't is Enacted that after Judgment the Parties shall be in Peace until the Judgment be undone by Attaint or Error this is agreed and amplified 3 Bulst 47.115 Here is mention even of the Parliaments Summoning persons to Answer in Subversion of the Laws There are other Statutes not Printed as 4 Edw. 3. numb 6. Cotton's Abridg. 7. and the same in 2 Inst 50. The Lords gave Judgment of Death without Indictment upon some who were not their Peers and agreed in full Parliament that they should be discharged of so doing for the future and that it should not be drawn in President that the like should not be done on any but their Peers 't is a Declaration of the Lords nay 't is an Act of Parliament and penned in the same manner as 29 Edw. 1. Statute del Estoppel at a Parliament agreed 33 Edw. 1. by common accord and 9 Edw. 2. the King in Parliament by Advice of his Council and these are held to be Statutes This was not only an acquittal from the trouble but a clear denial of the Power as appears by the words before that they had assumed upon themselves and the words subsequent that the like should not be done again The Complaint was because it was intermedling with Commoners after that manner Suppose this House should make an Order upon this matter which is a Law business and not of Equity no Execution can be made of it but Commitment There is the 15 Edw. 3. now insisted on Printed in the Old Statute Book but omitted in this 't is in Cotton 28.33 and 't is thus the Commons complained of breaches of Magna Charta c. and pray remedy with this Conclusion That every Man may stand to the Law according to his Condition and the Lords pray that Magna Charta may be observed and further that if any of what Condition soever should break it he should be adjudged by the Peers of the Realm in Parliament the next Parliament and so from Parliament to Parliament and it was Enacted accordingly This was Specious the same being only for the breakers of Magna Charta but in 17 Edw. 3. that whole Parliament i. e. all the Acts of it are Repealed which Repeal seems designed for the Petitioners for it Repeals the supposed Laws which make both their Title and this Jurisdiction which they would support 'T is observable what is said in the Repeal that the Act was contrary to the King's Oath in prejudice of his Crown and Royalty and against the Ancient Law And such is this for here 's no use of the King 's Writ no Address to or Command by the King for this Proceeding nor any mention of his name in the Petition By 1 Hen. 4. cap. 14. Appeals in Parliament for Offences are declared against as contrary to Reason and the Constitution this is such This is not incident to the Power of Hearing and Determining upon the Writ of Error because as was said before it belongs properly to the Chancery to Issue a Writ Commanding it to be done Si ita est as is Suggested By 12 Rep. 63. the King himself cannot take any Cause out of the Court where it depends and give Judgment on it himself And this House can make no Order upon this Petition that will be a Record as in Hob. 110. The Petition is in the name of a Person not party to the Record which seems very new for 't is by a Stranger in the eye of the Law to the Cause and consequently ought not to be joyned in any legal proceeding if this be such This is not incident to the Jurisdiction of the Error no more than Amendment of an Error in the Court from whence the Record comes or the filing of a Baile a Declaration or a Warrant of Attorney or the Sueing out another Process in Defect of one lost or the like These things are never Examinable in the Superior Court for in these Collateral things the other are intrusted Here 's no Hardship upon the Petitioner for he might have been Non-suite or have given this Repeal'd Act in Evidence at first and then have demurr'd on the Defendant's Evidence or might have Sued a Writ on the Statute of Westminster 2. But suppose this House should Examine this matter and find the Petition to be groundless will such Determination prevent the Judges from being troubled by Sueing of the Writ afterwards Suppose it E contra that this House should punish the Judges and commit them and award Damages or make other Order in favour of the Petitioners would such Order bar or stop the legal process afterwards can any Order made here be used below as a Recovery or Acquittal as an Auterfoits Convict or Auterfoits Acquitte If there be any thing in it 't is a breach of a Statute Law for which they are punishable at the King's Suit will the proceeding here save them from the trouble of answering to an Indictment or Information for the same thing Then since a Writ lies to Command them to Seal this Bill and since an Act of Parliament directs it if it were a true one perhaps it may be Questionable if they do not break their Oaths in case they Sign it in Obedience to any other direction If they did it in Obedience to the Royal Word Signet or Privy Seal of the King their Master 't would be a breach of their Oath Then as to presidents of the Exercise of such a Jurisdiction none come near this And abundance of particular Cases were put and answered but the considerable one was Jeffery Stanton's Case 14 Edw. 3.31 Cot. 30. The Case is odd 't is in Fits Abridgment tit voucher 119. there is a Writ directory to the Judges to proceed to Judgment or to bring the Record before the Parliament that they might receive an Averment c. To this Case it was Answered That the same was long before most of the Statutes aforementioned and in full Parliament and in that Case Stone would not agree to it but adhered to the Law according to his Opinion 't is true Shard in the absence of Stone gave Judgment according to that Advice but a Writ of Error was afterwards brought in the King 's Bench and the Judgment was Reversed 15 Edw. 3. B. R. even contrary to the Advice of Parliament to the other Judges As to the other Cases of Property Examined here either the Parties submitted to Answer or they were at the Suit or Complaint of the Commons or by Consent of the King and Commons but none of them carry any resemblance to this where the Judges insist upon it that there is another and a proper Remedy All the Cases in Ryley's Placita Parliamentaria are either Ordinances of Parliament or directions to follow
' suum ad prosequend ' predict ' primum Breve de Errore in et super Indictament ' predict ' pro alta proditione predict ' quod tamen Benedict ' Browne nullum habuit ' Warrant ' Attorn ' pro eodem Johanne Walcott de Recordo affilat ' ideo in eo manifeste est Errat ' Errat ' est etiam in hoc viz. quod Record ' predict ' apparet quod Judicium predict ' pro revocatione et adnullatione Judicij predict ' versus predict ' Thomam Walcott in forma predict ' reddit ' redditum fuit pro predict ' Johanne Walcott versus dict' Dominum Regem ubi per Legem terre hujus Regni Angliae Judicium ill ' reddi debuisset pro dicto Domino Rege versus eundem Johannem Ideo in eo scil manifeste est Errat ' et hoc parat ' est verificare unde pet ' Judicium et quod Judic ' ill ' ab Error predict ' et al' in Record ' et Process ' predict ' existen ' revocetur adnulletur et penitus pro nullo habeatur et quod dictus Dominus Rex ad que omnia ipse occasione revocation ' et adnullation ' Judicij predict ' amisit restituatur c. It was argued on behalf of the King That there was no Warrant of Attorney filed and consequently the Reversal was not regular for default of an Appearance by the Heir who prosecuted the Writ of Error and that there was no Day given to the Attorney General nor was the Attorney General or the Patentee a Party to the Record nor any Plea or Answer made by either of them to the Assignment of the Errors To this it was answered That by the Common Practise in the Crown-Office no Warrants of Attorney are filed neither for Defendants upon Indictments nor for Plaintiffs in the Writ of Error that it had not been known within the Memory of any Man living that such Warrants were ever filed That there need no day to be given to the King or the Attorney General for that the King's Attorney was supposed always present in Court and the King cannot be Nonsuited because he cannot be called That there never was any Answer to the Assignment of Errors in such Cases That in Capital Cases there needs no joyning of Issue upon pleading Not Guilty Then it was argued That there was no Error to warrant the Reversal to the Attainder that the Exception taken to the Judgment was trivial and frivolous that ipso vivente was not of necessity to be inserted that never any Judge was known to require that the Man's Bowels should be burnt while he was alive that the same was impossible to be executed that the Law never appointed any Judgment for Treason as essential besides Drawing and Hanging and that Quartering has been so long used as to be accounted part of the Judgment yet 't is not necessary to make a good Judgment and if that be so no more is needful than Drawing Hanging and Quartering that Ancient Presidents were thus short Rot ' Parliament ' 3 Hen. 5. p. 1. n. 6. Thomas de Gray al' had been Attainted of Treason upon a Special Commission at Southampton and the Record of the Attainder removed into Parliament 3 Hen. 5. and the Judgment was good Thomas de Gray ut proditor Domini Regis Regni sui Angliae distrahatur suspendatur decapitetur And in the Records Penes Thes Camar ' Scacc ' 3 Hen. 7. f. 10. a. 't is detrahatur suspendatur And many other there are in that place to the same effect and in the same manner Glanvil lib. 3. cap. 13. Fleta cap. 16. And there is the Case of David Prince of Wales who was Drawn Hang'd Beheaded Dismembred and Burnt Britton de Treason cap. 8. p. 16. Drawing and Death is the Punishment of Treason des Appeles c. 22. p. 43. to the same effect Lib. Assis 30 Edw. 3. pl. 19. and abundance of Records were cited as found in the Exchequer and nothing mentioned in them but detrahatur suspend ' And then was cited Rot. Parl. 2 Hen. 6. n. 18. and the Book 1 Hen. 6.5 19 Hen. 6.103 and 1 Hen. 7.24 Bro. Coron 129. there is a Judgment against Humfry Stafford per omnes Justiciar ' Angliae quod iterum ducatur turri abinde ponatur super herdillum et trahatur per London ad Tyburn ibidem suspendatur et ante mortem corda scindantur et caput scindatur et Corpus ejus dividatur in quatuor partes et mittentur ad voluntatem Domini Regis Earl of Essex's Case Moore 's Rep. and Owen's Case in 1 Roll's Rep. have not this inserted And Stamford who was a Judge in 1 et 2 Phil. et Mar. says c. 19. p. 128. only en son view And Alexander Burnett who was convicted of Treason for taking Romish Orders at the Old Baily 26 Car. 2. Rot. 56. had no such Judgment Corker's Case for the like Offence 31 Car. 2. Rot. 239. William Marshall 31 Car. 2. Rot. 240. And Mr. John Hampden had the like Judgment as Burnett c. 1 Jac. 2. upon confessing an Indictment of the same kind with Walcott's Whereupon considering that many Presidents were without this and that the Essential Parts of the Punishment were in this Judgment 't was prayed that the Judgment of Reversal might be Reversed and the Attainder confirmed On the other side it was argued That the Original Judgment was Erroneous and the Reversal just And first it was observed That this Writ of Error was new and particular ex gravi querela of the Countess of Roscommon who had nothing to do with the Record was a meer stranger to it and yet 't is suggested that the Reversal was to her Damage Then 't was urged that there was an Error in the first Judgment for that the Judgment in Case of Treason is by the Common Law and that it is and must be certain and not at the pleasure of the Court which pronounces and gives it That it ought to be severe because 't is a Punishment for the greatest Offence which can be committed Crimen lese Majestatis a Sin of the first Magnitude an Offence which imports Treachery to the Prince Enmity to the Country Defiance to all Government a Design to overthrow and confound all Order and Property and even the Community it self and in its Consequence occasions the Practise of all other Crimes whatsoever as Murders Burglaries Robberies c. and therefore our Constitution hath imposed upon it a severe and cruel Judgment such as the English do allow or permit in no other Case the greatest of other Crimes incur Death only but for Treason the Judgment is different Sir Tho. Smith's Treatise de Republica Anglic. 198. there ought in reason to be a proportion between the Offence and the Punishment and as this is the greatest so the Penalty is morte multo atrocior and in Fleta lib. 1. p. 21. 't is
is aliud testamentum i.e. a general Testament The 2 Rich. 3. fol. 3. is directly thus The Defendant pleads one Will the Plaintiff replies another and exception taken because he did not traverse the former but held needless to do so quia per ult ' testamentum ut placitatur generaliter primum testamentum revocatur in omnibus and it cannot be pretended that this might be the same Will written over again for if so it could not be aliud it would be the same these are not quibbles upon words for can it be said that this is a Devise by the last Will of Sir H. when there 's another Nor is it an Objection that the Contents do not appear for the Will belongs not to the Heir to keep and consequently not to shew in pleading he is not bound to a profert 't is enough that there was a subsequent Will And as the latter may confirm or be consistent with the former so it may not be so and the consistency is not to be presumed especially against an Heir at Law and in possession In the Case of Coward and Marshal 3 Cro. 721. the Substance of both are declared and thereby they appeared to be consistent and consequently no Revocation here Eadem mens sic testandi the same intent of disposing his Estate the same way can never be thought to continue for then there had been no occasion of making another Will If this be not a Revocation 't is an act void and to no purpose which is never to be intended Then 't was insisted on That the bare act of making and publishing another Will is a Revocation and the finding of the Contents unknown is void If this be not a Will 't is a Codicil and that is contrary to the finding of the Jury for the Verdict mentions a second Substantive independent Will without reference to the former which second Will is a Revocation and therefore 't was prayed that the Judgment should be reversed It was argued on the other side in behalf of Mr. Nosworthy That this was no Revocation that here had been a great stir about nothing for that nothing appeared against his Title that a Man may make a Will of several things at several times and they both shall stand that a deliberate Will being made the Contents whereof are known shall never be revoked by that which is not known nothing can be judged upon that which doth not appear and consequently it can never be judged to be a Revocation Here 's another Will and nothing is given by it nothing is found to be given by this subsequent Will The form of entring the ancient Judgments was Quibus visis lectis auditis per Curiam plene intellectis now what is here read to make a Revocation 2 Rich. 3. fol. 3. is with the Judgment for there 't is replied that he made another Executor there are the Contents pleaded sufficient to maintain his Count and answer the Defendant's Bar the Book is per hoc quod alius Executor nominatur Then was cited 1 Cro. 51. the Reason given is quia in dubiis non presumitur pro testamento and here being a good Will at the most the other is doubtful 1 Cro. 114 115. Several Wills of several things may be made And the same Book 595. 10 Car. 1. which Refolution Serjeant Maynard in arguing this Case below said that he heard in that Court of Kings Bench 'T is the Subject Matter of the Wills and the Repugnancy which makes the Revocation In this very Case in the Exchequer upon an English Bill 't was held by Hale to be no Revocation 't is in Hardres 375. Coke upon Littleton which hath been quoted Comments upon these words several Devises and if there be no Devise in the second there can be no sense or meaning in it and consequently unless some meaning appear it can never be an Evidence of a change of his Mind as it might be a Revocation so it might be otherwise and he that will have it to be a Revocation must prove it to be such No Man can affirm that every Will must necessarily be a Revocation of a former for the second Will might be of another thing as Goods or of another parcel of Land or in confirmation of the former If in these and many other like Cases a latter Will is no Revocation of a former how can it possibly with justice be concluded that a latter Will without Contents Purport or Effect shall be a Revocation of a former And tho' the Jury have in this Case believed the Witnesses and found that another Will was made it may be of dangerous Consequence to encourage and construe this a Revocation without knowing the Contents for no Will can be secure against the swearing of a new Will if there be no necessity of shewing it or proving what it was For which and other Reasons it was prayed that the Judgment might be affirmed and it was affirmed Sir Simon Leach al' Plaintiffs Versus J. Thomson Lessee of Charles Leach Defendant WRit of Error to Reverse a Judgment given in B. R. upon a Special Verdict on a Trial at Bar in Ejectment brought by Thomson on the Demise of Charles Leach the Special Verdict finds that Nicholas Leach was seized of the Lands in question in his Demesne as of Fee and being so seized 9 Nov. 19 Car. 2. he makes his last Will and thereby devises the Premisses to the Heirs Males of his Body lawfully to be begotten and for default of such Issue to Simon Leach his Brother for his Life and after his Decease to the first Son of the Body of the said Simon lawfully to be begotten and the Heirs Males of the Body of such first Son lawfully to be begotten and for default of such Issue to the second c. and so on to the eighth Sons of all and every other Sons c. and for default of such Issue to Sir Simon Leach his Kinsman Son and Heir of Simon Leach of Cadley in Com' Devon ' Esq deceased and the Heirs Males of his Body and for default of such Issue to the right Heirs of him the said Nicholas for ever Then they find That the Lands in the Declaration and those in the Will are the same that afterwards viz. 10 Apr. 20 Car. 2. Nicholas died seized without Issue of his Body that after his Death the said Simon his Brother and Heir Entred and was seized in his Demesne ut de libero tenemento for term of his Life Remainder to the first Son of the Body of the said Simon the Brother and the Heirs of the Body of such first Son lawfully to be begotten and for default of such to the second c. Remainder to Sir Simon in Tail Remainder to the said Simon the Brother and his Heirs belonging That Simon Leach the Brother being so seized afterwards viz. 20 Aug. 20 Car. 2. took to Wife Anne the Daughter of Vnton Crook that
the Alienation even of an Ideot and then after Office the Practise is to Issue a Scire facias to him in possession or to the Alienee and so is Fitzh tit Scire facias pl. 2. 106. All these Methods prescribed by the Law would be useless if the Acts themselves were void Then 't is as certain that the Office must be found during the Parties Life and during the insanity and not afterwards If there had been an Office 't would only avoid it with a prospect as it would be in case of an Heir after death Even after an Office the King cannot have the Profits from the time of the Alienation which shews it not it not void from the beginning If a Suit be against an Ideot after Inquisition the Ideot cannot plead it but the King shall send a Supersedeas to the Judges suggesting the Inquisition so that even then the Party himself cannot avoid it As to the other way of avoiding it by the Heir it must be by Writ or Entry and till Entry or Writ the Act remains good But here 's no Contest with the Party himself or with his Heirs but with a Remainder Man This Act of Surrender was no tortious Act it wrought no discontinuance there was no Trust in him to preserve the Contingent Remainder A Feoffment with livery is allowed not to be void and yet that may do a wrong by discontinuance c. As to the pretence that a Warrant of Attorney to make livery is void that doth not reach this Case for here 's an Act done by himself which would have passed the Estate as by and from himself if he had been of sound Mind Then 't was desired that the other side would shew any such Case as this whereas multitudes of Gifts Grants Releases Bonds and other Specialties sealed and delivered by the Party himself are allowed to be good and the same reason holds for a Surrender made in Person and there 's no difference between a livery made in Person and a Surrender the Act being Personal and not by another under his Authority makes the livery good and so it ought to be here 18 Ed. 4.2 Perkins sect 139. And 't is observable in 39 Hen. 6.42 per Priscott upon the Inquisition 't is reseized and revested into the Interest of the Ideot and consequently of the King and if revested 't was once out of him Now here 's no prejudice to the Man himself by this Opinion he is taken care of and his Acts avoided by the King on his behalf and his Heirs may avoid them But that Strangers should take notice of them as void was denied and therefore prayed that the Judgment should be reversed On the other side it was argued with the Judgment That this never was a Surrender that 't was against sense and reason to allow the Acts of a Madman a Person distracted to be valid to any purpose that in case of livery it had been allowed to be only voidable by reason of the solemnity and notoriety of the thing but in case of a Deed or a Thing passing only by Deed 't was otherwise and Bracton Britton Fleta and the Register were cited where 't is declared who can take and who can alien and that a Madman cannot alien and Fitzh is of Opinion that the Writ of dum non fuit compos may be brought by himself that there was a notion scattered in the Books that such Acts are only voidable but the reason of the Law is otherwise 39 Hen. 6.42 hath the distinction that Feoffment with livery is good but if livery be by Warrant of Attorney 't is void If it be a Feoffment with Warranty by Deed and possession delivered with his own hands yet the warranty is void because the Deed is void Perk. 5. The Deed of a Mad-man is void if he grants a Rent 't is void If an Infant makes a Warrant of Attorney 't is void so is Whittingham's Case A Deed and a Will are not to be distinguished and by the same reason that the one is void the other is so Finch 102. is general All Deeds of a Man of non sane memorie are null 12 Rep. Shulter's Case 'T is an offence to procure a Deed from him The Civil Law makes all his Acts which he doth without consent of his Curator to be void A Madman is taken pro absente 'T is a Rule unaccountable That a Man shall not stuitifie himself that he shall not be able to excuse himself by the Visitation of Heaven when he may plead Duress from Men to avoid his own Act. 'T is absurd to say That a Deed procured from a Man in a Fever or in Bethlehem shall be valid to any purpose Fitzherbert who was a good Lawyer ridicules the pretence and maintains That he himself may avoid such Act. Then were cited 2 Inst 14. Lloyd and Gregory 1 Cro. 501 502. Perkins tit Grant 13. Then it was said That in this Case there needs not much Argument the Reason of the Thing exposes the pretended Law And the Judges have declared that this Surrender is void the word amens or demens imply that the Man hath no Mind and consequently could make no Conveyance Wherefore 't was prayed that the Judgment should be affirmed and without much debate it was accordingly affirmed Henry Earl of Lincoln by Susanna Countess of Lincoln his Mother and Procheine Amye Appellant Versus Samuel Roll Esq Vere Booth Hugh Fortescue Esq and Bridget his Wife al' Respondents AApeal from a Decree of Dismission in Chancery The Case was thus Edward late Earl of Lincoln who was Son and Heir of Edward Lord Clinton the only Son of Theophilus Earl of Lincoln deceased being seized in Fee of the Mannors of c. after his Mothers decease who is yet living and of other Lands of about 3000 l. per Annum part of the ancient Estate of the Family And designing that in default of Issue-Male by himself his Estate should go with the Honour made his Will 20 Sept. 34 Car. 2. and thereby devised the Premisses to Sir Francis Clinton for Life Remainder to his first and other Sons in Tail-Male with many Remainders over to such Persons in Tail-Male to whom the Honour might descend and directed that his Houshold Goods at ...... should remain there as Heir Loomes to be enjoyed by the next Heir-Male who should be Heir of Lincoln and made the said Sir Francis the Appellants Father and after his Death Earl of Lincoln Executor On the sixth of Novemb. 36 Car. 2. Earl Edward made another Will in writing in like manner with the alteration of some Personal Legacies and afterwards in April 1686. and in Dec. 1690. did republish his Will Then Earl Edward sold part to Richard Wynne Esq for 24491 l. 3 s. 6 d. and mortgaged the Premisses in question to him for 12200 l. Then Earl Edward by Deeds of Lease and Release dated the 27th and 28th of April 1691. conveys his whole Estate to
Exception to all Grants for Lives but Credit ought to be given to the Honour Wisdom and Judgment of former as well as present Officers in respect of such Nominations 'till some Misbehaviour shews the Choice to have been ill and when that appears the Persons are removable and then the Inconvenience is likewise removed Here the Jury have found the Plaintiff in the Action below to be able and sufficient and well qualified for the Office and to have done his Duty in the Office while he had it Wherefore it was prayed that the Judgment might be affirmed and it was affirmed Henry Lord Bishop of London and Peter Birch D.D. Plaintiffs versus Attorney General pro Domino Rege Regina WRit of Error to Reverse a Judgment given in B. R. in a Quare Impedit The Case upon Record was thus The Declaration sets forth the Act of Parliament which Erects and Constitutes the Parish of St. James's within the Liberty of Westminster out of the Parish of St. Martyns c. prout that by force and virtue of that Act the said Parish was made and the District therein named became a Parish and Dr. Tennison Rector of the same that he was afterwards Rite et Canonice consecratus Episcopus Lincoln ' and that thereby the said Church became void and thereupon it belonged to the King and Queen to present a fit Person ratione Prerogative sue Regie Corone sue Angl ' annex ' and that the Defendants hindred c The Defendants crave Oyer of the Writ and it is general Vic' Com' Midd ' salut ' precipe Henric ' Episcopo Lond ' Petro Birch Sacre Theologie Professor ' quod juste et sine Dilatione permittant nos prefentare idoueam personam ad c. que vacat et ad nostram spectat dâ—mationem Et unde pred' Episcopus et Petrus nos injuste c. And then they pray Judgment of the Writ and Declaration because that between the Writ and Declaration there is a material variance iâ— hoc viz. quod ubi per Breve pred' pred' Dom ' Rex et Regine â—â—â—itulant se ad Donationem pred' c. pleno Jure tamen per Narr ' pred' iidem Dominus Rex et Domina Regina intitulant se ad c. Sec â—â—â—tione Prerogative sue Regie Corone sue Anglie annex ' unde pro variatione pred' inter Breâ—e et Narr ' pred' they pray Judgment of the Writ and Declaration aforesaid and that the said Writ may be quash'd c. The Attorney General Demurs and the Defendants Joyn and there 's Judgment to answer over Then the Bishop Demurs generally and Mr. Attorney Joyns and Dr. Birch pleads that he is Incumbent and then sets forth the Statute of Hen. 8. concerning Dispensations and that after Dr. Tennison was elected Bishop the Archbishop granted to him a Commendam Retinere with power to take and enjoy the Profits to his own use by the space of seven Months That this Commendam was confirmed under the Great Seal according to the Statute and the said Dr. Tennison did enjoy the same accordingly c. Mr. Attorney Demurs and Dr. Birch joyns in Demurrer and Judgment was given for the King c. And now it was argued in the first place That the Plea in Abatement was good and if so all that followed was Erroneous And to make that Plea good it was said that there is a variance between the Writ and Declaration that they are founded upon several Rights that upon arguing the Merits of the Cause it must be owned to be so on the other side That no Argument can be urged to maintain the Declaration in general but the Jure Prerogative and consequently it must be different from the Title or Interest pleno Jure They have said below that tho' the King's Interest is bound by Statutes yet his Prerogative is not This Distinction of the Rights must be allowed or else the main Judgment is not justifiable and that there is such a Distinction appears in Gaudy and the Archbishop of Canterbury's Case in Hob. 302. by the Presentation there recited which was drawn by the King's Counsel 't is ad nostram Presentation ' pertinet sive ex pleno Jure sive ratione Prerogative By Bracton 415. If the Writ be founded on one Right and the Declaration on another the Writ must be abated as in Case of Executors and Corporations In some Cases it must be agreed That the Writ may be General and the Count Special but none of those Cases will reach to this where several Rights are pretended 'T is no Objection to say That there is no Writ in the Register for this for that 's rather an Argument against their Prerogative Besides this Prerogative was never allowed till Dyer's time and in the old Books 't is denied where the King was not Patron In the Register 30. is a Writ Special quod permittant nos presentare idoneam personam ad Ecclesiam de c. que vacat et ad nostram spectat Donationem ratione Archiepiscopatus Cant ' nuper vacantis in manu existentis And another Sine titulo ut de jure and that is General ad nostram spectat Donationem Another Writ is there Ratione custodie terre et heredis upon a Tenure in capite And another Ratione foris facture unius et ratione custodie terre et heredis alterius per servitium Another Writ pro Domino Rege et aliis conjunctim Register 32. is another such by reason of the Vacancy of the Archbishoprick 'T is not an Answer That the Writ of Waste is General and the Count Special because that is not en auter droit Then it was said that it is true That where another Writ cannot be had a General Writ and Special Count are allowable but here a Special Writ might have been sued And there were cited the 1 Inst. 26 53 54 235 344 3 Cro. 185 829. And as to the Queen and the Archbishop of York's Case 3 Cro. 340. that doth not come up to this Case for tho' the Writ were General and the Count in Right of the Dutchy of Lancaster yet both were as Patron pleno jure and the Count did only shew how the Plaintiff came to be Patron but here they were several Rights as dictinct as a Claim by a Man singly and a Claim as Executor or in jure Vxoris In Answer to this were cited the Presidents in Mich. 31 Hen. 6. Rot. 65. Pasch 9 Eliz. Rot. 1408. or 1410. Hill 13 Car. 1. Rot. 486. Trin. 31 Car. 2. Dominus Rex versus Episcop ' de Worcester Writ General and Count Special Rastal 528 530. Then it was argued upon the Merits of the Cause as it was appearing upon the Declaration and Plea and Demurrer and therein three Queries were made as had been by the King's Counsel below 1. If the King hath any Prerogative to present upon an Avoidance by Promotion where neither himself nor the Bishop was Patron but
then 't was said That the prerogative to present by Lapse is not in the Statute and yet that is admitted so that the omission of it there can be no objection this is a prerogative that follows a Vacancy occasioned by the exercise of the prerogative for such it is to make Bishops The King first made them by the donation of a Ring and Staff then by a Conge d'Eslier the King gave licence to choose and approved the person chosen tho' not by absolute donation as before By the 25 Hen. 8. the Crown is restored to its ancient Prerogatives and there are Letters Missive directing the choice of such a person In Wright's Case in 3 Cro. and Moore then was the first time it came in question and it was debated and considered and the Judgment upon deliberation settled it with the King And as to the Objection that in Dyer 228. 't is said That he and the rest of his Brethren thought otherwise that point was nothing to the Case then in question But however 't is observable that the Queen presented Anno 6. and the Patron did not dispute it as appears in Woodly's Case And in Owen's Rep. 't is said that several Presidents in Henry the Eighth's time were searched 'T is true that in 11 Hen. 4.67 and 21 Edw. 4.33 the King did not intitle himself by virtue of his Prerogative but by reason of the Temporalties being in his hands those Cases can influence nothing in this matter because the King's Prerogative consists not in ousting of himself but of a Stranger it is to present in the turn of another upon such a Vacancy but not where he is intituled himself there he presents by virtue of his own Interest As to the Objection That the Old Books are silent about this Prerogative 't was answer'd That before the Statute of Provisors 25 Edw. 3. the King was defeated of his Prerogative by reason of the Pope's Provisions and therefore the King could not have it whereas 't is the Exercise of his Prerogative of Promotion that gives him this Prerogative of presenting upon this Vacancy by such Promotion and therefore that Statute was made to prevent all Incroachments and tho' it was made to that very purpose yet the Clergy being then so strongly united to the Pope's Interest the Kings of England could not use that Prerogative and frequent Usurpations were made upon the Crown till the Pope's Supremacy was denied The 41 Edw. 3.5 shews that there were such Usurpations 7 Hen. 4. cap. 8. complaint is made of them and 5 Hen. 4. num 95. Cotton 458. And thus it continued till the Statute about the Supremacy 28 Hen. 8. the Kings are to make the Bishops and then consequently in point of Law the right of presenting was restored Then 't was urged That none of the old Books do mention the King 's right to present by Lapse except in Cawdries Case where notice is taken of a Case in the time of Edw. 3. but that is not to be found Bro. tit Presentment 61. is as much Authority for this as that in Cawdries Case is for the Prerogative to present upon Lapse And this right in question having been enjoyed so long should not now have been questioned In 5 Edw. 2. Maynard 148 198. there is one Instance of the Patron 's presenting again but then Provisions were common and usual Walsingham 1313. so that supposing the Patron did in those times present the King was not concerned because 't was then only the Pope's right as was thought and the Pope might be ignorant of the matter And from thence 't was argued that the practise of those Times cannot be urged as Arguments in the present Case Then 2. it was urged That the King having this Prerogative he is not debarred of it by the Dispensation to hold it c. nor by the Act of Parliament nor by the King's Confirmation of it The King by that did transfer no Right to the Incumbent but meerly did continue him in and there was no Avoidance but the same is suspended and had the Incumbent died or resigned during this time the Church had been void by such Death or Resignation and had debarred the King of his Prerogative The Incumbent still remains Incumbent for the time by force of his first presentation and so the Dispensation doth prevent the Avoidance He is not in by force of any Title which the Dispensation gives him but of his old Title Jones 91. 161. Vaughan 18. 3. Then 't was argued that the Act of Parliament for making this new Parish did not alter the Case 'T was said that the making of this a Rectory in this manner doth make it subject to this prerogative and that it was by no means the intent of the Act to debar the prerogative It is made a Parish and Rectory such as others are subject to the EcclesiasticalLaws as well as any other Benefice under the obligation to Residence and liable to the Common Jurisdiction and Censure of the Ordinary and 't is to be made vacant by the same ways and means as other livings are the words Death or any other Avoidance prove it to be so Lapse will prevail upon this Rectory and that cannot be but because 't is made a Rectory and presentative It cannot be doubted but that the next Avoidance might have been granted over by the Bishop of London before any Avoidance was Suppose the Bishop of London had died and this Promotion had happened should not the King have presented by reason of the Temporalties and yet that is as much out of the Words of the Act as this is As to its being a Donative 't was said That the present Rector doth not come in by Donation and tho' 't is true That the King cannot present to a Donative upon such an occasion the reason is because the Promotion doth not make a Vacancy of the Donative it doth not make a Cession the Parson is not subject to Censures as other Rectors are he is still in by reason of the Institution of the Founder so that nothing can be inferr'd from thence Suppose the Incumbency of a Donative had been immediately turned into a Rectory would not that have subjected it to this Prerogative 'T is admitted That the promotion of the Rector did make an Avoidance then was cited Princes Case 8 Rep. Then suppose it a Donative as to Dr. Tennison at the same time that the Church becomes vacant the Patronage vests and then the King's Prerogative shall take place either codem Instanti or before But here the Right of Patronage did vest immediately by the Act he that is to present when the Rectory becomes void he is Patron 'T is like a Reversion granted cum acciderit there is a present Interest vested and there 's no reason why it should not be so in Case of this Act of Parliament The Stat. of 12 Car. 2. for confirming of Livings makes the then Possessors full and perfect Incumbents as this
doth were not these Benefices void if the Parties were advanced to Bishopricks and upon such promotions did not the King present undoubtedly he did Then 't was argued That 't was never the Intent of this Act to oust the King of this Prerogative the first Intent was to make a Parish and establish a Rectory that was the true design Suppose the Act had only vested the Advowson in my Lord of London and had not mentioned the Lord Jermyn would not this Prerogative have been consistent with the Right of Patronage As to the pretence that the Bishop is to present first that is only to make a Partition 't is an Explanation That they should not have it in common but by turns The holding of Dr. Tennison was reckoned as one turn and the Bishop was to have the next besides every Act of Parliament is to be construed according to the Subject Matter and not further than the Act designs and intends 't is plain from the Nature of the thing That nothing was designed but to settle the Rectory and establish the manner of Presentation according to the Agreement of the parties General Words shall not oust the King of his Prerogative since he is not named 3 Cor. 542. Moor 540.7 Rep. 32. Plowd 240. Hob. 146. Here are no Words which do import any Intention to restrain the King of that Right with respect to this as he hath with respect to other Rectories The King's Prerogative doth not interfere with their being two Parishes this Prerogative must operate upon all presentative Livings so soon as they are made so This can never be pretended to be partly presentative and partly donative for Dr. Tennison was in by Act of Parliament as one presented Then it being a Cession of a presentative Rectory whether old or new 't is the King's Right to present Vernon's Case 4 Rep. 4. Plowd 127. The Dr. came in not by Donation but was rather placed in by Parliament which implies in it the Consent and all the necessary Acts of the Patron and Ordinary Suppose the King should grant away his own Advowson during a Plenarty and afterwards such a Cession should happen by promotion surely that would not deprive the King of his prerogative and by the same Reason it ought not in this Case Wherefore upon the whole Matter it was prayed That the Judgment should be affirmed and it was affirmed accordingly Dominus Rex Versus Reginald Tucker WRit of Error to reverse a Judgment given in B. R. for Reversal of a Judgment against T. before Commissioners of Oyer and Terminer upon an Indictment for High Treason The Record is to the Effect following Ad Gen ' Session ' de Oyer et Terminer tent ' pro Com' Somerset apud Civitat ' Wellen ' in dict Com' Somerset corum Francisco Wythens mil ' un ' c. Richardo Heath un ' c. Georgio Strode mil ' un ' Servient ' c. et aliis Sociis suis Justiciariis dicti Domini Regis per Liter as Patentes ipsius Dom ' Regis sub magno sigillo Anglie confect eisdem Francisco Wythens Richardo Heath Georgio Strode et aliis aliquibus tribus vel pluribus eorum direct ' quorum alter ' eorum praefat ' F. W. vel Richardum Heath Dictus Dominus Rex unum esse voluit ad inquirend ' per Sacramentum proborum et legalium Hominum Com' praed ' ac aliis viis modis et mediis c. assignat ' per Sacrament ' Francisci Warre Baronett ' c. proborum et legalium hominum Com' Somerset praed ' adtunc et ibid impannellat ' jurat ' et onerat ' ad inquirend ' pro Domino Rege pro Corpore Com' praed ' presentat ' existit quod Reginald Tucker nuper de Long Sutton in Com' praed ' Gen ' et Thomas Place nuper de Eddington in Com' praed ' Yeoman timorem Dei in cordibus suis non habentes nec debitum ligeantie sue ponderantes sed Instigatione diabolica mot ' et seduct ' dilection ' ac veram et debit ' obedientiam quas veri et Fideles subditi Domini Jacobi secundi nuper Regis Anglie c. erga ipsum Dominum Regem gererent et de jure gerere tenentur subtrahent ' et machinant ' et totis viribus suis intendent ' pacem et Communem tranquilitatem c. proditoris compassaverint imaginat ' fuer ' et intendebant dictum Dominum Regem supremum et naturalem Dominum suum ad mortem adducere et contra dictum Dominum Regem supremum verum naturalem et indubitatum Dominum suum prodotorie levaverunt guerram c. contra pacem dicti Domini Regis nunc Coron ' et Dignitat ' suas ac contra formam Statut ' in hujusmodi casu edit ' et provis ' Et statim de premissis in Indictament ' praed ' specificat ' superius eis imposit ' per cur ' hic allocut ' qualiter se vellent inde acquietari iidem Reginald Tucker et Thomas Place separatim dicunt c. The Judgment is per cur ' hic quod praed ' Reginald Tucker et Thomas Place ducantur eteorum uterque ducatur usque ad Gaolam dicti Domini Regis Com' praed ' unde venerunt et abinde usque ad locum Executionis trahantur et uterque eorum trahatur et super furcas ibidem per collum suspendantur et viventes ad terram prosternantur et uterque eorum prosternatur et interiora sua extra ventres eorum et utriusque eorum capiantur ipsisque viventibus ibidem comburantur et quod capita eorum et utriusque eorum amputentur quodque corpora eorum et utriusque eorum in quatuor partes dividantur et quod capita et quarteria illa ponantur ubi Dominus Rex ea assignare voluit c. And now it was argued on the behalf of the King That this Reversal was not justifiable that the Exceptions taken below were many and as to the Pretence that secreta membra amputentur was omitted the same was not allowed as Error below by reason of the many Precedents which in the Entries did omit it That tho' the Practice be common to pronounce it yet few or no ancient Records do mention it that in 3 Inst. 210. where the Judgment is taken notice of this is not part In Plowd 387. 't is omitted that Interiora includes it In Bro coron ' 128. 't is not inserted That this was never entred as part of the Judgment till 12 Car. 2. Then as to the separatim allocut ' upon the Arraignment that was likewise over-rul'd below for it must be intended a several Demand or Question And the same is implied in this Entry as much as if it had been express'd and the Precedents are both ways But the main and only Exception for which the Court revers'd the Judgment was That in the Indictment 't is not said to be a Fact done
contra ligeantie sue debitum and as to this it was argued That it was not necessary to use those very Words That they are not Terms of Art such as are absolutely necessary they are not like to the Words Burglariter Felonice Murdravit and the like That proditorie implies it that 't is plainly apparent to be contrary to his Allegiance That all the whole Indictment shews it to be so 't is not weighing his Allegiance 't is against his true natural Liege Lord and Sovereign That it appears he was a natural born Subject That the very Words themselves are only of Aggravation That they may as well be laid precedent to the Fact as in the Conclusion That here is that which is Tantamount That Sir Henry Vane's Indictment was thus Cotton and Messingers Sid. 328. The Scotch Officers in Suffolk Lamberts Hackshams Titchburns and many more That 't is true the Fact in the Indictment ought not to be made good by Intendment or Inference but if there be Words which shew that the Party owed Allegiance it s enough An alien Enemy is not indictable in this manner but here 't is shewn That he is a Person capable of committing Treason and that the Act done was against his Duty and Obedience which he owed as a Subject That many Precedents have been thus That nimia subtilitas in jure reprobatur That a Certainty to a common Intent is sufficient Longs case That in 2 Rolls abr 82. contra coron ' et dignitat ' suas is held not necessary wherefore and for other Reasons then urged 't was prayed That the Reversal might be reversed and the King restored c. On the other side it was argued That this Reversal was just That this Arraignment being Joint for want of separatim makes the Proceeding Erroneous That the Precedents do use the Word separatim and abundance of Entries were mentioned as Leach and Ruthford et al' 28 Hen. 8. Dudely Gates and Palmer 1 and 2 Phil. and Mar ' Throgmorton and Weddall 2 and 3 Ph. and M. Peckham and Daniel eodem Anno. Blunt and Danverse 44. Eliz. Earl of Ess and S. eodem Anno. Guy Fawks and Sir Everard Digby 3 Jac. 1. Harrison Scot and the other Regicides 12 Car. 2. 1660. Green Berry and Hill for the Murder of Sir E. Godfrey 1678. Ireland Pickering and Grove 31 Car. 2. rot ' 242. Whitebread Fenwick et al' 32 Car. 2. rot ' 224. Johnson et al' 2 Will. et Mar. num ' 57. and Lord Preston and Ashton Trin. 3 Will. et Mar. n. 16. separatim allocut ' and many more Besides the Nature of the thing is such as requires a several Arraignment because they may plead several Pleas and they are several Offences and tho' they plead in this Case severally that 's not enough for they ought to be askt severally But this was not so much insisted on as the next Error the Omission of secreta in the Judgment 't is part of the Judgment upon the 25 Edw. 3. for compassing c. tho' for coining 't is only to be drawn and hanged according to Morgan's Case Cro. Car. 383 Stamp 182. 3. Inst 15 17. Finch's Law lib. 2. cap. Treason they are all secreta membra abscindant ' as well as interiora all common Books have it as Bolton's Justice of the Peace tit Prefidents of Indictments for High Treason 38 42. Dalton's Justice p. 335. Sheppard's Epitome tit Crown and all those common Abridgments c. Lord Preston and Ashton's was drawn by good Advice Harrison and al' 12 Car. 2. Ireland Pickering and Grove 1678. Whitehread's 1679. Walcott's 1683. Langhorn's 31. Car. 2. Colonel Sidney's 1683. The Earl of Stafford's in 1680. was thus upon Debate and Consultation with all the Judges Dominus Rex versus Owen 1 Rolls Rep 185 186. there 't is mentioned But then it was chiefly insisted on That the Reversal was to be maintained for the Error in the Indictment that contra ligeantie sue debitum was the general Form that all the great Men in all Ages who had been of Counsel for the Crown had inserted it That all the Indictments the first Assizes after Monmouth's Rebellion which were drawn or perused by Sir H. Poll ' had this Conclusion That Ashtons Crosses Gaunts Cornishes Earl of Staffords Batemans Ayliffs Goodenoughs Hone Blague Rowse Armstrong Sir Robert Peyton Langhornes Lord Bellasis Venner Harrisons Faukes Sir Everard Digbyes Patricius Dolphie Pasch 41 Eliz. John Tipping 34 Eliz. are all thus and the Prints are so likewise 3 Inst 214. Fitzh Justiee pag. 218. Plowd 387. Coke's Entries 361. Cro. Car. 120 122 123. and a great number of Particulars more which might be cited Then 't was urged that Reason doth require this for that Treason is punishable as a Breach of Allegiance that that is the very Essence of Treason that if the Fact be not alledged to be against his Allegiance 't is not Treason that 't is by reason of his Allegiance that he can commit Treason and therefore 't is that an Alien Enemy who was never protected can't commit Treason because he owed no Allegiance and there may be many Acts done which look like a levying of War without any Breach of Allegiance and for that was quoted King John's Charter made at Rumney Mead 18 die Junii Anno Regni 17 Rot. Pat. 17. m. 13. a Transcript whereof is in Matthew Paris 245. Anno 1215. which Charter was ratified four times within nine years after The first Confirmation was granted 1 Hen. 3. and probably at his Coronation for there was a Charter dated at Glocester 6 Febr. Rot. Pat. 1 Hen. 3. m. 13. that they should enjoy Libertatibus Regno nostro Anglie a Patre nostro et nobis concessis In the second year of his Reign he sends a Mandate to the several Sheriffs to proclaim this Charter amongst others Rex c. Salutem Mittimus tibi Chartas de Libertatibus c. Mandantes quatenus eas legi facias in pleno comitatu tuo Dat' 22 Febr. Rot. Claus 2 Hen. 3. Then was cited Fox's Acts and Monuments ad Ann. 1218. That after Michaelmas this King held a Parliament at Westminster wherein he confirmed and ratified by his Charter all the Franchises and Liberties which were made and given by King John his Father In the seventh year of his Reign viz. the Sixteenth of his Age he took the Government into his own Hands and then the Archbishop of Canterbury in open Parliament doth mind him of the Oath sworn in his Name by the Earl of Pembroke Rectore Regis Regni and others at the Pacification between him and the Dauphin that he would restore and confirm those Liberties to his Subjects for which the War broke out between his Father and the Barons Then was quoted what Henry the Third promised when he invited Henry de Lucy to come in to him 1 Hen. 3. m. 16. which is in very strange language if his Allegiance had been broken Then was cited Sadler
262. and Spelman verbo ligeantia and Calvin's Case 7 Rep. expounding of that word and the old Custumer of Normandy cap. 43. And the said and other Authorities were inforced and amplified in such manner as is not fit to be remembred Then 't was urged That as the Subject Matter of this Indictment did require these words so the Reason of the Law in other Cases did warrant them to be necessary here that vi armis was necessary till the Statute of Hen. 8. made it needless and 't would be strange that an Indictment for a Trespass setting forth an Assault and Battery with force of Arms should be ill for want of contra Pacem and this should be good without contra ligeantie sue debitum contra formam statut ' is necessary tho' the Fact be alledged sufficiently appearing to be within a Statute Law Indictments are not to be made good by Intendment or Implication Stamford 96. Trin. 18 Edw. 4.10 Furatus est without felonice not good Felonice abduxit without cepit not good So for a Rape quod ipsam contra voluntatem suam carnaliter cognovit without rapuit is ill 9 Edw. 4.26 and so is Dyer 304. Murdravit is necessary No Words or Terms of Art are to be supplied by any other Phrases equivalent or tantamount in Sense for the sake of certainty because if such loose Descriptions should be allowed 't would subject Mens Actions too much to the Power of Construction 2 Cro. 20 142 187 527. And in all Indictments for Offences committed between Decemb. 15. and Febr. 13. 1688. the Conclusion was contra pacem regni Then was cited Vaux's Case 4 Rep. 39. 2 Rolls Abridg. 82. Then 't was said that there were express Authorities for the Defendant 3 Inst 11. that the Indictment of Treason concludes thus 1 Inst 129. is the same and Dyer 144. to the like effect And what is said in the Margin of the new Dyer is very remarkable as to Mary Queen of Scotland Calvin's Case 7 Rep. 6. is full and express as to the reason of the thing and it is founded upon the Difference between an Alien Enemy and a Subject Courteen's Case Hob. 271. Hobart is of Opinion according to Calvin's Case that Indictment against Alien amie it must conclude contra debitum ligeantie sue Besides here are no words which carry the same Sense or are equivalent to it Proditorie doth imply a Treachery or Falshood and that he might be guilty of and yet not act contrary to his Allegiance for at that rate every Breach of Trust as to the King would be Treason debitum ligeantie sue minime ponderantes is not sufficient for a Man may not weigh his Allegiance and yet not act contrary to it then contra naturalem Dominum suum supremum verum indubitat ' those words in themselves are not necessary and anciently were not inserted In old time 't was only contra Dominum Regem and 't will be hard to say that the use of words unnecessary should supply what is necessary and hath anciently been used Those words do only import that the late King was King of the Place where the Defendant was born and lived and cannot make it appear that his Fact was contrary to the Laws of the Land and the Duty of his Allegiance as a Subject to him Then supposing it not necessary in the Conclusion for as some Presidents are in West's Symboleography 't is first as contra ligeantie sue debitum levavit guerram yet it ought to be in the Indictment in one part or another The formal Reason of the Facts being Treason is because 't is against his Allegiance and that ought to be expressed all the other Expressions urged on the other side are at the most but Argumentative and do not directly affirm the thing which is necessary to make the Offence As to the Presidents which are the other way they are but few those in the Reign of Hen. 8. and Queen Elizabeth they are upon particular Statutes as for denying the Supremacy taking Orders under the Pope and the like they are not contra ligeantiam in the nature of the Offence and there contra formam statut ' is enough But no Answer can be given to the Case of Lopez in Calvin's Case where the Judges met and considered how the Indictment should be and agreed to be contra supremum Dominum suum in Anglia and the Conclusion to be contra ligeantie sue debitum Whereupon for these and other Reasons it was prayed that the Judgment of Reversal given in the Kings Bench might be affirmed and it was affirmed accordingly Joseph Eastmond Executor of Henry Eastmond and Samuel Nayle Appellants Versus Edwyn Sandys Clerk Respondent APpeal from a Decree of the Court of Exchequer The Case was no more than this The Parish of Yeovilton consisting much in Pasture Land and the Respondent having been Rector thereof for Twenty years last past and upwards and being intituled to the great and small Tythes and all other Dues within the said Rectory he did exhibit his Bill in that Court against the Appellant Joseph in his own right and as Executor of Henry his Father and against the other Appellant Samuel Nayle for Agistment Tythes for depasturing and fatting their Oxen and other unprofitable Cattle within the said Rectory from the Year 1677. to the time of exhibiting his Bill which was in Michaelmas Term 1692. The Appellant Joseph Eastmond by his Answer admitted that he had Assets sufficient to answer the Plaintiffs Demands and both of them admitted that they and the Testator had fatted and depastured divers Oxen yearly upon their Lands in the said Parish but said that some of them were first used to the Plough and afterwards fatted when turned off from the Plough The Court of Exchequer did thereupon viz. May 26. 1696. decree Tythe Herbage to be paid for the Appellants and the Testators Oxen and unprofitable Cattle not used for the Plough and also for their Oxen and unprofitable Cattle used for the Plough for and during the time they were grazed and fatted in the Parish for Sale after they were turned off from the Plough And now it was insisted on in favour of the Appeal that the Decree was unjust and then were quoted some Texts of Scripture about muzzling the Ox c. And also it was urged That that part of the Decree concerning Oxen once used to the Plough was erroneous and there were cited all the Cases in the Books for exemption of Plough-Cattle from Tythe Herbage and that this was double Tything And it was insisted on that the Reason of the thing was against it in this Case because the agistment of these Cattle was necessary to sustain that labour which promoted the Grain of which Tythe was paid that this Priviledge extended to all such Oxen as ever had been used to the Plough that the exemption did continue after they were forborn to be used at the Plough for there was the same
Days of one whether they be many or few in number must be understood the Life c. That the Testatrix here could mean no other by Days but Life when she said That in case it pleased God to take her out of this World if it was his Will to give Days to give Life to her Child she left it all that belonged to her knowing well That if the Child was born alive it must be maintain'd from that Moment out of what was so left it that it appeared from the Preamble of the Codicil viz. In case it shall please God to take away my Child as well as my self then c. That the Testatrix never intended the Estate to go over unless the Child died as well as her self in her lying in Then it was argued from the Nature of the particular Legacies they were of such a sort as that they must be given without Sense or Reason had she not supposed her Child's Death as well as her own in her lying in for otherwise those new Ribbons must become old which were intended as a Present to a young Gentlewoman Clothes lockt up in a Trunk would have been of no use to Persons then in Distress and the poor Orphan had gone too far in Years to learn a Trade Then other Things are given as Tokens to be kept and worn by them for her sake as long as they lived Now what Reason can be assigned for this if she did not mean and suppose a Death in her lying in From whence it was inferred That the Intention of the Testatrix was to give all she had to her Child in case she survived her and if it did not survive her but was taken away as well as her self in her lying in then her Intention was to give that same All which she had given to her Child to other People as specified in the Will and unless this were the Intention the Child must have starved or lived upon Charity not having the Property of what was left it and the Condition precedent according to the Respondents Exposition excludes the Child till its Years of Discretion wherefore 't was prayed that the Decree might be reversed On the other side it was argued with the Decree that the same was just that no Objection could arise from the Nature of the other Legacies or of this as being reasonable or unreasonable for that 't is the Natural Right and Priviledge of every Person to dispose of that which they have at their pleasure to do what they will with their own a Priviledge so certain that tho' 't is used many times to ill purposes yet the Law cannot interpose nor restrain the Proprietor no not to preserve him and his Family from ruine as daily Experience shews That it is agreeable to Law and Justice and to true Piety to see that the Will of the Dead be performed and tho' the Law have ascertained how Estates shall go when there is no Will yet when there is a Will that disposes of it otherwise then the Law would do the Courts below will compel a Performance of such a Disposition as the Will directs Then 't was said That the Intention of the Testatrix in favour of the Respondent is both Charitable and Prudent He was her nearest Relation in England and considering a great part of what she left was once her Husbands she honourably gave as much to his as to her own Relations making her Husband's Sister and the Respondent Charles residuary Legatees to share equally and so is the Decree And to Reverse this Decree and permit the Appellant to go away with the whole as she must if the Decree be reversed doth directly destroy all the Prudent and Charitable Intentions of the Testatrix and carries the Estate where she never designed it viz. to the Appellant Then 't was argued That the Court of Chancery had done well in taking the Opinion of Persons skilled and knowing in the Matter in question that the Gentlemen of the Long-Robe of that Country now here in London did all give their Opinions that according to their Construction of these words in a Will it was an arrival to Years of Maturity or Age enabling to dispose that unless the Child had lived to such an Age as that she had been capable to give the same away her Representative in this Case could not be intituled to it Then ' was said That words are to be interpreted according to the Sense and Acceptation of those which use them That the Testatrix was a Native of France and therefore this method of Inquiring into her Meaning was just and reasonable That the Courts at Law have frequently consulted Merchants about the signification of Mercantile Terms and Trinity House about Marine Phrases so in like manner Grammarians Criticks Chymists and Artificers have been in the Court of Kings Bench consulted according to the Nature of the Thing in question upon words belonging to and used in their respective Professions That in case of words disposing of an Estate in a Foreign Language by the Will of a Foreigner the Judgment of Divines or Grammarians could be no proper Direction to the Court of Chancery but the Means of Information must be from those who were acquainted with the Rules of Interpretation in Case of Wills amongst those People That the Opinion of those Gentlemen was sufficient to justifie the Decree But then it was further argued That here the Meaning of the Testatrix could not be such as the Appellant would pretend i.e. that she meant to give her Estate to the Respondent and others only in case the Child she then went with should be still born or if born alive should dye with the Mother in her lying in for these Reasons First For that she was so far from apprehending that the Child would either be still born or if born alive would dye as soon as her self or in her lying in that she expected 't would live and as she hoped to full Age for she takes particular Care of its Education and earnestly recommends the same to the now Appellant and others prays God to bless it and not forsake it and hoped that all the Relations on the Father's side would for the Father's sake do it all the Services it should stand in need of Then taking it that the Testatrix did expect the Child to out-live her as unquestionably she did if her meaning had been such as the Appellant hath put upon her words the way to have it sure fixt to the Child and then to the Appellant had been to have made no Will at all because if the Child survived the Mother but a day or an hour or never so little the Law had vested the whole first in the Child in its own Right and upon the Child's decease in the Appellant as Administratrix to the Child Suppose the Child had outlived the Mother for a Month or the like what Interpretation could have been put upon this Will
All their Arguments will hold as well to a Month Week or Days surviving of the Mother as to this of two Years and therefore it must be thus construed to be her Intent that the Devises over should take effect if the Child should not live to an Age of Maturity and Power of Disposition And as to the pretence of the Child's starving in the mean time there neither is nor can be any weight in that for the Interest and Produce of the whole during all that time must remain and be to and for the benefit of the Child Wherefore upon the whole Matter 't was prayed that the Decree should be affirmed and it was affirmed Philip Jermin and Sarah Vxor ejus ' Plaintiffs Versus Mary Orchard Widow Defendant WRit of Error to Reverse a Judgment of Reversal given in the Exchequer Chamber upon a Judgment given in the Kings Bench for the Plaintiffs in an Action of Trespass for the mean Profits after a Recovery in Ejectment and Possession had thereupon The Case was this upon Record The Plaintiffs declare that the Defendant 1 Sept. 1672. their Close c. vi armis c. did break and upon the Possession of the Plaintiff did enter and the Plaintiffs from their Possession did expel and remove and them so being removed and expelled for a long time viz. from the said 1 Sept. 1672. to the time of exhibiting the Bill viz. 6 May 1685. did hold out from the same by which they lost the Prosits thereof c. Et al' Enormia c. The Defendant by Plea takes Issue as to the Force and Issue thereon and as to part of the Trespass pleads the Statute of Limitations and as to the residue of the Trespass pleads that Sir William Portman made a Lease to one Trowbridge for 1000 years and by mesne Assignments derives a Title down to Thomas Nicholas and that he in his Life time by Indenture assigned to the Defendant The Plaintiffs Reply and as to the first part of the Plea viz. of the Statute of Limitations they demur and as to the other part of the Plea they tender a Traverse and deny that Thomas Nicholas did assign the Premisses to the Defendant The Defendant joyns in Demurrer as to the first part of the Plea viz. the Statute of Limitations And as to the other part she takes Issue upon the Traverse which Issue is joyned and a Venire awarded tam ad triand ' the two Issues quam ad inquirend ' de dampnis upon the Demurrer The Jury find that Thomas Nicholas was possessed in manner as the Defendant in her Plea hath alledged and that he did make Seal and as his Deed deliver the Indenture in the Plea mentioned which said Indenture follows in these words and so set forth the whole in which after a Recital of the Lease and a Deducement of the Title down are these words viz. The said Thomas as well for and in consideration of the natural Love and Affection which he beareth to the Defendant his Grand child as for other good Causes and Considerations hath granted assigned and set over and by these Presents doth grant assign and set over unto the said Mary her Executors Administrators and Assigns all the said Cottage Barn and Lands and all and singular other the Premisses herein before recited or mentioned with the Appurtenances to the same belonging or appertaining together with the said recited Lease and all Writings and Evidences touching the Premisses to have and to hold the said Cottage Barn and Premisses and every part thereof with the Appurtenances unto the said Defendant Mary her Executors Administrators and Assigns from and immediately after the Death and Decease of the said Thomas Nicholas party to these presents and Mary his Wife unto the end of the term and for and during all the rest and residne of the said term of 1000 Years which shall be therein to come and unexpired by and under the yearly Rents Covenants c. expressed in the said Original Indenture of Lease Then the Jury leave it to the Court whether the Deed of Assignment be good in Law or not and conclude specially if the Assignment be not good in Law then they find for the Plaintiffs and Assess Damages 50 l. and 40 s. Costs and thereupon c. And now it was argued for the Plaintiff and it was said in the first place That this Case was extraordinary that tho' the Majority of the Judges in Westminster-hall were of Opinion with the Plaintiffs yet they were forced to sue this Writ they had the four Judges of the King 's Bench and the then Mr. Justice Powell and the then Baron Powell concurring with the King 's Bench and the chief Baron Atkins being absent the other Five in the Exchequer-Chamber reversed the Judgment it having been resolved upon the Stat. of Eliz. which erects that Jurisdiction That the Concurrence of six are not necessary to reverse but only that six must be present to make a Court so that here were six to five for the Plaintiff and yet he hath lost it Then it was argued That there had been two Things insisted on below one was the finding of Damages generally and the other was as to the Validity of the Assignment and as to the finding it was said That the Matter of the Force is meer Form and if there had been no non prosequi the same could not make an Error That in C. B. and B. R. the Issue upon the vi armis c. is seldom or never taken notice of no Entry is made of it upon the postea at all unless a wounding or some such other special Matter were mixt with it in the same Issue That 't is held in the Case of Law and King 1 Saund ' 81. If nothing be answered to the vi armis in a special Plea 't is well upon a general Demurrer and the 7 Hen. 6. 13. and 1 Hen. 7.19 are plain That if the Party have the special Matter which he pleads found for him the vi armis shall not be inquired of So if the Defendant have Judgment against him upon Demurrer to the special Matter pleaded by him the vi armis shall never be tried tho' Issue were joyned upon it but the Party shall be fined upon the Capiatur c. without any Inquiry So is the King and Hopper 2 Cro. 599. in a Scire Facias on a Recognizance for the good Behaviour special Matter pleaded held That the Jury need not inquire about the vi armis if such Special Matter be found for the Defendant much more is it so in case it be found for the Plaintiff for there the Act which is found imports it c. and it shall be intended to be vi armis c. and the Book of Hen. 6. is full in it no need of any Inquiry in such Case And in this Point both the Courts having concurred the Counsel for the Defendant did not contest
of Cases were quoted concerning the King's Grants Misrecitals false Recitals and Deceit c. Then it was strenuously insisted upon That the Recitals and the Granting Clause must be consider'd and judged of together that the contrary Opinion is to make the Granting Part to be without any Consideration 't is to have a Conclusion without Premisses an igitur without a Cause That eadem servitia can never be intended new ones That secundum tenorem must referr to the Appendant Advowson and therefore the Advowson in gross here declared upon and pleaded to can never pass by this Grant and upon the whole it was prayed That the Judgment might be affirmed It was replied on behalf of the Plaintiff in Error That as to the Variance in the Title of Knight no Answer had been given to the reasonable Distinction between the Case of Grants and that of Writs and Indictments that here was no Proof or Appearance of a Diversity of Persons That as to the Grant it self secund ' tenorem could mean only a Reference to the Interest or Estate granted by them not to the thing or the Nature of it That such Words signified only as fully and largely they had no express Relation to the Quality of the Advowson whether in gross or appendant That by such Niceties any or most Patents might be avoided That Grants of Honours as well as of Interests if questioned must be under the same Rule and the Considerations upon which they are grounded may be subject to Inquiry if true or false c. That the Patent of it self without Reference to the pleading was good That the Judgment desired was to condemn a Patent as void because another Patent recited in it was so which perhaps was not fully recited and if it were was not in Judgment before the Court and the substance of what was urged before was in short repeated and prayed That the Judgment might be revers'd and it was accordingly revers'd and Mr. Pierse Scroope being dead presented Francis Pemberton his Clerk who was admitted instituted and inducted c. FINIS THE NAMES OF THE Principal Cases 1. DOminus Rex Viscount Purbeck Page 1 2. Duvall versus Price Page 12 3. John Duvall and Elizabeth his Wife versus William Terry of London Merchant Page 15 4. William Dolphin and Katharine his Wife versus Francis Haynes Page 17 5. Dormer Sheppard al' versus Joseph Wright al' Page 18 6. Whitfield Ux ' al' versus Paylor Ux ' al' Page 20 7. Thomas Arnold versus Mr. Attorney General and Matthew Johnson Esq Thomas Bedford Gent. Page 22 8. Sir Richard Dutton versus Richard Howell Richard Grey and Robert Chaplyn Executors of Sir John Witham decased Page 24 9. Philips versus Bury Page 35 10. Dr. William Oldis versus Charles Donmille Page 58 11. Smith Ux ' versus Dean and Chapter of St. Paul's London and Lewis Ruggle Page 67 12. The Countess of Radnor versus Vandebendy al' Page 69 13. Dominus Rex versus Baden Page 72 14. Hall al' Executors of Thomas Thynne versus Jane Potter Administratrix of George Potter Page 76 15. The Society of the Governour and Assistants of the New Plantation of Vlster in the Kingdom of Ireland versus William Lord Bishop of Derry Page 78 16. Sir Caesar Wood aliàs Cranmer versus Duke of South-hampton Page 83 17. Sir Caesar Wood aliàs Cranmer versus Thomas Webb Page 87 18. Jonathan Lord Bishop of Exeter al' versus Sampson Hele. Page 88 19. Robert Davis versus Dr. John Speed Page 104 20. Wats al' versus Crooke Page 108 21. Lee Warner versus William North. Page 110 22. Briggs versus Clark ibid. 23. William Bridgman al' versus Rowland Holt al' Page 111 24. Dominus Rex versus Walcort Page 127 25. Sir Evan Lloyd Bar. and Dame Mary his Wife and Sidney Godolphin and Susan his Wife versus Richard Carew Bar. an Infant the Son and Heir of Sir John Carew Bar. deceased Page 137 26. Sir William Morley Knight of the Bathe versus Peter Jones Page 140 27. Sir Edward Hungerford and John Hill Executors and Devisees of Sir William Basset versus Edward Nosworthy Page 146 28. Sir Simon Leach al' versus John Thompson Lessee of Charles Leach Page 150 29. Henry Earl of Lincoln versus Samuel Roll al' Page 154 30. John Fox Gen ' versus Simon Harcourt Esq Page 158 31. Henry Lord Bishop of London and Dr. Birch versus Attorney General pro Domino Rege Page 164 32. Dominus Rex versus Reginald Tucker Page 186 33. Joseph Eastmond Executor of Hester Eastmond and Samuel Neyle versus Edwyn Sands Clerk Page 192 34. Magdalen Foubert versus Charles de Cresseron Page 194 35. Philip Jermin and Sarah his Wife versus Mary Orchard Page 199 36. Bennet Swayne versus William Fawkner and John Lane Executors of B. M. Page 207 37. Dominus Rex versus Episcop ' Cestr ' and Richard Pierse Page 212
yet where it was good at Law and no Cheat or Imposition upon the Party but he meant as he had undertaken to pay this Money and was not deceived in his Expectation as to the Success of the Respondent's Endeavours 't would be hard in Equity to damn such a Security and therefore 't was prayed that the Decree should be affirmed It was replied That Marriages ought to be procured and promoted by the Mediation of Friends and Relations and not of Hirelings that the not vacating such Bonds when questioned in a Court of Equity would be of Evil Example to Executors Trustees Guardians Servants and other People having the Care of Children And therefore 't was prayed that the Decree might be reversed and it was reversed accordingly The Society of the Governour and Assistants London of the new Plantation of Ulster in the Kingdom of Ireland Versus William Lord Bishop of Derry APpeal from a Judgment by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal of Ireland in Parliament assembled upon the Bishop's Petition and Appeal to their Lordships form an Order in the Chancery touching certain Lands in the County and Liberties of London-Derry It sets forth amongst other things after a recital of the Proceedings in Chancery and the Merits of the Cause that the Appellants were advised that no Appeal lyes to the House of Lords in Ireland from the Court of Chancery there but that all Appeals from thence ought to be immediatly to their Lordships here the Supreme Judicature as well for Matters arising in Ireland as in this Kingdom and therefore in the Conclusion prays that an Order might be made for the said Bishop to appear and put in his Answer thereto that the Matter might be heard before their Lordships here when it should be thought fit and that the Petitioners might receive such relief as should be agreeable to their Lordships great Wisdom and Justice c. Upon presenting this Appeal to the Lords here the House appointed Lords Committees to consider the proper method of Appealing from the Decrees made in the Court of Chancery in Ireland and to report c. Then pursuant to an Order made by the Lords Committees and a Letter sent to the Lords Justices of Ireland by Order of the House of Lords here Some Precedents or Cases from Ireland relating to the method of appealing from the Chancery there were brought before the said Committee and reported to the House whereupon the House ordered that both Parties might have Copies of the same Then the Society took Copies and preferred a short Petition to the House setting forth the said matter and that they were ready by their Councel to offer several things in order to their Lordship's receiving and proceeding upon their said Appeal whereupon a day was appointed for the hearing of Councel on both sides with regard to Jurisdiction And It was accordingly argued on behalf of the said Society that the Judgments in Ireland whether in Law or Equity were not to be finally Determined there that Ireland was dependant upon England 't was urged to prove it that our Money was to be Current there that our Laws did oblige them that they were governed secundum leges consuetudines anglicanas Davis 21. in which Book 24. that the Easterlings in England who first made the Money of this Standard and from whose Name comes that of Sterling were the first Founders of the four Principal Cities of Ireland Dublin Waterford Corke and Limrick and the other Maritime Villes in that Country and were the sole Maintainers of Traffick and Commerce there which were all utterly neglected by the Irish These Cities and Villes were under the Protection of King Edgar and Edward the Confessor before the Norman Conquest and these Easterlings in Ancient Record are called Ostmanni and therefore when Hen. 2. Upon the first Conquest after their Apostacy thought fit to People those Cities and Villes with English Colonies drawn from Exeter Bristol and Chester c. he assigned to them a certain proportion of Land next adjoyning to each of those Cities which Portion is called in the Records in Ancient time Cantreda Ostmannorum Davis 25. says further that Ireland is a Member of England Inhabitantes ibidem legibus Angliae subjiciuntur utuntur In the Statute of Faculties 28 Hen. 8. cap. 19. 't is mentioned to be the King's Land of Ireland and that this the King's Land of Ireland is a Member Appendant and rightfully belonging to the Imperial Crown of the Realm of England and united to the same And in the 33 Hen. 8. cap. 1. by which the Stile and Title of King of Ireland was given to Hen. 8. his Heirs and Successors 't is further Enacted that the King shall enjoy this Stile and Title and all other Royal preeminences Prerogatives and Dignities as united and annexed to the Imperial Crown of England Nay It may be compared to a County-Palatine Created by the King of England for Davis 62. speaking of that he says that a County-Palatine hath in it jura regalia which consists in Royal Jurisdiction and Royal Seignory By the first it hath all its High Courts and Officers of Justice which the King hath and by the latter it hath Royal Services and Royal Escheates as the King hath and therefore in some respects 't is separated and disjoyned from the Crown as is Plowd 215. yet 't is subordinate and dependant though it be said that breve Dom ' Regis non Currit there yet the Writ of Error which is the dernier resort and in like manner an Appeal is excepted out of their Charters so is Dyer 321. and 345.34 Hen. 6.42 and it would be excepted if it were not so expressed for to have the ultimate Judgment is that which the King cannot grant for such grant would if allowed alter the fundamental constitution of the Realm So in Ireland which is a Realm of it self as Consisting of many Counties Erroneous Judgments given in the chief place there shall be reversed in the King's Bench in England Davis quotes Bracton lib. 3. tit ' coron ' cap. 8. that Comites Palatini habent regalem jurisdictionem in omnibus Salvo Dominio Regi sicut principi so that by his Opinion they are much the same and no Man will deny but that in all Proceedings in Law or Equity the last resort is to the Parliament of England there it is that the King 's supreme Authority is exercis'd It must not be said to be a Conquered Country for the Earl of Stassord's sake though Coke and Vaughan have affirmed it so But it may be called a Plantation or Colony dependant upon England and to many purposes parcel of it This hath not only the same person for their King but 't is under the Crown and Government of England there must be in all these Cases a Superiority or superintendency over inferiour Dominions for otherwise as Vaughan puts it 401. the Law appointed or permitted to such places might be insensibly changed within it self
after Judgment affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber Or if that proceeding in the Exchequer Chamber doth not come in lieu of Error in Parliament according to the Statute of Eliz. William Bridgman al' Versus Rowland Holt al' A Writ of Error and Petition in Parliament The Case below was thus William Bridgman brings an Assize for the Office of chief Clerk for inrolling of Pleas in the Court of King's Bench and the Plaintiff declares that the Office of chief Clerk for inrolling of Pleas in the Court of King's Bench was time out of mind granted and grantable by the Kings and Queens of this Realm and that King Charles the Second by Letters Patents under the Great Seal of England Dated the Second of June in the Five and twentieth Year of his Reign after a Recital that Robert Henley and Samuel Wightwick were duly admitted to this Office for their Lives granted this Office upon the Petition of Eliott to Silas Titus so soon as it should become void and that Wightwick was dead and Titus had surrendred his Patent did in consideration of Service done by the Earl of Arlington grant this Office to the Plaintiff and his Heirs for the Lives of the Earl of Arlington Duke of Grafton and Dutchess of Grafton and the longer liver of them from and after the Death Forfeiture or Surrender of Sir Robert Henley and that Sir Robert Henly was dead and that thereupon the Plaintiff became seized and was seized of the Office till the Defendants did disseize him c. The Defendants pleaded that they did not wrong or disseize the Plaintiff Upon the Trial of this General Issue at the Bar of the King's-Bench before the three puisne Judges the Chief Justice then sitting near the Defendant's Counsel upon a Chair uncovered the Plaintiff gave in Evidence the Letters Patents of 2 June 25 Car. 2. Then it was proposed by the Counsel for the Defendant That they would prove their Allegation that the Office was anciently granted by the Kings and Queens of England as was declared but no Evidence was given besides this Patent of Car. 2. Then the Counsel for the Defendant waving the just Exception which they might have taken to the Plaintiff's Grant as to him and his Heirs which ought not to be of such an Office for that by that means it might come to an Infant They insisted upon the meer right of Granting the said Office viz. that it was not grantable by the Crown but was an Office belonging to the Chief Justice of the King's Bench and grantable by him Then to prove this it was shewn That this Officer is to Inroll Pleas between Party and Party only and had nothing to do with any Pleas of the Crown or Criminal Matters that all the Rolls and Records in this Office were in the Custody of the Chief Justice that all the Writs to certifie or remove the Records in this Clerk's Office are directed to the Chief Justice and from the nature of the Imployment 't was insisted that in truth he was but the Chief Justices Clerk and that consequently the same must be granted by the Chief Justice And for further proof it was shown by the Records of the Court that for the space of Two hundred thirty five years past this Office when void had been granted by the Chief Justice and enjoy'd accordingly under such Grants In Trin. 36 Hen. 6. Rot. 36. inter placita Reg. Anno Dom. 1458. It is inrolled thus Be it remembred that the Tenth of July this Term in the Court of our Lord the King at Westminster came William Sond chief Clerk of our Lord the King for inrolling Pleas before the King himself in his proper Person and in the same Court of his Free-will did surrender his said Office into the hands of Sir John Fortescue Kt. Chief Justice of that Court to whom of right it doth belong to grant that Office to whomsoever he pleaseth whensoever that Office shall be void during the time that the said Sir John Fortescue shall be Chief Justice and that Office doth resign and relinquish to the use of William Brome and the said Chief Justice doth accept the said Surrender and doth the same day grant the said Office to the said William Brome who is presently admitted into the said Office for his Life and sworn accordingly Mich. 1. Edw. 4. Rot. 51. Upon Brome's Surrender to Sir John Markham then Chief Justice the Chief Justice grants it to Mr. Sonde who is admitted for Life and sworn Mich. 8 Edw. 4. Rot. 26. 1467. Upon the Surrender of William Sonde to the said Sir John Markham then Chief Justice he grants it to Reginald Sonde who is admitted and sworn Reginald Sonde enjoyed this Office till the time of Henry the Seventh and then Bray came in and was Clerk till the 13 H. 7. and then came in Roper Hill 9 Hon. 8. Rot. 3. Anno 1518. Upon the Surrender of this place to Sir John Fineux Chief Justice by John Roper the Chief Justice grants the Office to Sir John Roper and William Roper who are admitted for their Lives and sworn Hill 1 2 Edw. 6. Anno 1547. Upon the Surrender of William Roper Sir John being then dead to Sir Richard Lister then Chief Justice he grants the Office to William Roper and Rute Heywood and they are admitted and sworn Hill 15 Eliz. 1573. Upon the Surrender of William Roper Heywood being dead to Sir Robert Catlin then Chief Justice he granted this Office to John Roper and Thomas Roper for their Lives and they are admitted and sworn Mich. 14 Jac. 1 Rot. 2. Anno 1616. Upon the Surrender of John Roper Thomas being dead to Sir Henry Mountagne then Chief Justice he grants the Office to Robert Heath and Robert Shute for their Lives who are admitted and sworn thereupon Hill 18 Jac. 1. 1620. Shute being dead upon Sir Robert Heath's Surrender to Sir James Leigh then Chief Justice he grants the Office to Sir Robert Heath and George Paul for their Lives and they are sworn and admitted in Court Mich. 5 Car. 1. Upon the Surrender of Sir Robert Heath and Sir George Paul to Sir Nicholas Hide then Chief Justice he grants it to Robert Henley and Samuel Wightwick for their Lives and they are admitted and sworn Trin. 1654. Upon Wightwick's Surrender to H. Roll then Chief Justice Henly being then under Sequestration the Chief Justice grants it to Sam. Wightwick and to Robert Henly Junior for their Lives and they are admitted and sworn Mich. 12 Car. 2. Upon the Surrender of Samuel Wightwick and Robert Henly to Sir Robert Foster then Chief Justice he grants it to Henly and Wightwick for their Lives and they are sworn Wightwick died soon after and Sir Robert Henly enjoy'd it under that Grant 32 years And it was observed on behalf of the Defendant That in all these Records produced and read in Court after the mention of the Surrender to the Chief Justice there are these words To
specially That if Parol Evidence or a naked Averment should be admitted then they find to such Uses But here 't is like finding the Badges of Fraud without finding the Fraud it self or a Demand and Denial without finding a Conversion upon neither of which can the Court judge the Thing to be a Fraud or a Conversion And for these and other like Reasons it was prayed that the Judgment might be reversed It was argued on the other side with the Judgment That this Fine thus levied was not to the use of the Husband but of the Wife and her Heirs that the Fine is not to the Uses in the Deed of the 29th but controuled by that of the 31st 'T was agreed that if there be a Deed to levy a Fine and in pursuance thereof a Fine is levied to the Person of the Lands and at the time no Proof shall be allowed that the Fine was to any other Use but if it be in case of a subsequent Deed then Averment may be against it but by the making of a precedent Deed all Parties are estopped to contradict it unless there be another Deed of equal Nature to controul that Where the Deed is punctually observed there 's no liberty to aver the contrary but where 't is not pursued the Averment is consistent Where it doth vary yet if nothing doth appear to the contrary there the fine shall be construed to be to the Uses of the Deed by construction of Law a Wife is bound by the Husband's Declaration and if the Fine be in pursuance of the Husband's Deed 't is as binding to her as if she were a Party An Infant cannot avoid a Fine where there was a Deed agreeable but by reversing it Then 't was argued That here was such a Variance as did allow of such Averment that 't is true the Deed of 29. had been a good Declaration of the Uses of this Fine notwithstanding the Variance if the Writing of 31. had not been made but there being a Variance that is admissible that this Fine now found differs as much from that in the Deed as if it had been levied at a time after that levying it before makes it not the same The Woman perhaps here did agree to levy a Fine at this distance of time that she might in the mean while have a competent Provision out of her Husband's Estate for her Joynture then when she levies this Fine at a different time she doth not do it in pursuance of the first Deed. Then 1 Rep. 76 99. 3 Bulstr 231. 2 Rolls Abridg 251. 2 Cro. 646. 2 Rolls Abridg. 799. Savil 124. 1 Leon. 210. 3 Cro. 210. 1 And. 240. were quoted and either answered or applied to this Point of Variance Then 't was said That there was a difference between a Fine that varies from a precedent Deed and a Fine that is followed with a subsequent Deed or Declaration of Uses If there be a subsequent Declaration the Heir at Law cannot aver that 't was to the use of the Conusor and his Heirs or to any other use then what is in the Deed the Party himself or his Heirs cannot aver it but they are estopped by this Deed tho' subsequent however a Stranger is at liberty to make such Averment But if a Deed be precedent and the Fine varies and is not the same there none are estopped neither the Party himself his Heir nor a Stranger because the Fine stands alone without any Deed referring to it and declaring the uses of it ' Then 't was urged That this second Deed was sufficient to declare the uses of this Fine If the use arise upon or by transmutation of the Possession as by Fine or Feoffment 't is sufficient without any Deed the use arises only upon the Parties Declaration or Appointment If without a transmutation of Possession there must be some Agreement binding the Party upon some Consideration for the use being founded in Equity the Chancery would never relieve where there was no transmutation of Possession or Agreement upon Consideration and if in Consideration of Blood it must be by Deed because the Consideration is not binding without it Moore 's Rep. Callow and Callow If this Writing of 31. had expresly declared that it should enure to the Husband and his Heirs upon such a Contingency this had been a good original Declaration of the use and would have altered the Estate because of the transmutation of the Possession and as 't is now penned 't is a good Writing sufficient to declare the uses of the Fine any sort of Agreement whereby the Parties intent appears is sufficient an use is an equitable thing and if it appears to have been intended that is enough 2 Leon. 14. Brent's Case any Agreement between the Party that hath the Estate and him who is to have it may raise an use in this Case a Bargain and Sale of the Lands carries the use tho' no mention of it 8 Rep. Fox's Case Crossing and Scudamore In this Case there was an Agreement betwixt Husband and Wife that he should have the Lands if he made a Jointure A Bargain and Sale tho' not inrolled a Charter of Feoffment without Livery shall raise the use of a Fine levied between the same Parties therefore this Writing is a good Appointment But suppose it were not so of it self 't is sufficient to controul that of the 29th for 't is agreed thereby that all Deeds shall be revoked which shews plainly that the Fine was not to be to the uses mentioned in that Deed especially when it varies from it A Parol Declaration of the Mind of the Party will be enough to controul and hinder the raising of an use by the Deed and Fine where different and if so then the use here is to the Wife and her Heirs Then supposing the Variance frivolous and immaterial this Writing of the Husband and Wife is a good appointment the Trustees or Conusees of the Fine need not to be Parties to the appointing or declaring of the uses The Indenture precedent is but directory and if there be another direction under Seal before the Fine it must over-rule the first Writing of it self seems enough 2 Cro. 29. 3 Cro. 571. But suppose an Indorsment on the Indenture revoking one use before the Fine be levied would not that controul it This is rather like a last Will and the last before the Fine must stand A Covenant to stand seized must have all the necessary Parts of a Deed so as to have been obligatory in Chancery before the Statute but a meer Declaration of uses need not be so formal The use declared by the 29th was always revocable till the Fine was levied and this is sufficient both to revoke the last Declaration and to declare new uses this amounts at least to a Deed-Poll and therefore sufficient Then were cited Moore 22 512. Latch 139. and many other Authorities And upon the whole 't was prayed that the Judgment should