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A35931 The royalist's defence vindicating the King's proceedings in the late warre made against him, clearly discovering, how and by what impostures the incendiaries of these distractions have subverted the knowne law of the land, the Protestant religion, and reduced the people to an unparallel'd slavery. Dallison, Charles, d. 1669. 1648 (1648) Wing D138; ESTC R5148 119,595 156

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have no voice in reversing judgements or damning Patents in Parliament therefore they have not a voice in passing Bils for publike Laws Answer Mr. Pryns words must be understood one of these wayes viz. That these judgements are reversed and Patents damned by Act of Parliament or else in the ordinary way of proceedings of Law as in a Court of Justice if he meane by Act of Parliament he onely beggs the question And false it is to say the King hath not a negative Voice in every Act propounded for a Law If he meane by judiciall proceedings as in a Court of Justice which I conceive he doth then the case truely stated is but thus The Lords House in Parliament time is a Court of Judicature and amongst other things the Members of that Assembly have power the cause being regularly brought before them by writ of errour and by the advice of the Judges and not else to reverse erroneous judgements given in the Kings Bench wherein it is true the King hath no Voice but that nothing disproves His negative Voice in making Laws if so that reason serves as well to exclude the Commons as the King for in reversing judgements in the Lords House the Members of the lower House have no Voice so if this argument of Mr. Pryns be of force the Lords without King or Commons have power to make Laws by Act of Parliament Then for damning Patents neither the Lords nor the Commons nor both Houses joyntly have power judicially or finally to determine the validity of any Patent or grant of the King That properly appertaines to the Judges of the Kings Bench of the Common Pleas and other Courts of Justice before whom as afterwards it is more clearly shewed such cases may be judicially brought to triall wherein neither King Lords or Members of the Commons House hath Voice And for the rest of his arguments they rather prove the contrary then that which Mr. Pryn infers upon them Kings saith he have in former times shewed their reasons why they denied to passe Bils presented unto them by both Houses which proves that those Kings had power to deny them else they could not shew cause of their refusall no more then Mr. Pryn can render reasons of his being at Westmiuster unlesse he have been there But Mr. Pryn knowes all Kings have most frequently rejected Bils passed by both Houses and Bils declared by the Members to concerne the publike good without rendring their reasons for the same And for the power of the Protector to confirme Bils passed by both Houses if that be granted that in some cases of imminent necessity the Protectors consent might make good and perfect such Bils it nothing proves the absolute power of both Houses without the King but rather the contrary and plainly demonstrates the imperfect power of the two Houses who cannot without the consent of a Protector in such cases make any compleat and binding Laws Therefore if not stronger the same it must be when we have a King no infant and Reigning without a Protector But saith Mr. Pryn in Countries where Kings are elective by the death of the Present King untill a new one be chosen the people having no King over them may make binding Laws Here although I beleeve Mr. Pryn cannot for other Countries make his position good yet this admitted to him rather disproves his argument against the Kings negative Voice for of his owne shewing it appears that in those Countries where Kings are elective after such time as the people have chosen a King they cannot make Laws without Him And if so where Kings are elective much more they cannot where Kings are hereditary Therefore by Mr. Pryns owne argument it followeth that in this Nation neither the people nor the two Houses without the King have power to make Laws For we have no interregnum there is not with us any time of vacancy of a King eo instante upon the death of the precedent King the Crowne is vested in the successour And for the two Houses refusall to grant the King Aide by Subsidies and the like That disproves the Kings power of His negative Voice in Parliament as the Kings refusall to confirme Bils passed by both Houses prove that the King at this day may make Lawes without them But saith he if Kings will not passe Laws presented unto them by both Houses they may be compelled thereunto for Kings saith he have been so forced as King H. 3. in that of Magna Charra and other Statutes Answer To admit that a Judge of a Court of Judicature may be forced to declare his opinion or to give judgement against his owne conscience seemes to me to be so absurd as I cannot but suppose that Mr. Pryn himself would grant it to be most unreasonable and even to be destructive of the Law it selfe If the King should assemble powers and by force compell the Lords or Commons to passe Laws by Him propounded it would be judged an act of high Tyranny and I beleeve Mr. Pryn would conceive Laws so obtained bound not And if so in that case if he be not extreame partiall he must upon the same ground agree that the King in the like case ought not to be forced He doubtlesse hath the same authority the same rules and motions to be guided by His Conscience as a Subject hath And methinkes the Law should protect the King from the violence of the people asmuch as it preserves them from the force of their King certainly it is at least reci mony or Oath taken is actually vested in the King succeeding upon which the Law saith that although in hoc individuo Hen. Rex moritur yet the King in His politick capacity never dieth Besides if the King at His Coronation should refuse to take an Oath we have no more Law to compell Him thereunto then we have to force Him to be Crowned And as it is not material to the right power of the King whether he be Crowned or not so it is inconsiderable to the people to have Him sworne for if we had no municipall Law the King unsworne were bound in Conscience to govern the people by naturall equity But we have a knowne Law by which both King and Subjects the one by a directive power the others by both directive and coercive are regulated and every one protected in his just rights and this whether the King be Crowned or not Crowned whether he take an Oath or no Oath Secondly admit Kings obliged to take an Oath at their Coronation yet even by the Members owne shewing they are not bound to take it in the words by themselves mentioned And of all the Kings past they instance but seven who have taken any Oath and but three of those seaven admitting that Oath in French and the other in Latine to be one and the same they name to have taken it And of these three offer proof but for one And themselves shew
and the two Houses that body cannot properly be said a Court of Justice The Office of a Judge is upon a Question depending before him to declare what the Law is but the office of the Parliament is only to make new laws By this it appears that neither the Members of the Lords house nor of the Commons house are qualified to be Judges of the Law nor have they either jointly or severally Commission for that purpose And lastly admit every Member of either house in Learning sufficiently qualified to make a Judge their composure considered they are not capable jointly to perform that Office they being two distinct bodies their proceedings severall and distinct it cannot be expected but they shall frequently differ in Opinion and judgment therefore were they never so learned should the King grant unto them power of judicature or should they have that authority given them by an Act of Parliament the Lawes of England would judge both that Grant and Statute absolutely void as a thing most incongruous against sense and reason Upon which it followeth that if the Lords House or the Commons house or both Houses jointly have or shall condemne any person for Treason Felony or other capitall offence try any title of Land tax the people with payments of money seise or confiscate the Subjects estates or the like be it by Order Ordinance or any other way all such proceedings are void done coram non Judice and consequently both the Members and all persons executing their commands therein are by the Lawes of England punishable as Murderers Felons or other transgressours because done without warrant or authority And how long soever they shall continue this power and how frequently soever it is used that alters not the case the Law is still the same it was Yet herein I doe not abridge the power and authority of the Peers of the Realme It is true when the King hath constituted a Lord high Steward and consented to the triall of a Peere for his life for a fact committed against the known Law such a Peere not only may but ought the Lords observing the rules of law to be tried by the Lords his Peers But there is no colour for the Lords or for the Commons or for both Houses jointly although the King should give way thereunto to try or judge any Commoner Every common person ought to be tried by his Peers too that is by a Jury of the Commons and that Iury by the Lawes of England ought to be of that County and neare that place where the fact is committed It is a Rule in our Law that in capitall offences Vbi quis delinquit ibi punietur persons dwelling near the place are most likely to have cognizance of the fact Besides by our law every free-born Subject of this Nation hath at his arraignment power and liberty to challenge Iurors impannelled for his triall But all such liberties are taken away by this usurpation of the Members Thus it appears that the Judges of every Court of Justice so far as their Commission extends and no other persons are Judges of Law But the Judges of no one Court are those unto whom the people are bound lastly to submit themselves for every Court of Justice in some respect is inferiour to another Court or power unto which appeales lie as in the case of a Writ of error and the like unlesse it be in the Exchequer Chamber when the cause regularly depends before the Judges of the Kings Bench the Common Pleas and the Barons of the Exchequer into which Chamber things of great weight and difficulty concerning matter of Law are usually transmitted And being there judicially determined from that sentence t● conceive no appeale lies to any other Court by Writ of error That is the sentence and judgement of the Judges of the Realme yet from that judgement some persons are of opinion a Writ of errour lieth before the Lords in the upper House of Parliament But upon consideration had of the reason of the Law concerning the proceedings in Writs of error brought there I conceive it were to little purpose to permit any such appeale unto the Lords upon judgements given in the Exchequer Chamber before all the Judges of the Realme The power of the Lords House to reverse erronious judgements I conceive began thus The Court of the Kings Bench is the highest Court of Judicature wherein any suite of Law can legally and regularly be brought and therefore their proceedings not to be examined by any other ordinary Court of Justice every one of them being inferiour to it But the Judges of the Kings Bench are as subject to erre as the Judges of other Courts Therefore as requisite to have their proceedings examined Now in regard the Judges of the Realme were at all times at least assistant to the Lords House it was proper enough to have the errors of the Kings Bench reversed in that place And having had its beginning thus constant use and custome hath Legally intituled them unto it Therefore although peradventure it may have happened that some few particular Writs of errour have been brought in the Lords House upon judgements given in some other Courts I conceive the prescription which is all the Commission they have lieth only for the Kings Bench. And I am the more confirmed therein because the Law bookes mentioning the authority of the Lords House in reversing judgements do generally instance in the Kings Bench not naming other Courts Besides as the Lords House hath this jurisdiction by prescription the same use and custome requires these circumstances 1. That the Kings consent to prosecute a Writ of error be obtained because every judgement in the Kings Bench doth immediately concerne the King the jurisdiction of that Court being properly Pleas of the Crowne 2. That the Lords after the cause is brought before them proceed by the advice of the Judges which is indeed the essentiall part of the prescription To have a profession of Law Courts of judicature erected persons learned in that profession appointed Judges thereof it were most preposterous to have the proceedings of these Judges even in the most difficult points of the Law examined reversed and controlled by persons ignorant in that profession By the constitutions of England no man is capable to be a Judge unlesse he have understanding in the Law to performe that office Therefore shall the King grant to one who is most learned a Judges place to him and his heires as to his heires it were void and the same it were if such a grant were made by Act of Parliament And so consequently if the Lords should prescribe that time out of mind they and their predecessours Lords of the Parliament in Parliament time have without mentioning it to be with the advise and assistance of the Judges reversed erronious Iudgements given in the Kings Bench or in any other Court of Iustice it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be disallowed judged as an evil use
not consonant to the rules of Law or reason it were without any disparagement to their Lordships all one if not better when the question is whether the Iudges of the Court of Kings Bench erred in judgement to have it determined by casting of lots for whether right or wrong judgment were given if the Lords determine it it is but chance whether they pursue the Law or not And if by lot expence of money is saved Therefore cleare it is to examine a judgement given in the Exchequer Chamber by a writ of error brought in the Lords House is in effect for the same persons to judge whether themselves erred or not and so whether the Lords have or have not this power the Iudges of the Realme are still depended upon And in case the King and the two Houses make an Act of Parliament concerning the same thing when that Act is passed from them as before appears an appeale lieth by an action or suite at Law unto the Judges who have power to determine whether that Statute be binding or void and therefore clear and manifest it is that in matters of Law the last and finall sentence is the Iudges of the Realme But me thinks for a Nation which hath been governed so many hundreds of years by a known Law and under it so flourishing a people as the Subjects of England have been and yet not to be agreed who are the finall Judges of the Law is so grosse a thing as that all forraigne Nations hearing of it cannot but accompt us men to have lost our wits In every constitution it is oftentimes difficult even amongst the learned in the profession in some particular questions arising to determine what the Law is But not to know what persons have Authority to decide those questions is most ridiculous The Judges of the Law ought to be so conspicuous as that all persons even from the most learned unto the most ignorant may equally alike discerne the men Which considered I conceive it necessary not only for the information of the vulgar people of England which have herein been grosly deceived but for the Vindication and Honour of our own Nation and the Law established so farre to digresse as in a word to shew how this fond question was raised and controverted in this Kingdome which was thus This Nation is governed by a known Law that Law ●●dgeth the King to be our onely Supream Governour gives power to the King with the assent of the two Houses and no other to alter that Law and to make new Lawes And to the Judges of the Realme it ascribes the power finally to declare the Law Now such whose aime is to usurp Soveraignty or to swallow the wealth of the Nation cannot hope to effect their ends by submitting to the known Law That were to commit a crime immediately submit themselves to the block Therefore they must either deceive the people by mis-informing them what the Law is else by strong hand to enforce upon them a new Law for their own purpose Now that the Members aime was at no lesse then all is too too apparent But at the beginning of these distractions they were not in a condition to force the people Therefore their Iudgements must be deceived Hereupon the Plot was that the Members in the opinion of the people should gaine the reputation of being the finall Judge of the Law which was effected thus The people by reason of some good Lawes obtained of the King by the Members procurement were inclinable to believe whatever they propounded Then the Members Voted Thus viz. That when the Lords and Commons declare what the Law of the Land is it is a high breach of Priviledge of Parliament to question it This being published and the people by Incendiaries spread throughout the Kingdome for that purpose by false Calumnies cast upon the King being grosly abused the Members work was in a manner finished Then they took upon them the power of the Militia declared that the Soveraigne power was not in the Kings Person but virtually in them And from thence what made for their advantage how grosse soever did but the Members declare it for Law and good enough Thus the Iustice seate even by a sleight became both disputed and usurped But now the Scales are turned The peoples understandings are enlightned they see how grosly they were misled They finde that whilst the Judges of the Realme declared the Law both King and Subject were preserved in their Persons lives and fortunes That by this usurpation the known Law is subverted and consequently that protection vanished But as the people have changed their opinions so have the Members framed a new Argument They have left the Word and betaken themselves to the Sword They having Armies to back them their will is now the Law and resolve whilst they can by force to hold it Thus we are fallen into a gulf of misery whereas had the people been but half so carefull to have found out the Truth as they were industrious to effect their owne destruction these calamities had been prevented When the difference first hapned between the King and the Members had not the people leaped into their own ruine but taken the least consideration thereof had they bethought themselves how they were to be rightly informed what the Law was they must have resolved that as we had a Law consequently there must so long have been a Judge of that Law But the Members neither exercised or pretended any such power one minute beyond the foresaid Vote And for Authority to make their pretence good none can be produced but that their own testimony in this their own case and in a thing of no lesse concernment then the gaining of the wealth of the whole Kingdome to their own use and enslaving the people to their owne pleasure Hereupon doubtlesse the people would have concluded that not the Members the Judges of the Realme were the men unto whom all persons were Obliged to submit for matter of Law But it is objected That this is too great a power for the Judges for say they those persons may and doe erre in Judgement and are subject to corruption as in that case of Ship-money Answer It is true the Iudges have erred and it being granted that in the case of Ship-mony they did erre and were corrupt too and that it cannot be expected but they shall againe and againe erre be corrupt yet until we have other Creatures then Men to make choise of for Iudges this Objection ought to be disallowed We finde the Members to be no Gods And for the weight of the businesse concluded to be too great for the Iudges I Answer that that power must be in some To have a Law without a Judge finally to end controversies were worse then to have no Law at all And to have a Law and a Judge of that Law who understands not the profession were a degree worse then
when the Law is only declared by Act of Parliament If the King and the two Houses declare that it is not by the Common Law of England Treason to kill or to attempt to kill the King the Queen or Prince or that it is not felony to steale or the like such declarations are of no effect they ought not they do not they cannot conclude the Judges And as every Statute may be judged by them whether it be binding or void so the meaning of the words thereof must be by the Judges expounded too It is the true sense which is the Law not the bare letter and this exposition is likewise the office of the Judges as is said before For example by a Statute made 1 Eliz. it is enacted that all leases made afterwards by any Bishop of his Church-lands exceeding 21. years or three lives shall to all intents and purposes be judged void and yet it hath been adjudged both in the Kings Bench and in the Common Pleas that a lease for an hundred years is not void against that Bishop himselfe who was lessor wherein the Judges expound the meaning of the Law-makers to be thus that their intent was onely for the benefit of the Successours not to releive any man against his owne Act therefore such leases made after the Statute exceeding twenty one years or three lives are voidable only by the successours if they please and adjudged not void against the lessour himselfe contrary to the expresse words of the Statute And in like manner are other infinite Acts of Parliament expounded by the Judges wherein it is a maxime in Law that their exposition of Statutes ought to be according to the rules of the Common Law by which it appears the Members are not the interpreters for they know not the rules of the Law Besides the Parliament cannot be the finall expounders of Statutes for these reasons 1. It appears before that it is not the bare letter but the true sence and meaning of the words which is the Law And the King and the two Houses cannot declare the meaning of those words but by Act of Parliament they cannot saith our Law otherwise speake what ever they Act or doe in any other way is extrajudiciall if the King and both Houses unanimously deliver an opinion without reducing it to an Act of Parliament concerning the meaning of a former Statute it is of no more nor greater force or effect then for the Judges of a Court of judicature to give their opinions in a point of Law in a case not judicially depending before them such an opinion binds not nor is pleadable in a Court of Justice And besides the absurd inconvenience and the impossibility to have an Act of Parliament to determine every question arising upon Statutes it may so happen as that the King and the two Houses can never give an end to one controversie For example suppose an Act be made to explaine the meaning of former Statute ambiguously penned the words of this Act must have a meaning too and may admit of severall interpretations as well as the former Act did and severall persons as they are therein concerned may differ in the exposition thereof and so irreconcileable as not to be ended without the authority of a Judge and this may fall out upon every Act of explanation upon explanation in infinitum and consequently by that way there cannot to the end of the world be a finall determination of the difference 2. The validity of every Statute and the exposition thereof at the will of every person concerned may regularly be brought before the Judges of the Law but cannot judicially depend before the Parliament For example every Statute is binding or void if binding it concerns the Subject in his person or estate and when it is put in execution the ministers or actors therein may at the will of him interrupted thereby be sued in the Court of Common Pleas or in some other Court of Justice by an action of trespasse by which suite what ever the Act of Parliament is both the validity of the Statute and the meaning of the words thereof is submitted to the Judges of that Court and to their judgement As suppose this case to arise upon the foresaid Statute of 23 H. 6. that one who hath continued Sheriff above one year by vertue of a Writ directed to the Sheriff of the same County doth arrest the body of A. who for this brings his action of trespasse in the Common Pleas in which the Sheriff justifies by vertue of the Writ A. replies pleads the Statute and shewes that the year was ended before the arrest upon which the Sheriff demurs in Law by these pleadings the whole fact is confessed on both sides the Sheriff doth acknowledge his year was out before the arrest and A. confesseth the arrest was by vertue of the Kings Writ directed to the Sheriff and so the question being matter of Law it is to be determined by the Judges of that Court wherein the sole doubt is whether that Statute be binding or void for if binding judgement ought to be given for the plaintife A. because the Statute being good the defendant was not Sheriff after his year ended when he made the arrest and so had no authority if void it ought to be given for the Sheriff for then the Law is not by it altered and so he was Sheriff at the time of the arrest although his year was out Now in this case no man can deny but that the Judges must give judgement else the Court of Common Pleas which were absurd to imagine hath not power to determine an action of trespasse and judgement being given as in this case it ought to be for the Sheriff because it is already resolved and received for a knowne truth that the foresaid Statute binds not the King this duty of the Subject to serve the King in person saith the booke being due by the Law of nature cannot be severed by Act of Parliament it is finall And so if it were enacted that a Member of the Commons House or any other subject by name should not be condemned or punished for murder who afterwards commits the fact for which being arraigned at the Kings Bench bar he pleades the Statute the Judges even against the expresse words and intent of that Act ought to give sentence of death And contrariwise if by Act of Parliament it were enacted that all Pardons for felony to be granted by the King should be judged void after which a subject commits felony obtaines the Kings pardon for it is arraigned at the bar and pleads this pardon it ought to be allowed being duely pleaded and the Justices in such case ought not to condemne but to acquit the prisoner And these judgements as to any appeale to the Parliament are finall they cannot be brought before the King and the two Houses by any suite or action at Law They cannot judicially determine any