Court recommitted which is the same Assault Taking and Imprisonment and Traverses absque hoc that he was guilty of the Assaulting Taking or Imprisoning him within the time last mentioned at London or elsewhere then in the Isle of Barbadees or otherwise or in other manner then as before The Plaintiff demurred and the Defendant joyn'd in Demurrer and Judgment was given for the Plaintiff and a Venire awarded tam ad triand ' exitum quam ad inquirend ' de dampnis c. and the Issue was found pro quaerent ' and 6 d. Damages and on the Demurrer 500 l. Damages and Judgment for Damages and Costs amounting in the whole to 590 l. The Plaintiff Sir J. Witham dying Trin. 2 Wil. Mar. the Judgment was revived by Scire Facias brought by Howel Gray and Chaplain Executors of Sir J. W. quoad omnia bona catalla sua except one Debt due by Bond from Henry Wakefield And at the Return of the Scire Fac ' the Defendant appears and demurs to the Scire Facias and there is an Award of Execution and thereupon a Writ of Error is brought in the Exchequer Chamber and the Judgment was affirmed Then a Writ of Error is brought in Parliament and the General Error assigned And here it was argued on the behalf of the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error that this Action did not lye against him because it was brought against him for that which he did as a Judge and so it appeared on the Record according to 12 Rep. 25. that the Rule seems the same for one sort of Judge as well as for another that this Person was lawfully made a Governour and so had all the Powers of a Governour that this was a Commitment only till he found Security tho' not so Expressed that this is not counsable here in Westminster-hall that he was only censurable by the King that the Charge is sufficient in that Sir J. W. had not taken the Oaths that male arbitrarie executus fuit is Charge enough to warrant a Commitment that this was a Charge before a Councel of State and there need not be all the Matters precisely alledged to justifie their Acts and by the same reason Actions may lye against the Privy Counsellors here and enforce them to set forth every particular which would be of dangerous Consequence the Plea might have been much shorter as only that he was committed by a Counsel of State and the addition of the other Matters shall not hurt and that the Charge was upon Oath shall be intended no Presumption shall be that the Supream Magistracy there did irregularly 't is a power incident to every Council of State to be able to commit This action cannot lye because the Fact is not triable here the Laws there may be different from ours Besides no Action lies unlefs 't were a malicious Commitment as well as causeless and that no Man will pretend that an Action can lye against the chief Governour or Lieutenant of Ireland or Scotland and by the same reason it ought not in this Case he had a power to make Judges and therefore he was more than a Judge and they have confessed all this Matter by the Demurrer The Statute of Car. 1. which restrains the power of our Councel of State supposes that they could Commit that in case of Crimes there they are punishable in that place and in Sir Ellis Ashburnham's Case there was a Remanding to be tried there and if so it can't be examinable here and if not this Action will not lye And further that what was done here was done in a Court for so is a Councel of State to receive Complaints against State Delinquents and to direct their Trials in proper Courts afterwards that there was never such an Action as this maintain'd and if it should it would be impossible for a Governour to defend himself First For that all the Records and Evidences are there 2. The Laws there differ from what they are here and Governments would be very weak and the Persons intrusted with them very uneasie if they are subject to be charged with Actions here for what they do in those Countries and therefore 't was prayed that the Judgment should be reversed On the other side 't was argued for the Plaintiff in the Original Action That this Action did lye and the Judgment on 't was legal That supposing the Fact done in England the Plea of such Authority so executed at Plymouth or Portsmouth or the like had been ill for that Liberty of Person by our Law is so sacred that every Restraint of it must be justified by some lawful Authority and that Authority must be expresly pursued That here was no Authority to commit for that must be either as a Court of Record or as Justices of Peace Constable or other Officer constituted for that purpose that the Letters Patents are the only Justification insisted on and that gives none 't is true the power of Committing is incident to the Office of a Court here 's only the Government of the Place committed to Sir Richard Dutton with a power to erect Courts and appoint Officers but none to himself He in Person is only authorized to manage and order the Affairs and the Law of England takes no notice of such an Officer or his Authority and therefore a Court of Law can take notice of it no further or otherwise then as it doth appear in pleading The Councel is not constituted a Court they are by the Letters Patents only to advise and assist the Governour and the Governour hath no power to commit or punish but to form and establish Courts to do so which imports the direct contrary that he had no such power The Ends of appointing the Councel as mentioned in the Letters Patents are quite different viz. to aid the Regent by their Advice not to act as of themselves and if neither the Governour of himself nor the Councel of it self had such a power neither can both together have it A Court of Justice is not to be intended unless the same be specially shewn Excepting the Case of the common known general Courts of Justice in Westminster-hall which are immemorial if any thing be justified by the Authority of other Courts the same must be precisely alledged and how their Commencement was either by Custom or Letters Patents Here it appears by the Plea it self that they had Justices of Oyer and Terminer appointed It doth not appear that he or the Councel were Judges of things of this kind Besides when a Councel is constituted as here was Twelve by Name that must be the Majority as is the Dean and Chapter of Femes Case Davis's Rep. 47. and that 's Seven at least which are not in this Case There must be a Majority unless the Erection did allow of a less Number The practise of the Courts of Westminster-hall do not contradict this for there 't is a Court whether more or less and so
command them in Ireland to do Execution there St. John vers Cummin Yelv. 118 119. 4 Inst 72. If Writ be abated in C. B. and Error brought in B. R. and the Judgment be reversed shall proceed in B. R. and 1 Rolls 774. to the same effect Green vers Cole 2 Saund. 256. The Judges Commissioners gave the new Judgment 'T is true in Dyer 343. the opinion was that he was only restored to his Action and then Writs of Error were not so frequent The Judgment may be erroneous for the Defendant and yet no reason to give a Judgment for the Plaintiff as in Slocomb's Case 1 Cro. 442. the Court gave a new Judgment for the Defendant therefore it properly belongs to the Court which doth examine the Error to give the new Judgment the Record is removed as Fitzh Nat. Brev. 18 19. on false Judgment in ancient Demesne v. 38 Hen. 6.30 and Griffin's Case in Error on a quod ei deforceat in 2 Saunders 29 30. new Judgment given here In the Case of Robinson and Wolley in 3 Keeble 821. Ejectment Special Verdict Judgment reversed in the Exchequer Chamber and they could never get Judgment here the Court of Exchequer Chamber not having given it and in the principal Case after several Motions in the Court of King's Bench the Remittitur not being entred there a Motion was made in Parliament upon this Matter and a new Judgment was added to the Reversal that the Plaintiff should recover c. Dr. William Oldis Plaintiff Versus Charles Donmille Defendant WRit of Error to Reverse a Judgment in the Court of Exchequer affirmed upon a Writ of Error before the Lord Chancellor c. The Case upon the Record was thus Donmille declares in the Exchequer in placito transgr ' contempt ' c. for a Prosecution contra regiam prohibit ' and sets forth Magna Charta that nullus liber homo c. that the Plaintiff is a Freeman of this Kingdom and ought to enjoy the free Customs thereof c. that the Defendant not being ignorant of the Premisses but designing to vex and aggrieve the Plaintiff did in Curia militari Henrici Ducis Norfolk ' coram ipso Henrico Com' Mareschal ' Exhibit certain Articles against the Plaintiff c. that Sir Henry St. George Clarencieux King at Arms was and is King at Arms for the Southern Eastern and Western Parts of the Kingdom viz. from the River of Trent versus Austrum and that the Conusance Correction and Disposition of Arms and Coats of Arms and ordering of Funeral Pomps time out of mind did belong to him within that Province and that the Plaintiff having notice thereof did without any Licence in that behalf had and obtained paint and cause to be painted Arms and Escutcheons and caused them to be fixed to Herses that he provided and lent Velvet Palls for Funerals that he painted divers Arms for one Berkstead who had no right to their use at the Funeral and did lend a Pall for that Funeral and paint Arms for Elizabeth Godfrey and marshalled the Funeral and the like for Sprignall and that he had publickly hanging out at his Balcony Escutcheons painted and Coaches and Herses and other Publick Processions of Funerals to entice People to come to his House and Shop for Arms c. That the Defendant compelled the Plaintiff to appear and answer the Premisses c. The Defendant in propria persona sua venit dicit That the Court of the Constable and Marshal of England is an ancient Court time out of mind and accustomed to be held before the Constable of England and the Earl Marshal of England for the time being or before the Constable only when the Office of Earl Marshal is vacant or before the Earl Marshal only when the Office of Constable is vacant which Court hath time out of mind had Conusance of all Pleas and Causes concerning Arms Escutcheons Genealogies and Funerals within this Realm and that no other Person hath ever intermeddled in those Pleas or Affairs nor had or claimed Jurisdiction thereof and that the Suit complained of by the Plaintiff was prosecuted in the said ancient Court of and for Causes concerning Arms Escutcheons and Funerals That by the 13 Rich. 2. 't was enacted that if any Person should complain of any Plea begun before the Constable and Marshal which might be tried by the Common Law he should have a Privy Seal without difficulty to be directed to the Constable and Marshal to Supersede that Plea till discussed by the King's Counsel if it belongs to that Court or to the Common Law prout per Statut ' ill ' apparet and that the said Court time out of mind hath been tant ' honoris celsitudinis that it was never prohibited from holding any Pleas in the same Court aliter vel alio modo quam juxta formam Statut ' praed ' Et hoc parat ' est verificare unde non intendit quod Curia hic placitum praed ' ulterius cognoscere velit aut debeat c. The Plaintiff demurs and the Defendant joyns From the Exchequer Court this was adjourned propter difficultatem into the Exchequer Chamber and afterwards by advice of the Judges there the Court gave Judgment for the Plaintiff which was affirmed by the Chancellor and Treasurer c. And now it was argued on the behalf of the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error that this Judgment was erroneous and fit to be reversed And first to maintain the Court as set forth 't was insisted on 1. That when there was a Constable and Marshal the Marshal had equal Power of Judicature with the Constable as each Judge hath in other Courts 2. That the Constable had in that Court power of Judicature alone when there was no Marshal And 3. That the Marshal had the like when there was no Constable That they had both equal power of Judicature appeared by all their Proceedings by their Libels or Bills in the Case of John Keightley Esq against Stephen Scroop The Libel is In the Name of God Amen Before you my Lords the Constable and Marshal of England in your Court of Chivalry and prays that the said Stephen by their Sentence definitive may be punisht 1 pars Pat. 2 Hen. 4. m. 7. And the same Stephen libelled against Keightley to the thrice Honourable Lords the Constable and Marshal of England So the Libels were directed to both and both sate judicially The same appears by the Sentence or Judgment given in that Court Bulmer libelled against Bertram Vsau coram Constabulario Mareschallo qui duellum inter partes allocaverunt assignaverunt locum tempus Rot. Vascor ' 9 H. 4. m. 14. It doth likewise appear to be so by the Appeals from their Judgments to the King they are both sent to to return the Rolls of their Judgments Rot. Claus 20 Edw. 1. m. 4. In the Appeal brought by Sir Robert Grovesnor against Richard Scroop 't is upon
receive the Allegations and Matters given in Evidence for the Plaintiff as sufficient to maintain his Title whereas they were given in Evidence and considered and if it be meant as a sufficient Evidence to controul and over-rule all other that doth not belong to the Court in Trials to determine unless referred to them upon demurrer to Evidence but is the proper business of the Jury and if the Party be aggrieved the Remedy is an Attaint Nor can it be pretended that the Defendants Evidence was admitted to over-rule the Record produced because no Objection was made to the Defendants Evidence at the Trial and the same was all given before the Record of 15 Ed. 3. was produced and consequently the Jury must consider the force of it for Evidence on both sides being given by the Law of England the Decision of the Right belongs to the Jury and the Act of Edw. 3. being repealed 't is no Matter of Law but the most which could be made of it was that it was Evidence which must be left to the Jury together with the Defendants Evidence But no Bill of Exception will lye in such a Case by the Statute when the Evidence given is admitted as Evidence and left to a Jury and where no Opposition was made to the Defendants Evidence as here in this Case and therefore in this Case a Bill of Exception could not be warrantable because the Plaintiff's Evidence was not refused or over-ruled nor was the Defendant's Evidence fit to be rejected or so much as opposed by the Plaintiff And as to the Allegations made by the Counsel and not proved those never could be an Exception And for these and other Reasons the Judges refused to Seal their Bill Upon this a Writ of Error is brought and a Petition was exhibited to the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament assembled in the Name of the Lady Isabella Dutchess of Grafton and William Bridgman her Trustee showing that King Charles the Second granted the Office in question to W. B. for the Lives of Henry Earl of Arlington Henry Duke of Grafton and of the Petitioner the Lady Isabella in Trust for the Duke his Executors and Administrators to commence after the Death of Sir Robert Henly that upon the death of Sir Robert Henly the Petitioner by virtue of the said Grant was well intituled to the said Office but was interrupted in receiving the Profits by Rowland Holt Esq Brother to the Lord Chief Justice Holt and by Edward Coleman Gent. who pretended to be admitted thereto by some Grant from the Chief Justice that thereupon an Assize was brought for the said Office which came to Trial and the Petitioners Counsel insisted upon an Act of Parliament proving the King to have the Right of granting the said Office which the Judges would not admit to be sufficient to prove the King's Right to grant the same That the Petitioners Counsel did thereupon pray the benefit of a Bill therein to be allowed and sealed by the Judges according to Law And the Petitioner's Counsel relying upon the said Act of Parliament as sufficient proof of the King 's Right duly tendred a Bill of Exceptions before Judgment in the Assize which the Judges upon the Trial said they would Seal yet when tendred to them in Court before Judgment would not Seal the same Thereupon Judgment was entred against the Petitioners Title in the Assize by default of the Judges not allowing and sealing the said Bill according to the Duty of their Office by Law whereby they are hindred from making the Matter of the said Bill part of the Record of the said Judgment now brought and depending before your Lordships upon a Writ of Error in Parliament for reversing the said Judgment in the Assize and so are precluded from having the full benefit of the Law by the said Writ of Error to examine reverse and annul the said Judgment Wherefore the Petitioners prayed that their Lordships would be pleased to order the said Judges or some of them to Seal the said Bill of Exceptions to the end the said Case might as by Law it ought come intirely before their Lordships for Judgment c. Upon reading this Petition 't was ordered that the Lord Chief Justice and the rest of the Judges of the Court of King's Bench should have Copies of the Petition and put in their Answer thereunto in Writing on ..... next At the Day appointed there was deliver'd an Answer in these or the like words The Answer of William Dolben William Gregory and Giles Eyre Knights three of their Majesties Justices assigned to hold Pleas in their Court of King's Bench at Westminster to the Petition of the most noble Isabella Dutchess of Grafton and William Bridgman exhibited by them to your Lordships THese Respondents by Protestation not owning or allowing any of the Matters of the Petition to be true as they are therein alledged and saving to themselves the benefit of all the several Statutes herein after mentioned and all the Right they have as Members of the Body of the Commons of England to defend themselves upon any Trial that may be brought against them for any thing done contrary to their Duty as Judges according to the due Course of the Common Law which Right they hold themselves obliged to insist upon in answer to the said Petition think themselves bound to shew and offer to your Lordships consideration That the Petition is a Complaint against them for refusing to Seal a pretended Bill of Exceptions contrary to a Statute in that behalf as the Petition pretends without setting forth the tenour of the said Statute or what that pretended Bill was whereas that Statute is the Statute of Westminster 2. cap. 31. and doth enact That if any impleaded before any Justices doth offer an Exception and pray the Justices to allow the same and they refuse so to do the Party offering the Exception is thereby to write it and pray the Justices to Seal it which they or one of them are thereby enjoyned to do So that if the pretended Bill was duly tendred to these Respondents and was such as they were bound to Seal these Respondents are answerable only for it by the Course of the Common Law in an Action to be brought on that Statute which ought to be tried by a Jury of Twelve honest and lawful Men of England by the Course of the Common Law and not in any other manner And the Respondents further shew and humbly offer to your Lordships consideration That the Petition is a Complaint in the nature of an Original Suit charging those Respondents with a Crime of a very high Nature in acting contrary to the Duty of their Office and so altogether improper for your Lordships Examination or Consideration not being any more triable by your Lordships then every Information or Action for breach of any Statute Law is all which Matters are by the Common Law and Justice of the Land of Common Right to be
upon grievous pain sometimes before the King himself sometimes before the King's Council sometimes to the Parliament to answer thereof anew to the grievance of the Parties and in Subversion of the Common-Law of the Land 't is Enacted that after Judgment the Parties shall be in Peace until the Judgment be undone by Attaint or Error this is agreed and amplified 3 Bulst 47.115 Here is mention even of the Parliaments Summoning persons to Answer in Subversion of the Laws There are other Statutes not Printed as 4 Edw. 3. numb 6. Cotton's Abridg. 7. and the same in 2 Inst 50. The Lords gave Judgment of Death without Indictment upon some who were not their Peers and agreed in full Parliament that they should be discharged of so doing for the future and that it should not be drawn in President that the like should not be done on any but their Peers 't is a Declaration of the Lords nay 't is an Act of Parliament and penned in the same manner as 29 Edw. 1. Statute del Estoppel at a Parliament agreed 33 Edw. 1. by common accord and 9 Edw. 2. the King in Parliament by Advice of his Council and these are held to be Statutes This was not only an acquittal from the trouble but a clear denial of the Power as appears by the words before that they had assumed upon themselves and the words subsequent that the like should not be done again The Complaint was because it was intermedling with Commoners after that manner Suppose this House should make an Order upon this matter which is a Law business and not of Equity no Execution can be made of it but Commitment There is the 15 Edw. 3. now insisted on Printed in the Old Statute Book but omitted in this 't is in Cotton 28.33 and 't is thus the Commons complained of breaches of Magna Charta c. and pray remedy with this Conclusion That every Man may stand to the Law according to his Condition and the Lords pray that Magna Charta may be observed and further that if any of what Condition soever should break it he should be adjudged by the Peers of the Realm in Parliament the next Parliament and so from Parliament to Parliament and it was Enacted accordingly This was Specious the same being only for the breakers of Magna Charta but in 17 Edw. 3. that whole Parliament i. e. all the Acts of it are Repealed which Repeal seems designed for the Petitioners for it Repeals the supposed Laws which make both their Title and this Jurisdiction which they would support 'T is observable what is said in the Repeal that the Act was contrary to the King's Oath in prejudice of his Crown and Royalty and against the Ancient Law And such is this for here 's no use of the King 's Writ no Address to or Command by the King for this Proceeding nor any mention of his name in the Petition By 1 Hen. 4. cap. 14. Appeals in Parliament for Offences are declared against as contrary to Reason and the Constitution this is such This is not incident to the Power of Hearing and Determining upon the Writ of Error because as was said before it belongs properly to the Chancery to Issue a Writ Commanding it to be done Si ita est as is Suggested By 12 Rep. 63. the King himself cannot take any Cause out of the Court where it depends and give Judgment on it himself And this House can make no Order upon this Petition that will be a Record as in Hob. 110. The Petition is in the name of a Person not party to the Record which seems very new for 't is by a Stranger in the eye of the Law to the Cause and consequently ought not to be joyned in any legal proceeding if this be such This is not incident to the Jurisdiction of the Error no more than Amendment of an Error in the Court from whence the Record comes or the filing of a Baile a Declaration or a Warrant of Attorney or the Sueing out another Process in Defect of one lost or the like These things are never Examinable in the Superior Court for in these Collateral things the other are intrusted Here 's no Hardship upon the Petitioner for he might have been Non-suite or have given this Repeal'd Act in Evidence at first and then have demurr'd on the Defendant's Evidence or might have Sued a Writ on the Statute of Westminster 2. But suppose this House should Examine this matter and find the Petition to be groundless will such Determination prevent the Judges from being troubled by Sueing of the Writ afterwards Suppose it E contra that this House should punish the Judges and commit them and award Damages or make other Order in favour of the Petitioners would such Order bar or stop the legal process afterwards can any Order made here be used below as a Recovery or Acquittal as an Auterfoits Convict or Auterfoits Acquitte If there be any thing in it 't is a breach of a Statute Law for which they are punishable at the King's Suit will the proceeding here save them from the trouble of answering to an Indictment or Information for the same thing Then since a Writ lies to Command them to Seal this Bill and since an Act of Parliament directs it if it were a true one perhaps it may be Questionable if they do not break their Oaths in case they Sign it in Obedience to any other direction If they did it in Obedience to the Royal Word Signet or Privy Seal of the King their Master 't would be a breach of their Oath Then as to presidents of the Exercise of such a Jurisdiction none come near this And abundance of particular Cases were put and answered but the considerable one was Jeffery Stanton's Case 14 Edw. 3.31 Cot. 30. The Case is odd 't is in Fits Abridgment tit voucher 119. there is a Writ directory to the Judges to proceed to Judgment or to bring the Record before the Parliament that they might receive an Averment c. To this Case it was Answered That the same was long before most of the Statutes aforementioned and in full Parliament and in that Case Stone would not agree to it but adhered to the Law according to his Opinion 't is true Shard in the absence of Stone gave Judgment according to that Advice but a Writ of Error was afterwards brought in the King 's Bench and the Judgment was Reversed 15 Edw. 3. B. R. even contrary to the Advice of Parliament to the other Judges As to the other Cases of Property Examined here either the Parties submitted to Answer or they were at the Suit or Complaint of the Commons or by Consent of the King and Commons but none of them carry any resemblance to this where the Judges insist upon it that there is another and a proper Remedy All the Cases in Ryley's Placita Parliamentaria are either Ordinances of Parliament or directions to follow
is aliud testamentum i.e. a general Testament The 2 Rich. 3. fol. 3. is directly thus The Defendant pleads one Will the Plaintiff replies another and exception taken because he did not traverse the former but held needless to do so quia per ult ' testamentum ut placitatur generaliter primum testamentum revocatur in omnibus and it cannot be pretended that this might be the same Will written over again for if so it could not be aliud it would be the same these are not quibbles upon words for can it be said that this is a Devise by the last Will of Sir H. when there 's another Nor is it an Objection that the Contents do not appear for the Will belongs not to the Heir to keep and consequently not to shew in pleading he is not bound to a profert 't is enough that there was a subsequent Will And as the latter may confirm or be consistent with the former so it may not be so and the consistency is not to be presumed especially against an Heir at Law and in possession In the Case of Coward and Marshal 3 Cro. 721. the Substance of both are declared and thereby they appeared to be consistent and consequently no Revocation here Eadem mens sic testandi the same intent of disposing his Estate the same way can never be thought to continue for then there had been no occasion of making another Will If this be not a Revocation 't is an act void and to no purpose which is never to be intended Then 't was insisted on That the bare act of making and publishing another Will is a Revocation and the finding of the Contents unknown is void If this be not a Will 't is a Codicil and that is contrary to the finding of the Jury for the Verdict mentions a second Substantive independent Will without reference to the former which second Will is a Revocation and therefore 't was prayed that the Judgment should be reversed It was argued on the other side in behalf of Mr. Nosworthy That this was no Revocation that here had been a great stir about nothing for that nothing appeared against his Title that a Man may make a Will of several things at several times and they both shall stand that a deliberate Will being made the Contents whereof are known shall never be revoked by that which is not known nothing can be judged upon that which doth not appear and consequently it can never be judged to be a Revocation Here 's another Will and nothing is given by it nothing is found to be given by this subsequent Will The form of entring the ancient Judgments was Quibus visis lectis auditis per Curiam plene intellectis now what is here read to make a Revocation 2 Rich. 3. fol. 3. is with the Judgment for there 't is replied that he made another Executor there are the Contents pleaded sufficient to maintain his Count and answer the Defendant's Bar the Book is per hoc quod alius Executor nominatur Then was cited 1 Cro. 51. the Reason given is quia in dubiis non presumitur pro testamento and here being a good Will at the most the other is doubtful 1 Cro. 114 115. Several Wills of several things may be made And the same Book 595. 10 Car. 1. which Refolution Serjeant Maynard in arguing this Case below said that he heard in that Court of Kings Bench 'T is the Subject Matter of the Wills and the Repugnancy which makes the Revocation In this very Case in the Exchequer upon an English Bill 't was held by Hale to be no Revocation 't is in Hardres 375. Coke upon Littleton which hath been quoted Comments upon these words several Devises and if there be no Devise in the second there can be no sense or meaning in it and consequently unless some meaning appear it can never be an Evidence of a change of his Mind as it might be a Revocation so it might be otherwise and he that will have it to be a Revocation must prove it to be such No Man can affirm that every Will must necessarily be a Revocation of a former for the second Will might be of another thing as Goods or of another parcel of Land or in confirmation of the former If in these and many other like Cases a latter Will is no Revocation of a former how can it possibly with justice be concluded that a latter Will without Contents Purport or Effect shall be a Revocation of a former And tho' the Jury have in this Case believed the Witnesses and found that another Will was made it may be of dangerous Consequence to encourage and construe this a Revocation without knowing the Contents for no Will can be secure against the swearing of a new Will if there be no necessity of shewing it or proving what it was For which and other Reasons it was prayed that the Judgment might be affirmed and it was affirmed Sir Simon Leach al' Plaintiffs Versus J. Thomson Lessee of Charles Leach Defendant WRit of Error to Reverse a Judgment given in B. R. upon a Special Verdict on a Trial at Bar in Ejectment brought by Thomson on the Demise of Charles Leach the Special Verdict finds that Nicholas Leach was seized of the Lands in question in his Demesne as of Fee and being so seized 9 Nov. 19 Car. 2. he makes his last Will and thereby devises the Premisses to the Heirs Males of his Body lawfully to be begotten and for default of such Issue to Simon Leach his Brother for his Life and after his Decease to the first Son of the Body of the said Simon lawfully to be begotten and the Heirs Males of the Body of such first Son lawfully to be begotten and for default of such Issue to the second c. and so on to the eighth Sons of all and every other Sons c. and for default of such Issue to Sir Simon Leach his Kinsman Son and Heir of Simon Leach of Cadley in Com' Devon ' Esq deceased and the Heirs Males of his Body and for default of such Issue to the right Heirs of him the said Nicholas for ever Then they find That the Lands in the Declaration and those in the Will are the same that afterwards viz. 10 Apr. 20 Car. 2. Nicholas died seized without Issue of his Body that after his Death the said Simon his Brother and Heir Entred and was seized in his Demesne ut de libero tenemento for term of his Life Remainder to the first Son of the Body of the said Simon the Brother and the Heirs of the Body of such first Son lawfully to be begotten and for default of such to the second c. Remainder to Sir Simon in Tail Remainder to the said Simon the Brother and his Heirs belonging That Simon Leach the Brother being so seized afterwards viz. 20 Aug. 20 Car. 2. took to Wife Anne the Daughter of Vnton Crook that
a Colony or Plantation and that imports rather the contrary and by such Names these Plantations have always gone in Letters Patents Proclamations and Acts of Parliament But whatsoever may by some be said as to Statutes in particular binding there the Common Law must and doth oblige there for 't is a Plantation or new Settlement of English-men by the King's Consent in an uninhabited Country and so is the History of Barbadoes written by Richard Ligon Printed at London 1673. pag. 23. says he 'T was a Country not inhabited by any but overgrown with Woods And pag. 100. They are governed by the Laws of England And Heylin in his Geography lib. 4.148 says The English are the sole Colony there they are called the King's Plantations and not his Conquests and he neither could nor can now impose any Laws upon them different from the Laws of England 'T was argued that even our Statutes do bind them and many of them name these Plantations as English they have some Municipal Rules there like our By-laws in the Stanneries or Fenns but that argues nothing as to the general which shall prevail when the one contradicts the other may be a Query another time By the 22 23 Car. 2. cap. 26. against the planting of Tobacco here and for the Regulation of the Plantation Trade the Governours of those Plantations are once a Year to return to the Custom-house in London an Account of all Ships laden and of all the Bonds c. And they are throughout the whole Act called the King's English Plantations Governours of such English Plantations to some of the English Plantations And Paragr 10. 't is said Inasmuch as the Plantations are inhabited which his Subjects of England and so 't is in 15 Car. 2. cap. 7. sect 5. and in 12 Car. 2. cap. 34. they are called Colonies and Plantations of this Kingdom of England From all which 't is natural to infer That the Rules in case of conquered Places cannot prevail here Conquest est res odiosa and never to be presumed besides 't is the People not the Soil that can be said to be conquered The reason of a Conquerour's Power to prescribe Laws is the Conqueror's Clemency in saving the Lives of the conquered whom by the strict right of War he might have destroyed or the presumed Chance of Subjection which the conquered Prince and People threw themselves upon when they first engaged in the War But this is not pretended to here tho' all the Cases about this Subject were put below stairs Then taking it as the truth is certain Subjects of England by consent of their Prince go and possess an uninhabited desert Country the Common Law must be supposed their Rule as 't was their Birthright and as 't is the best and so to be presumed their Choice and not only that but even as obligatory 't is so When they went thither they no more abandoned the English Laws then they did their Natural Allegiance nay they subjected themselves no more to other Laws than they did to another Allegiance which they did not This is a Dominion belonging not only to the Crown but to the Realm of England tho' not within the Territorial Realm Vaughan 330. says That they follow England and are a part of it Then 't was argued further If 't were possible that it should be otherwise when did the Common Law cease On the Sea it remained in all Personal Respects If Batteries or Wounds on Ship-board Actions lay here Then the same held when they landed there and no new Laws could be made for them but by the Prince with their consent Besides Either the Right of these Lands was gained to the Crown or to the Planters by the Occupancy and either way the Common Law must be their Rule It must be agreed that the first Entry gained the right and so is Grotius de jure Belli Pacis lib. 2. cap. 8. sect 6. and these Lands were never the Kings tho' they afterwards submitted to take a Grant of the King 'T is true in case of War what is gained becomes his who maintained the War and doth not of right belong to that Person who first possessed it Grot. lib. 3. cap. 6. sect 11. But in case it be not the effect of War but only by force of their first Entry it must be considered what Interest they did acquire and certainly 't was the largest that can be for an Occupant doth gain an Inheritance by the Law of Nations and the same shall descend then by the Rules of what Law shall the Descent be governed it must be by the Laws of the Country to which they did originally and still do belong But then supposing the Lands gained to the Crown and the Crown to distribute these Lands the Grant of them is to hold in Soccage and that is a common Law Tenure why are not their Persons in like manner under the Common Law When a Governour was first received by or imposed upon them 't was never intended either by King or People that he should Rule by any other Law than that of England And if it had been known to be otherwise the number of Subjects there would have been very small In these Cases their Allegiance continues and must be according to the Laws of England and 't was argued that ex consequenti the protection and rule of them ought to be by the same Laws for they are mutual and reciprocal unum trahit alterum and that Law which is the Rule of the one should be the Rule of the other besides 't is the Inhabitants not the Country that are capable of Laws and those are English and so declared and allowed to be and consequently there 's no reason why the English Laws should not follow the Persons of English-men especially while they are under the English Government and since the Great Seal goes thither And further a Writ of Error lies here upon any of their ultimate Judgments so says Vaughan 402. and 21 Hen. 7.3 that it doth so to all Subordinate Dominions and tho' the distance of the Place prevents the common use of such Writ yet by his Opinion it clearly lies and he reckons the Plantations part of those Subordinate Dominions Now a Writ of Error is a remedial Writ whereon Right is to be done and that must be according to the Laws of England for the King's Bench in case of a Reversal upon such Writ is to give a new Judgment as by Law ought to have been first given Vaughan 290 291 says It lies at Common Law to reverse Judgments in any inferiour Dominions for if it did not inferiour and Provincial Governments might make what Laws they please for Judgments are Laws when they are not to be reversed It lay to Ireland by the Common Law says Coke 7 Rep. 18. tho' there had been no Reservation of it in King John's Charter Then 't was inferred that the lying of a Writ of Error proves the Laws
to be the same i.e. in general the Common Law to govern in both places from the difference assigned between Ireland and Scotland it lies not to Scotland because a distinct Kingdom and governed by distinct Laws and it lies to Ireland because ruled by the same and consequently if a Writ of Error lies on the final Judgment there it 's a good Argument that the same Law prevails there These Plantations are parcel of the Realm as Counties Palatine are Their Rights and Interests are every day determined in Chancery here only that for necessity and encouragement of Trade and Commerce they make Plantation-Lands as Assets in certain Cases to pay Debts in all other things they make Rules for them according to the common Course of English Equity The distance or the contiguity of the thing makes no alteration in the Case And then 't was said as at first That this then was the same case as if the Imprisonment had been in England or on Shipboard as to the Rules of Justification that if there were another Law which could justifie it the same ought to have been certainly pleaded As to the Instructions those do not appear and therefore are not to be considered in the Case and they should have been set forth and no extraordinary Power is to be presumed unless shewn for every Man in pleading is thought to make the best of his own Case and consequently that if 't would have made for him the same would have been shewn and because they are not shewn they must be thought directive of a Government according to the Laws of England since 't is to a Subject of this Realm to govern other Subjects of this Realm living upon a part of this Realm and from the King thereof who must be supposed to approve those Laws which make him King and by which he reigns Then 't was argued Suppose this Governour had borrowed Money of a Man in the Island and then had returned to England and an Action had been brought for it and he had pretended to ustifie the receipt of it as Governour he must have shewn his Power the Law and how he observed that Law the like for Goods the same reason for Torts and Wrongs done vi armis Now the Court below could consider no other Power or Law to justifie this act but the Common Law of England and that will not do it for the Reasons given and if it be justifiable by any other it must be pleaded and what he hath pleaded is not pursued c. As to the Commitment by a Council of State what it means is hardly known in the Law of England and that Authority which commits by our Law ought to be certain and the Cause expressed as all the Arguments upon the Writ of Habeas Corpus in old time do shew but here 's no Councel and 't is not said so much as that he was debito modo onerat ' And as to the Demurr ' that confesses no more then what is well pleaded And as to Consequences there 's more danger to the Liberty of the Subject by allowing such a Behaviour then can be to the Government by allowing the Action to lye And therefore 't was prayed that the Judgment might be affirmed It was replyed on behalf of the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error That notwithstanding all that had been said the Laws there were different tho' the Foundation of them was the Common Law that they would not enter into that Question What sort of Title at first gave Right to these Lands but that this was a Commitment by a Councel of State And as to the Objection of too general Pleadings in male arbitrarie exercendo c. tho' the inducement of the Plea was so There were other Matters more particularly pleaded the altering the Decrees in his Chamber which was sufficient And as to the Objection That 't is not alledged in the Pleadings that the Charge in Councel against Wytham was upon Oath they answered That 't is not effential tho' prudent to have the Charge upon Oath before Commitment Matters may be otherwise apparent And as to the Objection That the Warrant of the Councel for the Commitment was not shewn they said that it lay not in their power because 't was delivered to the Provost Marshal as his Authority for the Capture and Detention of him and therefore did belong to him to keep And that the Councel tho' they were not a Court yet they had Jurisdiction to hear the Complaint and send him to another Court that could try the Crime and tho' it did not appear that the King gave any Authority to the Governour and Councel to commit yet 't is incident to their Authority as being a Councel of State the Councel here in England commit no otherwise and where the Commitment is not authorized by Law the King's Patent gives no power for it But the Government must be very weak where the Councel of State cannot commit a Delinquent so as to be forth-coming to another Court that can punish his Delinquency And therefore prayed that the Judgment should be reversed and the same was accordingly reversed Philips versus Bury WRit of Error to reverse a Judgment given for the Defendant in the Court of King's Bench where the Case upon the Record was thus Ejectione firme on the Demise of Painter as Rector and the Scholars of Exeter Colledge in Oxon for the Rector's House The Defendant pleads specially That the House in question is the Freehold of the Rector and Scholars of the Colledge but he says That he the said Dr. Bury was then Rector of that Colledge and that in right of the Rector and Scholars he did enter into the Messuage in question and did Eject the Plaintiff and so holds him out absque hoc That Painter the Lessor of the Plaintiff was at the time of making the Lease in the Declaration Rector of that Colledge hoc paratus est verificare c. The Plaintiff replys That the Messuage belongs to the Rector an Scholars but that Painter the Lessor was Rector at the time of the Lease hoc petit quod inquiratur per Patriam c. and thereon Issue is joyned and a Special Verdict The Jury find that Exeter Colledge is and was one Body Politick and Corporate by the Name of Rector and Scholars Collegij Exon ' infra Vniversitat ' Oxon ' that by the Foundation of the Colledge there were Laws and Statutes by which they were to be governed and that the Bishop of Exeter for the time being and no other at the time of founding the Colledge was constituted by virtue of the Statute concerning that Matter hereafter mentioned ordinary Visitor of the same Colledge secundum tenorem effectum statut ' eam rem concernent ' That the Bishop of Exeter who now is is Visitor according to that Statute Then they find the Statute for the Election of a Rector prout c. Then they find
haberi decrevit and then he adjourns 't is no Argument to say that he was hindred for he might have proceeded in absentia and if the 16th of June be tacked to it 't is longer than the time There needed no formal adjournment for that he is Authorized to proceed in a Summary way 't is no such absurdity to call that a Visitation which was in some sort hindred since notwithstanding the obstruction some Acts were done and more might have been by adjourning to another place 3. Here was no such cause as could warrant a Deprivation it was not one of the causes mentioned in the Statutes which are not directions merely but they are the constituent Qualifications of the Power and Contumacy is none of the causes nay here is no Contumacy at all The Offence of the Suspended Fellows was only a mistake in their Opinions and the Doctors was no more and 't is not a Contumacy for refusing to answer to or for any Crime within the Statutes for there was none of the Crimes mentioned in the Statutes laid to the charge of the Rector if the Crime charged had incurred Deprivation perhaps a Contumacy might be Evidence of a Guilt of that Crime and so deserve the same Censure but Contumacy in not consenting to a Visitation can never be such especially when the consenting to a Visitation is not required under pain of Deprivation 4. Admitting the Visitor legally in the Exercise of his Office that here was cause of Censure that the Cause or Crime was deserving of that Punishment which was inflicted that Deprivation was a congruous Penalty for such an Offence yet t was argued That this Sentence was void for that the Visitor alone was in this Case minus competens judex because his Authority was particularly designed to be exercised with the consent of others which was wanting in this Case This was the same as if it had required the concurrence of some other Persons Extra Colleg ' then that such a concurrence was necessary appears from the words of the Statute his meaning seems plain upon the whole to require it A greater tenderness is all along shewn to the Rector then to the Scholars 't is sine quorum consensu irrita erit hujusmodi Expulsio vacua ipso facto and the Sentence it self shews it necessary because it affirms it self to be made with such consent and it cannot be thought that the Rector should be deprivable without their consent when the meanest Scholar could not Then here 's no such consent for 't is not of the four Seniors but of the four Seniors not Suspended now this doth not fulfil the Command of the Statute for the Suspension doth not make them to be no Fellows a Suspended Fellow is a Fellow though Suspended a Suspension makes no vacancy the taking off of the Suspension by Sentence or by Effluxion of time doth make them capable of acting still without the aid of any new Election and they are in upon their old choice and have all the priviledges of Seniority and Precedency as before If they ceased to be Fellows by the Suspension then they ought to undergo the Annum probationis again and to take the Oaths again In case of Benefices or Offices Religious or Civil Ecclesiastical or Temporal 't is so a Suspension in this Case is only a disabling them from taking the Profits during the time it continues And 't is no Argument to say That their Concurrence was not necessary for that they had withdrawn themselves and were guilty of Contumacy for that a Man guilty of Contumacy might be present if withdrawn from the Chapel he might be in the Colledge or in the University and 't is not found that they were absent and then their Consent not being had the Sentence was void and null and consequently no Title found for the Lessor of the Plaintiff in the Action below It was replied in behalf of the Plaintiff much to the same effect as 't was argued before and great weight laid upon the Contumacy which hindred the observance of the Statutes that by allowing such a Behaviour in a Colledge no Will of the Founder could be fulfilled no Visitation could ever be had and all the Statutes would be repealed or made void at once that tho' this Crime was not mentioned 't was as great or greater than any of the rest that here was an Authority and well executed and upon a just Cause and in a regular manner as far as the Rector's own Misbehaviour did not prevent it and therefore they prayed that the Judgment might be reversed And upon Debate the same was reversed accordingly Note That in this Case there was one Doubt conceived before and another after this hearing The first was If a Writ of Error lay in Parliament immediately upon a Judgment in the King's Bench without first resorting to the Exchequer Chamber but upon perusing the Statute which erects that Court for Examination of Errors it appeared plainly that that Act only gives the Election to the Party aggrieved to go thither that it did not take away the old Common Law method of Relief in Parliament and so hath the Practise been but upon Judgments in the Exchequer Court the Writ of Error must first be brought before the Lord Chancellor and cannot come per saltum into Parliament because the Statute in that case expresly ordains That Errors in the Court of Exchequer shall be examined there and so held in the Case of the Earl of Macclesfield and Grosvenor The other Doubt was raised by a Motion in B. R. for the Court to give a new Judgment upon the Reversal above and insisted on that it ought so to be as was done in the Case of Faldo and Ridge Yelv. 74. entred Trin. 2 Jac. 1. Rot. 267. Trespass and Special Plea and Judgment in B. R. for the Defendant and upon Writ of Error in the Exchequer Chamber the Judgment was Reversed and upon the Record returned into the King's Bench they gave Judgment that the Plaintiff should recover contrary to the first Judgment for otherwise they said the Law would prove defective and a Precedent was shewn in Winchcomb's Case 38 Eliz. where the same Course was taken and the like Rule was made Mich. 1 W. Mar. upon the Reversal of the Judgment inter Claxton vers Swift which is entred Mich 2 Jac. 2. B. R. Rot. 645. the like between Sarsfield vers Witherley 'T was argued on the other side That the Court which reverses the Judgment ought to give the new Judgment such as ought to have been given at first that in the Exchequer Chamber it may be otherwise because they have only power to affirm or reverse for yet in the Case of King and Seutin the Exchequer Chamber gave a new Judgment tho' they cannot inquire of Damages and that is a kind of Execution which must be in B.R. In Omulkery's Case 1 Cro. 512. and 2 Cro. 534. the Court here sends a Mandatory Writ to
of the greatest Members of the House Selden Hollis Maynard Palmer Hide c. that the Earl Marshal can make no Court without the Constable and that the Earl Marshal's Court is a grievance Rushworth 2 Vol. 1056. Nalson's 1 Vol. 778. Spelman in his Glossary verbo Mareschallus seems to say 't was officium primo Servile and that he was a meer Servant to the Constable and gives much such another account of it as Cambden doth and pag. 403. is an Abstract or rather Transcript of all that is in the Red Book in the Exchequer about the nature of this Office and there 't is said that if the King be in War then the Constable and Marshal shall hold Pleas and the Marshal shall have the Amerciaments and Forefeitures of all those who do break the Commandments of the Constable and Marshal and then it was further alledged by the Councel for the Defendant in the Writ of Error that they knew of no Statute Record or Ancient Book of Law or History that ever mentioned the Earl Marshal alone as having Power to hold a Court by himself So that taking it as a Court held before an incompetent Judge a Prohibition ought to go and the Party ought not to be put to his Action after he has undergone imprisonment and paid his Fine since it hath the semblance of a Court and pretends to act as such and if it be a Court before the Earl Marshal alone in case it exceeds the Jurisdiction proper to it a Prohibition lies either by force of the Common-Law which states the boundaries and limits of that Jurisdiction or by force of the Statute of 8 Rich. 2. which is not repealed by the subsequent Law in that Reign and if such Prohibition do lie in any Case that here was cause for it the subject matter of the Articles being only a wrong if any to a private Officer who had his proper remedy at the Common-Law and therefore it was prayed that the Judgment should be affirmed and it was affirmed Smith Vx ' Versus Dean and Chapter of Paul 's London and Lewis Rugle APpeal from a Decree of Dismission made by the Lord Jeffreys the Bill was to compel the Dean and Chapter as Lord of the Mannor to receive a Petition in nature of a Writ of false Judgment for Reversing a common recovery suffered in the Mannor Court in 1652. whereby a Remainder in Tail under which the Plaintiff claimed was barred suggesting several Errors in the proceeding therein And that the said Lord might be commanded to examine the same and do Right thereupon To this Bill the Defendant Rugle demurred and the Dean and Chapter by Answer insisted That 't was the first Attempt of this kind and of dangerous consequence and therefore conceived it not fit to proceed on the said Petition unless compelled thereto by course of Law That Rugle being the Person concerned in interest to contest the sufficiency of the Common-recovery they hoped the Court would hear his defence and determine therein before any Judgment were given against them and that they were only Lords of the Mannor and ready to Obey c. and prayed that their rights might be preserved This demurrer was heard and ordered to stand And now it was insisted on by the Council with the Appellant that this was the only Remedy which they had that no Writ of Error or false Judgment lies for Reversing of a recovery or Judgment obtained in a Copyhold Court that the only method was a Bill or Petition to the Lord in nature of a Writ of false Judgment which of common right he ought to receive and to cause Errors and defects in such recovery or Judgment to be examined and for this were Cited Moore 68. Owen 63. Fits N. B. 12. 1 Inst 60. 4 Rep. 30. is such a Record mentioned to have been seen by Fenner where the Lord upon Petition to him had for certain Errors in the proceedings Reversed such Judgment given in his own Court 1 Roll's Abridg. 600. Kitchin 80. 1 Roll's Abridg. 539. Lanc. 98. Edward's Case Hill 8. Jac. 1. by all which it appears that this is an allowed and the only remedy Then it was argued That in all Cases where any Party having a Right to any Freehold Estate is barred by Judgment Recovery or Fine such Party of common Right may have a Writ of Error if the same be in a Court of Record and a Writ of false Judgment if in a Court Baron or County Court and reverse such Judgment Recovery or Fine for Error or Defect and there can be no reason assigned why a Copyholder especially considering the great quantity of Land of that Tenure in England should be without remedy when a false Judgment is given and the rather for that in Real Actions as this was the Proceedings in the Lord's Courts are according to those in Westminster-hall and now tho' a Common Recovery be a Common Assurance yet it was never pretended that a Writ of Error to Reverse it was refused upon that pretence and if the Lord of a Mannor deny to do his Duty the Chancery hath such a Superiour Jurisdiction as to enjoyn him thereto 'T is the Business of Equity to see that Right be done to all Suitors in Copyhold Courts Fitsh Abridg. Subpena 21. 2 Cro. 368. 2 Bulstr. 336. 1 Rolls Abridg. 373. If an Erroneous Judgment be given in such Court of a common Person 's in an Action in the Nature of a Formedon a Bill may be in Chancery in nature of a false Judgment to Reverse it and Lanc. 38. Tanfield says that he was of Counsel in the Case of Patteshall and that it was so decreed which is much more then what is here contended for and tho' Common Recoveries are favoured and have been supported by several Acts of Parliament yet no Parliament ever thought fit to deprive the Parties bound by such Recoveries of the benefit of a Writ of Error On the other side 't was urged in defence of the Dismission That the Person who suffered this Recovery had a power over the Estate that she might both by Law and Conscience upon a Recovery dispose of it as she should think fit that she hath suffered a Recovery and that it was suffered according to the custom of the Mannor tho' not according to the form of those suffered in Westminster-hall That the suffering of Recoveries in any Court and the Methods of proceeding in them are rather notional then real things and in the Common Law Courts they are taken notice of not as Adversary Suits but as Common Assurances so that even there few Mistakes are deemed so great but what are remedied by the Statute of Jeofailes or will be amended by the Assistance of the Court And if it be so in the Courts at Westminster where the Proceedings are more solemn and the Judges are Persons of Learning and Sagacity how much rather ought this to stand which was suffered in 1652. during the Times of
of making a new Presentation And in all pleadings of this sort the notice is generally alledged to be the same day or within a day or two at the most That certainly it ought to be with convenient notice But then it was urged That the six Months ought not to be from the Death of the last Incumbent if there be a person Criminal presented which the Patron doth or may know as well as the Bishop there the six Months must be from the Death but if it be upon a refusal for a Cause which lies only in the Bishop's knowledge then it must be only from the notice and that notice ought to be personal but if the Months incur from the Death the notice should be in conveient time and what that is the Court must Judge Then it was urged from Speccot's Case That this Plea is too general and uncertain that a Temporal right being concerned the Bishop ought to have set forth more particularly and distinctly the cause of his Refusal 8 Rep. 68. the certain cause of a Divorse must be shewn 11 Hen. 7. 27. 2 Leon. 169. The Ordinary is a Judge only of the matter of Fact if true not if this matter pretended be a cause of Refusal he ought to alledge that so particularly as to manifest it to the Court in which the Suit depends That 't is a legal cause of Refusal He is not a Judge whether Hodder's insufficiency in any one point of Learning be a good cause of Refusal for if it should be so the Temporal Right of Patronage would be very precarious The Court ought to have enough before them whereon to Judge of the Cause as well as that on Issue may be joyned and tried here 't is only said that he is less sufficient not that he is altogether illiterate this will put it in the Power of the Ordinary to refuse for want of knowledge in any Learning as he thinks fit as Mathematicks or Anatomy without which a Man may be well Qualified to be the Rector of a Benefice and the consequence of such Opinion will be much to the prejudice of Lay Patrons that certainty in Pleading ought to be encouraged for the prevention of the exercise of Arbitrary discretionary Power that the Wisdom of the Common-Law is to reduce things to single Questions that the Determination upon them may be plain and certain and known and the reasons of such Determinations may appear which cannot well be done if general Allegations or Pleadings be countenanced for which and other Reasons urged by the Counsel who argued with the Judgment 't was prayed that the Judgment might be affirmed It was replied on behalf of the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error that the Books were very plain that the six Months were to incur from the Death of the Incumbent and then if there were not notice in convenient and due time in order to enable the Patron to present again that this ought to come on the other side That to require Learning in Presentees to Benefices would promote the Honour of the Church nay of the Nation in general That every Man who knew this Presentee and his Ignorance even as to the Latin Tongue must acknowledge that the Reverend Prelate who refused him had done worthily and becoming the Character of his Order Family and Person and therefore 't was prayed that the Judgment should be Reversed and it was Reversed Robert Davis versus Dr. John Speed WRIT of Error on a Judgment in Ejectment in the King 's Bench for certain Lands in Hamp-Shire the Declaration was upon the Demise of Francis Cockey The Verdict finds that William Horne and Ann his Wise were seized of the Lands in Question in their Demesne as of Fee in Right of the Wife that they made and executed a Deed Covenanting to Levy a Fine thereof to the use of the Heirs of the said William Horne lawfully begotten and to be begotten on the Body of the said Ann his Wife and for default of such Issue then to the use of the right Heirs of the said William Horne for ever and a Fine was Levied accordingly to these uses that William and Ann were seized prout Lex postulat that they had Issue William Horne their Son who Died without Issue in the Life of William and Ann that she Died and William the Father and Husband Survived her that then he Died without Issue that the lessor of the Plaintiff is Sister and Heir of the said William Horne that after his Death she entred and was seized prout Lex postulat that Elizabeth Joanna and others were Co-heirs of the said Ann that their Estate and Interest came by mean conveyances to the Defendant Speed That he was seized prout Lex postulat that the Lessor of the Plaintiff entered and Ousted the said Speed and made the Demise in the Declaration and that the Plaintiff entered and was Possessed till the Defendant entered upon him and Ousted him And if it shall appear to the Court that the Desenant's entry was lawful they find the Defendant not Guilty and if c. upon this special Verdict Judgment was given in B. R. for the Defendant And now it was Argued on the behalf of the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error that this Judgment was Erroneous and ought to be Reversed for that these Lands belonged to the Heirs of the Husband by force of this Deed and Fine that this was in the Case of an Use which was to be construed as much according to the intent of the Parties as a will That if by any construction that intent could be fulfilled it ought That the intent of the parties here was plain to give this Estate to the Husband and his Heirs that uses are to be governed by Equity and that therefore the meaning of the persons concerned was to be pursued That the Woman intended to take nothing her self nor to reserve any thing but to part with the whole That here was an use by implication in the Husband tho' none could result back to the Husband because he had none before but that in this case as in that of a Will an use might by implication very well be raised to the Husband and then this might be good by way of Remainder after the Death of the Husband or create an Estate Tail in him by coupling the use implied to him for Life with that to the Heirs of his Body and that if it were not so then that it was good as a springing contingent use to the Heirs of the Body of the Husband c. and that in the mean time till that Contingency happened the same was to the use of the Wife and her Heirs And that this Construction contradicted no Rule of Law That it was no more than was allowed in case of a Will by way of Executory Devise according to Pell and Brown's Case in 2 Cro. that the Estate should remain in the Wife and her Heirs during the Life of the Husband
' suum ad prosequend ' predict ' primum Breve de Errore in et super Indictament ' predict ' pro alta proditione predict ' quod tamen Benedict ' Browne nullum habuit ' Warrant ' Attorn ' pro eodem Johanne Walcott de Recordo affilat ' ideo in eo manifeste est Errat ' Errat ' est etiam in hoc viz. quod Record ' predict ' apparet quod Judicium predict ' pro revocatione et adnullatione Judicij predict ' versus predict ' Thomam Walcott in forma predict ' reddit ' redditum fuit pro predict ' Johanne Walcott versus dict' Dominum Regem ubi per Legem terre hujus Regni Angliae Judicium ill ' reddi debuisset pro dicto Domino Rege versus eundem Johannem Ideo in eo scil manifeste est Errat ' et hoc parat ' est verificare unde pet ' Judicium et quod Judic ' ill ' ab Error predict ' et al' in Record ' et Process ' predict ' existen ' revocetur adnulletur et penitus pro nullo habeatur et quod dictus Dominus Rex ad que omnia ipse occasione revocation ' et adnullation ' Judicij predict ' amisit restituatur c. It was argued on behalf of the King That there was no Warrant of Attorney filed and consequently the Reversal was not regular for default of an Appearance by the Heir who prosecuted the Writ of Error and that there was no Day given to the Attorney General nor was the Attorney General or the Patentee a Party to the Record nor any Plea or Answer made by either of them to the Assignment of the Errors To this it was answered That by the Common Practise in the Crown-Office no Warrants of Attorney are filed neither for Defendants upon Indictments nor for Plaintiffs in the Writ of Error that it had not been known within the Memory of any Man living that such Warrants were ever filed That there need no day to be given to the King or the Attorney General for that the King's Attorney was supposed always present in Court and the King cannot be Nonsuited because he cannot be called That there never was any Answer to the Assignment of Errors in such Cases That in Capital Cases there needs no joyning of Issue upon pleading Not Guilty Then it was argued That there was no Error to warrant the Reversal to the Attainder that the Exception taken to the Judgment was trivial and frivolous that ipso vivente was not of necessity to be inserted that never any Judge was known to require that the Man's Bowels should be burnt while he was alive that the same was impossible to be executed that the Law never appointed any Judgment for Treason as essential besides Drawing and Hanging and that Quartering has been so long used as to be accounted part of the Judgment yet 't is not necessary to make a good Judgment and if that be so no more is needful than Drawing Hanging and Quartering that Ancient Presidents were thus short Rot ' Parliament ' 3 Hen. 5. p. 1. n. 6. Thomas de Gray al' had been Attainted of Treason upon a Special Commission at Southampton and the Record of the Attainder removed into Parliament 3 Hen. 5. and the Judgment was good Thomas de Gray ut proditor Domini Regis Regni sui Angliae distrahatur suspendatur decapitetur And in the Records Penes Thes Camar ' Scacc ' 3 Hen. 7. f. 10. a. 't is detrahatur suspendatur And many other there are in that place to the same effect and in the same manner Glanvil lib. 3. cap. 13. Fleta cap. 16. And there is the Case of David Prince of Wales who was Drawn Hang'd Beheaded Dismembred and Burnt Britton de Treason cap. 8. p. 16. Drawing and Death is the Punishment of Treason des Appeles c. 22. p. 43. to the same effect Lib. Assis 30 Edw. 3. pl. 19. and abundance of Records were cited as found in the Exchequer and nothing mentioned in them but detrahatur suspend ' And then was cited Rot. Parl. 2 Hen. 6. n. 18. and the Book 1 Hen. 6.5 19 Hen. 6.103 and 1 Hen. 7.24 Bro. Coron 129. there is a Judgment against Humfry Stafford per omnes Justiciar ' Angliae quod iterum ducatur turri abinde ponatur super herdillum et trahatur per London ad Tyburn ibidem suspendatur et ante mortem corda scindantur et caput scindatur et Corpus ejus dividatur in quatuor partes et mittentur ad voluntatem Domini Regis Earl of Essex's Case Moore 's Rep. and Owen's Case in 1 Roll's Rep. have not this inserted And Stamford who was a Judge in 1 et 2 Phil. et Mar. says c. 19. p. 128. only en son view And Alexander Burnett who was convicted of Treason for taking Romish Orders at the Old Baily 26 Car. 2. Rot. 56. had no such Judgment Corker's Case for the like Offence 31 Car. 2. Rot. 239. William Marshall 31 Car. 2. Rot. 240. And Mr. John Hampden had the like Judgment as Burnett c. 1 Jac. 2. upon confessing an Indictment of the same kind with Walcott's Whereupon considering that many Presidents were without this and that the Essential Parts of the Punishment were in this Judgment 't was prayed that the Judgment of Reversal might be Reversed and the Attainder confirmed On the other side it was argued That the Original Judgment was Erroneous and the Reversal just And first it was observed That this Writ of Error was new and particular ex gravi querela of the Countess of Roscommon who had nothing to do with the Record was a meer stranger to it and yet 't is suggested that the Reversal was to her Damage Then 't was urged that there was an Error in the first Judgment for that the Judgment in Case of Treason is by the Common Law and that it is and must be certain and not at the pleasure of the Court which pronounces and gives it That it ought to be severe because 't is a Punishment for the greatest Offence which can be committed Crimen lese Majestatis a Sin of the first Magnitude an Offence which imports Treachery to the Prince Enmity to the Country Defiance to all Government a Design to overthrow and confound all Order and Property and even the Community it self and in its Consequence occasions the Practise of all other Crimes whatsoever as Murders Burglaries Robberies c. and therefore our Constitution hath imposed upon it a severe and cruel Judgment such as the English do allow or permit in no other Case the greatest of other Crimes incur Death only but for Treason the Judgment is different Sir Tho. Smith's Treatise de Republica Anglic. 198. there ought in reason to be a proportion between the Offence and the Punishment and as this is the greatest so the Penalty is morte multo atrocior and in Fleta lib. 1. p. 21. 't is
only the signification of a Man's purpose how his Estate shall go after his death and tho' it be solemnly made in writing signed published and attested yet if he do any intermediate Act whereby it must be necessarily inferred that such Purpose and Intention of his did not continue the Consequent must be that what was done before as to such Will is totally defeated and unless it be set up anew by a Republication 't is as no Will. The Case of Mountague and Jeffryes 1 Rolls Abridg. 615. and Moore 429. proves this If a Conveyance at Law shews an Intent different from the Will as to Lands 't will be a Revocation tho' such Conveyance be not perfect to all purposes Hodgkinson versus Wood Cro. Car. 23. 'T is a Revocation tho' the Owner should be in again as of his old Reversion The Case of Lestrange and Temple 14 Car. 2. reported in Sid. 90. 1 Keble 357. is stronger but this is stronger yet because 't is not to the old use but limited in a different manner 't is a qualified Fee and to be determined upon the qualifications taking effect and so cannot be the old Estate and if it were yet 't is a Revocation and there 's no Circumstance in the Case that can direct a Court of Equity to differ from the Law and therefore it was prayed that the Decree of Dismission might be affirmed and it was affirmed John Fox Gen ' Plaintiff Versus Simon Harcourt Arm ' Defendant WRit of Error on a Judgment in B. R. The Case was upon a Special Verdict in an Action of the Case upon an Indebitus Assumpsit for Moneys received to the Plaintiff's use brought there by Harcourt versus Fox which Verdict finds the 37 Hen. 8. cap. 1. intituled a Bill for Custos Rotulorum and Clerkship of the Peace Then they find that 1 Will. Mar. intituled An Act for enabling Lords Commissioners for the Great Seal to execute the Office of Lord Chancellor or Lord Keeper and several Clauses therein concerning this Matter Then they find that John Earl of Clare was by Letters Patents dated the 9th day of July Anno 1 Will. Mar. according to the 37 Hen. 8. made Custos Rotulorum for the County of Middlesex and set forth the Letters Patents in haec verba Then they find that the Office of Clerk of the Peace for this County being void the Earl of Clare by writing under his Hand and Seal dated 19 July Anno primo did nominate appoint and constitute the Plaintiff Mr. Harcourt to be Clerk of the Peace for Middlesex for so long time only as he should well demean himself therein and the Instrument was found in haec verba Then they find him to be a Person resident in the County capable and sufficient to have and execute the Office that he took upon him the execution of the said Office and before he did so he at the Quarter Sessions for the said County in open Sessions took the Oath required by the late Act of this King and the Oath of Clerk of the Peace and did do and perform all things necessary to make him a compleat Officer and that during all the time he did execute the sald Office he demeaned himself well Then 't is found That on the fifth of February Anno tertio the said Earl of Clare was in due manner removed from being Custos and William Earl of Bedford by Letters Patents dated the sixth of February was made Custos according to the 37 Hen. 8. and those Letters Patents are also found in haec verba Then they find an Appointment in Writing dated the fifteenth of February by the said Earl of the said Fox to be Clerk of the Peace for the said County to hold the said Office for and during the time the Earl should enjoy and exercise the said Office of Custos so as he well demean himself therein They likewise find Fox to be a Person capable c. and that he took the Oath and did the other things requisite to qualifie himself for the said Office that he did thereupon enter on the Execution of the said Office and during the time that he executed it he well demeaned himself therein and did take the Fees belonging to the said Office which they found to be to the value of five shillings Sed utrum c. Et si c. Et si c. Upon this Judgment was given for the Plaintiff below And it was now argued for the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error That this Judgment ought to be Reversed And first it was said that whatsoever the Common Law was as to ancient Offices could be no Rule in this Matter Many and most of those were for Life but my Lord Coke says That the Office of Chancellor of England could not be granted to any one for Life because it was never so granted the like of Treasurer So that Custom and nothing else can govern in those Offices But here can be no pretence of its being a Common Law Office for the Common Law knew no such thing as Justics of the Peace to whom they say he is a Clerk That the first Statute which makes Justices hath no mention of Clerk but 't was meerly an Incident some Person of necessity was to officiate in that kind And where he is called the Justices Clerk it can only be that he was one appointed by them to make and write their Records for them and 't is probable that in ancient time he that was their Clerk was Custos Rotulorum and intrusted with the keeping of the Records then it coming to be an honorary thing to be Custos he that was the most eminent for Quality amongst them was appointed to that Trust and then he appointed his Clerk under him For there 's no ancient Statute or Law that empowered the Chancellor to make a Custos but he making out the Commission of the Peace might very well name one of them to be Keeper of the Records and to have the first place amongst them And such Person might very well appoint his Deputy or Servant who in time came to be Clerk of the Peace We have no certain but this is the most probable Account of the thing Then the Statute of 37 Hen. 8. recites That the Chancellor had much perverted the Institution by assuming to make Custos's for Life and so the Clerks of the Peace were for Life likewise The end of that Act was not only to remove ignorant Persons for the Common Law it self would turn any such out of Office if he be not able to perform the Duty of it but the Grants for Life were the great Grievance and therefore to remedy that Mischief the Custos must be appointed by Bill signed with the King 's own hand and at his pleasure removeable and the Clerk of the Peace to be appointed by the Custos and to continue only during the time of the others continuing to be Custos This tho' not
Exception to all Grants for Lives but Credit ought to be given to the Honour Wisdom and Judgment of former as well as present Officers in respect of such Nominations 'till some Misbehaviour shews the Choice to have been ill and when that appears the Persons are removable and then the Inconvenience is likewise removed Here the Jury have found the Plaintiff in the Action below to be able and sufficient and well qualified for the Office and to have done his Duty in the Office while he had it Wherefore it was prayed that the Judgment might be affirmed and it was affirmed Henry Lord Bishop of London and Peter Birch D.D. Plaintiffs versus Attorney General pro Domino Rege Regina WRit of Error to Reverse a Judgment given in B. R. in a Quare Impedit The Case upon Record was thus The Declaration sets forth the Act of Parliament which Erects and Constitutes the Parish of St. James's within the Liberty of Westminster out of the Parish of St. Martyns c. prout that by force and virtue of that Act the said Parish was made and the District therein named became a Parish and Dr. Tennison Rector of the same that he was afterwards Rite et Canonice consecratus Episcopus Lincoln ' and that thereby the said Church became void and thereupon it belonged to the King and Queen to present a fit Person ratione Prerogative sue Regie Corone sue Angl ' annex ' and that the Defendants hindred c The Defendants crave Oyer of the Writ and it is general Vic' Com' Midd ' salut ' precipe Henric ' Episcopo Lond ' Petro Birch Sacre Theologie Professor ' quod juste et sine Dilatione permittant nos prefentare idoueam personam ad c. que vacat et ad nostram spectat dâ—mationem Et unde pred' Episcopus et Petrus nos injuste c. And then they pray Judgment of the Writ and Declaration because that between the Writ and Declaration there is a material variance iâ— hoc viz. quod ubi per Breve pred' pred' Dom ' Rex et Regine â—â—â—itulant se ad Donationem pred' c. pleno Jure tamen per Narr ' pred' iidem Dominus Rex et Domina Regina intitulant se ad c. Sec â—â—â—tione Prerogative sue Regie Corone sue Anglie annex ' unde pro variatione pred' inter Breâ—e et Narr ' pred' they pray Judgment of the Writ and Declaration aforesaid and that the said Writ may be quash'd c. The Attorney General Demurs and the Defendants Joyn and there 's Judgment to answer over Then the Bishop Demurs generally and Mr. Attorney Joyns and Dr. Birch pleads that he is Incumbent and then sets forth the Statute of Hen. 8. concerning Dispensations and that after Dr. Tennison was elected Bishop the Archbishop granted to him a Commendam Retinere with power to take and enjoy the Profits to his own use by the space of seven Months That this Commendam was confirmed under the Great Seal according to the Statute and the said Dr. Tennison did enjoy the same accordingly c. Mr. Attorney Demurs and Dr. Birch joyns in Demurrer and Judgment was given for the King c. And now it was argued in the first place That the Plea in Abatement was good and if so all that followed was Erroneous And to make that Plea good it was said that there is a variance between the Writ and Declaration that they are founded upon several Rights that upon arguing the Merits of the Cause it must be owned to be so on the other side That no Argument can be urged to maintain the Declaration in general but the Jure Prerogative and consequently it must be different from the Title or Interest pleno Jure They have said below that tho' the King's Interest is bound by Statutes yet his Prerogative is not This Distinction of the Rights must be allowed or else the main Judgment is not justifiable and that there is such a Distinction appears in Gaudy and the Archbishop of Canterbury's Case in Hob. 302. by the Presentation there recited which was drawn by the King's Counsel 't is ad nostram Presentation ' pertinet sive ex pleno Jure sive ratione Prerogative By Bracton 415. If the Writ be founded on one Right and the Declaration on another the Writ must be abated as in Case of Executors and Corporations In some Cases it must be agreed That the Writ may be General and the Count Special but none of those Cases will reach to this where several Rights are pretended 'T is no Objection to say That there is no Writ in the Register for this for that 's rather an Argument against their Prerogative Besides this Prerogative was never allowed till Dyer's time and in the old Books 't is denied where the King was not Patron In the Register 30. is a Writ Special quod permittant nos presentare idoneam personam ad Ecclesiam de c. que vacat et ad nostram spectat Donationem ratione Archiepiscopatus Cant ' nuper vacantis in manu existentis And another Sine titulo ut de jure and that is General ad nostram spectat Donationem Another Writ is there Ratione custodie terre et heredis upon a Tenure in capite And another Ratione foris facture unius et ratione custodie terre et heredis alterius per servitium Another Writ pro Domino Rege et aliis conjunctim Register 32. is another such by reason of the Vacancy of the Archbishoprick 'T is not an Answer That the Writ of Waste is General and the Count Special because that is not en auter droit Then it was said that it is true That where another Writ cannot be had a General Writ and Special Count are allowable but here a Special Writ might have been sued And there were cited the 1 Inst. 26 53 54 235 344 3 Cro. 185 829. And as to the Queen and the Archbishop of York's Case 3 Cro. 340. that doth not come up to this Case for tho' the Writ were General and the Count in Right of the Dutchy of Lancaster yet both were as Patron pleno jure and the Count did only shew how the Plaintiff came to be Patron but here they were several Rights as dictinct as a Claim by a Man singly and a Claim as Executor or in jure Vxoris In Answer to this were cited the Presidents in Mich. 31 Hen. 6. Rot. 65. Pasch 9 Eliz. Rot. 1408. or 1410. Hill 13 Car. 1. Rot. 486. Trin. 31 Car. 2. Dominus Rex versus Episcop ' de Worcester Writ General and Count Special Rastal 528 530. Then it was argued upon the Merits of the Cause as it was appearing upon the Declaration and Plea and Demurrer and therein three Queries were made as had been by the King's Counsel below 1. If the King hath any Prerogative to present upon an Avoidance by Promotion where neither himself nor the Bishop was Patron but
doth were not these Benefices void if the Parties were advanced to Bishopricks and upon such promotions did not the King present undoubtedly he did Then 't was argued That 't was never the Intent of this Act to oust the King of this Prerogative the first Intent was to make a Parish and establish a Rectory that was the true design Suppose the Act had only vested the Advowson in my Lord of London and had not mentioned the Lord Jermyn would not this Prerogative have been consistent with the Right of Patronage As to the pretence that the Bishop is to present first that is only to make a Partition 't is an Explanation That they should not have it in common but by turns The holding of Dr. Tennison was reckoned as one turn and the Bishop was to have the next besides every Act of Parliament is to be construed according to the Subject Matter and not further than the Act designs and intends 't is plain from the Nature of the thing That nothing was designed but to settle the Rectory and establish the manner of Presentation according to the Agreement of the parties General Words shall not oust the King of his Prerogative since he is not named 3 Cor. 542. Moor 540.7 Rep. 32. Plowd 240. Hob. 146. Here are no Words which do import any Intention to restrain the King of that Right with respect to this as he hath with respect to other Rectories The King's Prerogative doth not interfere with their being two Parishes this Prerogative must operate upon all presentative Livings so soon as they are made so This can never be pretended to be partly presentative and partly donative for Dr. Tennison was in by Act of Parliament as one presented Then it being a Cession of a presentative Rectory whether old or new 't is the King's Right to present Vernon's Case 4 Rep. 4. Plowd 127. The Dr. came in not by Donation but was rather placed in by Parliament which implies in it the Consent and all the necessary Acts of the Patron and Ordinary Suppose the King should grant away his own Advowson during a Plenarty and afterwards such a Cession should happen by promotion surely that would not deprive the King of his prerogative and by the same Reason it ought not in this Case Wherefore upon the whole Matter it was prayed That the Judgment should be affirmed and it was affirmed accordingly Dominus Rex Versus Reginald Tucker WRit of Error to reverse a Judgment given in B. R. for Reversal of a Judgment against T. before Commissioners of Oyer and Terminer upon an Indictment for High Treason The Record is to the Effect following Ad Gen ' Session ' de Oyer et Terminer tent ' pro Com' Somerset apud Civitat ' Wellen ' in dict Com' Somerset corum Francisco Wythens mil ' un ' c. Richardo Heath un ' c. Georgio Strode mil ' un ' Servient ' c. et aliis Sociis suis Justiciariis dicti Domini Regis per Liter as Patentes ipsius Dom ' Regis sub magno sigillo Anglie confect eisdem Francisco Wythens Richardo Heath Georgio Strode et aliis aliquibus tribus vel pluribus eorum direct ' quorum alter ' eorum praefat ' F. W. vel Richardum Heath Dictus Dominus Rex unum esse voluit ad inquirend ' per Sacramentum proborum et legalium Hominum Com' praed ' ac aliis viis modis et mediis c. assignat ' per Sacrament ' Francisci Warre Baronett ' c. proborum et legalium hominum Com' Somerset praed ' adtunc et ibid impannellat ' jurat ' et onerat ' ad inquirend ' pro Domino Rege pro Corpore Com' praed ' presentat ' existit quod Reginald Tucker nuper de Long Sutton in Com' praed ' Gen ' et Thomas Place nuper de Eddington in Com' praed ' Yeoman timorem Dei in cordibus suis non habentes nec debitum ligeantie sue ponderantes sed Instigatione diabolica mot ' et seduct ' dilection ' ac veram et debit ' obedientiam quas veri et Fideles subditi Domini Jacobi secundi nuper Regis Anglie c. erga ipsum Dominum Regem gererent et de jure gerere tenentur subtrahent ' et machinant ' et totis viribus suis intendent ' pacem et Communem tranquilitatem c. proditoris compassaverint imaginat ' fuer ' et intendebant dictum Dominum Regem supremum et naturalem Dominum suum ad mortem adducere et contra dictum Dominum Regem supremum verum naturalem et indubitatum Dominum suum prodotorie levaverunt guerram c. contra pacem dicti Domini Regis nunc Coron ' et Dignitat ' suas ac contra formam Statut ' in hujusmodi casu edit ' et provis ' Et statim de premissis in Indictament ' praed ' specificat ' superius eis imposit ' per cur ' hic allocut ' qualiter se vellent inde acquietari iidem Reginald Tucker et Thomas Place separatim dicunt c. The Judgment is per cur ' hic quod praed ' Reginald Tucker et Thomas Place ducantur eteorum uterque ducatur usque ad Gaolam dicti Domini Regis Com' praed ' unde venerunt et abinde usque ad locum Executionis trahantur et uterque eorum trahatur et super furcas ibidem per collum suspendantur et viventes ad terram prosternantur et uterque eorum prosternatur et interiora sua extra ventres eorum et utriusque eorum capiantur ipsisque viventibus ibidem comburantur et quod capita eorum et utriusque eorum amputentur quodque corpora eorum et utriusque eorum in quatuor partes dividantur et quod capita et quarteria illa ponantur ubi Dominus Rex ea assignare voluit c. And now it was argued on the behalf of the King That this Reversal was not justifiable that the Exceptions taken below were many and as to the Pretence that secreta membra amputentur was omitted the same was not allowed as Error below by reason of the many Precedents which in the Entries did omit it That tho' the Practice be common to pronounce it yet few or no ancient Records do mention it that in 3 Inst. 210. where the Judgment is taken notice of this is not part In Plowd 387. 't is omitted that Interiora includes it In Bro coron ' 128. 't is not inserted That this was never entred as part of the Judgment till 12 Car. 2. Then as to the separatim allocut ' upon the Arraignment that was likewise over-rul'd below for it must be intended a several Demand or Question And the same is implied in this Entry as much as if it had been express'd and the Precedents are both ways But the main and only Exception for which the Court revers'd the Judgment was That in the Indictment 't is not said to be a Fact done
it Then as to the other Matter of the Damages which should have been inquired of upon the Demurrer 't was said That they were released upon Record and 't is plain that the Jury have found nothing upon that because the Conclusion of the Verdict doth shew that they inquired and found Damages only as to the concessit or assignavit they assess Damages for nothing else for if the Deed did pass the term then they find for the Plaintiff and assess Damages and if the term did not pass they find the Defendant Not guilty c. the Damages cannot therefore be for both for if they had found any for the Matter demurred upon it must have been with a si Contingat here 't is not so And tho' the Special Fact found had been against the Plaintiff it might have been for him upon the Demurrer and consequently the conditional finding of the Damages here can never be as to that Then it was further said That this might be supplied by an Inquest of Office in case it had not been released and there was cited Cheyney's Case Mich. 10 Jac. 1. 10 Rep. 118 119. Writ de Valore maritagij Issue on the Tenure and Verdict for the Plaintiff and no Value found of the Marriage and held ill because they say an Attaint lyes upon it that being the Point of the Writ and there the Rule is taken generally that where an Attaint lyes upon the finding the omission of finding such Matter cannot be supplied by a new Writ of Inquiry because such Writ of Inquiry would prevent the Party of the Benefit of his Attaint Then the Book says further That the Rule is that the Court ex Officio ought to inquire of such thing upon which no Attaint lyes and there the omission of its being found in the Verdict may be supplyed by a Writ of Inquiry of Damages as in the case of a Quare Impedit Poyner's Case Dyer 135. Issue found for the Plaintiff but the Jury per negligence were not charged to inquire of the four Points Plenarty ex cujus Presentatione si Tempus Semestre and the yearly Value of the Church there a Writ of Inquiry lyes de novo because upon them no Attaint lyes as is the 11 Hen. 4.80 because as to them 't is only an Inquest of Office and the Book says further That all the Cases to the contrary of that Rule have passed sub silentio without due Advisement and were against the Rule of Law So in the Case of Detinue the omission of the Value in the finding is fatal because an Attaint lyes upon a false Verdict in that particular So that by the Case cited it may be only an Inquest of Office as to part which is the present Case In that Case of a Quare Impedit in Dyer is cited a President for it in the Old Book of Entries 110. which is a false Folio for 't is in 93. b. and there is the very Entry of the Writ setting forth a Recuperavit presentation ' virtute Breais de Nisi prius Et quia nescitur utrum Ecclesia plena c. And as the Case is in Dyer the Plaintiff did there as the Plaintiff doth here release his Damages and had a Writ to the Bishop Now in Heydon's Case 11 Rep. 6. 't is held that no Attaint lyes upon an Inquest of Office and therefore 't is that if in a Trespass against divers Defendants some plead to Issue and one suffers Judgment to go by Default the Damages found on the Issue shall be chargeable upon all and the Inquiry of Damages on the Judgment by Default shall stay because no Attaint lyes upon that 'T is there also said that attaint lyes only on a Verdict on the mise of the Parties In Trespass three Issues Non culp ' to one part Prescription for a Common to another part and the Cattle raptim momorderunt in going to take Common to another c. The Jury find one for the Plaintiff and another for the Defendant and inquire not of the third Issue at all the Plaintiff relinquishing his Damages on the third Issue prays Judgment on the Verdict for the first and held that this prevented all Error Mich. 13 Car. 1. B. R. Brown and Stephens adjudged 1 Rolls Abridg 786. Then as to the Case of Vastuman and Row 11 Car. 1. B. R. in 2 Rolls Abridg. 722. Trespass for an Assault Battery and taking Corn Special Plea to the Battery and Demurrer thereupon and Non culp ' to the taking the Corn the Jury find no Damages upon the Demurrer said there That when Judgment is for the Plaintiff on the Demurrer the Damages for it cannot be assessed on a Writ of Inquiry but a Venire Facias de novo for the whole 'T was now argued that that was expresly against the Rule in Cheyney's Case and that in the Case in Rolls 't is put with the addition of a dubitatur But if that be Law there needs no Writ of Inquiry in this Case because the Damages as to that part are released and for this there is the express Case of Bentham 11 Rep. 56. In Annuity the Parties descended to Issue found for the Plaintiff as to the Arrearages but no Damages and Costs 't was held an imperfect Verdict and that it could not be supplyed by Writ of Inquiry of Damages yet the Plaintiff releasing the Damages and Costs had Judgment for him and a Writ of Error was brought and the Insufficiency of the Verdict was assigned for Error but the Judgment was affirmed because the Plaintiff had released it Dyer 369 370. Ejection ' custod ' terre hered ' and ill because intire Damages and for the beres no Ejectment lyes yet the Damages being released he had Judgment for the Land And 't was said to be there held That insufficient finding of Damages and finding of none are all one If a Release of that which is ill found will help where such thing released is directly in Issue much more it should do so where the thing released is but obliquely inquired of and was not put in Issue to the Jury and then 't was repeated what was said before that the Special Conclusion helps and prevents the General Intendment which otherwise would be had as to the Damages being intire and therefore 't was insisted that this made no Error but the Judgment in the Kings Bench stood good notwithstanding this Exception Then the Counfel for the Defendant did likewise wave this as not being the Cause of the Reversal in the Exchequer Chamber Wherefore it was argued for the Plaintiff That this Assignment or Grant found in the Verdict is void and passed nothing for that either it passed the whole Term or no part of it and that immediately that this must be agreed Then 't was said that it could not pass the whole for so to do was contrary to the Intention of all the Parties to the good will of the Grantor and even to the hopes of
had of Liberty of Speech not to make every thing a Cause of Action and to justifie this on the same side were quoted multitude of Cases too many to deserve a remembrance It was argued on the other side That these words toucht the Person in the most tender point viz. his Loyalty That it carried Scandal in it self not to be zealously affected to the Government which protects the whole that it was equivalent in Common Understanding to the calling him Traytor or Rebel That this was much more than affirming one not to be a good Man that disaffected implyed somewhat positive it 's meaning was that the Party hath an aversion a fixed settled Enmity to the Government that this was spoken of an Officer of great Trust that 't was a Reflection upon him with regard to his Office for Loyalty is as necessary as Justice in such a Post that to slander him in the one ought to be as actionable as to slander him in the other which is allowed it will because of the Reference to the Office in the nature of the words without any Special Damage that to deny these words to be actionable would tend to encourage Breaches of the Peace by provoking Challenges c. for that if Men cannot relieve themselves by Law they will be tempted to do it of themselves in other methods and that these words were a Reflection on the Government which employed Men thus disaffected and abundance of the Common Cases upon this Subject were quoted to shew what words would bear an Action in respect of Officers and Allegiance And then 't was argued strenuously that this was a Special Damage viz. to lose the Prince's Favour which every Man ought to covet and to lose a Place of Honour and Command both which the Jury have Found It was replyed on the behalf of the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error That as to the Reflection on the Government it might perhaps warrant an Information or Indictment but not an Action That as to Challenges there were vast variety of words which are reckoned provocative in the highest degree As the giving the Lie calling a Man a Coward and the like and yet will bear no Action And at last upon Debate the Judgment was Reversed John Duvall and Elizabeth his Wife Appellants Versus William Terrey of London Merchant Respondent THE Appeal was to be relieved against a Decree in Chancery The Case was That the Appellant Elizabeth had entred into a Bond of 140 l. Penalty conditioned for the payment of 72 l. on the Twentieth of April 1676. and by reason of several Promises and Delays of Payment and insisting upon Priviledge and other like Occasions it was not put in Suit till lately and then the Respondents were Arrested And upon a Declaration the Appellants pleaded Payment at the Day And after Issue joyned and notice of Trial upon some discovery of a Defect in the Evidence to prove the Bond Motion was made in the King's Bench to alter the Plea which denied a Bill was preferred in Chancery on suggestion that Elizabeth had never Executed it or that 't was obtained by Fraud and that there was no Consideration for the same and the Respondent preferred a Bill praying a Discovery if such Bond c. Upon Examination of Witnesses and after publication passed the Cause was heard and upon the hearing 't was ordered That the Appellants should not be relieved save against the Penalty of the Bond and that it be referred to one of the Masters to compute the Principal-money and Interest due thereon and to tax for the Respondent his Costs both at Law and in that Court and that what should be found due for the Principal Interest and Costs be paid by the Appellants at such Time and Place as the Master should appoint who computed the Principal and Interest at 154 l. and the Costs at 67 l. and to be paid the Twentieth of October following Upon the hearing of this Appeal there were two Queries made 1. Whether there being some difference in and about the proof of the Bond the Court ought to have made a Decree without directing a Trial at Law upon the validity of the Bond But 't was held That the Bond not being denied in pleading upon the Issue at Law the Chancery had done right and could not well have directed any other Issue than what the Parties themselves had joyned in at Law and tho' 't was pretended that the Attorney haâ— pleaded thus without direction the Court did not much regard that pretence because of the proper Remedy which the Law gives against such an Attorney if the pretence were true and therefore they did not much consider that Another Query was Whether the Court of Equity could justly award more than the Penalty and objected that the Order being to save against the Penalty no more ought to have been decreed But 't was said That notwithstanding that when the same was referred to a Master to tax Principal and Interest the Order bound the Party to pay both tho' it amounted to more than the Penalty and the meaning of the first part was only to relieve against the Penalty in case the Principal and Interest came to less than the Penal Sum especially the same coming to be heard upon cross Bills and as this Case was circumstanced after such delay and such pleading in the Court of King's Bench And as to Costs held no cause for an Appeal in this Case nor in truth was it ever known to be a Cause if the Merits were against the party Appellant And so the Decree was affirmed in the whole William Dolphin and Katharine his Wife Appellants Versus Francis Haynes Respondent APpeal to be relieved against a Decree in Chancery made by the Master of the Rolls Nov. 10. 1696. The Case was thus That one Paris Slaughter of London being Guardian to Katharine the Appellant during her Infancy he placed her with his Kinsman Chambers Slaughter near Worcester and sometimes boarded her in that place for her Education and the Respondent and the said P.S. being Correspondents Paris Slaughter ordered the Respondent to pay the said Chambers what Sums should be called for upon the account of Katharine In pursuance whereof several Sums were paid upon her account and the same were allowed again to the Respondent by P. S. The Appellant Katharine having just attained her Age she came to the Respondent and desired more Money as by the Order of P. S. and accordingly two several Sums were paid her and Receipts taken from her as by the Order of P. S. The Appellant Katharine did afterwards come to an account with P. S. which was fairly stated in Writing and they executed General Releases each to the other But the said two Sums not being entred in the Books of P. S. were not accounted for by the Appellant Katharine and the Respondent not having received any Allowance from P. S. in his Life time nor having as he thought any
Suspended were Seniors to the Consenting Scholars Then they find that after this Sentence Painter was elected into the Rectorship Concurrentibus omnibus requisitis si praedict ' Officium Rectoris eo tempore fuit vacans and that Dr. Bury 1 June Anno Jac. 2. semper postea usque sententiam praedict ' si sententia in contrar ' non valeat semper postea fuit adhuc est verus legitimus Rector Collegij praedict ' That William Painter as Rector and the Scholars of the said Colledge did make the Demise in the Declaration and thereon the Plaintiff entred and Dr. Bury enters on him and holds and yet doth hold him out modo forma prout in nar ' c. sed utrum super totam materiam praedict ' locus Rectoris per privation ' praedictam praed ' Arthuri legitime vacavit nec ne the Jury are ignorant si per inde locus praedict ' legitime vacavit tunc pro quaerent ' si non tunc pro Defendent ' It was argued on the behalf of the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error That this Judgment was illegal and the general Question was Whether this Sentence of Deprivation thus given by the Visitor against Dr. Bury did make the Rectorship void as to him and so consequently gave a Title to the Lessor of the Plaintiff But upon this Record the Questions were two 1. Whether or no by the Constitution of this Colledge the Bishop had a Power in this Case to give a Sentence 2. Supposing that he had such a Power Whether the Justice of that Sentence were examinable in Westminster-hall upon that Action And 1. 't was argued That the Bishop had such a Power to give a Sentence and it was agreed that he could make his Visitation but once in five Years unless he be called by the Request of the Colledge and if he comes uncalled within the five Years his Visitation would be void But yet the Visitation of the 24th of July was a good Visitation and consequently the Sentence upon it is good that there was no colour to make Dr. Masters's coming in March to examine Colmer's Appeal upon the Visitor's Commission to be a Visitation and that because it was a Commission upon a particular Complaint made by a single expelled Fellow for a particular Wrong and Injury supposed to be done to him and not a general Authority to exercise the Visitatorial Power which is to inquire into all Abuses c. Colmer complains that he was expelled without just Cause and seeks to the Visitor for redress they having expelled him for an Offence of which he thought himself innocent and the Visitor sends his Commissary to examine this particular matter Then 't was urged That tho' a Visitor be restrained by the Constitutions of the Colledge from visiting ex officio but once in five Years yet as a Visitor he had a constant standing Authority at all times to hear the Complaints and redress the Grievances of the particular Members and that is part of the proper Office of a Visitor to determine particular Differences between the Members and thus is Littleton's Text sect 136. that complaint may be made to the Ordinary or Visitor praying him that he will lay some Correction and Punishment for the same and that such Default be no more made c. And the Ordinary or Visitor of right ought to do this c. and so was it held in Appleford's Case in the Court of King's Bench who was expelled upon a like occasion as Colmer was he appealed to the Bishop of Winton who was Visitor and he confirmed the Expulsion and held to be good upon the Appeal for the hearing of Appeals is a standing fixed constant Jurisdiction Visiting is one Act or Exercise of his Power in which he is limited as to time but redressing of Grievances is another and his proper Office and Business at all times 'T is the Case of all the Bishops of England they can visit by Law but once in three years but their Courts are always open to hear Complaints and Determine Appeals so that here tho' but one Visitation can be in five years without request yet the Power and Authority to hear and examine any difference between the Members and to relieve against any particular Injury that 's continual and not limited Then 't was argued That tho' what was done upon the 16th of June was with an Intention to Visit yet being denied to enter the Chappel where the Visitation was appointed to be held it was none and his Calling over the Names was only to know who hindred the Visiting and his making an Act of it afterwards or administring an Oath at the time can never be called one tho' it hath been below said to be a tacking that of June to that of July but that cannot be for then it continued much longer than was intended nay much longer then it can by the Statutes of the Colledge for that is to cease in three days It turns rather the other way having been hindred in June he makes an Act of it in July in order to call them to an account for it as for a Conturnacy and to bring them to Judgment at his Visitation 'T was no more then taking an Affidavit of the Service of a Citation The appointment of a Visitation in the Hall was occasioned by the Obstruction met with at the Chappel and 't would be a very strange Construction that when he designed a Visitation and was hindred that the Hinderance and his Inquiry about it should be called a Visitation and a former Contumacy in opposing an intended Visitation should prevent their being subject to an actual true one Then 't was argued That there was no necessity that there should be the Consent of the four Senior Fellows to the Deprivation of the Rector and by one of the Counsel 't was owned that if such Consent had been necessary the Sentence had been a Nullity But as this Statute is framed 't was argued that the Bishop might deprive tho' they did not concur for these Reasons 1. By the Statutes the Bishop for the time being is made the ordinary Visitor of Exeter Colledge and that where any one is Visitor of a Colledge he hath full and ample Authority to Deprive or Amove any Member of the Colledge quatenus Visitor 2. There is an express Power given to the Bishop to proceed to the Deprivation of the Rector or the Expulsion of a Scholar and this in his Visitation And 3. The qualifying words do not restrain it to be with the Consent of the four Fellows the word is Deprivatio as to the Rector and Expulsio as to the Scholar tho' they are synonymous as to real Sense yet by this Statute they are differently applied Then it says If the Bishop do proceed c. that only relates to the Case of a Scholar because the word there used is Expulsio which is never applied but to the amotion
Visitor not appearing upon Summons refusing to be examined was an Offence and contrary to what the Statutes require He is to inspect the state of the Colledge and each Member's particular behaviour and now when the Visitor comes to make such an Inquisition and the Head or the Members withdraw themselves and will not appear to be examined if this be not a good Cause of Deprivation nothing can be for that nothing else can ever be inquired into As for that Statute which refers to the Causes for which a Rector may be deprived it doth not relate to a Deprivation in a Visitation but shews the manner how the Colledge is to proceed if he be guilty of such Offences they may complain at any time to the Visitor if he wasts the Revenues or behave himself scandalously and upon request will not resign and they may Article against him out of a Visitation but when he comes to execute his Power in his quinquennial Visitation he is not confined to proceed only upon the Information of the Fellows but is to inquire into all the Affairs of the Colledge and may proceed to deprivation as he sees Cause Now Contumacy is a causa of a Forfeiture of his Office which is subject to the power of the Visitor by the original Rules of the Foundation and to evade or contumaciously to refuse or deny a Submission to that Power is an Offence against the Duty of his Place and consequently a just Cause of Deprivation so that upon the whole Matter 't was inferred and urged that the Bishop hath a Visitatorial Power vested in him to deprive the Rector without consent of the four Senior Fellows And 2. that the Justice of the Sentence is not examinable in Westminster-hall And 3. that if it were and the Cause necessary to be shewn here was a good one an affronting the very Power of Visiting and fetting up for Independency contrary to the Will of the Founder and therefore it was prayed that the Judgment should be reversed On the other side 't was argued by the Counsel with the Judgment That this Sentence was void that 't was a meer Nullity that this proceeding had no Authority to warrant it and that it being done without Authority 't is as if done by a meer Stranger and whether it be such an Act or not is examinable at Law for that the Power of a Visitor must be considered as a meer Authority or a Trust and it is one or rather both and then either way 't is examinable for every Authority or Trust hath or ought to have some Foundation to warrant it and if that Foundation which warrants it hath limited any Rules or Directions by which it is to be executed then those Directions ought to be pursued and if they are not 't is no Execution of the Authority given or Trust reposed and if not 't is a void Act a meer Nullity and consequently 't is that of which every Man may take notice and advantage Then 't was said That it must be agreed that of a void thing all Persons may take advantage and contest it in a Collateral Action and that altho' it have the form and semblance of a Judicial Proceeding and for this was cited the Case of the Marshalsea's 10 Rep. 76. as a full Authority the Resolution was That when a Court hath no Jurisdiction of a Cause there all the proceeding is coram non judice and Actions lye against any Person pretending to do an Act by colour of such Precept or Process without any regard to its being a Precept or Process and therefore the Rule qui jussu judicis aliquid fecerit non videtur dolo malo fecisse quia parere necesse est will not hold where there is no judex for 't is not of necessity to obey him who is not Judge of the Cause and therefore the Rule on the other side is true judicium a non suo judice datum nullius est momenti and so was it held in the Case of Bowser and Collins 22 Edw. 4.33 per Pigot and 19 Edw. 4.8 And therefore if the Court of Common Bench held Plea of an Appeal of Felony 't is all void but it must be owned that the meer erroneous procedure of a Court which hath a General Jurisdiction of the Subject Matter is not examinable in a Collateral Action whether upon true Grounds or not and yet if it be a limited Jurisdiction and those limits are not observed even that is coram non judice and holds with respect to Courts held by Authority of Law which are much stronger then the Cases of Power created or given by a private Person A Sheriff is bound by Law to hold his turn within a Month after Michaelmas and he holds it after the Month and takes a Presentment at that time if that be removed into the King's Bench the Party shall not answer it but be discharged because the Presentment was void coram non judice for that the Sheriff at that time had no Authority and yet in that Case his Authority and Jurisdiction extended to the Person and Thing The same Law for a Leet unless Custom warrants the contrary and then that Custom must be pursued The Commissioners of Sewers have a limited Authority and if the number of Persons or other Requisites mentioned in their Commission be not pursued what they do which exceeds it is void and yet they have a kind of Legislative Authority so is it in Sir Henry Mildmay's Case 2 Cro. 336. and there they had an Authority both of Thing and Person but did not observe the Rules prescribed in the Gift of that Authority according to the 23 Hen. 8. cap. 5. and no reason could or can be given for that Resolution but that it was a particular limited Authority And then to apply this to the present Case the Sentence in question can no more aggrieve the Defendant then an Order pronounced or made by a non Judex if it be not agreeable to the Power given by the Statutes and this appears further from Davis's Rep. 46. where the same Distinction is allowed Nay in some Cases the Award of a wrong Process is void as if by a Steward of a Mannor Court that a Capias should issue where the same doth not lye but only an Attachment Turville and Tipper's Case Latch 223. A Court of Pypowders hath Jurisdiction of an Action of the Case yet if it holds Plea of Case for Slander 't is all void tho' the words were spoken within the Boundaries of the Fair because the Jurisdiction is limited so that if the Thing the Time the Person or the Process be not regarded according to the Authority given 't is all void and an Advantage may be taken of it by any Body where the Plaintiff Claims or makes his Demand by colour of such Act. 'T was further argued That the Reason given in that Case of Latch is because the Custom which gave him his Authority gave him
Inst 125. though the Statutes of Hen. VIII impower Commissions for trial of Treasons Committed beyond the Seas yet this Court doth and may still take Conusance of such Causes 4 Inst 124. Its Sentences are only reversable by and upon Appeal to the King no Writ of Error or false Judgment lies upon any of them which shews the greatness of the Court and the difference of its Jurisdiction from other Courts which may be some of thereasons why no Prohibition was ever granted to it and why the Parliament of Rich. II. gave the Remedy of a Privy Seal wherefore it was prayed that the Judgment should be Reversed On the other side it was argued by the Council in behalf of the Plaintiff in the Original Action that this Judgment ought to be affirmed and it was after this manner there seem three Queries in the Case 1. If any Prohibition lies to that Court 2. If any Cause here for a Prohibition and 3. If there be any such Court as that before the Earl Marshal but another doubt was raised whether any of these Questions could be such upon this plea which is concluded to the Jurisdiction for that seems to make only one doubt whether the Court of Exchequer could hold Plea of an Action for proceeding contrary to a Prohibition already granted but this was waved and then it was argued 1. That a Prohibition doth lie to this Court of Chivalry in case it exceeds the Jurisdiction proper to it and it was agreed that the Office of Constable is Ancient and by Cambden is held to have been in Ure in this Kingdom in the Saxon's time though the Office of Marshal is but of a puisne date but however Great and Noble the Office is however large and Extensive the Jurisdiction is yet 't is but limitted and Coke in 4 Inst 123. says that 't is declared so by the Statute of Rich. II. where 't is said that they incroached in great prejudice of the King's Courts and to the great grievance and oppression of his people and that their proper Business is to have conusance of Contracts and Deeds of Arms and of War out of the Realm which cannot be determined or discussed by the Common-Law which other Constables have heretofore duly and reasonably used in their time now by this Act 't is plain what the Jurisdiction is Contracts and Deeds of Arms and War out of the Realm are the subject matter of it and by Coke 't is called curia militaris or the Fountain of Marshal Law which shews it a Court that hath its boundaries a Court that may incroach nay which hath incroach'd in diverse instances belonging to the Common-Law And that 't is a Court that ought to meddle with nothing that may be Determined in Westminster-Hall then there must be some way of restraining this excess and these incroachments and if the Statute of Rich. II. had not been made it must be agreed that a Prohibition would have lain for else there had been no remedy which is absurd to affirm 'T is no Objection that Prohibitions are only grantable to Inferiour Courts and that this is one of the greatest Courts in the Realm for if a Court Marshal intermeddle with a Common-Law matter ea ratione it becomes inferior and may be controwled There needs no contest about the Superiority of Courts in this matter 't is the same here as among private Persons he that offends becomes inferior and subject to the Censure of his equal by offending though that Court should be reckoned so noble and great as hath been represented yet 't is only so while it keeps within its Jurisdiction Prohibitions are grantable to almost all sort of Courts which differ from the Common-Law in their proceeding to Courts Christian to the Admiralty nay to the Delegates and even to the Steward and Marshal upon the Statute of Articuli super Chartas Cap. 3. That they shall not hold Plea of Freehold or of Trespass Fits ' N.B. 241 242. is an express Writ of Prohibition though the Statute gave no such Writ but only did restrain the Jurisdiction of the Court which in truth is the Case in Question antecedent to the Statute pleaded No Argument can be raised from the subject matter of the Jurisdiction of this Court that 't is different from the Common-Law for so is the Admiralty and the Prerogative Courts nor is it any Objection that upon any Grievance in this Court the Appeal must be to the King for that holds in the other Courts with equal reason Nay Prohibitions lie from Westminster-Hall to hinder proceeding in Causes which the Courts that grant such Prohibitions cannot hold Plea of as to the Ecclesiastical Court which grants probate of a Will made within a Mannor to the Lord whereof such probate belongs 5 Rep. 73. to the Marches of Wales if hold Plea of what belongs to Court Christian 2 Roll's Abridg. 313. are several Cases to this purpose there were also Cited 1 Roll's Rep. 42. 2 Roll's Abridg. 317. Sid. 189. 1 Brownl 143 144. and Herne 543. 't was further urged that there neither was nor could be any reason assigned why a Prohibition should not be grantable to the Court of Chancery when by English Bill it meddles with the Common-Law in other manner than its Ancient and proper Jurisdiction doth allow and several Authorities were Cited to countenance that Assertion Then was considered the reason of Prohibitions in general that they were to preserve the right of the King's Crown and Courts and the ease and quiet of the Subject that 't was the Wisdom and Policy of the Law to suppose both best preserved when every thing runs in its right Channel according to the Original Jurisdiction of every Court that by the same reason one Court might be allowed to incroach another might which could produce nothing but confusion and disorder in the Administration of Justice that in all other Writs of Prohibition the suggestion is and with Truth in prejudicium corone Regis Gravamen partis and both these are declared to be the consequent of this Courts excess or incroachment of Jurisdiction even by their own Statutes and when the reason is the same the remedy ought to be so But it hath been pretended That the Statute appoints a Privy Seal for to supersede c. and therefore no Prohibition to this it was answered That this Act doth not take away the force of the 8 Rich. II. mentio ned in 4 Inst 125. which restrains the Constable and Marshal from medling with any Plea which concerns the Common Law and if it had a limitted Jurisdiction by the Common-Law or by that Statute the subsequent Statute which gave a further Remedy for to restrain them did not take away that which they had before and every Body must agree that where an Act of Parliament restrains a Jurisdiction such Act warrants a Prohibition in case that restraint be broken or exceeded 't is so in case of a limited Power at
8 Rep. 171. York and Athen's Case Lane's Rep. 20. Hob. 115. 2 Rolls Abridg. 158. Stevenson's Case 1 Cro. 389 390. 'T was argued that nothing could be inferred from Tanfield's Opinion in 2 Rolls Abridg. 159. which is also in Lane's Rep. 65. for there the Debt was not a Debt to the King till after the Death of the Testator but here is a Forfeiture to the King before the Elegit sued and admitting that the King hath only the pernancy of the Profits yet while he hath so no other Person can intermeddle for the King is intituled to all the Profits even to a Presentment to a Church which was void before the Outlawry as is Beverly's Case 1 Leon. 63. 2 Rolls Abridg. 807. and Oland's Case 5 Rep. 116. And Process of Outlawry is to be favoured and encouraged as 't is a Means for the recovery of just Debts and the effects of them by Forfeiture to the King ought to be favoured as a Prerogative wherewith the King is intrusted to that purpose 'T is a Penalty or Judgment upon him to be put Extra Legem because he contemns the Law and will not obey it so that as to him 't is the greatest Justice in the World that he should not enjoy any benefit of his Estate by virtue of the Law during the time that he despises it And as to Baden 't was his own default that he did not extend sooner he trusted the Party longer then he should and for that he may thank himself Wherefore upon the whole 't was prayed that the Judgment should be affirmed and it was affirmed Hall al' Executors of Tho. Thynne Versus Jane Potter Administratrix of George Potter APpeal from a Decree of Dismission in the Court of Chancery The Case was thus That Thomas Thynne Esq having intentions to make his Addresses to the Lady Ogle gave a Bond of 1000 l. Penalty to the Respondents Husband to pay 500 l. in Ten days after his Marriage with the Lady Ogle the Respondent assisted in promoting the said Marriage which afterwards took effect soon after the said Thynne was barbarously murdered and about six years after Mr. Potter brought an Action upon this Bond against the Appellants as Executors of Mr. Thynne and proving the Marriage recovered a Verdict for the 1000 l. Thereupon the Appellants preferred their Bill in Chancery to be relieved against this Bond as given upon an unlawful Consideration the Defendants by their Answer acknowledge the Promotion of that Marriage to be the Reason of giving the Bond. Upon hearing the Cause at the Rolls the Court decreed the Bond to be delivered up and Satisfaction to be acknowledged upon the Judgment The Respondent petitioned the Lord Keeper for a re-hearing and the same being re-heard accordingly his Lordship was pleased to Reverse that Decree and ordered the Respondents to pay Principal Interest and Costs or else the Bill to stand dismist with Costs And it was argued on behalf of the Appellants That this Bond ought in equity to be set aside for that even at the Common Law Bonds founded upon unlawful Considerations appearing in the condition were void that in many Instances Bonds and Contracts that are good at Law and cannot be avoided there are cancelled in Equity That such Bonds to Match-makers and Procurers of Marriage are of dangerous Consequence and tend to the betraying and oftentimes to the ruin of Persons of Quality and Fortune And if the use of such Securities and Contracts be allowed and countenanced the same may prove the occasion of many unhappy Marriages to the prejudice and discomfort of the best of Families that the Consideration of such Bonds and Securities have always been discountenanced and Relief in Equity given against them even so long since as the Lord Coventry's time and long before and particularly in the Case of Arundel and Trevilian betweeen whom the Fourth of February 11 Car. 1. was an Order made in these or the like words Vpon the hearing and debating of the Matter this present day in the presence of the Counsel Learned on both sides for and touching the Bond or Bill of 100 l. against which the Plaintiff by his Bill prayeth relief It appeared that the said Bill was originally entred into by the Plaintiff unto the Defendant for the payment of 100 l. formerly promised unto the said Defendant by the Plaintiff for the effecting of a Marriage between the Plaintiff and Elizabeth his now Wife which the said Defendant procured accordingly as his Counsel alledged But this Court utterly disliking the Consideration whereupon the said Bill was given the same being of dangerous consequence in precedent upon reading three several Precedents wherein this Court hath relieved others in like Cases against Bonds of that nature thought not fit to give any countenance unto Specialties entred into upon such Contracts It is therefore ordered and decreed That the said Defendant shall bring the said Bill into this Court to be delivered up to the Plaintiff to be cancelled Then 't was further urged That the Appellants had once a Decree at the Rolls to be relieved against the Bond in question upon consideration of the said Precedent in the time of the said Lord Coventry and others and of the Mischiefs and Inconveniences likely to arise by such Practises which increase in the present Age more then in the Times when Relief was given against such Bonds and therefore 't was pray'd that the Decree might be Reversed On the other side it was urged That the Consideration of this Bond was lawful that the assisting and promoting of a Marriage at the Parties request was a good Consideration at Law in all Times to maintain a Promise for payment of Money That this Bond was voluntary and the Party who was Obligor was of Age and sound Memory that here was no Fraud or Deceit in procuring it that Chancery was not to Relieve against Voluntary Acts that here was a great Fortune to be acquired to the Appellant's Testator by the Match that here was Assistance given that the Persons were both of great Quality and Estate and no Imposition or Deceit on either side in the Marriage That it might be proper to Relieve against such Securities where ill Consequences did ensue yet here being none and the thing lawful and the Bond good at Law the same ought to stand that here are no Children Purchasers or Creditors to be defeated that there are Assets sufficient to pay all and consequently there can be no Injustice in allowing this Bond to remain in force that it was the Expectation of the Respondent without which she would not have given her Service in this Matter and that it was the full meaning of the Appellant's Testator to pay this Money in case the Marriage took effect that there was a vast difference between supporting and vacating a Contract in Chancery that tho' Equity perhaps would not assist and help a Security upon such a Consideration if it were defective at Law
yet where it was good at Law and no Cheat or Imposition upon the Party but he meant as he had undertaken to pay this Money and was not deceived in his Expectation as to the Success of the Respondent's Endeavours 't would be hard in Equity to damn such a Security and therefore 't was prayed that the Decree should be affirmed It was replied That Marriages ought to be procured and promoted by the Mediation of Friends and Relations and not of Hirelings that the not vacating such Bonds when questioned in a Court of Equity would be of Evil Example to Executors Trustees Guardians Servants and other People having the Care of Children And therefore 't was prayed that the Decree might be reversed and it was reversed accordingly The Society of the Governour and Assistants London of the new Plantation of Ulster in the Kingdom of Ireland Versus William Lord Bishop of Derry APpeal from a Judgment by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal of Ireland in Parliament assembled upon the Bishop's Petition and Appeal to their Lordships form an Order in the Chancery touching certain Lands in the County and Liberties of London-Derry It sets forth amongst other things after a recital of the Proceedings in Chancery and the Merits of the Cause that the Appellants were advised that no Appeal lyes to the House of Lords in Ireland from the Court of Chancery there but that all Appeals from thence ought to be immediatly to their Lordships here the Supreme Judicature as well for Matters arising in Ireland as in this Kingdom and therefore in the Conclusion prays that an Order might be made for the said Bishop to appear and put in his Answer thereto that the Matter might be heard before their Lordships here when it should be thought fit and that the Petitioners might receive such relief as should be agreeable to their Lordships great Wisdom and Justice c. Upon presenting this Appeal to the Lords here the House appointed Lords Committees to consider the proper method of Appealing from the Decrees made in the Court of Chancery in Ireland and to report c. Then pursuant to an Order made by the Lords Committees and a Letter sent to the Lords Justices of Ireland by Order of the House of Lords here Some Precedents or Cases from Ireland relating to the method of appealing from the Chancery there were brought before the said Committee and reported to the House whereupon the House ordered that both Parties might have Copies of the same Then the Society took Copies and preferred a short Petition to the House setting forth the said matter and that they were ready by their Councel to offer several things in order to their Lordship's receiving and proceeding upon their said Appeal whereupon a day was appointed for the hearing of Councel on both sides with regard to Jurisdiction And It was accordingly argued on behalf of the said Society that the Judgments in Ireland whether in Law or Equity were not to be finally Determined there that Ireland was dependant upon England 't was urged to prove it that our Money was to be Current there that our Laws did oblige them that they were governed secundum leges consuetudines anglicanas Davis 21. in which Book 24. that the Easterlings in England who first made the Money of this Standard and from whose Name comes that of Sterling were the first Founders of the four Principal Cities of Ireland Dublin Waterford Corke and Limrick and the other Maritime Villes in that Country and were the sole Maintainers of Traffick and Commerce there which were all utterly neglected by the Irish These Cities and Villes were under the Protection of King Edgar and Edward the Confessor before the Norman Conquest and these Easterlings in Ancient Record are called Ostmanni and therefore when Hen. 2. Upon the first Conquest after their Apostacy thought fit to People those Cities and Villes with English Colonies drawn from Exeter Bristol and Chester c. he assigned to them a certain proportion of Land next adjoyning to each of those Cities which Portion is called in the Records in Ancient time Cantreda Ostmannorum Davis 25. says further that Ireland is a Member of England Inhabitantes ibidem legibus Angliae subjiciuntur utuntur In the Statute of Faculties 28 Hen. 8. cap. 19. 't is mentioned to be the King's Land of Ireland and that this the King's Land of Ireland is a Member Appendant and rightfully belonging to the Imperial Crown of the Realm of England and united to the same And in the 33 Hen. 8. cap. 1. by which the Stile and Title of King of Ireland was given to Hen. 8. his Heirs and Successors 't is further Enacted that the King shall enjoy this Stile and Title and all other Royal preeminences Prerogatives and Dignities as united and annexed to the Imperial Crown of England Nay It may be compared to a County-Palatine Created by the King of England for Davis 62. speaking of that he says that a County-Palatine hath in it jura regalia which consists in Royal Jurisdiction and Royal Seignory By the first it hath all its High Courts and Officers of Justice which the King hath and by the latter it hath Royal Services and Royal Escheates as the King hath and therefore in some respects 't is separated and disjoyned from the Crown as is Plowd 215. yet 't is subordinate and dependant though it be said that breve Dom ' Regis non Currit there yet the Writ of Error which is the dernier resort and in like manner an Appeal is excepted out of their Charters so is Dyer 321. and 345.34 Hen. 6.42 and it would be excepted if it were not so expressed for to have the ultimate Judgment is that which the King cannot grant for such grant would if allowed alter the fundamental constitution of the Realm So in Ireland which is a Realm of it self as Consisting of many Counties Erroneous Judgments given in the chief place there shall be reversed in the King's Bench in England Davis quotes Bracton lib. 3. tit ' coron ' cap. 8. that Comites Palatini habent regalem jurisdictionem in omnibus Salvo Dominio Regi sicut principi so that by his Opinion they are much the same and no Man will deny but that in all Proceedings in Law or Equity the last resort is to the Parliament of England there it is that the King 's supreme Authority is exercis'd It must not be said to be a Conquered Country for the Earl of Stassord's sake though Coke and Vaughan have affirmed it so But it may be called a Plantation or Colony dependant upon England and to many purposes parcel of it This hath not only the same person for their King but 't is under the Crown and Government of England there must be in all these Cases a Superiority or superintendency over inferiour Dominions for otherwise as Vaughan puts it 401. the Law appointed or permitted to such places might be insensibly changed within it self
yet then they would have over-ruled the Plea and not have wrote to the Arch-Bishop at all This is the sole cause of that Judgment and then the consequence will be as was observed before But their own reason fails in this Case for here the sufficiency of Learning is Traversable for as hath been shewn it hath often been Traversed and as to the ea Ratione inhabilis no Objection can be to that for the old Authorities Cited do warrant nay require it and all Pleas of Special non est fact ' as by breaking of a Seal and the like are in the same manner Then besides the very words of the Law of Articuli Cleri are very much worthy of consideration it impowers the Bishop to refuse a Clerk propter defectum scientiae alias Causas rationabiles now all these Causes of Refusal mentioned in their cases comes under the causas Rationabiles and causa vaga in certa estnon Rationabilis now want of Learning is not included by intendment but by express words and therefore need not otherwise be set forth take it for granted that as they would have it the Temporal Judges are to Judge what is a reasonable cause of Refusal yet they are not to Judge if defect of Learning be a cause or not for in that the Statute is positive then if said to be deficient in Learning ea ratione inhabilis they had nothing to Judge upon they were only to write to the Arch-Bishop to know if the Fact were true if he were deficient and therefore it need not be set forth any otherwise then as the Statute expresses it tho' in that case they say there are divers sorts of Schisms and Heresies in Doctrines on which the Bishop might warrant his Refusal yet 't is not so much as once pretended there are any Opinions delivered in those cases that deficiency of Learning is subject to the same Rules of Pleading Then the Plea is in the Negative as was shewed before which is more than enough to make a good difference and Negatives in a Bar are always allowed to be more general because most favoured and especially here where the matter and person to which the words are applied do sufficiently restrain and determine the seeming uncertainty of it Nothing can be pretended to reduce this to a greater certainty but the Canons or the Statute of 13 Eliz. cap. 12. or other Laws of the same nature 1 Canons of King Jac. 1. made in 1602. and they were made pursuant to Canons made 1562. by which no Man was to be admitted nisi rationem fidei juxta Articulos Religionis in Synodo Episcoporum Cleri Anno 1562. approbatos Latine reddere eandem Scripturae testimonio Corroborare possit Can. 3 4. Conditiones in ordinandis requisit ' this is merely a Negative injunction on the Bishop never to confer Orders upon any Man that cannot do this it is not mandatory upon him to ordain every Man that can do this nor does it any way lessen or diminish the Authority or Judgment of the Ordinary in Examination of the fitness and Learning requisite So is the Statute of 13 Eliz. the same induces an incapacity on those that shall not subscribe the Articles but it leaves all things else to the Ecclesiastical Law neither the Canon nor the Statute are Derogatory from the Old Ecclesiastical Law they both leave it in Statu quo to the Ecclesiastical Judges no Man will pretend that these are a Repeal of the Statute of Articuli Cleri so that the Law remained as it did with more Latitude indeed to the Bishop but not with more favour to the Clerk They objected that here was not convenient notice to the Patron and the usual pleading of it is the same day But surely that 's well enough and so was it held by all the Judges that favoured their side in this case and 't is apparent that he had above four Months time to have presented another besides the Judges declared below that if not a convenient time it ought to have come on their side but they admit notice by their Replication and insist upon his Orders as an Estoppel to say that he was Illiterate They pretend That he is still under the Bishop's Jurisdiction and that he may deprive him for the same Cause if sufficient after Institution but that 's a great mistake for there may be a cause of Refusal which is not of Deprivation for he may become Learned that was not so and besides the Rule is false after induction they would then be discoursing about Freehold c. a Man may be refused because non compos but he cannot be deprived for that Cause though the Bishop may provide a Curate c. As to the pretence of six Months notice from the time of the Refusal 't was never insisted on at the Bar in C. B. or B. R. and the Judge who doubted did only say he was not fully satisfied with the current Opinion of the Books his doubt arose upon this That the cause of Refusal was not within the Partron's knowledge Suppose the Man had not Episcopal Orders but pretended to them and the Patron knew nothing of the matter should this Presentation prevent lapse and the rest were all of another Opinion and the Books are full to this effect for the Patron ought to present a Man qualified otherwise 't is as no Presentation and then lapse in course Suppose he had presented a mere laicus 't is as none suppose he had presented a Woman as idonea persona 't is as none and these instances may seem Trivial but our Books do mention them 2 Roll's Abridg. 364. Kelway 49.59 34 Hen. 7.21 14 Hen. 7.21 and Dyer 227. and Sir Symon Degges Parson's Gounsellor Upon the whole the Question is whether a Court of Law shall Repeal the Statute of Articuli Cleri whether the Plea shall be adjudged ill which is in the very words of that Statute when the same Fact was never pleaded otherwise nay when it hath been pleaded thus often times and never excepted against till now Wherefore it was prayed that the Judgment might be Reversed On the other side 't was argued That the Bishop's Plea below was too general and the Plaintiffs Replication good that his being Ordained a Priest and a Licensed Preacher is enough that this is an Answer to the Allegation of the Minus Literatus his being a Priest is a kind of a supersedeas to his Examination that there was no Learning requisite to his having a Cure of Souls which was not Antecedently necessary to his receiving of Orders That he ought not to be admitted into Orders unless he be assured of or named to some Curacy all which supposes the Qualifications Requisite for a Benefice with Cure of Souls then 't was urged that here was not notice sufficient for 't is not till many days after the Refusal for this might have put Hele the Patron beyond the possibility
that this was never designed to take effect as an use to be vested immediately and it was no more then if the Deed had declared the use to be after the expiration of twenty Years or at other future time to the Heirs of the Body of William Horne and for default of such Issue to his right Heirs and that such time had happened the use would have vested in the Heirs of his Body or in his right Heirs if he had Died before that time That 't is true there must be a person capable of taking at the time when the Contingency happens and so there was here at the time of his Death That it could never be intended that the Heirs should take immediately for that then there was no such person in being there could be no Heirs during his Life That this was like the Case of Webb and Sir Caesar Cranmer where the Trust of the Estate during the Life of the Duke of Southampton was adjudged to remain in the Heirs of the Devisor the Duke himself not being capable to take it That here being no person able to take under this Deed and Fine during the Husband's Life it shall be construed to remain as it was before till that Life ends and then the use ought to take effect for otherwise both the Deed and Fine are to no purpose they are all in vain and the intent of the parties to it is defeated And there were Cited the Lord Paget's Case in 1 Anderson and Woodlett and Denny 2 Crook 439. and 1 Leon 256. On the other side it was argued with the Judgment that this Deed and Fine can raise no use to the Heirs of the Husband according to the Rules of Law It was insisted That if Husband and Wise do levy a fine of the Wife's Land and no uses are declared or such uses are declared as are void and can never take effect such Fine is to the use of the Wife and her Heirs that in such case the Estate remins ' as it was or if the Fine Operates any thing it shall be for the benefit of the party to whom it did belong before Then it was urged That this was designed to raise an use immediately to the Heirs of the c. and that there was no person capable of taking at the time of levying this Fine the common Maxim in the Law proving it quod nemo est heres Viventis that the name and nature of an Heir import a successor after Death that this being designed to raise an use ex presenti and no person being capable of taking at that time the same must be void That this is the case of a Deed executed in the Life-time of the parties and not a Will where large allowances are often made in favour of supposed intentions by reason that persons are often surprized by Sickness and presumed to want the assistance of Counsel but the Rules of Law are always allowed to govern in Construction of Deeds Then it was urged that nothing was ever designed to the Husband himself by this that no words in the Deed can favour such a presumption that this must either work as an Estate in present or by way of remainder if the latter then by the known Rules of Law there must be a particular Estate to support it and such particular Estate must be either expressed or implied here is none expressed and if implied it must be in the Wife and if in her then she dying before the Husband her particular Estate did determine before the remainder could take place and consequently by all the Rules of Law it can never take place and no particular Estate can be implied in or for the Husband for that there is nothing said shewing such intent and if the Construction of Law be to prevail then as was urged before that is in favour of the Wife But here it was plainly designed to take effect immediately and therefore void because there was no person in being capable of taking at the time the Estate was intended to vest and no uses are to be executed by the State which are limitted against the Rules of the Common-Law Chudleigh's Case 1 Rep. 129. if the limitation of an use be at this day to A. for Years and afterwards to the use of the Heirs or Wife of B. which shall be this is void because 't would have been void if limitted in possession Dyer 190. the Earl of Bedford's Case in Popham 3 4. and 82. resolved in like manner to be void because would have been so in an Estate conveyed at Common-Law And all that can be objected is that then this is all void which is no more than may be pretended upon every imperfect conveyance but here the Case is in a Court of Law and the Defendant is a Purchaser who hath been Thirty Years in Possession tho' that doth not appear in the Case And it was said That as to the Notion of a springing contingent use 't is hardly intelligible in it self and by no means applicable to this Case because here are no words in this Deed that carry any relation to a future time or Contingency and the Objection is only this That the Conveyancer was mistaken in his Judgment or that the parties knew not what they meant or that they meant to create such an Estate and in such a manner as the Law will not allow and neither of these are Reasons sufficient to prevail for the Reversing of a Judgment given according to the Rules of Law by which Men's Inheritances have all along been governed and upon which many Estates do now depend 'T was further urged That the contrary Opinion which must be advanced to annul this Judgment would reder the Law and Men's Conveyances as doubtful and uncertain as last Wills and Testaments and submit Men's Titles to the Arbitrary Power and Will of those that shall Judge of them It is to impower them to suppose intentions where not expressed and to raise uses by Implication where they were never designed And in short 't will destroy all the difference between good and bad Conveyances and enable Men to limit uses and raise Estates contrary to and in different manner from what the Law hath hitherto allowed it will render Purchases more uncertain than they are at present and that 's more than enough already and the consequence must be to produce a confusion in property c. wherefore upon the whole it was prayed That the Judgment might be affirmed and it was affirmed accordingly Watts al' versus Crooke APpeal from a Decree in Chancery The Case in short was this That Peter Crooke and Elizabeth his Wife who was Sister of the half Blood to George Watts claimed to have an equal share with John Watts and Elizabeth Camfield who were Brother and Sister of the whole Blood to the Deceased of his Personal Estate and a Decree was made in Chancery in favour of Crooke and his Wife It was argued on
cum aggravatione pene corporalis somewhat more than Death Then this being a Common Law Punishment and not prescribed by any Statute the knowledge of it must be fetcht from our Law-Books and from Presidents for the General Practise of the Realm is the Common Law 't is describ'd with an ipso vivente in Smith's Republica Anglic. p. 28. lat Edit pag. 245. Stamf. 182. en son view which is tantamount and Stamford wrote 2 Eliz. In Coke's 3 Inst 210. 't is ipsoque vivente comburentur Pulton de Pace Regni 224. and many other Books were cited to the same effect And 't was affirmed that there was no Book which recited the Judgment at large but had this Particular in it Several Books do in short put it That for Treason the Party shall be Drawn and Hanged and Quartered but those are only Hints of the Chief Parts not Recitals of the Judgment it self In the English Book of Judgments printed 1655. pag. 292. 't is mentioned particularly as the Kings Bench have adjudged it should be The Duke of Buckingham's was so 13 Hen. 8. Stow's Chronicle 513. shews that he was the Person Then 't was said they have been thus in every Age without interruption 'till 26 Car. 2. Humfrey Stafford's Case 1 H. 7.24 which was per consensum omnium Justiciariorum tho' quoted on the other side as shortly stated in the Year-Book yet on the Roll which hath been seen and perused 't is with an ipso vivente Plowden 387. and Rastal's Entries 645. the same Case is thus Coke's Ent. 699. is so likewise John Littleton in 43 Eliz. Coke's Ent. 422 423 and 366. is so In the Lord Stafford's Case 33 Car. 2. by the Direction of this House and with the Advice of all the Judges was the Judgment so given by the Earl of Nottingham then Lord High Steward In the Lord Preston's Case 't is so which was drawn by Advice of the then Attorney and Sollicitor the present Keeper and Chief Justice of the Common Pleas. As to the Objection That vivens prosternatur doth imply it and that 's enough It was answered That ipso vivente comburentur implies both but not e contra and all the Presidents shew the latter to be requisite And as to the Case of David Prince of Wales mentioned in Fleta there 's only a Relation of what was the Execution not of what was the Judgment And Coke 2 Inst 195. says That the Judgment was in Parliament and therefore the same can be no President to this purpose and any one that runs over Cotton's Records will find the Judgments in Parliament to be different as the Nature of the Case required No Argument can be drawn from the Acts of the Legislature to govern Judiciary Proceedings however John Hall's Case 1 Hen. 4. Cott. 401. is as now contended for Before the 1 Hen. 7. there were some Erroneous Attainders and the 29 Eliz. takes notice of them as so errneous The Judgments against Benson and Sir Andrew Helsey cited below are plainly erroneous they dispose of the Quarters which they ought not but leave the same to the King's pleasure Sir Andrew's President is a monstrous arbitrary Command by Writ to Commissioners of Oyer and Terminer ordering them to Examine him and to give Judgment in manner as in the Writ is directed that therefore is not to be justified and 't was before 25 Edw. 3. Henry Ropers 21 Rich. 2. doth dispose of the Quarters and hath other Errors in it and so have William Bathurst's and Henry South's which were in 3 Hen. 4. But from that time to 26 Car. 2. there 's none which do omit it The four Presidents at the Old Baily were against Popish Priests and what private politick Reasons or Commands might occasion the omission is unknown and Hampden was not Executed but his Judgment was upon a Confession and his Life saved the reason of which is also unknown So that there have been none Executed upon such Erroneous Judgments And that there are no more Presidents with the Omission is a good Argument that those many which have this Particular in them are good and legal the constant Current having been this way proves the same to be the Common Law And this is the most severe part of the Punishment to have his Bowels cut out while alive and therefore not to be omitted As to the Earl of Essex's Case in Moore and Owen's Case in Roll's Rep. the first is only a Report of the Case and the last a descant upon the Judgment but neither do pretend to recite the whole Judgment Then to pretend that this Judgment cannot be Executed is to arraign the Wisdom and Knowledge of all the Judges and Kings Counsel in all Reigns And Tradition saith that Harrison one of the Regicides did mount himself and give the Executioner a Box on the Ear after his Body was opened c. Then 't was argued That if it be a necessary part of the Judgment and be omitted it is a fatal Error and doth undoubtedly in all Cases give a good reason for the Reversal of such Judgment as in the Common Case of Debt where dampna are omitted in the Judgment tho' for the Advantage of the Defendant as is Beecher's Case and Yelv. 107. Besides if this be legal then all those Attainders in which this Particular is inserted must be illegal for 't is impossible that both the Judgments should be right for either those are more severe than they should be or this is more remiss To say that 't is discretionary is to give the Judges a power which they themselves have disclaimed and to Reverse this Reversal is to tell the Court of Kings Bench that they are not obliged to follow the General Practise of their Predecessors that they are obliged to no form in their Judgment for Treason that nothing but Death and being Drawn to it are essential and according to that Doctrine a Woman might receive the Judgment of Quartering and a Man might be Burnt and both according to Law But the Constitution of this Kingdom hath prescribed and fixed Rules and Forms which the Executive Power is obliged and bound to follow that as nothing can be made or construed to be an Offence at the Pleasure of the Court so no Judgment can be given for any known Offence at Pleasure But the Law either Statute or Common hath established what is an Offence and what is its Punishment and there is nothing of Arbitrary Power allowed in respect of either Wherefore upon the whole it was prayed that the Reversal might be affirmed and it was affirmed accordingly Sir Evan Lloyd Baronet and Dame Mary his Wife and Sidney Godolphin Esq and Susan his Wife Appellants Versus Sir Richard Carew Baronet an Infant the Son and Heir of Sir John Carew Baronet deceased Respondent APpeal from a Decree of Dismission in Chancery The Case was thus Rice Tannott died seized in Fee of several Lands in the several Counties of Salop
specially That if Parol Evidence or a naked Averment should be admitted then they find to such Uses But here 't is like finding the Badges of Fraud without finding the Fraud it self or a Demand and Denial without finding a Conversion upon neither of which can the Court judge the Thing to be a Fraud or a Conversion And for these and other like Reasons it was prayed that the Judgment might be reversed It was argued on the other side with the Judgment That this Fine thus levied was not to the use of the Husband but of the Wife and her Heirs that the Fine is not to the Uses in the Deed of the 29th but controuled by that of the 31st 'T was agreed that if there be a Deed to levy a Fine and in pursuance thereof a Fine is levied to the Person of the Lands and at the time no Proof shall be allowed that the Fine was to any other Use but if it be in case of a subsequent Deed then Averment may be against it but by the making of a precedent Deed all Parties are estopped to contradict it unless there be another Deed of equal Nature to controul that Where the Deed is punctually observed there 's no liberty to aver the contrary but where 't is not pursued the Averment is consistent Where it doth vary yet if nothing doth appear to the contrary there the fine shall be construed to be to the Uses of the Deed by construction of Law a Wife is bound by the Husband's Declaration and if the Fine be in pursuance of the Husband's Deed 't is as binding to her as if she were a Party An Infant cannot avoid a Fine where there was a Deed agreeable but by reversing it Then 't was argued That here was such a Variance as did allow of such Averment that 't is true the Deed of 29. had been a good Declaration of the Uses of this Fine notwithstanding the Variance if the Writing of 31. had not been made but there being a Variance that is admissible that this Fine now found differs as much from that in the Deed as if it had been levied at a time after that levying it before makes it not the same The Woman perhaps here did agree to levy a Fine at this distance of time that she might in the mean while have a competent Provision out of her Husband's Estate for her Joynture then when she levies this Fine at a different time she doth not do it in pursuance of the first Deed. Then 1 Rep. 76 99. 3 Bulstr 231. 2 Rolls Abridg 251. 2 Cro. 646. 2 Rolls Abridg. 799. Savil 124. 1 Leon. 210. 3 Cro. 210. 1 And. 240. were quoted and either answered or applied to this Point of Variance Then 't was said That there was a difference between a Fine that varies from a precedent Deed and a Fine that is followed with a subsequent Deed or Declaration of Uses If there be a subsequent Declaration the Heir at Law cannot aver that 't was to the use of the Conusor and his Heirs or to any other use then what is in the Deed the Party himself or his Heirs cannot aver it but they are estopped by this Deed tho' subsequent however a Stranger is at liberty to make such Averment But if a Deed be precedent and the Fine varies and is not the same there none are estopped neither the Party himself his Heir nor a Stranger because the Fine stands alone without any Deed referring to it and declaring the uses of it ' Then 't was urged That this second Deed was sufficient to declare the uses of this Fine If the use arise upon or by transmutation of the Possession as by Fine or Feoffment 't is sufficient without any Deed the use arises only upon the Parties Declaration or Appointment If without a transmutation of Possession there must be some Agreement binding the Party upon some Consideration for the use being founded in Equity the Chancery would never relieve where there was no transmutation of Possession or Agreement upon Consideration and if in Consideration of Blood it must be by Deed because the Consideration is not binding without it Moore 's Rep. Callow and Callow If this Writing of 31. had expresly declared that it should enure to the Husband and his Heirs upon such a Contingency this had been a good original Declaration of the use and would have altered the Estate because of the transmutation of the Possession and as 't is now penned 't is a good Writing sufficient to declare the uses of the Fine any sort of Agreement whereby the Parties intent appears is sufficient an use is an equitable thing and if it appears to have been intended that is enough 2 Leon. 14. Brent's Case any Agreement between the Party that hath the Estate and him who is to have it may raise an use in this Case a Bargain and Sale of the Lands carries the use tho' no mention of it 8 Rep. Fox's Case Crossing and Scudamore In this Case there was an Agreement betwixt Husband and Wife that he should have the Lands if he made a Jointure A Bargain and Sale tho' not inrolled a Charter of Feoffment without Livery shall raise the use of a Fine levied between the same Parties therefore this Writing is a good Appointment But suppose it were not so of it self 't is sufficient to controul that of the 29th for 't is agreed thereby that all Deeds shall be revoked which shews plainly that the Fine was not to be to the uses mentioned in that Deed especially when it varies from it A Parol Declaration of the Mind of the Party will be enough to controul and hinder the raising of an use by the Deed and Fine where different and if so then the use here is to the Wife and her Heirs Then supposing the Variance frivolous and immaterial this Writing of the Husband and Wife is a good appointment the Trustees or Conusees of the Fine need not to be Parties to the appointing or declaring of the uses The Indenture precedent is but directory and if there be another direction under Seal before the Fine it must over-rule the first Writing of it self seems enough 2 Cro. 29. 3 Cro. 571. But suppose an Indorsment on the Indenture revoking one use before the Fine be levied would not that controul it This is rather like a last Will and the last before the Fine must stand A Covenant to stand seized must have all the necessary Parts of a Deed so as to have been obligatory in Chancery before the Statute but a meer Declaration of uses need not be so formal The use declared by the 29th was always revocable till the Fine was levied and this is sufficient both to revoke the last Declaration and to declare new uses this amounts at least to a Deed-Poll and therefore sufficient Then were cited Moore 22 512. Latch 139. and many other Authorities And upon the whole 't was prayed that the Judgment should
be affirmed and it was affirmed Sir Edward Hungerford and John Hill Executors and Devisees of Sir William Basset deceased Plaintiffs versus Edward Nosworthy Defendant WRit of Error to Reverse a Judgment in B. R. upon a Special Verdict in Ejectment by Hitchins the Lessee of Nosworthy against Sir William Basset Defendant for the Mannor of Lanrock and other Lands in Cornwall wherein upon Not Guilty pleaded and a Trial at Bar the Jury find That Sir Henry Killegrew was seized in Fee of the Lands in question and on the 12th of November 1644. made his Will in writing which follows in these words I Henry Killegrew c. and so they set forth the Will whereby Sir Henry Killegrew devised the Premisses to Mrs. Jane Berkley his near Kinswoman for Life with Remainder over to Henry Killegrew alias Hill Sir Henry's Natural Son in Tail and makes Mrs. Berkley sole Executrix They further find that after the making of that Testament and before the time when c. viz. about the Feast of St. Michael in the Year 1645. Condidit fecit aliud Testamentum in scriptis sed quid fuit content ' in eodem ult ' mentionat ' Testamento vel quale fuit purportum sive effectus inde juratoribus praed ' non constat And that Sir Henry on the 29th of September 1646. died seized of the said Lands that Mrs. Jane Barkley Devisee of the said Will in 1644. by Lease and Release conveyed to Mr. Nosworthy's Father and that the Father died in 1684. that Mr. Nosworthy is Son and Heir to him that Sir William Basset is Cosin and Heir to Sir Henry viz. Son and Heir of Elizabeth Basset Daughter and Heir of Sir Joseph Killegrew elder Brother of Sir Henry the Testator that Nosworthy the Lessor of the Plaintiff entred and made the Lease in the Declaration c. But upon the whole Matter whether the Said Testament made in writing 1645. was a Revocation in Law of the said Devise of the said Lands to Mrs. Berkley they are ignorant and pray the Judgment of the Court Et si And upon this Judgment was given for the Plaintiff in the Ejectment And now it was argued That the Judgment was Erroneous that this last Will could not be taken to be a duplicate of the former but must be deemed a Revocation that no Will is good but the last that every Will is revokable till death that the making of another doth import a Revocation of all former ones tho' it be not so expresly declared in writing for it must be the last or nothing that this Conveyance by Will was anciently a Priviledge by the Civil Law for People in Extremis who had not the time or assistance necessary to make a formal Alienation and chiefly intended for Military Men who were always supposed to be under those Circumstances and therefore the Ceremonies and number of Witnesses required of others were dispensed with as to Soldiers but now the Rules for Military Testaments as they are called are allowed in most Cases that as to Lands by our Law was a Priviledge only given to some Boroughs and Places within the Kingdom and particular Custom gave the liberty of disposing Lands or Houses by Will and that by nuncupative Will or Parol without writing so is Bracton lib. 4. fol. 272. Fleta lib. 5. cap. 5. Potest legari catallum tam hereditas quam perquisitum per Barones London Burgenses Oxon 1 Inst 111. that then came the Statute of Hen. 8. and impowers a Devise by a Man's last Will and Testament in writing but still 't is by his last Will. And so is Littleton sect 168. If divers Wills the latter shall stand and the others are void 1 Inst 112. In truth 't is plain Law the first Grant and the last Testament In Swinb 1 part sect 5. p. 14. no Man can die with two Wills but he may with divers Codicils and the latter doth not hinder the former so long as they be not contrary Another difference there is between Wills and Codicils If two Testaments be found and it can't be known which is first or last both are void but the latter countermands the first tho' there be a Clause in the first that it shall not be revoked and tho' an Oath were taken not to revoke because the Law is so that the very making of a latter doth revoke the former So is Liuwood's Provincial ' de Testamentis Justice Dodderidge's Office of Executor published by Wentworth 29. A verbal Will revokes a former written Will Forse and Hembling 4 Rep. 60 61. Plowd 541. Perkins sect 178 179. and sect 478. The 2 Hen. 5.8 is full to this purpose There 's an Action by an Executor against two Executors and they plead a Testament whereby they are made Executors and the Plaintiff replys that he afterwards made another and himself Executor and held that by the second the first became void Now the meaning of these Books cannot be that a Will expresly revoking is the only Will that can make a Revocation nor is it that a Contrariety or Repugnance between the one and the other is necessary to make a Revocation for tho' there be no new Will made yet a Revocation may be by word of Mouth as 2 Cro. 49.115 1 Cro. 51.3 Cro. 781. nay a void Bequest shall revoke a Will so shall a Deed that hath no effect as Feoffment without livery a Devise to J.S. or to a Corporation when there is no such will do it so that 't is not the Contradiction between the disposal which revokes for that which is no disposition at all will do it wherefore the meaning of the Authors cited is somewhat else and it can only be this That there is somewhat particular in a Will to that Instrument of Conveyance more than to any other that even the making of a new Will is a sufficient Revocation the words are plain by the making a new Will the former are all destroyed for there can be but one last And when a Man makes and declares a new Will that new Will must be presumed to contain his whole Mind concerning the disposition of his Estate declaring his Will imports thus much and excludes all other When a Man would alter part of his Will there 's a proper Instrument for it called a Codicil which is known in the Law as well as that of a Will here 's nothing found of a reference to the former to judge it otherwise would confound the use of Wills and Codicils and the difference between them 'T is true that a Man may make partial Wills of several parts of his Estate and all may stand together but then they must be declared to be Wills concerning particular things and they are but several pieces of the same Will tho' written in different Papers but then in pleading one of them you must not generally say he made ult ' voluntatem but ultimam voluntat ' of such a thing but here 't
the Alienation even of an Ideot and then after Office the Practise is to Issue a Scire facias to him in possession or to the Alienee and so is Fitzh tit Scire facias pl. 2. 106. All these Methods prescribed by the Law would be useless if the Acts themselves were void Then 't is as certain that the Office must be found during the Parties Life and during the insanity and not afterwards If there had been an Office 't would only avoid it with a prospect as it would be in case of an Heir after death Even after an Office the King cannot have the Profits from the time of the Alienation which shews it not it not void from the beginning If a Suit be against an Ideot after Inquisition the Ideot cannot plead it but the King shall send a Supersedeas to the Judges suggesting the Inquisition so that even then the Party himself cannot avoid it As to the other way of avoiding it by the Heir it must be by Writ or Entry and till Entry or Writ the Act remains good But here 's no Contest with the Party himself or with his Heirs but with a Remainder Man This Act of Surrender was no tortious Act it wrought no discontinuance there was no Trust in him to preserve the Contingent Remainder A Feoffment with livery is allowed not to be void and yet that may do a wrong by discontinuance c. As to the pretence that a Warrant of Attorney to make livery is void that doth not reach this Case for here 's an Act done by himself which would have passed the Estate as by and from himself if he had been of sound Mind Then 't was desired that the other side would shew any such Case as this whereas multitudes of Gifts Grants Releases Bonds and other Specialties sealed and delivered by the Party himself are allowed to be good and the same reason holds for a Surrender made in Person and there 's no difference between a livery made in Person and a Surrender the Act being Personal and not by another under his Authority makes the livery good and so it ought to be here 18 Ed. 4.2 Perkins sect 139. And 't is observable in 39 Hen. 6.42 per Priscott upon the Inquisition 't is reseized and revested into the Interest of the Ideot and consequently of the King and if revested 't was once out of him Now here 's no prejudice to the Man himself by this Opinion he is taken care of and his Acts avoided by the King on his behalf and his Heirs may avoid them But that Strangers should take notice of them as void was denied and therefore prayed that the Judgment should be reversed On the other side it was argued with the Judgment That this never was a Surrender that 't was against sense and reason to allow the Acts of a Madman a Person distracted to be valid to any purpose that in case of livery it had been allowed to be only voidable by reason of the solemnity and notoriety of the thing but in case of a Deed or a Thing passing only by Deed 't was otherwise and Bracton Britton Fleta and the Register were cited where 't is declared who can take and who can alien and that a Madman cannot alien and Fitzh is of Opinion that the Writ of dum non fuit compos may be brought by himself that there was a notion scattered in the Books that such Acts are only voidable but the reason of the Law is otherwise 39 Hen. 6.42 hath the distinction that Feoffment with livery is good but if livery be by Warrant of Attorney 't is void If it be a Feoffment with Warranty by Deed and possession delivered with his own hands yet the warranty is void because the Deed is void Perk. 5. The Deed of a Mad-man is void if he grants a Rent 't is void If an Infant makes a Warrant of Attorney 't is void so is Whittingham's Case A Deed and a Will are not to be distinguished and by the same reason that the one is void the other is so Finch 102. is general All Deeds of a Man of non sane memorie are null 12 Rep. Shulter's Case 'T is an offence to procure a Deed from him The Civil Law makes all his Acts which he doth without consent of his Curator to be void A Madman is taken pro absente 'T is a Rule unaccountable That a Man shall not stuitifie himself that he shall not be able to excuse himself by the Visitation of Heaven when he may plead Duress from Men to avoid his own Act. 'T is absurd to say That a Deed procured from a Man in a Fever or in Bethlehem shall be valid to any purpose Fitzherbert who was a good Lawyer ridicules the pretence and maintains That he himself may avoid such Act. Then were cited 2 Inst 14. Lloyd and Gregory 1 Cro. 501 502. Perkins tit Grant 13. Then it was said That in this Case there needs not much Argument the Reason of the Thing exposes the pretended Law And the Judges have declared that this Surrender is void the word amens or demens imply that the Man hath no Mind and consequently could make no Conveyance Wherefore 't was prayed that the Judgment should be affirmed and without much debate it was accordingly affirmed Henry Earl of Lincoln by Susanna Countess of Lincoln his Mother and Procheine Amye Appellant Versus Samuel Roll Esq Vere Booth Hugh Fortescue Esq and Bridget his Wife al' Respondents AApeal from a Decree of Dismission in Chancery The Case was thus Edward late Earl of Lincoln who was Son and Heir of Edward Lord Clinton the only Son of Theophilus Earl of Lincoln deceased being seized in Fee of the Mannors of c. after his Mothers decease who is yet living and of other Lands of about 3000 l. per Annum part of the ancient Estate of the Family And designing that in default of Issue-Male by himself his Estate should go with the Honour made his Will 20 Sept. 34 Car. 2. and thereby devised the Premisses to Sir Francis Clinton for Life Remainder to his first and other Sons in Tail-Male with many Remainders over to such Persons in Tail-Male to whom the Honour might descend and directed that his Houshold Goods at ...... should remain there as Heir Loomes to be enjoyed by the next Heir-Male who should be Heir of Lincoln and made the said Sir Francis the Appellants Father and after his Death Earl of Lincoln Executor On the sixth of Novemb. 36 Car. 2. Earl Edward made another Will in writing in like manner with the alteration of some Personal Legacies and afterwards in April 1686. and in Dec. 1690. did republish his Will Then Earl Edward sold part to Richard Wynne Esq for 24491 l. 3 s. 6 d. and mortgaged the Premisses in question to him for 12200 l. Then Earl Edward by Deeds of Lease and Release dated the 27th and 28th of April 1691. conveys his whole Estate to
in the Negative doth amount to it viz. that he shall continue no longer especially when the Act recites the Mischief to be a Continuance during Life It implies that the Clerkship of the Peace should be never granted for a longer Interest than the Custos had in his Office The 3 and 4 Edw. 6. doth indeed repeal part of the 37 Hen. 8. not by express words but by a very strong Implication by giving the Chancellor a power to nominate the Custos But the Office of Clerk of the Peace is not toucht by that of Edw. 6. and continues as settled by 37 H. 8. which is during the continuance of the Custos Then 't is the new Statute which gives the occasion of the present Dispute and there 's nothing in this Act which can make such an Alteration in the Law as was below contended for The words So long only as he shall well demean himself are not enlarging of his Estate but Restrictive and whensover 't is considered how to make a Grant for Life to be good you must consider the power and capacity of the Grantor and how the thing is capable of being so granted as in Case of Tenant in Tail or Fee and each make a Lease for Life in the latter Case 't is for the Life of the Lessee and in the former for the Life of the Tenant in Tail because of the different Capacities of the Grantors and so the thing it self is considerable here 's an express Statute that saith it shall be only during the continuance of the Custos now that Provision is to be pursued 'T is said that a Grant quam diu se bene gesserit is for Life but the words themselves do not import any such thing 't is indeed a restrictive Condition which the Law imposes upon all Offices for Misbehaviour in any Office if in Fee is a Forfeiture but the chiefest Consideration is if it be an Office that is capable of being granted for life if it be so these words may amount to a Grant for Life as expounded by usage and the nature or capacity of the Office it self but otherwise if the Office be not grantable for Life such words will not give an Estate for Life These words seem only to be an Expression of what the Law always implieth tho' not particularly expressed If it operate any thing it seems only to have reference to the power of the Grantor as a Restirction on him and not as an Enlargement of the Estate of the Grantee especially where by a Law in being there 's an incapacity upon the very Office not to be granted for life Then it was urged that the Statute of 37 H. 8. was not repealed the 3 and 4 Edw. 6. doth not alter this Matter at all and where it did make any Alteration the same is expresly repealed by this last Act in question It is a settled Rule that if there be two Statutes and both consistent and not contradictory the latter can never be said to repeal the former and so is Dr. Foster's Case 11 Rep. 5 6. so it is in Wills Hodgkinson and Wood Cro. Car. 23. This last Act of Will. et Mar. is consistent with the 37 Hâ—n 8. the one says He shall continue during the time that the Custos doth remain such so as he demean himself well the other says He shall enjoy his place so song only as he demeans himself well in it Now take the Office to be by the 37 Hen. 8. only granâ—able to hold during the continuance of the Custos then suppose in the same Act it should be said to hold so long only as he demean himself well where is the inconsistency or contradiction And if none then this last Act doth not Repeal the former as to this Matter And Mr. Fox's Grant is pursuant to the Statute of Hen. 8. and Mr. Harcourt's hath no relation to it Then 't was argued That 't was unreasonable that a Custos should have an Officer under him of anothers choice when himself is responsible for the Records which such Officer is concerned with The primary Intent of this last Act was only to settle the Doubts about the Keepers of the Great Seal not to alter the Estate of the Office of Clerk of the Peace The Offices of the Judges in Westminster-hall determine with the King's Life who grants them tho ' they are granted to hold during good behaviour In this Act the reason of using these words was for Caution to advertise them that Misbehaviour should forfeit their Places If an Alteration of the Law had been intended they would have said for Life so as he demean himself well especially when as was said before he was removable for Misbehaviour by the former Laws in being Wherefore upon the whole Matter it was prayed that the Judgment might be reversed On the other side it was argued with the Judgment That 't is clear and apparent that this Act of W. M. was made not only to satisfie Doubts and prevent Questions about the Office for the Custody of the Great Seal but to settle the manner of naming the Custos and Clerk of the Peace and that 't is in part introductive of a new Law and in part a reviver of the old But the general end was that that Office of Clerk should be filled and executed by a learned able honest Person because it concerns the Administration of Justice He is the King's Attorney in many respects he not only writes the sense of the Justices in their Orders but draws Indictments and upon Traverses he joyns Issue as one qui pro Domino Rege in ea parte sequitur and prays Judgment for the King in many Cases joyns in Demurrer when occasion requires and is in the Sessions the same as the Clerk of the Crown is in the King 's Bench. Now to accomplish this end of having a Person well qualified and to encourage and oblige him to his good Behaviour it requires a Residence in the County it enjoyns that the Person named be able it subjects him to the Jurisdiction of the Justices who have a daily observance of his demeanour it gives them a power to remove him upon a just Complaint which they could not before it frees him from the usual Temptation to Fraud and Corruption by introducing him gratis sine pretio and to provoke his Care and Diligence it gives him a more durable Estate in his Office then he had before when he bought it viz. Freehold an Estate for his Life That it should be so is convenient because then he will be encouraged to endeavour the increase of his Knowledge in that Employment which he may enjoy during Life whereas precarious dependent Interests in Places tempt Men to the contrary That this is an Estate for Life appears from the words of the Act they do direct how long he shall enjoy his Office so long only as he shall behave himself well If the word only had been omitted
preferr'd and the reason is because it is a new Right which the Act gave to present to the Church to which the Union was and consequently it must be taken as 't is given And so was it held by the Civilians at Doctors Commons before the Chancellour of London and several assistant Delegates upon a Caveat there against Institution and on Advice of the Lawyers the King 's Presentee acquiesced and never brought any Quare Impedit The Argument now is only as to this one first Presentation there 's no flat Contradiction between the use of the Prerogative and My being Patron for ever but 't is a Contradiction to say the King and I shall both have the same Presentation To say That he shall have a Prerogative here is to say That he shall do a wrong to his Subject for the Bishop can have no other than this one Presentation he can have no other in lieu of it and has no Advantage or Recompence antecedent or subsequent from this Prerogative First-Fruits and Tenths are not demandable from this Parish because no saving of them in the Act to the King upon passing the Act 't is known That in the Commons House the same was press'd to be inserted but denied and the Clause rejected the same Attempt was made in this House but to no purpose In other Acts for the Erecting of new Parishes there is generally such a saving as for St. Ann's and St. John's of Wapping and the Act for uniting of Parishes upon Rebuilding the City hath a Clause of saving to this Effect All which shews That such a saving is necessary tho' the First-Fruits and Tenths being formerly enjoyed by the Popes might have been pretended by Construction of Law to be a Profit annexed to the Crown by Stat. of 26 Hen. 8. cap. 1. all Payments to the Pope having been prohibited by 25 Hen. 8. cap. 21. and all Profits and Commodities enjoyed by the Popes thereby annexed to the Crown Yet neither that Act nor that other in the same Year whereby the First-Fruits and Tenths of all Ecclesiastical Livings that then or thereafter should belong from any Parsonage or Vicarage were granted to the Crown were ever intended to reach this Parish of St. James's it being a new Creation by Act of Parliament and because in the Act no First-Fruits or Tenths are given or saved and there 's as much Reason to argue in that case for an implied saving as there is for this Prerogative Suppose it should be admitted That a presentable Benefice created by Act of Parliament should be subject to the same Rules as others are yet that will not reach this because not like other Benefices till once presented to 't is a peculiar singular Case by 2 Roll. abr 342. and 1 Inst 344. If a Patron present to a Donative it becomes presentative ever after which shews That 't is the Presentation which makes it presentative in its Nature now here 't is plainly a Donative till once presented to Then it was said That it is not needful to engage in the Dispute whether this Prerogative shall prevail against the Grantee of the next Avoidance according to Woodley's Case 2 Cro. 695. or whether that case be Law for that the same is plainly distinguishable from our Case for there the Grantee comes in the place of the Grantor quoad that Avoidance and he can have no better or greater Right than his Grantor would have had if no such Grant had been made Here ours is a first Presentation granted by Act of Parliament Suppose the Donors of this Presentation to the Bishop had named a Person in Esse to have succeeded upon the Death or Avoidance of Dr. Tennison no Man will pretend that this Prerogative should have prevented him the reason given in the Books cited for that Case of the Grantee of the next Avoidance is That the Patron could not grant more or otherwise than under the Contingency of this Prerogative Surely they will not say That the King Lords and Commons were such feeble qualified restrained Donors then the Parliament being the Donors the Prerogative insisted upon and the express Gift to the Bishop are contradictory and repugnant and cannot both be fulfilled It is no Argument to say That if a Vacancy had been in the See and the Temporalties in the King's hands then the King must have presented and not the Bishop and that would have contradicted the Act as much as this for that had been the same as if the Bishop had presented himself for the King during that time was in loco ordinarij To say That the Bishop of London hath no more right by the Act of Parliament then a Grantee of the next Avoidance hath by the Common Law this surely is no very close reasoning for there is some difference between the one and the other Here the Act of Parliament which hath the King's Consent gives a particular and express Right and an Act of Parliament may as Coke saith alter change annul abridge diminish qualifie enlarge or transferr any Common Law nay it hath the Common Law and the Prerogative too under its Controul Upon the whole it was concluded That by this Judgment a new Prerogative is affirm'd to belong to the Crown and this is extended to a turn after a Commendam which may be a prejudice to all the Patrons in England 2. It destroys and makes useless the plain and express Words and Meaning of the Act of Parliament which gives the first Presentation to the Bishop of London and 3. It confirms the old Non obstante Doctrine of Commendams which hath always been acknowledged to be to the prejudice of the Church wherefore it was prayed That the said Judgment might be revers'd On the other side it was argued That this Judgment ought to be affirmed for that as to the first pont tho' it hath been said to be a new thing and grounded upon late Presidents yet it hath been so often adjudged that it doth not now deserve a Debate 't was solemnly settled in Wright's Case and upon Consideration 2 Rolls Abridg. 343 344. 3 Cro. 526. Moore 399. That tho' many ancient Authorities have been lost yet in Brooke Presentment al Esglise 61. there is the Opinion of the Bishop of Ely for it And as to the old Presidents there 's no need of Recourse to them because continual Usage hath been with the King in this matter a settled Opinion for an hundred years is surely enough to declare the Law as to this particular This is sufficient Evidence to prove this Right in the Crown there being no Judicial Opinion against it The reason for this Prerogative is because the King by the exercise of his prerogative in the promotion hath made the Avoidance and it is but changing one Life for another and possibly the Patron is as near the having another presentation as before It was agreed that this is none of the prerogatives mentioned in the Statute de Prerogativa Regis but
All their Arguments will hold as well to a Month Week or Days surviving of the Mother as to this of two Years and therefore it must be thus construed to be her Intent that the Devises over should take effect if the Child should not live to an Age of Maturity and Power of Disposition And as to the pretence of the Child's starving in the mean time there neither is nor can be any weight in that for the Interest and Produce of the whole during all that time must remain and be to and for the benefit of the Child Wherefore upon the whole Matter 't was prayed that the Decree should be affirmed and it was affirmed Philip Jermin and Sarah Vxor ejus ' Plaintiffs Versus Mary Orchard Widow Defendant WRit of Error to Reverse a Judgment of Reversal given in the Exchequer Chamber upon a Judgment given in the Kings Bench for the Plaintiffs in an Action of Trespass for the mean Profits after a Recovery in Ejectment and Possession had thereupon The Case was this upon Record The Plaintiffs declare that the Defendant 1 Sept. 1672. their Close c. vi armis c. did break and upon the Possession of the Plaintiff did enter and the Plaintiffs from their Possession did expel and remove and them so being removed and expelled for a long time viz. from the said 1 Sept. 1672. to the time of exhibiting the Bill viz. 6 May 1685. did hold out from the same by which they lost the Prosits thereof c. Et al' Enormia c. The Defendant by Plea takes Issue as to the Force and Issue thereon and as to part of the Trespass pleads the Statute of Limitations and as to the residue of the Trespass pleads that Sir William Portman made a Lease to one Trowbridge for 1000 years and by mesne Assignments derives a Title down to Thomas Nicholas and that he in his Life time by Indenture assigned to the Defendant The Plaintiffs Reply and as to the first part of the Plea viz. of the Statute of Limitations they demur and as to the other part of the Plea they tender a Traverse and deny that Thomas Nicholas did assign the Premisses to the Defendant The Defendant joyns in Demurrer as to the first part of the Plea viz. the Statute of Limitations And as to the other part she takes Issue upon the Traverse which Issue is joyned and a Venire awarded tam ad triand ' the two Issues quam ad inquirend ' de dampnis upon the Demurrer The Jury find that Thomas Nicholas was possessed in manner as the Defendant in her Plea hath alledged and that he did make Seal and as his Deed deliver the Indenture in the Plea mentioned which said Indenture follows in these words and so set forth the whole in which after a Recital of the Lease and a Deducement of the Title down are these words viz. The said Thomas as well for and in consideration of the natural Love and Affection which he beareth to the Defendant his Grand child as for other good Causes and Considerations hath granted assigned and set over and by these Presents doth grant assign and set over unto the said Mary her Executors Administrators and Assigns all the said Cottage Barn and Lands and all and singular other the Premisses herein before recited or mentioned with the Appurtenances to the same belonging or appertaining together with the said recited Lease and all Writings and Evidences touching the Premisses to have and to hold the said Cottage Barn and Premisses and every part thereof with the Appurtenances unto the said Defendant Mary her Executors Administrators and Assigns from and immediately after the Death and Decease of the said Thomas Nicholas party to these presents and Mary his Wife unto the end of the term and for and during all the rest and residne of the said term of 1000 Years which shall be therein to come and unexpired by and under the yearly Rents Covenants c. expressed in the said Original Indenture of Lease Then the Jury leave it to the Court whether the Deed of Assignment be good in Law or not and conclude specially if the Assignment be not good in Law then they find for the Plaintiffs and Assess Damages 50 l. and 40 s. Costs and thereupon c. And now it was argued for the Plaintiff and it was said in the first place That this Case was extraordinary that tho' the Majority of the Judges in Westminster-hall were of Opinion with the Plaintiffs yet they were forced to sue this Writ they had the four Judges of the King 's Bench and the then Mr. Justice Powell and the then Baron Powell concurring with the King 's Bench and the chief Baron Atkins being absent the other Five in the Exchequer-Chamber reversed the Judgment it having been resolved upon the Stat. of Eliz. which erects that Jurisdiction That the Concurrence of six are not necessary to reverse but only that six must be present to make a Court so that here were six to five for the Plaintiff and yet he hath lost it Then it was argued That there had been two Things insisted on below one was the finding of Damages generally and the other was as to the Validity of the Assignment and as to the finding it was said That the Matter of the Force is meer Form and if there had been no non prosequi the same could not make an Error That in C. B. and B. R. the Issue upon the vi armis c. is seldom or never taken notice of no Entry is made of it upon the postea at all unless a wounding or some such other special Matter were mixt with it in the same Issue That 't is held in the Case of Law and King 1 Saund ' 81. If nothing be answered to the vi armis in a special Plea 't is well upon a general Demurrer and the 7 Hen. 6. 13. and 1 Hen. 7.19 are plain That if the Party have the special Matter which he pleads found for him the vi armis shall not be inquired of So if the Defendant have Judgment against him upon Demurrer to the special Matter pleaded by him the vi armis shall never be tried tho' Issue were joyned upon it but the Party shall be fined upon the Capiatur c. without any Inquiry So is the King and Hopper 2 Cro. 599. in a Scire Facias on a Recognizance for the good Behaviour special Matter pleaded held That the Jury need not inquire about the vi armis if such Special Matter be found for the Defendant much more is it so in case it be found for the Plaintiff for there the Act which is found imports it c. and it shall be intended to be vi armis c. and the Book of Hen. 6. is full in it no need of any Inquiry in such Case And in this Point both the Courts having concurred the Counsel for the Defendant did not contest
him nay against the Lessee himself the Owner of the Lands if he takes it before the Performance of the Condition so that these Words cannot alter the Case this is not the Case of a Will but of a Deed Executed in the Life-time of the Party the Rule and the Reason of the Rule about Exceptions in Grants will hold to this where the Grant is General the Exception cannot be rejected as void on pretence of Repugnancy The Common Law doth not care to raise or make Estates by Implication where the same Person hath an express one so is Vaughan 261 262. therefore there 's no Reason in this Case to construe the whole Term to pass by Implication in the Premisses a particular Estate being limited in the Habend ' and that not being good all is void Here 's no Purchaser Creditor or Heir in the Case but 't is a meer voluntary Act to the Defendant Then was cited 1 Cro. 376. 2 Bulstr 272. of a Copy-holders Surrender Habend ' a tempore mortis and held void wherefore upon the whole it was insisted That by the Premisses nothing passed but an Estate at Will That the Habend ' giving an Estate or Interest which was not allowable in the Law the Deed was void and passed nothing and therefore the Verdict was for the Plaintiff and the Judgment in B. R. was good and accordingly it was prayed That the Reversal of that Judgment might be reversed On the other side it was argued That to construe this to be void was contrary to the Intention of both the Parties That now the Grantor and his Wife were dead and there was no dispute about their Estates That the Premisses here passed the whole 't is to her and her Executors and Assigns 't is all that Cottage 't is together with all his Deeds concerning it the Deeds are concomitant with the Estate and when he grants the Deeds he certainly did design to pass his Interest he could never mean an Estate at Will when he names the Executors c. Then was cited the Case of Lilley and Witney Dyer 272. pl. 30. Grant of all his Interest Estate and Term Habend ' after his Death the Habend ' is void Plowd 520. 1 Bulstr 191. Bro. Grants 154. Leases 66. The Presumption that a Man can out-live a 1000 Years is a weak Pretence and void of Reason Equity is a part of the Law of the Land and here to judge this void is unconscionable and unreasonable Then was cited 1 Anderson 284 290. Grant of a Reversion Habend ' after his Death shall vest immediately the Lease imports and carries the Estate Peto and Pemberton 1 Cro. 101. Plea That he had surrendred his Lease which shews that it carried the Interest they are Synonimous Bro. tit Grant 155. A Man grants omnia firma sua shall pass his Term There 's no prescribed Form for passing a Chattel before the Stat. of Frauds A Man possessed of a Term grants it to another and his Heirs it passeth the whole so to a Man for Life it shall pass the whole Interest and shall go to his Executor Plowd 424. 3 Cro. 534. If the Habend ' were out of the Case this would pass the whole and if so the Habend ' is void 't is an old Rule and a good one Vt res magis valeat quam pereat The Lord Chief Baron Hale seem'd of that Opinion in the Case of Smith and Tutchett in scacc ' but that proved a Mistake for that Case was different and was ended by Consent as appeared by a Rule Die Mercurij 13. Die Maij Term ' Pasch 26. Car. 2. after Hale was removed into the Kings Bench. Then 't was said that there could be no ill Consequence in adjudging this to be a good Assignment the like case was never probable to happen again that here had been a Diversity of Opinions below Stairs that Equity was with the Defendant and therefore 't was prayed That the Reversal might be affirmed and it was affirmed accordingly Bennett Swayne Esq Petitioner Versus William Fawkener and John Lane Executors of Benjamin Middleton Defendants WRit of Error to Reverse a Judgment in the Kings Bench given for Benjamin in an Action against Swayne for 20 l. received by him of the Profits of a Share in the New-River c. The Case was thus Simon Middleton Esq being seized in Fee of Seventeen Thirty-six Parts of the King's Moiety in the New-River Water and having Issue eight Children viz. Hugh Sarah Hannah and Anne by his first Wife and Elizabeth Rebecca Benjamin and Hezekiah by his second Wife made his last Will and thereby amongst other things to the intent that all his younger Children might be provided for he devised Seven Thirty-sixth Parts or Shares of the King's Moiety aforesaid amongst them in manner following viz. to Sarah Hannah and Anne to each of them and their Heirs one full Thirty-sixth Part or Share of the said King's Moiety free and discharged from the Fee Farm Rent payable to the King's Majesty and of 100 l. per Annum payable to Henry Middleton deceased and his Heirs and from all other Payments and Charges whatsoever And also to Elizabeth Rebecca and Benjamin and to each of them her and his Heirs one full Thirty-sixth Part or Share of the said New-River Water of the King's Moiety only they and each of them proportionably to stand charged with the payment of the Fee-Farm Rent due and payable to the King's Majesty and with the 100 l. per Annum to Henry Middleton and his Heirs and with no other Payment or Charge whatsoever and to his Son Hezekiah and his Heirs one full Thirty-sixth Part or Share of the said New-River Water the said Share being part of the King's Moiety to hold to him and his Heirs with the Rents Issues and Profits thereof from and immediately after his Decease only proportionably to stand charged with the Payments of the Fee-Farm Rent due and payable to his Majesty and with the aforesaid 100 l. per Annum to the said Henry Middleton and his Heirs and also charged with 150 l. more towards binding out of his Brother Benjamin an Apprentice when and so soon as he shall attain to the Age of Sixteen Years but with no other Charge or Payment whatsoever And further devises That in case any of his said younger Children Sons or Daughters shall happen to die before he she or they should attain the full Age of Twenty One Years or be married then and in either of the said Cases he did will and devise that Part or Share with the Profits thereof of him her or them so deceasing as aforesaid to the Survivor or Survivors of all his aforesaid younger Children Share and Share alike chargable nevertheless with the several Payments as aforesaid but liable to no other Charge or Payment whatsoever And all the rest of his Shares in the said New-River Water he gives to his eldest Son Hugh and his Heirs so that he permit
and one of these is necessary to prevent a Survivorship Wherefore upon the whole it was prayed That the Judgment should be Reversed On the other side it was argued with the Judgment That the same was Legal and ought not to be Reversed for that as to the last thing stirred it must be a Tenancy in Common the words Share and Share alike imply a Division or Partition in esse or in future and it hath always been so construed The distinction between divided and to be divided hath been long since Exploded as importing no difference Then it was argued That here was only an Estate for Life given by this Clause to the Survivors that a Devise of the Share is the same with the Devise of the Land that the Share doth not signifie the Estate or Interest but the Quantity or Proportion of the Thing here are no words to vest the Inheritance in the Survivors there are proper words to give an Inheritance to the Children and there are no such proper words used to divest it out of them and to give it to the Survivors upon the decease of any one of them under Age and Unmarried The Share or Part can only be the Thing it self not the Estate in the Thing and 't is all consistent if it be adjudged an Estate for Life Besides In the last Clause when he enjoyns the Heir to permit the Devisees to enjoy their Interests and in case he do not discharge the Fee-farm Rent he gives the rest of his Shares to and amongst all other of his Children and their Heirs equally to be divided among them The adding of the word Heirs in this Clause and omitting it in the former shews the Testator to have a different meaning in the first from what he had in the last Then were cited several Cases to prove that totam illam partem carried only the Thing devised not the Interest which the Devisor had therein 3 Leon. 180 181. 3 Cro. 52. 2 Leon. 156 56. and 1 Rolls Abridg. tit Estate 835 836. 1 Cro. 356. Latch 40. and as to the 150 l. appointed to be paid for to bind Benjamin Apprentice 't was said That the same was to Issue out of the Rents and Profits And therefore upon the whole it was prayed That the Judgment might be affirmed and it was affirmed accordingly Dominus Rex Versus Episcop ' Cestr ' and Richard Pierse Esq WRit of Error upon a Judgment in a Quare Impedit in C. B. given for the King and affirmed in B. R. The Case upon the Record was to this effect Mr. Attorney General declares That Queen Elizabeth was seized of the Advowson of the Church of Bedall ut de uno grosso per se ut de feodo jure in jure corone sue Anglie and being so seized did such a Day in the Twelfth Year of her Reign present to the said Church then vacant John Tymms as by the Inrollment of c. appears that he was instituted and inducted that Queen Elizabeth died seized of such her Estate of and in the Advowson aforesaid that the same descended to Jac. 1. per quod he was seized of the Advowson of the said Church ut de uno grosso c. That the Church became void by the death of Tymms and that King presented Dr. Wilson that he was admitted instituted and inducted that King Jac. 1. died seized of such his Estate in the said Advowson and the same descended to Car 1. and he became seized and the Church was again void by the death of the then Incumbent and Car. 1. presented Dr. Wickham that Dr. Wickham died that thereupon one John Pierse not having any Right to present to the said Church sed usurpando super dict' nuper Regem Car. 1. did present one Metcalfe who was inducted that Car. 1. died seized that the Advowson descended to Car. 2. that the Church became void by the death of Metcalfe that Car. 2. presented Samways who was inducted that Car. 2. died seized and the same descended to Jac. 2. who became seized ut de uno grosso c. who being so seized de regimine hujus regni Anglie se dimisit by which the said Advowson came to the present King and Queen and they were and are now seized of it ut de uno grosso c. That the Church became void by the death of Samways and it belongs to the King and Queen to present a fit Person but the Defendants hinder them ad dampnum c. The Bishop pleads that he claims nothing in the Advowson but as Ordinary c. The other Defendant Richard Pierse pleads That the King occasione premissor ' ipsum pred' Richardum impetere seu occasionare non debet quia dicit quod bene verum est quod Car. 1. devenit fuit seisitus of the Advowson aforesaid ut de uno grosso per se ut de feodo jure modo forma pred' in narr ' pred' specificat ' and did present Wickham his Clerk who was inducted But he says further That the Church being so full of the Incumbent and Car. 1. so seized as aforesaid the said Car. 1. by his Letters Patents c. bearing date at Canbury 19 Julij anno regni sui decimo quarto quas idem Richardus hic in curia profert ex speciali gratia certa scientia mero motu for himself his Heirs and Successors did give and grant cuidam Willielmo Theckston adtunc armig ' postea milit ' the Advowson aforesaid to hold to him and his Heirs to the use of him and his Heirs for ever prout per easdem Litteras Patentes plenius apparet by virtue of which said Grant the said Theckston was seized of the Advowson in question ut de uno grosso c. And he being so seized the Church became void by the death of Wickham posteaque ac eodem tempore quo superius in narr ' pred' supponitur pred' Johannem Pierse usurpasse super pred' nuper Regem Car. 1. He the said John Pierse usurping upon the said William Theckston to whom of right it then belonged did present the said Metcalfe who was accordingly instituted and inducted by which the said John Pierse was seised of the Advowson aforesaid and being so seized and the Church then full he the said Theckston did by Indenture 18 April 18 Car. 1. release to the said John Pierse and his Heirs all his Right Title Claim c. by which the said John Pierse became seized and he dying seized the same descended to the Defendant Richard as his Son and Heir by which he became seized and then the Church became void by the Death of Metcalf and continued so void for a Year and half and more and by that Reason Car. 2. to the Church so void per lapsum temporis in defectu Patroni Ordinarij et Metropolitani jure Prerogative sue Regie eidem Car. 2. devolut ' did present Samwayes his
the Plaintiffs Title or Charge This is no more then if they had traversed the Grant which they could not do In the Case of a common Person suppose the Defendant's Title not full yet if he traverses the Plaintiffs that 's enough Form requires an Inducement to a Traverse but the latter is only material for the Plaintiff to answer to for nothing can be traversed but what is material now why should it not have been a good answer to their Declaration to have said that Car. 2. presented by Lapse absque hoc that Car. 1. died seized for by this the Seisin or Presentation of Car. 2. had been avoided and there 's nothing else material in the Declaration for the Seisin of Queen Elizabeth and Jac. 1. are not to the purpose and if answered by the Defendant it must have been against him there had been a good Title for the King without it then supposing it necessary to shew how it came out of Car. 1. the Attorney General can only take Issue on the Traverse of his dying seized for that denies the whole Title that is material to be answered to Now whatsoever shews that the Plaintiff hath no right to the thing in demand is a good Plea let who will have the true right The true Title upon this Declaration is that Car. 1. presented and thereby became seized and died seized and the denying him to dye seized is a denial of this Title for if K. Car. 2. did present by Lapse and K. Car. 1. did not die seized 't is with the Defendant no Man is bound to answer that which if he do 't will still be against him but if a Man makes such an answer as if true the present Plaintiff hath no Title 't is enough Then if it be true that no Right descended from Car. 1. to Car. 2. and that Car. 2. presented only by Lapse what Right can his present Majesty have and all this is confessed by the Demurrer if well pleaded and 't is no Objection to say that the dying seized ought not to be traversed but only the Presentation for that is a mistake in case of Land 't is good and an Advowson is an Inheritance descendible in like manner and Mr. Attorney thinks it a good Traverse for he all along in his Declaration alledges a dying feized from Queen Elizabeth downward and there are several Presidents thus Winch's Ent. 661 662. and Winch. 912 686 692. and Buckler and Symonds Winch. 911 912. is of an Advowson in gross and in the same Book 35 59 are thus A man may die seized of an Advowson as well as of Land and if he doth not dye seized it doth not descend and the Seisin in gross is not to be traversed as is 1 Anderson 269. and Hob. 102. ' Then 't was said that the true Reason and Nature of a material good Traverse is well explained in Vaughan's first Case of Tufton and Sir Rich. Temple and 1 Saund. 21 22. and it is this especially in a Quare Impedit If any thing in the Count be travers'd it must be such Part as if true is inconsistent with the Defendants Title and if false or found against the Plaintiff doth absolutely destroy his Title nay if the Traverse leaves no Title in the Plaintiff then 't is good whatsoever comes of the Defendants Then the Difficulty is If the King by his Prerogative may waive his own Title which is traversed and insist upon the Deficiency of that which the Defendant alledges and in the Case of the King and the Bishop of Worcester and Jervis in Vaughan 53. there 't is said That the King ought to maintain his own and not to question the Defendants he cannot desert that which he hath alledged for himself and fall upon the Defendants Title and Reason warrants such Rule for tho' the King hath no Damages in a Quare Impedit notwithstanding his laying it ad dampnum Hob. 23 yet the Suit supposes an Hindrance and Damage to the King and if the Right be not his he hath no Cause to complain of the Defendant tho' another hath Every Man is to recover by his own Strength and not by the Weakness of the Defendants Pretensions and if the Law be thus then how can Mr. Attorney-General take Advantage of this upon Demurrer after Oyer for now upon Oyer 't is as they say become Part of the Defendants Plea and consequently it must be part of the Inducement and if so he ought in that Case to have taken Issue upon the Traverse which denied his Master's Title Wherefore upon the whole Matter it was prayed That the Judgment should be reversed On the other side 't was argued for the King That this Judgment ought to stand and as to the last point 't was said That taking it for granted the King could not traverse any Point of the Defendants Plea yet certainly he might demurr upon the whole in case it were insufficient That now Oyer was craved and had the Deed did become part of the Defendants Plea and must be taken as such That tho' there had been no need of a Profert yet when 't is produced 't is such as he hath pleaded and upon the whole the Court is to judge there being a Demurrer That as the Case stood the King might take advantage of both the Exceptions That the Declaration of it self was good and if the Plea be naught the King ought to have Judgment for him That every Plea is to be taken most strongly against the Party that pleads it That here the Defendant had admitted K. Car. 1. well seized that he ought to shew it out of him otherwise the Plea was ill that every Traverse must have an Inducement That if upon the whole Plea it did not appear that King Car. 1. parted with this Advowson 't is naught That if by the Parties own shewing it was manifest to the Court That the King continued seized and what he doth further shew no ways contradicts it he could not traverse the dying seized and therefore a Demurrer was most proper and consequently upon this Demurrer they were let in to affirm that nothing passed from the King by these Letters Patents of Car. 1. Then it was argued That this Grant was void because it was to a Person then Esq that Tunc Armigero can have Reference only to the time of the Letters Patents that a Man cannot be a Knight and an Esq at the same time that Knight is part of his Name and the Title of Esq is drowned in that of Knight that the old Books are thus 7 Hen. 4.7 14 Hen. 6.15 21 Edw. 4.72 2 Inst. 594. 666. Hutt 41. Bro. Tit. nosme 33. 1 Cro. 372. That 't is true if a Deed of Feoffment be made to a Man by a wrong Name and Livery be thereupon had 't is good but all the Books make a difference between that Case and where it is by Deed where the Operation is altogether by Deed Then was cited
of Cases were quoted concerning the King's Grants Misrecitals false Recitals and Deceit c. Then it was strenuously insisted upon That the Recitals and the Granting Clause must be consider'd and judged of together that the contrary Opinion is to make the Granting Part to be without any Consideration 't is to have a Conclusion without Premisses an igitur without a Cause That eadem servitia can never be intended new ones That secundum tenorem must referr to the Appendant Advowson and therefore the Advowson in gross here declared upon and pleaded to can never pass by this Grant and upon the whole it was prayed That the Judgment might be affirmed It was replied on behalf of the Plaintiff in Error That as to the Variance in the Title of Knight no Answer had been given to the reasonable Distinction between the Case of Grants and that of Writs and Indictments that here was no Proof or Appearance of a Diversity of Persons That as to the Grant it self secund ' tenorem could mean only a Reference to the Interest or Estate granted by them not to the thing or the Nature of it That such Words signified only as fully and largely they had no express Relation to the Quality of the Advowson whether in gross or appendant That by such Niceties any or most Patents might be avoided That Grants of Honours as well as of Interests if questioned must be under the same Rule and the Considerations upon which they are grounded may be subject to Inquiry if true or false c. That the Patent of it self without Reference to the pleading was good That the Judgment desired was to condemn a Patent as void because another Patent recited in it was so which perhaps was not fully recited and if it were was not in Judgment before the Court and the substance of what was urged before was in short repeated and prayed That the Judgment might be revers'd and it was accordingly revers'd and Mr. Pierse Scroope being dead presented Francis Pemberton his Clerk who was admitted instituted and inducted c. FINIS THE NAMES OF THE Principal Cases 1. DOminus Rex Viscount Purbeck Page 1 2. Duvall versus Price Page 12 3. John Duvall and Elizabeth his Wife versus William Terry of London Merchant Page 15 4. William Dolphin and Katharine his Wife versus Francis Haynes Page 17 5. Dormer Sheppard al' versus Joseph Wright al' Page 18 6. Whitfield Ux ' al' versus Paylor Ux ' al' Page 20 7. Thomas Arnold versus Mr. Attorney General and Matthew Johnson Esq Thomas Bedford Gent. Page 22 8. Sir Richard Dutton versus Richard Howell Richard Grey and Robert Chaplyn Executors of Sir John Witham decased Page 24 9. Philips versus Bury Page 35 10. Dr. William Oldis versus Charles Donmille Page 58 11. Smith Ux ' versus Dean and Chapter of St. Paul's London and Lewis Ruggle Page 67 12. The Countess of Radnor versus Vandebendy al' Page 69 13. Dominus Rex versus Baden Page 72 14. Hall al' Executors of Thomas Thynne versus Jane Potter Administratrix of George Potter Page 76 15. The Society of the Governour and Assistants of the New Plantation of Vlster in the Kingdom of Ireland versus William Lord Bishop of Derry Page 78 16. Sir Caesar Wood aliàs Cranmer versus Duke of South-hampton Page 83 17. Sir Caesar Wood aliàs Cranmer versus Thomas Webb Page 87 18. Jonathan Lord Bishop of Exeter al' versus Sampson Hele. Page 88 19. Robert Davis versus Dr. John Speed Page 104 20. Wats al' versus Crooke Page 108 21. Lee Warner versus William North. Page 110 22. Briggs versus Clark ibid. 23. William Bridgman al' versus Rowland Holt al' Page 111 24. Dominus Rex versus Walcort Page 127 25. Sir Evan Lloyd Bar. and Dame Mary his Wife and Sidney Godolphin and Susan his Wife versus Richard Carew Bar. an Infant the Son and Heir of Sir John Carew Bar. deceased Page 137 26. Sir William Morley Knight of the Bathe versus Peter Jones Page 140 27. Sir Edward Hungerford and John Hill Executors and Devisees of Sir William Basset versus Edward Nosworthy Page 146 28. Sir Simon Leach al' versus John Thompson Lessee of Charles Leach Page 150 29. Henry Earl of Lincoln versus Samuel Roll al' Page 154 30. John Fox Gen ' versus Simon Harcourt Esq Page 158 31. Henry Lord Bishop of London and Dr. Birch versus Attorney General pro Domino Rege Page 164 32. Dominus Rex versus Reginald Tucker Page 186 33. Joseph Eastmond Executor of Hester Eastmond and Samuel Neyle versus Edwyn Sands Clerk Page 192 34. Magdalen Foubert versus Charles de Cresseron Page 194 35. Philip Jermin and Sarah his Wife versus Mary Orchard Page 199 36. Bennet Swayne versus William Fawkner and John Lane Executors of B. M. Page 207 37. Dominus Rex versus Episcop ' Cestr ' and Richard Pierse Page 212