words in their Letters Patents Constituimus vos Justitiarium nostrum Capitalem ad Placita coram nobis tenenda durante beneplacito nostro That is to say we have made you our Chief-Justice to hold Pleas before our self during our pleasure But this Writ though it be shorter does not at all abridge the power they had by the former And for the Letters Patents for the Chief-Justice of the Common-Pleas they go thus Constituimus dilectum Fidelem c. Capitalem Justitiarium de Communi Banco Habendum c. quamdiu nobis placuerit cum vadiis foedis ab antiquo debitis consuetis Id est We have Constituted our Beloved and Faithful c. Chief-Justice of the Common-Bench To have c. during our pleasure with the ways and Fees thereunto heretofore due and usual Ph. I find in History that there have been in England always a Chancellour and a Chief-Justice of England but of a Court of Common-Pleas there is no mention before Magna Charta Common-Pleas there were ever both here and I think in all Nations for Common-Pleas and Civil-Pleas I take to be the same La. Before the Statute of Magna Charta Common-Pleas as Sir Edw. Coke granteth 2 Inst. p. 21. might have been holden in the Kings-Bench and that Court being removeable at the Kings will the Returns of Writs were Coram Nobis ubicunque fuerimus in Anglia whereby great trouble of Jurors ensued and great charges of the parties and delay of Justice and that for these causes it was Ordain'd that the Common-Pleas should not follow the King but be held in a place certain Ph. Here Sir Edw. Coke declares his Opinion that no Common-Plea can be holden in the Kings-Bench in that he says they might have been holden then And yet this doth not amount to any probable proof that there was any Court of Common-Pleas in England before Magna Charta For this Statute being to ease the Jurors and lessen the Charges of Parties and for the Expedition of Justice had been in Vain if there had been a Court of Common-Pleas then standing for such a Court was not necessarily to follow the King as was the Chancery and the Kings-Bench Besides unless the Kings-Bench wheresoever it was held Plea of civil Causes the Subject had not at all been eased by this Statute For supposing the King at York had not the Kings Subjects about London Jurors and parties as much trouble and charge to go to York as the People about York had before to go to London Therefore I can by no means believe otherwise then that the Erection of the Court of Common-Pleas was the effect of that Statute of Magna Charta Cap. 11. And before that time not existent though I think that for the multiplicity of Suits in a great Kingdom there was need of it La. Perhaps there was not so much need of it as you think For in those times the Laws for the most part were in setling rather than setled and the old Saxon Laws concerning Inheritances were then practised by which Laws speedy Justice was Executed by the Kings Writs in the Courts of Barons which were Landlords to the rest of the Freeholders and Suits of Barons in County-Courts and but few Suits in the Kings Courts but when Justice could not be had in those Inferior Courts but at this day there be more Suits in the Kings Courts than any one Court can dispatch Ph. Why should there be more Suits now than formerly For I believe this Kingdom was as well Peopled then as now La. Sir Edw. Coke 4 Inst. p. 76. assigneth for it six Causes 1. Peace 2. Plenty 3. The Dissolution of Religious Houses and dispersing of their Lands among so many several persons 4. The multitude of Informers 5. The number of Concealers 6. The multitude of Attorneys Ph. I see Sir Edw. Coke has no mind to lay any fault upon the Men of his own Profession and that he Assigns for Causes of the Mischiefs such things as would be Mischief and Wickedness to amend for if Peace and Plenty be the cause of this Evil it cannot be removed but by War and Beggery and the Quarrels arising about the Lands of Religious Persons cannot arise from the Lands but from the doubtfulness of the Laws And for Informers they were Authorised by Statutes to the Execution of which Statutes they are so necessary as that their number cannot be too great and if it be too great the fault is in the Law it self The number of Concealers are indeed a number of Couseners which the Law may easily Correct And lastly for the multitude of Attorneys it is the fault of them that have the power to admit or refuse them For my part I believe that Men at this day have better learn't the Art of Caviling against the words of a Statute than heretofore they had and thereby encourage themselves and others to undertake Suits upon little reason Also the variety and repugnancy of Judgments of Common-Law do oftentimes put Men to hope for Victory in causes whereof in reason they had no ground at all Also the ignorance of what is Equity in their own causes which Equity not one Man in a thousand ever Studied and the Lawyers themselves seek not for their Judgments in their own Breasts but in the precedents of former Judges as the Antient Judges sought the same not in their own Reason but in the Laws of the Empire Another and perhaps the greatest cause of multitude of Suits is this that for want of Registring of conveyances of Land which might easily be done in the Townships where the Lands ly a Purchase cannot easily be had which will not be litigious Lastly I believe the Coveteousness of Lawyers was not so great in Antient time which was full of trouble as they have been since in time of Peace wherein Men have leisure to study fraud and get employment from such Men as can encourage to Contention And how ample a Field they have to exercise this Mystery in is manifest from this that they have a power to Scan and Construe every word in a Statute Charter Feofment Lease or other Deed Evidence or Testimony But to return to the Jurisdiction of this Court of the Kings-Bench where as you say it hath power to correct and amend the Errors of all other Judges both in Process and in Judgments cannot the Judges of the common-Common-Pleas correct Error in Process in their own Courts without a Writ of Error from another Court La. Yes and there be many Statutes which Command them so to do Ph. When a Writ of Error is brought out of the Kings-Bench be it either Error in Process or in Law at whose Charge is it to be done La. At the Charge of the Clyent Ph. I see no reason for that for the Clyent is not in fault who never begins a Suit but by the advice of his Council Learned in the Law whom he pays for his Council given Is not
this the fault of his Councellor Nor when a Judge in the Common-Pleas hath given an Erroneous Sentence it is always likely that the Judge of the Kings-Bench will reverse the Judgment though there be no Question but as you may find in Bracton and other Learned Men he has power to do it because being Professors of the same Common-Law they are perswaded for the most part to give the same Judgments For Example if Sir Edw. Coke in the last Terme that he sate Lord-Chief-Justice in the Court of common-Common-Pleas had given an Erroneous Judgment that when he was removed and made Lord-Chief-Justice of the Kings-Bench would therefore have reversed the said Judgment it is possi he might but not very likely And therefore I do believe there is some other power by the King constituted to reverse Erroneous Judgments both in the Kings-Bench and in the Court of common-Common-Pleas La. I think not for there is a Statute to the contrary made 4 o Hen. 4. cap. 23. in these words Whereas as well in Plea Real as in Plea Personal after Judgment in the Court of our Lord the King the Parties be made to come upon grievous pain sometimes before the King himself sometimes before the Kings Council and sometimes to the Parliament to answer thereof anew to the great Impoverishing of the Parties aforesaid and to the subversion of the Common-Law of the Land it is ordained and established that after Judgment given in the Court of our Lord the King the Parties and their Heirs shall be there in Peace until the Judgment be undone by Attaint or by Error if there be Error as hath been used by the Laws in the times of the Kings Progenitors Ph. This Statute is so far from being repugnant to that I say as it seemeth to me to have been made expresly to confirm the same For the substance of the Statuâ—e is that there shall be no Suit made by either of the Parties for any thing adjudged either in the Kings-Bench or Court of Common-Pleas before the Judgment be undone by Error or Corruption prov'd and that this was the Common-Law before the making of this Statute which could not be except there were before this Statute some Courts authorised to examine and correct such Errors as by the Plaintiff should be assign'd The inconvenience which by this Statute was to be remedied was this that often Judgment given in the Kings Courts by which are meant in this place the Kings-Bench and Court of common-Common-Pleas the Party against whom the Judgment was given did begin a new Suit and cause his Adversary to come before the King himself here by the King himself must be understood the King in Person for though in a Writ by the words Coram nobis is understood the Kings-Bench yet in a Statute it is never so nor is it strange seeing in those days the King did usually sit in Court with his Council to hear as sometimes King James and sometimes the same Parties commenced their Suit before the Privy-Council though the King were absent and sometimes before the Parliament the former Judgment yet standing For remedy whereof it was ordained by this Statute that no Man should renew his Suit till the former Judgment was undone by Attaint or Error which Reversing of a Judgment had been impossible if there had been no Court besides the aforesaid two Courts wherein the Errors might be Assigned Examin'd and Judg'd for no Court can be esteemed in Law or Reason a Competent Judge of its own Errors There was therefore before this Statute some other Court existent for the hearing of Errors and Reversing of Erroneous Judgments What Court this was I enquire not yet but I am sure it could not be either the Parliament or the Privy-Council or the Court wherein the Erroneous Judgment was given La. The Doctor and Student discourses of this Statute cap. 18. much otherwise than you do For the Author of that Book saith that against an Erroneous Judgment all Remedy is by this Statute taken away And though neither Reason nor the Office of a King nor any Law positive can prohibit the remedying of any Injury much less of an unjust Sentence yet he shows many Statutes wherein a Mans Conscience ought to prevail above the Law Ph. Upon what ground can he pretend that all Remedy in this case is by this Statute prohibited La. He says it is thereby enacted that Judgment given by the Kings Courts shall not be examin'd in the Chancery Parliament nor elsewhere Ph. Is there any mention of Chancery in this Act It cannot be examin'd before the King and his Council nor before the Parliament but you see that before the Statute it was examin'd somewhere and that this Statute will have it examin'd there again And seeing the Chancery was altogether the highest Office of Judicature in the Kingdom for matter of Equity and that the Chancery is not here forbidden to examine the Judgments of all other Courts at least it is not taken from it by this Statute But what Cases are there in this Chapter of the Doctor and Student by which it can be made probable that when Law and Conscience or Law and Equity seem to oppugne one another the written Law should be preferr'd La. If the Defendant wage his Law in an Action of Debt brought upon a true Debt the Plaintiff hath no means to come to his Debt by way of Compulsion neither by Subpoena nor otherwise and yet the Defendant is bound in Conscience to pay him Ph. Here is no preferring that I see of the Law above Conscience or Equity for the Plaintiff in this case loseth not his Debt for want either of Law or Equity but for want of Proof for neither Law nor Equity can give a Man his Right unless he prove it La. Also if the Grand-Jury in Attaint affirm a false Verdict given by the Petty-Jury there is no farther Remedy but the Conscience of the party Ph. Here again the want of Proof is the want of Remedy for if he can prove that the Verdict given was false the King can give him remedy such way as himself shall think best and ought to do it in case the Party shall find surety if the same Verdict be again affirmed to satisfie his Adversary for the Dammage and Vexation he puts him to La. But there is a Statute made since viz. 27 Eliz. c. 8. by which that Statute of Hen. 4. 23. is in part taken away for by that Statute Erroneous Judgments given in the Kings-Bench are by a Writ of Error to be examin'd in the Exchequer-Chamber before the Justices of the Common-Bench and the Barons of the Exchequer and by the preamble of this Act it appears that Erroneous Judgments are only to be reform'd by the High Court of Parliament Ph. But here is no mention that the Judgments given in the Court of common-Common-Pleas should be brought in to be examin'd in the Exchequer-Chamber why therefore may not the Court of Chancery
should have been Commended You see by this that many things are made Crimes and no Crimes which are not so in their own Nature but by Diversity of Law made upon Diversity of Opinion or of Interest by them which have Authority And yet those things whether good or evil will pass so with the Vulgar if they hear them often with odious terms recited for hainous Crimes in themselves as many of those Opinions which are in themselves Pious and Lawful were heretofore by the Popes Interest therein called Detestable Heresie Again some Controversies are of things done upon the Sea others of things done upon the Land There need by many Courts to the deciding of so many kinds of Controversies What order is there taken for their Distribution La. There be an extraordinary great number of Courts in England First there be the Kings Courts both for Law and Equity in matters Temporal which are the Chancery the Kings-Bench the Court of Common-Pleas and for the Kings Revenue the Court of the Exchequer and there be Subjects Courts by Priviledge as the Court in London and other priviledg'd places And there be other Courts of Subjects as the Courts of Landlords called the Court of Barons and the Courts of Sherifs Also the Spiritual Courts are the Kings Courts at this day though heretofore they were the Popes Courts And in the Kings Courts some have their Judicature by Office and some by Commission and some Authority to Hear and Determine and some only to Inquire and to Certifie into other Courts Now for the Distribution of what Pleas every Court may hold it is commonly held that all the Pleas of the Crown and of all Offences contrary to the Peace are to be holden in the Kings Bench or by Commissioners for Bracton saith Sciendum est quod si Actiones sunt Criminales in Curia Domini Regis debent determinari cum sit ibi poena Câ—rporalis infligenda hoc coram ipso Rege si tangat personam suam sicut Crimen Laesae Majestatis vel coram Justitiariis ad hoc specialiter assignatis That is to say That if the Plea be Criminal it ought to be determin'd in the Court of our Lord the King because there they have power to inflict Corporeal punishment and if the Crime be against his person as the Crime of Treason it ought to be determin'd before the King himself or if it be against a private person it ought to be determin'd by Justices Assigned that is to say before Commissioners It seems by this that heretofore Kings did hear and determine Pleas of Treason against themselves by their own Persons but it has been otherwise a long time and is now For it is now the Office of the Lord Steward of England in the Tryal of a Peer to hold that Plea by a Commission especially for the same In Causes concerning Meum and Tuum the King may sue either in the Kings-Bench or in the Court of Common Pleas as it appears by Fitzherbert in his Natura Brevium at the Writ of Escheat Ph. A King perhaps will not sit to determine of Causes of Treason against his Person lest he should seem to make himself Judge in his own Cause but that it shall be Judged by Judges of his own making can never be avoided which is also one as if he were Judge himself La. To the Kings-Bench also I think belongeth the Hearing and Determining of all manner of Breaches of the Peace whatsoever saving alwayes to the King that he may do the same when he pleaseth by Commissioners In the time of Henry the 3d and Edward the 1st when Bracton wrote the King did usually send down every seven years into the Country Commissioners called Justices Itinerant to Hear and Determine generally all Causes Temporal both Criminal and Civil whose places have been now a long time supplyed by the Justices of Assize with Commissions of the Peace of Oyer and Terminer and of Goal-delivery Ph. But why may the King only Sue in the Kings-Bench or Court of Common-Pleas which he will and no other Person may do the same La. There is no Statute to the contrary but it seemeth to be the Common-Law for Sir Edw. Coke 4 Inst. setteth down the Jurisdiction of the Kings-Bench which he says has First Jurisdiction in all Pleas of the Crown Secondly The Correcting of all manner of Errors of other Justices and Judges both of Judgments and Process except of the Court of Exchequer which he sayes is to this Court Proprium quarto modo Thirdly That it has power to Correct all Misdemeanours extrajudicial tending to the breach of the Peace or oppression of the Subjects or raising of Factions Controversies Debates or any other manner of Misgovernment Fourthly It may hold Plea by Writ out of the Chancery of all Trespasses done Vi Armis Fifthly It hath power to hold Plea by Bill for Debt Detinu Covenant Promise and all other personal Actions but of the Jurisdiction of the Kings-Bench in Actions real he says nothing save that if a Writ in a Real Action be abated by Judgment in the Court of common-Common-Pleas and that the Judgment be by a Writ of Error reversed in the Kings-Bench then the Kings-Bench may proceed upon the Writ Ph. But how is the Practice La. Real Actions are commonly decided as well in the Kings-Bench as in the Court of common-Common-Pleas Ph. When the Kng by Authority in Writing maketh a Lord-Chief-Justice of the Kings-Bench does he not set down what he makes him for La. Sir Edw Coke sets down the Letters Patents whereby of Antient time the Lord Chief-Justice was Constituted wherein is expressed to what end he hath his Office viz. Pro Conservatione nostra tranquilitatis Regni nostri ad Justitiam universis singulis de Regno nostro exhibendam Constituimus Dilectum Fidelem nostrum P. B. Justitiarium Angliae quamdiu nobis placuerit Capitalem c. That is to say for the preservation of our self and of the Peace of our Realm and for the doing of Justice to all and singular our Subjects we have Constituted our Beloved and Faithful P. B. during our pleasure Chief Justice of England c. Ph. Methinks 't is very plain by these Letters Patents that all Causes Temporal within the Kingdom except the Pleas that belong to the Exchequer should be decidable by this Lord-Chief-Justice For as for Causes Criminal and that concern the Peace it is granted him in these words for the Conservation of our self and peace of the Kingdom wherein are contained all Pleas Criminal and in the doing of Justice to all and singular the Kings Subjects are comprehended all Pleas Civil And as to the Court of Common-Pleas it is manifest it may hold all manner of Civil-Pleas except those of the Exchequer by Magna Charta Cap. 11. So that all original Writs concerning Civil-Pleas are returnable into either of the said Courts but how is the Lord-Chief-Justice made now La. By these
which have either been not preserv'd in the Records or else by Sir Edw. Coke because they were against his opinion not alledged For this is possible though you will not grant it to be very likely therefore I insist only upon this that no Record of a Judgment is a Law save only to the party Pleading until he can by Law reverse the former Judgment And as to the proceeding without Juries by two sufficient Witnesses I do not see what harm can proceed from it to the Common-wealth nor consequently any just Quarrel that the Justice of the Common-Law can have against their proceedings in the Admiralty For the Proof of a Fact in both Courts lyeth meerly on the Witnesses and the difference is no more but that in the Imperial-Law the Judge of the Court Judgeth of the Testimony of the Witnesses and the Jury doth in a Court of Common-Law Besides if a Court of Common-Law should chance to Incroach upon the Jurisdiction of the Admiral may not he send a prohibition to the Court of Common-Law to forbid their proceeding I pray you tell me what Reason there is for the one more than for the other La. I know none but long Custom for I think it was never done Ph. The Highest ordinary Court in England is the Court of Chancery wherein the Lord Chancellour or otherwise Keeper of the Great Seal is the only Judge This Court is very Antient as appears by Sir Edw. Coke 4 Inst. p. 87. where he nameth the Chancellors of King Edgar King Etheldred King Edmund and King Edward the Confessor His Office is given to him without Letters Patents by the Kings delivery to him of the Great Seal of England and whosoever hath the keeping of the Great Seal of England hath the same and the whole Jurisdiction that the Lord Chancellour ever had by the Statute of 5 Eliz. cap. 18. wherein it is declar'd that such is and always has been the Common-Law And Sir Edw. Coke says he has his name of Chancellour from the highest point of his Jurisdiction viz. a Cancellando that is from Cancelling the Kings Letters Patents by drawing strokes through it like a Lattice Ph. Very pretty It is well enough known that Cancellarius was a great Officer under the Roman Empire whereof this Island was once a Member and that the Office came into this Kingdom either with or in Imitation of the Roman Government Also it was long after the time of the 12 Caesars that this Officer was created in the State of Rome For till after Septimius Severus his time the Emperors did diligently enough take cognizance of Causes and Complaints for Judgments given in the Courts of the Praetors which were in Rome the same that the Judges of the Common-Law are here but by the continual Civil Wars in after-times for the choosing of Emperors that diligence by little and little ceased and afterwards as I have Read in a very good Author of the Roman Civil Law the number of complaints being much increased and being more than the Emperor could dispatch he appointed an Officer as his Clerk to receive all such Petitions and that this Clerk caused a partition to be made in a Room convenient in which partition-Wall at the heighth of a Mans reach he placed at convenient distances certain Bars so that when a Suitor came to deliver his Petition to the Clerk who was sometimes absent he had no more to do but to throw in his Petition between those Bars which in Latin are called properly Cancelli not that any certain Form of those Bars or any Bars at all were necessary for they might have been thrown over though the whole space had been left open but because they were Cancelli the Clerk Attendant and keeping his Office there was called Cancellarius And any Court Bar may properly enough be called Cancelli which does not signifie a Lattice for that is but a meer Conjecture grounded upon no History nor Grammar but taken up at first as is likely by some Boy that could find no other word in the Dictionary for a Lattice but Cancelli The Office of this Chancellour was at first but to Breviate the matter of the Petitions for the easing of the Emperor but Complaints encreasing daily they were too many considering other Businesses more necessary for the Emperor to determine and this caused the Emperor to commit the Determination of them to the Chancellor again what Reason doth Sir Edw. Coke alledge to prove that the highest point of the Chancellors Jurisdiction is to Cancel his Masters Letters Patents after they were Sealed with his Masters Seal unless he hold Plea concerning the validity of them or of his Masters meaning in them or of the surreptitious getting of them or of the abusing of them which are all causes of Equity Also seeing the Chancellor hath his Office only by the delivery of the Great Seal without any Instruction or Limitation of the Process in his Court to be used it is manifest that in all Causes whereof he has the hearing he may proceed by such manner of hearing and examining of Witnesses with Jury or without Jury as he shall think fittest for the Exactness Expedition and Equity of the Decrees And therefore if he think the Custome of proceeding by Jury according to the Custome of England in Courts of Common-Law tend more to Equity which is the scope of all the Judges in the World or ought to be he ought to use that method or if he think better of another proceeding he may use it if it be not forbidden by a Statute La. As for this Reasoning of yours I think it well enough but there ought to be had also a reverend respect to Customs not unreasonable and therefore I think Sir Edw. Coke says not amiss that in such Cases where the Chancellor will proceed by the Rule of the Common-Law he ought to deliver the Record in the Kings-Bench and also it is necessary for the Lord Chancellor to take care of not exceeding as it is limited by Statutes Ph. What are the Statutes by which his Jurisdiction is limited I know that by the 27 Eliz. cap. 8. He cannot Reverse a Judgment given in the Kings-Bench for Debt Detinue c. Nor before the Statute could he ever by virtue of his Office Reverse a Judgment in Pleas of the Crown given by the Kings-Bench that hath the Cognizance of such Pleas nor need he for the Judges themselves when they think there is need to relieve a Man opprest by ill Witnesses or power of great Men prevailing on the Jury or by Error of the Jury though it be in case of Felony may stay the Execution and Inform the King who will in Equity relieve him As to the regard we ought to have to Custome we will Consider of it afterward La. First in a Parliament holden the 13th of Rich. 2. the Commons Petitioned the King that neither the Chancellor nor other Chancellor do make any order against the Common-Law
also if he will And they say true but they have no reason to think he will unless it be for his own profit which cannot be for he loves his own Power and what becomes of his power when his Subjects are destroyed or weakned by whose multitude and strength he enjoyes his power and every one of his Subjects his Fortune And lastly whereas they sometimes say the King is bound not only to cause his Laws to be observ'd but also to observe them himself I think the King causing them to be observ'd is the same thing as observing them himself For I never heard it taken for good Law that the King may be Indicted or Appealed or served with a Writ till the long Parliament practised the contrary upon the good King Charles for which divers of them were Executed and the rest by this our present King pardoned La. Pardoned by the King and Parliament Ph. By the King in Parliament if you will but not by the King and Parliament you cannot deny but that the pardoning of Injury to the Person that is Injur'd Treason and other Offences against the Peace and against the Right of the Soveraign are Injuries done to the King and therefore whosoever is pardoned any such Offence ought to acknowledge he ows his Pardon to the King alone But as to such Murders Felonies and other Injuries as are done to any Subject how mean soever I think it great reason that the parties endammaged ought to have satisfaction before such pardon be allow'd And in the death of a Man where restitution of Life is Impossible what can any Friend Heir or other party that may appeal require more than reasonable satisfaction some other way Perhaps he will be content with nothing but Life for Life but that is Revenge and belongs to God and under God to the King and none else therefore if there be reasonable satisfaction tendred the King without sin I think may pardon him I am sure if the pardoning him be a sin that neither King nor Parliament nor any earthly Power can do it La. You see by this your own Argument that the Act of Oblivion without a Parliament could not have passed because not only the King but also most of the Lords and abundance of Common People had received Injuries which not being pardonable but by their own Assent it was absolutely necessary that it should be done in Parliament and by the assent of the Lords and Commons Ph. I grant it but I pray you tell me now what is the difference between a general Pardon and an Act of Oblivion La. The word Act of Oblivion was never in our Books before but I believe it is in yours Ph. In the State of Athens long ago for the Abolishing of the Civil War there was an Act agreed on that from that time forward no Man should be molested for any thing before that Act done whatsoever without exception which Act the makers of it called an Act of Oblivion not that all Injuries should be forgotten for then we could never have had the story but that they should not rise up in Judgment against any Man And in imitation of this Act the like was propounded though it took no effect upon the death of Julius Caesar in the Senate of Rome By such an Act you may easily conceive that all Accusations for offences past were absolutely dead and buried and yet we have no great reason to think that the objecting one to another of the Injuries pardoned was any violation of those Acts except the same were so expressed in the Act it self La. It seems then that the Act of Oblivion was here no more nor of other nature than a General Pardon Of Courts Ph. SInce you acknowledge that in all controversies the Judicature originally belongeth to the King and seeing that no Man is able in his own person to execute an Office of so much business what order is taken for deciding of so many and so various Controversies La. There be divers sorts of Controversies some of which are concerning Mens Titles to Lands and Goods and some Goods are Corporeal and Lands Money Cattel Corn and the like which may be handled or seen and some Incorporeal as Priviledges Liberties Dignities Offices and many other good things meer Creatures of the Law and cannot be handled or seen And both of these kinds are concerning Meum and Tuum Others there are concerning Crimes punishable divers wayes and amongst some of these part of the punishment is some Fine or Forfeiture to the King and then it is called a Plea of the Crown in case the King sue the party otherwise it is but a private Plea which they call an Appeal And though upon Judgment in an Appeal the King shall have his Forfeiture yet it cannot be called a Plea of the Crown but when the Crown pleadeth for it There be also other Controversies concerning the Government of the Church in order to Religion and virtuous Life The offences both against the Crown and against the Laws of the Church are Crimes but the offences of one Subject against another if they be not against the Crown the King pretendeth nothing in those Pleas but the Reparation of his Subjects injur'd Ph. A Crime is an offence of any kind whatsoever for which a penalty is Ordain'd by the Law of the Land But you must understand that dammages awarded to the party injur'd has nothing common with the nature of a penalty but is meerly a Restitution or satisfaction due to the party griev'd by the Law of Reason and consequently is no more a punishment than is the paying of a Debt La. It seems by this Definition of a Crime you make no difference between a Crime and a sin Ph. All Crimes are indeed Sins but not all Sins Crimes A Sin may be in the thought or secret purpose of a Man of which neither a Judge nor a Witness nor any Man take notice but a Crime is such a Sin as consists in an Action against the Law of which Action he can be Accused and Tryed by a Judge and be Convinced or Cleared by Witnesses Farther that which is no Sin in it self but indifferent may be made Sin by a positive Law As when the Statute was in force that no Man should wear Silk in his Hat after the Statute such wearing of Silk was a Sin which was not so before Nay sometimes an Action that 's good in it self by the Statute Law may be made a Sin as if a Statute should be made to forbid the giving of Alms to a strong and sturdy Beggar such Alms after that Law would be a Sin but not before For then it was Charity the Object whereof is not the strength or other Quality of the poor Man but his Poverty Again he that should have said in Queen Maries time that the Pope had no Authority in England should have been Burnt at a Stake but for saying the same in the time of Queen Elizabeth
examinâ—â— Judgment given in the Court of common-Common-Pleas La. You deny not but by the Antient Law of England the Kings-Bench may examine the Judgment given in the Court of common-Common-Pleas Ph. 'T is true but why may not also the Court of Chancery do the same especially if the fault of the Judgment be against Equity and not against the Letter of the Law La. There is no necessity of that for the same Court may examine both the Letter and the Equity of the Statute Ph. You see by this that the Jurisdiction of Courts cannot easily be distinguished but by the King himself in his Parliament The Lawyers themselves cannot do it for you see what Contention there is between Courts as well as between particular Men. And whereas you say that Law of 4 Hen. 4. 23. is by that of 27 Eliz. cap. 8. taken away I do not find it so I find indeed a Diversity of opinion between the makers of the former and the latter Statute in the preamble of the latter and Conclusion of the former The Preamble of the latter is forasmuch as Erroneous Judgments given in the Court called the Kings-Bench are only to be reformed in the High Court of Parliament and the Conclusion of the former is that the contrary was Law in the times of the Kings Progenitors These are no parts of those Laws but Opinions only concerning the Antient Custom in that Case arising from the different Opinions of the Lawyers in those different times neither Commanding nor Forbidding any thing though of the Statutes themselves the one forbids that such Pleas be brought before the Parliament the other forbids it not But yet if after the Act of Hen. 4. such a Plea had been brought before the Parliament the Parliament might have Heard and Determin'd it For the Statute forbids not that nor can any Law have the force to hinder the Law of any Jurisdiction whatsoever they please to take upon them seeing it is a Court of the King and of all the People together both Lords and Commons La. Though it be yet seeing the King as Sir Edw. Coke affirms 4 Inst. p. 71. hath committed all his power Judicial some to one Court and some to another so as if any Man would render himself to the Judgment of the King in such case where the King hath committed all his power Judicial to others such a render should be to no effect And p. 73. he saith farther That in this Court the Kings of this Realm have sitten on the High Bench and the Judges of that Court on the Lower Bench at his feet but Judicature belongeth only to the Judges of that Court and in his presence they answer all Motions Ph. I cannot believe that Sir Edw. Coke how much soever he desir'd to advance the authority of himself and other Justices of the Common-Law could mean that the King in the Kings-Bench sate as a Spectator only and might not have answered all motions which his Judges answer'd if he had seen cause for it For he knew that the King was Supream Judge then in all causes Temporal and is now in all Causes both Temporal and Ecclesiastical and that there is an exceeding great penalty ordained by the Laws for them that shall deny it But Sir Edw. Coke as he had you see in many places before hath put a Fallacy upon himself by not distinguishing between Committing and Transferring He that Transferreth his power hath deprived himself of it but he that Committeth it to another to be Exercised in his name and under him is still in the Possession of the same power And therefore if a Man render himself that is to say Appealeth to the King from any Judge whatsoever the King may receive his Appeal and it shall be effectual La. Besides these 2 Courts the Kings-Bench for Pleas of the Crown and the Court of Common-Pleas for Causes Civil according to the Common-Law of England there is another Court of Justice that hath Jurisdiction in Causes both Civil and Criminal and is as Antient a Court at least as the Court of Common Pleas and this is the Court of the Lord Admiral but the proceedings therein are according to the Laws of the Roman Empire and the Causes to be determin'd there are such as arise upon the Marine Sea For so it is ordain'd by divers Statutes and confirm'd by many Precedents Ph. As for the Statutes they are always Law and Reason also for they are made by the Assent of all the Kingdom but Precedents are Judgments one contrary to another I mean divers Men in divers Ages upon the same case give divers Judgments Therefore I will ask your Opinion once more concerning any Judgments besides those of the King as to their validity in Law But what is the difference between the proceedings of the Court of Admiralty and the Court of Common-Law La. One is that the Court of Admiralty proceedeth by two Witnesses without any either Grand-Jury to Indict or Petty to Convict and the Judge giveth Sentence according to the Laws Imperial which of old time were in force in all this part of Europe and now are Laws not by the Will of any other Emperor or Forraign Power but by the Will of the Kings of England that have given them force in their own Dominions the reason whereof seems to be that the causes that arise at Sea are very often between us and People of other Nations such as are Governed for the most part by the self same laws Imperial Ph. How can it precisely enough be determin'd at Sea especially near the mouth of a very great River whether it be upon the Sea or within the Land For the Rivers also are as well as their Banks within or a part of one Country or other La. Truly the Question is difficult and there have been many Suits about it wherein the Question has been whose Jurisdiction it is in Ph. Nor do I see how it can be decided but by the King himself in case it be not declar'd in the Lord Admirals Letters Patents La. But though there be in the Letters Patents a power given to hold Plea in some certain cases to any of the Statutes concerning the Admiralty the Justices of the Common-Law may send a Prohibition to that Court to proceed in the Plea though it be with a non-obstante of any Statute Ph. Methinks that That should be against the Right of the Crown which cannot be taken from it by any Subject For that Argument of Sir Edw. Coke's that the King has given away all his Judicial Power is worth nothing because as I have said before he cannot give away the Essential Rights of his Crown and because by a non-obstante he declares he is not deceived in his Grant La. But you may see by the Precedents alledged by Sir Edw. Coke the contrary has been perpetually practised Ph. I see not that perpetually for who can tell but there may have been given other Judgments in such cases
Council the Judges La. The Council Inform the Judges Ph. Why may they not as well Inform the Chancellor Unless you will say that a Bishop understands not as well as a Lawyer what is sense when he hears it Read in English No no both the one and the other are able enough but to be able enough is not enough when not the difficulty of the Case only but also the Passion of the Judge is to be Conquer'd I forgot to tell you of the Statute of the 36 Edw. 3. cap. 9. That if any Person think himself grieved contrary to any of the Articles above Written or others contained in divers Statutes will come to the Chancery or any for him and thereof make his Complaint he shall presently there have Remedy by force of the said Articles and Statutes without elsewhere pursuing to have Remedy By the words of this Statute it is very apparent in my opinion that the Chancery may hold Plea upon the Complaint of the Party grieved in any Case Tryable at the Common-Law because the party shall have present Remedy in that Court by force of this Act without pursuing for Remedy elsewhere La. Yes but Sir Edw. Coke Answers this Objection 4 Inst. p. 82. in this manner These words says he He shall have Remedy signifie no more but that he shall have presently there a remedial Writ grounded upon those Statutes to give him Remedy at the Common-Law Ph. Very like Sir Edw. Coke thought as soon as the Party had his Writ he had his Remedy though he kept the Writ in his Pocket without pursuing his Complaint elsewhere or else he thought that in the Common-Bench was not elsewhere than in the Chancery La. Then there is the Court of Ph. Let us stop here for this which you have said satisfies me that seek no more than to distinguish between Justice and Equity and from it I Conclude that Justice fulfils the Law and Equity Interprets the Law and amends the Judgments given upon the same Law Wherein I depart not much from the Definition of Equity cited in Sir Edw. Coke 1 Inst. Sect. 21. viz. Equity is a certain perfect Reason that Interpreteth and Amendeth the Law Written though I Construe it a little otherwise than he would have done for no one can mend a Law but he that can make it and therefore I say not it amends the Law but the Judgments only when they are Erroneous And now let us Consider of Crimes in particular the Pleas whereof are commonly called the Pleas of the Crown and of the punishments belonging to them and first of the Highest Crime of all which is High Treason Tell me what is High Treason Of Crimes Capital La. THe first Statute that declareth what is High Treason is the Statute of the 25 Edw. 3. in these words Whereas divers Opinions have been before this time in what Case Treason shall be said and in what not the King at the Request of the Lords and of the Commons hath made Declaration in the manner as hereafter follows That is to say when a Man doth Compass or Imagine the Death of our Lord the King of our Lady the Queen or of their Eldest Son and Heir or if a Man doth violate the Kings Companion or the Kings Eldest Daughter unmarried or the Wife of the Kings Eldest Son and Heir or if a Man do Levy War against our Lord the King in his Realm or be adherent to the Kings Enemies in his Realm giving to them Aid and Comfort in the Realm or elsewhere and thereof be provably Attainted by open Deed by People of their Condition And if a Man Counterfeit the Kings Great or Privy-Seal or his Money And if a Man bring false Money into this Realm Counterfeit to the Money of England as the Money called Lushburgh or other like to the said Money of England knowing the Money to be false to Merchandize and make payment in deceit of our said Lord the King and of his People And if a Man slay the Chancellor Treasurer or the Kings Justices of the one Bench or the other Justices in Eyre or Justices of Assises and all other Justices Assigned to Hear and Determine being in their Places and doing their Offices And is to be understood in the Cases above rehearsed that That ought to be adjudged Treason which extends to our Royal Lord the King and his Royal Majesty and of such Treason the Forfeiture of the Escheats pertains to our Lord the King as well the Lands and Tenements holden of others as himself And moreover there is another manner of Treason that is to say when a Servant Slayeth his Master or a Wife her Husband or when a Man Secular or Religious slayeth his Prelate to whom he oweth Faith and Obedience and of such Treason the Escheats ought to pertain to every Lord of his own Fee And because many other like Cases of Treason may happen in time to come which a Man cannot think nor declare at this present time it is accorded that if any Case supposed Treason which is not above specified doth happen before any Justices the Justices shall tarry without giving any Judgment of the Treason till the Cause be shewed and declared before the King and his Parliament whether it ought to be adjudged Treason or other Felony Ph. I desir'd to understand what Treason is wherein no Enumeration of Facts can give me satisfaction Treason is a Crime of it self Malum in se and therefore a Crime at the Common-Law and High Treason the Highest Crime at the Common-Law that can be And therefore not the Statute only but Reason without a Statute makes it a Crime And this appears by the Preamble where it is intimated that all Men though of divers Opinions did Condemn it by the name of Treason though they knew not what Treason meant but were forced to request the King to determine it That which I desire to know is how Treason might have been defined without the Statute by a Man that has no other faculty to make a Definition of it than by meer Natural Reason La. When none of the Lawyers have done it you are not to expect that I should undertake it on such a sudden Ph. You know that Salus Populi is Suprema Lex that is to say the safety of the People is the highest Law and that the safety of the People of a Kingdom consisteth in the safety of the King and of the strength necessary to defend his People both against Forraign Enemies and Rebellious Subjects And from this I infer that to Compass that is to design the Death of the then present King was High Treason before the making of this Statute as being a Designing of a Civil War and the Destruction of the People 2. That the Design to Kill the Kings Wife or to violate her Chastity as also to violate the Chastity of the Kings Heir apparent or of his Eldest Daughter unmarryed as tending to the Destruction of the certainty of
Bishops and Right of Advowsans and Presentations belonged to himself and to the Nobility that were the founders of such Bishopricks Abbies and other Benefices And he enacted farther that if any Clerk which he or any of his Subjects should present should be disturbed by any such Provisor that such Provisor or Disturber should be attached by his Body and if Convicted lye in Prison till he were Ransomed at the Kings Will and had satisfied the Party griev'd renouced his Title and sound sureties not to sue for it any farther and that if they could not be found then Exigents should go forth to Outlawrie and the Profits of the Benefice in the mean time be taken into the Kings hands And the same Statute is confirmed in the 27th year of King Ed. the 3d which Statute alloweth to these Provisors six weeks Day to appear but if they appear before they be outlaw'd they shall be received to make Answer but if they render not themselves they shall forfeit all their Lands Goods and Chattels besides that they stand outlaw'd The same Law is confirmed again by 16 Rich. 2d cap. 5. in which is added because these Provisors obtained sometimes from the Pope that such English Bishops as according to the Law were instituted and inducted by the Kings Presentees should be excommunicated that for this also both they and the Receivers and Publishers of such Papal Process and the Procurers should have the same Punishment Ph. Let me see the Statute it self of 27 Ed. 3. La. It lies there before you set down verbatim by Sir Edw. Coke himself both in English and French Ph. 'T is well we are now to consider what it means and whether it be well or ill interpreted by Sir Edw. Coke And first it appeareth by the Preamble which Sir Edw. Coke acknowledgeth to be the best Interpreter of the Statute that this Statute was made against the Incroachments only of the Church of Rome upon the Right of the King and other Patrons to collate Bishopricks and other Benefices within the Realm of England and against the power of the Courts Spiritual to hold Plea of Controversies determinable in any of the Courts of the King or to reverse any Judgment there given as being things that tend to the Disherison of the King and Destruction of the Common-Law of the Realm always used Put the case now that a Man had procur'd the Pope to reverse a Decree in Chancery had he been within the danger of Premunire La. Yes certainly or if the Judgment had been given in the Court of the Lord Admiral or in any other Kings Court whatsoever either of Law or Equity for Courts of Equity are most properly Courts of the Common-Law of England because Equity and Common-Law as Sir Ed. Coke says are all one Ph. Then the word Common-Law is not in this Preamble restrained to such Courts only where the Tryal is by Juries but comprehends all the Kings Temporal Courts if not also the Courts of those Subjects that are Lords of great Mannors La. 'T is very likely yet I think it will not by every Man be granted Ph. The Statute also says That they who draw Men out of the Realm in Plea whereof the Cognizance pertaineth to the Kings Court or of things whereof Judgment is given in the Kings Court are within the Cases of Premunire But what if one Man draw another to Lambeth in Plea whereof Judgment is already given at Westminster Is he by this Clause involv'd in a Premunire La. Yes For though it be not out of the Realm yet it is within the meaning of the Statute because the Popes Court not the Kings Court was then perhaps at Lambeth Ph. But in Sir Edw. Coke's time the Kings Court was at Lambeth and not the Popes La. You know well enough that the Spiritual-Court has no power to hold Pleas of Common-Law Ph. I do so but I know not for what cause any simple Man that mistakes his right Court should be out of the Kings Protection lose his Inheritance and all his Goods Personal and Real and if taken be kept in Prison all his Life This Statute cannot be by Sir Edw. Cokes Torture made to say it Besides such Men are ignorant in what Courts they are to seek their Remedy And it is a Custom confirmed by perpetual usage that such ignorant Men should be guided by their Council at Law It is manifest therefore that the makers of the Statute intended not to prohibit Men from their suing for their Right neither in the Chancery nor in the Admiralty nor in any other Court except the Ecclesiastical Courts which had their Jurisdiction from the Church of Rome Again where the Statute says which do sue in any other Court or defeat a Judgment in the Kings Court what is the meaning of another Court Another Court than what Is it here meant the Kings-Bench or Court of common-Common-Pleas Does a Premunire lye for every Man that sues in Chancery for that which might be remedied in the Court of Common-Pleas Or can a Premunire lye by this Statute against the Lord Chancellor The Statute lays it only on the Party that sueth not upon the Judge which holdeth the Plea Nor could it be laid neither by this Statute nor by the Statute of 16 Rich. 2. upon the Judges which were then punishable only by the Popes Authority Seeing then the Party Suing has a just excuse upon the Council of his Lawyer and the Temporal Judge and the Lawyer both are out of the Statute the punishment of the Premunire can light upon no body La. But Sir Edw. Coke in this same Chapter bringeth two Precedents to prove that though the Spiritual-Courts in England be now the Kings Courts yet whosoever sueth in them for any thing tryable by the Common-Law shall fall into a Premunire One is that whereas in the 22d of Hen. 8. all the Clergy of England in a Convocation by publick Instrument acknowledged the King to be Supream Head of the Church of England yet after this viz. 24 of H. 8. this Statute was in force Ph. Why not A Convocation of the Clergy could not alter the Right of Supremacie their Courts were still the Popes Courts The other Precedent in the 25th of Hen. 8. of the Bishop of Norwich may have the same Answer for the King was not declared Head of the Church by Act of Parliament till the 26th year of his Reign If he had not mistrusted his own Law he would not have laid hold on so weak a Proof as these Precedents And as to the Sentence of Premunire upon the Bishop of Norwich neither doth this Statute nor that other of R. 2. warrant it he was sentenced for threatning to excommunicate a Man which had sued another before the Mayor But this Statute forbids not that but forbids the bringing in or publishing of Excommunications or other Process from Rome or any other Place Before the 26 Hen. 8. there is no Question but that for a
Suit in the Spiritual Court here in a Temporal Cause there lay a Premunire and if perhaps some Judge or other hath since that time judged otherwise his Judgment was erroneous La. Nay but by the Statute of 16. Rich. 2. cap. 5. it appeareth to the contrary as Sir Edw. Coke here will shew you The effect saith he of the Statute of Rich. 2. is That if any Pursue or cause to be Pursued in the Court of Rome or elsewhere any thing which toucheth the King against him his Crown or Regality or his Realm they their Notaries c. shall be out of the Kings Protection Ph. I pray you let me know the very words of the Statutes as they ly La. Presently The words are if any Man Purchase or Pursue or cause to be Purchased or Pursued in the Court of Rome or elsewhere any such Translations Processes and Sentences of Excommunication Bulls Instruments or any other things whatsoever which touch the King against him his Crown and his Regality or his Realm as is aforesaid c. Ph. If a Man bring a Plea of Common-Law into the Spiritual Court which is now the Kings Court and the Judge of this Spiritual Court hold Plea thereof By what Construction can you draw it within the compass of the words you have now read To sue for my Right in the Kings Court is no pursuing of Translations of Bishopricks made or procur'd in the Court of Rome or any place else but only in the Court of the King nor is this the suit against the King nor his Crown nor his Regality nor his Realm but the contrary Why then is it a Premunire No. He that brings in or setteth out a Writing in any place whatsoever wherein is contained that the King hath so given away his Jurisdiction as that if a Subject be condemned falsly his Submission to the Kings Judgment is of none effect or that the King upon no necessity whatsoever can out of Parliament time raise Money for the defence of the Kingdom is in my opinion much more within the Statute of Provisors than they which begin suit for a Temporal Matter in a Court Spiritual But what Argument has he for this Law of his since the Statute Law fails him from the Law of Reason La. He says they are called Courts either because they proceed by the Rules of other Laws as by the Canon or Civil Law or by other Tryals than the Common Law doth Warrant For the Tryals Warranted by the Law of England for matter of Fact is by verdict of 12 Men before the Judges of the Common Law in matters pertaining to the Common Law and not upon Examination of Witnesses as in the Court of Equity so that Alia Curia is either that which is govern'd per aliam Legem or which draweth the Party ad aliud Examen For if Ph. Stop there Let us consider of this you have read for the Tryal warranted by the Law of England is by Verdict of 12 Men. What means he here by the Law of England Does it not warrant the Tryals in Chancery and in the Court of Admiralty by Witnesses La. By the Law of England he means the Law used in the Kings Bench that is to say the Common-Law Ph. This is just as if he had said that these two Courts did warrant their own way of Tryal but other Courts not so but were warranted by the King only the Courts of Common Law were VVarrants to themselves You see that alia Curia is this way ill expounded In the Courts of Common Law all Tryals are by 12 Men who are Judges of the Fact and the Fact known and prov'd the Judges are to pronounce the Law but in the Spiritual Court the Admiralty and in all the Courts of Equity there is but one Judge both of Fact and of Law this is all the difference If this difference be intended by the Statute by alia Curia there would be a Premunire for suing in a Court being not the Kings Court The Kings Bench and Court of Common Pleas may also be different kinds of Courts because the Process is different but 't is plain that this Statute doth not distinguish Courts otherwise than into the Courts of the King and into the Courts of the Forraign States and Princes And seeing you stand upon the name of a Jury for the distinguishing of Courts what difference do you find between the Tryals at the Common-Law and the Tryals in other Courts You know that in Tryals of Fact naturally and through all the World the Witnesses are Judges and it is impossible to be otherwise What then in England can a Jury judge of except it be of the sufficiency of the Testimony The Justices have nothing to judge of nor do but after the Fact is proved to declare the Law which is not Judgment but Jurisdiction Again though the Tryal be in Chancery or in the Court of Civil Law 1. The Witnesses are still Judges of the Fact and he that hath the Commission to hear the Cause hath both the parts that is to say of a Jury to judge of the Testimony and of a Justice to declare the Law In this I say lyes all the difference which is indeed enough to make a Dispute as the World goes about Jurisdiction But seeing it tends neither to the Disherison of the King nor of the People nor to the subversion of the Law of Reason i. e. of Common-Law nor to the subversion of Justice nor to any harm of the Realm without some of which these Statutes are not broken it cannot be a Premunire La. Let me read on For if the Freehold Inheritances Goods and Chattels Debts and Duties wherein the King and Subject have Right and Property by the Common-Law should be judged per aliam Legem or be drawn ad aliud Examen the 3 Mischiefs afore exprest would follow viz. the destruction of the King and his Crown the Disherison of his People and the undoing and destruction of the Common-Law always used Ph. That is to say of the Law of Reason From hence it follows that where there are no Juries and where there are different Laws from ours that is to say in all the World besides neither King nor People have any Inheritance nor Goods nor any Law of Reason I will examine his Doctrine concerning Cases Criminal no farther He no where defineth a Crime that we may know what it is An odious name sufficeth him to make a Crime of any thing He hath put Heresie among the most odious Crimes not knowing what it signifies and upon no other Cause but because the Church of Rome to make their usurped Power the more terrible had made it by long Preaching against it and Cruelty shown towards many Godly and learned Men of this and other Reformed Churches appear to common People a thing detestable He puts it in as a Plea of the Crown in the time of Queen Elizabeth whereas in her time there was no
Justice La. The Judgment for Felony is Ph. Heresie is before Felony in the Catalogue of the Pleas of the Crown La. He has omitted the Judgment against a Heretick because I think no Jury confin'd Heresie nor no Judge Temporal did ever pronounce Judgment upon it For the Statute of 2 H. 5. c. 7. was that the Bishop having convicted any Man of Heresie should deliver him to the Sheriff and that the Sheriff should believe the Bishop The Sheriff therefore was bound by the Statute of 2 H. 4. after he was delivered to him to burn him but that Statute being repeal'd the Sheriff could not burn him without a Writ de Heretico comburendo and therefore the Sheriff burnt Legat 9. king James by that Writ which was granted by the Judges of the Common-Law at that time and in that Writ the Judgment is expressed Ph. This is strange reasoning when Sir Edw. Coke knew and confessed that the Statutes upon which the Writ de Heretico comburendo was grounded were all repeal'd how could he think the Writ it self could be in force Or that the Statute which repealeth the Statutes for burning Hereticks was not made with an intent to forbid such burning It is manifest he understood not his Books of Common-Law For in the time of Hen. 4. and Hen. 5. the word of the Bishop was the Sheriff's warrant and there was need of no such Writ nor could he till the 25 Hen. 8. when those Statutes were repeal'd and a Writ made for that purpose and put into the Register which Writ Fitzherbert cites in the end of his natura brevium Again in the later end of the Reign of Queen Elizabeth was published a correct Register of Original and Judicial Writs and the Writ de Haeretico comburendo left out because that Statute of 25 H. 8. and all Statutes against Hereticks were repeal'd and burning forbidden And whereas he citeth for the granting of this Writ 9. Jac. the Lord Chief Justice the Lord Chief Baron and two Justices of the Common-pleas it is as to all but the Lord Chief against the Law for neither the Judges of Common-Pleas nor of the Exchequer can hold Pleas of the Crown without special Commission and if they cannot hold Plea they cannot condemn La. The Punishment for Felony is that the Felon be hang'd by the Neck till he be dead And to prove that it ought to be so he cites a Sentence from whence I know not Quod non licet Felonem pro Felonia decollare Ph. It is not indeed lawful for the Sheriff of his own Head to do it or to do otherwise than is commanded in the Judgment nor for the Judge to give any other Judgment than according to Statute-Law or the usage consented to by the King but this hinders not the King from altering his Law concerning Judgments if he see good cause La. The King may do so if he please And Sir Edw. Coke tells you how he altered particular Judgments in case of Felony and sheweth that Judgment being given upon a Lord in Parliament that he should be hang'd he was nevertheless beheaded and that another Lord had the like Judgment for another Felony and was not hang'd but beheaded and withal he shews you the inconveniency of such proceeding because saith he if hanging might be altered to beheading by the same reason it might be altered to burning stoning to Death c. Ph. Perhaps there might be inconveniency in it but 't is more than I see or he shews nor did there happen any inconveniency from the execution he citeth Besides he granteth that death being ultimum supplicium is a satisfaction to the Law But what is all this to the purpose when it belongeth not to consider such inconveniencies of Government but to the King and Parliament Or who from the authority of a deputed Judge can derive a power to censure the actions of a King that hath deputed him La. For the death of a Man by misfortune there is he saith no express Judgment nor for killing a Man in ones own defence but he saith that the Law hath in both Cases given judgment that he that so killeth a Man shall forfeit all his Goods and Chattels Debts and Duties Ph. If we consider what Sir Edw. Coke saith 1 Inst. Sect. 745. at the word Felony these Judgments are very favourable For there he saith that killing of a Man by Chance-medley or se defendendo is Felony His words are wherefore by the Law at this day under the word Felony in Commissions c. is included Petit Treason Murder Homicide burning of Houses Burglary Robbery Rape c. Chance-medley and se defendendo But if we consider only the intent of him that killeth a Man by misfortune or in his own defence the same judgments will be thought both cruel and sinful Judgments And how they can be Felony at this day cannot be understood unless there be a Statute to make them so For the Statute of 25 H. 3. cap. 25. The words whereof Murder from henceforth shall not be judged before our Justices where it is found Misfortune only but it shall take place in such as are slain by Felony and not otherwise make it manifest if they be Felonies they must also be Murders unless they have been made Felonies by some latter Statute La. There is no such latter Statute nor is it to say in Commission nor can a Commission or any thing but another Statute make a thing Felony that was not so before Ph. See what it is for a Man to distinguish Felony into several sorts before he understands the general name of Felony what it meaneth but that a Man for killing another Man by misfortune only without any evil purpose should forfeit all his Goods and Chartels Debts and Duties is a very hard Judgment unless perhaps they were to be given to the Kindred of the Man slain by way of amends for dammage But the Law is not that Is it the Common-Law which is the Law of Reason that justifies this Judgment or the Statute-Law It cannot be the Law of Reason if the Case be meer misfortune If a Man be upon his Apple-tree to gather his Apples and by ill fortune fall down and lighting on the Head of another Man kill him and by good fortune saves himself shall he for this mischance be punished with the forfeiture of his Goods to the King Does the Law of Reason warrant this He should you 'l say have look'd to his Feet that 's true but so should he that was under have look'd up to the Tree Therefore in this Case the Law of Reason as I think dictates that they ought each of them to bear his own misfortune La. In this Case I agree with you Ph. But this Case is the true Case of meer misfortune and a sufficient reprehension of the Opinion of Sir Edw. Coke La. But what if this had hapned to be done by one that had been stealing Apples upon the Tree