be construed to be conditionall because the consideration intended is executed viz. that he hath assumed c. Dyer 76. and 44. Eliz. in the Kings Bench Sir William Lees case in consideration that he had assumed to make a release another promised to pay him 10 l. an action may be brought for the 10 l. without averment of making the release because the consideration is a thing executed viz. the Assumpsit c. but if Executory then the Grant is conditionall as 9. E. 4.19 15. E. 4.9 If an Annuity be granted pro concilio impendendo this makes the Grant conditionall and void for not giving counsell but otherwise it is if it be pro consilio impenso 4. But admitting that here it was conditionall yet the Queen cannot avoid it without Office and so the Plaintiff had no title to enter for an avoidance which was before his grant and so the lease is in esse at the time of the Grant made to the Plaintiff your Grant is without recitall thereof and therefore is void see Knights case Coo. lib. 5. If there be a condition to re-enter for non-payment an Office ought to be found but if it be upon condition to cease for non-payment then it is void to the King without Office as it was agreed in this Court in Sir Moyle Finches case and he vouched Cook lib. 1. Altonwoods case to prove that the lease ought to be recited in the Grant of the reversion or future interest and here although there be a non abstante in your Patent this doth not aid you because it is not found in the speciall Verdict Also for another cause the Plaintif shall not have judgement here for it is not found that the Queen died seised neither that it came to the King that now is and so it cannot come to the Plaintiff and although a fee-simple shall be intended to continue in the same person yet without shewing it shall not be intended to come to the heir 7. H. 7. 3. and so he prayed judgement for the Defendant Tanfield chief Baron said that the case here is by Verdict therefore we ought to intend such circumstances if they be not expressed to the contrary also the seisin of the Queen is shewed to be in Jure Coronae and therefore the intendment that it may be devised by disseisin or abatement between common persons holdeth not here Carew against Braughton Mich. 7. Jacobi in the Exchequer THomas Carew Exequetor of William Carew brought debt against Morgan Broughton Sherif of the County of Cardigan and the case was that John Wyner was in execution upon a Iudgement for William Carew and that after William Carew dyed and that John Wyner brought an Audita querela against Carew Executor of William Carew and upon that Writ he had a venire facias against Thomas Carew and thereupon as the Stat. apoints of 11. H. 6. cap. 10. he put in baile by recogni-zance in the Chancery to the said Thomas Carew and one of the parties for his baile was Thomas Wyner and after upon the Audita Quaerela Iudgment was given against the said Wyner and a Scire facias awarded issued against Thomas Wyner as Bail and after the said Thomas Winer was in execution upon this Recognizance as Bail to the said Thomas Carew and the said Morgan Broughton being Sheriff suffered him to escape upon which escape Thomas Carew brought debt against the Sherif in the debet and detinet and had a verdict to recover and now in arrest of judgement it was moved by Jefferies that the action ought to be brought in the detinet only and he said that if an Action be brought as Executor this alwaies ought to be in the detinet only and he vouched Hitchcock and Browns case remembred at the end of Hargraves case lib. 5. where the case was that one Anthony Brown Executor brought debt against one Lister and that Lister being in execution the wife entermarried the said Lister escaped the Husband and Wife brought debt for his escape in the debet and detinet and there it was resolved that it ought to be in the detinet only and so here and see the custome to plead mentions that the Recognizance acknowledged was to the use of the Executor and not to the use of Thomas Carew by his name but Wild of the Inner Temple prayed judgement and said that the Action is well brought in the debet and detinet and he vouched 9. H. 6. and 20. H. 6. if an Executor recover and after upon the Iudgement he brings debt it ought to be in the detinet but if an Executor sels goods of the Testator and takes an Obligation in his name as Executor yet here the Action upon this Obligation ought to be in the debet and detinet because it is upon his own contract and 1. E. 3. Brooke Executor pla 287. although it appears there and so by 9. H. 6. fo 11. That is good either way and 41. E. 3. Brook pla 545. that if a debt be brought against the Executor upon a contract made by them it ought to be in the debet and detinet or otherwise the Writ shall abate and as 9. H. 6. is at his pleasure to name him Executor or not and therefore c. Snig the second Baron if the Executors bring an Action of goods carried away in the life of the Testator c. and hath judgement to recover 20 l. and dammages for them and upon this judgement he brings debt this shall be in the detinet Altham 3. Baron if an Executor sells the goods of the Testator and an Obligation is made to him for the money for which they were sold without doubt this action shall be in the debet and detinet for the action concerns him in his person and so if he with his own money redeem goods which was pawned by the Testator c. and the Stat. of the 11. H. 6. cap. 10. is that upon an Audita Querela the party who sueth it shall put in Bond to the party c. and the Testator is not party at the time of this Audita Querela but Thomas Crew who is the Executor and it is not as a Proces of execution pursuant c. but is a new thing and so for his opinion suddenly it is good in the debet and detinet Bromley the 4. Baron seemed cleer that if a Bond be made to an Executor upon a simple Contract made with him for the goods of Testator there the action ought to be brought in the debet and detinet but this account is conceived upon a dependency of a duty to the Testator and therefore it ought to be detinet only Tanfield chief Baron the case is doubtfull and therefore it is good to be advised but for this time it seemeth there is a diversity where the Recognizance is Legally forced and where it is voluntary for in our case the Law compels this Recognizance upon the suite which the
impedit praesentare to the Church of D. the Defendant saith that there is no such Church 22. E. 4. fo 34. an action was brought against I. S. Maior of D. and he Traversed that there is no such Corporation Tanfield chief Baron said that if in an action of Trespass the Defendant saith that I. S. was seised in fee and infeoffed him without that c. and the Plantiff saith that I. S. was seised in fee and infeoffed me without that that there was any such person as I. S. in being this is no good Traverse Hern Baron seemed that this Traverse is good in the principal Case but he was once of Counsel with the Plantiff and it was moved that the Case should be Compounded An Information against Page IN an Information against Page and another upon the Statute of 3. 4. E. 6. cap. 21. for buying of Butter and selling of the same by retail contrary to the form of the Statute upon not guiltie pleaded the Iury found one of them only guiltie both of buying and selling and the other not guiltie and it was moved that no judgement may be given in this Case in asmuch as the action is conceived upon a joynt buying by two and it appeareth that this is but by one but it was argued that judgement ought to be given for it cannot be intended in Law as to this purpose a joynt buying for the wrong is several and in proof thereof was cited 36. H. 6. fo 27. the 11. H. 4. Dyer fo 194. or 195. accordingly also this action is for a wrong done to the Common-wealth which is a several wrong by either and to this purpose was cited 40. E. 3. fo 35. 36. H. 6. cited before and 5. H. 5. fo 3. where an action de malefactoribus in Pareis was brought against three and one only was found guiltie and judgement was given against him and there is no difference as to this purpose between this Case and an action of debt upon a joynt contract made by two as appeareth by 21. H. 7. and Partridges Case in Plowden where it is said that the bargaining is but matter of conveyance to the action and according unto this was cited 33. H. 8. Brook tit issue and also 28. H. 6. fo 7. and 36. H. 6. fo 29. and a Case was adjudgeed in Mich. 35. 36 Eliz. in the Kings Bench which proves the same also where an information was brought supposing the Defendant to have bought Cattle of two contrary to the form of the Statute and it was found that he bought them but of one and yet judgement was given Hitchcock to the contrary and he argued that no judgement ought to be given for he said that if an information be brought against two upon the Statute of usury and one only is found guiltie yet no judgement may be given in this Case to which the Court agreed and he cited Dyer 160.5 Ma. where two sued in the Court of Admiraltie one for an offence triable within the bodie of the Countie contrary to the Statutes of 13. 15. of R. 2. and an action was brought against one of them only and good and he vouched also 22. Eliz. Dyer fo 370.2 R. 3. fo 18. where three brought an account against one he pleads he was never their receiver and the Iury found c. and he cited a case to this purpose an information was brought against two for buying of Cattle of one B. and for selling of them contrary to the form of the Statute and in this Case the Iury found the Defendant not guiltie for the buying them of B. but that he bought them of one P. and upon an attaint of the Iury the opinion of the Court was in this case that though the verdict was affirmed yet no judgement ought to be given thereupon and this was the true Case of Lidwood and Pearpoint cited before on the other side as George Crook said York and Allein A Man recovered damages in an action upon the Case against B. who at the time of the judgement was joyntly seised in fee with C. and that after B. and C. aliened the partie who recovered is outlawed the King eight years after this outlawry extends the moitie of this land for these damages recovered against B. and it was moved if he shall have them in extent for them or not also if he shall have it without a scire facias and the Barons were clear in opinion that he shall have it in extent for it was liable to the extent of the partie outlawed before the Alienation and then when it comes to the King by the outlawry although it be after the Alienation it continueth extendible for the King although the Alienation was before the outlawry It was admitted by all the Barons that if a Coppiholder surrender to the use of a younger son and dies that this younger son cannot bring an action until admittance but if the Copihold had descended to the heir he may have an action before admittance see Cook Coppihold Cases lib. 4. fol. 22. and also it was said that all Coppiholders of the Kings Mannors may now have admittance into their Coppihold estates well enough and the order for the stay of their admittances which was made heretofore is now dissolved and quashed Dennis against Drake DEbt was brought by Dennis against Drake Sheriff for an escape a man had judgement in the Kings Bench and a writ of error was brought within the year and after the year passed the judgement was affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber and within a year after the affirmation a Capias issued to the said Drake the Sheriff who took the partie and suffered him to escape and this being the Case upon the declaration in this action the Defendant demurred and all the Barons said that there is no question but a Capias may well issue within the year after judgement affirmed without a scire facias though it be more then a year after the first judgement and it seemed to them that there was no difference though that the writ of error was not brought untill after the year of the first judgement given although in such case there be an apparant neglect in the partie who had not sued his execution within the year and therefore he was enforced to a scire facias thorough his neglect whereas if error had been brought within the year he had never been driven to his scire facias in this Case yet for asmuch as when the judgement is affirmed this is all one as a new judgement they conceived it made no difference and Tanfield chief Baron said that it had been often so judged in the Kings Bench. It was said here that if a man be instituted to a benefice he ought to pay the first fruits before induction by the Statute but by the Common Law it was otherwise for he is not to have the temporalities until induction and therefore he could not pay the first fruits
therefore he had done well to shew the special matter as he had done and not to confess it as it is in the in formation nor to traverse the said demise because it is matter in Law 5. H. 7. and Vernons case Cook lib. 4. he needs not traverse absque hoc that the lease was made for and in satisfaction of Dower and to shew the special matter viz. that it was a conditional lease and so leave it to the Iudges for the matter in Law if it be a joynture or not also it seemeth to me that it is sufficient for the Bar to say that the Commission was not returned by Hammond and Porter for that is a Traverse to the information and it cannot be intended to be returned by any other of the Commissioners in regard that those two only did execute it for the taking of the acknowledgement as the information mentions but he said nothing in this case if this Commission may be returned by those Commissioners who took not the acknowledgement also by him and Snig Bromley absent sigillo suo ratificat is good enough without saying sigillo suo sigillat contrary to Baron Altham also the Defendants have shewed the time in their Bar when the first lease was intolled so that it is certain but it seems to me that admit the matter in Law was for the King yet upon this information we cannot give judgement for him for the information is for the mean profits incurred before the inrolment and this is clear that the King cannot have them without doubt admit that the Bishop had been living yet the inrolment cannot relate as to the mean profits although it should be admitted to be good to make the lease good at the time of the inrolment and so upon all the matter he agreed that judgement ought to be given against the King and so it was Tanfield chief Baron said that if a man take a lease of my land from the King by Patent rendring rent this is not an Indenture to compel him to pay the rent for the King had nothing to grant whereupon a rent might be reserved to him Altham Baron said that the King shall have the rent here as by estoppel between common persons but it was adjourned It was said by Tanfield chief Baron that a Collector of a fifteenth may levie all the Tax within one Township upon the goods of one inhabitant only if he will and that inhabitant shall have aid of the Court to make each other inhabitant to be contributory which was granted by the Court Bromley being absent Tanfield chief Baron said that if a man had judgement against A. upon an Obligation who dieth and another Obligee of the said A. assignes his Obligation to the King the Executors of A. satisfie the said judgement it is good against the King in respect the debt now due to the King was not upon Record before the death of the Testator which was granted by the Court. Levison against Kirk THis Term the case between Levison and Kirk which was opened the last Term was adjudged and the case was that Levison brought an Action upon the case in the office of Pleas against Kirk and declared that whereas the Plantiff was a Merchant and 13. Martii 40. Eliz. intended to go beyond the Seas to M. to Merchandise and the same day and year at D. he acquainted the Defendant with his determination and then in the same place appointed and trusted the Defendant being his servant to receive for him all such Merchandise and goods which should be sent over or carried or conveyed by the Plantiff in the same voyage and to pay for the custome of them and to dispose of them and convert them for the profit and commoditie of the said Plantiff and thereupon conveyed divers goods to the Defendant and that the same day and year the Plantiff took shipping and sailed to M. and that within five dayes following 20. pieces of Velvet were brought into the Port of S. consigned by the Plantiff to the Defendant in the absence of the Plantiff and that the Defendant on purpose to deceive the Queen of her custome and to make the Plantiff to allow custome unto him did take of the said goods so consigned and land them on the land at S. aforesaid the custome not paid whereby the Plantiff lost his goods as forfeited for default of payment of custome to the damage of c. and upon not guiltie pleaded a venire facias was awarded to the the Sheriff that he should cause to come 12. from the Venue of D. and those c. viz. from the place where the trust was reposed and from the place where the trust was broken and thereupon the Defendant was found guiltie and damages 50. l. and in Pasch Chibborn Serjeant moved in arrest of judgement that the Action did not lie for every fault against the servant although it be such a misfeazance for which the Plantiff receives prejudice and therefore if you will have an Action in this case you ought to shew a special trust reposed and a breach of that trust by the servent or otherwise an Action upon the case lieth not and that is not observed here for although that you shew that the Defendant being your servant was appointed and trusted for the goods to be consigned in the said voyage yet you did not shew that these goods were not consigned in the said voyage neither do you shew that he was such a servant generally used to be imployed in trading for your goods neither do you shew that you have allowed or delivered moneys to him to make him able to pay the custome and to say that by the sale of the goods themselves he may pay it himself and you appointed him to dispose them at his pleasure yet hereby you do not inable him thereunto for he ought to pay the custome before he sell them and them peradventure he had not money to discharge the custome wherefore there is no cause of your Action as this Declaration is and therefore he prayed that judgement may be stayed George Crook prayed that judgement may be given for although it bâ— not expresly shewed that the Plantiff continued beyond the Seas in the said voyage at the time of the coming of the goods to the said Port yet the intendment ought to be so of necessitie in regard it is shewed that within five dayes after his departure and in his absence these goods were consigned c. and his return cannot be intended in so smal a time and he vouched 21. E. 4. fo 13. also it is not material in the case to shew that the Master hath left where withal to pay the custome for here the Action is brought in respect of deceipt and fraud in the Defendant and this is inferred divers wayes the first that the Defendant ought to receive my goods Secondly that he should pay the custome Thirdly that he should dispose of them at his pleasure for
Heir except that judgement be given against the Ancestor and for that see 40. E. 3. Executors 74. and 41. Ass pl. 15. and 15. Eliz Dyer 322. And also if a Recusant had been convicted upon the Sat. of 23. Eliz. and dyed before judgement cleerely this forfeiture shall never be charged upon the Heir for the words are that a Recusant shall forfeit 20. l. a moneth and if he doe not pay it then appoints the recovery by Bill Plaint or Information and this ought to be alwaies in the life of the party then the Stat. of 28. Eliz. maketh not a new debt or Forfeiture but gives a penalty for the non-payment of that which was a debt within 23. Eliz. and that the intent of the Stat. of 28. Eli. was but such this is proved by the Title of the Act. viz. for the more speedy and due execution c. 2. It is proved by the first words of the Act for the avoiding of all delaies c. so that it appears that this Act is but as a penalty meerly Also he said that this Stat. of 28. Eliz. dispenceth with the conviction as to the penalty but doth not take away the Conviction also he said that conviction without Iudgement maketh not a Debt Also he who is convicted by proclamation and dieth is discharged Also he said that our Case hath been compared to a Debt upon an Obligation but this is not like for the Stat. stands not indefinite but hath reference to 23. for otherwise a Recusant may be doubly charged that is upon both the Statutes for there is no means to recover the Debt but by this Statute of 23. Eliz. See Sir Edward Walgraves case Dyer 231. Wentworth and others against Stanley WEntworth and his Wife and Rich and his Wife brought an Ejectione firmae against Stanley and shewed in their Declaration how one Edward Stanley was seised in Fee and infeoffed the Earl of Darby others to the use of himself for life the remainder to the use of the Plantiffs wife for 100. years and died and the Plantiffs entred and the Defendant ejected them c. and this Feofment was made in 40. Eliz. the Defendant saith that long before one Richard Stanley was sesed in Fee and gave it to the said Edward Stanley in tail and that he so seised made a Feefment to the uses as is alledged and died and the Plantiffs entred and the Defendant as issue of the Feoffor re-entred and so by his pretence his is remitted whereupon it was demurred and upon the opening this case the Barons were clear of opinion that the issue in tail is remitted and came paramount the lease and so the lease for years is gone also by the chief Baron and Baron Snig there needs no Traverse to be alledged by the Plantiffe because it was but of a fee gained in an instant by the feofment of a Tenant in tail and a fee-simple gained in an instant needeth not to be Traversed 5. H. 7. and 2. E. 4. wherefore the Court said that judgement ought to be given against the Plantiffs but yet at the desire of the some the Court gave day to the Councel on both parts to argue the case at which day came Heneag Finch for the Plantiffs and he argued to the matter in Law and therein he said that by the feofment of Tenant in tail the use to himself for life the remainder to his daughters for years without limiting the residue of the use that in this case the residue of the use shall be in the feoffes and not in the feoffor for by him there is a difference between a feofment by him who had a fee with limitation of an use as above and a feofment made by him who derives an estate out of a fee for when Tenant for life or Tenant in tail makes a feofment and limits an use for part of the estate as above there the residue of the issue shall be to the feoffee and he vouched Castle and Dods case adjudged in the Common Pleas 8. Iac. that if Tenant for life grant over his estate without limiting of an use it shall be to the use of the grantee more strong here in a tortious act as our case is but if Tenant in tail will levy a fine with limitation of uses as above there the residue of the use shall be to the use of the Conusor Secondly admit that the residue of the use in this case shall he to the feoffor yet he shall not be remitted to the use as it seemeth the words of the Statute of 27. H. 8. are that cestuy que use shall have like estate in the land as he had in the use and therefore it is clear that the first taker of the use shall not be remitted as it is resolved in Amy Townsends case in Plowden and although the words of the Statute mention not heirs or issues yet by the intent of the Statute they are in equal degree but the Books which are against this opinion are two viz. 33. H. 8. Dyer fo 51. but there it is not expresly said that the issue is remitted but 34. H. 8 Br. remitter 49. is expresly against me but the same year in Dyer fo 54. it is there made a quere and in Bevils case it is only said that the first taker of the use cannot be remitted but of my opinion was Baldwin and Shelley in 28. H. 8. Dyer 23 24. and in Sanages case and 29. H. 8. it is resolved that if a man hath land by Act of Parliament there shall be no remitter and so here wherefore c. and he said if Tenant in tail be the remainder in fee and Tenant in tail makes a feofment to the use of himself in tail the remainder to him in remainder in fee in this case he in the remainder in fee shall not be remitted for then the first taker should be remitted to the pleading it seemeth that the bar is not good and first the general demurrer here doth not confess the matter of fact no more then in Gawins case in 29. H. 8. fo 40. by Brown a demurrer upon account in an appeal is no confession of the fact and in 44. Eliz. in Crisp and Byrons case accordingly see Sir Henry Browns case before a good case to this purpose then as to the Bar it seems it is not sufficient for want of a Traverse of a seisin in fee alledged in the feoffor who was Edward Stanley for it is a rule that two affirmatives cannot be allowed in a Declaration and the Bar without Traverse of that which is mentioned in the Declaration is not good except there be cause of some impossibilitie or inconvenience but yet this is to be understood where the affirmatives are express and not by implication as in Moiles case if the Defendant in his Bar confess a fee determinable he needs not Traverse the fee alledged by the Plantiffe but in our case here is an allegation made by the
Recusant may be seised after his death Thirdly if they shall be charged by the Statute of 1. Iac. as to the first it seems they are not wherein I shall endeavour to prove three things First that such land was not liable to debt by the Common Law Secondly that they are not liable to debts by the general words of the Statute Law Thirdly that they are not liable to debt by any word within the Statute of primo Iac. as to the first he observed that here is no fraud put in the case but that these lands and leases were never in the Recusant so that before that they were conveyed to the Defendants they were not liable to this debt and I alwayes observed that which the common law calleth fraud ought to be of such nature as shall be tortious and prejudicial to a third person and put him in a worse estate and condition then he was before and then he who is so prejudiced in some cases should avoid such conveyances by the common Law 22. Assises 72.43 Ed. 3.2 and 32. the Defendant in debt after judgement aliens his goods and he himself takes the profits yet the Plantiffe shall have them in execution so that if a man binde himself and his heirs in an Obligation and dies and assets descend to his heir who by Covin aliens those assets yet he shall be charged in debt for in these cases the Plantiffe had a lawful debt and such lands and goods before the alienation were liable and that former interest was intended to be defeated by those alienations and therefore they are void but of the other side where no former interest of the partie is wronged there no fraudulent conveyance was void at the Common Law and therefore if Tenant in Knights service had made a fraudulent Feofment to defraud the Lord of his wardship this was not aided by the Common Law until the Statute of Marlebridge for the title of the Lord was not prejudiced or wronged by this Feofment because it was subsequent to the Feofment also after the said Statute the Lord was without remedy for his release for it is agreed in 17. Ed. 3. fo 54. and 31. Ed. 3. Collation 29. and therefore at the Common Law if cestuy que use had bound himself and his heirs in an Obligation and died if the use descended to his heir none will say this use was assets to the heir and so was Rigler and Hunters case 25. Eliz. as to the second point it seems that the general words of a Statute shall be expounded according to the rule and reason of the Common Law and by the Common Law such confidence is not extendible therefore c. Westmin 2. cap. 18. which gives the elegit hath these words medietatem terrae and within those words an use was never extendible by that Statute 30. Ed. 3. because it was not an estate in him and so if a man be indebted for Merchandise or money borrowed and makes a gift of his lands and Chattels to defraud Creditors and takes the profits himself and flieth to the Sanctuary at Westminster or Saint Martins and there abideth by conclusion to avoid the payment of his debts it is thereby enacted that Proclamation shall be made at the Gate of the Sanctuary where such person resideth by the Sheriffe and if such person doth not thereupon appear in person or by Atturney judgement shall be given against him 2 Rich. 2. Stat. 2. cap. 3. 1. Rich. 3. cap. 1. and execution awarded aswel of those lands and goods given by fraud as of any other out of the same Franchise these words are more particular then the Statute of Westminster the second and yet it was doubted if it did extend to executions for debt as it appears by 7. H. 7. and 11. H. 7.27 and therefore in 19. H. 7. cap. 15. an Act of Parliament was made that execution for debts Recognizances and Statutes should be sued of lands in use As to the third it seems that that Statute doth not make lands in use liable to debts the words of the Statute are that the King shall seise two parts of the lands Tenements and Hereditaments leases of Farms of such offendors so that they are as general as the words of the Statute of Westminster 2. cap. 18. and here those lands and leases were not the Recusants for he had but a confidence in them the first clause of the Statute doth not extend thereunto for two causes First in regard that it never was in the Recusant and this clause extends only to such conveyances which are made by any man which hath not repaired or shall not repair to some Church for the disjunctive words do not extend throughout that branch but to the last part thereof viz. that which cometh after the word and for otherwise this would extend to conveyances made at any time without limitation which should be against the meaning of the Act. Secondly this Branch provides what shall be done concerning the King touching the levying and paying of such summes of money as any person by the Lawes of the Realm ought to pay of else to forfeit c. and by the Statutes before made nothing was forfeited but for such time as is mentioned in the Indictment which in our case is but 6. moneths but out of this branch a strong argument may be made in respect that the Statute avoids all conveyances made by Recusants in trust by express words but saith nothing to conveyances made by others to the use of Recusants and therefore this Statute doth not extend unto it if Tenant by Knights service infeoffs his heir within age and dies the Lord may enter upon the heir without suing an action but if a Feofmenche made to a stranger there he cannot enter but ought to bring his Action according to the provision of that Statute because it may be to the use of the Feoffee but no such provision is made for the heir the Statute of 3. Jac. cap. 4. provides by express words that the King shall seise two parts of all the lands Tenements and Hereditaments Leases and Faims that at the time of such seisure shall be or afterwards shall come to any of the hands of the said offendors or any other to their use or in trust for him or her or at his or her dispose or disposition or whereby wherewith or in consideration whereof such offendors or their families or any of them shall or may be relieved maintained or kept c. the different penning of these Statutes proves the diversitie of the meaning thereof this Statute is a new Law which gives to the King this penalty which he had not before and in new manner for it appoints that the partie shall be convicted by Proclamation and that being so convicted he shall alwayes pay the said penaltie until his submission without any other conviction 3. Jac. cap. 4. and also limits a manner how this new penaltie shall be levied viz.
demurrer joyned George Crook for the King conceived that the lease made in the 26. Eliz. is good first he said that although the Queen cannot take an inheritance of freehold without matter of Record yet she may take Chattels upon a surmise made that they were granted unto her and therefore he vouched 21. H. 7. fo 19 that an Obligation may be granted to the King without inrolment of the grant and 40. Assise pl. 35. Brook tit suggestion pl. 5. it appears that the King shall have a Chattel by a demise by parol upon a suggestion made thereof in the Exchequer without a Record and in the 15. H. 7. fo 15. the Kings Baylie who is not of Record may be compelled to accompt upon a suggestion made Brooks suggestion pla 31. and in the 37. H. 6. fo 7. 18. if the King gives goods with his hands this is good although no record be made thereof because it is but a Chattel and by the same reason he inferred that he may also accept of Chattel without a Record but admitting that he cannot take without a Record it seemeth that here is a thing well enough Recorded to intitle the King after the return made by the Commissioners for the Commissioners are officers of Record to this purpose and they endorse the prayer of the partie to have it Recorded and this being after the return is a sufficient Record to intitle the King and he vouched the 2. H. 7. fo 10. where the servant of Iustice Catesby after the death of the Iudge made a return and this was good and the 8. H. 4. a Record certified by a Iudge after he was displaced and 43. Assises if a Coroner makes his Rols and dies before he certifie them they may be certified after his death and so here this acknowledgement and prayer being certified may at any time after be inrolled and although it seemeth by the Book in the 19. Eliz. Dyer fo 355. that a grant being made to the King and acknowledged before one of the Masters of the Chancery and inrolled in the time of another King maketh not the Grant good yet he said that it was adjudged for another grant made to the King by the Duke of Somerset and acknowledged before one of the Masters of Chancery and inrolled in the time of another King was good enough to perfect the grant and this was by a grant made by the Duke of Bozoms Inne in London and he said that it is not reasonable that the Law should adjudge otherwise for it may be that the Clark will not inroll it untill such a time viz. a moneth within which time the King may die should it now be reasonable that it should not be inrolled at all he said it was unreasonable and he said that it appeareth by the 37. H. 6. fo 10. that a deed delivered at the Kings Coffers is good enough to avoid his lease made in the 44. Eliz. for although that it be true that a grant of a reversion shall never operate to the destruction of a right of a third person yet it seemeth that an Act commenced may be confirmed well enough to the destruction of a mean interposed Act and it seemeth that the inrolment here is but a confirmation of a precedent lease and not a relation to make a thing which was not before and therefore to examine what thing an inrolment is and it seemed to him that it is no matter of Record as it appears 24. E. 3. and 29. H. 8. fo 15. and therefore it appears by Wymacks Case Cook L. 5. that a deed inrolled ought to be pleaded hic in Curia Prolat which proveth that the deed and not the inrolment thereof is the thing which passeth the estate and therefore he vouched the case in the 6. E. 6. Brook title faits if one joynt Tenant sells all his land in D. and after his companion dieth and then the deed is inrolled yet a moitie only shall pass and 41. Eliz. Cook Perimans Case lib. 5. if a man make a feofment of lands and inroll the Deed within the Mannor as by the custome it ought to be yet the inrolment shall pass nothing and therefore it is there said the inrolment may be good enough after the death of the parties so by the same reason aforesaid it is put in the same Case of Perimon and also in Butlers and Bakers Case Cook lib. 3. that if a man deliver a writing as an escrow to be his Deed upon certain conditions performed and after the Obligor and the Obligee die and then the Conditions are performed the Deed is good for there was traditio inchoata in the life of the parties and this being after consummated takes his effect by force of the first delivery and acknowledgement and therefore also he said that it was lately adjudged that if two men are mentioned to be bound by one Obligation and the one seals at one day and the other at another day this is as good as if it had been at one day and therefore he said that there is no doubt but if a lease be made to the King by a Bishop and after another lease is made also of the same land or if the Bishop die yet if after the first lease be inrolled this is good and therefore also he cited a case to be adjudged in Banco Regis 41. Eliz. between Collins and Harding that if a man be seised of freehold and Coppihold land and makes a lease of both for years with licence rendring rent and after he grants the reversion of the freehold and makes a surrender of the Coppihold to the use of the same person and an attornment is had for the freehold and the presentment of the surrender for the Coppihold is not made untill a year after yet he in reversion shall have an action of debt for all the rent for the presentment of the surrender is but a perfection of the surrender before made also he cited the case as I observed him to this effect in the 9th of Eliz. in the Abbot of Colchesters Case where he said that the Abbot of Colchester committed treason and after made a lease for years and then he surrendred to the King all his lands and after an office found the treason and it was holden the lease is good against the King who took by the surrender and not by the treason committed before but as Walter said the case was adjudged that the King should avoid the lease for now he is in by the treason paramount the surrender Phillips against Evans IN an Ejectione firmae brought up three acres in the forrest of Kevington in the Countie c. the Defendant pleaded not guiltie and the Venire facias was awarded de vicineto of the forrest and the Defendant moved in arrest of judgement because the Venire facias de vicineto of the forrest was not good for as Stephens for the Defendant said that a forrest and the name thereof is but
Baron answered that he should have them of right see Bartues case in Dyer but the Lord Treasurer said that he saw no reason to satisfie himself thereof Doillie against Joiliffe DOillie Plantiff against Joiliffe in an Action upon the case for false imprisonment of the Plantiffs wife the case was that Leonard Lovies was formerly Plantiff in an action in the Common Pleas against Julian Goddard a feme sole and in this action the Plantiff and Defendant were at issue and a venire facias was awarded and before the return thereof the said Julian took to husband Doillie now Plantiff and after upon a special verdict found in the suit judgement was given in the Common Pleas for the said Julian against th◠said Leonard upon which judgement Leonard brought error in the Kings Bench and a scire facias was awarded against Julian by the name of Julian Goddard as a feme sole and she appeared by Attorney as a feme sole and this as the Defendant said in his answer was by the consent of her husband now Plantiff and after judgement was given to reverse the judgement in the Common Pleas and the entrie of that judgement as it was pleaded by the Defendant here was quod praedict Leonard Lovies recuperet c. versus praedict Julianam c. and costs and damages were taxed c. upon which judgement the said Lovies sued a Capias ad satisfaciendum against Julian Goddard and by vertue of that writ the Defendant here the Sheriff or Devon took the said Julian being the Plantiffs wife and imprisoned her until the Plantiff paid 10. l. which was the cost taxed by the Kings Bench for her deliverance upon which imprisonment the husband only hath brought his action against the Defendant being Sheriff Davenport of Grayes Inne argued for the Defendant and first he thought that between the parties to the error and the first action in the Common Pleas there is an estoppel and admittance that the said Julian continued a feme sole for the process in all the proceedings ought to be as it was in the Original and he vouched 18. Assise pla 16. by which book it appears that if a man bring an assise for lands in the Countie of O. and the Tenants plead a Common recovery of the same land in the Common Pleas this doth conclude the partie to say that the lands did lie else where c. also if an original be depending and before the first Capias or process awarded the Defendant intermarrieth and after a capias issueth against her as a feme sole this is well awarded lib. 5. E. 4.16 and also 5. E. 3. fo 9. and 10. also he said that such a thing as is done between the plea and not after the judgement is not material to alter the proceedings in that course it was begun for the same partie against whom judgement is given shall error have against him for whom the judgement is given except she had married after the judgement for then he agreed that the writ of error shall be brought by the husband and wife in case judgement had been given against the wife while she was sole 35. H. 6. fo 31. and 12. Assise pla 41. and it also appears by 18. E. 4. fo 3. if Trespas he brought against a married wife as against a feme sole and she appears as a feme sole and judgement is given and execution accordingly this is good until it be reversed by error and the Sheriff in such case never ought to examine if it be evil or nor no more then if Trespas be brought against A. my servant by the name of B. and A. is taken in execution the Master shall not take benefit of this misnaming admitting that A. should punish the Sheriff for it also he vouched one Shotbolts case 10. and 11. Eliz. Dyer and 15. Eliz. Dyer 318. in the Earl of Kents case which prove that the Sheriff is to be excused for taking me by a false name and if the Iudges admit this false name yet this judicial writ ought not to be examined by the Sheriff and it was adjourned Shoftbey against Waller and Bromley SHoftbey brought an action upon the case against Waller and Bromley and declared that the Defendants conspired that the said Bromley should commence a suit against the Plantiff and that the Plantiff was then worth 5000. l. and that he was then dwelling in Middlesex and that the Defendants knowing thereof maliciously and falsely agreed that the said Bromley should lay his action in London and prosecute it until the Plantiff were outlawed in the said suit to the intent that his goods should be forfeited to the King and after in performance of the agreement aforesaid the Plantiff suggested that he was dwelling in London and laid his action here which was prosecuted until the Plantiff here was outlawed to his damage c. Tanfield chief Baron thought that if the suggestion was by Bromley to make the process into a wrong County it seemed that the Action should lie against him only but in regard it is shewed in the Declaration that the said suggestion was made by him in performance of the precedent agreement that the action lieth against both which the Court granted Godfrey in this action moved in arrest of judgement and that for two causes the action lieth not upon the matter here it appears by the 4. Eliz. Dyer 214. that a man may say his action wherein an outlawry lies in London and then by the Statute of 6. H. 8. cap. 4. proclamation shall issue into the Countie where he dwelleth therefore the suing of him in another Countie is no such act wherefore an action should be brought no more then if before the Statute of W. 2. cap. 12. a man had brought an appeal Maliciosè yet no remedy before the said Statute as appears in the 13. H. 7. in Kellawaies case because it was lawful to bring an appeal and so notwithstanding the said Statute no action did lie against him who brought an appeal if it abated 9. H. 5. cap. 1. also the Statute of the 18. H. 6. provideth remedy for false appeals or judgement in another Countie maliciosè c. by action of the case whereby it appeareth that in such case the Common Law allowed no action also the Statute of the 18. H. 6. provideth another remedy then that Statute and therefore no action lies against us no more then in the case aforesaid at the Common Law Secondly here is no issue joyned if the Defendants be guiltie of the execution of this practice but only if they be guiltie of the agreement and this is found for the Plantiff but clearly such agreement without execution giveth no cause of action and the word Practizatione comprehends only the going about and not the executing of this conspiracy and therefore the issue should have been general if the Defendants be guiltie or not and therefore he prayed judgement might be stayed and he cited Owen
Woods case in Cook lib. 4. Tanfield chief Baron it is true that the issue should be better if it were general not guiltie of the Trespass aforesaid but yet it is good enough in this case for the special words comprehend as much as the words not guiltie of the practice and agreement aforesaid c. and the word Practizatione comprehends aswel the subsequent Acts of execution as the precedent combination and therefore Tantamounts a general issue and it was good by the Court and as to the action Altham Baron conceived that it lieth although it be for a lawful cause for the Law abhoreth fraud and conspiracy as if two conspire to vex me for my land by suit an action lieth F. N. B. yet it is lawful for every man to sue me without title and he vouched 16. Assise and here it is laid that the Defendants indeavoured to make the Plantiff forfeit his goods which are worth 5000. l. and this is reasonable that it should lie and 9. E. 2. Fitz. discents 52. is our case directly upon the matter and therefore it seemeth to me that it lies Tanfield chief Baron said that 9. E. 2. crosseth this case in part and yet he thought that the action lies to which Snig agreed and it seemed the cases of appeal put by Godfrey did lie well enough without aid of the Statute of W. 2. if there be such a conspiracy Tanfield chief Baron accordingly if it be legally thought without cause yet if without conspiracy the action lieth not for it as it appears in Owen Woods case Cook lib. 4. and in all cases where strangers have nothing to do with the suit brought for the conspiracy and yet combine with the Plantiff in the suit an action upon the case lieth for this vexation and judgement was entred for the Plantiff by the Court. An inquisition for the King was returned here and it was found that Fleet-wood the Kings debtor for his office of receiver for the Court of Wards did purchase a certain Term and interest of and in the rectory of Yeading for divers years then to come and that being so possessed he became indebted to the King and that this term is now in the hands of the Lady Edmonds and by colour of this inquisition the land is extended for the Kings debt Harris Serjeant moved that this inquisition is insufficient to extend the land but good to sell a term and he vouched Palmers case Cook lib. 4. to which the Court inclined but it was adjourned If a Bishop becomes indebted to the King for a subsidie and dieth his successors shall not be charged upon the lands of the Bishoprick but the executors of the predecessor or his heir and if they have nothing the King shall lose it as chief Baron Tanfield said which the Court granted upon the motion of Bridgman for the Bishop of Saint Davids Trallops case A Scire facias issued against Trallop the father and Trallop the son to shew cause wherefore they did not pay to the King 1000. l. for the mean profits of certain lands holden by them from his Majesty for which land judgement was given for him in this Court and the mean rates was found by inquisition which returned that the said mean profits came to 1000. l. upon which inquisition this scire facias issued whereupon the Sheriff returned Trallop the father dead and Trallop the son now appeared and pleaded that he took profits but as a servant to his father and by his commandment and rendred an accompt to his father for the said profits and also the judgement for the said land was given against his father and him for default of sufficient pleading and not for the truth of the fact and he shewed the Statute of the 33 H. 8. cap. 39. which as he pretended aided him for his equitie whereupon the King demurred Hitchcock for Trallop seemed that the Statute did aid him by equity and he moved two things the one that if here be such a debt that the Statutes intends to aid it the other if the Defendant hath shewed sufficient matter of equitie within the intent of the Act and he thought that it is such a debt as the Statute will aid for although that here be au uncertainty of the time of the judgement given for the King that being reduced to a certainty by the inquisition after it shall be within the intent of the Statute for id certum est quod certum reddi potest and the words of the Statute are if any judgement be given for any debt or duty c. and here although that there was no certainty unto how much these mean rates extended at the time of the judgement given yet it is clear that it was a duty at the time of the judgement and then it is within the Statute also he said that the words in the proviso of that Statute explain that the intent of the makers of the Act was so for the words are for any thing for which the partie is chargable and the mean rates are a thing for which he is chargable see Cook lib. 7. fo 20. and the Lord Andersons case there fo 22. as to the point of equitie there seem to be two causes First he shewed that he was but a servant to his father and had given an accompt to him Secondly the judgement was given against him upon a point of mispleading Tanfield chief Baron said that the matter in equitie ought to be sufficiently proved and here is nothing but the allegation of the partie and the demurrer of Mr. Attorney for the King and if this be in Law an admittance of the allegation and so a sufficient proof within the Statute it is to be advised upon and for that point the case is but this a scire facias issueth out of this Court to have Execution of a recognizance which within this Act ought by pretence and allegation of the Defendant to be discharged for matter in equitie and the Defendant pleads his matter of equitie and the King supposing this not to be equity within this Statute demurreth in Law whether that demurrer be a sufficient proofe of the allegation within the Statute or not and it was adjourned Trin. 7. Jac. in the Exchequer Doillie and Joiliffs case again Trin. 7. Jac. in the Exchequer CRessey for the Plantiff said that the Plea in Bar is not good because the Defendant justified by force of a Capias ad satisfaciendum and pleads no return thereof and moved that it is not justifiable without returning of the writ but the Court seemed the plea to be good notwithstanding that but if it were a mean process then it ought to be pleaded to be returned see Cook lib. 5. Hoes case fol. 19. according to this diversitie Tanfield chief Baron thought that the Plantiff shall recover for first the writ of error here is not a writ but a commission and therefore false lattin shall not abate it as it hath been
and therefore he vouched a case between Scockwood and Sear where a man devised part of his land to his wife for life and another part of his land until Michaelmas next ensuing his death and further by the said will he devised to his younger son all his lands not devised to his wife and adjudged that by the said words the younger son shall have only that parcel which was devised to the wife for life and not that which was devised unto her till Michaelmas and yet by Popham it appeareth that his intent was otherwise viz. that all that should go to his younger son so there ought not to be a strained construction made against the heir and so in our case the words being that if he die without issue c. that then it shall go to his wife herein as much as he had issue at the time of his death it cannot be said that he died without issue but that he is dead without issue and this appeareth by the pleading in the Lord Bartleys case in Plowden and he vouched also a case in the Kings Bench 4. Jac. between Miller and Robinson where a man devised to Thomas his son and if he die without issue having no son there it was holden that if the devisee had issue a son yet if he had none at the time of his death the devisee in the remainder shall have it yet he was once a person having a son and so in our case there was a person who did not die without issue and he vouched also the case of Bold and Mollineux in 28. H. 8. Dyer fo 15.3 when a man deviseth to his wife for life paying a yearly rent to his sister and that if the rent be not paid that the sister may distrain it seems to me that this is a conditional estate in the wife notwithstanding the limitation of the distress and he vouched 18. Eliz. in Dyer 348. which as he said proved the case expresly for there in such a case it is adjudged that the devisee of the rent may after demand thereof distrain and yet the heir may enter for the not payment of the rent although it were never demanded so that the subsequent words of distraining do not qualifie the force of the condition although there be there an express condition and in our case but a condition implyed and he said that it seemed reasonable that such a construction for the distress and condition also shall stand as appeareth by divers cases that upon such words the Law will allow a double remedy and therefore he vouched Gravenors case in the Common Pleas Hill 36. Eliz. Rot. 1322. where a lease was made by Magdalen Colledge to husband and wife so that if the husband alien that the lease shall be void and provided that they do not make any under-tenants and to this purpose he vouched the case of the Earl of Pembrook cited in the Lord Cromwels case Cook lib. 2. where the words amounted to a covenant and a coudition and if this word paying should not be construed to be a condition then it were altogether void and idle and such a construction ought not to be made in a will and he conceived that this rent ought to be paid by the wife without any demand upon the pain of the condition and therefore he vouched 22. H. 6. fo 57.14 E. 4 21. E. 4. by Hussey and 18. Eliz. Dyer 348. vouched before and so it was resolved as he said in the Court of Wards in Somings case where a man made a devise paying a rent to a stranger this ought to be paid without demand and he said that the Common case is proved when a feofment is made upon condition that the feoffee shall do an act to a stranger this ought to be done in convenient time without request by the stranger and so here it seemeth although a demand ought to be made by the sister yet the wife ought to give notice to the sister of the Legacy so that she may make a demand and therefore he vouched Warder and Downings case where a man devised that his eldest son upon entry should pay to the younger son such a summe of money here the eldes brother ought to give notice at what time he will enter to the intent that the younger brother may be provided to make a demand Edwards of the Inner Temple contrary First it seemeth that by this limitation the wife ought to retain the land until the issue of the devisor should have come to the age of 18. years for this a time certain and as it is construed upon such words in Borastons case Cook lib. 3. that the Executors there have an interest certain so it should be construed here to refer to a certainty which is until the time by computation that the issue should have attained to 18. years and the rather in this case in respect the devisor had otherwise disposed of the land until the son should have accomplished the said age Secondly it seemeth that the wife hath an estate for life not conditional in so much as the words are not joyned in the case the 18. Eliz. Dyer hath been vouched but that was upon an express condition but here it is by implication and then the clause of distress taketh away the force of the implication which otherwise might be thereupon inferred and therefore in 5. Eliz. Dyer it appeareth that the word Proviso annexed to other words makes it no condition in judgement of Law and so in 14. Eliz. Dyer 311. and he vouched also 18. Eliz. Dyer Greens case that if a man deviseth lands to his friends paying to his wife with a clause of distress this is no condition as it is adjudged Thirdly it seemeth that this summe to be paid to the sister is a rent and therefore ought to be demanded or otherwise in judgement of Law the condition shall not be broken and the 21. E. 4. the case of an obligation to perform covenants c. and a case between Wentworth and Wentworth 37. Eliz. that a demand ought to be made for a rent which is granted in liew of Dower for the wife brought a writ of Dower for the land of her husband the Tenant pleaded that she accepted a rent out of the land in liew of her Dower and the wife replied that the said rent was granted upon condition that if it were not paid at certain dayes that it should be void and that she should have Dower of the land and she said that the rent was not paid at the dayes c. but shewed not in her pleading any demand to be made and therefore it was holden evil pleading for such a rent ought to be demanded or otherwise the condition is not broken and so here Nota that this case was appointed to be argued again but after as I heard the Barons amongst themselves resolved to give judgement for the Defendant upon one point only which was that the estate
the profit and comoditie of his Master the Plantiff and it is shewed that he intended to deceive his Master and the Queen also and where a wrong is made to another in my name whereby I am damnified there I shall have an Action and if in this case the Defendant had left the goods in the ship then the Plantiff had suffered no loss and therefore his taking them out of the ship is the cause which occasions the loss to the Plantiff and therefore it is reasonable that he should render us damages and he vouched the writ of deceipt in F. N. B. and divers cases therein put and 21. E. 4. that if a man bring an Action in London and the Defendant to delay my Action brings a writ of priviledge be shall have an Action upon the case and he vouched the like case to be adjudged in the Kings Bench 40. Eliz. between Byron and Sleith upon an Action of the case brought by the Defendant because he sued a scire facias against a Bail in a Court where he ought Bromley Puisne Baron said that the Plantiff shall have judgement First it shall be intended that the Plantiff was beyond the Seas at the time in respect of the Minute of time between his departure and the landing of the goods Secondly he said that it needs not be expressed that the Master had left moneys wherewith to discharge the custome for it shall be intended in this case because the Defendant had taken upon him to meddle according to the appointment of the Plantiff wherefore c. and so he departed to the Parliament Altham second Baron agreed that the Statute for the paying of custome appointeth that if the goods of any man be laid upon the land the custome not paid that then the goods shall be forfeited and therefore here he shall not lose his goods by reason of this Act made by the Defendant so that if the Defendant be a meer stranger to the Plantiff without question an Action of Trespass lies for this taking then in the principal case by reason of this trust an action of the case lies and if a stranger drives my Cattle upon your land whereby they are distrained by you I shall recover against the stranger for this distress by you in an action against him for by reason of this wrongful Act done by him I suffer this loss and he vouched 9. E. 4. fo 4. a case put by Jenney Snig third Baron to the contrary I agree that if a stranger put in my Cattle to the intent to do hurt to me a Trespass lieth but here is an Action upon the case and that lies not because it appears not sufficiently that the Defendant was servant to the Plantiff to Merchandise but generally his servant and therefore an Action of Trespas rather lieth generally for in an Action upon the case he ought to hit the bird in the eye and here it is not shewed that the goods were for the same voyage nor that the Defendant is a Common servant in this imployment also the Declaration is not good because he doth not shew that the Defendant had moneys or means from the Master to pay the custome and he is not compellable to lay out money of his own besides he cannot dispose of the goods until the custome be paid wherefore c. Tanfield chief Baron there are two matters to be considered in the case First if here you charge the Defendant as your special servant or if as a stranger Secondly if as a stranger then if an Action upon the case or a general Action of Trespass lieth and as to the first if in this case you have shewed him to be such a servant as a Bayliff or Steward and he hath misbehaved himself in such a thing which belongs to his charge without any special trust an Action upon the case lieth but if he be taken to be your general servant then he is to do and execute all Acts and lawful commands and against this general servant if his Master command him to do such a thing and he doth it not an action upon the case lieth but yet this is with this diversitie viz. if the Master command him to do such a thing which is in his convenient power or otherwise not and therefore if I command my servant to pay 100. l. at York and give him not money to hire a horse an Action lieth not for the not doing of this command but if I furnish him with ability to do it and then he doth it not an action lieth well against him and in the principal case it is shewed that the Plantiff appointed the Defendant being his servant generally to receive c. and to pay all customes c. then it is examinable if the Plantiff sufficiently inabled this Defendant to do this command and the woâ—ds of the command seem to be all one as if he had commanded the Defendant to receive the Wares paying the custome and therefore the Defendant needs not to receive them if he had not money to pay for the custome and so it is not within the Plantiffs command to receive the Wares and then if he doth receive them not paying for the customes this is another thing then the command anâ— therefore it is no misfeazance as my particular servant but being my general servant he had done another thing then I commanded him whereby I receive some damage and by consequence is in case of a stranger for if my general servant who is not my horse keeper take my horse out of my pasture and ride him this is a thing which he doth not as a servant but as a stranger then as to the second matter the Defendant being as a stranger if an action upon the case or a general action of Trespass lieth for this is as if my general servant take my horse and rides him without my appointment a general action of Trespass lieth but if by reason of his riding my horse die an action upon the case lieth and so it is in the case here the Defendant had laid the goods upon the land by reason whereof they were forfeited it is collourable that an Action upon the case lieth but if a man take my goods and lay them upon the land of A. a Trespass or an Action upon the case lieth against him who took them by the better opinion but it is good to be advised and it was adjourned and at another day Altham Baron said that an Action upon the case or a Trespass generally did lie well enough and he vouched F. N. B. that if a Bailiff arrest one without any warrant I shall have Trespass generally or an Action upon the case at my election and so in the like case 18. E. 4 fo 23. Trespass or Action upon the case lies also by F. N. B. if Executors be outed by the Testators Lessor there they may have an Action upon the case if they will or Trespass generally and in
Slade and Morleys case a case was put which proves it to be according Snig Baron agreed that Iudgement ought to be given for the Plantiff and by Tanfield if I take your goods and detain them until I have caused you to pay me 10. l. a general Action of Trespass lieth and not an Action upon the case and it is cited 7. H. 4. or 7. E. 4. to be accordingly but yet he agreed that judgement should be entred and so it was appointed to be done but then Chibborn for the Defendant said that here is a mistrial for if this trust be not material because it is not effectually shewed in the Declaration as you have argued then the Venue shall come only from the parish where the Wares were laid upon the land and not from the parish also where the appointment or trust was made by the Plantiff and therefore the trial also being from both parishes is a mistrial and the Court agreed that this is a mistrial upon that reason for now the appointment or Trust is but an inducement and therefore needs not to be shewed within what parish it was made and therefore a new Venire facias was granted and upon that a new trial and damages more then before and judgement was given accordingly Arden against Darcie NOta a good case of Attornament which was decreed in the time of Baron Manwood betwixt Arden and Darcie and it was this one Arden was seised in fee of divers lands in the County of c. and made a lease for years and after made a feofment with words of Grant of those lands to A. and B. to the use of the feoffor and his wife for their lives the remainder to Arden his son in tail and after the feoffor said to the Lessee that he had conveyed his land which the Lessee held in lease to the uses aforesaid and the Lessee said I like it well and after he paid his rent to the feoffor generally and it was decreed in the Exchequer Chamber that this is no Attornament because the Attornament ought to be to the feoffees and it appeareth not that the Lessee had notice of the names of the feoffees and therefore it cannot be said to amount to an Attornament but notwithstanding that Decree Arden the same to whom the remainder was limited had his Action depending in the Kings Bench to trie the point again as he said to me also this Term a point concerning the said Decree was in question upon another Bill exhibited in the Exchequer Chamber by Sir Edward Darcie against Arden and the case was as followeth Sir Edward Darcie exhibited his Bill here in the nature of a scire facias against Arden to shew cause wherefore the said Edward Darcie should not have execution of a Decree made in the time of Baron Manwood and the Defendant shewed that Darcie in his first suit supposed by his Bill that he had a grant of the land then and now in question from Queen Elizabeth rendring rent as it appears by the letters Patents and in facto there was no rent reserved upon the Patent and that the Defendant gave answer to the said Bill and admitted the Iurisdiction of the Court and after a Decree was made against the Defendant and the Defendant now having shewed this special matter demurred upon this Bill in respect that by his pretence the Court had not jurisdiction to hold plea in the first suit and here it was shewed that the first decree was made upon a matter in Law not properly examinable by English Bill and that in facto the Law was therein mistaken and therefore the Defendant prayed that the decree may be re-examined Tanfield chief Baron it is usual in the office of Pleas that if an action be brought as a debtor of our Lord the King this is good although that de facto no suggestion be made thereof if it be not shewed on the other side and therefore a writ of Error for this falsity shall not cause the judgement to be reversed as it was resolved in a case in which I was of Councel and so here as it seemeth Altham Baron here we are in equity wherein we are not tied to so strickt a course as if it were in the office of pleas Brock of the Inner Temple for the Defendant in a Court of equity it is in the discretion of the Court to deny Execution of a decree if good cause be shewed and in 18. E. 4. fo 1. judgement was given against a married wife by the name of a feme sole and reversed although she did not shew in the first suit that she was married and in 8. E. 4. judgement was given in the Kings Bench in a suit and by writ of error was reversed although the Defendant had admitted the Iurisdiction of the Court and the chief Baron and all the Court inclined that Arden may exhibit a Bill to reverse this Decree made against him and may shew what point in Law the Iudges mistook in the Decree or otherwise we should not do as Law and Iustice requireth for it is not expedient to be examined by way of Bar to this Bill in the nature of a scire facias and after Arden according to the Decree of the Court and their direction did exhibit his Bill in the nature of a writ of error Comprising how the first decree was erroneously made and prayed that the said decree might be reversed and in his Bill he shewed the point in Law which was decreed and that upon divers long conveyances appears to be thus and so it was agreed by Councel on both parties that Arden the father was seised of the Mannor of Cudworth in the County of c. and was also seised of the Mannor of Parkhal in the same County and of Blackclose c. which was parcel of the Mannor of Cudworth but lying neer unto Parkhal and alwayes used and occupied with it and reputed parcel thereof but in truth it was parcel of Cudworth and that Arden the father made a Conveyance of the Mannor of Parkhal and of all the lands thereunto belonging and reputed as parcel thereof or occupied with it as part or parcel thereof and of all other his lands in England except the Mannor of Cudworth to the use of Arden his son that now is Plantiffe here and if Blackclose will pass to the son by this conveyance or if by intendment it shall be excepted by the exception made it was the question here and was decreed in the time of Baron Manwood that it is excepted by the exception but all the Barons now thought it to be a strong case that Blackclose is not excepted by the exception of the Mannor of Cudworth and so the first decree was upon a mistake out of the Law and Tanfield chief Baron said that the point is no other but that I infeoffe you of Blackacre parcel of the Mannor of D. exceyt my Mannor of D. this doth not except the King
by express terms quaer if in this case there was any land occupied with Parkhal which was not parcel of Cudworth nor of Parkhal for if so then it seems that Blackclose will be within the exception in regard that the words and lands occupied therewith viz. Parkhal are well satisfied Harris Serjeant said that the case is to be resembled to the point in Carter and Ringsteeds case concrrning the Mannor of Odiam where a man was seised of of a Mannor within which the Mannor of D. did lie and is parcel thereof and he by his will devised the Mannor of D. excepting the Mannor of Odiam where the Mannor passeth by the devise and is not excepted Snig and Altham Barons agreed that this proves the case in equity but by the chief Baron Tanfield because this is a rare case that we should reverse or undo a decree made by our predecessors in the very point decreed by them it is good to be advised and therefore they directed Arden to finde presidents if he could by search made for them in the said case and therefore the Attorney general who was of Councel for Darcie had demurred upon the Bill which was exhibited by Arden and that he being not present day was given until another term to hear Councel on both parts at which day the Attorney said that he conceived it a strange case and without president that a Court should impeach and reverse the decrees given in the same Court and that if it should be suffered the subjects would be vexed and troubled without any end or quiet and this stands with the gravity of every Court to maintain their own judgements and therefore several Statutes were made to reverse judgements upon erroneous proceedings and judges of other Courts constituted to examine them which proveth that before the Statutes aforesaid and without aid of them the Iudges would not reverse their own Iudgements and so here Harris to the contrary it is not without presidents that in a Court of equity one and the same decree in the same Court hath been reversed by decree of the same Court upon some consideration had of the erroneous misprisions of Law and it is no dishonour to a Court of justice so to do for matter in Law but otherwise it were for matter of fact for then that betrayeth an Ignorance in the Iudges which would be a dishonour to the Court but for Law men are not Angles and for that point there may be errour to prove that the Court of equity may do so he vouched the Book of 27. H. 8. fo 15. Martin Dockwraies case which is our very case ruled in the Chancery and so he said that in this Court 3. Jac. a decree made in the time of Baron Manwood was reversed upon the like reason and Tanfield chief Baron said to Serjeant Harris that if it appear by your president that if the same matter in Law which was decreed was reversed in the same point in Law then this proveth for you but if it were for matter of fact otherwise it is and therefore we will see your president Kent and Kelway KEnt and Kelway entred Hil. 6. Jac. Rot. 722. in the Exchequer in the case between Kent and Kelway which was debated Pasc 8. Jac. the Iudges pronounced in the Exchequer Chamber that judgement ought to be affirmed notwithstanding their opinion before to the contrary as it appeareth and therefore I demanded of Mr. Hoopwel Clark of the Errors what was the reason of their opinions and he told me that the case was debated by them this Term at Serjeants Inne and then they resolved to affirm the Iudgement and the reasons as he remembred were as followeth and he also delivered unto me the case as he had collected it out of the Records and delivered it to the Iudges which was that the Plantiff in the Kings Bench declared that one Benjamin Shephard was indebted to him in 300. l. and that he sued out of the Kings Bench an Alias Capias directed to the Sheriffe of N. to the intent to compel the said Benjamin Shephard upon his appearance to put in Bail according to the custome of that Court for the Recovery of his debt which writ was delivered to John Shaw Sheriffe of the said County to be executed the Sheriffe made his warrant to the Bailiffe of the liberty of the Wapentake of Newark and the Plantiffe himself delivered it to James Lawton Deputy of the Lord Burley the Kings chief Bailiâ—e of that liberty to be executed and the Deputy Bailiffe by vertue of the said warrant arrested the said Benjamin Shephard whereupon the Defendant with others made an Assault and rescued the said Benjamin Shephard out of the custody of the said Deputy Bailiffe whereby he lost all his debt and damages were assessed at 172. l. and cost 10. l. and in this case the Iudges agreed that notwithstanding the Defendant had rescued the said Benjamin Shephard out of the hands of c. when the said Benjamin Shephard was arrested upon an Alias Capias out of the Kings Bench which writ is only in nature of a plea of Trespass yet the party who rescued him shall answer in this action damages for the debt because the Plantiffe by this means had lost his debt And yet it is not shewed that the Rescuer knew that the Plantiffe would declare for his debt but if in this case the Sheriffe or Bailiffe had suffered a Negligent escape they should be charged only with the damages in the same plea as the writ supposeth and no for the debt and so a diversity also they agreed that the Declaration is good enough to say that he was rescued out of the hands of the Deputy Bailiffe and the course in the Kings Bench was alwayes so upon the return of a rescue notwithstanding the Book of the 7. Eliz. Dyer fo 241. also it was resolved that the Declaration was good saying that he sued an Alias Capias without mention of any latitat before sued also it was agreed that the arrest was good made by the Deputy Bailiffe by vertue of a warrant delivered to the Sheriffe but quere if they should not examine if the Bailiffe had a power given to make a Deputy by his Patent for this appears not in the case Bently and others against Leigh in Trespas Hill 45. Eliz. Rot. 1231. Trin. 7. Jac. in the Exchequer TPe Iudges affirmed a Iudgement this Term between Leigh Plantiffe in a writ of Error and one Bentley and others Defendants and the matter assigned for Error was because the Trespass was brought in the year 45. Eliz. for a Trespass made in the 42. Eliz. and the judgement upon the verdict was against the Defendant and the Margent of the Roll it was entred quod Defendens capiatur where it ought to be pardonatur as he pretended for the general pardon which was in 43. Eliz. had pardoned the fine to the King for the Trespass and this is a thing whereof the Iudges
purpose as to the avoiding of the Benefice but his want of privitie availeth to excuse him of being Simoniacus yet because he is Simoniace Promotus the presentation is void and the King shall have it by the expresse words of the Statute and therefore as it seems if in this Statute there had been an expresse saving of the interest of the Incumbent by reason of his innocency yet such a saving of Interest had been void and repugnant in respect that it was expresly given to the King before as it is in Nichols case in Plowden upon the Stat. of 1. H. 7. See 1. Mar. Dyer and 7. Eliz. Dyer 231. such a saving doubted if it be void and in Cook lib. 1. Altonwoods case a saving Repugnant to the expresse words of the Premisses is void and so in our Case the Presentation is given to the King expressely and therefore if there were a saving in the words subsequent this were void much more in our Case where there is no saving And to prove that by the Symonie in the Patron that the Patron shall be prejudiced he vouched 42. E. 3. fo 2. It goods be given to B. by A. this is by fraud in A. to the intent that he may defraud another although B. is not knowing of this friend yet the gift is void as to him 34. E. 1. Title Garranty accordingly and Burrells case Cook lib. 6. upon the Statute of 27 Eliz cap. 4. to the same purpose To the second matter it seems that by the Queens death her Presentation is determined cleerely and so in case of a common person for if an Admission c. should follow after the death of the Presentor this is without any Authority of the instrument of Presentation for although there were no Admission there is no Presentation and he said that the Presentation passeth no interest but is as a Commendation and therefore he compared it to the Case of Say and Fuller in Plowden Com. If a Lease be made for so many years as a stranger shall name there ought to be certainty of years appointed in the life of the parties or otherwise it will be void and in 38. E. 3.3 If a Bishop present and die before c. Now the King shall present anew and also there it appears that the King may present by Paroll well enough and so it is said in 34. E. 3.8 tit Quare impedit 11. That a Presentment made by the Bishop becometh null and void by his death and therefore it appeareth in Fitzh Office of Court 29. that licence to alien granted to the King is void by the Kings death there needeth no actual Repeal or recital of the new presentation yet I agree that the King may make an actual repeal if he will as it appears by divers cases which have been cited before but that is of necessity to be done and as it seems the words of the Statute 6. H. 8. prove that before this Statute a second Grant made the first void without actual repeal in case where the thing passed by the Grant and by 38. E. 3. fo 3.4 it appears that a second Presentation made by the King was good without a repeal of the first and by Gascoigne 7. H. 4.32 if the King make a Presentation to one and then presents another without recitall or repeal of the first yet the Bishop ought to receive the latter Presentee for it is good without actual repeal wherefore judgement ought to be given for the Plaintiff Snig Baron said that as the Action is brought judgement ought to be given for the Plaintiff but if the Plaintiff had brought a Quare impedit peradventure I should have been of another opinion And as to the point of Symonie by the Civill Law it was punishable by deprivation and the guilt of the Patron should prejudice the Parson as to matter of Commodity in the Parsonage and at the Common Law if the Parson will pleade such Presentment he should be prejudiced as appears by our Books and hereby the incumbency the words of the Statute will not be satisfied for then the Queen should not Present if an usurper present and the Presentee is in by six moneths this gives Title of Presentation to the King against the rightfull Patron also it seemeth That if I. S. hath an Advowson and A. purchase the next avoidance to the intent to present B. and the Church becomes void and A. presents B. this is Symonie by averment as by good pleading the Presentation of B. shall be adjudged void To the second Point in respect that the Plaintiff had the possession by induction it is no question but he may retaine a possessorie Action for the Titles But if it were in a Quare impedit it would be materiall whether a Repeal should be in the case or not according to the Presidents in the Booke of Entries fo 303 304 305. for if a Licence be Granted to purchase in Mortmaine this may well be executed after the death of the Queene as it appeareth by Fitzherberts natura brevium expresly and so in Dyer a license of Transportation doth not cease by the Kings death 7. H. 4. in the Countess of Kents case it appears when the King makes a grant which is void yet there shall be no new grant without an actual repeal but it seems we are out of the intent of the Statute of 6. H. 8. because the words during his pleasure are not in the grant or Patent and so upon the whole matter judgement shall be given for the Plantiffe Tanfield accordingly the case is that the Defendant had prioritie of the possession of the Corn for which the action is brought and yet it seems judgement ought to be given for the Plantiffe and first as this case is here is Simonie by the Civil Law and the partie had his benefice by Simonie although he be not conusant thereof Secondly admit that here was not Simonie by the intendment of the Civil Law yet the Statute hath made an avoidance of the benifice in this case although it be not Simonie for the Statute speaks not one word of Simonie throughout the Act and yet by express words it doth avoid such presentations as this is and as to the Civil Law such benefice is to be made void by sentence declaratorie but it is not void ipso facto as it seems in the case where a common person was consenting to the Simonie but the text of the Civil Law sayes expresly that the Church ought not to be filled Corruptivè or by corruption and the Civil Law expresseth such a person as is in our case by Simoniace promotus and calls him who is particeps criminis Simoniacus and he who is Simoniacus is by the Civil Law deprived not only of the benefice ipso facto but also is deprived to be a Minister and adjudged guiltie in Culpa et poena Petrus Benefieldus a late writer of good authoritie saith that if a friend