BAnks against Barker Hill 12. Jac. rotulo 1979. In an Action of Trespass the venire facias was well awarded upon the case of the venu in Westown and of the Mannor of D. and the Writ of Venire was mistaken to wit of the venu of Westown and exception being taken after tryall the Court was moved for the amending of the venire facias by the roll and it was denyed because the Jury did come of another venu then they ought by the Law of the Land to come and therefore could not be amended but afterwards the Court seemed to be of an opinion that the awarding of the venu in the roll was mistaken because it was of the venu of the Villiage and Mannor and it should have been of the Mannor only being to try a custome of the Mannor FOrrest against Headle Hill 13. Jac rot 1123. An Action of Trespass brought and a continuando of the Trespass unto the day of the shewing forth the Plaintifs Originall to wit the 20. day of November which day was after the shewing forth of the Originall and because the Jury gave damages for the whole time which ought not to be it was proved that the Judgment upon the verdict might stay but by the whole Court the videlicet was held idle and Judgment given for the Plaintiff COcks against Barnsley Hill 10. Iac. rotulo 2541. An Action of Trespass brought and a speciall verdict found and the question was whether Land held in ancient Demesne was extendable for debt and an action of Trespass brought for that cause And Justice Nichols held it was extendable for otherwise if it should not be extendable there would be a fayler of Justice for if a Judgment should be had against a man that had no other Land but what was in ancient Demesne and that it could not be extendable there would be a fayler of Justice which the Law doth not allow of but an Assize or a re-disseisin doth not lye of Land in ancient Demesne because of the Seisin that must be given by the Common Law and it would be prejudicial to the Lord which the Law allows not and Wynch and Hubbard were of the same opinion For ancient demesne is a good plea where the Free-hold is to be recovered or brought in question but in an action of Trespass it is no plea. And note that by this execution neither the Free-hold nor Possession is removed but only the Sheriffe enters to make execution upon a Judgment had in the Common bench in debt which is a proper Action to be brought there WRight and his Wife against Mouncton Hill 12. Iac. rotulo 43. An Action of Trespass brought to which the Defend pleaded not guilty And the Husband only made a challenge that he was servant to one of the Sheriffs and prayes a processe to the Coroners and the Defendant denies the challenge and therefore notwithstanding the challenge the Venire issued to the Sheriffs and after a tryall exception was taken because the woman did not joyne in the challenge and it was held that the Husband and Wife should joyn in the challenge although the cause of challenge proceded from the Husband only but after tryall it was helped by the Statute of Ieofailes and judgment given for the Plaintiff BIde against Snelling Hill 16. Iac. rotulo 1819. An Action of Ejectment brought and also a Battery in one and the Writ and after a verdict it was moved in Arrest of Judgment because the Battery was joyned with the Ejectment The damages were found severally and the Plaintiff had released the damages for the Battery and prayed Judgment for the Ejectment Winch held the Writ naught but Judgment was given for the Plaintiff notwithstanding STeward and his Wife against Sulbury An Action of Trespass brought wherefore by Force and Armes the Close of the Wife while she was sole at D. hath broken and the wood of the said D. to the value of 1005. there lately growing hath cut down and carried away and in his Count shews that he hath cut downe two acres of wood and exception was taken because he declared of so many acres of wood and not of so many loads of wood to wit twenty c. loads and held by the Court to be a good exception BLackeford against Althin Trin. 14. Jac. rotulo 3376. An action of Trespass brought wherefore by Force and Armes a certain Horse of the said Plaintiffs took away c. The Defendant conveys to himselfe a certain annuity granted to him by one John Hott The Plaintiff shews that one William Hott Father of the said Iohn Hott the Grantor was seised of Land in Fee which Land was Gavel-kind Land and devised it to his Wife for life the remainder to Iohn Hott the Elder and Iohn Hott the Younger his Sonne and the Heirs of their bodies And afterwards William dyed and the Woman entred and was seised for life and the two sonnes entred and were seised in tayl and being so seised Iohn Hott the younger had issue Iohn Hott c. and traverses without this that Iohn Hott the Father at the time of granting the annuity was seised of the Tenements aforesaid with the appurtenances in his Demesne as of fee as c. And the Defendant as before saith that the said J. H. the Father at the time of the granting the annuity aforesaid was seised and after the tryall it was moved in Arrest of Judgment supposing it was mistried because the issue was that the said J. H. the Father at the time of the grant c. And it doth not appear that the said J. H. was nominated Father neither could it appear that the said J. H. was the Father and so the word Father was idle and the Court were of opinion that it was helped by the Statute of Ieofailes and the word Father was idle and judgment was given for the Plaintiff A. brought an Action of Battery against the Husband and Wife and two others the Wife and one of the others without the Husband pleads not guilty and the Husband and the other pleaded seu assault demesne and tryed and alledged in arrest of Judgment because the Woman pleaded without her Husband and Judgment was stayed and a Repleader alledged and this case was confirmed by a case which was between Yonges and Bartram HArvy against Blacklole Trin. 8. Jacobi rotulo 1749. An Action of Trespass brought wherefore by force and Armes his Mare so strictly to a Gelding did fetter that by that fettring the Mare aforesaid did dye If a stranger take a Horse that cometh and strayeth into a Mannor the Lord may have his action of Trespass If my stray doth stray out of my Mannor and goeth into another Mannor the day before the yeare be ended I cannot enter into the other Mannor to fetch out the stray If I take an Horse as a stray and onother taketh him from me the Action lyeth not by the Owner against the second taker
or Geldings and no more and because the Beasts aforesaid in the narration aforesaid specified over and above the aforesaid other three Mares or Geldings the aforesayd time in which c. were in the aforesayd place in which c the Grasse then growing there eating and the Common of pasture of the sayd Robert Pargiter overcharging and doing damage to the sayd Robert there the sayd Robert Pargiter in his owne right doth wel avow and the aforesayd John Phillips as Bayliff of the aforesayd Pargiter doe well acknowledge the taking of the Beasts aforesayd in the aforesayd place in which c. and justly c. they then doing damage there c. And the aforesayd Robert Kenrick saith That neither the sayd Robert Pargiter for the reason before alleadged the taking of the aforesayd Beasts in the aforesayd place in which c. can justly avow nor the aforesayd John Phillips as Bayliff of the aforesayd Pargiter for the same reason the taking of the Beasts aforesayd in the aforesayd place in which c. justly can acknowledge Because by protestation that he the sayd Robert Kenrick and all those whose estate the sayd Robert Kenrick now hath and at the aforesayd time of the taking c. had in the sayd Messuage and foure Virges of Land with the appurtenances whereof c. time out of minde had not nor used to have or were accustomed every yeare at the first day of August called Lammas day and from thence to the next Feast of the Parification then next following Common of pasture in the aforesayd place in which c. onely for three Horses Mares or Geldings and not more in manner and forme as the aforesayd Robert Pargiter and John Phillips above have alleadged for Plea the sayd Robert Kenrick sayth That he long before the time of the taking of the Beasts aforesayd and also at the same time of the taking c. was seised of the Mannor of Kings Sutton with the appurtenances in Kings Sutton and Astrop in the County aforesayd whereof the aforesayd Messuage and four Virges of Land with the appurtenances whereof c. are and at the aforesayd time of the taking c. and also time out of mind c. were parcell in his Demesne as of Fee and the aforesayd House and foure Virges of Land with the appurtenances thereof c. and of the taking and likewise time out of mind were parcell of the Demesne Lands of the Mannor of Kings Sutton aforesayd And the sayd Robert Kenrick so of the Mannor aforesayd with the appurtenances in manner aforesayd appearing seised the sayd Robert before the sayd time in which c. put his Beasts aforesayd which then were the proper Beasts of the sayd Robert Kenrick upon the aforesayd House and four Virges of Land with the appurtenances lying and rising in the aforesayd place in which c. to eate the Grafs there growing in the sayd place in which c. called Great Greens parcell c. the Grass in the same then growing feeding and the aforesayd Beasts were in the place aforesayd untill the aforesayd Robert Pargiter and John Phillips the aforesayd fourth day of August the seventh yeare aforesayd at Kings Sutton aforesayd in the County aforesayd at Great Greene parcell c. took the sayd Beasts of the sayd Robert Kenrick and those unjustly detained against Sureties and Pledges untill c. as he above against those complaines and this he is ready to verifie whereof and from which the aforesayd Robert Pargiter and John Phillips the taking of the aforesayd Beasts in the aforesayd place c. further acknowledge the sayd Robert Kenrick demands Judgment and his damages by reason of the taking and unjust detaining of those beasts to be adjudged unto him c. And the aforesaid Robert Pargiter and John Phillips say that the aforesaid Plea of the said Robert Kenrick above in the Bar avowed pleaded and matter therein contained is very insufficient in Law justly to avoid the said Robert Pargiter and the said John from just acknowledging the taking of the Beasts aforesaid to have and shut up and that he to the said plea in manner and forme aforesaid pleaded hath no need not by the Law of the Land shall be held to answer and this they are ready to averr whereof for default of a sufficient plea of the aforesaid Robert Kenrick in this part the said Robert and John as before demand Judgement and Returne of the Beasts aforesaid together with their Damages c. To them to be adjudged c. And the aforesaid Robert Kenrick in respect he hath sufficient matter in Law justly to avoid the said Robert Pargiter and the aforesaid John from justly acknowledging the taking of the said Beasts to be shut out as above alledged which he is reaoy to verify which truly matter of the aforesaid Robert Pargiter and John do not answer according to their verifying they altogether refuse to admit as before and demand Judgment and their Damages occasioned by the taking and unjust detaining of the said Beasts to be adjudged to them c. And because c. Upon the pleadings the Case was thus a Freeholder prescribs to have common in parcell of the Demesnes of the Mannor for six Horses and other Cattel in certain Land from Lammas to Candlemas that the Lord of the Mannor hath used to have the said Parcell of Land in severall to his owne use from Candlemas to Lammas and in consideration of that the said Lord hath used to have Common in the said parcell of Land for Horses only and not more and the Lord unjustly puts in other Beasts then the said three Horses in the said parcel of Land and surcharged the Common and the Free-holder distrayned them doing Damage and the Lord brings a Replevin and it was argued that prescription was not good for that that Free-holder claimes that as Common without number in his severall Soyle the Grantee cannot exclude the owner of the Soile 12 H. 8. Brooke so of him which hath Common Fishing in the severall of another he cannot exclude him which hath the severall 18 H. 6. 16. And it is not like to the Case of the time of Edward the first prescription the 55. Where is Prescription that the Owner of the Soile shall be excluded from his Common for part of the yeare for there the other claimes all the Vesture of the Land and so may well exclude the Lord but not when he claimes it but as Common but it was agreed that by Lawes by the Commoners consent they may order that their great Cattell shall be put in in such Feild only untill such a Feast and after that for sheep and swine and this is good as it appears by 46 Ed. 3. 25. And Coke cheife Justice said that such prescription to have Common and to exclude the Owner of the Soyle is not good and he saith that so it hath been adjudged between Whyte of Shirland 31 Eliz. And in
21 H. 8. grants administration to one which is next of Blood that he cannot repeale it but Coke cheife Justice seemed the contrary and that he incurred the penalty of the statute only And if an Administration be granted to one which is next of Blood upon which the first Administrator brings an action of debt hanging that upon suggestion that the first Administration is void another Administration is granted and it seems that this second Administration granted upon this suggestion shall be repealed from the first though it be generall and without any recitall of it But if the second be declared by sentence to be void from the beginning then the first remains good Action upon the Case was brought for these words that is thou hast killed I. S. And it seems that the action doth not lye for a man may kill another in execution and as Minister of Justice or in Warr in which things killing is justifiable Michaelmasse 1611. 9. Jacobi in the Common Bench George Barney against Thomas Hardingham IN Trespasse for breaking the House and taking of a Cowe the Defendant pleades that the King and all those whose Estates he hath in the hundred have had Turne and at the Court held such a day it was presented that the Plaintiff hath incroached upon the high Way for which he was amerced and the amercement was affirmed by two Justices of peace according to the Custome of the Turne aforesaid And that he being Bayliff of the hundred by vertue of a Warrant to him in due manner made and directed hath entred the said house and taken the said Cowe for distresse for the said amercement and carrying it away which is the same Trespasse and so demands Judgement upon which Plea the Plaintiff Demurred And by Haughton Serjeant for the Plaintiff the Plea in Barr is not good and first he conceived that it was not good insomuch that the King hath made his Prescription by whose Estate and he intended that he could not make his Prescription by whose Estate insomuch that this lies in grant as it is 12. H. 7. 15. where it is agreed that by nothing which lieth in grant a man may Prescribe by whose Estate Also the Plea is that the King was seised in his Demesne as of Fee where it ought to be in Fee only insomuch that it is a thing only in Jurisdiction or Signiory and not Manurable as in 8. H. 7. 7. H. 4. 30. assis In an Action of Debt upon Reservation made upon Lease of a Mannor and hundred it is agreed that the hundred is not in Demesne nor Manurable Also the Plea is not good insomuch that it is not Pleaded before whom the Turne shall be held And allwaies when a man claimes a Court by Patent he ought to shew before whom his Court shall be held otherwise it shall not be good so of Conusance of Pleas otherwise it is if it be in a Turne for that shall be intended a certaine ancient Court See 44. Ed 5. 17. 1. H. 4. 6. 6. H. 4. 1. Also the Statute of Magna Charta chap. 35. requires that it should be held in the accustomed place and so it ought to be alledged or otherwise it is against the Statute and for that it shall not be good for it is of the nature of Sheriffs Turne and derived out of that See the book of Entries in Replevin 2. Also the Statute of Magna Charta chap. 14. appoints that the officers shall be the Sheriffe and this is not pleaded but generally by two Justices of Peace upon their Oath And also it is not pleaded to what Sum the amercement was made Also it is pleaded that he being a Bayliffe of the Hundred by vertue of a Warrant to him in due manner directed and made hath taken the distresse and doth not plead the Warrant certainly nor the place where it was made And for that the Plea is not good Also he pleades that he took and led away the Cowe in name of distresse and he ought to say that he took it and impounded it for that he tooke it and carried it away imports that he tooke it to his owne use 9. Ed. 4. 2. 20. Ed. 4. 6. And so he concluded that the Barr is not good and praied Judgement for the Plaintiff And Barker Serjeant for the Defendant conceived that the Prescription for the Hundred by which the Estate was very good and for that See 12. H. 7. 17. a. 8. H. 7. 13. H. 7. Also he intended that the title to the Court is very good notwithstanding that it is expressed before that it shall be held insomuch that the Law takes notice of the Turne of the Sheriffe and that he is Judge of that and that the Affirance is very good insomuch that this is according to the Custome of the Turne aforesaid And the Warrant of the Baylifâe is very well pleaded and more is pleaded then need for it is the duty and appertaineth to his office to gather the amercements and he might do that without Warrant by force of his office But if it be upon plaint between party and party otherwise it is and for that see the book of Entries 553. And also the charge in the Action is for that that he took and carried away and of that he made Justification and he cannot Plead otherwise and to the whose Estate c. That a man cannot Prescribe to have a thing by whose Estate which lieth meerely in grant without shewing of a Deed yet when that is appurtenant to another thing as here the Court is to a Hundred it may very well that do and 33. H. 8. B. Leete when the penalty is Presented by the Jury it selfe there needs not any affirance And so he concluded that the Plea in Barr is very good and praied Judgement upon that for the Defendant And Coke cheife Justice said that Turne of the Sheriffe is derived of Turner which signifies to ride a Circuit and so of that is derived Turner and of that the Turne of the Sheriffe and of this is derived the Hundred and from this the Leete And it seems to him that he ought to plead before that the Court shall be held insomuch that it is against Right and so it was adjourned Michaelmas 1611. 9. Jacobi in the Common Bench. Hill against Upchurch NOTE that Coke cheife Justice saith that it was adjudged in 27. of Eliz. For the Mannor of Northhall in the County of Essex that admitting that a Copy-hold may be Intailed by the Statute that then Custome that a surrender shall be a Barr or discontinuance of such Estate tayl is good for as well as the Estate may be created by Custome as well it may be Barred or discontinued by Surrender by Custome Brandons Case NOTE if a Mannor or other signiory be extended upon a Statute and a Ward falls which is a sufficient value to make satisfaction of the Extent yet this shall not be
Acres to the Plaintiff and that the Defendant made and erected one Ditch and Hedge by reason whereof the Plaintiff lost the benefit of his way and after Triall and Verdict for the Plaintiff it was moved in Arrest of Judgement because it did not appear in the Declaration to what Village the common way led to And it was held a good Exception and Judgement arrested but if it had been unto a common way there or in such a Village it had been good KEnt versus Prat Hill 7. Jac. rotulo 131. Action upon the Case the Plaintiff declares that Prat was Rector of the Church of S. And that Kent was lawfully possessed of the Parsonage-house and that there were divers strifes between the Plaintiff and Defendant for the said Rectory and that the said Prat in consideration that the said Kent would surrender the Parsonage-house and the Gleab-land which were then sowed by Kent he promised c. And after Triall it was moved in Arrest of Judgement that the Surrender was not a valuable consideration because it did not appear to the Court that Kent had any Estate but at will which is determinable at the will of the Lessor and so he surrendred nothing but if these words had been in the count viz. of the Demise of the said Prat For a term of divers years it had been good though the certainty of the years had not been expressed SMailes versus Belt uxorem Hill 1. Jac. rotulo 1372. Action upon the Case for words spoken by the Woman Videlicet Thou art a Theif and a mainsworn Theif and a Verdict for the Plaintiff and moved in Arrest of Judgement that the Action would not lie but Judgement was arrested because the Issue was Quod ipsi non sunt cul and it ought to have been that the Woman was not guilty YArdley Attourney versus Ellyll Mich. 11. Jac. rotulo 1252. Action upon the Case brought for these words Your Attourney meaning the Plaintiff is a bribing Knave and hath taken twenty pounds of you to cozen me the Plaintiff laid a Communication such a day and place by the Defendant with one B. which B. had before that time retained the Plaintiff to be his Attourney concerning the Plaintiff Hubbart and Nichols held the words actionable videlicet for the first word Bribing Knave and that the last words did not extenuate or weaken the former if the words touch him in his Profession the Action will lie for it is against the Oath of an Attourney Birtridge is an old perjured Knave and that is to be proved by a stake parting the Land between M. and C. One Judge for the Plaintiff and two for the Defendant COrnhill versus Cowler Trespass upon the Case brought against Baron Feme for words spoken by the Woman the Baron Feme plead Quod ipsi in nullo sunt cul de praemissis and the Jury finde that the Woman was guilty and Exception taken after Triall to the Issue and Verdict and they were both aided by the Statute of Ieofayles But another Exception was that the Action was laid in Suff. And the Addition in the Writ was A. C. de C. in Com. Essex and in the Declaration the Plaintiff alleadges that the words were spoken at C. in the County aforesaid which was in the County of Essex and so a Mistryall CHimery versus God Action upon the Case upon a promise to discharge and save harmless the Plaintiff against all manner of persons and shews a Suit for Tithes in Norwich Court and the Defendant replies that the Plaintiff was not damnified and the Plaintiff rejoyns that he was damnified to wit at S. aforesaid which was in the County of Suffolk where the Action was brought and the Court held the Cause was mis-tried because the Suit was in Norwich and ought to be tried in Norwich and not in Suffolk and these words Apud S. praedictam were idle TIllet versus Bruen for words Trin. 12. Iac. The Plaintiff shews a Suit in Colchester Court and a Triall there before the Bayliff and that the Plaintiff gave in Evidence his knowledge and the Defendant willing to defame the Plaintiff as if he had given false Evidence said of the Plaintiff Thou art as much forsworn meaning in the Evidence aforesaid by the Plaintiff upon his Oath in Form aforesaid given as God is true and moved in Arrest of Judgement that the Inuendo would not maintain the Action and so adjudged LAmpleigh versus Braithwaie Mich. 13. Iac. rotulo 712. Action upon the Case in which the Plaintiff sets forth that whereas the Defendant had feloniously killed a Man and after the Felony committed did earnestly request and solicit the Plaintiff that he would labor and indeavour to obtain from the King for the Defendant a Pardon for the Felony upon which the Plaintiff at the instance and request of the Defendant by all lawfull ways and means possible did often and by many days labor and indeavor to obtain c. Videlicet by riding and journeying at his own cost and charges from L. unto the Village of R. where the King then was and from thence back again to L. to obtain c. The Defendant afterwards at H. in confideration of the Premisses did assume and promise to give the Plaintiff an hundred pounds of lawfull money when he should be required and a Verdict for the Plaintiff and moved in Arrest of Judgement for that it did not appear that the Plaintiff had spoken to the King for a Pardon nor done any thing or obtained a Pardon and Judgement was given for the Plaintiff Wynch said the Promise was subsequent to the Request and good for although the Defendant had no good by it yet because the Plaintiff was at costs and labor and it was at the Defendants request sufficient to maintain the Action If I request one to do a thing for me and make no promise and after you let me know that you did such a thing for me and then I promise to discharge or pay you this is a good consideration although the Promise go not with the Request otherwise it is where a man doth me a curtesie without any request And Hobart took this difference between a consideration executed and executory for where Non assumpsit is pleaded to a consideration executed the Plaintiff needs onely to prove the Promise for where the consideration is executory the Defendant may take Issue as well for not performing the consideration executory as upon the Promise GLover versus Taylor Hill 13. Iac. rotulo 852. Action upon the Case for ill using a Horse so that the Horse died and the Defendant promised to re-deliver the Horse The Defendant pleads Non cul And after a Verdict it was moved in Arrest of Judgement because he did not plead Non assumpsit And it was held a good Issue MArshall versus Steward Mich. 13. Iac. rotulo 1134. Action upon the Case reciting the Statute of 1.
Iac. against Invocation c. for these words The Devil appeareth to thee every night in the likeness of a black Man riding on a black Horse and thou conferrest with him and whatsoever thou dost ask he doth give it thee and that is the reason thou hast so much money and this I will justifie Judgement for the Plaintiff In Trover Judgement by Nihil dic and Exception taken to the Declaration to stay the filing the Writ of Inquiry because no day of the conversion was in the Declaration and by two Judges held naught Mich. 14. Iac. PArker versus Parker Hill 12. Iac. rotulo 426. In Trover after a Verdict it was moved in Arrest of Judgement that the imparlance Roll was entred with Spaces for the possession and conversion but both those Spaces in the Issue were filled up and held good The Imparlance was entred Mich. 12. Iac. rotulo 547. WHitepain versus Cook Pasch 12. Iac. For words Thou art a Rogue and I will prove thee a Rogue no Judgement STone versus Bates A man may well incourage one that was robbed to cause the Felon to be indicted and accompany him to the Assizes and this shall be lawfull for to do without incurring the danger of an Action upon the case upon conspiracy but if he knew that he was not robbed then he is in danger of the Action upon the case COpe and his Wife administratrix Plaintiffs versus Lewyn Trin. 12. Iac. rotulo 1714. An Action upon the case brought upon a promise made to the Intestate and in the Court omits to shew the Administration and after Triall that Fault moved in Arrest of Judgement and the whole Court was of opinion that he should not have his Judgement for it did not appear that he was Administrator for at the Common Law no Administration lay but the Ordinary ought to have the Goods HArvey Attourney versus Bucking Mich. 12. Iac. rotulo 842. Action of the case for slanderous words He meaning the Plaintiff shewed me first a Bill of fourty pounds without a Seal meaning the said Bill by the said E. as aforesaid sealed and delivered and afterwards he shewed me the same Bill with a Seal and he meaning the Plaintiff hath forged the Seal of the same Writing meaning the Seal of the said Bill by the said E. as aforesaid sealed and delivered The Defendant traverses the words and a Verdict for the Plaintiff and it was alleadged in Arrest of Judgement that the Declaration was naught for that it did not directly appear that there was any communication between the Plaintiff and Defendant concerning the Bill but onely in the inuendo which will not maintain the Action and Judgement arrested MOrton versus Leedall Hill 10. Iac. rotulo 1783. Action upon the case for these words He is a lying and dissembling Fellow and a mainsworn Fellow And a Verdict for the Plaintiff And afterwards it was moved in Arrest of Judgement that the Action would not lie but at length Judgement was given for the Plaintiff And Serjeant Hutton cited the like case adjudged in t Barnes He is a mainsworn Villain ãâã Skipwash SKipwash versus Skipwash Hill 14. Iac. rotulo 3472. Action upon the case that whereas the Defendant in consideration that the Plaintiff would marry one A. B. did assume to pay the Plaintiff twenty pounds when he should after the Marriage be thereunto requested The Plaintiff alleadges no special Demand and that Fault was moved in Arrest of Judgement Hobart and Wynch were for the Plaintiff Warburton for the Defendant JOtham versus Ball Hill 12. Jac. rotulo 1920. Action upon the case for slanderous words Videlicet Your Master Euseby meaning the Plaintiff is a Rogue a Rascall and Forger of Bonds the Plaintiff laid a Colloquium between the Defendant and one R. G. And after Verdict moved in Arrest of Judgement for that it did not expresly appear that the said R. G. at the time of speaking the words was Servant to the Plaintiff and Judgement was stayed by the Court. COddington versus Wilkin for words Trin. 12. Iac. He is a Theif and why will you take a Theifs part spoken 1. Martii 10. Iac. The Defendant justifies the words because the Plaintiff stole Sheep The Plaintiff by way of replication sets forth a general Pardon granted such a time and further saith that if any Felony were committed it was before the general Pardon made and shews himself to be a Subject and no person excepted in the Pardon The Defendant demurs The Court were of opinion that by the Pardon both the Punishment and Fault were taken away and that the wrong was done to the King by the Common Law and the King being the supreme Head if he pardons the party is cleared of the wrong As if a Villain be infranchised he from thenceforth is no Villain Note if a man upon good consideration promise to become bound to another by his Obligation to do an Act and if he do not become bound Action upon the case will lie against him and the Plaintiff is not bound to tender him an Obligation but the Defendant hath took it upon himself to do it RIchards versus Carvamell Action of the case brought and counts for non-payment of money at the Plaintiffs next coming into the County of Somerset and avers that such a day he came into the County of Somerset Videlicet apud T. in Com. Somerset and that the Defendant though often requested hath not paid And Exception taken because the Plaintiff did not alleadge in his count that he gave notice to the Defendant when he came into the County of Somerset but not allowed and Judgement given for the Plaintiff And note when a man assumes to pay money or do any thing upon condition the Defendant may take Issue upon the condition and needs not plead Non assumpsit but if he pleads Non assumpsit then he confesses the performance of the condition which mark AVstin versus Jarvis Trin. 13. Jac. rotulo 2180. The Plaintiff declares that such a Day and Year he bought of the Defendant a Horse for a peice of Gold of the value of 22. s. by him to the Defendant then in hand paid and for a 11. l. to be paid to the Defendant at the Day of Death or Marriage of the Plaintiff which should first happen for payment of which 11. l. the Plaintiff should bring to the Defendant one sufficient man to be bound together with the Plaintiff to the Defendant the Defendant in consideration thereof assumes to deliver the said Horse to the Plaintiff when he should be thereunto requested and the Plaintiff avers that such a Day he brought the Defendant one sufficient man Videlicet I. A. de B. Yeoman to be bound together with the Plaintiff to the said Defendant for the payment of the said 11. l. and shews that he requested the Defendant to deliver the said Horse yet the Defendant hath not delivered
him according to his promise The Defendant pleads Non assumpsit And a Verdict for the Plaintiff and moved in Arrest of Judgement for that the Plaintiff at the time of the Contract was an Infant and that he could not perform his promise by reason of his Infancy and therefore the promise void and another Exception for that it was not alleadged in what sum the Plaintiff and his Surety offered to be bound and Judgement was that the Plaintiff Nihil capiat per breve JAcob versus Songate Trin. 9. Jac. rotulo 2776. An Action upon the case brought for this word Perjured The Defendant justifies that it was found by Verdict that the Plaintiff was perjured but no Judgement entred upon that Verdict And whether the Plea were good being there was no Judgement was the Question and it was adjudged no Bar because no Judgement was given in the first-Action and so Judgement entred for the Plaintiff CRuttall versus Hosener Pasch 16. Iac rotulo Action of the case for these words He meaning the Plaintiff hath caught the French Pox and brought them home to his Wife And Judgement for the Plaintiff THornton versus Iepson The Plaintiff being a Currier brought an Action upon the case for these words He is a common Barretor but the words would not lie for a man of that Profession but would lie for a Justice of Peace or Lawyer IReland versus Smith Hill 9. Iac. rotulo Action upon the case brought for these words You Norgate take part against me with Ireland who is a Papist and hath gotten a Pardon from the Pope and can help thee to one if thou wilt The Plaintiff laid a communication between the Defendant and Norgate and alleadges himself of the age of 40. years and not above because it might appear to the Court that he was born within Queen Elizabeths Reign The Court held the Action would not lie as it was adjudged in Halls case and for this word Papist no Action will lie If I deliver my Goods to you to keep and I request them and you deny the Delivery of them now an Action of Trover will lie otherwise it is without a Deniall if I distrain Cattle I must not use them WArter versus Freeman Mich. 15. Iac. rotulo 1941. Action upon the case brought for that the Defendant sued out a Fieri facias upon a Judgement which he had against the Plaintiff upon which Judgement the Defendant had before sued out a Fieri facias and the Sheriff of Oxford had upon the first Fieri facias returned that he had levied the Debt and Damages and that they remained in his hands for want of Buyers and the Defendant knowing that the Sheriff had levied the Debt and Damages and intending to charge him again prosecuted another Fieri facias and that the Sheriff had again levied the said Debt and Damages and hath paid the Debt and Damages to the Plaintiff to wit at Westminster in Com. Middlesex where the Action was brought and Judgement after Debate was given for the Plaintiff though the Defendant alleadged that the Fieri facias was an Act in Law and so no cause of Action against him PArkhurst versus Powell vic Denbigh Mich. 15. Iac. rotulo An Action of the case for a false Return of a Capias utlagat and declares that he prosecuted a Capias utlagat directed to the Sheriff of Denbigh where the Defendant inhabited and delivered the said Writ to the Sheriff to be executed and the Defendant being then in the company of the Sheriff and might safely have arrested him did not but suffered him to escape and returned that he was not to be found and upon Not guilty pleaded it was tried in the County of Middlesex where the Action was brought and moved in Arrest of Judgement that the Triall ought to be in Denbigh because the not arresting was the principal matter but because the Action was grounded upon double matter the Plaintiff had his Election to bring his Action either in the County of Denbigh or Middlesex by the whole Court BLand versus Edmonds Pasch 16. Jac. rotulo 444. Action upon the Case brought for these Words Videlicet George Bland is a troublesome Fellow and he did combine with thee to trouble the Countrey and I hope to see thee at the next Sessions indicted for Barratry or for sheep-stealing as George Bland was at the last Sessions for Bland was indicted the last Sessions for sheep-stealing And it was held by the whole Court that those Words would not bear an Action the Plaintiff layed the Words to be spoken to one Jo. Eagle and the Declaration was held naught and insufficient because it was not averred that the Plaintiff was not indicted at the Sessions BRadshaw versus Walker Hill 16. Jac. rotulo Action upon the case brought for these words Videlicet Thou art a filching Fellow and didst filch from A. B. 4. l. And Judgement that the Plaintiff should take nothing by his Writ for it shall not be intended that he stole the money ADams versus Fleming Hill 16. Jac. rotulo 890. Action of the case brought for these words Videlicet He hath forsworn himself before the Councel of the Marches meaning the Councel of the Marches of Wales in the Suit I had against him there and I will sue him for Perjury there And after Verdict for the Plaintiff moved in Arrest of Judgement that the words were not actionable for their uncertainty because the Court could not take notice that they had authority to hold plea in matters of record Judgement for the Plaintiff for these words Thou art a false forsworn Knave for thou didst take a false Oath before a Judge of Assise to hang a man GOre versus Colthorpe Trin. 5. Jac. rotulo The Declaration was in consideration that the Plaintiff would give credit to E. C. then servant to the Defendant for any thing the said E. should deal for to the use of the Defendant with the Plaintiff promised that he would see the Plaintiff contented that which the said E. should deal for with the Plaintiff for the use of the Defendant any way when the said Defendant thereof after it should become due should be requested and a special Verdict by which it was found that the Defendant promised to see the Plaintiff contented that which the above named E. C. should deal with the Plaintiff for the use of the said Defendant any way The Judgement of the Court was that the Verdict did not maintain the Declaration because for collaterall matters which are not Duties a Request is material and are not like a Duty as for Debt which is due and no Day of payment expressed that shall be alleadged to be when he shall be thereunto requested generally For if I sell my Horse for ten pounds and no Day of payment that shall be alleadged in the Count Cum inde requisitus esset And one case of Peters was cited which was
upon the Summons pone or Distress the Outlary lies the Process is returnable from fifteen Dayes to 15 Dayes an Essoin lies In this Action there are two Judgements the first Judgement is that the Defendant shall account because he hath not accounted before in this first Judgement the Plaintiff shall not recover Costs or Damages but a Capias ad computand shall issue and if a Non est inventus shall be returned thereupon then an Exigent and when the Defendant by the rigor of the Law is imprisoned yet the Court doth in favour of the Defendant take Bail for he shall account before Auditors which the Court shall appoint which shall be the Officers of the Court to audit the Account and he shall appear from day to day before the Auditors at every day and place assigned by the Auditors untill the Account shall be determined and before the Auditors the Plaintiff or Defendant may joyn Issue or demurr upon the Plea pleaded before the Auditors and if any of the parties shall make Default and shall not appear then if after Appearance the Defendant shall not plead or if he shall joyn Issue or joyn in a Demurrer the Auditors shall certifie that to the Court and the Court shall proceed to the matter certified by triall of the Issue if it be joyned or by arguing the Demurrer as the cause shall require and if the Plaintiff shall make Default or shall not prosecute or if the Defendant shall not answer they may commit him to the Fleet and if Verdict pass for the Plaintiff Costs and Damages shall be recovered by reason of the inter-pleadings and the Plaintiff shall recover his Goods or Moneys demanded with his Costs and Damages and a Fisa or Elegit or casa shall be awarded and if a Non est inventus be returned then an Outlary after Judgement An account against a Bailiff of Lands shall be brought in the County where the Lands lie In every case in account where an Attachment may be returned an Essoyn lies Where the Defendant is charged to account for Moneys received from the hands of the Plaintiff the Defendant may wage his Law and likewise for Goods delivered to be sold but it is otherwise where the Receit is by the hands of a Testator or of any other then the Plaintiff That after a year and a day after Judgement given every Action shall be revived by Scire facias which is given by the Statute for all Actions at Law if the Plaintiff shall not obtain his Execution within a year and a day he shall be driven to bring a new Action Or if a Defendant be charged as Receiver by Indenture he shall not be admitted to plead that he was not a Receiver If the Plaintiff die before the second Judgement the Writ shall abate and no Scire facias lies for the Executor if the Defendant die before the second Judgement If two be adjudged to account and a Ca. exfa. issue and one appear and the other be outlawed he that appears shall account alone for that the Plaintiffs Process is determined against the other and so if one die the other shall account alone and if one be adjudged to account and will not he shall be committed to the Fleet. That if I deliver Goods to one to the value of 100. l. to traffique with for my use and he sels them for 10. l. I have no remedy but if my Bailiff buy a thing for 10. l. which is not worth it he shall not be allowed it Account lies not before a Sheriff for that he can assigne no Auditors If two be joyntly possest of Goods one of the two deliver the Goods for Merchandise he onely shall bring the Action An Account lies not against an Executor or Infant An Account lies not for a Park of Deer Matter that is in discharge of an Account shall not be pleaded in Barr of the Action for the Judges are Judges of the Action and not of the Account If Money be delivered to render an Account an Account lies but if it was delivered to keep untill the Plaintiff shall require Account doth not lie but Detinue If the Plaintiff account upon Witness of the Receit the Defendant shall not wage his Law If an Account shall be brought for Goods in the Declaration the Plaintiff declares that they were in his house whereas indeed they were not it is good HArrington versus Dean Hill 10. Jac. rotulo 3230. Action of Account render brought against the Defendant for the Receit of Money by the hands of one Rotheram for 200. l. The Defendant pleads that he was not a Receiver for to render an Account the Jury finde it specially that Rotheram was indebted to the Plaintiff in 200. l. and the Plaintiff required the Defendant to receive the said 200. l. and the Defendant required Rotheram to pay the 200. l. and Rotheram upon Request to him made desires the Defendant to borrow of any person 200. l. and to pay the Plaintiff and finde that the Defendant did borrow 200. l. of one Stanhop to pay the Plaintiff and Rotheram became bound to Stanhop for the payment of the said 200. l. and that the Defendant appointed his Wife to pay the Money to the Plaintiff and if upon the whole matter c. and Judgement was given that the Defendant was a Receiver THe Earle of Cumberland against Hilton The Clerk that entred the Cause had omitted the Charge which was for 400. l. and it was omitted in the Roll and Nisi prius and after a Verdict Excepon taken and amended by the Court. Assise IN an Assise Trin. 29. Jacobi rotulo 27. brought against Thacker and Elmer the Defendants come and say that there was no Tenants of the Tenements put to the view of the Recognisors of the Assise aforesaid nor at the time of purchasing the Writ to wit such a Day nor any time after and this they were ready to verifie and pray Judgement and if so then they say that they have done no injury or Disseisin of the Tenements with the appurtenances to the said W. T. and put themselves upon the Assise and the said W. T. doth so likewise therefore the Assise was taken between them and thereupon the Recognisors of the Assise say that the said E. E. at the purchasing of the original Writ of the Assise Videlicet such a Day were Tenants of the Tenement aforefaid with the appurtenances as of his Free-hold and that the said W. T. was seised of the Tenements aforesaid with the appurtenances in his Demesne as of Fee untill the said E. did unjustly and without judgement disseise the said VV. but not by force and armes and assess Damages to 12. d. and for Costs 6. d. and Judgement given that the said VV. should recover his Seisin of the Tenements aforesaid against the said E. by the view of the Recognisors of the Assise and his
Fawden an Attorney of the Common Pleas and he pleads in Barr an Outlary against the Administrator and adjudged no Plea MIch 4. Ed. 4. rotulo 144. An Action of Debt was brought against J. R. de W. in Com. L. Chapman the Defendant appeared by his Attorney and offered to wage his Law and essoyned and at that Day the Plaintiff appeared and the Defendant being solemnly required one J. R. came to answer the Plaintiff as Defendant in that Action in his proper person and offered to wage his Law the Plaintiff said that J. R. now appearing to wage his Law ought not to be admitted because the said J. R. is not that person which the Plaintiff prosecutes because this I. R. appearing is I. R. de W. in Com. L. Jun. Chapman and he who the Plaintiff prosecutes is I. R. de W. in Com. L. Sen. Chapman both of them at the purchasing the Plaintiffs Writ living at W. and that he agreed with the Defendant so to do therefore because I. R. de c. hath not appeared to wage his Law prayes Judgement the Defendant confesses such matter and sayes that he beleiving that the Writ was prosecuted against him appeared by his Attorney and offered to wage his Law and prayes to be discharged of the Debt and the other I. R. being exacted appeared not and the Court would advise but no Judgement for the Plaintiff HIll 26. Eliz. rotulo 420. The Lessor makes a Lease by Indenture for years and the Lessee grants over his whole Terme and the Lessor grants over the Reversion and it was adjudged that the Grantee of the Reversion should have an Action of Debt for the Arrears of Rent against the Assignee of the terme and not against the first Lessee HIll 43. Eliz. Pasch 41. Eliz. rotulo 425. An Action of Debt brought against an Executor in the Debet detinet for Rent due in the time of the Executor upon a Lease made to the Testator upon a Judgement given in the upper Bench and that Judgement was reversed in the Exchequer because it was not in the Detinet alone but afterwards in the upper Bench. Int. dominum Rich. Frank Administrator for Arrears due after the Death of the Intestate it was adjudged good in the Debet detinet and also in the Common Pleas Trin. 11. Jac. rotulo 2013. MIch 30. 31. Eliz. rotulo 907. An Action of Debt brought to which the Defendant pleads an Outlary against the Plaintiff in its force the Plaintiff replies the general Pardon granted by Parliament the Defendant demurrs and Judgement that he should answer over MIch 40. 41. Eliz. Ralph Rogers brought an Action of Debt upon an Obligation of 400. l. and Judgement was entred by the Clerk upon a Nichil dic that the said Roger should recover c. and for that Default the Defendant brought his Writ of Error to reverse the Judgement given for Ralph and when the Record was certified the Judges of the then Kings Bench would not proceed And afterwards the Judges of the Common Pleas upon a motion and before another Writ of Error brought amended the Mistake of the Clerk And Justice Walmsley would have committed Keale the Clerk to the Fleet for his carelesness but afterwards the Amendment was withdrawn by the Court and upon further advice the Roll made as it was before An Action of Debt was brought upon a single Bill for Payment of Money upon Demand and the Plaintiff declares generally that he often had requested c. and Serjeant Harris demurres to the Declaration and the opinion of the Court was that he ought to plead yet if the Defendant had demanded Oyer of the Bill and upon that have demurred it had been a good Demurrer because one special Demand was in the Bill and no special Demand alleadged in the Count. MIch 3. Iac. Burnell versus Bowes Action of Debt brought upon a Bond and the Plaintiff in the Imparlance Roll had counted upon a Bond made the tenth of March and an Imparlance thereupon untill the next Terme and in the next Terme he declared as of a Bond made the tenth of May and the Defendant pleaded per Dures and it was entred of Record and the next Terme after Entry thereof the Plaintiff moved that that Mistake might be amended and at first it was denied to be amended because the Defendant had pleaded to it and by that Amendment his Plea should be altered as if he had pleaded that it was not his Deed and the cause of his pleading that Plea was the the Mistake and if that Mistake should be amended he would be trised and overthrown and upon the first motion it was denied to be amended but afterwards granted to be amended by the whole Court for the Imparlance was entred Hillar first of James and the Issue was Pasch second of James but the Defendant was admitted to plead a new at his pleasure MIch 3. Jac. rotulo 2575. Fitch versus Bissie An Action of Debt brought upon an Obligation with a Condition to pay Money yearly according to the forme and effect of the Indenture made between the Plaintiff and Defendant the Defendant pleads that there was not any such Indenture made between the Plaintiff and Defendant as is in the Condition supposed and the Plaintiff demurrs upon that Plea for that the Defendant is estopped to plead that Plea KIng and his Wife Executrix of J. Wright Plaintiffs brought a Scire facias after the said Executrix came to full Age against Death and his Wife Administratrix of W. D. to have Execution of a Judgement had by J. D. and H. E. Administrators during the minority of the Executrix upon a Bond entred into to the Testator and whether a Scire facias lay by the Executrix or no was the Question and by the better opinion of the Court it did not lie MAyor and Burgesses of Linn Regis in Norfolk Mich. 10. Jac. rotulo 2413. brought an Action of Debt upon a Bond against one Pain and it was Ad respondendum Majori Burgensibus de Linn Regis in Comitatu Norfolciae Pain pleads that it was not his Deed and a special Verdict was found that the Mayor and Burgesses were incorporated by the name of Majores Burgenses Burgi de Linn non per aliud And whether the omission of this word Burgi should barr the Plaintiffs was the Question and Judgement was given by Cook Warburton and Nichols for the Plaintiff for Cook said that if the essential part of the Corporation was named it was sufficient and in this case the Mayor and Burgesses was one essential part and Linn Regis is another essential part and those two were duly expressed and sufficient to maintain the Action and Cook said that those words Et non per aliud shall be intended to be Non per aliud sensum non literae and of the same opinion were the other Judges there NIchols versus Grimwin Mich.
the Plaintiff shews that the Rector of M. had 2. parts of the Tithes in 3. parts to be divided that the Vicar of the same place had the third part of the Tithes and layeth this by Prescription as to the manner of the taking the Tithes shews further how the Parson Vicar by several Leases had demised the Tithes to him so he being Proprietor of the Tithes the Defend sowed 10. Acres within the Parish to wit Wheat Rie c. carried it away without setting forth the Tithe to his Damage c. And upon a Nil debet per patriam pleaded it was found for the Plaintiff and moved in Arrest of Judgement that the Plaintiff had in that Action comprised severall Actions upon the Statute and that it appeared by his own shewing for the Plaintiff claimed not the Tithes under one Title but under the severall Tithes of Parson and Vicar and Fennor Justice held they could not joyn and no more could the Plaintiff who claimed severally under them and it seemed to him that the Parson could not have this Action against severall Tenants for not setting forth their severall Tithes because he could not comprehend two Actions in one but the whole Court besides held the contrary for although the Parson and Vicar could not joyn in this Case because they claim their Tithes severally by divided Rights yet when both their Tithes are conjoyned in one person as it is in the Plaintiffe then the the Interest of their Title is conjoyned also in one and it suffices generally to shew the Plaintiffe is a Farmer or proprietor of the Tithes without saying of what Title for it is but a personall action grounded meerly upon a contempt against the Statute for not setting forth Tithes and also Tithes are not demanded by this Action although the Title may come in debate yet it was agreed by all the Judges that the Plaintiffe should recover his Tithes in dammages and shall not demand them again by any suit after a recovery in this Action which Mark. BErket versus Manning Pasch 3 Jacobi Action of Debt brought against the Defendant as Administrator of J. S. The Defendant pleads fully administred the Plaintiffe replies that himself had assets and it should have been that the Defendant had assets and this was moved in arrest of Judgement but amended by the Court being the Clerks misprision onely as where it is entred predict Defend similiter and it should have been predict quer similiter and this hath been often amended by the Court. PAler versus Hardman Pasch Jacobi Hardman and his wife Executrix J. H. brought an Action of Debt in the common Pleas against Paler and as that they should restore a tun of Iron to the value of twelve l. and declare upon a Bill for the delivery of the said tun of Iron within such a time and that the Defendant had not delivered it to the Plaintiffes dammage of c. and upon non est fact pleaded it was found for the Plaintiffe and Judgement was given that the Plaintiffe should recover the Tun of Iron or the value of the same and if he should render the tun then by the oath c. should inquire what the tun of Iron was worth and before any return of the writ to inquire of the dammages the Plaintiffe in the common Pleas takes out a Capias upon the Judgement and on Exigent upon that and the Defendant brings a writ of Error and it was adjudged erroneous for two causes first because the Judgement was in the disjunctive that the Plaintiffe should recover the tun of Iron and if not the value thereof so in detinue as it appears by the Judgement in this Case that the Plaintiffe may choose whether he will have the Iron or the value thereof which he cannot do for if the iron be to be delivered he shall recover that onely but if it be not to be delivered then the value and not as before Secondly for that the Judgement is not perfect untill the writ to inquire be returned with issues to the Sheriffe to distrain the Defendant to render the Iron and also to inquire of the value and before the return thereof nothing in certain appears One which to ground any writ of Execution for the Judgement comprehends no certainty but is to be made certain by the return of the writ to inquire with the whole Court granted CArpenter versus Collins Mich. 3 Jacobi An Action of Debt brought by the Plaintiffe for rent arere and declares upon a Lease made to the Defendant at Will to be held from Mich. as long as both parties should agree yeelding and paying three pounds yearly and shews that Collins entred and occupied from the Feast c. unto the Feast of Mich. and upon nil debet plenius the Jury foundthat J. Norrington had issue a Son and a daughter and Devises that his Son shall have his Land at the age of twenty four years and gives forty pounds to his Daughter to be paid her at the age of two and twenty years an further wills that the Plaintiffe should be his Executor and should repair to his houses and have the oversight and doing of all his Lands and moveable Goods untill the severall ages aforesaid and after dies and Carpenter the Executor makes the Lease before mentioned and the Jury further find that the Son died but find not at what age he was at his death but that the Daughter at the Sons death was nineteen and no more and find the Lease made by the Plaintiffe and that the Lessee by force thereof entred and continued possession from Michaelmas for one year and more and find that within that year the Daughter entred and that the Defendant atturned to the Daughter and refused to continue Tenant to the Plaintiffe and by Fennor Yelverton and W. Judgement was given against the Plaintiffe for the Plaintif took no interest in the Land by the Will for the oversight and doing of his Lands shall be intended but in Right of the Heire and to his use because the Testator though not his Son of discretion and government untill the age of twenty four years and in the mean time appointed his Executor to oversee and order the Land to the profits of the Heââe that wanted discretion 28 H. 8. D. 26. where it is declared that J. S. shall have as well the governing of c. as the disposing setting letting and ordering of his Lands and by the Court held that J. S. had them onely to husband for the profit of his children and no otherwise but he was of opinion that the Plaintif had an estate in the Land upon a limitation determinable at the Sons age of four and twenty years and it appears not at what age he died being not found by the verdict therefore it is incertain and the Entry of the Daughter lawfull for the limitation looks but to the age of the Sonne and
to seal and he refused and upon such Refusall the Plaintiff brought his Action and a Verdict was given for the Plaintiff and Serjeant Yelverton moved in Arrest of Judgement that the Plaintiff ought not to have Judgement for he said that the Defendant was not bound and compellable to seal that Obligation because it was not in Law any Assurance but a collateral thing and the whole Court agreed that and therefore being the Action was brought for refusing to seal the Obligation and Letter of Attorney and the Judgement according it ought to be arrested but Cock said that Judgement ought not to be arrested for the Premises of the Delaration it appeared that he refused to seal the Letter of Attorney and thereupon concluded that it should not be arrested and Fennor said that the Letter of Attorney was not any such Assurance as the Law required in such Case for when he had made the Surrender it should be accounted the Surrender of him that made the Assurance and he said he should make a present Assurance of it but Tanfeild was of another opinion and said that when the Surrender was made it shall be said to be the immediate Surrender of him that made the Letter of Atturney and such an assurance as the Law required and Yelverton Justice said the Letter of Atturney was lame for this cause the Letter of Atturney was made to one for the surrendring of such a Copy-hold and did not say in the Letter of Atturney for him and in his name for otherwise the Copy-hold might be the Copy-hold of him that surrendred by vertue of the Letter of Atturney and then he should surrender his own Copy-hold but Tanfeild was of another opinion because he said in the Letter of Atturney that he did constitute and appoint and in his stead and place put such a one which words in his stead and place are as full as if he should have said in his name HOllingworth versus Huntley Pasch 5 Jacobi An Action of Debt brought upon an Obligation the Condition amongst many other things contained that the Husband and Wife being Lessees for life of certain Lands that if the said Husband and Wife should levy a Fine to an estranger at the Costs and Charges of an estranger and also that they should levy a Fine of other Lands that they also held for their lives to an estranger and at their Charge then c. the Obliger sayes that the Husband and Wife did offer to levy the Fine if the estranger to whom the Fine was to be delivered would bear their Charges the Obligee demurres and it was adjudged for the Plaintiffe because the levying the second Fine had not any reference to the other because they are two distinct sentences and these words and also make them so Man versus Somerton Pasch 5. Jacobi The Plaintiffe being Parson of Henley brought an action of Debt for six hundred pounds upon the Statute of ãâã 6. for not setting forth Tithe of Wood and the Plaintiffe shews that the Defendant had cut down two hundred loads of Wood to the value of two hundred pounds and saith the tenth part of that did amount to two hundred pounds and so he brought his action for six hundred pounds upon the Statute and the Plaintiffe was nonsuit for one fault in his Declaration for whereas he names the price of the Wood to be two hundred pounds it was mistaken for it should have been two thousand pounds for he demanded more for the tenth part then the principall is by his own shewing and Tanfeild Justice held that Beech by the common Law is not Timber and so it was adjudged in Cary and Pagets Case and it was held that Tithes shall not be paid for Beech above the growth of twenty years in a common Countrey for Wood as in Buckingham-shire for there it is reputed Timber but in a plentifull Countrey of Wood it is otherwise for there it is not Timber and Tithes shall be paid for such wood Silva cedua for which Tithes shall be paid is under the growth of twenty years but Tithes shall be paid for such wood which is not Timber which is above the growth of twenty years PErcher versus Vaughan Trin. 5. Jac. An action of Debt brought upon an Obligation for six pounds thirteen shillings eight pence The Defendant demands Oyer of the Obligation and imparles and after an imparlance the Defendant comes and sayes there was variance between the Plaintiffes writ and the Obligation for it appeared by the Obligation that the Defendant was obliged in viginti nobilis and so his action ought to be brought according to the Obligation and demands Judgement if the Plaintiffe ought to have his action the Plaintiffe demurres and it was argued by the Plaintiffes counsell first that it was no variance for it was said that twenty nobles and six pounds thirteen shillings eight pence were all one in substance if a man be bound to pay a hundred nobles and brings his action for fifty marks it is not variance 34 H. 8. 12. and 4 E. 3. Fitzherbert Title varians 102. agrees to that but if a man be obliged to pay certain money in Flemish money he ought to shew the performance of that strictly 9 Ed. 4. 49. and the Plaintiffes counsell said that it was variance it could not be shewed after an Imparlance in Marks Case Co. 5. 74. and said the conclusion of the Defendants Plea to demand Judgement of the Plaintiffe ought to have his action was not good for this Plea was not in barr of the action but in abatement of the Writ and Yelverton Justice agreed to that and he said when the Obligation was in viginti nobilis it shall be intended twenty nobles and good Tanfeild said that when there is no good and apt Latine words for a thing no unapt Latine word is put in the Bond for that thing the Bond is void as when a man is bound in quinque libris it it was adjudged in Mich. Term 5 Jac. that the Obligation was void because there was a fit Latine word and that was quinque and so it was adjudged in the Lord Danvers Case where the Indictment for one blow super capud and it was held void because it was an unapt word and there was a fit and apt word to wit Caput and VVilliams agreed to this for he said it was adjudged in the common Pleas between Pencrosse and Tout a man was bound in a Bond in viginti literis when it should have been viginti libris and adjudged void for the same cause but after in Hillary Term the Plaintiffe had Judgement because in one Dictionary nobilis was a Latine word for six shillings eight pence VEntris versus Farmer Trin. 5. Jacobi A Lease was made for years rendering Rent payable at a place of the Land and the Court was moved whether a Demand of the Rent may not be made upon the Land but denied by the
that if it had been by Writ he must have shewed it but need not it being by Plaint if the truth appear in that and if a man bring his Action as Assignee he need not shew it in his Plaint if the truth appear in the Declaration but it is otherwise in an Original and a Plaintiffe in Kings Bench as an originall but not in all things and if the Plaint be incertain the Defendant in that Court shall plead in Abatement of the Plaint as to an Original in the Common Pleas and at last two Presidents were shewen one between Champion and Hill and the other between Merrick and Wright that were allowed without naming of the Plaintiff Rector in the Queritur and Judgement was given for the Plaintiff by the whole Court Note it was agreed by all the Court of Kings Bench Mich. 5. Jac. and hath many times been ruled that if a man sell his Tithes for years by word it is good but if the Parson agree that one shall have his Tithes for seven years by word it is not good by the opinion of Fleming Cheif Justice because it amounts to a Lease and he held strongly that Tithes cannot be leased for years without a Deed. COb versus Hunt Hill 5. Jac. Cob sued a Prohibition in the Common Pleas against Hunt Parson of D. in Kent and suggests a Modus demandi as to part of the Tithes demanded against him in the Spiritual Court and as to the residue suggests a Contract executed and performed between him and the Parson in satisfaction of the residue and because he proved not his Suggestion within six Moneths Hunt the Parson had a Consultation and Costs assessed by the Court to fifty shillings and Damages fifty shillings by the Statute of the 2 E. 6. they shall be doubled but in truth no Judgement was given to recover them because these words Videlicet Ideo considerat fuit qd recuperet was omitted yet Hunt thinking that all was certain and perfect brought an Action of Debt in the Common Pleas for the Costs c. and declared of all the matter above and that the Damages were assessed upon which it was adjudged that he should recover c. and that the Costs were not paid Per quod Actio c. And had a Judgement against Cob by Non sum informat and thereupon Cob brought his Writ of Error as well in the Record and Processe c. of the Prohibition as of the Record and Processe in the Action of Debt for the Costs and assigne the general Error but Yelverton assignes two Errors in special first that there was no Judgement in the Prohibition for Recovery of the Costs but onely an Assessement of Costs without any more which is not sufficient for the Assessement of Costs onely is but matter of Office in Court but no Judgement of Court to binde which was confessed by the whole Court The second Error was that no Costs ought to be assessed or adjudged in the Cause above because the Prohibition is grounded solely upon the Modus decimandi which needs proof and upon the Contract between the parties which requires no proof and the Suggestion being intire and part of it needing no proof they could not give any Costs for that is onely where the whole matter in the Suggestion needs proof and therefore the mixing the Contract with the manner of Tithing priviledges the whole as to the matter of Costs but they might grant a Consultation as to that part of the Suggestion which concerned the manner of Tithing but not for the rest which was granted by the whole Court and so both the Judgements were reversed which mark MArkham versus Mollineux Hill 1. Jac. Mollineux sued out an Original in the Common Pleas in an Action of Debt upon a Bond against Markham by the name of John Markham Alderman de D. and all the mean Processe are continued against him by the name of Alderman Markham he appeared and the Plaintiff declared against him by the name of Markham of D. Esquire and afterwards the parties were at Issue and it was found for the Plaintiff and Judgement entred and it was reversed by Writ of Error because it did not appear that that Markham was the same Markham against whom the Original was prosecuted and the Processe continued but it seemed rather that he was another person by reason of his severall Additions of Alderman and Esquire which mark OLiver versus Collins Pasch 6. Jacobi The Plaintiff brought an Action of Debt upon the Statute for not setting forth of Tithes and shews that he is Parson of the Parish Church of Little Lavar in Com. Essex and that the Defendant had so many Acres within the Parish of Little Lavor sowed with Wheat whereof the tenth severed from the ninth part came to eight and twenty pounds and shews that the Defendant at Little Lavor aforesaid took and carried away the Wheat without setting forth the Tithes contrary to the Statute by reason whereof he forfeited threescore Pounds and upon Nil debet pleaded it was found for the Plaintiff and moved in Arrest of Judgement first that the Statute was mis-recited for whereas the the Plaintiff declared that the 4. Novemb. 2 E. 6. it was inacted it was said that there was no such Statute for the Parliament commenced 1 E. 6. and continued by prorogation untill the 4. Novemb. 2 E. 6. and therefore the Plaintiff was mistaken in that but that Exception was not allowed for there were an hundred Presidents against it and in respect of the continual use in that form as the Plaintiff had declared the Court said that they would not alter it for that was to disturb all the Judgements that were ever given in that Court. And secondly it was objected that the matter was mis-tried and there ought to be a new Triall because the Venire facias was of Parva Lavar whereas by their pretence it ought to have been of the Parish of Little Lavar to which Yelverton made Answer that the Triall was well enough for by that Action no Tithe is demanded nor recovered but the Defendant is onely punished for his Contempt against the Statute in not setting forth his Tithe and the wrong done to the Plaintiff complained of is laid onely in the Village of Little Lavor and not in the Parish for all the places in the Declaration where the Parish is named are onely matter of Conveyance and inducement to the Action and not of the substance for the substance is onely that where the wrong and grievance is done to the Plaintiff and that arises onely in Parua Lavor which was granted by the whole Court upon a grand Debate at severall Dayes and Judgement was given for the Plaintiff and the like Judgement was given between Barnard and Costerdam in an Action upon the same Statute upon the last point for the Venn and this hath been twice adjudged but in Costerdams Case which concerned the Earl
Carr. The Tenant in Dower before the value inquired of and Damages found brought a Writ of Error and by the opinion of the whole Court a Writ of Error would not lie for the Judgement is not perfect untill the value be inquired upon The Demand in Dower was of the third part of two Messuages in three parts to be divided and the Judgement was to recover Seisin of the third part of the Tenements aforesaid with the Appurtenances to hold to him in severally by Meets and Bounds and adjudged naught because they are Tenants in common and the Judgement ought to be to hold to him together and in common but if it had been in three parts divided it had been good Actions in Ejectment ALlen versus Nash Hill 5. Jacobi rotulo 719. The Plaintiff brought an Ejectione firme and a special Verdict upon a Surrender of Copy-hold Land which was to the use of the second Son for Life after the Death of the Tenant and his Heirs and it was adjudged not to be good in a Surrender for though it be good in a Will yet Implication is not good in a Surrender and in Copy-hold Cases a Surrender to the use c. this no use but an Explanation how the Land shall go if the Lord grant the Land in other manner then I appoint it is void if there be found Joynt-tenants and one Surrender to the use of his Will it was a Breach of the Joinder and the Will good EYer versus Bannaster Trîn 16. Jacobi rotulo 719. The Plaintiff brought an Ejectione firme and declared upon a Lease made by Ed. Kynaston to which the Defendant pleads not guilty and the Plaintiff alleadges a Challenge that the Wife of the Sheriff is Cosin to the Plaintiff and desires a Venire facias to the Coroners and the Defendant denied it and so a Venire was made to the Sheriff and at the Assises the Defendant challenges the Array because the Pannell was arrayed by the Sheriff who married the Daughter of the Wife of the Lessor and note the first Challenge was made after the Issue joyned and at the Assises the Defendant challenged as above and a demurrer to it and Hutton held that a Challenge could not be after a challenge except it were for some cause that did arise after the challenge made and that the party ought to rely upon one cause of challenge though he had many causes observe the Defendant could not challenge the Array untill the Assises but Husband held that a Challenge might be upon a Challenge but this challenge was adjudged naught by all the Judges HIll versus Scale Trin. 16 Jacobi rotulo 5. 18. the Plaintiff brought an Ejectione firmae and declares upon a Demise made to the Plaintiff by J. C. bearing date the first of January anno 15. and sealed and delivered the twelfth of January following to hold from Christmasse then last past for two years the Jury found a speciall Verdict and found the Lease and a Letter of Atturney to execute the Lease in this manner that the Lessor was seised of the Land in Fee and being so seised he made signed and sealed an Indenture of a Demise of the said Tenements and found it in haec verba this Indenture c. and they further found that the Lessor the said fifth day of January did not deliver the said Indenture of Demise to the Plaintiff as his Deed but that the Lessor the said fifth day of January by his writing bearing Date the same Day gave full power and authority to one C. to enter into all the premises and to take possession thereof in the name of the Lessor and after possession so taken to deliver the said Indenture of Demise to the Plaintiff upon any part of the premises in the name of the Lessor and find the Letter of Atturney in haec verba To all c. whereas I the said J. C. by my Indenture of Lease bearing date with these Presents have demised granted and to Farm let c. for and during the Term of two years c. and they further find that the said C. such a day as Atturney to the Lessor by vertue of that writing did enter into the Tenements aforesaid and took possession thereof to the use of the Lessor and immediately after possession so taken the said C. did deliver the said Indenture of Demise upon the Tenements as the Lessors Deed to the Plaintiff to have c. and the doubt was because the Lessor in the Letter of Attorney and said that whereas he had demised and if it were a Demise then the Letter of Attorney was idle but notwithstanding the Court gave Judgement for the Plaintiff WEeks versus Mesey An Ejectione firmae brought against two and one of them was an estranger and was in the house and the principall would not appear and the other appeared and pleaded non informat and the Court was acquainted with the proceedings and the Plaintiff prayed an habere facias possessionem and the Court told the Plaintiff that by that Writ and recovery he could not remove him that had Right when a Lease is made to bring an Ejectment of Land in divers mens hands then they must enter into one of the parcells and leave one in that place and then must he go unto another and leave one there and so of the rest and then after he hath made the last Entry there he sealeth and delivereth the Lease and then those men that were left there must come out of the Land and this is a good executing of the Lease and Pasch the ninth of James the Court held that an Ejectment would not ly of Common pasture or of Sheep-gate BEamont versus Cook Trin. 13 Jacobi An exception taken in Ejectment because the Originall was teste the very same day that the Ejectment was made and adjudged good by the whole Court and one Goodhall brought an originall in Ejectment against Hill and three others and the Plaintiff counts against three of the Defendants and no simulcum against the fourth and this matter was moved in arrest of Judgement And the Judgement was stayed by the whole Court COronder versus Clerk Hill 10 Jacobi rotulo 3315. Action upon an Ejectment brought the Jury found it specially upon a Devise the words of the Will were to my right Heires Males and posterity of my name part and part like the question was who should have the Land and the Court held the Land must go to the Heire at the Common Law and not according to the words of the Will because they cannot consist with the grounds of Law a Will must be construed in all parts the brother cannot have it by the Devise because he is not Heir and the Daughters cannot for they are not Heirs and posterity and therefore neither of them could have it because they are not Heirs and posterity because they that take it must be Heir and posterity
first had the Free hold granted to him by the Lord of the Mannor And then he leavied a Fine and five years passe whether he in the Remainder be Barred or no those whose estates are turned to rights either present or future are meant by the Statute to be barred of a Copy-hold for years be put out of possession and a Fine Leavied and no entry by him he is barred by the Statute by the Bargain and Sale he in the Remainder is not put out of possession if a man make a Lease to begin at Easter next and before Easter a Fine is leavied and five years passe this Fine will not barr because at the Leavying of the Fine he could not enter for then his right was future if the Lease had been in possession and the Lessee had never entered he had been barred A Lease for years Remainder for years if the first man taketh for life the first estate is not so determined but that the Remainder standeth if a Copy-hold surrender for life there passeth no more from him then so much as maketh the estate and no more and the rest remaineth in him CRantley versus Kingswel Pacsb 15 Jacobi rotulo 710. The Defendant makes cognisance as Bailiff of Kingswell his Father for Rent service due to his Father at such a Feast And shews that Cramley holds of him by fealty and rent paiable at such a Feast and for Rent due at such a Feast made Cognisance the Plaintiffe in Barr saies that he at the said Feast offered the Rent upon the Land and that no body was there to receive it And the Plaintiffe saith that afterwards he demanded the Rent upon the Land and the Plaintffe made a Replevin pretending the Lord should make a personall demand but the whole Court was against him And Warburton took acception against the pleading the Tender because he saith that he offered the Rent to pay when as he was not present And the question was whether the Lord for a Rent service did not demand it at that day whether he can distrain without a demand of the person and held he might for the Tenant is yet bound to tender and the Land is debter and the Lord may resort thither when he pleases to demand the Rent upon the Land but if he tender his Homage and the Lord refuses it he cannot distrain without a demand of the Person and Judgment for the Defendant STokes versus Winter Trin. 15. Jacobi rotulo 2242. In Replevin the Defendant makes cognisance as Bayliff to Tenant for life to whom the Annuity was granted for life to begin by will after the death of the devisor And alledges the death of the devisor but not the day of the death after whose death the said H. was seised of the yeerly rent aforesaid in his demesn as of his Free-hold for terme of his life by vertue of the devise aforesaid And because seven pounds of the Rent aforesaid for one yeer ended at the Feast c. and by the space of 14. dayes then next following were behinde to the said T. the said time with c. the said T. as Bayliffe of the said H. doth make cognisance of the taking of the cattell aforesaid in the said place in which c. for the said 7 li. for the yeerly Rent aforesaid being so behind c. and issue was taken whether the said I. at the time of his death was seised of the said six Acres of Land in his demesne as of Fee as c. And after tryall exception was taken to the Advowry because it was not alledged that the annuity at such a Feast after the death of the devisor was behinde but it was over-ruled because there is so much expressed and Judgment given for the Defendant HVmfrey versus Powell Trin. 12. Jacobi rotulo 2791. Replevin wherein the Defendant avows for one Annuity granted to the Defendant to whom the office of Catorship of the Church of Roffen in Kent was granted by the Dâan and Chapter of that Church for life with an Annuity of 6. pounds for the exercising of that Office with a clause of distresse by vertue of which grant he was possessed and avowes for the Annuity and avers that it was an ancient Office pertaining to the Dean and Chapter of Roffen and doth not aver that the Annuity was an ancient Annuity The Defendant pleads the Statute of the 13 Eliz that all Devises Donations Grants c. made by any Master and Fellows of any Colledge Dean and Chapter c. other then for the terme of twenty and one yeers or three lives from the time of this Devise c. should be totally void And shews that the old Dean died and another was elected And a Demurrer thereupon And Judgement that the Grant was void HYen versus Gerrard Mich. 13. Jacobi rotulo 752. The Defendant in Replevin avows that one being seised in Fee made a Lease to him and avows for Damage feasant The Plaintiffe in Barr pleads and maintains his Declaration and traverses the Lease upon the Avowant demurrs and adjudged a goodtraverse IEnyx versus Applefourth Trin. 17. Eliz rotulo 543. The Defendant avows for a Rent charge the Plaintiffe in Barr pleads that the Defendant had presented a Writ of Annuity And that he had an Imparlance thereunto And demands Judgement if the Defendant did well make cognisance to the taking of the cattell in the said place in which c. in name of a distresse for the rent aforesaid by vertue of the said writing as Bayliffe of the said R. the said Writ of Annuity being prosecuted c. upon the said writing in form aforesaid c. And a Demurrer thereupon and Judgement by the whole Court for the Plaintiffe it is not needfull to lay a prescription to distrain for an Amerciament in a Court Leet but it is otherwise for an Amerciament in a Court Baron by the whole Court DArcy versus Langton The Defendant avows for a Rent charge and for a Nomine penae and no mention made in the Avowry of the Rent charge and the Plaintiffe was non-suit and afterwards in Arrest of Judgement this matter was alledged and at first held to be a good exception but afterwards Judgement was entred an Advowry is in the nature of a Declaration if that be vitious no Judgement can be given for the Advowant TRin. 9. Jacobi Regis rotulo 2033. Replevin for the taking of Cattell at Andover in a certain place there called R The Defendant makes cognisance for damage feasant the Plaintiffe saies that he was seised of the Messuage c. in C. in the Parish of A to which he claimed Common of Pasture And issue taken upon the prescription and a Venire Facias of A. and exception taken because it was not tryed of C. and A. or of the Parish of A. but it was adjudged to be good TRinbone versus Smith Trin. 12. Jacobi rotulo 626. In Replevin foure and twenty were returned upon the
village is in question or could come in Issue yet it was resolved by the whole Court but him that those of the village of Bail might well know whether the Plaintif being an inhabitant within the village in which the Leet was were a chief Pledge at the Court or no for to have cheif pledges doth properly belong to a Leet which Leet is within the village and therefore they of the Mannor cannot have so good knowledge of the matter as they of the Mannor and village together and therefore they all ought to have been of both as in the Case of Common or a way from one village to a house in another village this ought to be tried of both villages and so also of the Tenure of Land in D. held of the Mannor of Sale the triall must be as well of the village where the Land lies as of the Mannor of which the Land is holden as it was adjudged Hill 45. El. in the then Queens Bench in the Case between Lovlace and and Judgement was reversed and see 6 H. 7. and Arundels case in my Lord Cooks Reports BVrglacy versus Ellington Burglacy brought a Replevin against Ellington for the taking of his cattell c. the Avowant pleads that one W. B. was seised of the place in which c. in his Demesne as of Fee and being so seised died by reason whereof the Land descended to one Crist. his Daughter and Heir who took to Husband the Avowant the Plaintiff in his Barr to the Avowry confesses that W. B. was seised and that it descended to C. who took to Husband the Avowant but he further said that the 16 of April primo Jac. the Husband and Wife by their Deed indented and inrolled did bargain and sell the same Land unto one Missenden and a Fine levied by them and that M. the 30 of James bargained and sold it to F. M. in Fee and he being so seised licensed the Plaintiff to put in his cattell the Avowant replies if in the said Bargain and Sale made by the Husband and Wife a Proviso was contained that if the said Ellington should pay one hundred pounds a year after then c. and pleaded the Statute of 13 Eliz. of usury with an averment that the profits of the Land were of the value of twelve pounds by the year the Plaintif rejoyned that true it is there is such a clause in the Indenture but he further said that before the sealing of the Indenture it was agreed by word that the said Ellington should have and receive the profits and not the Plaintif and thereupon the Avowant demurres and the Case was thus Ellington bargains his Land to M for the payment of one hundred pounds a yeare after to be paid and that the Bargainee should have the profits the bargainor enters as upon a void Sale because of the statute of usury for by the Proviso âhe is to have the hundred pounds and ten pounds for the forbearance and by the Law he is to have the profits and the which did amount above ten pounds by the hundred the bargainee to avoid the usury pleaded an agreement by word before the sealing of the Bargain and Sale and the question arising upon this was if the Bargainee might plead this verball agreement for the avoiding of the Deed which did suppose the contrary and Moore of Lincolns ânne counsell was of opinion that he could not put that maxime that every thing must be dissolved by that by which it is bound and his whole argument depended upon that and he cited divers Cases as 1 H. 7. 28. 28 H. 8. 25. 1 Eliz. Dier 16. 9. Rutlands Case 5 Rep. and Cheyney 6 Case there but the whole Court without any argument were of opinion that he might plead the verball agreement and avoid the usury and first they all agreed that when a Deed is perfected and delivered as his Deed that then no verball agreement afterwards may be pleaded in destruction thereof as it is in the Cases put but when the agreement is parcell of the Originall contract as here it is it may be pleaded and secondly otherwise it would bring a great mischief being the custome so to do by word but if it had been expressed within the Deed that the Bargainee should have the profits and that it was delivered accordingly that no agreement or assignment of the profits could now avoid it for it is an usurious contract and therefore the whole court gave Judgement for the Plaintif that he might well plead the agreement Actions of Trespass and Battery JOhnson versus Turner Trin. 44 Eliz. Trespasse brought for breaking the Plaintifs house and the taking and carrying away his goods the Defendant justifies all the Trespasse the Plaintif as to the breaking of the House and taking the goods and the matter therein contained demurres upon the Defendants Barr the Defendant joins in demurrer in this form to wit because the Plaintif aforesaid as to the breaking of the House and taking the goods is sufficient demands Judgement and Judgement given in the Common Pleas for the Plaintiff and a Writ to inquire of Damages upon which Damages are assessed for the breaking of the House and taking the goods and whether the subsequent words to wit and the matter therein contained go to the whole matter in the Barr to wit to the carrying of the Goods away also for when the Defendant joyned in Demurrer with the Plaintiff he joyned specially to wit to the breaking of the House and taking the Goods but nothing of the carrying them away and so as to the carrying of them away nothing is put into Judgement of the court yet the Writ to inquire is for the whole and the Judgement also and the carrying of the Goods away being parcell of the matter and for which greater Damages are adjudged and that being not put into the Judgement of the Court by the Demurrer therefore the Judgement is erronious for there is a discontinuance as to the carrying of the Goods away which is part of the matter and this businesse concerned Mr. Darcy of the privy chamber concerning his patent for Cards PVrrell versus Bradley Pasch 1 Jacobi The Plaintif declares in Trespass wherefore by force and Arms such a day the Defendant did assault him and one Mare price six pounds from the person of the Plaintiffe then and there did take and Yelverton moved for the Defendant in arrest of Judgement and the Declaration was not good for the Plaintif did not shew any property in the Mare for he ought to have that it was his Mare or the Mare of the Plaintif for as it is laid in the Declaration the words may have two intendments that the property of the Mare was to the Defendant and then the taking was lawfull or that the property was in the Plaintif and then the taking was wrongfull and it being indifferent to whether it shall be taken most strongly against the Plaintif for his
times used to have a Dispensation from the Archbishop and if the Incumbent in this Case should preach Heresie as the Attorney and Popham said the Ordinary might correct him for the parson is not exempted out of his Jurisdiction but his Parsonage onely but by Gawdy and the rest the Ordinary could not meddle with him for the Parson is priviledged in respect of the place but the Patron may commission and examine the matter and thereupon out and deprive him and so it happened in Coverts Case as Gawdy and Williams said wherein the Bishop of Winchester was the Donor of such a Donative 13 E. 4. LEe versus Lacon 3. Jac. In trespass the action was Land in the County of Salop and not guilty pleaded and the venire facias was made with a space for Salop but Salop was not named there And by vertue of that Writ the Sheriffe of Salop impannelled the Jury and found for the Plaintiff and the matter above specified was moved in Arrest of Judgment to wit that the venire facias was vicious and so a mistriall but by Fenner and Williams it was to be accounted his if no venire facias had been awarded And so indeed by the Statute of Jeofailes for the County to wit Salop is omitted and left out and so the Sheriffe of Salop had no power nor authority to summon the Jury because the Writ which is his Warrant is generall to the Sheriff and not naming of any County but the Court held it to be the best way to amend it and they put this difference For when the action is laid in Salop and upon a special pleading the issue is drawn into a forreign County there the entry and award of the venire upon the Will is speciall to wit to the Sheriff of that County where the issue arises to be tryed and in such case a venire facias with a blanâk shall not be good because it cannot be judged to which of the Sheriffs the venire was to be awarded and upon that incertainty it shall be naught but when the generall issue is taken or the matter is triable in the same County where the action is laid there the venire facias is awarded generally and must of necessity be intended to be the Sheriffe of that County where the action is laid and cannot be otherwise intended and for this reason it was but the default of the Clerk which is amendable and so it was amended BAylie versus Moon Trin. 3. Jacobi An action of Battery brought in Plymouth Court before the Major and Bailiffs there and not guilty pleaded but afterwards the issue was waived and Judgment was given for the Plaintiff and a Writ to enquire of damage was awarded to the Serjeant of the Mace that by the oath of twelve c. he should inquire and the Writ was made returnable at the next Court before the Maior and Baylifs And upon a Writ of Errour brought it appeared by the Record certified that the Writ to inquire of damages was taken before the Maior of Plymouth who was also Judg of the Court and for that cause reversed for the Writ warrants the inquiry to be before the Serjeant of the Mace who by the writ for that purpose is made a distinct Officer and so an inquiry before the Maior is not warranted by any writ And so by consequence a Judgment to recover those damages taxed before a wrong Officer to whom the Writ was not directed is erroneous which was granted by the whole Court LAxworth versus West Mich. 3. Jacobi Trespass brought for the taking of Hay severed from the ninth part of Elthorp in the County of Warwick the Defendant to part pleads not guilty and to the residue pleads a devise of the Parsonage made by Lepworth to the Defendant at Wapenbury in the same County and to inable the devise for tithes in L. alledges L. to be a Hamlet in Wapenbury to the intent that the whole Tithes may pass and upon a non devisavit the venn was of Wapenbury and found for the Plaintif that T. L. did not devise it and the other issue of not guilty found for the Defendant and moved in Arrest of Judgment that the venu was mistaken because it was of Wapenbury only and not of Elthorp and they of W. could not try a matter in E. And although it was answered that the Defendant himself by his plea had confessed that E. was but an Hamlet yet the Court held the venu mistaken for when the Plaintif declares of a Trespass in E. This by generall intendment is presumed to be a Village of which Village the matter which is there in question ought to be tryed and although the Defendant had alledged Elthorp to be but an Hamlet yet it was but to inable the devise and doth not extend to the issue before joyned upon the not guilty for part for in that issue both parties agree that Elthorp is a Village and it is a perfect issue taken which hath not any coherence with the other issue of non devisavit but if the Defendant had to the whole issue pleaded the devise as his excuse and had alledged E. to be an Hamlet of W. and that only been in issue there the venu awarded had been good of W. only but in this case it was adjudged that the venire was mis-awarded and that the Plaintif should have a venire facias de novo DElves versus Wyer Mich. 3. Jacobi The Plaintiff brought an action of Trespasse for breaking his Close and for cropping 200. Pear-trees and 100. Apple-trees and damage found to 40. l. And the Court was moved by Richardson for that the damages might be mitigated because he produced an Affidavit whereby it appeared that the party himself before the Action brought would have took 5 l. but denyed for the Court said that they could not diminish the damages in Trespass which was locall and therefore could not appear to them and the damages might well amount to 40 l. for cropping of an Orchard and so Judgment entred WOody's case Mich. 3. Jacobi Woody brought an action of false imprisonment and Battery against two who justifie and set forth that London is an ancient City and that the Maior of London is a Justice of Peace and that the Defendants were Serjeants of the Mace according to the custome of the City and that the Lord Maior to wit one Lee commanded them to arrest the Plaintif for causes to them unknown but to him known and to imprison him c. Walter moved that this Justification was insufficient because they only shewed that they were Serjeants at Mace duely elected according to the custome of the City but do not shew the Custome and Authority that they have to make Serjeants and to arrest as it is 4. H. 4. 36. in trespass the Defendant justifies that the Tower of London is within the City of London and time out of mind c. one Court was there used
John W. was seised of three hundred Acres of Land in R. aforesayd of which the place in question called G. is parcell and that 30 H. 6. the sayd John Whithing reciting that whereas N. de la moore 31 E. 1. the Plaintiffs Ancestor Son and heire of H. de la Moore grants to William de la Moore Corsum aque which runs from W. thorow the middle of the Land of the sayd M. And shews further that by meane discents it discends to the Defendant c and so justifies The Plaintiff replies if W. S. was seised of the place where c. and made a Lease thereof to him for yeares and traverses that the three hundred Acres of Land were parcell and Issue joyned upon that and found for the Plaintiff and it was moved in Arrest of Judgement that the Defendant had not made any answer to the Plaintiff and so no Issue joyned for the Plaintiff layes the Trespass in G. in L. the Defendant sayes he was seised of three hundred Acres of which the place c. was parcell but he conveys no title to himselfe but by a course of water thorow the middle of the Land of M. but whose Land that was it doth not appeare and is another thing and therefore an Issue upon that which the Defendant doth not claime is voyd and although Issue be joyned yet it is not helped by the Statute of Jeofailes of 18 Eliz. or 32 H. 8. for it is as no Issue when it is of a thing not in question but if the Issue had been of a matter in question although ill joyned yet it is ayded as Nichols Case is 5 Rep. 43. upon payment pleaded without Deed And Doddridge and Crooke Justices agreed to that but Haughton seemed to incline that it was an Issue and so helped by the Statute FVller against Pettesworth Knight Mich. 11. Iacobi Fuller brought an Action of Trespass against Pettesworth and his Servant for breaking his Close and taking one Cow in D. in the County of B. One of the Defendants plead not guilty the Servant pleads that the Plaintiff holds of Sir Peter P. as of c. in the County aforesayd and for services behinde by the command of his Master he seised the Cow c. The Plaintiff traverses c. and one Venire facias was awarded out of both the Villiages and being found for the Plaintiff it was new moved in Arrest of Judgement by Finch of Grays Inne that two Venire facias ought to have been awarded because the Issue is of things in severall places for if there be severall Issues in one place one Jury shall be onely Impannelled but if in severall places for severall things locall severall Juries shall be but the whole Court held that one Jury onely should be impannelled and one Venu onely should be awarded out of both the places and it is all one as if it had been in one place but it had been otherwise if in severall Counties as 41 Eliz. DAme Petts Case Mich. 11. Iacobi In an Action of Trespass brought by the Lady Petts upon not guilty pleaded the Jury being at Bar the matters following came in question upon the evidence by Haughton and the other Justices If A. be seised of a great Close where c. and a Stranger enter and occupy part of the Close yet notwithstanding A. continues the posaession of the residue whether this shall preserve his possession in the residue and he shall be judged to be in possession of that because it is an intire thing 5 E. 4. 2. and 8 E. 3. 13. Seisin of part of the services is the seisin of the whole and so is Bettisworths Case 2. Rep. The possession of the House is the possession of the Land for the Lessee against his Lessor of that which passes by one demise But if a stranger enter and sever part by metes and bounds nothing is wrought by the possession of the residue Another question was this A Lessee for yeares of ten Acres paying twenty shillings Rent the Lessee is outed of parcell yet he payed all the Rent to him in Reversion the Lessor having notice of the enter whether this protects the Reversion so that nothing is gained by the entry but the interest of the Lessee and shall be no disseisin And Yelverton at the Barr was of opinion that it should be no Disseisin Rithen Sect. 590. saith That so long as the particular Tenant continues his possession so long is the reversion in the Lessor for in such case as to the Lessor the Lessee shall be alwayes deemed in possession by force of the Lease and the reason why the Lessee shall be adjudged in posaession of all as to the Lessor is because the Lessor cannot have notice of the alteration of the posaession for when the Lessee by his owne Act or sufferance doth a thing in alteration of the posaession of which by common intendment the Lessor cannot have or take notice there the Law will not prejudice the Lessor And see for that Farmers Case in the third Rep. 79. If Tenant for life levy a Fine having Land in the same Villiage this shall not bind the Lessor if five yeares pass before he take notice of what Land the Fine is levied And the same Law if Tenant for life make a Feofment to one who hath land within the same Village levies a Fine and in this cafe if the Lessee hath continually payd all his Rent the Lessor cannot intend or suspect but that the Lessee is absolute Tenant of the whole and in Farmers Case it is sayd That if the Lessor levy a Fine the Disseisee is barred without claime for it is impossible but he to whom the wrong is done shall presently know it But if he that hath the particular estate by Grant or trust reposed in him shall secretly practice although he pay the Rent and continue posaession yet it is otherwise But the Reporters opinion was that if in the principall case no Rent had been reserved then the Reversion had been devested by the entry for there had been no act done to mislead or hinder the knowledge thereof and also although rent be reserved and all payd yet if he had express notice thereof the reversion had been devested And secondly if it should be a Disseisin a great mischeif would follow for if a discent should be it would take away the Lessors entry and yet no fault in them because in common presumption the Lessee alwayes continued Tenant but Cook of a contrary opinion for he said it could not be denyed but that the Lessee is out of the posaession and then it follows of necessity that the Lessor must be out of his reversion And as to notice to make his claime he must take notice at his perill 4 M. Dyer 143. b. But note that this is when the Law intends that he may take notice which it will not intend in this Case Haughton was of opinion that it was a
Disseisin and Doddridge sayd It would be mischeivous if it should Hill 6. Iac. In the Common Pleas that if in the Common Barre in Trespass the place in the Common Barre is alledged to be Blackacre the Plaintiff may plead that it is his Free-hold and then it was held by the whole Court that an abuttall of one side is sufficient without alledging it of every side SWaine against Becket An Action of Trespass brought for cutting down of Trees And upon a speciall verdict the question was that whereas there is a Mannor wherein are Copi-holders for life which have used to lopp Trees growing upon the Copy-holds for their necessary fire and repairing of their customary Tenements the Lord of the Mannor maketh a Lease of the Mannor for yeares excepting the Trees the Lessee of the Mannor granteth a copy for life the Copy-holder loppeth the Trees growing on his Copy-hold whether by law he might do it or no was the doubt of the Jury And it was held by all the Court that the Copy-holder might lopp the Trees because he is in by the custome which is above the Lords Estate after he is admitted and that the copy-hold doth not depend upon the Lords interest And that the Trees excepted and the Soil remained parcell of the Mannor because the Lease was but for years but if the Lease had been for life it had been otherwise because it had been severed from the Mannor And whereas it was objected that the Tenant should not be in a better condition then his Author it was answered that a Lord of a Mannor at will may grant a copy for life or in fee and it is good If the Lord cut down all the Trees so that the Copy-holder can have no lopping he may have his Action upon the Case against the Lord as it was adjudged in Gosnolds case If the Lord sell away his waste and the Copy-holder dye and the Lord grant a new copy he shall have his Common If the Lord sell away the Trees so that the Copy-holder cannot have Estovers because the Bargainee felleth down the Trees the Copy-holder shall have his Action against the Bargainee Common and lopping are incident to the copy-hold Judgment for the Defendant HArris against Ap-John An Action of Trespasse brought the Defendant pleads not guilty and verdict found for the Plaintif And in Arrest of Judgment it was alledged that the venire facias was de placito debiti and so also was the habeas corpus and it should have been de placito transgressionis And it was amended by the whole Court MYnwinnock against Bligh Trin. 16. Jacob. rotulo 1697. An action of Trespasse brought for breaking the Plaintiffs Close done Septemb. in the 13. year of King James The Defendant pleads as to part of the Trespasse in award and that the Defendant submits himself to the award the 15. yeare and that the Arbitrators in the 13. yeare which was before the submission made the Award and traverses that he was guilty of the Trespasse after the award made And the Plaintiff replies that the Arbitrators the said day in the 13. year made not any award c. And after Tryall exception was taken that the issue was ill joyned being of a thing that was void yet notwithstanding Judgment was given for the Plaintiff and they resembled to a payment upon a single Bond and conditions performed at a Feast not contained in an Obligation Trin. 15. Jac. rotulo 3044. An Action of Trespass brought wherfore by force and armes his Goods and Chattels to wit a thousand posts and forty railes took and caryed away and damages given intire and after a verdict exception taken because Rales was pretended to be no Latine word nor to have any exception but Judgment was given for the Plaintiff DVncomb against Randoll Hil. 9. Jac. rotulo 2267. Three issues in Trespasse One issue was upon a prescription to wit that they had accustomed to have for himselfe his Farme and Tenants of the same Mannor common of pasture in the said c. for all his Sheep which are levant and couchant in and upon the Demesne Lands of W. which lye and are in A. aforesaid every yeare And exception was taken for the uncertainty because it did not appear that those were demesne Lands which lye in A. for it was ill pleaded and ought to be averred but notwithstanding it was held good after a tryal and Judgment was given for the Plaintiff and in this case an exception was taken to the venire facias because it was of A. and of the Mannor of C. and because it was made in this manner to wit de visu de A. and de visu manerij de C. but it was disallowed because against the form used in the Common Pleas. DOwnes against Skrymsher Trin. 9. Iac. rotulo 334. An Action of Assault and Battery brought and there was a Demurrer upon the Evidence And the case was that the Defendant the day specified in the Declaration said that the Plaintiff assaulted the Defenant and in defence of himselfe justifies the beating the Plaintiff replies that he did it of his own wrong without any such cause and in the Evidence the Defendant maintained that the Plaintiff beate him the day mentioned in the Declaration and in the same place And the Plaintiff perceiving that gave in evidence that the Battery was made another day and place to wit c. which was the cause of the speciall verdict for if there be two Batteries made between the Plaintiff and Defendant at divers times the Plaintiff is bound to prove the Battery made the same day in his Declaration and shall not be admitted to give another day in evidence by the opinion of the whole Court HEydon against Mich. 8. Jac. rotulo 839. An Action of Battery brought against three two of them pleaded not guilty and Judgment by non sum informat against the third and the two were found guilty for all And the Jury gave damages severally against one a 100 l. and against the other a 100 s. and what Judgement should be given was the question and at first the Court was of opinion that the Plaintiff should not have Judgment at all for where the Defendants are found guilty of all the Trespass in this case the damages shall be intire but if one shall be found guilty of part or at another time in this case the damages shall be severall otherwise not And they thought a Venire de novo ought to issue out because the Jury had mis-behaved themselves in severing the damages but afterwards it was resolved that the damages that were given by the first Jury to wit one 100 l. should be recovered against all the Defendants in that Writ named and that in Trespass the first Jury taxes the damages for the whole Trespass and that shall bind all the Defendants and therefore execution was given against all the Defendants for the hundred pounds Trin. 9. Jam. rotulo 1835.
of Parent 42 Imparlance what plea after 42 Judgment Arrested 2 Judgment reversed because the Sheriff was not named in the Venire facias 3 Iudgment arrested 5 Justification not good where 5 Justification amounting to a not guilty naught 5 Innuendo will not help the action 7 9 Imparlance Roll supplyed by the issue 9 Juror committed 44 Judgment upon a By-law 48 49 Judgment pleaded in Bar by Executor 49 Judgment against Executors 53 Imparlance amended 53 Judgment arrested for improper words Sans Anglice 82 Jeofaile the statute not helping where 82 Judgment reversed by Error in the disjunctive 88 Intendment upon a Will 89 Judgment reversed in an inferiour Court why 97 Judgment reversed for Errour in the judgment 99 Judgment reversed for changing the Defendants addition 100 Judgment priority considerable 102 Judgment reversed for not shewing in what Court a deed was enrolled 115 Judgement reversed for want of words in the Tales 115 116 Implication not allowed of in a surrender where 128 Judgment in an Eject firmae 129 Interest what 136 Judgment reversed by Writ of Error non obstante a verdict the Statute of 18. Eliz. 106 Imparlance what is pleadable after 138 Joynture what 139 Interest in possession and in future the difference 148 Implication not intended where 153 Judgment arrested for that the plea was naught 172 Jurors name mistaken was amended upon constat de persona Iudgment arrested for not shewing in what place the Messuage did lie to which Common did belong 188 Iury challenge 194 Iudgment it 's nature as to the Plaintiff and Defendant 194 Issue helped by the Statute of Jeofailes where 200 Iudgement reversed because the writ of Enquiry was before a wrong Officer 203 Imprisonment justified by the commandment of the Maior of London naught where 204 Justice of Peace cannot command his servants to arrest in his absence without Warrant 205. Iustification in Trespass for a way 212. Iustification not good where 218. Iustification speciall pleaded in Battery 226. Issue of things in severall places 229. K. KIngs Title not lost 164 Knight ought to be returned in the Pannell where 193. L. LAw Gager lies not if the except be per manus proprias 25 Lease to two determined upon the death of one where 30. Lease of a Reversion sans Attornament where good 30. Legacy of Land not suable for in Court Christian 32. Legacy of a Chattell suable for in Court Christian 34. Locallity not to be made transitory 35. Limitation is taken strictly grant aliter 39. Lessee at will cannot grant over his Estate 43. Law mistaken where it is hurtfull 41. Letters of Administration ought to be shewed 9. Law waged where 53. Law wager by a false party 55. Letter of an attorny where naught 94. 95. Law Gager lies not in debt for sallery 60. Law Gager where 70. 65 Lessee at will if he determine his Will Devis au yet shall pay the intire Rent 90. Lease to try a Title of Lands in the hands of many 129. Lease to be executed by Letter of an Attorney how 129. Lease made to three for their lives with a Covenant that the Land should remain to the survivor for 90 years is a good Interest in the Survivor 136. London how houses passe without inrollment 141. 142. Liberty to make Leases 169. Lease for life to three where it was naught 175. Lord of Parliament not appearing shall forfeit 100 l. 193. Lunatick where an Action ought to brought in his name 197. Levant and Couchant is certainly fufficient 198. M. MIstryall the Ven. fac mistaken 17 Mistake of the Iury 18 Misprision of the Clerk amended 26 Monasteries dissolved onely those Regular 39 Mistake by the Court no prejudice 42. Mistriall 7. Missworn fellow Actionable 9. Medietas Linguae where 45. Master chargeable where 64 Misprision of the Clerk amended after tryall 88. Mannor by that name what will passe 155. Mistake of a day of an Act by way of Bar not prejudicial 196. Marshalsey hath no authority to hold plea of Debt except one party be of the houshold 199 Marshalsey no Iurisdiction 199. 200. Master cannot have an Action for the loss of Service if the Servant die of the beating 205. N. NOtice not necessary 10 Non est inventus where the party did escape 12 Nusance where it lyeth 4. Non damnificatus pleaded 7 Noverint for non assumpsit 8. Notice where needfull 46. Nul tiel Record pleaded to a Plea of Outlawry 84. Non damnificatus pleaded 118. Nisi prius amended by the Roll 133 Nonage tryed where it is alledged not where the Land lies 150. 151. Non-tenure pleaded 153. Nisi prius the Record amended upon motion 156 Nullum tempus occurrit Regi 166. Negativum praegnans 172. Non residency the Statute 13 El. a generall Law 208. New Asignment where not good 217. Bar to it 236. Nihil dicit 237. 238. Non omittas 240. O ORdinary cannot make a division 32. Ordinary his power 45. Outlawry no Plea where 55. Outlawry in the Testator 55. Originall want of it after verdict no Error 97. Obligation discharged why 98. 99. Originall against four count against three without a Simulcum adjudged naught 130 Ordinary and Patron their severall Rights 202. P. PArdon generall de effect 10. Promise by an Infant not good 11 Papist to a Bishop actionable 12. Proviso implicit where good 14. Perjured knave actionable 15. Proviso 18 19. Pyracy no excuse in an Action of Covenant 21. Plea in abatement 27 in Assise 28. Premunire in a Parson 30. Pleas severall cannot be in a joint debt or contract 30. Proof how far extendible 33 Where required and where not 34. Pardon crimen legitur non tollitur 34. Priviledge from Arrest where not to be allowed 84 Prender and Render the difference 34. 35. Prescription where good 35 Property not altered upon a Scire facias 41. Punishment corporall not to be imposed for the default of a deputy where 45. Proviso Executory and executed the difference 8. Priviledge respective 47 Payment where peremptory 49 Plea made good by verdict 52 Payment when upon demand 52 Pardon generall pleaded 56. Plea to a Bond taken by the Sheriff 58. Payment to the Heir and not to the exceutor where good 64. Priviledge of an Vniversity where not to be allowed 75. Plene adm nistravit no Plea where 77 78. Proprietor sufficient 88. Priviledge of Parl. pleaded 92 Plea naught for want of traverse 98. Primo deliberat shall not be pleadded sans traverse 105. Propriety of goods cannot be in abeyance 132. Prescription and custome do differ how 132. Processe misawarded where helped by the Statute 134. Plea where it shall be in discharge but not in Barr of an obligation 109. Partition Processe in it 156. For whom it lies 157 Partition error in the first Judgement 157. Partition in another Writ was pleaded Presentment of a Clerk by words good 162. Patrons 6 moneths 165. Proprietate probanda 167. Plea naught 173. Pannell of hab corp
elect him See the Statute of 25 H. 8. That a Canon against Common Law confounds the Roiall Prerogative of the King or Law of God is void and Custome of the Realme cannot be taken away but by act of Parliament See 21 Ed. 4. 44. the Abbot of Saint Albones hath a Charter of the King to be discharged of Collection of tenthes granted by Parliament or Convocation The Clergy grants tythes in Convocation there is a clause in the grant that no one of them who shal be chosen to be collector shal be discharged of collection by colour or force of any Letters Patents and after they return the Abbot of St. Albones Collector who pleads his Letters Patents in discharge of Collector and resolved by the Court that the clause in the grant of tenthes doth not take away the exemption of discharge by the Letters Patents granted And it was resolved that if the Parish clark misdemene himselfe in his office or in the Church he may be sentenced for that in the Ecclesiasticall court to Excommunication but not to Deprivation And after Prohibition was granted by all the court and held also that a Prohibition lyeth as well after sentence as before Trinity 8. Jacobi Common Bench. ON was cited to appear in the Prerogative Court of Canterbury which was out of the Diocesse of Canterbury and upon that he praied Prohibition upon the Statute of 32. H. 8. Which willeth that none shall be cited to appeare out of his Diocesse without assent of the Bishop and Prohibition was granted And yet it was said that in the time of H. 8 and Reigne of Mary that the Arch Bishops of Canterbury had used to cite any man dwelling out of his Diocesse and within any Diocesse within his Province to appeare before him in the Prerogative Court and this without the assent of the Ordinary of the Diocesse But it was resolved by the Court that this was by force of the power Legantine of the Arch-Bishop that as Lynwood saith ought to be expressed in the Prohibition for the Arch-Bishop of Canterbury York Pisa and Reymes were Legati nati and others but Legates a Latere Hillary 1610. 8. Jacobi in the Common Bench. Beareblock against Reade IN an Action of Debt brought by Beareblocke against Reade Administratrix to her Husband upon a Judgement given in this Court The case was this the Plaintiffe had Judgment against the Husband and after sued him to an Vtlagary and upon that he brought a Writ of Errous and removed the Record into the Kings Bench and reversed the Judgement for the Vtlagary But the first Judgment was affirmed and then the Husband acknowledged a Statute and dyed And the Wife took out Letters of Administration and then the Statute is extended against the Wife and all the goods which shee had of the Intestates taken in execution After which Beareblock in the Kings Bench sueth a Scirefacias upon the said Judgment against the said Administratrix to have execution and shee pleads upon that the said Statute in Barre and the extent of that and that more then that shee hath nothing to satisfie and this was adjudged a good plea. And then the Plaintiffe being not satisfied he hrought an action of debt upon the said Judgment in this Court and in Barr of that the Wife pleaded all this matter in Barr as aforesaid upon which the Plaintiffe demurred in Law and the Judges seemed to incline that this was no Barr for though that the Wife hath not any means to aide her selfe or to prevent the extent of the Statute yet it seemed to them that this should not prevent the execution upon the Judgement and that the Wife might have Audita quaerela against the Connusee of the Statute and so to make the extent void It was not argued at this day but the point only opened see 3. Eliz. Dyer 7. H. 6. See Pasche 9. Jacobi the Residue Petty against Evans IN an Ejectione firme brought by the Lessee of a Copy-holder it is sufficient that the count be generall without any mention of the License if the Defendant plead not guilty then the Plaintiff ought to shew the Lycense in Evidence But if the Defendant plead specially then the Plaintiff ought to plead the License certainly in his replication and the time and place when it was made and in this case the Plaintiff replied that the copy-holder by License first then had of the Lord did demise and did not shew what estate the Lord had nor the place nor time when it was made and all the Justices agreed that it is not good For the License is traversable for if a copy-holder without License of the Lord make a Lease for yeares The lessee which enters by calour of that is a Disseisor and a Disseisor cannot maintain an Ejectione Firme and the Defendant cannot plead that the Plaintiff by license did not demise for this is a pregnant negative also it ought to appeare what estate the Lord had for he cannot give license to make a lease of longer time in the Tenancy then he hath in the signiory And for that if he be Lessee for life of a Mannor and he licenses a copi-holder to make a Lease for 21. yeares of a copy-hold and then the Lessee for life dies the license is for that determined though that the copy-holder be of Inheritance for the Inheritance of the Lord is bound by that And for that the Plaintiff replies that the copy-holder by license of the Lord first therefore had made the Lease that is not good by Coke and Walmesley expresly and though that the Defendant confesse the Replication by Implication by pleading Yet this shall not ayd the Plaintiff for that it is insufficiently pleaded which note Hillary 8. Jacobi 1610. in the Common Bench. IN action upon the case upon an Assumpsit the Plaintiff counts that when he such a day at the speciall instance and request of the Defendant lent to the Defendant the same day ten pound And that the Defendant the same day in consideration thereof assumed and promised to the Plaintiff to pay the same summ of ten pound at an other day to come And it was moved in arrest of Judgement that the consideration was too generall and for that the action not maintainable and all the Justices but Foster seemed the consideration was good but Foster it seems was in some doubt of that but Judgement was entred for the Plaintiff according to the verdict And Coke cheife Justice said that such a like action was maintained against Kercher his Chaplain as Executor of his Father and it seems for good Law Legates Case ONe Legate was committed to Newgate Prison for Arrianisme for denying of the Trinity by the high Commissioners and it was moved on the behalfe of Legate to have a habeas Corpus and it was granted and it was said by Coke cheife Justice that the Statute of 5. H. 4. Chapter 10. Inhibits Justices of peace to commit any man to
of the King for the Plaintiff and day given for the argument of that till the next tearm Hillary 8. Jacobi 1610. in the Common Bench. Tresham against Lambe LEwes Tresham was Plaintiff in waste against John Lambe the Plaintiff supposed the Defendant had made waste in sowing and plowing ancient meadow the which he had let to the Defendant for years in Rushton in the county of Northampton and sowed it with Woade and prayed Estrepement upon the Statute of Glocester chapter 13. And upon examination it appears that the Lands let was pasture and Meadow the Pasture was Ridge and furrow but had been mowed and used for meadow for diverse years and that the Defendant plowed and sowed that with Woade but this which had been ancient meadow he used that as Meadow and did not convert that to Arable Land but the Judges would not grant any Estrepement to the Pasture for that it was Ridge and furrow and it was no ancient meadow although that had been mowed time out of minde c. But to the ancient Meadow they granted a writ of Esterpement but Foster seemed to be of another opinion for that that it was to sow Woade for that that it is against common Right and the fume and smell of that is offensive and infectious but if it had been to sow Corne he agreed as above and for the executing the Writ of Estrepement they all agreed that the Sheriff ought to take if need be the power of the County against those which made the waste hanging the Action and may commit them if they will not obey him for the words of the Statute are that you shall cause to keep which shall be intended in safety But if Lessee for years trench or draine that is no Wast as it was now of late times adjudged where if the Lessee takes any of the reasonable Bootes that the Law allowes that it shall be no Waste nor Estrepement shall be granted see Fitzherberts Natura Brevium 59. m. If a man devise Land to his Executors for years this is assetts but if he devise that his Executors shall sell his Lands or devise his Lands to his Executors to be sold this shall be no assets untill the Lands are sold and the money for which the land shall be sold shall be assetts A Record of Nisi prius in an Action of Debt upon an obligation with condition to pay such a sum of Money at such a Feast next after the date of the obligation and the day of the date of the obligation was omitted in the Record of the Nisi prius so that it doth not appear which shall be the next Feast at which the mony ought to be paid after the date and by all the Justices that was no perfect Issue and for that the Justices of Nisi prius have no power to proceed upon it and for that it shall not be amended otherwise if it had been a good Issue though that another thing had been mistaken see Dyer 9. Eliz. 260. 24. And see before the same Tearm here The King pardoned a man attaint for giving a false verdict yet he shall not be at another time impannelled upon any Jury for though that the punishment were pardoned yet the Guilt remaines Hillary 8. Jacobi 1610. In the Common Bench. James versus Reade THE case was the King was seised of a Mannor where there were diverse Copy-holders for life and was also seised of eight Acres of Land in another Mannor in which the Copy-holders have used time out of minde c. To have common and after the King grants the Mannor to one and the eight Acres to another and a Copy-holder puts in his beasts into the eight Acres of Land and in trespasse brought against him by the Patentee of the eight Acres he prescribes that the Lord of a Mannor and all those whose estate he hath in the Mannor have used time out of minde c. For themselves and their Copy-holders to have Common in the said eight Acres of Land and further pleaded that he was Copy-holder for his life by grant after the said unity of possession in the King and so demanded judgment if action against which the said unity of possession was pleaded upon which the Defendant demurrs and all the Justices seemed that though that prescription was pleaded that the common was extinct but it seems also to them that by speciall pleading he might have beene helped and save his common for this was common Appendant see 4. Coke Tirringhams Case 37. 6. Hillary 8. Jacobi 1610. In the Common Bench. Cartwright against Gilbert IN Debt upon an obligation with condition to be and perform an Arbitrement to be made the Arbitrators award that the Defendant should make Submission and should acknowledge himself sorry for all transgressions and words at or before the next Court to be held in the Mannor of P. And for the not performance of that Award the Plaintiff brought this Suit and the Defendant in Barr of this pleads that at the said next Court he went to the Court to make his submission and to acknowledge himself greived according to the Award and was there ready to have performed it but further he saith that the Plaintiff was not there to accept it upon which the Plaintiff demurred and it seemes to Coke and Foster that the Defendant hath done as much as was to be done of his part and for that that the Plaintiff was not there ready to accept the Defendant was discharged for this submission is personall and to the intent to make them freinds and for that both the parties ought to be present But Walmesley and Warburton seemed that it might have been very well made in the absence of the Plaintiff as well as a man may submit himself to an Arbitrement of a man which is absent for this is only to be made to the intent to shew himself sorrowfull for the Trespasses and words which he hath made and spoken and it was not argued but adjourned till the next tearme and the Justices moved the parties to make an end of that for that it was a trifling Suit Hillary 8. Jacobi 1610 In the Common Bench. Sir Edward Ashfeild SIR Edward Ashfeild was bound in an obligation by the name of Sir Edmund and subscribed that with the name of Edward and in Debt brought upon that he pleads it is not his Deed and it seemes to all the Justices that he might well plead that for it appears to them that he is not named Edmund and the originall against him was Command Edward otherwise Edmund and this was not good for a man cannot have two Christian names and if judgment were given against him by the name of Edmund and the Sheriff arrest him by Capias that false imprisonment lies against him But if he have a name given to him when he was christened and another when he was confirmed he shall be called and known by the name given unto him at the time
if a man devise his Lands to his Wife and after her death to his Son and the remainder to his sayd Wife in Fee-simple the Husband of the Wife having Issue shall not be Tenant by the Curtesie for alwayes the Judges have made such favourable construction of Wills that if Estates devised by Will might be created by act executed in the life of the party then it should be good by devise and to the objection that conclusion and agreement is uncertaine and so for that shall be voyd he saith that it is not so uncertaine as going about or resolve and determine an attempt or procure as in Corbets Case first of Coke 83. b. or as attempt or endeavour as in Germins and Arscotts Case there cyted fol. 285. a. See 6 Coke 40. a. Mildmayes Case and also the words subsequent are repugnant that the Estate tayle shall cease as if the Tenant in tayle were dead and not otherwise which is absurd and repugnant for the Estate tayle doth not determine by his death if he doe not dye without Issue And also he sayd that it is more reasonable that the perpetuity in Scholasticas Case for here the limitation depends upon agreement which is a thing certaine upon which the Issue may be joyned and also the condition doth stand with the nature of the Estate tayle and for the preservation of it and Recovery is against the nature of it for this destroyes the Estate tayle and is onely a consequent of it and not parcell of the nature of the Estate and this is the reason that Littleton saith That an Estate tayle upon condition that he should not alien is good for that preserves the Estate and also preserves Formedon for him in reversion if there be a discontinuance and with that agreed 13 H. 7. 23. 24. and he sayd that there was a Judgement in the point for his Clyent for another part of the Land and he cyted 31 Edw. 5. Fitz. Feoffment placito the last and Fitzherberts Natura brevium Ex gravi querela last Case and so concluded and prayed judgement for the Plaintiff and this Case was argued againe by Shirley Serjeant for the Defendant and he intended that the agreement is voyd to the Wife and shall be intended the agreement of the Husband onely for a marryed Wife cannot countermand Livery 21 Assis 25. and if a Woman makes a Feoffment upon condition to enfeoff upon request made by her and she takes a Husband she cannot make request after coverture 35 Assisarum So that he intended that this shall be intended the agreement of the Husband onely and not of the Wife and yet he argued that Declaration of a use by a marryed Wife shall be good according to Beckwiths Case But he sayd That the reason of that is for that that she is party to the Recovery which is a matter of Record and as long as the Record remaines in force so long the Declaration of the use shall be good and also he argued that if the condition being that if the Wife conclude or agree to any act to make discontinuance that then c. that that shall be intended unlawfull acts and Recovery is no unlawfull act and for that shall not be within the restraint of the Condition as the Earl of Arundels Case 17 Eliz. Dyer 343. and admitting that it is a limitation yet it shall be of the same nature as a condition and as well as a condition that Tenant in tayle shall not suffer Recovery is voyd So also is such Limitation void and so it was intended before the Statute of Donis Conditionalibus and it appeares by the pleading that the parties did not intend to take advantage of the agreement for it is pleaded that at the time of the Recovery suffered the youngest Daughter was seised of an estate tayl the which could not be if her estate were determined and destroyed by the agreement and conclusion so that the last words make the Forfeyture for the first are not unlawfull and before the execution of the Recovery the estate tayl is determined and so he concluded and praied Judgement for the Defendant Barker Serjeant argued for the Plaintiff It shall be intended a Limitation and not a condition for a Will shall have favorable construction according to the intent of the Devisor for a Joyntenant may devise to his Companion 49. Ed. 3. and Fitz. Na. Bre. Ex gravi querela last case A man devises Land to his Wife for life upon condition that if he marry that it should remain over to his Son in tayl and the Wife marries and the Son in remainder sues Ex Gravi querela by which it appeares that it was a Limitation and not a condition and 34 Ed. 3. devise was to one for life upon condition that if his Sonn disturbed him that then it should remaine over in taile upon disturbance he in Remainder in tail brings Formedon by which it appears it was a Limitation and with that agrees all the Justices in 29 Assisarum 17. And Wellock and Hamonds Case cited in Barastons Case before and 18. Eliz. Dyer If Land be limited to no third person by the Devise then the Heir shall enter for breaking the condition and also he said that it appears by Littleton and 13 H. 7 23. and 24 and 20 H. 7. and 17 Eliz. 343. the Earle of Arundells case which conditioneth that Tenant in taile shall not alien standeth with his Estate but not with Fee simple and so it is adjudged in Nowes and Scholasticas Case which is adjudged in the point which as he saith cannot be answered and the Words of the Condition are not that her Estate taile shall cease as if shee had been dead but as if she had not been named which is not so repugnant or absurd as the other and this compared to 34 Ed 3. Where the Estate was limited till it was disturbed And he also argued that the agreement of the Wife shall be a forfeiture notwithstanding the coverture for when the Estate is granted upon such condition he which hath the estate shall take it subject to the condition as if two Lessees are and one Seals the Counterpart onely yet the other shall be bound by the Covenants contained in it and 33 H. 6. 31. a Woman disavows to be Executor notwithstanding that shee was marryed and if Precipe had been brought against the Husband and Wife the default of the Husband shall binde the Wife and so she shall be punished for waste made during the coverture and so concluded and prayed judgement for the Plaintiff Foster Justice that an Estate of Free-hold shall not cease by agreement or conclusion without entry for it is a matter of Inheritance and Free-hold and it is not like to 33 H. 6. 31. which concerns Chattels and Goods and Walmesley Justice accorded with him Warburton Justice it hath been adjudged in Scholasticas Case that the condition was good and therefore he would not deliver his
condition to re-enfeoff and she with her Husband makes the re-enfeoffment it is good so a Woman being Lessee for Life and with her Husband attorn upon a Grant of Reversion is good and shall binde the Wife after the Death of the Husband 3 Ed. 3. 42. 4 Ed. 3. Attornment 12. 15 Ed. 3. Attornment also this Estate was made to the Wife when she was sole and for that it shall be accounted her folly that she would take such a Husband that would forfeit her Estate but with that agreed the reason of the Booke of 20 H. 6. 28. Where a woman Tenant was bound by the ceasing of her Husband and so he concluded and prayed Judgment for the Plaintiff and so it was adjourned see another argument of this case in Michaelmas Tearm 9. Jacobi 1611. by Haughton and Nicholls Serjeants Pasch 9. Jacobi 1611. In the Common Bench. Pitts against Dowse IN an Ejectione firme upon not guilty pleaded The Case was this A man makes his Will by these words I bequeath all my Lands to my Son Richard except my Chauntery Lands And I devise all my Chauntery Lands to be devided amongst all my Children men and women alike except my Son Richard And if Richard die without Issue the remainder to A. My second Son the remainder to B. My third Son the remainder to C. My fourth Son the remainder to my next of blood and so from Heire to Heire And so likewise I would to be done upon my Chauntery Lands and Tenements in case all my aforesaid Children die without Issue Then I would the one halfe of my Chauntery Lands to remaine to the next of kin and the other half to the Hospitall of M. And the question was what estate the Heire of the eldest Son shall have in the Chauntery Lands and it was argued by Dodridge the Kings Serjeant that the Heire of the eldest Son shall have estate tayl in the Chauntery Lands the Devisor devises no estate to Richard his eldest Son in the Chauntery Lands nor limitts any estate of that in certaine and for that he seemed that the youngest Sons and Daughters shall be Tenants in Common for life and by this manner of Interpretation every part of the Will shall be for first he excludes Richard himselfe so that he shall have nothing in that and then by the Limitation to the younger Children to be equally divided between them makes them Tenants in Common see 28. H. 8. 25. Dyer 155. And he cited Lewin and Coxes Case to be adjudged Michaelmasse 41. and 42. of Eliz. Pasche 42. Eliz. Rot. 207. Where a man devises Lands to his two Sons to be equally divided and adjudged that they are Tenants in Common so devise to two part and part like and equally divided and equally to be divided is all one and for that there is no other words to make an estate of Inheritance it shall be an estate for life and the remainder shall be directed according to the estates limited of the other Land And he seemed that the words in the last sentence all my aforesaid Children shall extend to Richard his eldest Son as well as to the others and so all the Will shall stand in his force which may be Objected that Richard the eldest Son shall be excluded out of the Possession and for that see 6. Eliz. Dyer 333. 29. Chapmans Case and also he cited one case to be adjudged Trinity 37. Eliz. Rot. 632. betweene Bedford and Vernam where a man deviseth all his lands in Alworth and afterwards purchaseth other Lands in the same Town and afterwards one comes to him to take a Lease of this Land newly purchased which the Testator refused to Let. And said that these Lands newly purchased should goe as his other Lands And upon his Death bed adds a Codycell to his Will but saith nothing of his purchased Lands and adjudged that the purchased Lands shall passe and so concluded and praied Judgement Harris Serjeant that it is a new Sentence and Richard is excluded and it shall be a good Estate tayl to the youngest Children and foresayd Children shall be intended them to which the Chauntery Lands are limited see Ratcliffes case 3. of Coke adjudged that they shall be Tenants in Common by the devise to he equally divided and thall not be surviving but every youngest Children shall have his part in tayl though that the first words do not containe words of Inheritance yet the last words in case all my Children die without Issue declares his intent that they should have an estate tayl see the 16. of Eliz. Dyer 339. 20. Claches Case that when he hath disposed of part devised to Richard then disposeth of the residue and the sentence begins with And so likewise and that shall be intended in the same manner as he had disposed of the Lands devised to Richard for he hath devised the remainder otherwise that is to an Hospitall and so concludes and praies Judgement accordingly Coke cheife Justice saith that it was adjudged between Coke and Petwiches 29. Eliz. that if a man devise a house to his eldest Son in tayl and another house to his second Son in tayl and the third house to the third Son in tayl and if any of them die without Issue the remainder to the other two equally this shall be but for life for this enures to the quantity of the Land and not to the quality of the Estate And he said that Richard is excepted without question for it is but a Will and every of the youngest Sons therein shall have the Chauntery Land one after another and Richard shall have no part and the Chauntery shall have nothing till they all are dead and he likened that to Frenchams Case where Lands were given to one and to his Heires Males and if he died without Issue the remainder over the Issues Females shall not take though that it be if they die without Issue for expresse it makes to cease only and so it was adjourned Petoes Case PEto suffers a common Recovery to the use of himselfe for life the remainder to his eldest Son in tayl with diverse remainders over to the intent that such Annuities should be paid as he by his last Will or by grant declares so that they did not exceed the summ of sixty pound and if any of the said Rents be behind then to the use of him to whom the Rent shall be behind till the Rent be satisfied with clause of distresse Rent of twenty pound was granted to his youngest Son for his life the grantee distraines for the Rent and in Replevin avowes the Plaintiffe replâes that by the non-paiment the use riseth to the youngest Son by which it was objected that the Rent shall be suspended Quere if without demand or if the distresse shall be demanded or that the use shall not rise till after the distresse and to the distresse well taken and agreed by all that the Plaintiff shall take nothing by
Statute and if the Words do not extend to that then the Equity of the Statute shall not extend to that and he said that Copy-hold is not within any of the Statutes which are made in the same yeare as the Statute which gives Elegit and such like and to Littleton that an Estate by copy is where Lands are given in Fee-simple Fee-taile and that Formedon lies for that with which agrees 10 Ed. 2. Formedon 55. It seems that the Estate taile here mentioned shall be intended Fee-simple conditionall at the Common Law and the Formedon in Discender which was at the Common Law for alienation before Issue And so Littleton shall be intended For the Estate is within time of memory see Heydons case that a Copy-hold Estate is an Estate in being within the Statute of 31 H. 8. And Manwood there said that insomuch the Estate of that is created by custome and the Estate taile is created by Statute yet it shall not be within the Statute and he said that the case of 15 H. 8. B. Copy of Court 24. is repugnant in it self in the words of Formedon for he saith though that Formedon was given by Statute and was no otherwise in Discender yet now this Writ lies at the Common Law and it shall be intended that this hath been a custome there time out of minde c. And so he concluded and prayed Judgment for the Plaintiff Pasche 9. Jacobi 1611. in the Common Bench. Yet Bearblock and Read SEE the beginning before Hillary 8. Jacobi this Case was argued by Hutton Serjeant that the Plaintiff in the Action of Debt ought to Recover for if Executor may pay Debt due by the Testator by Obligation before Debt due by Judgement this shall be a Devastavit as it is resolved in Trewinyards Case 6. and 7. Edward 6. Dyer 80. 53. And he shall be charged for the Iudgement with his owne goods And so it was adjudged between Bond and Hales 31. Eliz. that Judgement at the Common Law shall be first satisfied before the Statute which is but a Pockett Record and Medium redditer in invitum Also it was adjudged in Harrisons Case 5. Coke 28. b. That Debt due upon an Obligation shall be first payd before Statute with Defeasans for performing of Covenants the which Defeasens is not broken and also it is adjudged between Pemberton and Barkham here cited that Judgement shall be satisfied before Statute Merchant or Staple or Recognizance though that the Statute be acknowledged before the Judgement had by the Testator See this Case in Harrisons Case 5. Coke 28. b. and in 4. Coke 60. a. Sadlers Case upon which he infers that if an Executor first satisfie a Statute or a Recognisance before a Judgement that this shall be a Devastavit as well as if he satisfies an Obligation first as in Trewynyards Case and that when the Plaintiff which hath Judgement the Executor may aid himselfe by Audit a querela by this matter subsequent Quere of Doctor Druryes Case as in 7 H. 6. 42. in Detinue against Gamishe and Judgment had for the Plaintiff If the Judgement be reversed restitution shall be made to every one which hath losse So here by Audita Querela if the Executrix hath not more then was taken in execution by the Statute and it seemes to him that the Judgement in the Scire Facias shall not be a Barr in this Action for the Judgment remaines Executrix and the Plaintiff may have Action of Debt upon that But of the contrary if the Plaintiff had brought Action of Debt upon the Judgement and had been barred then shall be barred in Scire Facias also But the Plaintiff this notwithstanding may have Scire Facias upon surmise that there are new assets come to the hands of the Executor and so he concluded and praied Judgement for the Plaintiff Nicholls Serjeant for the Defendant relies only upon the Judgement had upon the Scire Facias and that till that he Defeated the Plaintiff cannot maintaine Action of Debt for the Action of Debt is nothing but demanding of Execution and for that till the first Judgement be Defeated the Plaintiff hath no remedy at the Common Law All things which barr the Execution of the Judgement in Scire Facias these shall be Barrs in an Action of Debt as in Baxters Case here last adjudged in an Action upon the Case for slanderous words the Defendant pleads that he had justified the speaking of these words at another time in another Action brought against him and had a verdict and Judgement upon that and so demands Judgement and adjudged a good Plea till the first Judgement is reversed for Judgement is the saying of the Law and 13. Eliz. Dyer 299. 34. in Debt for Costs recovered in a Writ of entry the Defendant pleads that the Plaintiff hath sued an Elegit which was Executed and a good Barr in an Action of Debt and so 1. and 2. P. and M. Dyer 107. 24. In Debt for Dammages recovered in Assise the Defendant pleads in Barr that after the verdict given and before Judgement the Plaintiff entred into the Land and there no Judgement is given But it seemes if the Plaintiff fayl of Course that the Common Law prescribes that then he shall not have Execution for of those things which rightly are Acted let there be Executions but if the Defendant in the first Action had pleaded a release and Judgement was given upon that against him he cannot plead that againe for it runs into the thing Judged 34. Ed. 3. in Debt against an Executor and part of the assetts found the Plaintiff cannot have new Scire Facias without Averrment that there are new assetts and 34. H. 6. Action with averment that there are assets and Judgement good both waies and presidents shewed of both Courts And he intended that the Executor could not have helped himselfe by Audita Querela unlesse he feares to be impleaded but after Execution he cannot have Restitution and so concluded and praied Judgement for the Defendant Coke cheife Justice that there cannot be a Devastavit in the Wife unlesse that it be voluntary payment by her for the Statute of 23. H. 8. gives present Execution of a Statute Staple without Scire Facias So that the Wife had no time to plead the Judgement and for that this unvoluntary Act shall not be a Devastavit for she is no agent but only a sufferer And at the Common Law if the Plaintiff hath Judgement in an Action of Debt after the yeare he hath no remedy but new Originall and this mischeife was remedied by the Statute of Magna Charta which gives Scire Facias in place of new Action But it seemes to him that the Barr in the Scire Facias shall remaine good Barr till it be reversed as in 2 Rich. 3. A man hath election to have action of Detinue or action of Trespasse and he brings his action of Detinue and the Plaintiff wages his Law and after
brings an action of Trespasse and the first Nonsuit pleaded in Barr and adjudged a good Barr 12 Edw. 4. accordingly Foster Walmesley and Warburton agreed without any doubt but they sayd that if the first execution had been had by Covin then it should have been otherwise In Debt upon buying of diverse severall things the Defendant confesseth part and for the residue the action being brought by an Executor in the Detinet onely the Defendant pleads he oweth him nothing and upon this Tryall was had and Verdict for the Plaintiff and after Verdict it was moved that this misjoyning of Issue was ayded by the Statute of Jeofailes but it was resolved by all the Justices that it was not ayded for it was no misjoyning of the Issue but no Issue at all but if there had been Issue joyned though that it were not upon the direct matter yet this shall be ayded and at the end the Plaintiff remitted the part that the Issue was joyned and prayed Judgment for the residue and this was granted but if the Plaintiff had been nonsuited that would go to all Administrators during the minority had Judgment in debt and before execution sued the Executor came to his age of seventeen yeares and how this execution shall be sued comes the question for the power of the Administrator was determined by the attaining of age of 17. yeares by the Executor and the Executor was not party to the Record and for that he could not sue execution but it seems that the Executor may sue speciall Scire facias upon the Record and so sue execution in his owne name See 27 H. 8. 7. a. Action upon the Case for these words He hath stolne forty Staure of Lead meaning Lead in Stauce from the Minster and resolved by all that action doth not lye for it shall be intended that the Lead was parcell of the Minster and the Innuendo shall not helpe that Pasche 9. Jacobi 1611. In Common Bench Crane against Colepit THomas Crane Plaintiff in Replevin against Bartholemew Colepit the only question was if Tenant by discent of the age of twenty years and more ought under one and twenty yeares to attorn to a Grant of the signiory or not and it was adjudged that the Attornement is good for three reasons First For that he gives no Interest and for that it cannot be upon condition for it is but a bare assent Secondly His Ancestors held the same Land by the payment of the Rent and making of their Services and it is reason that the Rent should be payd and the Services performed and for that though that he shall have his age for the Land yet for the Rent he shall not have his age and though that it is agreed in 32 Ed. 3. That he shall have his age In per que servitia yet after his full age the Grantee shall distraine for all the arrerages due from the first so that the Attornement is no prejudice for this Infant and he is in the number of those which shall be compellable to attorn see 41 Ed. 3. age 23. 26 Ed 3. 32. 32 Ed. 3. and 31 Ed. 3. Per que servitia 9 Ed. 3. 38. 32 Ed. 3. Infant of the age of three years attorned and good and 3 Ed. 3. 42. Husband attornes and that shall bind the Wife 12 Ed. 4. 4. 18 H. 6. Attornement of an Infant is good to binde him for that it is a lawfull act Thirdly The Attornement is a perfect thing of which the Law requires the finishing that is the grant of the signiory which is not perfect till the Tenant attorn and Foster Justice said that so it had been adjudged in this Court in the time of the Reigne of Elizabeth in which Judgment all the Justices agreed with one voyce without any contradiction See 26. Ed. 3. 62. Pasch 9. Jacobi 1611. In the Common Bench. As yet Rowles against Mason see the beginning Michaelmas 8. Jacobi DOdridge Serjeant of the King argued for the Plaintiff he saith that there are two Copies first that a Copy-holder for life under a 100. l. may nominate his Successor Secondly That such Copy-holder after such nomination may cut down all the Trees growing upon his Copy-hold and sell them and he saith that it hath been adjudged that the custome that Copy-holder for life may sell the Trees growing upon his Copy-hold is void between Popham and Hill Hillary 45 Eliz. in this Court so if the first custome doth not make difference by the nomination the second is resolved to be void and it seemes to him that the first custome doth not make difference and to the objection that the first custome hath been adjudged to be good between Bale and Crab he saith that the custome adjudged and this custome as it is found differs in many points First It was found that every Copy-holder for life solely seised without Remainder but here is sole Tenant in possession and this may be where there is a Remainder so that uncertainty in this makes the custome void as in 6 Ed. 3. custome that an Infant at the age of discretion may alien is void for uncertainty also in the case here it is found that the Copy-holder may name who shall be next Tenant to the Lord and doth not say to whom the nomination shall be made but in the first case the custome is found to be that the nomination ought to be to the Lord in the presence of two Copy-holders also in the first it is found that if they cannot agree of the Fine that the Homage shall assess it but in this custome here found there is not any mention of that he ought to seek to be admitted and doth not say at what court the which ought to be shewed in certain as it is resolved in Penimans Case 5 Coke 84. Where custome that a Feoffment ought to be inrolled is expressed shall be inrolled at the next court also in the first case to be found that after the Fine is payd or offered he which is named shall be admitted and here is not any mention of that so that he concluded that this is a new custome and not the same custome which was in question between Bayle and Colepit also it is found that the trees were cut immediately after nomination of a new Tenant and before any admittance or Fine payd for him so that insomuch that the Benefit was not equall as well as to the Lord as to the Tenant as in 2 Ed. 4. 28. and 22 Ed. 4. 80. For plowing and turning upon the Land of another for that the custome shall be void And to the second custome also it seems that that is voyd and unreasonable First for that when any is alledged in the custome that is inconvenient though that it be not mischeivous yet the custome shall be void as in 4. Assisarum 27. in Assise brought against an Abbot which pleads custome that all the houses of the South side of
that the Husband was subject to that then by consequence it was intended that all persons which were chargeable by the common Law shall be chargeable by the Statute and by the action which is formed upon that and by the common Law the Husband was chargeable and by consequence shall be chargeble by the Statute and he intends that there would be difference between actuall wrongs and others which are come by omission and if the VVife be the person which did the wrong then she shall be punished as well by Statute as she was before by the common Law also she shal be out-lawed and it hath been agreed that Ravishment of Ward shall be maintainable against the Husband and the wife if they both are Ravishers and also if the wife be Ravisher before marriage and after takes a Husband the Husband shall be charged with the damages and his Body shall be imprisoned and by consequence shall be abjured also shee may make an Executor by the consent of her Husband but admitting that she could not then the remedy is given against the Heir and she shall be within this Statute as well as other Statutes made in the time of the said King as the Statute of Westminster 1. 37. And shall be a Disseisor with force and shall be imprisoned whether the Husband joyn with her or not as it is adjudged 16 Assise 7. for all Statutes which provide for actuall wrong a married VVife shall be intended within them as it is 9 H. 4. 6. But the pleading of Joyntenancy there the Plea is the act of the Husband and so fayling of Record upon the Statute of 34 Ed. 3. as it is 16 Assise 8. for the Husband propounds the exception but if the VVife propounds the exception then she shall be within the Statute and shall be imprisoned 21 Assise So if a married VVife make actuall disseisin with force she shall be imprisoned 9 H. 4. 7. b. 8 Ed. 3. 52. 22 Ed. 2 Damages 20. 27 H. 6. Ward 118. And so the President Trinity 33 H. 8. Rot. 347. in a case between Thomas Earle of Rutland against Lawrence Savage and his VVife in Ravishment of Ward at the Nisi prius the Defendants make default and the Judgment was that the Husband and the VVife should be taken and upon that he inferred that the Husband should be subject and charged with the damages and so it is taken upon the statute of 35. Eliz. That the Husband shall be charged with Debt for the Recusancy of the VVife and shall be imprisoned for the not payment of it as to the verdict it seems that this is good and it shall be intended the VVard was marryed by the Defendants as in 33 Ed. 3. Verdict 48. It is found by verdict that Mulier enters and resolved that this shall be intended in the life of the Bastard or otherwise it is nothing worth and in Fulwoods case 4 Coke the Jury found that the Defendant acknowledged himself to be bound and that shall be intended according to the statute of 23 H. 8. and so here though that it be not found that the VVard was married by these Defendants yet it shall be so intended notwithstanding that nothing is found but only that he appeared married and so he concluded and prayed Judgment for the Plaintiff This case was sollemnly argued this Tearme by all the Justices that is Coke and Walmesley Warberton and Foster and upon their selemn arguments Coke and Walmesley were of opinion that a married wife is not within the statute and Warberton and Foster were of the contrary opinion and so by reason of their contrariety in opinion the Judgment was staid Trinity 9. Jacobi 1611. in the Common Bench. Burnham against Bayne THE case was A Man seised of divers Lands the halfe of them were extended by Elegit and before Judgement was had against him a new Elegit Awarded and if all the halfe which remaines or but the halfe of that which was the fourth part of all should be extended was the question And it was agreed by all the Justices that but the halfe of that which remaines and not the halfe of all which he had at the time of the Judgement But the halfe of that which he had at the time of the Elegit And if all which remaines be extended the Extent shall be void by all the Justices see 10. Ed. 2 Execution 137 16. E. 2. Execution 118. And here the principall case was A man hath a Rent of forty pound reserved upon a Lease for years and two Judgments in Debt were had against him at the Suit of Sir Thomas Cambell and three Judgments at the Suit of the Plaintiff the halfe was first extended by Elegit upon the first Judgment had at the Suit of Sir Thomas Cambell and after upon the Judgment had at his Suit the halfe of the residue was extended and after upon the Judgment at the Suit of the Plaintiff all the residue was extended and all the Justices agreed that the Extent was void for they ought to extend but the halfe of that which remaines and that was but the fourth part Trinity 9. Jacobi 1611. In the Common Bench. Trobervill against Brent THE Case was A man makes a Lease for yeares rendring Rent and after grants the Reversion for life to which Grant the Lessee for years attornes the Grantee acknowledgeth a statute and after surrenders his Estate the Conusee extends the Statute and distraines for the Rent and in Replevin avowes for the cause aforesaid and adjudged that the Avowry was good Agreed that Creditor may sue the Executors and the Heir of the Debtor also but he shall have but one Execution with satisfaction see the Statute of 23 H. 8. for such course in the Exche quer Note that no Court of Equity may examine any matter of Equity after Judgment which was precedent the Judgment see the Statute of 4 H. 4. chapt 23. Trinity 9. Jacobi 1611. In the Common Bench. Hamond against Jethro THe case was this Edward Hamond was Plaintiff in Debt upon a Bill against VVilliam Jethro and the Bill was made in this manner Memorandum that I VVilliam Jethro do owe and am indebted unto Edward Hamond in the Sum of ten pound for the payment whereof I binde my self c. In witnesse and after the in witnesse it was thus subscribed Memorandum that the said VVilliam Jethro be not compelled to pay the said ten pound untill he recovers thirty pound upon an obligation against A. B. c. And in the Count was no mention made of this Subscription but this appears when the Defendant prayes hearing of the Bill the which was then entered Verbatim of Record and upon that the Defendant demurred in Law Harris Serjeant for the Plaintiff agreed that if it had been in the Body of the Bill it ought to have been contained in the Count to inable the Plaintiff to his action but that which is after in witnesse
is no parcell of the Bill and for that it need not to be contained in the Count 9 H. 6. 15 16. A thing which doth not intitle the Plaintiff to action need not to be contained in the Count 36 H. 6. 6. If the condition be indorced or subscribed it need not to be contained in the Count but if it be contained before the in witnesse then it ought to be contained in the Count 21 Ed. 4. 36. If a man be bound to pay ten pounds when the Obligee carries two hundred load of Hay to his House there the condition is precedent and it ought to be contained in the Count 22 Ed. 4. 42. accordingly so here the matter is subsequent to the in witnesse and there is not any other matter upon which the action is founded nor contained in the body of the Bill nor to be performed by the Obligee and for that he prayed Judgment for the Plaintiff Shirley Serjeant for the Defendant that the sealing is immediately after the Proviso and is adjoyning to the Bill in writing and for that be it to be performed of the part of the Plaintiff or Defendant it ought to be mentioned in the Count for this intitles the Plaintiff to his Action of the case in 36 H. 6. 6. It is a condition subsequent and there need not to be shewed but if the condition be precedent and contained in the writing before the insealing there it ought to be mentioned in the Count and in this principall case this is either a condition Precedent or nothing for it is that he shall not be compelled to pay the sayd ten pounds untill he had recovered thirty pound and if he never recover he never shall pay the ten pound and it is a condition of the part of the Defendant and it is adjudged in Vssards case that where a condition is precedent there it ought to be contained in the Count but where it is subsequent otherwise it is So 15 H. 7. 1. Grant that when the Grantor is promoted to a Benefice that he ought to give to the Grantee ten pound this is precedent but in the principall case it is a Condition or Covenant and though that it be subsequent yet it may stay the Suit as well as an acquittance which is to be an acquittance if he be vexed otherwise not but a condition that he shall not sue the Bill is void for it is contrary to that and barrs him of all the fruit of that and precedent condition may be placed after the in Witnesse as well as before so he prayed Judgment for the Defendant Coke cheife Justice said that this which is after in witnesse is not part of the Deed but may be a Condition or Defeasance but if it be not in witnesse in the Deed then it shall be parcell of the Bill but though that this be put after the in witnesse yet it shall have his force as Defeasance but it need not to be contained in the Count for in Bonds and personall things there need not such strict words as in other Deeds and for that this shall be a good Condition or Defeasance but then the Defendant ought to have that so pleaded and not demurr for this makes the Bill conditionall VVarberton and Foster agreed VValmesley did not gainsay it and for that it was adjudged for the Plaintiff if the Defendant did not shew cause to the contrary by such a day which was not done Note It was adjudged by all the Justices that fealty gives seisin of all annuall services sufficient to make seisin in avowry but not in Assise but of accidentall services this gives seisin in Assise and a man cannot take excessiive distresse for that for this is more sacred service as Littleton saith of Homage the most honourable See 42 Ed. 3. 26. 11 H. 4. 2. Note Two retaine an Attorney both dye the Executor or Administrator of the survivor shall be onely charged and not the Executors of them both for a personall contract survives of both parties otherwise of reall contracts as warranty See 16 H. 7. 13. a. 3 Coke Sir William Harberts Case 30 Ed. 3. 40. 17 Ed. 3. 8. The Attorney brought an Action of Debt against both and the Executors of both the parties which retained him for his Fees and both pleaded joyntly that they detained nothing and it was found for the Plaintiff and upon motion in arrest of Judgement the Judgement was stayed insomuch that the Executor of the survivor was onely chargeable notwithstanding the pleading and admission of the Parties Note That it was agreed by all the Justices that by the Law of Merchants if two Merchants joyne in Trade that of the increase of that if one dye the other shall not have the benefit by survivor See Fitzherberts Natura brevium Accompt 38 Ed. 3. And so of two Joynt Shop-keepers for they are Merchants for as Coke saith there are foure sorts of Merchants that is Merchant Adventurers Merchants dormants Merchants travelling and Merchants residents and amongst them all there shall be no benefit by survivor Jus accrescendi inter Mercatores locam non habet Note That Arbitrators awarded that every of the parties should pay onely five shillings for writing the award to the Clark and agreed that the award was voyd to that part and good for the residue for they cannot award a thing to be made to a stranger Action upon the Case was brought for these words He is a Cozening Rogue and hath cozened Richard Wood of thirty pound and goeth about to doe the like by me and agreed that the action doth not lye So for Rogue or Cozener for it is without aspersion and gentle and words shall be taken in the gentlest sense Devise that Executors shall sell Land with the assent of J. S. if J. S. dyes before that he assents the Executors shall not sell notwithstanding the death of J. S. was the act of God and in the life time of J. S. they could not sell without his consent and so it was agreed in the Case concerning Salisbury Schoole where the under Schoole-Master was to be placed by the head Schoole-Master with the assent of two cheife Bailiffs and it seems the head Schoole-Master cannot place without their consents Note it was said to be adjudged that the Inhabitants of a Town cannot be incorporated without the consent of the major part of them and incorporation without their consent is void In action upon the case the case was this The Brother of the Defendant spoke these words to the Plaintiff that is Thou Theif thou Goale whelpe thou hast stolne a peice of Silver from my Master Hocken and the Defendant sayd as insued that is That which my Brother spake is true I will justifie it and spend a hundred pounds in proofe thereof and it seems to the Court that the Action doth not lye against the Defendant insomuch that it doth not appeare by the Court that
is penal Law and for that shall have strict opposition and not by equity but he saith that this rule failes as to the interest of the Common-Wealth that is when the Common-Wealth is intervenient and to the Objection that this is a thing invented after the making of the statute he answered that with the case of Saint-John 5 Coke 71. b. Which inhibits Hand-Guns and it is there adjudged that Dags and Stone-Bowes which are of later Invention shall be within the statute for they are their invention and their form of the things which are inhibited and so Vernons case 4 Coke if he to whose use infeoffs his Son and Heir this shall be taken within the statute of Marlebridge and yet he to whose use cannot make a Feoffment nor uses were not known till many yeares after the making of this statute and Baker furthers the Meale for the use of man and for that he may sell it in Bread without any punishment and then he sayd it was the Office of a good Judge to suppresse the mischeife and to advance the remedy as the Lord Anderson sayth in Brownes Case 3. Coke And so he concluded and prayed Judgment for the King and the Informer And note that this case was solemnly argued by all the Justices of this Court and it was adjudged that this was ingrossing within the statute by Warburton Foster and Winch. But the Lord Coke agrued the contrary Walmesley being absent that Tearme The same question was argued the same Tearme in the Exchequer upon an Information there exhibited by one Collins an Informer and it was there argued by Hitchcocke of Lincolnes Inne for the Defendant and he argued that the Starch was not the same thing which was bought no more then if it had been made in Bread and he cyted the Booke of 5 H. 7. 15. 16. Where it is agreed that if a man takes Barley and makes Malt of that that he from whom it was taken could not take the Malt for that that there the thing is altered in another nature and he intended that the Starch is not the same in number nor quality but he agreed that if wheat be only grownd that this notwithstanding is within the Statute but if it be made into Bread then sold it is not within the Statute for then it is another Body and other things added to it and the forme is also altered and the forme gives the being and the name and if Water be turned into Wine it is no Water though it be by miracle so if a Parson be made Bishop he is not the same person for Honours change Manners and this is his reason that the Writ shall abate for it is newly created as of nothing 7 H. 6. 15. 22 R. 2. Bre. 93. b. 2 R. 3. 20. Also the Statute of 21 H. 8. Which provides that the party from whom any Goods are stolne after that the Felon is indicted shall have restitution of the same goods but if Corn be stolne and converted into Meale the Owner shall not have restitution for it is not the same which was stolne but if Plate be stolne and altered in other forme yet the owner shall have restitution of that as he sayd which was adjudged for the King 40. Eliz. But where restitution upon a Writ of Errour where the Judgment is the same thing shall be restored that if yet tearm be sold by fieri facias and after the Judgment is reversed by Errour he shall not be restored to the Tearm but shall have the money for which it is sold also he saith it is not the same in number and substance for the 1 thing was corrupt and the corruption of that was the beginning of the new and the Wheate is the matter of which and also Water is and fire and the heat of the Sun and after that it is made in Starch it will not be dissolved and made into victuall no more then Bread and the worst Wheat will make the best starch also he intended that it is not in the same condition nor similitude also he objected that Ligamen which is the word contained in the Count is no Latine word at all but Legumen is the latine word and that is latine for Pulse and that not being any latine word the english which is added will not help it and so he concluded and prayed Judgment for the Defendant Dodridge the Kings Serjeant for the King and for the Informer argued that the starch is the same Numero in number quality and substance not in likenesse and that the statute is no law of explanation but of difinition of three severalls which make dearth without want and the fore-stalling prevented the punishment of Law before the making of this Statute but now these are in severall degrees that is forestalling is commonly ingrossing and regrating and Ingrosser is alwayes Regrator and that the Defendant in this case is Ingrosser of Victualls that is victualls which is the staffe of mans health and the want of that is more greivous then the want of all other things and the dearth of that is the most pinching dearth which may be and the gain of that is a base gain and they which basely buy of Merchants that they may straightways sell not any thing unless they may get great gains or save in the measure they are called Regrators as Grators of the faces of the People and if this Statute had been executed this had prevented many Dearths and to the objection that it is a penall Law and for that shall be taken strictly and there is a generall rule and as true as it is generall but it is true if it be not within the exception that is if publick good doth not intervene and here it concerns the Common-VVealth as much as the lives of men and many other penall Statutes have been taken by Equity as the Statute which makes that to be petty Treason if the Servant kill his Master and in the 19 H. 6. It is agreed that if the Servant after he is departed out of the service of his Master kill him upon any malice conceived during the time that he was in his Service this shall be taken within the Equity of the statute and so the statute of 33 H. 8. Was made precisely against Hand-Guns and Daggs are taken to be within the Equity of that notwithstanding that they were invented after the making of that Statute and were not known at the time of the making of that for they are the same in intention as it is resolved in Streches Case in Coke 71. b. And to the words of the Statute who shall sell the same it intends that starch is the same in all but only in similitude for a thing which is of the same similitude is not the same but like the same for no like is the same Also he intended that it is the same both in number and form and he agreed that forme gave the being for that is
not the accidentall as here it is but it is the substantiall forme and every one knows that Meale of Wheat is the same as Pepper beaten in a Morter and Pepper and all other Spices so that it is the same in number existence substance and essence and he intended also the same in intention for Meale is Victuall and is dead Victuall be it Corne or Meale and Corn grownd and made in Meale then sold yet that remains dead Victuall and Meale is the same dead Victuall though that it be not the same Corne and to prove that Corn is Victuall he cyted the Statute of 25 Edw. 3. 5. Stat. Chap. 7. Which provides that no Forester shall make any gathering of Victuals by colour of their Office and hee intended that Corne was within this statute and so also of the statute of the 3. P. and M. Chap. 15. Rastal Universities which provides that to the Purveyor Bargainor for any Victuals within 5 miles of any of the Universities of Oxford or Cambridg where Grain and Victuall are joyned together So the Statute of 25 H. 8. Chap. 2. abridged by Rastall Victual 15. which inhibits the transportation of Victuall if it be not of Meal and Butter into Ireland by which it appears that Meale is dead Victualls And he said that Victuals is that which refresheth men and Victualls are those things which to the use of eating and drinking are necessary So that Meale is the same in number though that the Corne were turned into Meale And he cyted Peacock and Reynolds Caâe to be adjudged 42 Eliz. That if a man buy Corne and convert that into Meale and so sell it it is within this Statute And hee said that if a man be made a Knight hanging his action that this shall abate his action but yet he remains the same person but his name is changed which is the cause of the abatement of his action 7 H. 6. 15. Also the Defendant is concluded by his demurrer upon the Information to say that it is not the same thing for this is confessed by the Demurrer and though that the name be changed this is not materiall if the substance be the same and he agreed that a Baker which buys Wheat and makes it into Bread is not within the Statute for he furthers that to the use of man as a Curryer makes the Leather more fit and apt for use but so doth not he which makes it into starch for he furthers the abuse for it is no lawfull Occupation but idle and friâolous furtherance of vanity of men And in 35. H. 6. 2. If a man enter into the Land of another man and cut Trees and that square and make into Boards yet if the Owner enter hee may take them But if it be made into a House otherwise it is for there it is mingled with other things as it is 5 H. 7. 15 16. So Iron made in Anvill But of Leather made in Shooes otherwise it is insomuch that it is mingled with other things 12 H. 8. 11. a. A dead Stag is not a Stag but is a certain dead thing and flesh As a man dead is not a man but agreed the Book of H. 7. 15. and 16. That Corne converted into Meale cannot be restored nor reprized no more may that if it remains in Corne if it be not in Baggs And hee said that upon the Statute of Merton the Re-disseisin after the Recovery in Assise if the same Disseisor makes Re-disseisin the Sheriffe may examine that c. And it is agreed in 27 H. 6. That if Tenant in tayle be disseised and recover in assise and is put in possession and after his Estate is altered and he become Tenant in tayle after possibility of Issue extinct and then the Disseisor makes Re-disseisin that this is aided by the statute not that it is alteration of the Estate And also he saith it appears more fully by the Proviso by which it is provided that Barley turned into Malt and Oates turned into Oatmeale if it be by Ingrossing it is within the purview of the statute So if it be by way of Fore-stalling or if they sell them again before that they are converted shall be Regrators And to the Objection that other things that is Water and Fire are added to that he saith that none of them remains for the Fire dryes the water and the fire also goeth out and so he concluded and prayed Judgment for the King and the Informer and it was adjourned Michaelmass 1611. 9. Jacobi in the Common Bench. IN Dower against Infant which makes default upon the grand Cape returned and agreed by all the Justices that Judgment shall be given upon the Default for the Infant shall not have his age and so it was adjudge upon a Writ of Error Charnock against Currey Administrator of Allen. IN debt upon an Obligation against the Defendant as Administrator as above he pleads Judgment had against him in an action of debt and over that hath not to satisfie to which the Plaintiff replies that this Judgment was for penalty and the condition was for a lesser sum and that the Plaintiff in the first action had accepted his due debt and had promised to acknowledg satisfaction of the Judgement at the request of the Defendant and at his charges and the Administrator which was the Defendant did not make request upon fraud and Covin to avoid the Plaintiffs action Upon which the Defendant hath demurred and so confesseth the matter of the Plea But Foster seemed that the Plaintiff ought to aver that the Plaintiff in the first action hath offered to acknowledg satisfaction and that otherwise he should be put to his action upon the Case but Coke and Warberton intended that the Replication is very good without such averment for it shall be intended that the Plaintif will perform his promise But further this Demurrer which was only for part was also for another part an Issue joyned for the other part which was to be tryed by the Country and which shall be tryed of the Issue or of the Demurrer was the question and it was agreed by them all that the Issue or Demurrer shall be first at the discretion of the Court see 11 H. 4. 5. 38. Ed. 3. Commission is granted to the Councel in Wales of which the President Vice-president or Cheife Justice to be one And the question was if they might make a Deputy and it was agreed that a delegate power could not be delegated but they might make an Officer to take an accompt in any such act Note that a Caveat was entred with a Bishop that he should not admit any without giving notice that the admission this notwithstanding is good but if he admit one which hath no right he is a disturber but otherwise the Caveat doth nothing but only to make the Bishop carefull what person he admits Foster Justice seemed that if the Ordinary now after the statute of
any satisfaction in tender to satisfaction Insomuch that this is only the fruit of Tenure and not like to cutti ng of Trees nor to digging of Cole or other Ore And so Coke cheife Justice that it hath been adjudged and with this agreed the booke of 21. Ed. 3. 1. The manner to make Summons in Dower if the Land lieth in one County and the Church in another County Then upon the Statute the Sheriffe ought come to the next Church though it be in another County and there make Proclamation asthe Auditors in Accompt ought to commit the Accomptants found in arrerages to the next Gaole and there ought to be committed though that they are in another County The words of a Patent of a Judge of the Common Bench are as follows that is to say James by the grace of God c. Know that we have constituted Humphrey Winch Serjeant at Law one of our Justices of the Common Bench during our good pleasure with all and singuler Vales and Fees to the same office belonging and appertaning In Witnesse of which c. Michaelmasse 1611 9. Jacobi in the Common Bench. Jacob against Stilo Sowgate IN an Action upon the Case for slanderous words The declaration was that the Defendant said of the aforesaid Plaintiff that he is perjured to which the Defendant pleads that the Plaintiff another time hath brought an Action in the Kings Bench against the same Defendant for that that he the said Plaintiff was perjured and had cozened John Sowgate and that the Defendant had pleaded to all besides these words Thou art perjured not guilty and to the words thou art perjured he Justifies that the Plaintiff was perjured in making an Affidavit in the Star-chamber and this Issue was Joyned and it was found for the Defendant but it was not pleaded that any Judgement was given upon it And Haughton Serjeant for the Plaintiff which had Demurred upon the Defendants Plea Argued that the Plea is insufficient for if it shall be intended by that that the Plaintiff was afore times barred if it be in a reall Action it ought to be averred that it is for the same Land and if it be in a personall Action it ought to be averred that it is the same Debt or Trespasse and if it be pleaded by way of Justification then he ought to have averred also that the Plaintiff hath taken a false and untrue Oath upon which Issue might have been taken But here nothing is pleaded but the Record and nothing averred in Facto So that the Issue cannot be taken upon it for the pleading is only of Record and that the Defendant for the cause aforesaid in the Record afore said mentioned spoke the said words and this is not good for there is not contained any cause of Justification as in Quare Impedit in the 15. and 16 H. 6. The Defendant pleads that he was Incumbent by the cause aforesaid and without that But this was no good Plea for he ought to plead his Title specially And also it is not pleaded as Estoppell for then he ought to have relied upon that precisely as 35. H. 6. in Replevin the avowant relies upon discent 30. assis 32. 2. H. 7. 9. Also Estoppell it cannot be insomuch that Judgement was not given in the first Action Also it is not pleaded as Estoppell for the Plea is concluded Judgement if Action where he ought to have relied upon the Estoppell and peradventure also the Triall was voyd by unawarding of Venire Facias or other Error So that without Judgement it can be no Estoppell and so he concluded and praied Judgement for the Plaintiff Barker Serjeant argued for the Defendant that the Declaration is very good and notwithstanding that the words are generall that is he is perjured yet this may be supplyed very well by the Innuendo as it appeares by James and Alexanders Case 4. Coke 17. a. And also that Estoppell by the Verdict is good without Judgement as in Action of Debt release was pleaded and Issue joyned upon that and found for the Defendant and after another Action was brought for the same Debt and agreed that the first Virdict was Estoppell 2. Ed. 3. 19. b. c. And he cited Baxter and Styles Case to be adjudged in the point that the Estoppell is good and also Vernons Case 4. Coke where the bringing of a Writ of Dower Estopped the Wife to demand her Joynture and so concluded and prayed Judgement for the Defendant Coke the Count is good being of the aforesaid Plaintiff and may after be supplyed by Innuendo though that the words after are generall But if the words were generall that is He is perjured without saying that the Defendant spoke of the aforesaid Plaintiff these English words following Videlicet he Innuendo the Plaintiff is perjured this is not good and shall not be supplied by Innuendo and he said that another time convicted is a good Plea in case of life without Judgement but this is in favour of life but in trespasse it ought to be averred that it is the same Trespasse and also there ought to be Judgement and the Defendant ought to relye upon that as an Estoppell and agreed by all that Judgement should beâgiven for the Defendant if cause be not shewed to the contrary such a day c. Michaelmass 1611. 9. Jacobi in the Common Bench. Hall against Stanley IN Trespass for Assault and Imprisonment the Defendant justifies insomnch that the Action upon the case was begun in the Marshalsey for a Debt upon an Assumpsit made by the Plaintiff and that upon that Capias was awarded to this Defendant being a Minister of the said Court to Arrest the Plaintiff to answer in the said Action and that he by force of that Arrested the Plaintiff and him detained till the Plaintiff found suerties to answer to the said Action which is the same assault and Imprisonment To which the Plaintiff replied that none of the parties in the said Action were of the Kings houshold and so demanded Judgement upon which the Defendant Demurred in Law And Dodridge the Kings Serjeant for the Defendant that the Court of Marshalsey may hold Plea of Actions of Trespasse by the parties or any of them of the Kings house or not and he intended that the Jurisdiction at the Common Law was generall and then they have Jurisdiction of all Actions as well reall as personall and though that their Jurisdiction be in many cases restrained yet in an Action of Trespasse there is not any restraint but at this day they have two Jurisdictions That is in Criminall cases and also in Civill causes within the Virge See Fleta book the second and third where he discribes the Jurisdiction of all Courts and amongst them the Jurisdictions of this Court and also Britton which wrote in the time of Ed. 1. lib. 1. chap. 2. which saith it was held before Bygott who was then Earle
ancient Demesne that this shall not alter the tenure insomuch that it is meerly personall and the damages are the principall which are to be recovered and in 21 Edw. 4. 10. b. the difference is shewed between ejectione firme and quare ejecit infra terminum for one lyes against the Lessor or other Ejector immediately and the other lyes against the Feoffee of the other immediate Ejector and the first is by force of armes and the other not and it alwayes lyes against him that is in by Title and the first against him which is the wrong doer and hee intended that the agreement with one of these Defendants is good for it is satisfaction and discharges the action as release the which every one which hath it may plead and here it is pleaded with satisfaction that is obligation upon which the Plaintiff may have action and so he concluded and prayed Judgement for the Defendants Wynch Justice argued this case notwithstanding that hee had not heard any argument at the Barr this being the first case that he argued after he was made Justice of this Court and he delivered his opinion that the agreement was a good Barre and he said that the difference is where the thing to be recovered is in the Realty and where it is in the Personalty as it is agreed in Blakes Case 6 Coke 43. b. So that here the only question is if this action be in the Realty or in the Personalty and it seems to him that it is in the Personalty and that it is of the nature of Trespass and the tearm is not anciently to be recovered as it is 6. R. 2. Fitz. Na. Bre. and it is within the statute of 4 Edw. 3. Chap. 6. which gives action to Executors for goods carryed away in the life time of the Testator as it is 7 H. 4. 6. b. And to objection that ancient Demesne is a good plea and for that is in the Realty and hee said and so it is in Accompt and Accompt is not in the Realty and the reason why it shall not be a Barr in Assise is in so much that there the Free-hold shall be recovered but this fails here so in Waste also this toucheth the Inheritance but here the Inheritance doth not come in question but the tearm only and it doth not appeare to the Court that it concerns Inheritance for it may be betwixt the Lessor or another which claims under him and the Lessee And if a Husband which hath a tearm in right of his Wife submits himself to Arbitrement this shall not bind the Wife but shall bind the Husband and shall be a Barr if the Wife hath not Interest and so he concluded that Judgment shall be given for the Defendants and that the agreement is a good Barr. Foster Justice intended that the agreement is a good Barr in an Ejectione firme c. And it seems that it is no question but that the action is personall and yet hee agreed that ancient Demesne is a good plea. So in debt receipt of part hanging the Writ abates all the Writ And 21 Ed. 4. 10. b. Two Tenants in Common were of a Tearm and 7 H. 4. 6. b. Executors shall have an action upon Entry made in the time of their Testator by the statute of 4 Edw. 3. Chap. 6. and in this the Plaintiff shall recover his Tearm but he denyed that the reversion is reduced by the recovery nor revested in the Lessor till the Lessee enter And to the Objection that the Realty and Inheritance may come in question in this that is not to the purpose for so it may in an action of Trespasse And he intended there is no difference between agreement and Arbitrement and agreed that none of those is a plea where the Inheritance or Free-hold comes in question And he conceived that Arbitrement for free-hold is not good unlesse the submission be by Deed indented for by Obligation with Condition is not sufficient 11 H. 4. 44. b. and it is not in difference 14 H. 4. that in ravishment of ward submission may be without Deed insomuch as it is in the personalty and he intended that there is no difference between that and Ravishment of Ward and Ward is but Chattâll so is tearm which may be sold by word as well âs the possession may be sold by word so may the right of that be extinct by word And as if a may be bound to pay a certain summe of money at a certaine day and the Obligee accept parcell in satisfaction before the day and that is very good So in this case acceptance of a summe of lesse value may be a satisfaction of such personall thing 4 H. 8. Dyer 1. 8 Edw. 6. Dyer 19 H. 6. 9 H. 7. And so he concluded that for that nothing is to be recovered but Chattell that for that the agreement shall be good plea. Warburton Justice agreed that the agreement should be good in Ejectione Firme insomuch that this is meerely personall And he argued that it is no Plea in assise insomuch that this is reall and there the Free-hold is to be recovered and this is the reason that waging of Law lieth in Debt upon arbitrement insomuch that the seale of the Arbitrators is not annexed unto it and for that to him it is but only matter in Deed 13. Ed. 4. And he intended that agreement with satisfaction is as much as Arbitrement for a personall thing cannot be satisfaction for a reall thing and that is the cause that it cannot be a Barr in Debt upon arrerages of accompt insomuch that that is founded upon Record and is a thing certaine And in wast it is no Plea insomuch that this is a mixt Action if it be against a Lessee for life otherwise if it be against a Lessee for yeares for a Tearme is taken in 7. H. 4. 6. b. to be within the word Goods and an Executor may have an Action upon that of goods carried a way in the life of the Testator And though that the Entry abate the Writ yet this doth not prove that it is more then a Tearme and though that the Tearme determine hanging the Writ this shall not abate the Action but the Plaintiff shall recover Dammages and in Ravishment of Ward Summons and Severance lies and the Body of the Heire shall be recovered and so in Quare Impedit Summons and Severance lies and the presentment shall be recovered and Dammages and yet the principall is but presentmemt which is but a Chattell and for that agreement shall be a Barr and so he concluded that Judgement shall be given for the Defendant and that the agreement is a good Plea Coke cheife Justice agreed that the agreement is a good Plea he thought that that savered of Realty for that that the Tearme is to be recovered and of the personalty in respect of the Dammages which are to be recovered and that in all Actions where money or Dammages
executed for then it would be too late for then the Estate is transferred to another as it was in the cases put by Anderson in Corbetts Case But here all the Estate limited to him which made the forfeyture shall be determined and also he intended that the Reason that the Replication containes that the parties being in actuall possession are only to satisfie the words of the Condition And so he concluded and praied Judgement for the Plaintiff In dower the Demandant recovered Dower of tenths of Wool and Lamb and how execution shall be made was the question And the Justices intended that the Sheriffe might deliver the tenths of every 3 yard land and assign the Yard Lands in certain Bât after it was conceived that this would be uncertain and unequall and for that the Sheriffe was directed to deliver the third part of all in generall and yet the first was agreed to be good but onely in respect of Inequalities as in dower of a Mill the third Toll dish and of a Villayne the third dayes work as in 23 H. 8. And it was also agreed that the Sheriffe may assign this dower without a Jury It was moved if an Attachment be granted against a Sheriffe for contempt after he is removed out of his Office and the Justices intended that not insomuch that now he is no Officer and for that he cannot be now fyned and without fyne they did not use to Imprison but the Judges would be advised to see the Presidents of the Court in such a case Mâchaelmas 1611. 9. Jacobi in the Common Bench. Kemp and Philip his Wife James and Blanch his Wife Plaintiffs against Lawrere and Trollop and the Wife of Gunâer Executrix during the minority of the Wives of the Plaintiffs THe case was An Executrix during the nonage for so it was and not Administratrix that is shee was ordained Executrix till the Wives of the Plaintiffs came to their full age or were marryed and then they should be Executrixes And this Executrix during the minority brought an action of Debt and recovered and before Execution the women Executrixes took Husbands and brought Scirefacias upon the Record to have Execution upon the Judgment against these Defendants as Ter-tenants which pleaded specially that they had nothing in the Free-hold nor in the Land but only a lease for yeares and that the free-hold was in another stranger upon which Plea the Plaintiffs demurred in Law And Nicholls Serjeant for the Plaintiffs that there is the difference betwixt this Executor and an Administrator during the minority as in 26 H. 8. 7. a. if an Administrator have Judgment and dyes before Executors or other have sued out their Letters of Administration they shall have no execution of this Judgement insomuch as he comes in paramount the first Administrator and as immediate Administrator to the first Intestate as it is agreed in Shelleys case So the Administrators of one Executor shal not have execution of a Judgment given for the Executor as it is resolved in Brudenels case 5 Coke the 9. b. And in 21 Edw. 4. It is agreed if two are made Joynt-Executors and one of them dies the other shall be sole Executor to the Testator and if hee make his Executor and dyes his Executors shall be Executors to the first Testator And also there is in Fox Gretbrooks Case in the Com that one may be Executor for certain years and another after and this differs from the other cases for in this case all these Executors were in privity one to another but in the other case one comes paramount the other But here they are all made by the first Testator and the Will And he cyted the 2 Case in the Lord Dyer and 18. and 32 Edw. 3. there cyted where a Purchasor brought a Writ of Errour and was not privy to the first Record And Grantee of a Reversion brought a Scire facias against Conusee of a Statute-Merchant alledging that he had received satisfaction So if a Parson of a Church recovers an Annuity and after the Church is appropriate to a house of Religion the Soveraign of the said house shall have a Scire facias And so if union be made of two Benefices and yet in all these cases there was no privity to the first Judgement so he in reversion shall have Errour in Attainâ upon Judgment against his Lessee for life and the Reason is given in Brudenels Case that is they which may have prejudice may have scire facias and it is not like where two Joynt-tenants are and one makes a Lease for years and dyes the other shal have the Rent insomuch that he comes in by survivorship and not in privity But here the Executors come in in privity as in case of two Executors are joyntly one âyes the other which survives shall have Execution of Judgement given for them for Administrator during the nonage is only to the use commodity and profit of an Executor and of a Testator so that he being Executor to the Testator he shall have execution And to the second that is that the Defendants have nothing but for yeares and that the free-hold is to a stranger he intended that this is not good yet he agreed that in scire facias where a free-hold is to be recovered speciall non-tenure is a good plea as in 8 Edw 4. 19. and 8 H. 6. 32. but not of the contrary and there also generall non-tenure is no plea But here where the free-hold is not to be recovered nor one nor the other is a Plea for it may be averred that the Defendant hath a release from him that hath the reversion and as in 14 H. 4. 5. in scire facias to accompt against an Executor who pleads that the Testator was never his Bayliffe to give an accompt and yet it is agreed that this hath been a good plea for the first Defendant and this is the reason that it was not taken nor was allowed for a good plea in the 11 H. 4. 11. Insomuch that this amounts to non-tenure and in 44. and 45. Eliz. Mich. Rot. 834. it was adjudged in Scire facias where the Defendant pleads that he was not Tenant of the Free-hold and adjudged no plea And so he said it was adjudged in the case of All-soules Colledge in Scire facias to have execution of a Judgment in Ejectione firme and the Defendant in the Scire facias pleads that he was but Lessee for years and adjudged no Plea insomuch that nothing was to be recovered but only the tearm and not the Free-hold and so he concluded and prayed Judgement for the Plaintiff in Scire facias Harris Serjeant argued to the contrary and he intended that the Return of the Sheriffe is void insomuch that the Writ commanded him to give notice to the Tenants of the Land in Fee-simple and hee did not return that those which he had returned were Tenants of the Land in Fee-simple and
to whom the private damage is done may have action And he said that the Register contains many Writs for publique wrong when that is done to private men as fol. 95. A man fixes a pale crosse a navigable River by which a Ship was cast away and the Owner maintained action of Trespasse And fol. 97. A man brought Trespasse against one which cast dung into a River by which his Medow was drowned so if the River be infected with watering Hemp or Flax he which hath fishing there may maintain action of Trespasse and 2 H. 4. 11. Action of Trespasse by one for ploughing of Land where one had a common way and so it is 13. H. 7. 17. One brings an action of Trespasse against another for erecting a Lyme Kill where many others are annoyed by that So by an assault made upon a servant the Master and servant also may have severall actions and so in the other cases many may have actions and yet this is no reason to conclude any one of them that hee shall not have his action for in truth those are rather actions upon the Case then actions of Trespass for the truth of the Case is contained in the Writ Also in this case it doth not appeare that there are any other Commoners which have Common there and for that this Objection is not to the purpose and it appears by Heisman and Crackesoods Case 4 Coke 31. That Copy-holder shall have Common by prescription in the demesnes of the Lord and so he concluded and prayed Judgment for the Plaintiff Coke cheife Justice said that it was adjudged in this Court Trinity 41 Eliz. Rot. 153. b. between Holland and Lovell where Commoner brings an action upon the Case as this Case is against a stranger which pleads not guilty and it was found by verdict for the Plaintiff and it was after adjudged for the Plaintiff for insomuch that the Plaintiff may take them damage feasant that proves that he hath wrong and this is the reason that he may distraine doing dammage And by the same reason if the Beasts are gone before his comming he may have action upon his Case for otherwise one that hath many Beasts may destroy all the Common in a night and doe great wrong and shaâl not be punished and it is not like to a Nusance for that is publique and may be punished in a Leet but the other is private to the Commoners and cannot be punished in another place nor course and he also cyted one Whitehands case to be adjudged where many Copy-holders prescribe to have Loppings and Toppings of Pollards and Husbands growing upon the Waste of the Lord and the Lord cuts them and one Copy-holder only brings his action upon the Case and adjudged that it was very well maintainable notwithstanding that every other Copy-holder may have the same remedy And he said also that so it was adjudged in the Kings Bench Hillary 5 Jacobi Rot. 1427. in George Englands Case And 2 Edw. 2. b. Covenant 49. If a man Covenant with 20. to make the Sea banks with A. B. and every one of them and after he doth not doe it by which the Land of two is drowned and damnified and they two may have an action of Covenant without the others Quere for it seems every one shall have an action by himselfe But Foster and Wynch Justices seemed that the Plaintiffe ought to sue in his Court that the Beasts of the stranger escaped in the Common or were put in by the Owner for it may be they were put in by the Lord which was owner of the Soile or by a stranger in which cases the Owner of the Beasts shall not be punished But Coke and Warburton seemed the contrary and that this ought to be averred and pleaded by the Defendant in excuse of the Trespasse as in action of Trespasse why he broke his Close And so it was adjourned see Gosnolds case 490. see Judgment Pasche 1612. 10. Jacobi in the Common Bench. Henry Higgins against George Biddle IN Replevin the Defendant made Conusance as Bayliff to Sir Thomas Leigh and Daine Katherine his Wife intimating that Isabel Bradburn was seised of the place where c. in their demesne as of Fee and so seised the first of June 15 H. 8. gives this to the Lord Anthony Fitzherbert and Maud his Wife and to the Heirs males of their bodies which have Issue Thomas Fitzherbert Knight John Fitzherbert and William Fitzherbert Anthony and Maud dyed and the said place where c. discended to Sir Thomas Fitzherbert as Heire to the Donees to the Intayl and the said Thomas Fitzherbert the 5. of Aprill 6 Edw. 6. of that enfeoffed Humphrey Swinnerton Ralph Cotton and Roger Baily to the use of William Fitzherbert and Elizabeth his Wife for their lives and after to the use of Sir Thomas Fitzherbert and the Heirs of his body the remainder to the use of the right Heirs of the said William Fitzherbert William Fitzherbert dyed Sir Thomas Fitzherbert disseised the said Elizabeth and the said John Fitzherbert had Issue Thomas and dyed Sir Thomas Fitzherbert dyed without Heir of his body and the said place where c. discended to the said Thomas as Cousin Heir of the said Sir Thomas and Son and Heir of the said John Fitzherbert which enters and was seised to him and to the Heirs Males of his body as in his Remitter And the said Thomas Fitzherbert 4 of Novemb. 39. Eliz. by Indenture of Bargain and Sale enrolled in the Chancery within six moneths bargained and sold the said Land to Sir William Leighton his heirs and Sir William Leighton 5 of Novemb. 43. Eliz. by Indenture enrolled within six moneths for 4000. l. bargained and sold the said land where c. to Sir Thomas Leigh and Dame Katherine as aforesaid and so avowed the taking for doing damage And the Plaintiff for Barr to the said Avowry pleads that well and true it is that the said Sir William Leighton was seised of the said place where c. in his Demesne as of Fee as it was alledged by the Defendant But further hee saith that the said Sir William Leighton so being thereof seised 1 Decemb 44 Eliz. enfeoffed the Plaintiff in fee and by force of that the Plaintiff was seised and put in his Beasts into the said place where c. without that that the said Sir William Leighton bargained and sold the said Land in which c. to the said Sir Thomas Leighton and Katherine his Wife as in the Conusance hath been alledged by the Defendant upon which the Defendants joyn Issue and it was agreed by all the Justices that notwithstanding this admission of the Parties is an Estoppell by the pleading yet as well the Plaintiffe as the Defendant were admitted to give another evidence to the Jury against their own pleading that is that Sir William Leighton was not seised and so nothing passed by the bargain and sale and also
hath the Copy-hold Estate for life in remainder was the question And it was argued by Harris Serjeant that the Estate of Fines in the body of that binds all persons but onely some which have Infirmities and by the saving Rights Titles Claimes and Interests are saved But Title comes in the conditionall perclose of saving that is so that they pursue their Title Claime and Interest c. By way of Act or lawfull Entry within five yeares next after the said proclamations had and made So that in this case the principall matter to be considered is what thing is operated by the acceptance of the Bargaine and Sale for if by that the remainder of the Copy-holder be turned to right then insues that the Fine shall be a Barr And it seemes that this determines the first Estate for life and he agreed that it cannot be a surrender insomuch that there is a mesene remainder as it is 37. H. 6. 17. b. 4. H. 7. 10. But this Lease to commence at a day to come cannot be a surrender but shall be determined and extinct by acceptance of a new Lease as it is there and in 22. H. 7. 51. a. agreed and so it was adjudged in Hillary 30. Eliz. between Wilmottand Cutlers Case that if a Husband which was seised of a Copy-hold Estate in right of his Wife accept an estate for life this determines the copy-hold Estate which he hath in right of his Wife in possession So if Lessee for yeares accept an estate of one which hath no Estate yet this determines his Tearme as it was adjudged Hillary 31. Eliz. Rot. 1428. b. That if Lessee for yeares of a Lease made by the Ancester accept an estate of Guardian in Soccage this determines his Lease which he had of the Ancestor and upon that he concluded that in this case the acceptance of a Bargaine and Sale turnes the Copy-holder in remainder to a Right and then it appeares by Saffins Case 5. Coke 125. That he shall be bound though that he hath only Interest and so of Title also and he said that it appeares by Kite and Quarintons case 4. Coke 26. a. that a Right or Title may be of Copy-hold Estate for it is there said by Wray cheife Justice that it shall be with in the Statute of 32 H. 8. chapter 9. of buying of Titles and so concluded Dodridge the Kings Serjeant agreed that the sole question is if any thing be here done to turn the Copy-hold-Estate in remainder into a right for then he agreed that this shall be barred otherwise not and to that hee intended that the first Estate for life shall be sayd to be in Esse notwithstanding the acceptance of the Bargaine and Sale as to all estrangers and especially when it is to their prejudice as if Tenant grant Rent and after surrenders his estate now between the parties the Lease shall be extinct by the surrender but to the Grantee of the Rent it shall be sayd to be in Esse and if during his life he in Remainder also grants a Rent hee shall hold the Land subject to both the Rents though that the grants be both to one self sameperson so if he in Reversion grants his Reversion with warranty and after the Tenant for life surrenders and the Grantee be impleaded he shall never vouch during the life of the Tenant for life 5 H. 5. Comment 24 Ed. 3. And here also is a custome which preserves the Copy-hold Estate in Remainder and their particular Tenant cannot that prejudice and for that also it shall not be turned into a right as if a Copy-hold Estate be granted to one for life by one Copy and after the Lord grants another Estate for life by another Copy to another and then the first Copy-holder commits forfeiture he which hath the second estate cannot take advantage of that but the Lord shall hold it during the life of the first Tenant for no act made by the particular Tenant shall prejudice him in Remainder for otherwise many Inconveniencies would insue upon that as by secret conveyances or as if a grantee of a Rent charge grant that to the Tenant of the Land for his life the Remainder over the Remainder shall be good notwithstanding that the particular Estate bee extinct and drowned also he intended that the Copy-hold Estate is another thing then the land it self and for that the Fine shall not be a Barr no more then in Smith and Stapletons Case Com. Where a Fine levied of Land shal not be a Barr of Rent insomuch that it is another thing so in this case he intended that the fine shall not be a Barr of the Copy-hold Estate and concluded c. Wynch Justice was of opinion that the Fine shall not be a Barr to the Copy-hold Estate in Remainder for the acceptance of the Bargaine and Sale doth not determine the first Copy-hold Estate for life as to him in Remainder but only to the first Tenant and the Lord and betweene those he agreed that the Copy-hold Estate is determined as in Heydens Case by acceptance of a Lease for years and for that the Remainder shall not be turned to a Right and by consequence shall not be barred and for that he supposed that the reason that the Fine was a Bar in Saffins Case 5 Coke 123. b. was insomuch that the Lessor entered made a Feoffment and after levied a Fine and it is there agreed that the Feoffment turnes the Estate of the Lessee to a Right and for that the Fine shall be a barr and also there the Lease was by limitation of time to have a beginning but if a man makes a Lease for years to begin at a day to come and before the beginning of that makes a Feoffment or is disseised and Fine with proclamation is levyed yet he which hath future Interest shall not be barred for this is not turned to a Right and it was not the intent of the Statute of Fines to make a Barr of right where there was no discontinuance or Estate at least turned to right and this was the cause that at the Common Law Fine with Non-claime was no Barr but where they make alteration of possession and he cited Palmers case to be adjudged that a Fine of Land shall not be a barr for Rent where the case was Lessee for life Remainder for life of Rent The first Lessee for life of the Rent purchaseth Land and levies Fine of that and adjudged that this shall not binde them in Remainder of the Rent no more if he in remainder levy a fine that shall not prejudice the particular Tenant and so he concluded in this case that the Ramainder shall not be barred and that the Plaintiff shall have Judgment Warburton Justice accordingly and he argued that the Statute of Fines containes two parts The first to barr those which have present right and they ought to make their claim within five yeares after the Fine levied or otherwise they
shall be barred And the second those which have Right title or interest accrued after the Fine levied by reason of any matter which preceded the Fine and in both cases the Estate which is barred ought to be turned into a right or otherwise it shall not be barred the which cannot be here for the estate is given by the Custome and it is to have his beginning after the Death of the first Tenant and though that the first Tenant commit Forfeiture yet he in remainder cannot enter for his time is not yet come as in 45 Ed. 3. is a collaterall Lease with warranty to the Tenant for life in possession this shall not be a barr insomuch that it is made to him which hath possession so if a man make a Feoffment upon condition and the Feoffee levy a Fine with proclamations and five yeares passe and the condition is broken the Feoffee may enter at any time otherwise if the Fine had been levied after the condition broken and so if the Lord be intituâed to have Cessavit and Fine is levied by the Tenant and five yeares passe he shall be barred and this was the cause of the Judgment in Saffins case insomuch as the Lessee had present interest to enter and this was altered into a Right by the Feoffment and then the Fine was a Barr but here he in Remainder hath no right till after the Death of him which was the first Tenant and then his right to the possession begins and then if a Fine had been levied with proclamation this shall be a Barr and so he concluded that Judgment should be entered for the Plaintiffe Coke cheife Justice accordingly and he agreed also that the sole question is if by acceptance of a Bargaine and sale by the first Tenant for life the Remainder be turned into a right and he sayd that right sometimes sleepeth but it never dyes but this shall be intended the right of the Law and not right of Land for that may be barred by Writ of Right at the Common Law and he intended that Copy-holdes are within the Statutes of Fines be they Copy-hold for life yeares in tayl or in fee for the third part of the Realme is in Copy-holdes and two parts in Lease for yeares and if these shall not be within the Statute then this doth not extend to three parts of the Realme and it is agreed in Heydons case 3 Coke 8. a. That when an act of Parliament doth not alter the Tenure Service Interest of Land or other thing in prejudice of the Lord or of the custome of the Mannor or in prejudice of the Tenant there the generall words of such act of Parliament shall extend to Copy-holds and also it is resolved to be within the Statute of 32 H. 8. Of Maintenance and also it is within the expresse Letter of this which containes the word Interest and Copy-holder hath interest and so also of Tenant by Statute Merchant then the question will be if the acceptance of a Bargaine and sale turnes that to a right and he intended that his Estate for life remaines though that it is only passive in acceptance of Bargain and sale and for that it shall not be prejudice more then if Tenant at will accepts a Bargaine and Sale for his Estate at will this notwithstanding remaines but if Lessee for years or life accepts a Fine upon conusance of right this is a forfeiture insomuch that it is a matter of record and it shall be an estoppel to say that he did not take Fee by that doth not admit the Reversion to be in another also insomuch that the Bargain and sale was executed by the Statute for this cause it shall not be prejudice as it was adjudged in the Lady Greshams case in the Exchequer 28 Eliz. Where two severall conveyances were made with power of Revocation upon tender of ten pound and adjudged by act of Parliament that a revocation was good and also that no license of alienation shall be made insomuch that it was by act of Parliament which doth no wrong and it is for the Trespasse for which the party ought to have license and if it be not Trespasse there need no license before hand nor pardon afterwards So if a man makes a Lease for yeares remainder for yeares the first Lessee accepts Bargaine and Sale this shall not turn these in remainder to prejudice Thirdly it seemes to him also that notwithstanding the acceptance of the Bargain and Sale the first Copy-hold Estate for life remains in Esse and is not determined For this differs from an Estate of Land for it shall not be subject to a Rent granted by the Lord the first Estate remaines till all the remainders are determined for the first tenant for life cannot surrender to the Lord also it is customary estate for by the Common Law this being granted to three successively this shall be determined and extinct for the third part for they three take into possession and the word successively shal be taken as void but here the Custome appoints that the remainder shall not have his beginning till the death of the first-Tenant and that they should take by succession and for that there is a difference between this customary Estate and other Estates at the Common Law and other surrenders for if a Copy-holder surrender to the use of another for life nothing passeth but for life only the Lord hath not any remainder by this Surrender and if this Tenant for life commits forfeiture he in reversion shall not take advantage of that and if at the Common Law Tenant for life remainder for life or in fee be and the first Tenant for life makes a Feoffment and after levies a Fine and resolved that he in reversion should not be bound till 5 years are incurred after the death of the 1. Tenant for life for then his title of Entry first accrues in apparancy and before that is in secrecy of which he in remainder is not held to take notice and so in this case he in remainder shall not be bound till five yeares are incurred after the death of the first Tenant and the rather insomuch as the first Estate remaines for that that the first Tenant was only passive and not active and so he concluded that Judgement shall be given for the Plaintiff insomuch that the Fine was no Bar and upon this concordance of all the three Justices in opinion no other Justices being present this Tearm Judgment was entered accordingly Pasche 1612. 10. Jacobi in the Common Bench. Danyell Waters against the Deane and chapter of Norwich IN covenant The case was this in 37 H. 8. the then Deane and Chapter of Norwich made a Lease to one Twaits for fifty yeares which ended 35 Eliz. in time of Ed. 6. The then Dean and Chapter surrendred all their possessions to the King which those newly endowed and incorporated by the name of Deane and Chapter of the foundation
agreed that the Prior was not Predecessor to the Abbot as it appeares by 10. and 11. Eliz. Dyer 280. 11 12 13. That the Deane and Chapter of Norwich made a surrender in the time of Ed. 6. and then newly incorporate So that he which made to Twaits in the 37. H. 8. could not be Predecessor to the Deane and Chapter which made to Thimblethorp in 18. of Eliz. for he could not then be any Predecessor and for that the Lease to Thimblethorp void and then there is no Eviction but wrong to the Plaintiff for which he may have an Action of Trespasse and then he cannot have an Action of covenant as it appeares by 22. H. 6. against the Lessor But admitting that the Lease to Thimblethorp were good then this hath his beginning in the 38. of Eliz. and makes the Lease for three lives to the Plaintiff void by the Statute of 13. Eliz. insomuch that the aforesaid Lease for yeares was then in beginning and the Statute is expresly that it shall be void as the grant of next avoidance of a Church in the case of the Bishop of Lichfeild and Coventry against Sale cited in Lincolne Colledge Case 3. Coke as if a Parson makes a Lease for yeares and is Non-resident the Lease is void by the Statute against the Parson himselfe and then if the Estate be void all covenants which depend upon that are also void Also he supposed that there is not any good conveyance of the estate of Thimblethorp to Doyley which is intended to be the disturber to make the Covenant to be broken and then when Doyley entered without title the Covenant cannot be broken and so he concluded and prayed Judgement for the Defendants Nichols Serjeant for the Plaintiff agreed that if there be an alteration of Corporation and title is to be made by prescription it ought to be so specially shewed as it hath been said of the other part by Dodridg But here it is not so for the same Dean and Chapter which made the Lease to the Plaintiff made the Lease to Thimblethorp and this appears by the pleading and the Lease made to Twaits is not mentioned but only to shew the beginning of the Lease to Thimblethorp And then the Deane and Chapter which made the Lease in 18 of Eliz. to Thimblethorp were the same Deane and Chapter which made the Lease in 42. Eliz. to VValters And hee supposed the Covenant being expressed this remains otherwise if it had been a Covenant created only by the Law as it appears by the Books of 9. Eliz. Dyer 257. 13. and 32 H. 6. 32. And also when a Covenant is created by Law the Covenantee cannot have Covenant if he be not outed by one which hath title 26 H. 8. 36. otherwise of expresse Covenant as it is agreed in the 12 H. 4. 5. So in 47. Edw. 3. Covenant lies against Executors and 38 Edw. 3. Covenant lyes against Heir being made by Tenant in tayl if the Lessee be outed after his death and so hee concluded and prayed Judgement for the Plaintiffe Wynch Justice supposed that Judgement should be given for the Plaintiff and that he had good cause of action and he intended that the Livery and Seisin by the Attorney after Rent incurred was good Secondly That the Covenant shall extend to the Lease made to Thimblethorp for it doth not appeare but that it is the same Deane and Chapter which was in time of H. 8. For it is not pleaded that it was founded by Ed. 6. but had his name by him And also it is confessed by the Demurrer that it is the same Deane and Chapter but admitting that it is not yet it may be answered as it hath been by Nichols before that is that the Deane and Chapter which made the Lease in 8 of Eliz. to Thimblethorp is the Deane and Chapter which made the Lease to the Plaintiff in the 42 of Eliz. are all one and the Lease to Twaits is shewed only to shew the beginning of the Lease made to Thimblethorp Also he supposed the conveyance of Thimblethorps Estate to Doyley to be good and it doth not appear but that the Deane and Chapter were in possession at the time of the making of the Lease for 3 lives So that this hath a good beginning and continued till it was avoyded by the Entry of the succeeding Dean for this remains good against the Deane that made it But Thimblethorp also may avoid it during his Tearm and now here is eviction by the Assignee of Thimblethorpe before that the Lâase be avoyded by the succeeding Deane and Chapter where the Deane himselfe could not avoid it for he is the party which made it Also here is expresse warranty against the Lease made to Thimblethorp and for that also action of Covenant lyes otherwise if it had been only warranty in Law as if Lessee for life had made a lease for years and dyed Upon the covenant in Law action doth not lye for the Law doth not constrain to Impossibilities as in the 40. Ed. 3. Covenant that the wind shall not peirce nor break the Trees and 2 Ed. 4. 12 Ed. 4. Action of Covenant lies upon express Covenant though that a stranger enters without title and he cyted one Dormans case to be adjudged that where a man borrows money upon a usurious contract and the principall gives security to the Surety that was bound with him by collaterall Obligation and the Surety being arrested takes advantage of the Counterbond notwithstanding that the principall Obligation was void by the Statute of Usury So here notwithstanding that the estate was void and that is the principall Yet the Covenant being expressed and collaterall shall bind the Lessor and so he concluded that Judgement shall be given for the Plaintiff Warburton Justice to the contrary and yet he agreed that the livery was good notwithstanding that it was made by the Attorney after three Rent dayes incurred and he seemed that it might be made at any time during the tearm and the lives of the parties And also he agreed that the Corporation shall be intended the same Corporation and yet Corporation had no Predecessor nor Successor but the Statutes say Predecessors Antecessors and Progenitors of the King as 39 H. 6. 7 Ed. 4. 2 H. 6. But he did not insist upon that but agreed that But the matter upon which he insisted was that the Lease to the Plaintiff was void against the succeeding Deane and Chapter insomuch that the lease to Thimblethorp was in Esse at the time of the making of that and this by the Statute of 13 Eliz. And it appears that the Deane which made the Lease to the Plaintiff is dead for he is named in the Count the late Deane and then when the Covenants depend upon the estate be they expressed or in Law these determin and end with the estate as in Lemons case 28 H. 8. Dyer 28. 189. resolved that where the statute of 21
H. 8. makes Leases being in the hands of Spirituall persons void this avoids these Covenants also which depend upon the Lease So if a Parson make a Lease and Covenant that he will not be non-resident and binds himselfe for the performance of that if the Covenants be released the Obligation also is released So if the Lease be avoyded the Covenants also are avoyded And as an action of Covenant doth not lye for the not injoying of Land after a surrender so Covenant doth not lye after the estate is avoyded see 4 H. 7. And to the case put by Wynch of counter-bond where the Principall was void by the staiute of Usury he said that there the Obligation was not void but voidable by plea. But here it is the estate is made void by the express words of the statute and he intended that this difference between expresse Covenant and Covenant in Law but that the one determines with the estate as well as the other and yet he agreed that express Covenant shall extend to charge the Covenanter upon Entry by a stranger which hath no title but yet this doth not charge the Lessor after the estate determined and so he concluded that Judgment ought to be given for the Plaintiff Coke cheif Justice accorded with Wynch that Judgment shall be given for the Plaintiff And he supposed that the livery was well executed by the Attorney after the 3 Rent dayes incurred and yet he agreed that it had been a probable objection made against that But he supposed that the Lessor was not prejudiced insomuch that the Law intends that they had the possession and the profits of the Land till livery made and the Attorney is only as a servant to the Lessor And he said that this is not like to Cromwels and Andrews Case of grant of a Mannor upon Condition to re-grant Advowson or Rent in which cases the Advowson or Rent ought to be re-granted before that the Church becommeth void or the Rent day be incurred insomuch that they are followers of the thing granted notwithstanding that the Feoffee hath time during his life to make the re-grant if it be not hastned upon Request 2. He supposed that the express Covenant shall bind the Lessor though it be referred to the tearm for tearm includes Estate and Interest but this is when it is Tearm but when it is no Estate then it shall be intended during the continuance of the years as it appears by the Rector of Chedingtons Case and this he held clear and so of promise also as if a man makes a Lease for years and before that the Lessee enters makes a lease to another and promises that the second Lessee shall enjoy during the tearm if the first Lessee enter the second Lessee may have an action upon the promise and he said that it was adjudged in the Kings Bench Hill 35 Eliz. between Foster and Wilson Plaintiffs and Mayes Defendant where the case was A man made a Lease of a Rectory for years and covenanted with the Lessee to save him harmlesse against one Blunt Parson of Dole which entered and outed the Lessee which brought Covenant against the Lessor and resolved that it lyes notwithstanding that it doth not appear whether he had Interest or no So that be the Lease good or void yet when there is an Eviction Covenant lyes though the Lease be originally void yet till it be avoided it shall be intended a good Lease And if a Covenant of Dean and Chapter doe not bind them none will take Lease of them so they shall be compellable to plow the Land themselves and also he supposed that the Lease was good against the succeeding Dean and Chapter till it be avoyded by Entry as it was adjudged Trin. 30 Eliz. between Elmer and Page where a Bishop made a Lease for years and dyes the Successor makes a Lease for 3 lives the Lease for years not determined And it was resolved that the Lease for 3 lives was void notwithstanding that the Bishop might make a concurrant Lease for years which is not made void by the Statute of 1 Eliz. insomuch that the Statute is in the definitive that is Leases for 3 lives or 21 years and so they cannot make both for then the Lessee for life should have the Rent reserved upon the Lease for years which is setled in the Lessee for 3 lives by the regress of the Lessee for years and so he said also notwithstanding that the statute of 18 Eliz. made void all Leases made by Deane and Chapters where there are more then 3 years in being he agreed that a Lease for years where there are so many years in being is good but if there be but two years in being that makes the Lease for life void And he agreed that notwithstanding the statute yet any Lease shall be good against the Deane himselfe insomuch that he is party to that and hath a negative voyce in the making of that And he seemed that the Proviso in the statute of 18 Eliz did not extend to Leases in possession but to Leases in reversion which are dormant of which a stranger cannot take notice insomuch that they are invisible and for that if a Dean and Chapter procure surrenders of them and within 3 years that shall make another Lease good and so they shall save their Covenant and for that the Lease here made to the Plaintiff had been good if the Defendants had procured the Lease made to Thimblethorp to be surrendred within 3 years after the taking of that Also he cyted the Case betwixt the Bishop of Lychfield and Coventry and Sale to be adjudged Michaelmass 32. and 33. Eliz. That a grant of the next avoydance is good against a Bishop himself that granted it and not made void by the Statute of 1 Eliz. as to him but to all Successors only And so in this case he said they all agreed that the Lease was not void which is made to Waters against the Deane himself which made it but only against the Successor And he said also Covenant in Law extends to lawfull Evictions and to estates in being and not where an estate is determined as if Lessee for life makes a Lease for years and dyes the Lessee shall not have an action of Covenant upon Covenant in Law as it is agreed in 9 Eliz. Dyer and 38 H. 6. before cyted So also he supposed to express reall Covenants which extends to Free-hold or Inheritance as Warrant and Defend upon which a man cannot have an action if he be not outed by one which hath title and as in 3 Edw. 3. 7. and 21. A man makes a Feoffment with warranty nonfeoffavit is a good Plea for if the Feoffment be avoided the Warranty also is avoided for that depends upon the Feoffment But if a man makes a Lease for years and covenants that he will warrant and defend the Land to the Lessee if the Lessee be outed by one which hath title or
without title he may have an action of Covenant for the Lessor hath the Evidences and ought to defend the possession of his Lessee and the right also and damages are only to be recovered and so is the difference between a Lease and Inheritance though that the words of the Covenant are all one And also he said that it may be objected that the Incorporation was not well pleaded by Edw. 6. Insomuch that he doth not say after the Conquest for Ed. 3. was Ed. 6. in truth sor there were 3 Edwards before the Conquest and he was the third after And he saith that he hath known many exceptions to be taken to that but hath not known any of them to be allowed and for that he will not insist upon it But the principal matter upon which he insists was that it doth not appear by the pleading that the Deane which made the Lease was dead and it appears by the pleading that he entered in 4 Jacobi and was seised and then of necessity ought to be living and such averment of his life is sufficient as it is agreed in the 13 Eliz. Dyer where a Parson made a Lease for years and the Lessee brought an Ejectione firme and in pleading it was said that the Parson is seised of the reversion and this was allowed to be good without other averment of his life for he cannot be seised if he be not living and then if the Deane shall be intended to be living then they all agreed that the Lease shall be good against him for it was adjudged in this Court between Blackeleech and Smal that if a Bishop makes a Lease for years and after makes a Lease for life the Lease for years being in Esse and dyes and the Successor accepts Rent this shall bind him and by this it appears that the Lease was good against the Dean himself which made it and also against the Successor till he enter and avoid it and then by consequence the action of Covenant shall be very well maintainable and so he concluded also that Judgement should be given for the Plaintiff which was done accordingly Pasche 1612. 10. Jacobi in the Common Bench. Browning against Strelley MIchael 2 Jac. Rot. 531. In debt the Margent of the Count contains Nottingham and the Count it self contains that the Obligation was made at the Town of Nottingham which is a County of it self and the Defendant pleads non est factum and the view was of the Town of Nottingham and it was tryed by the Jury of the County of Nottingham and this was moved in arrest of Judgment after verdict for the Plaintif by Nichols Serjeant And it was agreed by all the Justices that Judgment shall be given accordingly to the verdict insomuch that notwithstanding that the Town of Nottingham is a County of it self yet it may be that some part of the Town may be within the County and for that possibility they would not arrest the Judgment Ireland against Smith IN action upon the Case for these words the Plaintiff counts that he was and is Proctor in the Arches and in communication between one Morgat and the Defendant of him the Defendant said to the said Morgat You take part with Ireland against me who is an arrant Papist and hath a Pardon from the Pope and can help you to such an one if you will And after verdict it was moved by Hutton Serjeant in arrest of Judgment that the action doth not lye and he saith that it hath been adjudged in this Court 3 Jacobi Rot. 7031. between Kingstone and Hall that an action doth not lye for like words he is an arrant Papist And it were good that he and all such as he is were hanged for he and all such as he is would have the Crowne from the Kings head if they durst And it was adjudged that an action doth not lye for these words which are more strong then the words in this action but of the other part it was said by Haughton Serjeant that he did not insist upon these words that he is a Papist but that he had obtained a Pardon from the Pope the which by the Statute of 13 Eliz. is made High Treason and then notwithstanding that no time was limited when the Pardon should be procured that is before the Statute or after yet it shall be intended such a Pardon which is against the Statute for the presumption of the Law shall be taken in the worst sense and not like to the Case where a man saith to another that he hath the Pox And also it is alledged by the Count that the Plaintiffe is not above the age of 40. years so that he cannot obtain a Pardon before the Statute of 13 Eliz. And for that he supposed that the action is very well maintainable Coke cheif Justice said that it was adjudged in the Kings Bench in the time of Catlyn cheife Justice there that an action upon the Case doth not lye for calling a man Papist And Winch Justice said that if a man call a Bishop or another man which is trusted with government of the Church and Ecclesiastical causes that he thought the action lyes otherwise not Also he supposed that the Pardon might be for Purgatory or other matters which are not within the Statute of 13 Eliz. And also the Pardon may be procured by another and come to his hands by delivery over afterwards that it had passed two or three and the averment is not sufficient for it is onely Implication and Inference Coke and Warberton Justices sayd that a Papist is one that errs in his opinion and though that the Papists are Authors of many Treasons yet the Law doth not intend so and so of Heretick which is alwaies in a fundamentall point of Religion and yet an action doth not ly for calling a man Heretick also the Pope is a temporall Prince in Italy and for this cause also may pardon and this is out of the statute of 13 Eliz. and so they all agreed that the Action doth not ly for these words Pasche 1612. 10 Jacobi In the Common Bench. Marstones Case IN a common Recovery the Tenant appears by Attorney and vouches one which is present in Court which appears and vouches the common Vouchee and the Attorney hath a Warrant of the party acknowledged before a Judge but this was not entred of record and this was in Hillary tearme 16 Eliz. And it was moved by Dodridge the Kings Serjeant that the Warrant of Attorney might be now amended and entred upon the record and Coke supposed cleerly that it shall not be entred insomuch that it is a want of a Warrant of Attorney but if there had been a mis-construing of the Warrant of Attorney otherwise it is for this seems to be within the Statute of 27 Eliz. Chapter 5. Concerning amendments In Debt upon an obligation with condition to perform Covenants in an Indenture of Lease the Defendant pleads that after
and before the originall purchased the Indentnre was by the assent of the Plaintiff and the Defendant cancelled and avoyded and so demands Judgment if action and it seemes by Coke cleerly that the Plea is not good without averment that no Covenant was broken before the cancelling of the Indenture Pasch 12. Jacobi 1612. In the Common Bench. Barde against Stubbing IT was moved in arrest of Judgment that the Venire facias wants these words Et habeas ibidim nemina Juratorum but the words Venire facias duodecim c. were incerted and it seems by all the Justices that it was good and that the first words are supplyed in the last and they are aided by the statutes of Jeofai es after verdict and so it was adjourned In Audita querela sued by the sureties upon an escape made by the principall they being in execution offered to bring the Money into the Court or to put in sufficient Sureties to the Court and so prayed that they might be bayled and it was agreed that if Audita querela be grounded by specialty or other matter in writing or upon matter of Record Supersedeas shall be granted before that the party be in Execution and if he be in execution he shall be bayled but if it be founded upon a matter in Deed which is only surmise he shall not have Supersedeas in one case nor shall be bayled in the other case and so was the Opinion of all the Justices In an Action of Waste for digging of earth to make Brick Estrepement was awarded and upon Affidavit that the Writ of Estrement was delivered to the Sheriff and that he gave notice of that to the party and he notwithstanding that continues to make waste attachment was awarded Pasch 12 Iacobi 1612. In the Common Bench. Fetherstones Case Trinity 1612. IN Ejectione firme The Plaintiff had Judgment and an Habere facias possessionem to the Sheriff of Coventry which returnes that he had offered possession to the Plaintiff and he refused to accept it and it seems that the Plaintiff cannot have Habere facias possessionem insomuch that it appeares by the Record that he hath refused to have the possession The case was A Dean and Chapter being Lord of a Maunor parcell of the Demesnes of the Mannor being severall adjoyned to the Common which was parcell of the wast of the Mannor and one Copy-holder which had Common in the sayd Wast puts his Beasts into the sayd waste to take his Common and they for default of inclosure escape into the sayd Demesnes by which the Lord brings his action of Trespass and upon this the Defendant pleads the speciall matter and that the Lord and all those whose Estate he had in the said place where the trespass is supposed to be made have used to fence the said place which is parcell of the Demesnes of the sayd Mannor against the Commoners which have Common in the sayd Common being parcell of the waste and also of the demesnes of the sayd Mannor and that the Beasts of the sayd Defendant escaped into the sayd place in which c for default of inclosure and so demands Judgment upon which the Plaintiff demurrs in Law In the agreement of which it was agreed by Hutton and Haughton the Serjeants which argued it whether a man by prescription is bound to make fence against Commoners as it is agreed in the 22 H. 6. 7. 8. 21 H. 6. 33. But the doubt which was made in this case by Haughton which demurred was for that that the Lord which by the prescription ought to inclose is owner of the soyle also against which he ought to inclose and so he ought to inclose against himself and for that he supposed that the pleading should have been that there is such a custome there and of time out of minde that the Lord shall inclose against the Common insomuch that by that the Copy-holder would bind the Lord and upon that it was adjourned c. Pasch 12 Jacobi 1612. In the Common Bench. Sir Henry Rowles against Sir Robert Osborne and Margeret his Wife IN Warrantia Charte the case was Sir Robert Osborne and his Wife levyed a Fine of the Mannor of Kelmersh with other Lands in Kelmersh to Sir Henry Rowles against all persons and this is declared for the Lands in Relmersh to be to the use of Sir Henry Rowles for life with diverse Remainders over and for the Mannor no use was pleaded to be declared at all and then a Writ of Entry in the Post was sued against the sayd Sir Henry Rowles which vouched Sir Robert Osborne and his sayd wifeâ and this was declared for the sayd Lands to be to the use of the sayd Sir Henry Rowles for his life with other Remainders over which were declared upon the Fine of the Lands in Kelmersh only and of the Mannor of Kelmersh no uses were declared upon the Recovery also and upon this Recovery pleaded in barr the Plaintiffe demurred and it was argued by Dodridge Serjeant of the King for the Plaintiffe that the Plea in Barr was not good insomuch that it doth not appeare that the warranty which was executed by the Recovery was the same warranty which was created by the Fine and also the Fine was taken for assurance against the Issue in tayle and the Recovery to Barr the remainders and so one shall not destroy the other and for the first he sayd that a man may have of another severall warranties and severall causes of Voucher and all shall be together for warranty is but Covenant reall and as well as a man may have severall Covenants for personall things as well he may have severall reall Covenants for one self same Land as if the Father infeoff one with warranty and the Sonn also releases to the same Feoffee with warranty or if the Father infeoff one with warranty against him and his Heires and the Sonn release with warranty against all men the Feoffee may vouch one and Rebut against the other so of Warranty of Tenant in tayle and release of an Ancestor collaterall with warranty in Law and expresse warranty as it is agreed in 31 Ed. 1. Fitzh Voucher 289. And upon that he concluded that a man may have severall warranties of one selfe same man and the one may be executed and the other remaine notwithstanding that it be for one selfe same Land and he supposed the effect of these warranties are as they are used for if that may vouch generally and bind himselfe upon the Fine or upon his owne warranty or upon the warranty of his Ancestor notwithstanding that the voucher be generally as it is 31. Ed. 3. Warranty of Charters 22. So if he be vouched as Heire though that it were speciall but if he be Heire within age otherwise it is for that is a good Counter Plea that he was within age and so praied that the word might demur during his nonage 17.
Ed. 2. Counter Plea of voucher 111. 21. Ed. 4. 71. Then he supposed here was generall warranty which is executed and also another warranty which remaines notwithstanding any thing which appears to the Court for he hath not demanded any binding 10. Ed. 3. 15. a. b. Also the warranty in the Fine is the warranty of all the Conusees and the warranty upon which the voucher is is only the warranty of Sir Robert Osborne which cannot be intended the same warranty which is contained in the Fine which is by two as it is resolved in 10. Ed. 3. 52. But admitting that it agrees in all that is the voucher and the warranty in the Fine that is in number of persons and quantity of land and all other circumstances yet it shall be no Barr for the Common Recovery is only as further assurance for it is for forfeiture if it be suffered by Tenant for life as it is resolved in Pelhams Case 1. Coke Also he supposed that notwithstanding that the Fine was levied hanging the Writ of entry and âo Sir Henry Rowles made Tenant yet this is good being by purchase but not if it be by discent or by recovery upon elder Title And he supposed that if the recovery and the warranty might be together by any possible meanes they shall not be distroied insomuch that this is the common case of assurance and for that shall be taken as in Pattenhams Case 4. and 5. Phil. and Mary Dyer 157. and 2. Coke Cromwells Case 77. b. where a man makes a Feoffment upon condition rendring Rent and after suffers common recovery and yet this notwithstanding the condition and Rent remaines And so it seemes that in this case the warranty remaines notwithstanding the Recovery and so he concluded and praied Judgement for the Plaintiff Nicholls Serjeant for the Defendant and he seemed that the warranty is destroied first insomuch that the Recovery was to other uses and the Fine was when proved that there was no further assurance also he supposed that insomuch that it doth not appeare to what use the Recovery was for the Mannor of Kelmersh that for that it shall be intended to the use of Sir Robert Osborne himselfe and then for that also the warranty is distroied insomuch that part of the Land is re-assured to Sir Robert Osborne as in 40. Ed. 3. 13. The Father enfeoffes the Son with warranty which re-enfeoffes the Father this destroies the warranty So if they make partition by their owne Act as it is agreed in the 34. Ed. 3. Also he supposed that the Tenancy in Sir Henry Rowles is distroied before that the Fine was Levied insomuch that this was Executed by voucher and so he did not purchase hanging the Writ for this is also conveied from him by the Recovery in the value before that the Fine is levied and it is all one with the case where a man recovers upon good Title hanging a Writ and he agreed that the recovery had been for further assurance that then it shall be as it hath been objected by the other party and the warranty had remained but this he supposeth it was not insomuch it was to other uses then the Fine was and he intended that if the Estate to which the warranty is annexed be distroied the warranty also shall be distroied 19. H. 6. 59. 21. H. 6. 45. 22. H. 6. 22. and 27. So if the Estate be avoided the warranty is distroied if it be by the Act of the parties named also he supposed that the warranty is executed and that it shall be intended the same tye upon which the warranty is created as it is 10. Ed. 3. 51. Mauxells case Com if he demand no tye but enter generally into the warranty there shall be execution of all warranties and shall bind all his rights for otherwise all the Estates tayl cannot be bound by that But where the Lieu is demanded as where there are three severall Estates tayl limited to one man and upon voucher he enters generally into the warranty all the tayles shall be bound but if he demand the Lieu's which he hath to bind him to warranty there shall be a Barr of that only upon which the voucher is and the remedy is that if he be impleaded by the party that hath made the warranty he shall be rebutted by his owne warranty But if he be Impleaded by a stranger he shall vouche him that warranted that and if warranty be once executed by voucher and Recovery in value though that the Land recoverd in value be a defeasable Title yet the party shall not voucheat another time by the same warranty as it is 5. Ed. 3. Fitz. voucher 249. and 4. Ed. 3. 36. And for that in this case insomuch that the warranty was once executed he shall not vouche againe upon the same warranty Also it is not alledged in the Count that the Plaintiff was Impleaded by Writ of Entry in the Post but in the Per in which he might have vouched and so shall not have this Action where he might have vouched And also he supposed that Sir Henry Rowles shall not have benefit by this warranty without praying aid of those in remainder insomuch that he is but Tenant for life but he supposed that it was no Remainder but reversion for otherwise they are but as an Estate and he may have advantage of the warranty as it seemes without aid praying But not where there is Tenant for life with the reversion expectant And so he concluded and praied Judgement for the Defendant And he cited one Barons Case where Tenant in tayl levies a Fine with warranty and after suffers Recovery And it was agreed by all the Justices that yet the Recovery shall be a Barr to the Remainder notwithstanding that the Estate tayl be altogether barred and extinct by the Fine but Coke cheife Justice said that Wrayâ cheife Justice would not suffer that to be argued insomuch that it was of so great consequence being the common course of assurances But it seemes that the Recovery shall not be a Barâ for the Remainders for the causes aforesaid and he said that he was of councell in Bartons Case and thought this Objection to be unanswerable and of this opinion continued Pasche 1612. 10. Jacobi in the Common Bench. Richard Lampitt against Margeret Starkey EJECTIONE Firme upon speciall verdict the case was this Lessee for five hundred yeares devised that to his Father for life the remainder and residue of that after the death of his Father to his Sister the Devisor dies the Sister which hath a remainder takes a Husband the Husband at the request of the Father grants release and surrenders all his Right Tearme and Intrest to the Father which had the Possession And the question was if by that the remainder of the Tearme should be extinct or not And it was argued by Dodridge for the Plaintiff that the remainder remaines that notwithstanding insomuch that this is
concluded and praied Judgement for the Plaintiffs Wynch Justice that the Count is not good for the Plaintiffs have not alledged that they have used time out of mind c. To maintaine Ferrey but only that they have used to make Constitutions Secondly it is not alleadged that they onely have used to maintaine Ferrey and if they cannot prescribe in the sole using of that and to exclude others then others may use that as well as they being for the publick good for how shall they be punished if that they do not use and maintaine at the Common Law the Inhabitants of a Towne shall be punished for not repairing of a Bridge or high Way the which may be maintained by the Inhabitants together and if they do not do it then others may do it as well as others may repaire high Waies or Bridges as those which have used to repaire them as a common Host shall be punished in Eyre if he refuse to lodge any man and yet he which he refused to lodge may have an Action upon the Case for the refusall Also the Patent gives the forfeyture to the Port-reeve but the By-Law doth not make any mention who shall have it and he conceives that it shall not be as upon the Statute of 2. Ed. 6. Which gives penalty for not setting forth of Tythes but doth not appoint who shall have them and this was adjudged to be to him which ought to have the Tythes but this cannot be so here insomuch that it is against the Grant and agreed that a stranger shall be bound by By-Law where it is for the publick good but not otherwise and also the custome that these Bardge-men shall have the preheminence may be good as well as custome that the poore of such a Parish shall have common in such a place till such a day and then the others and so in this case and so he concluded that Judgement shall be Arrested Warburton Justice conceived that the Count is good and that the Inhabitants may prescribe very well as 47. Assis foure Townes were charged for the repaire of a High way and so may the two Townes for the Ferrey that he intended to be high way upon the water and also he conceived that this is inquirable in Eyre and also by the Justices of the Kings Bench and now by the Justices of Assises by Indictment by the name of Inhabitants The which may be as good an Action upon the Statute of Winton against the Inhabitants of the Hundred and so he conceived that in this case the Inhabitants of Milton and Gravesed may be punished by Indictment if they do not repaire the Ferrey and that the King there this day may erect a Ferrey in place where it is necessary for the King may erect office which is for the benefit of the Common Wealth but not to charge the Common Wealth And that if any will passe in his owne Ferrey without carrying of another this is no breaking of the By-Law and so he concluded that Judgement should be given for the Plaintiffs Coke cheife Justice seemed the contrary for he conceived it is not shewed in the Count to whom the Ferrey belongs for the owners of that are not mentioned the which it ought And yet he agreed that a Ferrey may be without owner as it is agreed 12. Ed. 4 8. Insomuch as this is locall and need not any Agent but out of Leete and Ferrey otherwaies it is for there ought to be Agent or otherwise the Ferrey should be of no use and for that there ought to be an owner Secondly it is alledged that Infra Easterne Townes there is such a custome that the Inhabitants may make constitutions and that the Inhabitants shall maintaine a Ferrey but not that there was a Ferrey but that he conceived it might be good insomuch that it is not traversable Thirdly what Action the Inhabitants may have if they be disturbed of it for this is no easement and they have no Estate of Inheritance and for that the Prescription by the name of Inhabitants is not good for they cannot have Estate and to the Satute of 6. H. 6. chapter 7. Which saith it is a laudable custome and usage that a Bardge shall be maintained but not that Inhabitants shall maintaine that nor those incorporate so that the Statute doth not make them capable of such a thing for which a Writ of right and assise by the Statute of Westminster 2. lies Fourthly That the custome and the Patent are repugnant for by the custome the Bardge hath not any preheminence nor precedence but equall liberty was to all water-men to carry what passengers that they could and with that also agreed the Statute of 6. H. 6. And then if the custome were not so this cannot be made by the grant of the Queene nor by the By-Law for this is the liberty of the Subject the which cannot be abridged nor restrained by them for if the King may grant such prehâminence here so may he do in all other Ferreis and places and also in the practise of the Law to have preaudience in this Court and in all other Courts of Justice And so should it be also of Butchers and Bakers and all others which used buying and selling And he said that the King hath preemtion of time in some places but this is not by his prerogative but by the custome of the place And he agreed that custome in subject may have preemption but not by the Kings grant for the King cannot grant that to another that he himselfe hath not by his prerogative and perchance he which hath such grant will not come to Market till all the Market be ended and he conceived that the River of Thames is so publick that the King cannot restraine that by his grant no more then he can grant preheminence to a Coachman to carry people into the Streets of London The which is adjudged upon the matter in the 50. of Ed. 3. Toll 2. Where the King grants Toll for every one which passeth by a Common way And agreed that it was not good if it be in a Common Way or in a Common River for as it is resolved in the 22. assis 93. Every common River is as high Street and Common Waies and the passengers Way as the water increases and the Thames is a branch of the Sea and a common Street as it appears by Bracton fol. 8. 5. The Plaintiffs have brought their Action by the name of Corporation of Port-reeve Jurats and Inhabitants of Milton and Gravesend and they are incorporate by the name of Port-reeve Jurates and Inhabitants of Gravesend possessors of Ships the which words are left out in the name by which the Action is brought so that the By-Law is not made by the same name by which they are incorporate nor the Action brought by the same name And yet he agreed that they might make a By-Law according to the grant without calling all the
is a stranger and doth not know if these Defendants are Executors or Administrators as it is said by Danby 9 Edw. 4. 13. And he conceived that the plea is good that the Defendants have not goods besides the goods which do not amount c. And divers presidents were cyted by him to this purpose as Trin. 18. Eliz. Rot. 1405. between Blanekson and Frye Hillary 40 Eliz. Rot. 902. Smalpeeces case and Trin. 44 Eliz. Rot. 1900. between Goodwin and Scarlet in all which the pleadings were all one with the plea in question and no exceptions taken to that and infinite other presidents may be shewed in the point for which cause he demanded Judgment for the Defendants Coke cheife Justice seemed that in an action brought against one as Executor he may plead that Administration was committed to him for such intent that the dead dyed Intestate and demands Judgment if action without traverse that he was Executor and with this agreed 1 Ed. 4. 2. a. 20 H. 6. 23. And so if the Ordinary be charged as Executor he may plead that he administred as Ordinary without traverse that he was Executor but only shewed that the party dyed Intestate and the Plaintiff ought to reply that he made a Will and the Defendant proved that and traverse that he dyed Intestate and with this agreed 9 Edw. 4. 33. and 1 Edw. 4. 11. And if an action be brought against Executor of his own wrong hee may plead that administration is granted to such an one and the Party dyed Intestate and demand Judgment if action for he shall not be charged for more goods then came to his hands But if a man administer of his own wrong and after rightfull administration is committed to him yet he may be charged as Executor of his own wrong insomuch that Right of action is attached in him But this seems for the goods that he hath administred before rightfull administration committed unto him And he cyted 14 Eliz. Dyer 305. b. where in debt brought against one as Executor which pleads never Executor nor ever administred as Executor and the Plaintiffe replies that he administred as Executor of the Will c. and so to Issue And in Evidence the Defendant shews Letter of administration to him committed of goods of the dead by which he administred them and before that he did not administer and this seems there to be good Evidence but the Book was Quere of that and for that he would rather plead that in abatement of the Writ and so the Book inclined also And he conceived here that the medling with the goods here by the Defendant as Administrator made him Executor of his own wrong insomuch that it was for Funeralls and when it is a work of Charity and the other is to preserve them And the Defendant hath not conveyed himselfe to be Executor insomuch that he said that administration was committed to him by an Arch-Deacon and he doth not say that Administration of right belonged to him to commit insomuch that hee hath but a sub-ordinate Jurisdiction And the Common Law doth not take notice that he nor no other but the Ordinary hath such power and for that the power of all which have such subordinate and peculiar Jurisdiction is pleaded that ought to be shewed as it seems by 1 Ed. 4. 2. a. b. 22 H. 6. 23. And the rather when this is pleaded by the Administrator himselfe which ought to have notice of that and make title to himselfe and if so it be then he conceived that the Recovery by Hornego was void and so all the goods confest remain as Assets Also he conceived that if the Executor allow a Writ to suffer Judgment to be had against him upon a Writ which is abateable he shall not have allowance of that but this shall be returned as Devastavit as in 10 Edw. 3. 503. a. If the Tenant vouch when he might have abated the Writ he shall lose the benefit of his Warranty So here and Com. Manwells case 12. a. 22 H. 6. 12. ãâã Also he conceived if a man be charged as Administrator where he is no Administrator he cannot plead that he never administred as Administrator but he ought to traverse the Commission of Administration as it appears by 21 H. 6. 23. And it seems also to him and by 9 Edw. 4. 33. that if a man be an Executor of his owne wrong and after administration is committed to him and he is charged as Executor after administration committed that the Writ shall abate otherwise if administration be committed hanging the Writ So if a man be made Executor and hee not knowing of that Iues letters of Administration he shall be named Administrator and if after when he hath notice of the Will he proves it then he shall be impleaded by the name of Executor for in such manner as the power is given to him by the Bishop he shall be charged and it seemes though that he plead where he is Administrator and is sued as Executor or otherwise in such manner that hee might have abated the Writ or suffer Judgment yet the Writ shall abate and he intended also that Executor of his owne wrong might pay debts due to another and shall be discharged and shall not be charged with more then he hath in his hands And if two Executors are joyntly sued and one confesse the action this shall bind him and his companion also for so much as he hath in his hands But if an Executor of his own wrong confesse the action this shall not prejudice him which is rightfull Executor and so he conceived that judgment ought to be given for the Plaintiff Warburton Justice conceived that the Barr is good notwithstanding that he did not shew that the Arch-Deacon had power to grant Administration insomuch it is no Inducement and the Defendant doth not relie upon it as Littleton saith in Trespasse where the Defendant pleades that it was made by two and the Plaintiff releases to one and if the Defendant pay due Debts it is not materiall whether he have Authority or not though that it be in another respect As if a man be Indicted of man-slaughter and aquitted and after is Indicted of Murder by the same man he may pleade another time aquitted insomuch that these are matters of substance But here it is but of forme and then if it be not shewed it is not materiall But the matter upon which he relied was insomuch that the Action was brought against two Executors and one hath confessed the Action And he intended without question that if this shall bind his companion and for that he will not dispute the other questions but declares his opinion cleerely that the Plaintiff ought to have Judgement against both these Defendants upon the confession of one and this shall bind his companion Wynch Justice conceived that the Plea is good by Administrator without traverse insomuch that it is to the Writ as it
appears by 9 Edw. 4. 33. 37 H. 6. 32 H. 6. 1. Ed. 4. 2. 50. Ed. 3. And he conceived that the burying is not any Administration nor the taking of the goods into his custody to preserve them no more then in Trover and Conversion when a man takes the goods for to preserve them And he agreed that where a man intitles himselfe to goods by Administration committed by any but by the Bishop he ought to pleade specially that he which committed it had power to doe it But here it is not so but only conveiance and for that need not here such precise pleading of that insomuch it is only execution of Administration and for that it is good without intitleing the Arch-Deacon And he agreed that an Executor of his owne wrong may pay Debts due to another and shall be discharged And he agreed also that the Confession of one Executor shall bind his Companion and that Judgement shall be given upon that for the Plaintiff And they all agreed that the pleading that the Defendant hath no goods besides the goods which do not amount c. it was not good and for these causes they all agreed that Judgement ought to be given to the Plaintiff Trinity 10. Jacobi in the Common Bench. Tyrer against Littleton 9. Jacobi Rot. 299. IN Trespasse for taking of a Cow c. Upon not guilty pleaded by the Defendant the Jury gives speciall Verdict as it followes that is that the Husband of the Plaintiff was seised of eighty Acres of Land held of the Defendant by Harriot service that is the best Beasts of every Tenant which died seised that he had at the time of his death and that the Husband of the said Defendant long time before his death made a Feoffment of that Land in consideration of marriage and advancement of his Son to the use of his Son and his Heires with such agreement that the Son should redemise to his Father for forty yeares if he so long lived and that after the marriage was had and the Son redemised the Land to his Father and the Father injoyed that accordingly and paied the Rent to the Lord and after died and that the Plaintiff had no notice of his Feoffment and that the Husband at the time of his death was possessed of the said Cow and that the Defendant took it as the best Beast in name of Harriot and also found the Statute of 13. Eliz. of fraudulent conveiances to deceive Creditors and so praied the direction of the Court and this was agreed by the Plaintiff aforesaid Nicholls Serjeant first that all conveiances made upon good consideration and Bona Fide are by speciall Proviso exempted out of the Statute of 13. Eliz. chap. And he conceived that this is made upon good consideration and Bona Fide and for that it is within the said Proviso and also he said that as upon the Statute of Marlebridge there is fraud apparent and fraud averrable as it appeares 12. H. 4. 16. b. Where in ward the Tenant pleads that his Father levied a Fine to a stranger the Lord replies that this was by Collusion to re-enfeoff the Heire of the Tenant at his full age and so averred that to be by Collusion to out the Lord of his Ward and this is fraud averrable But if the Tenant had enfeoffed his Tenant immediately in Fee-simple this is apparent without any averment and the Court may adjudge upon it And so upon the Statute of 27. Eliz. chap. 4. it appears by Burrells Case that the Fraud ought to be proved in Evidence or confessed in pleading or otherwise this shall not avoid conveiance for it shall not be intended 6 Coke 78. a. and see 33. H. 6. 14. b. Andrew Woodcocks case upon which he inferred that this is but a fraud averrable if it be a fraud at all and of this the Court could not take notice if it be not found by the Jury and he said upon the Statute of 32 H. 8. Of Devisees as it appeares by Knights Case 8 Coke and 12. Eliz. Dyer 295. 8 9 10 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17. And so he concluded and praied Judgement for the Plaintiff Harris Serjeant for the Defendant argued that the Circumstances which are found in the speciall Verdict are sufficient to satisfie the Court that it is fraud for as well as the Court may give direction to the Jury upon Evidence that it is fraud and what not as well may the Court Judge upon the special matter being found by special Verdict at large as in 9 El. Dyer 267. and 268. that is the special matter being found by special verdict at large as in 9 El. Dyer 267. 268. that is the speciall matter is found by Inquisition upon Mandamus and leave to the Court to adjudge if it be fraud or not and in 12 El. 294. and 295. 8. the speciall matter was found by Jury upon Eligit directed to the Sheriffe and by him returned to the Court And in Trinity 27. Eliz. between Saper and Jakes in Trover the Defendant pleades not guilty and gives in Evidence as assignement of a Tearme to him with power of revocation And the Court directed the Jury that this was fraudulent within the Statute of 27. Eliz. to defraud a purchasor and in Burrells Case 6. Coke 73. a. before the fraud to the Court upon Evidence to the Jury and the Court gave direction to the Jury that it was fraud and that upon the Circumstances which appeares upon the speciall Evidence And so in this case he conceived that insomuch the circumstances appear by the Verdict that the Jury may very well adjudge upon it and so he concluded and praied Judgement for the Defendant Coke cheife Justice that the Statute of 13. Eliz. Doth not aid the Defendant insomuch that the Feoffment was made for good consideration and for that shall be within the said Proviso for if that shall be avoided at all that shall be avoided by the Statute of Marlebridge which is ouly affirmance of the Common Law and this is the reason that not withstanding the Statute speakes only of Feoffment by the Father to his Son and Heire apparent yet a Feoffment to a Cosin which is Heire apparent is taken to be within the Statute and in the 24. of Eliz. in Sir Hamond Stranges Case It was adjudged that if the Son and Heire apparent in the life time of his Father purchase a Mannor of his Father for good consideration this is out of the Statute and so it was adjudged in Porredges Case also he said that the Law is an Enemie to fraud and will not intend it being a conveiance made for consideration of a marriage to be fraudulent no more then if the Father had made a Feoffment to the use of a stranger for life the remainder in Fee to his Son and Heire the which is not within the Statute of Marlebridge as it is agreed in Andrew Woodcocks Case 33.
H. 6. 14. b. Also he conceived that the Feoffment in consideration of marriage naturall love to his Son and that the Wife of the Sonne shall be Indowed and that the Son should redemise that to his Father for forty yeares if he so long lived and that the Father should pay the Rent to the Lord these he intended to be good considerations and for that should be within the said Proviso of the Statute of 13. Eliz. otherwise if it had been to defraud Creditors But if it had been to such intent that is to defraud Creditors this shall not be extended to other intent that is to defraud the Lord of his Harriot And in the 28. of Eliz. it was adjudged in the Kings Bench if a man make a Feoffment in Fee to the use of himselfe for life remainder to his Son in tayl with divers Remainders over with power of Revocation and after bargaines and sells to a stranger upon condition and after performes the Condition that yet the first conveiance remaines fraudulent as it was at the time of the making of it But this is only as to the purchasor and not as to any other And in Goodhers Case 3. Coke 60. a. In debt against Heire which pleads nothing by discent day of the Writ purchased the other joynes Issue and gives in Evidence fraudulent conveiance and upon speciall Verdict adjudged that it was very good See also 4. Coke 4. b. c. Vernâns Case the Collusion to have Dower and Joynture also And so he concluded that Judgement should be given for the Plaintiff Warburton Justice agreed that the fraud shall not be intended if it be not found no more then if a man grant an Annuity to another Quam diu se bene gesserit in Annuity for that he need not to averr that he hath behaved himselfe well for this shall be intended if the contrary be not shewed of the other party So here insomuch that it is not found to be fraudulent it shall be intended to be Bona fide And he agreed that if it had been fraudulent at the first If the Son had made a Feoffment over in the life of the Father as it is agreed in Andrew Woodcocks Case 33 H. 6. 14. that then the fraud is determined So here when the Son hath made a Lease to his Father this determines the fraud if any be and so he concluded that Judgment should be given for the Plaintiff Wynch Justice agreed insomuch that it is expresse consideration found by the Verdict and for that other consideration shall not be intended and also that it shall not be intended that the Conveyance was made to defraud or to deceive the Lord of such a Peccadell as Harriot is which is of small consequence but if it be a fraud within the Statute of 27 Eliz. apparent that is if it containe power of revocation which is declared to be apparent fraud by the Statute the Court may take notice of that without any averrment And he saith That in the 2. and 3. Eliz. Dyer Wainsfords Case 193. a. and 9 Eliz. Dyer 267 268. there is no averrment of fraud but expresse Issue joyned upon the Fraud and for that he need not any other averrment And so he concluded also that judgement should be given for the Plaintiffe and so it was Ruled accordingly if the Defendant did not shew other matter to the contrary at such a day which was not done Trinity 10. Jacobi 1612. In the Common Bench. Strobridge against Fortescue and Barret IN a Replevin the case was this A man seised of Lands in Fee devises Rent out of it with clause of Distress and dies his Son and Heire enters and dyes the Rent is behind the Son of the Son dyes and his Son enters and makes a Feoffment to the Plaintiff and the Devisee of the Rent releases all Actions Debts and Demands to the Feoffor and after distraynes the Beasts of the Feoffee for the Rent behinde before the Feoffment and it seemes the Release is not good insomuch that the Devisee had no cause of Action at the time of the Release made against him to whom the Release is made nor Demand against him otherwise if the Release had been made to the Feoffee for he was subject to the distress and this is a demand Trinity 10. Jacobi 1612 In the Common Bench. Case of Cinque Ports NOTE that Coke said that it hath been adjudged by three Judges against one in a Case of Cinque Ports that the Cinque Ports cannot prescribe to take the Body of a Freeman in Withernam as they use for another for this is against the Statute of Magna Charta Quod nullus liber homo Imprisonetâr nisi per Legate Judicium and also against the liberty of a Subject but they more inclined that they might take the Goods of one in Withernam when another is arrested and them retain and this seemes the more reasonable Custome and Prescription The Case was Tenant for life the Remainder for life with warranty the first Tenant for life was impleaded and he vouches him in Reversion but he first prays in aid of him in Remainder and if this aid prayer shall be granted this was the question And it seemes by Nicholls Serjeant that it shall not be granted see 11 H. 4. 63. Where it is agreed that if a man makes a Lease for life Remainder for life Remainder in fee and the first Tenant for life hath ayd of him in remainder for life and he in Fee joyntly and 44 Edw. 3. 20. in Trespasse against a Miller which takes Toll where he ought to grind Toll-free the Defendant saith that J. had the Mill for life and that he is his Deputy the reversion to W. in Fee and prays ayde of the Tenant for life and of the Tenant in reversion and had it of the Tenant for life and not of him in reversion and this for default of Privity as it seems to Brooke Ayde 30. Haughton conceived that it should be granted for Tenant for life notwithstanding that he may plead any Plea yet he doth not know what Plea to plead without him in reversion but by the ayde praying al the Estate shall be reduced into one and the warranty shall come and for that he conceived that the first Tenant for life shall have ayde of him in remainder for life Wynch Justice conceived that ayde shall not be granted against the first Tenant for life against him in remainder for life for he conceived that ayde is alwaies to be granted when the defects of him and his Estate which prays it are to be supplyed by him which is prayed that this is the reason that he may have ayde of his Wife and where there are many remainders the first Tenant may have ayde of them all otherwise where he is Tenant for life the remainder for liâe and the reversion expectant for the Tenant for life cannot supply his
awarded good because it comes in Lieu of Goods which they had as Executors and shall be Assets in their hands as the Goods should have been and for that it is well brought in the Detinet only And they said that in the principall case it shall be mischeivous if the Action shall be brought in the Debet and Detinet for it may be the Rent reserved is of more worth then the Profits of the Land will amount unto and that the Executors or Administrators have no other Assets now shall be the Executor or Administrator be charged with his own proper Goods which shall be mischeivous and the case of 10. H. 7. 5. and 6. that is direct in the point was often times cited and all these three things which were of councell with the Defendant informed the Court that they were of Councell with Hargrave when the Judgement given in the Kings Bench was reversed for Error in this very point and for this cause because the Action was brought in the Debet and Detinet where it should be in the Detinet only And so they praied that the Judgement should be hindered But by the whole Court except Yelverton And so it was adjudged that the Action was well brought as it is and especially for the reasons given in Hargraves Case 5. Coke 31. And to that which hath been said by Yelverton Justice that in all cases where Executors are charged by the name of Executors or Administrators that there the Action shall be against them in the Detinet only Flemming cheife Justice answered that ârue it is in all personall things where they are named as Executors Action shall be in the Detinet But as it is an Action of Debt for Rent reserved upon a Chattell reall and an Executor is as an Assignee in Law and so charged as privy in Estate and not meerely as Executor and if he have no more Assets then the Rent which he is to pay he may plead nothing in his hands against all the World and to that that hath been said that the Executor hath been charged of his own Goods If the profits be not more then the Rent or the Rent more then the profits to this he said that in this case where the Executor hath the Tearme and hath not any other Assets that they may wave this Tearme And in Action of Debt brought against him for the Rent may plead to the occupation and that recover The reason of the diversity between this case and the case of 28. H. 8. Dyer 14. is plain for in an Action of Debt against the Termor himselfe Non habuit nec occupavit is no Plea for there was a contract between them and for this privity of contract is the Lessee charged though he did not occupy But in the case of an Executor the privity of the contract is gone and so may be a difference But yet it seemes if he have Assets sufficient to pay the Rent he cannot wave it And to the case 14. H. 4. 28. that hath been cited that doth speake nothing how the Action should be brought And the Justices have seen the record of Hargraves case and the Reversall of that And they said the same error which was in Hargraves case is in this case and for that bring your Writ of Error in the Exchequer chamber if you will for we so adjudge And then it was moved that the Lord Rich was Tenant in Tayle of part of the reversion and Tenant in Fee-simple of the other part and so it seemes that he ought to have two Actions because he hath as two reversions But it was resolved by all the Court that if a man have a reversion of part in Fee-simple and of the other part in tayl and makes a Lease for yeares rendring a Rent he shall have but one Action both being in the hands of one But otherwise it had been if the reversion had been in severall hands they should not Joyne in Debt and for that Fenner put this case two Coparceners are of a reversion and they make partition now the Rent is apportioned and they shall sever in Debt But if one dies without Issue and the part discends to the other Parcener now he shall have but one Action of Debt againe and so it is if a man makes a Lease of two Acres rendring Rent and after grants the reversion of one Acre to J. S. and of the other Acre to J. N. now they shall sever in Debt for this Rent but if J. S. and J. N. Grant their reversions againe to the first Lessor he shall have but one Action of Debt and so the exception dissalowed by all the Court and the Judgement given for the Plaintiff according to the Verdict Yates and Rolles THe case was this J. S. covenants by Indenture with J. N. I. D. and A. B. to enter Bond to pay ten pound to J. N. and J. N. dies and his Administrator brings a Writ of covenant and the question was insomuch that this ten pound was to be paid to J. N. if his Administrator shall have Action of Covenant or if the Action shall survive to the other two and it was moved by Stephens that the Action shall be well brought by the Administrator for this shall be taken as a severall covenant and this now is in nature of a Debt and enures only to him which shall have it also the payment of the money which is the effect of the covenant shall be to him only Ergo the Damages for the not performing of it shall goe to him also and by consequence to his Administrator But it was adjudged insomuch that this was a joynt covenant that this shall survive to the others and not well brought by the Administrator So also resolved that insomuch that the words are that he would enter Bond and doth not say to whom that this shall be intended to the Covenantees and though that the Solvendo is but to one of them yet that is very good as an Obligation made to three Solvendum to one of them is good by Fenner and by Williams Obligation to two Solvendum ten pound to one and ten pound to another both ought to joyne in Debt upon this Obligation and Judgement for the Defendant Sammer and Force THe Case was this The Lord of a Copy-hold Mannor where Copy holders are for life grants Rent-charge out of all the Mannor one Copy-hold Escheats the Lord grants that againe by Copy the question was If the Grantee shall hold it charged or not and by the whole Court but Fenner he shall not hold it charged because he comes in above the Grant that is By the custome the same Law of Statutes Recognizances or Dowers but the 10. of Eliz. Dyer 270. by the whole Court that he shall hold it charged but this hath been denyed for Law in a Case in the Common Bench between Swaine and Becket which see Trinity 5. Jacobi But to Coke Justice it seemed that
Grant his Intent was cleerly to pass all but Williams if he had sayd Totum Molendinum suum or all his Estate in the Mill there paradventure it should haue been otherwise and so a difference where he saith he grants the Mill and all his Estate in that and where he grants all his Estate in the Mill for in the first case all passes by the Grant of the Mill and these words which are after are but words explanatory as ârooke sayd and it was adjourned And after in Easter Tearm next insuing Hitcham the Queens Attorney came again and prayed that the Judgment be affirmed and Yelverton of Grayes Inne sayd that he hath considered of Nokes Case 4. Coke and this was all one with this case for the case was thus A man lets a House in London by these words demise Grant c. That the Lessee should injoy the House during the Tearm without eviction by the Lessor or any claiming from or under him and the Lessor was bound to peform all Covenants Grants Articles and Agreements as our case is and there by the whole Court that the sayd express Covenant qualifies the generalty of the Covenants by the Words Demise and Grant which is all one with our case for first he granted Totum Molendinum and after covenant that he should injoy c. against himself and all which claime in by from or under him and after binds himself to perform all Grants Covenants Articles and Agreements and so it seems to him that it is au expresse Covenant in this Case as well as in other and qualifies the generall Covenant implyed by the word Grant and then the Grantee being outed by a title Paramount no Action of Debt upon such Obligation and prayed that the Judgment be reversed and the Justices sayd they would consider Nokes Case and the next day their opinions were prayed again and the cheife Justice sayd that he had seen Nokes case and said that there is but a small difference between the cases but he sayd that some diflemay be collected For first in our case is a Recitall of the Estate of the Grantor that is that all belongs to him as Survivor and for that this was a manner of Inducement of the Grantee to be more willing and forward to accept of the Grant and to give the more greater consideration for it but in Nokes case there is no recitall and so this may be the diversity Secondly In Nokes Case the Tearm past all in Interest at the first and the Grantee or Lessee had once the effect of this Lease in Interest of the Lessor but in this case when two Tenants in Common and one grants Totum molendinum there passes but a half at the first and so the grant is not supplyed for the other halfe and then if the speciall Covenant shall qualify the generall c. The Grantee shall not have any remedy for a half at all and this may be the other diversity but admitting that none of these will make any difference then he sayd that all the Court agreed that this point in Nokes Case was not adjudged but this was a matter spoken collaterally in the case and the case was adjudged against the Plaintiff for other reasons for that that he did not shew that he which evicted this Tearm had title Paramount for otherwise the Covenant in Law was not broken and for this reason Judgment was given against the Plaintiff and not upon the other matter and so the whole Court against Nokes Case And the cheif Justice sayd that to that which is sayd in Nokes case that otherwise the speciall Covenant shall be of no effect if it cannot qualify the generalty of the Covenant in Law he sayd that this serves well to this purpose that is that if the Lessor dyes and any under the Testator claim the Estate that the Action of Covenant in this case lies against his Executors which remedy otherwise he cannot have for if a man makes a Lease by these words Devise and Grant and dyes Action of Covenant doth notly against his Executors as it is sayd in the 9. Eliz. Dyer 257. But otherwise upon expresse Covenant and then this expresse speciall Covenant shall be to this purpose And also it seems to him that if a man devise and grant his Land for years and there are other Covenants in the Deed that in this case if the Lessor binds himself to perform all Covenants that he is not bound by his Bond to perform Covenants in Law and he cited that to this purpose the Books of 22 H. 6. and 6 Ed. 6. B. Tender that if a man makes a Lease for yeares rendring Rent this is Covenant in Law as it is sayd 15 H. 8. Dyer and a man shall have Debt or Covenant for that and yet if a man binds himself in a Bond to perform all Covenants where there are other Covenants in the Deed and after doth not pay the Rent no action of Debt lyeth upon this Obligation nor the nature of the Debt altered by that and he sayd that the Munday next they would pronounce Judgment in the Writ of Errour accordingly if nothing shall be sayd to the contrary and nothing was sayd Hillary 7. Jacobi 1609. In the Kings Bench. Bartons Case THE Case was this A man was taxed by the Parish for Reparations of the Church and the Wardens of the Church sued for this Taxation in the spirituall Court and hanging this Suit one of the Wardens released to the Defendant all Actions Suits and Demands and the other sued forward and upon this the Defendant there procured a Prohibition upon which matter shewed in the Prohibition was a Demurre joyned and Davenport of Grayes Inne moved the Court for a Consultation and upon all the matter as he sayd the point was but this If two Wardens of a Church are and they sue in the Court Christian for Taxation and one Release if that shal barr his Companion or not And it seems to him that this Release shall not be any Barr to his Companion or Impediment to sue for he sayd that the Wardens of a Church are not parties interested in Goods of the Church but are a speciall Corporation to the Benefit of the Church and for that he cited the Case in 8 Ed. 4. 6. The Wardens of the Church brought Trespass for goods of the Church taken out of their possession and they counted Ad damnum Parochianorum and not to their proper damage and the 11 H. 4. 12. 12 H. 7. 27. 43 H. 7. 9. Where it is sayd expresly that the Wardens of the Church are a corporation only for the Benefit of the Church and not for the disadvantage of that but this Release sounds to disadvantage of the Church and for that seems to him no Barr also this Corporation consists of two persons and the Release of one is nothing worth for he was but one Corps and the moyity of the Corps could not release
Thirdly The third point was that after the disseisin of the Tenant for life he that had future Interest of a Tearme to begin after the death of the Lessee for life during the disseisin assignes over all his Interest if this assignement be good or not and he argued that not for by him the disseisin of the Tenant for life the future Interest to commence after the death of the Tenant for life is converted into a Right and Right of a Tearme cannot be transferred over for though that Lessee for years to begin presently may grant over his Interest before his Entry and it is well for that that it is an Interest forth with yet if before his Entry the Lessor be disseised by a stranger yet by him now he cannot grant his Interest over for that it is converted into a Right of a Tearme but he ought to re-enter before that the Lessee may grant over his Tearme so in our case though that before the disseisin of the Lessee for life the future Interest was transferrable over for that that it was Interest though that it was not a Lease in posaession yet when the Tenant for life was disseised then his Interest of a Tearme was turned into a Right of a Tearme and then it is not transferable over till the re-entry by the Lessee for life and he said that it was resolved by the 2. cheif Justices in the Star-chamber as he hath heard that if Lessee for years be and before his entry a stranger enters and disseises the Lessor that now the Lessee cannot grant his Tearme before that the Lessor hath entred or he himselfe hath gained the Tearme in posaession And so it seemes to him that the future Tearme doth not passe by this assignement and then it is extinguished by the purchase which commeth after and then the Justification of the Defendant as Servant to the Assignees not good And so upon all the matter he praied Judgement for the Plaintiff Williams Justice said that it was cleer if a man have a Lease for years to begin after the death of a Lessee for life as is the case at the Barr that though that the Lessee for life be disseised yet the Interest remaines good Interest to the Lessee and is not turned into a Right of a Tearme and for that he may grant it over notwithstanding the disseisin and so is Sapphins case 5. Coke 104. Otherwise if the Lessee for years had been any time in posaession by force of his Lease and it is Adjourned At another day the same Tearme the case was argued againe by Yelverton of Grayes Inne of the other part that is for the Defendant and first he said that the Plaintiff which claimes under the Wife of Hlobeame hath not any right to one Moytie cleerely for the Husband and the Wife were Joynt-Tenants before the coverture So that they take by Moyties and not by Intirities and when the Husband bargaines and sells all that is a seperation of the Joyntenancy and his Moytie is gone for ever as it appeares by 3. M. Dyer 149. 82. So that for one moytie it is cleer that the Plaintiff hath not any right any way how ever the case prove for the other Moytie and this Moytie which was conveied by the Husband is discended to the Defendant which hath no speciall outer found by the Verdict But only that he entered which he well might having the other halfe and then no Trespasse found by the Jury and also the Damages found by the Jury are Intire and then being no cause of Damages for part there shall be no Judgement for the residue And the first point that he moved was if after this disseisin and feoffment over the Feoffor might tender the money to cease the first Estate and it seemes that not for the Free-hold cannot accrue as it seemes to him by any tender after his disseisin and so it hath been agreed to him as he said by the Councell of the other part and then by him this condition consisting of two parts this is Disseisin of one Estate and Accruing of the other Estate if by this desseisin the condition be distroied for the accruing of the Estate it seemes also that it shall be distroied as to the ceasing of the first Estate for if a condition be distroied in part it shall be distroied in all for it is Intire and cannot be apportioned and by consequence if one Estate cannot accrue the other shall not cease And he resembled it to the cafe in the 14. H. 8. 17. And Perkins condition being in the Coppulative one part being dispenced with the other was a discharge so when a man hath election to do one of two things if one be discharged though that it be by the Act of God as by death c. Yet the other shall be discharged by the Law as it was in Langtons Case 5. Coke 22. a Fortiore when one is discharged by the Act of the party also by him if he had made any Feoffment after this desseisin yet the very disseisin would destroy the accruing of the Estate for though that he do not gaine Fee by the disseisin but only Estate for life and retaines his old reversion in him according to 9. H. 7. 25. Yet the Fee and the Free-hold are so conjoyned by discent of that Estate alters an entry as it appeares by 3. Ed. 3. Entry Congeable 58. And if he in reversion disseise Tenant for life the Contingent uses shall never rise by Chidleys Case first of Coke 158. Condition that he retaine his old remainder no more of the accruing of the Fee in our Case for by him it appeares by 10. Assis and Nicholls Case Com. That Estate ought to accrue upon posaession or at least upon an Estate in being and not upon a right of an Estate only And for that he cited 6. R. 2. Pleasingtons Case Lease for years upon condition that if the Lessee be outed he shall have Fee though that he be outed yet he shall not have Fee for that that at the time of the condition performed he had but a right of Tearme and no Tearme in posaession so is our case after the disseisin he having but right the Estate cannot accrue Secondly if the Grantee or he to whose use may performe the Condition either by the Common Law or by Statute Law And he conceived that none of these might performe that for first at the common Law though that Grantees of reversions may take advantage of a Condition by way of cesser of Estates upon the condition performed yet this is only when the condition was to be performed of the part of the Lessee and so was the case cited by Serjeant Nicholls of 11 H. 7. but if the condition were of the part of the Lessor otherwise it was as the Book is in 26 H. 6. Entries And then a Fortiori here the Assignee of a Disseisor cannot performe the condition which may be performed of the part
of the Lessor But he agreed the case of Littleton that an Assignee of an Estate may perform a condition in preservation of an Estate otherwise of an Assignee of a Reversion in destruction of an Estate so at the Common Law it is clear that the Feoffee cannot perform the condition and by him it is cleerly out of the Statute of 32 H. 8. for this Statute doth not extend to a collaterall condition as it appears by Spencers case 5. Coke and so hath been many times after this adjudged and this is a collaterall condition Ergo c. And so concluded and prayed Judgment for the Defendant Nicholls Serjeant to the contrary and that this Disseisin hath not suspended the condition but that he may pay the Money and make the Estate to cease notwithstanding the Disseisin for-that that the condition is collaterall like to the 20 of Ed. 4. and 20 H. 7. That where a Feoffee upon a collaterall condition takes back an Estate for years yet this shall not suspend the condition but it may be performed or broken notwithstanding the Lease for that that it is collaterall so in our case for suppose that the condition had been if he marry Mistris Holbeam that then his Estate shall cease and as well it shall be upon the Tender of the Money here and he said that this case was late in the Common Bench. This feoffment was made to the use of the Feoffor for life Remainder to another for life the Remainder to the third in tayl the Remainder to the right Heirs of the Feoffor in fee with power of Revocation and after the Feoffor lets for years and during the Tearm he revokes the mesne Remainders and it seems to the Justices that well he may for that that the Lease for years goes only out of the Estate for life as he sayd and for that the power of Revocation as to the Mesne Remainders was not suspended Quere of the truth of this case in the common Bench for perchance it is not truly collected but so entred and so he prayed Judgment for the Plaintiff Flemming cheife Justice sayd that the point of the principall case would be if by the wrong of the Lessor the Estate of the Lessee shall be prevented to accrue then he might perform the condition to determine the ancient Estate that is the Lease for years and it is adjourned Pasch 8. Jacobi 1610. In the Kings Bench. Earle of Shrewsbury against the Earle of Rutland IN a Writ of Errour the Earle of Rutland brought an Assise of Novel Disseisin against the Earle of Shrewsbury and four others and the Plaint was of the office of the keeping of the Park of Clepson and of the vailes and fees of the sayd Parke and of the Herbage and Paunage of the same and the Demandant made his title and alledged that the Queen Eliz. was seised of Clepsam Park in fee in right of her Crown and that she being so seised by her Letters Patents under the great Seal granted unto one Markham the keeping of the Park of Clepson with the vailes and fees and the Herbage and Paunage of the same Park for his life after the Queen Eliz. reciting the Grant made to Markham and that Markham was alive gave and granted by her Letters Patents to the Earl of Rutland the Office of the keeping of the sayd Clepson Parke with the Fees and Wages to that appertaining to have and to hold to him for his life after the death of Markham or after the surrender or forfeiture of his Letters Patents and further granted the Herbage and Paunage to the sayd Earle of Rutland for his life and doth not say when this shall begin after which the Queen Eliz. died and the Eee-simple discended to our Lord the King which-now is as lawfull Heir to the Crown of England which granted that to the Earle of Shrewsbury after which Markham dyed and the Earle of Rutland entered and was seised till the Earle of Shewsbury with four others entered upon him and dissersed him and to that the Tenants alledged no wrong no disseisin and when the Assise was to be taken in the Country the Array was challenged by the Tenants for that that one of the Tenants in the Assise had an Action of Trespasse hanging against the Sheriff and this challenge was not allowed and the Assise being perused at large for the Herbage and Paunage they found that the said Queen Eliz. was seised of Clepson Park as aforesaid and by her Letters Patents as afore is rehearsed granted the Keeping of this to Markham for his life and further by the same Letters Patents granted to him the Fees and Wages to that belonging and further granted by Letters Patents and doth not say Easdem to him the Herbage and Paunage of the sayd Park and that the Queen after the reciting the Grant made to Markham and that Markham was alive granted to the Earle of Rutland the keeping of the sayd Park and vailes and fees to have and to hold after the death surrender or forfeiture of the Letters Patents of Markham for his life And further by the sayd Letters Patents shee granted the Herbage and Paunage of the same Park to him for his life as more fully appears by the Letters Patents and it was not expressed as to the Herbage and Paunage when that began and they found the death of Markham and that the Earle of Rutland put two Horses into the sayd Park to take seisin of the sayd Herbage and Paunage and they found further the grant of the King to the Earle of Shrewsbury of the fee-simple and of that prayed the advise of the Court and to the keeping of the Park they found the seisin and disseisin of that and of the fees and wages to the Dammages c. And this being adjourned into the Common Bench was remanded into the Country and there Judgment was given for all for the Demandant and after this it came into the Kings Bench by Writ of errour and the Errours assigned by the councell of the Tenants and argued at the Barr were foure The first was that the Earle of Rutland himself between the verdict and the Judgment hunted in the Park and kild a Buck and took a shoulder of that for his fee and so he hath abated his Assise and so the Judgment was given upon a Writ abated and therefore they cannot plead that in abatement insomuch that it was mesne betwixt the Judgment and the verdict they assigned that for errour The second was because the principall challenge was not allowed where that ought to have beene allowed and the challenge was that one of the Tenants had an Action or Trespasse hanging against the Sheriff before the Assise The third was Because the Jury have found the Letters Patents made to Markham and that the Queen granted to him by her Letters Patents the custody of the Parke of Clepson in Clepson And further by the same Letters Patents granted the vailes
and fees c. And further granted the Herbage and Paunage and have not found that this was granted by the same Letters Patents and then if this be not granted by the same Letters Patents then there is not any grant of this to the Earle of Rutland because there is no receitall of the Patent by which the Herbage and Paunage was granted to Markham The fourth errour was that they have erred in point of Law and to that the point is but this the King grants the Herbage and Paunage of a Park to one for life and after reciting that grant and that the Patentee is alive grants that to another and doth not say when that shall begin and it seems to them that the Argument for the Plaintiffes in the Writ of errour that this was a voyd grant and so the Judgment erronious but I have not the Report of the Arguments of the Conncellors at the Barr but only of the Judges which moved two other errours in the case not moved by the councell at the Barr and Crooke Justice rehearsed the case as before And to the first errour he conceived that this is no errour and that for two reasons First He tooke a difference betweene a thing which abates the Writ by Plea as if a man brings an Assise against another and mesne between verdict and Judgment the Plaintiff dies this matter shall abate the Writ without Plea and for that if Judgment be given upon such verdict the Judgment is erronious but in our case an entry doth not abate the Writ without pleading that and now as this case is this cannot be pleaded being between Verdict and Judgment and for that it shall not be assigned for Errour see 19 Assise 8 Where this difference is taken and agreed Secondly Admit that this entry might have abated the Writ in Facto without Plea yet there is no such entry alledged which might abate the Writ in Facto without Plea for the entry is alledged that the Earl of Rutland entred to hunt and kild a Buck and took a shoulder of that for his fee and it seems that this is no such entry that shall abate the writ for he hath now entred to another purpose to hunt the which he could not do but the entry ought to have been alledged that he entred to keep for in every entry the intent of the Entry is to be regarded and to this purpose he cited the case of Assise of Freshforce Com. 92. and 93. Where entring into the Seller hanging the Assise of that to see the Antiquity of the House there was no Entry to abate the Writ and the case of 26 Assise 42. where the Disseisee hanging the Assise comes and sets his foot upon the Land but takes no profits and adjudged that he should recover notwithstanding so in this case the intent is not shewed that is that he entred to keep possession but to hunt nor was it such entry which should abate the writ and to that which is sayd that he kild a Buck and took the shoulder of that for his fee this doth not help for if that had been a Buck which he might to have kild by vertue of his Office he ought to have shewed his warrant for otherwise a Parker cannot kill a Buck if not that it be for his fee and then he shall have the Buck and not a shoulder only also it is alledged that he took a shoulder and doth not say the best shoulder or the right shoulder and this ought to be shewed in certain And so for he first Errour he couceived that this is no cause to reverse the Judgment and to the challenge he sayd that he would speake to that at the last and for that he now spake to the errours supposed in the grant And first to Markhams Grant where the Jury found the Queen Eliz. granted to him the keeping of the Park and by the same Letters Patents grant the fees and Wages and further granted by her Letters Patents and doth not say Easdem the Herbage and Paunage it seems to him that this is very well for two reasons First insomuch that there is a copulative which is this word Et and also a Relative which is this word Vlterius and this word conjoynes the matter precedent with the subsequent and the word Vlterius hath necessary relation to the same Letters Patents and so Ex precedentibus subsequentibus the Iury hath well found the matter Secondly these words are supplied in the second Patent for there the Jury have found that the Queene hath granted that to Marham by the same Letters Patents and so for these two reasons he concluded that this is no Error to reverse the Judgement And to the Patent made to the Earle of Rutland it seemes to him also that this is very good and all that he said in effect was that in construction of the Patents of the King such exposition is to be made that if any reasonable meaning may be conceived they shall not be defeated but shall stand good And so he said in our case that it is necessarily intended that this was also to begin after the Estate of Markham determined and for that good And he said that a man ought not to make a curious and captious interpretation of the Kings Patents for Talis Interpretatio injure Reprobatur And to the challenge that seemed unto him a principall challenge and this not being allowed where it ought to be allowed this is an error as it is said 8. of Assises 23. and for this error it seemes to him that the Judgement shall be reversed and to that he said he relied much upon the book of 11 H. 4. 25. which takes a difference between Debt and Trespasse for battery for the booke saith that a man may demand his Debt without giving occasion of any malice But Battery is an evill Action and there the book is resolved that it shall be a principall challenge and so he saith in Trespasse this being with force and Armes that c. And in 8. H. 5. in a Assise the Tenant challenges the array because he had an Action of Trespasse hanging against the Sheriff And there the array was affirmed because it appeares that the Defendant had brought this Action by Covin against the Sheriff which case proves as he said that if there be not any Covin this is a principall challenge and 38 H. 6. 7. accordingly and the case 28. Assise 11. where the Defendant in Assise challenged a Juror because he had an Action of Trespasse hanging against him and was outed by award and in 21. Ed. 4. 12. it is said where there is an apparent favour or apparent displeasure there shall be principall challenge and certainly though the Law may intend that a man may lawfully demand his right and without malice yet it appeares that the nature of men is perverse and froward and few Actions are begun without apparent displeasure especially
Actions of Trespasse Pedibus Ambulando and vexation plainly appeares when Actions are begun upon such slight occasions and in Actions of Trespasse there issueth a Capias for a Fine and so the Defendant shall be Fined and Imprisoned and sure to be deprived of his liberty is a thing distastefull And it cannot be but that displeasure shall be between them which endeavour to restraine one the other of their liberty and so he concluded that this was a principall challenge and not being allowed this is error and so for this cause he reversed the Judgement Also it seemed to him as this case is there is no seisin found of the Paunage for the Jury have found that the Earle of Rutland hath put in two Horses and it seemes to him that Horses cannot take seisin of Paunage which is properly meate for Hoggs and so for this reason also insomuch that there is no seisin found of the Paunage and the Jury ought to find of necessity a Seisin and Desseisin it seemes to him that this is error and so the Judgement ought to be reversed and at the same day Williams Justice rehearsed the case as before and in his argument he spake First to Grants Secondly to the challenge Thirdly to the abatement of the Writ And it seemes to him that none of these matters were sufficient to reverse the Judgement but yet he conceived for two other causes that the Judgement shall be reversed And first concerning Markhams Patent that the Jury have found very good though that they have not said by the same Letters Patents but he said that it had been more proper if they had found that the King had granted that by the same Letters Patents and for that he cited the case of Information of Mines in the Com. And the pleadings before the case there the Letters Patents of the King are pleaded and where the King grants divers things it is there said that the King by the same Letters Patents granted and so the case of Grendon against the Bishop of Lincolne where the King by his Letters Patents granted to a Deane and Chapter that they should hold an Advowson to their proper use and further granted by the same Letters Patents c. And so he said in this case that this had been more properly found if it had been found that the King Per Easdem Litteras Patentes granted yet this is very good as it is and this as he said by the Intendment for it cannot be otherwise intended and for that he cited the book of Entries in Title Covenant That where a man brings a Writ of covenant and counts upon an Indenture that is that the Defendant covenanted to do such a thing and further covenanted and doth not say by the same Indenture yet this is very good because it cannot be otherwise intended but when that is by the same Indenture and where things shall be taken by Intendment he cited the case of 5. Assis 2. Where in Assise of Common the Plaintiff made him Title that is that he was seised after the Coronation of King H. this shall be intended H. 3. See Brooke Limitation 4. and the Case of 17. Eliz Dyer 342 Where these Letters H. R. A. F. shall be intended Henricus Rex Angliae Franciae c. And he cited the case of 21. H. 7. 32. Where a man pleads a release made in Villa de West the County of Middlesex and doth not say secondarily In Predicta Villa And there these Justices held that good and it shall be intended the same Town so he said in this case this shall be intended that Grant by the same Letters Patents though that Easdem be left out And to the Grant to the Earle of Rutland he held that good also though that it is not expressed as concerning the Herbage and Paunage when that should begin and he said that this is also for the intent and also he said that this is not in prejudice of the King nor in deceit of the King nor to the double Intendment and for that good And he put the case where the King made a Lease for one and twenty years rendring Rent and doth not shew when that shall begin That shall begin from the Date of the Letters Patents because it cannot be otherwise intended so in the principall case the grant of the Herbage and Paunage depends upon another Grant That is the custody of the Parke which was to begin after death surrender or c. of Markham and having relation to that by this word Vlterius that shall be necessarily intended to begin at the same time and he well agreed the bookes of 3. H. 7. fol. the last and 6. H. 7. 14. 8. H. 7. 1. 9. Eliz. 259. 7. Ed. 6. Dyer 80. That there is no reversion of an office But yet the King may grant an office after the first Grant determined and this shall be good And so shall be in our case of the Herbage and Paunage and he cited the case of 8 H. 7. 12. 13. where the King was Founder of an Abbey and he had granted a Corody to another for life and after he released that and granted it to the Abbot this shal not be a good release presently because another hath the possession for present of it but this shall be good after the death of him which hath this granted for his life And he cited the case of the Lord Chaundois 6. Coke where the King grants the Mannor of Dale in tayl and after grants the Mannor to another this shall passe the reversion for this is all that the King can passe So he said in this case this shall passe in such manner as it may passe by which he concluded the Grant to the Earle of Rutland good Also to the challenge it seemed to him it is no principall challenge and for authority he cited the case in 11. H. 4. That hath been cited of the other part which was for him as he said for this takes the difference between Debt and Battery and 38. H. 6. a. Juror was challenged because one of the parties had an Action of Trespasse hanging against him and this was not any principall challenge unlesse it be Trespasse of Battery and to the booke of 20. Assis 11. Where a Juror was challenged because he had Trespasse against him before the Assis he said it did not appeare by the book what Trespasse that was So it shall be intended Battery and he concluded with this difference that if such an Action be hanging which tends to the utter undoing of him against whom it is brought then if the Defendant in such Action make the array this shall be a principal challenge but if it be but such an Action in which a man shal recover but his Debt or Damages or such lawfull duties there to say that such Action is hanging between them at the time of the array made shall be no principall challenge And for that he
cited the book of 24 Ed. 3. Where a Tales was returned by the Sheriff of Middlesex and the party challenged the Jury because he sued the Sheriff for the death of his Servant and this was a principall challenge for in such case his life was in question the same Law in case of Maintenance and Champerty for the Law hath inflicted great punishment upon such Offences so these matters tend to utter subversion of his Estate and life but otherwise in Actions of Trespasse and so he concluded no principall challenge To the abatement of the Writ it seemes no Error First he conceived that there is no entry and for the reason that Crooke had given before that is because he entred to hunt and not to keep possession and hath not shewed any Warrant to kill the Buck and he cited the book of the 5. of Ed. 4. fol. 60. Where Babington brought an Assise of the house of the Fleete and hanging the Assise Babington came to the Jury within the house when they had the View with his Councell to shew Evidence for the view and this was not any entry to abate the Writ and so the entry to hunt is an entry for another purpose then an entry to keep possession not being by warrant as it is not found and for that no entry to abate the Writ But admitting that this had been an entry to abate the Writ yet being a thing which doth not abate the Writ without Plea and that cannot be pleaded as the case is he conceived was no Error but if it had been a thing which abated the Writ in Facto without Plea then to give Judgement upon a Writ abated is Error As if the party die hanging the Writ or if a woman sole brings an Assise and takes a Husband hanging the Assise or if the Plaintiff in a Assise be made Judge of Assise as the 15. of Assise in all these cases the Writ is abated in Facto without Plea But entry shall not abate the Writ without Plea and so it seemes to him no error But he conceived that there were two other errors for which he reversed the Judgement The first was that this Assise was de Libero Tenemento in Clepson and the plaint was of the keeping of the Park of Clepsom and of the Herbage and Paunage of the Parke aforesaid called Clepsom and made his Title for Herbage and Paunage of the Park of Clepsom and so he conceived that there is variance between the Plaint and the Title and Park of Clepsom and Clepsom cannot be intended one without speciall averment and for that he conceived it to be errour And to that he cited the case of twelve Assises two Where in attaint the first originall was of the Mannor of Austy and the Attaint was of the Mannor of Auesty and yet for that that the Attaint is founded upon the Record and not upon the Originall and the Record was of the Mannor of Auesty this was very good but the Booke saith that this variance between the Originall and the Record was sufficient to reverse the Record for errour and the case in 42 of Ed. 3. Where Scire facias was brought of Tenements in Eastgrave and the Fine was of Tenements in Deepgrave and for the variance the Writ abated and in the case of 5 Coke 46. Formedon was brought of the Mannor of Isfeild and the Tenant pleads in barr a recovery of the Mannor of Iffeild and this shall not be amended unlesse it appear that this is a misprision of the Clark or by other averment he cited also the case of 3 H. 4. 8. Scire facias upon garnishment in a Writ of Detinue of writings the Originall name John Scripstead and the Scire facias was made Iohn Shiplow and therefore agreed that he shall sue a new Scire facias so he said in the Principal case the Plaint being of Herbage and Paunage of Clepson Parke aad the title being at Clepsom Parke these shall not be intended to be the same Parke without averment and there in no averment in our case and for that such variance is such errour that shall reverse the Judgment The second errour for which he reversed the Judgment was that which was moved by Justice Crook that the Jury have not found any seisin of the Paunage for it seemed to him that a Horse could not take Seisin of paunage and for that he defined paunage and he sayd that Linwood title-Tithes saith the Paunagium est pastus Porcorum as of Nuts and Akornes of trees in the wood and Crompton saith that this is Pastus Porcorum and he saith that Paunagium is either used for Paunage or the Paunage it self and the Statute of Charta de Foresta saith that every Freeman may drive his Hoggs into our royall Wood and shall have there Paunage but he doth not say Horses or other Beasts but he conceived that if the Earle of Rutland had right in the Park that this had been sufficient seisin of Herbage and Paunage also for Hoggs will feed upon grass as well as upon Akornes and he cited the Book of 37 H. 6. saith that Seisin to maintain an Assise ought not to be of a contrary nature to the thing of which seisin is intended to be given but in one case only and that is where the Sheriff gives seisin of a Rent by a Twig or by a Clod of Earth and this is in case of necessity for the Sheriff cannot take the Money out of the purse of the Tenant of the Land and deliver seisin of that and for that he cited the case in 45 Ed. 3. Where Commoner comes to the Land where he ought to have Common and enters into the Land and the Lord of the Waste or the Grantor of the Common outs him he cannot have an Assise of his Common upon this outing for this was not any seisin of the Common so it is in this case the Horses cannot take Seisin of the Paunage and so there is no seisin or disseisin found by the Jury and then no Assise and this being after Judgment no abridgment may be of the Plaint and so for these last reasons he reversed the Judgment And at another day the case was rehearsed again and argued by Yelverton and Fenner Justices but I did not hear their Arguments insomuch that they spake so low but their opinions were declared by the cheife Justice and Yelverton affirmed the Judgment in all First he held that this entry shall not abate the writ Secondly admit that it is abated yet being between Verdict and Judgment shall not be assigned for errour Thirdly he held that no principall challenge Fourthly he held both the grants good Fifthly that Clepsam and Clipsam are all one and not such variance that shall make Errour And lastly that a Horse may well take Seisin of Paunage and Fenner agreed in all but he held that this was a principall challenge and not being allowed this
was Error and for this cause and another exception to the Record which was not much materiall he reversed the Judgment And at another day Flemming cheife Justice rehearsed the case and this argued and to the first matter he conceived First That it is no such entry that abates the Writ Secondly Admitting that it were yet this cannot be assigned for Errour And to the first matter he took this ground That every entry which may abate a writ ought to be in the thing demanded and for that he sayd if a man brings an Assise of Rent or common and hanging this Assise he enters into the Land this is not any Entry which will abate the Writ and he sayd that the Park and the keeping of the Park are two distinct things and for that the entry into one that is the Park will not abate the Writ for the keeping of that and to that which is sayd that he took a Fee that is a shoulder of a Buck that doth not make any matter for two reasons First he hath not shewed a Warrant he had to kill the Buck. Secondly the taking of the fee is no entring into the Office but the excercising of that but admit that this were an entry or the thing it self yet he sayd every entry into the thing shall not abate the Writ and to that he sayd that if this entry of the Earl of Rutland to hunt was no such entry that shall abate the Writ for his office was not to hunt and for that his entry being to another purpose it shall not be sayd an entry to abate the Writ and for that he cited a case which hath been cited as he sayd by Justice Yelverton that if a man have Common in the Land of J. S. between the Annunciation of our Lady and Michaelmas and the Commoner brought an Assise of his Common and at Christmas put in his Beasts and this shall not be any entry to abate his Writ for it cannot be intended for the same Common which case is agreed to be good Law and he cited the case put by Brooke in Assise of Freshforce before remembred Com. 93. Where hanging a Formedon the Tenant pleads in abatement of the Writ that the Demandant hath entred after the last continuance and upon the evidence it appears that many were cutting wood upon the Land and the Demandant comes into the Land to them and warnes them upon the perill that might ensue to them that they should do no more then they could do by Law and this was found no entry Also the case of 26. Assise before cited by Justice Crooke and he sayd that the Statute of Charta de Foresta chapter 11. willeth that every Arch-Bishop Bishop Earl or Baron comming to the King by his command and passing by his Forrest c. Was licensed to take one Beast or two by the sight of the Keeper c. Put case then that the King had sent for the Earl of Rutland and he had passed through this Park and had killed a Buck had this beene an entry to abate this writ Quasi diceret non for this was entry to another purpose so he sayd in the principall case the entry to hunt and so no entry to abate the Writ but admitting that this had been an entry which would abate the writ then let us see if this entry hath so abated the writ being Mesne between the Verdict and the Judgment it cannot be assigned for errour and to that he agreed the diversity before taken by Crooke and Williams where the writ is abated by Plea and without plea and he cited a Judgment in the Kings Bench between Jackson and Parker 2 Eliz. where in Ejectione firme the Plaintiff entred Mesne between Verdict and Judgment and this was assigned for Errour in the Exchequer Chamber and the Judgment notwithstanding affirmed and he sayd that if Memorandum had been made of it or if a Jury had found it and it had been prayed that that might be Recorded yet this had not been materiall and that that be not assigned for Errour And to the matter moved by my Brother Williams that there should be a variance between the plaint and the Title he conceived that there is no such variance that shall make the Judgment errronious and to that he examined the matter First that the Assise was of a Free-hold in Clepsom and his title is made of the parke of Clipson that that cannot be otherwise intended but that of necessity it ought to be the same park For first there is but one park by all the Record Secondly the plaint saith De parco predicto which hath reference to Clepsom park and there is but one park put in view by all the record Fourthly It shall be so taken according to the common speaking Fiftly when he hath made his plaint of the custody of the park of Clepsom and of the Herbage and paunage of the park aforesaid called Clepsom these words called Clepsom are but Idle and Trifles and that which is but Surplusage shall not annoy Also he said that J. and E. are letters which do not much differ in pronunciation and they are all one as I and he shall be pronounced as hi and he cited the Book of 4 H. 6. 26. Where in Debt variance was taken between the writ and the Obligation that is Quatuordecem pro Quatuordecim and this variance was not materiall but that the writ was awarded good and so he conceived that in this case the variance of Clepsom and Clipsom shall not be such a materiall variance that shall make the Judgment erronious and to the title First to Markhams grant that is where the Jury have found Quod ulterius concessit c. And doth not say Per easdem he held that good without scruple and this for the necessary relation that this had to any thing before granted for he sayd that this should be a strange and marvelous patent which begun in such a manner that is Et ulterius Rex concedit c. And there was not any thing granted before And for that he cited the case of 11 Ed. 4. 2. where Debt was brought upon an Indenture against the Abbot of Westminster and the Indenture was between the Abbot of the Monastry of the blessed Mary of Westminster and rehearsed divers Covenants for performance of which Covenants the Abbot of Westminster bound himself in twenty pound and doth not say that the aforesayd Abbot and yet good for it shall be intended the same Abbot for he is party to the Deed and the case of 10 H. 7. 12. Where in Assise of Common the plaintiff makes his plaint of Common appurtenant to his Free-hold in D. and shews for Title that he was seised of a Messuage and of a Carve of Land in D. to which the Common is appurtenant and that he and his Ancestors and all those whose Estates c. have used Common of pasture with ten Beasts and exception
one and his Heires Males this is void for uncertainty of the Estate then it is so averred in our case if there be not sufficient recitall and certainty and to the recitall that is good without question for she recites that she hath granted that to Markham for ifâ and Markham is yet alive and so the recitall good Then for the certainty he said that the rule is that if the certainty be declared by expresse words or if the King may reduce that to a certainty the Grant of the King shall not be defeated and for that he cited the case of Information of Mines Comment But if the King grant to me all Mines in the Land of J. S. There I shall have all Mines Royall for the Law saith the King cannot have other Mynes in the Soil of a Subject but Mines Royall and so there the Law supplies the Grant so that they be Mines Royall though not expressed in the Grant in certaine so he said in the principall case that the Queen hath expresly recited that she hath granted the Herbage and Paunage for life to Markham and that Markham was yet alive and after grants that to the Earle of Rutland and doth not say when that shall begin the Law saith that shall begin after the death of Markham for before that it cannot begin But if the Queen had exprest in the Letters Patents that this shall begin forthwith then this had been void as the Lord Gaudy said in Altonwoods Case 1 Coke fol. 51. And so he concluded the Title of the Earle of Rutland good So he affirmed the Judgement in all But Williams was very peremtory for the conceit of Paunage that it was not good Seisin But after Crooke Justice recanted his opinion of that and insomuch that there were three which concluded for the reversing of the Judgement And yet for every point there were three against two It was doubted if this Judgement should be reversed or not And they said that they would advise with the rest of the Judges and after that it was moved againe by Serjeant Nicholls in the next Trinity Tearme and Yelverton and the cheife Justices would have the Judgement affirmed but Williams Fenner and Crooke to be reversed and note well this President where Judgement was reversed and yet for every point there were three Contra two or foure Contra one see the first Judgement in the Common Bench Michaelmasse 6. Jacobi afterwards Termino Pasche 7. Jacobi 1609. In the Kings Bench. Trinity Colledge Case THE Case was this King Henry the eight Incorporated the Schollers of Trinity Colledge in Cambridge by the name of Masters Fellowes and Schollers Collegij Sanctae et Individuae Trinitatis in the Town and University of Cambridge and in the 6. Ed. 6. They made a Lease by the name of Master and Fellowes of Trinity Colledge in Cambridge leaving out the University And if this Lease were good or not was the question And Yelverton argued that this was not a good Lease and that for the misnaming of the Corporation And to that he said to every Corporation two things were incident That is name and place and if any of those fayl and be not certainly recited in a Lease the Lease shall not be good And he conceived that this Corporation is founded upon two places and that one of them That is the University is left out and for that cause the Lease is nothing worth for if a Corporation hath two names one of them cannot be omitted as it is in the first of Mary Dyer 96 97. and 4. Mary 140. and 150. 11. Eliz. Dyer 278. 35. H. 6. 5. and 6. No more then when it consists of two places one of them may be left out And for that if they had been incorporated by the name of Master and Fellowes of Trinity Colledge in Norfolke and Suffolke in a Lease they could not leave out Norfolke or Suffolke but both the places ought to be incerted And by him in the principall case if the Lease had been made by the name of the Master and Fellowes of Trinity Colledge in the Town and leave out the University of Cambridge without question this shall be void so here this being impliedly omitted shall be as strong as if it had been by expresse words excluded so in the making of every Corporation the intent of the Founder is to be considered and for that it seemes the intent of the King in placing that in both places was first to erect a Colledge and that to grace the Town and then he hath placed them in the University and this was for the instruction in good Arts and Learning and so for these benefits they have of both these places nor one nor the other may be left out And if the King had been incorporated by the name of Master and Fellowes of Trinity Colledge in Cambridge and in the Market place of Cambridge There though that the Market place was parcell of the Town of Cambridge yet it seemes to him that this cannot be left out for peradventure the Founder hath a speciall reason to place that there that is to have all things necessary for them more neer unto them Also where any stranger demands any possession of them in Precipe Quod Reddat or such like he ought to ensue them certainly and precisely Then a Fortiore where they depart with their possessions by their own Act there they shall not be unknowing of their one names And Walter of the inner Temple argued to the contrary and he conceived that the Lease is good and first he argued the ground which hath been taken of the other part that is that every corporation ought to be in a certain place and he conceived that there is a certaine place in this place that is the Town of Cambridge And to that that is said that this Corporation is founded upon two places he denied that all together for no more then one materiall Body may be but in one place Simul and Semel no more may it be in a Body Corporate which hath allwaies his resemblance to a Body naturall and for that he denied the case which hath been put of the other part of Norfolk and Suffolk And he cyted the opinion of the Lord Popham in Buttons Case in which the Lord North was Interested that a Corporation cannot be limited to a County as Probos Homines of such a County or Trinity Colledge in such a County but it ought to be restrained to some certaine place or one County or a Town But admit that the Corporation may be founded upon two places yet he faith that a University is not Locall but Personall And to this purpose he cyted two Records one in 48 H. 3. Which was this King H. 3. Intending to keep a Parliament at Oxford and knowing that the place was not sufficient to contain all those which should be there assembled and the Schollers together sent his Writ which was directed to the
Chancellor and University of Oxford commanding them that they should remove the University to such a place till the Parliament should be ended And after he sent his Writ to them againe which was directed to the Chancellor and University by which he wild that they should returne againe the Parliament being ended by which Writ he conceived that it appeares that the University was not Locall And this for two reasons First insomuch that this Writ was directed to the Chancellor and University and every Writ is directed to a person and not to a place Secondly the Writ that he should move and remove the University which is a thing impossible to do if it should be a place The other Record was 49. Ed. 3. And this declares that there was contention between the Schollers of Cambridge and the Townesmen there and the Schollers went to Northampton and there they made a Petition to the King that they might erect a University and the King sent his Writ to the Maior commanding him that he would not suffer the Schollers to remaine there and that he would there erect a University which proves that a University may be erected at the Kings pleasure and so cannot a place then admitting that a Corporation may consist upon a place yet the University not being a place that shall not be any prejudice to omit it And he cited a case which was adjudged as he said in the 26. of Eliz. which was thus The Deane and Canons of Winsor made a Lease for years by the name of Deane and Canons of new Winsor And this was adjudged no variance and the case of 5. Ed. 4. 5. of the Abbot of Saint Maries in York which see there and he said the Lord Norths Case was thus That Christ Church in Oxford was incorporate by the name of Deane and Canons of Christ Church in Oxford And they made a Feoffment by the name of the Deane and Canons of Christ Church in the University of Oxford and adjudged a good Feoffment And he said that in the argument of this case it was said by Gaudy that if a corporation were made of Dale and after Dale is made into a City they may make a Lease by the name of a City of Dale and the Lord Popham as he said put these cases That is that if a Corporation be founded of Oxford And that they made a Lease by the name of c. In the Precincts of Oxford this shall be a good Lease yet a thing may be within the Precincts of another place and not in the place and in the 32. Eliz. was the case of one Jermin and Wylles that if a Corporation be made by the name of Deane and Chapter of Saint Maries in Exceter is good But they agreed in this case as he said that if it appeare that they cannot be intended allone otherwise it should be and he conceived in the principall case that it is not necessarily that it should be intended the same place and for that he conceived in all those cases that the Lease shall be good and he said that there were neer two hundred Leases upon the same Title for which c. And after this it was argued in Michaelmasse Tearme 1609. 7. Jacobi by the Justices And the opinion of Crook and Williams Justices was that the Lease was good But Fenner and Yelverton to the contrary and Flemming cheif Justice argued that the Lease was not good but he said this should not be absolutely his opinion but moved a composition betwixt the parties But insomuch that the matter was not compounded in the same Michaelmasse Tearme Judgement was praied And Williams Justice brought into the Court a decree out of the Court of Wards concerning the Case which is put in 7. Eliz. Dyer and 1. Coke Porters Case And upon the decree appeares that an Information being exhibited there against the Master and fellows of Trinity Colledge in Cambridge concerning certain Land they made Title to by a Devise made to them by the name of Masters Fellows and Schollers of Trinity Colledge in Cambridge and this Devise was made four and five of Phil. and Mary and the Decree recyted that upon this were two great Doubts and Questions conceived First If this Devise were good and also by the Statute of 1. and 2. Phil. and Mary which inabled to devise to spirituall Corporations And the second point was That where they were incorporated by the name of Master Fellows and Schollars De sancta and Individua Trinitate in the University and Town of Cambridge if this devise made to them by the name of Master Fellowes and Schollers of Trinity Colledge in Cambridge was good and the Decree rehearsed that the opinion of all the Justices in England was First That it was a good Devise within the Statute of one and two Phillip and Mary as it is reported in the Booke before cited Secondly That this was not such a mis-naming of the Corporation which made the Devise voyd and Williams Justice produced this Record as he sayd to fortify his opinion And he conceived no difference between a Grant and a Devise nor no difference when an Estate or conveyance made unto them and conveiance made by them and for that he cited the Case in the 19 H. 8. in Dyer where if a man devise Land to the Abbey of Saint Peters where the foundation is Saint Paul this is a voyd devise and so in a grant And Crooke Justice to the same Intent Yelverton Justice to that Decree shewed by my Brother Williams I conceive a great Difference First a Will and a grant for in case of a Will it sufficeth if they be described by a name by which the Intent of the Devisor may be sufficiently known and a man is intended to be Inops consilij at the time of the Devise made and for that that he hath not any to instruct him oâ the precise name of the Corporation for which c. And Fenner Justice to the same intent and if a man devise to one and his Assignes as it is a Fee-simple in case of a Devise so it is not in grant and so devise to one and his Children is an Estate Tayl in case of Devise but not in a grant Flemming cheife Justice to the same intent and to the Decree he sayd that this is as good Law as ever he heard in his life but yet he conceived also that there is a great difference between a Grant and a Devise as if a man devise to a Monke the Remainder over this is a good remainder so devise to one the Remainder over and the particular Tenant refuse this is good in a Devise contrary in grant and to the case which is put by my Brother Williams out of the 19 H. 8. Dyer there is a great difference where there is not any such person at all to take there the Devise shall be void as where the Devise to the Abbot of Saint Peter where
Lessee for years or life surrender before the performance of the condition the Fee doth never increase as it is 14. H. 8. 20. and the Lord Chandois Case 6 Coke But the Estate tayl remaines after the condition performed and then hath the Fee dependant upon the Estate tayl and that there is a necessity that there shall be an office as it was in Nicholls Case in the Com because of the right and that after the condition performed then the Fee shall vest Ab Initio and this corporates together partly by the Letters Patents and partly by the performance of the condition and so it is in Butler and Bakers case that it is not a Grant in futuro but one immediate Grant to take effect In futuro see 2. H. 7. for the execution of Chantrey and Grendons Case in the Com. and 2. H. 7. If the King grant Land to J. S. for life the remainder to the right Heires of J. R. which is in life the remainder is good as well as in case of a common person and so he seemed that Judgement shall be given for the Plaintiff Walmesley Justice agreed that it shall be remainder and not reversion as if Lands begin to the Husband and the Wife and to the Heires of the Body of the Husband the Husband dies this is a remainder in the Heires Males and not a reversion for it cannot grow higher and it was not in the King as one distinct Estate before the Grant and Formedon in remainder lieth for it and though it be misrecited yet it shall be good and ayded by the Statute of Misrecitalls and grant of a thousand is suffered to convey the reversion of a thousand by the common Law and if the recitall were that it was a reversion depending upon the Estate tayl it was good without question and the King may grant five hundred reversions if he will and that the last Damus is ex certa scientia et mêre motu nostris Damus et concedimus that if the Patentee pay twenty shillings Tunc sciatis quod nos de ampliori gracia ea certa scientia et mero motu nostris concedimus c. and that the word Volumus will amount to a Covenant or a Release as 32. H. 6. The King by his Patent by these words Nolent that he shall be impleaded and this amounts to a release and so words which intends expresly words of Covenant may be pleaded as a Grant in case of the King as it is 25 Ed. 4 So is a common person license another to occupy his Land this amounts to a Lease of Land if the time be expressed so if a man grants to another that he shall have and injoy his Land to him and his Heires that by that Fee passeth And if the King grant reversion to begin at Michaelmasse the Grant is void for that it is to begin totally at Michaelmasse and doth not looke back to any precedent thing But if it relate to any precedent Act then that shall be good by relation and shall passe ab Initio see Com. Walsinghams Case 553. b. that in such case the performance of the condition divests the Estate out of the King and there is no difference in this case betwixt the King and a common person and agreed in the case of Littleton Where a man makes a Lease for yeares upon condition to have Fee that the Fee shall not passe till the condition be performed and with this agrees 2. R. 2. But if a man makes a Charter of Feoffment upon condition that if the Feoffee injoy the Land peaceably for fifteen years that the Feoffment shall be void In this case the Fee-simple determineth by the performance of the Condition and in this case the Fee passeth ab Initio by the Livery as in 10. Assise 18. Assise 1. 44. Assise 49 Assise And he agreed that the words Habeat et Teneat the Reversion passes and this is good Fee-simple and this refers to the first Damus et Concedimus and so concluded that he seemed that Judgement shall be given for the Plaintiff Coke cheife Justice accordingly and he conceived that there are two questions upon the substance of the Grant And to the first objection that hath been made that is that reversion was granted and increase of an Estate cannot be of a reversion and in all these cases which have been put they are of an Estate in possession and so is the case of Littleton also and he agreed that it shall not be good if it be not good ab Initio that though there be not other words then Reversionem predictam That it shall be good And to the second point upon the former He conceived that the Grant is but a Grant and that the condition is but precedent Limitation when the Estate of Fee-simple shall begin and so it is said by Montague in Colthurst and Brinskins Case in the Com. And further he saith that there are four things necessary for increasing an Estate First that it ought to be an Estate upon which the increasing Estate may increase Secondly the particular Estate ought to continue for otherwise it is grant of a reversion in Futuro Thirdly That the Estate which is to increase ought to vest by the performance of the Condition for if there be disturbance that it cannot then vest then it can never vest Foutthly that both the Estates as well the particular Estate as the Estate which is to increase ought to have their beginning by one self same Deed or by diverse Deeds delivered at one self same time And to the first and to prove that he cyted 44 Ed. 3. Attaint 22. Lessee for yeares upon condition to have Fee granes his Estate the Fee doth not increase upon the performance of the condition for then it shall passe as a Reversion and so the particular Tenant surrenders his Estate as it is sayd 14. H. 8. For if the Privity be destroyed the Fee will never increase but there is no such âycity but that if the substance of the Estate remains though it doth not remain in such form as it was at the first Reversion the Estate may well increase as if Lands be given to the Husband and wife and to the Heirs of the Husband upon the Body of the Wife to be begotten the Wife dies and the Husband is Tenant after possibility of Issue extinct yet he may well perform the condition for the Estate remaines in substance and with this agrees 20 H. 6. Ayd and so it is if a Lease be made to two for years upon condition to have fee one dies the other may perform the Condition and shall have Fee-simple as it is agreed by 12. Assise 5. the reason is that the privity remaines and the Estate also in substance Thirdly As to that also it seems that it ought to vest upon the performance of the condition which is the time limited for the beginning of the Estate and if it do not vest
all their Study is practise and that if they have no practise of themselves then they attend upon others which practise and apply themselves to know the nature of Simples And to third objection that in London ought to be choyce men for the Statute appoints that they shall be examined by the Bishop and Deane and four others at least and for that there is a more strict course for them then in other places to that it is agreed But he said that in the University there is a more strict course then this for here he ought to be publickly approved by many after that he hath been examined and answered in the Schooles to diverse questions and allowed by the Congregation house And 35. H. 6. 55. Doctor is no addition but a degree quia gradatim et progressâone Doctrine provenit to that and that Doctor is teacher and that he was first taught by others as Scholers afterwards he is Master and Doctor dicetur a docendo quia docere permittitur and they are called Masters of their faculty and that the Originall of Doctor came of the Sinagogue of Jewes where there were Doctors of Law and it appeares that they had their ceremonies in time of H. 1. And when a man brings with him the Ensigne of Doctrine there is no reason that he should be examined againe for then if they will not allow of him he shall not be allowed though he be a learned and grave man and it was not the intent of the King to make a Monopoly of this practise And to the second point that he propounded it seemes that the Justification is not good which is Quia non comperuit upon Summons he was amerced and ordered that he shall be arrested and being arrested being examined if he would submit himself to the Colledge he answered that he was a Doctor and had practised and would practise within the sayd City as he conceived he might lawfully do and for that shewing of this case he was committed to prison and he conceived two things upon the Charter First That it doth not inhibit a Doctor to practise but punisheth him for ill using exercising and making and may imprison the Emperick and Imposter and so prayed Judgment for the Plaintiff and after in Hillary Tearm in the same year this case was argued by all the Justices of the Common Bench and at two severall dayes and the first day it was argued by Foster Daniell and Warburton Justices at whose Arguments I was not present but Foster argued against the Plaintiff and Daniell and Warburton with him and that the Action of false imprisonment was well maintainable And the second day the same case was argued again by Walmesley Justice and Coke cheife Justice and Walmesley argued as followeth that is that the Statute of 3. H. 8. was in the negative that no person within the City of London or seven Miles of that take upon him to exercise or occupy as Physitian or Chirurgion c. And he doth not know in any case where the words of the Statute are negative that they admit any Interpretation against that but one only and that is the Statute of Marlebridge chapter 4. Which provides that no Lord shall distrain in one County and the beasts distrayned drive into another County in which case though that the words are uegative yet if the Lord distrain in one County he may drive the Beasts to his Mannor in another County of which the Lands in which the distresse was taken were held but it is equity and reason in this case that the Statute should admit such exception for it is not of malice but for that that the Beasts may remain within his Fee but in the principall case there is not the like reason nor Equity And also the King H. 8. in his Letters Patents recites as followeth that is Cum Regij officij nostri munus arbitremur ditionis nostri hominum felicitati omni ratione consulere id autem vel imprimis fore si Improborum conatibus tempestive occurremus apprime necessarium duximus improborum quoque hominum qui medicinant magis avaritiae sue causa quam ullius bonae conscientiâ fiducia profitebantur c. By which it appears that it is the Office of a King to survey his Subjects and he is as a Phisitian to cure their Maladies and to remove Leprosies amongst them and also to remove all fumes and smells which may offend or be prejudiciall to their health as it appears by the severall Writs in these severall cases provided and so if a man be not right in his Wits the King is to have the Protection and Government of him least he being infirme wast or consume his Lands or Goods and it is not sufficient for him that his Subjects live but that they should live happyly and discharges not his Office if his Subjects live a life but if they live and flourish and he hath care as well of their Bodyes as of their Lands and Goods for Health for the Body is as necessary as vertue to the minde and the King H. 8. to express his extraordinary care of his Subjects made the said Act in the third year of his Reigne which was the beginning of his Essence to that purpose and by the Common Law any Phisitian which was allowed by the University might practise and exercise the sayd faculty within any place within England without any dispensation examination or approbation of any but after the making of the sayd Act made in the third year of King H. 8. none may practise exercise or occupy as Phisitian or Surgion within theCity of London and seven miles of that if he be not first examined approved and admitted by the Bishop of London and the Dean of Paules for the time being calling to them foure Doctors of Phisick or Chirurgions c. And that no practiser may occupy or exercise the sayd faculty out of the sayd Precincts if he be not first examined approved and admitted by the Bishop of the Diocess or in his absence by his Vicar generall every of them calling unto him such expert persons in the said faculty as their discretions thinks convenient and the reason of this difference as he conceived was for that that in this City and the sayd Precincts the King and all his Councell and all the Judges and Sages of the Law and divers other men of quality and condition live and continue and also the place is more subject unto Infection and the Heir more pestiferous and for that there is more necessity that greater Care diligence and examination be made of those which practised here in London and the precincts aforesayd then of those which practise in other places of the Realm for in other places the People have better aire and use more exercise and are not so subject to Infection and for that there is no cause that such care should be used for them for they are not in such danger and
Proviso that if the sayd John disturbed the Executors of taking his Goods in his House that then the sayd use and uses limited to the sayd John Francis and his Heires shall cease and after declared that his intent was that in all other points his Will should be in his force and it was pleaded that Iohn did not suffer the sayd Executors to take the sayd Goods in the sayd House and if his Estate for years or in Tayl or Fee-simple shall cease was the question and it seemed to the Judges that the Condition shall not be Idle but shall have hiâ operation as it appears by Hill and Granges case and the Lord Barkleyes Case in the Comment and the Lord Cheneyes Case Coke And it seems also that it shall not be referred to Estate in Fee simple for then it shall be void and it shall not be referred to a Tearm for it is limited to an Estate limited to the said Iohn and his Heires but it seemeth it shall be referred to an Estate tayl only as it is 2 and 3. P. and Mary Dyer 127. 55. 11 H. 7. 6. But the case was adjudged upon one point in the Pleading for it was not pleaded that Iohn Francis had notice of the Devise nor that he had made any actuall disturbance and peradventure he entered as Heir and had no notice of the Condition and when the Executors came to demand the Goods which were belonging to the Heir and annexed to the House and he sayd that it doth not appear to them to prove that an express notice was given in this case the Books of 43 Assise where a man was attaint and after was restored by Parliament and a Writ being directed to the Esceator the Escheator returns that he was disturbed and upon Scire facias the disturber pleads that he had no notice of the sayd act of restitution and for this he was excused of Disturbance And see 35. H. 6. Barr 162. Michaelmas 7. Jacobi 1609. In the Common Bench. Waggoner against Fish WAGGONER brought a Writ of Priviledge supposing that he had a suit depending here in the Common Bench which was directed to the Maior and Sheriffs of London and upon the return it appears that 4. Iacobi an Act of Common Councell was made that none should be retayler of any Goods within the same City upon a certain pain and that the Chamberlain of the said City for the time being may sue for the said penalty to the use of the sayd City at any of the Courts within the said City and that the Defendant hath retailed Candles and held a shop within the sayd City being a stranger and against the sayd Act and for the sayd penalty the Chamberlain hath brought an Action of Debt within the sayd City according to the sayd Act of Common Councell and upon the return it appeares that by their Custome the Maior and Aldermen with the Assent of the Commoners of the said City may make By-Laws for the Government of the sayd City and that the sayd custome and all other their Customes were confirmed by Act of Parliament and upon this it seems that though there be not remedy given for this penalty in another place then in London that yet if it be against Law he shall not be remanded and if a Corporation hath power to make By-Laws that shall be intended for the Government of their ancient Customes only and not to make new Lawes see 2 Ed. 3 Iohn De Brittens Case but it seems if this By-Law be for the Benefit of the Common-Wealth that it shall be good otherwise not and it was Adjourned see Hillary next insuing for then it was adjudged that he shall not be remanded see afterward Michaelmas 7. Iacobi It was adjudged NOte that this Tearme was adjourned untill the Moneth of Michaelmas by reason of the Plague and upon the adjournment this insued and was moved by Yelverton and Crook at the Bar and the Case was this Michaelmas 7. Iacobi 1609. In the Common Bench. POynes being an Infant levies a Fine and in Trinity Tearm last past brought his writ of Errour in the Kings Bench and assigned for Errour that at the time of the Fine levied was and yet is within age and prayed that he be inspected and insomuch that he had not his proofs there he was not inspected but Dies datus est usquâ Octabis Michaelis Proximas at which time came the said Poynes the day which was wont to be the day of the Essoyn and prayed Justice Crooke which was there to adjourn the Tearm to inspect him and to take his proofs who did inspect him accordingly De bene esse and now before the Moneth of Michaelmas the Infant came of full age and if this inspection were well taken and what authority the Judge had upon that day to adjourn was the question And Flemming cheife Justice sayd that the day of Essoyn is a day in Tearm and that the Court was full though there was but one Judge and if the inspection had been the day of the Essoyn and before the fourth of the Post he had come of full age this shall be very good but the doubt rose as the case is if upon the day of Adjournment the Judge had power to do any thing but to adjourn the Tearm and for that it was appointed to be argued and for the Argument of that Quere of my Author Lane Michaelmas 7. Iacobi 1609 In the Common Bench. Rivet Plaintiff Downe Defendant IN an action upon the case upon an Assumpsit the case appears to be this Copy-holder makes a lease for a year according to the custome of the Mannor the Lord distrains the Farmer of the Copy-holder for his Rent and the Copy-holder having notice of that comes to the Lord and assumes that in consideration that the Lord should relinquish his Suit against his Farmer touching the same distress he would pay the Rent by such a day the Lord delivers the Distress and for default of payment at the day brings an Action upon the case and upon Non Assumpsit pleaded Verdict passed for the Plaintif And Barker Serjeant came and moved in arrest of Judgment First that a man cannot distrayn a Copy-holder but he ought to seise but Williams Justice and others to the contrary and by him if a man makes a Lease at will Rendring Rent he may distrain for this Rent 9 H. 7. 3. The case of Rescous Secondly He moved that when the Lord distraines that now the Tenant hath cause of Action that is Replevin and for that it cannot be sayd Sectam suam and so the consideration failes but all the Court against that and that this was a good consideration and by Flemming cheife Justice Distress is an Action in it self because this is the cause of a Replevin and when the Tenant brings his Replevin and the Lord avowes now is the Lord an Actor and so it is secta sua and by him secta is not
charge to the King and to the Common Wealth and the execution of Writs may be prejudicall and penall to the Sheriff himselfe And for that he may well provide that he shall have notice of every execution which are most Penall And also in all the Indenture now made he doth not constitute him to be his under Sheriff but only for to execute the Office and for these reasons he seemed the Obligation is good and demands Judgement for the Plaintiff But it seemes to all the Court that the Covenant is void and so by consequence the Obligation as to the performance of that void but good to the performance of all other Covenants And Coke cheif Justice said that the Sheriff at the Common Law was elligible as the Coronor is and then by the death of the King his Office was not determined and also it is an intire Office and though the King may countermand his Grant of that intirely yet he cannot that countermand by parcells and also that the under Sheriff hath Office which is intire and cannot be granted by parcells and this Covenant will be a meanes to nourish bribery and extortion for the Sheriff himselfe shall have all the benefit and the under Sheriff all the payn for he is visible the under Sheriff and all the Subjects of the King will repaire to him and the private contracts between the Sheriff and him are invisible of which none can have knowledge but themselves And Warburton sayd that in debt upon escape c. are against the Sheriff of Notingham he pleaded Nihil debet and gives in evidence that the Bayliff which made the Arrest was made upon condition that he should not meddle with such executions without speciall warrant of the Sheriff himselfe and his consent but it was resolved this notwithstanding that the Sheriff shall be charged in and in the principall case Judgement was given accordingly that is that the Covenant is void Note that the Sheriff of the County of Barkes was commited to the Fleete for taking twenty shillings for making of a warrant upon a generall Capias utlagatum for all the Justices were of opinion that the Sheriff shall not take any Fees for making of a warrant or execution of that Writ but only twenty shillings and foure pence the which is given by the Statute of 23. H. 6. for it is at the Suit of the King But upon Capias utlagatum unde convictus est which is after Judgement it seemes it is otherwise A man grants a Rent to one for his life and halfe a yeare after to be paid at the Feasts of the Anunciation of our Lady and Michaell the Archangell by equall portions and Covenants with the Grantee for the payment of that accordingly the Grantee dies 2. Februarâ⦠and for twenty pound which was a moyity of the Rent and to be payd at the anunciation after the Executors of the Grantee brings an Action of Covenant and it seems it is well maintainable And Coke cheife Justice sayd That if a man grants Rent for anothers life the Remainder to the Executors of the Grantee and Covenant to pay the Rent during the Tearm aforesayd this is good Collective and shall serve for both the Estates and if the Grantee of the Rent grant to the Tenant of the Land the Rent and that he should distrain for the sayd Rent this shall not be intended the same rent which is extinct but so much in quantity and agreed that when a Rent is granted and by the same Deed the Grantor covenants to pay that the Grantee may have annuity or Writ of Covenant at his Election Michaelmas 7. Jacobi 1610. In the Common Bench. Waggoner against Fish Chamberlain of London JAMES Waggoner was arrested in London upon a Plaint entered in the Court of the Maior in Debt at the suit of Cornelius Fish Chamberlain of the sayd City and the Defendant brought a Writ of Priviledge returnable here in the Common Pleas and upon the return it appears that in the City of London there is a custome that no forrainer shal keep any shop nor use any Trade in London and also there is another Custome that the Maior Aldermen and Commonalty if any custome be defective may supply remidy for that and if any new thing happen that they may provide apt remedy for that so if it be congruae bonâ fidei consuetudo rationi consentiae pro communi utilitate Regis civium omnium aliorum ibidem confluentium and by Act of Parliament made 7 R. 2. All their customes were confirmed and 8 Ed. 3. The King by his Letters Patents granted that they might make By-Laws and that these Letters Patents were also confirmed by Act of Parliament and for the usage certified that in 3 Ed. 4. and 17. H. 8. were severall acts of Common Councell made for inhibiting Forrayners to hold any open shop or shops or Lettice and penalty imposed for that and that after and shewed the day in certain was an Act of Common counsell made by the Mayor Aldermen and Commonalty And for that it was enacted that no Forrayner should use any Trade Mistery or occupation within the said City nor keep any Shop there for retayling upon payn of five pound and gives power to the Chamberlain of London for the time being to sue for that by Action c. in the Court of the Mayor in which no Essoyn nor wager of Law shall be allowed and the said penalty shall be the one halfe to the use of the said Chamberlain and the other half to the poor of Saint Bartholomewes Hospitall And that the Defendant held a shop and used the Mistery of making of candles the seventh day of October last and for that the Plaintiff the ninth day of the same month then next insuing levied the said plaint And upon this the Defendant was Arrested and this was the cause of the taking and detaining c. And upon argument at the Bar by Serjeant Harris the younger for the Defendant and Hutton for the Plaintiff and upon sollemne arguments by all the Justices Coke Walmesley Warburton Danyell and Foster it was agreed That the Defendant shall be delivered and not remanded And the case was devided in to five parts The first the custome Secondly the confirmation of that by Act of Parliament Thirdly the grant of the King and the confirmation of that by Act of Parliament Fourthly the usage and making of Acts of common councell according to this Fiftly the Act of common councell upon which the Action is brought and upon which the Defendant was Arrested And to the first which is the custome it was also said that this consists upon three parts That is first if any custome be difficult Secondly if it be defective Thirdly if Aliquid de novo emergit The Mayor Aldermen and Commonalty Possunt opponere remedium and that there are foure incidents to that remedy First it ought to be Congruum Retione
the Arbitrator awards that one party shall enter into Bond to another for injoying of certain Lands and doth not say in what Sum and adjudged void for the uncertainty and so in this case by which c. But it was answered and resolved that the Arbitrement was good And to the first objection it was resolved and agreed that every award ought to have respect to both parties if it be not a matter which concernes one party only and neither recompence nor acquittall due to the other party in which case the award shall be good And it was resolved in the principall case that the award was made of both parties for one was to have money and the other though there was no expresse mention that the other should be discharged of his Assumpsit yet the award was a good discharge in Law and may be pleaded in Bar upon an Action brought upon the Assumpsit and so it was for both parties And to the second objection it was agreed that where submission is with Ita quod c. as above that there the Arbitrators ought to make arbitrement of all the variances and controversies referred to their arbitrement and if they do make no arbitrement of all the matters of which the submission is made the award is void but if the submission be generall as of all matters in variance or controversie between them There if the Arbitrator makes his award of all matters which are known to him the award shall be good As my Lord Coke conceived though that there are other matters in variance of which the Arbitrator hath no notice as if divers Creditors sue a-commission upon the statute of Barkrupts and an another person to whome the Bankrupt was indebted doth not come in as a Creditor nor give notice to the Commissioners that the Bankrupt was indebted to him he shall not take benefit of the commission for the Commissioners cannot releive those Creditors of which they have no notice as it appeares by the case of Bankrupts in 2. Coke And to the third objection it was answered and resolved that the award was good notwithstanding that no place be expressed where the money shall be paid for in Law that ought to have resonable construction and the party ought to have reasonable time for the payment of that but Foster conceived that it is not good for it seemed to him that if the award shall be good that the Obligation of submission shall be immediatly forfeyted for that there was neither time nor place where the money should be payd but this was answered with the Bookes of 3. H. 7. 16. Ed. 4. Where it is said that if an Arbitrator award that one party shall pay such a sum of money at such a day and keeps the award in his Pocket till such a day be past that yet the Obligation shall not be forfeyted And so it was resolved and adjudged by all the other Justices that the award was good and Judgement was entred accordingly Hillary 7. Jacobi 1609. In the Common Bench. Foster against Jackson RICHARD Foster Plaintiff in Scire Facias against Anno Jackson and Myles Jackson Executors of Thomas Jackson upon Judgement had against the said Thomas in an Action of Debt The Defendants pleades that the said Thomas Jackson the Testator was taken upon a Capias ad Satisfaciendum awarded upon the sayd Judgement and in execution for the sayd Debt by force of the said Capias and there died in execution and so demands Judgement c. And the sole question was if the said Testator being in execution for the said Debt by force of the said Capias and there dies if this be satisfaction of the Debt or not And Dodridge the Kings Serjeant which argued for the Plaintiff in the sayd Scire Facias conceived that it is no satisfaction but that notwithstanding the Debt remaines for the words of the Writ are Capias ad satisfaciendum and all others Executions as Fire Facias and Eligit are satisfactory But the Capias is but a restraint of his liberty till he hath satisfied the Debt and for that it is no plenary satisfaction but only restraint of his liberty which the Law more respects then Goods or Lands and for that Custodia ought to be Salva stricta So by this the party may be Inforced to pay his Debt Salva to the party so that by this the party may be safely detained till he hath satisfied the Debt and Stricta to the King so that by this Justice may be satisfied and for that Bracton saith that it is only to compell the party to make satisfaction And it is resolved in the 33. H. 6. 47. That it is no satisfaction but that the Body should remain as a Pledge till satisfaction a were made or as return Irreplevisable and yet neither the one nor the other are satisfaction And the words of the Writ are Capias ad satisfaciendum the party but if he will satisfie then there is no reason that the Defendant shall be Imprisoned by the Writ But if he will not pay then he shall continue in Prison Quousque satisfecerit by which it appeares that the Imprisonment is no satisfaction and it appeares also by the Register and Fitz. Na. Bre. 246. b That if a man recover Damages of Trespasse before the Justices of Oyer and Terminer and hath the party in execution by force of this Judgement now if the parry which is in execution dies in Prison he which recovered may sue Certiorari to the Justices to remove this Record into the Kings Bench that the Justices there may make upon that Record as the Law will in such case And it seemes by this that the party shall have execution by Elegit or by Fieri Facias for it is not reasonable as it is there sayd that the death of him which died in Prison shall be satisfaction to the party which recovered but Fitzh here saith Tamen quere for he doubted of that but in the Register there is a speciall Writ of Certiorari to this purpose that is to remove the Record into the Kings Bench so that the Justices may do there upon that as the Law will and if the Law will not allow the party to have new execution it were in vain to have such Certiorari for other course cannot be taken and the end of every suit is to have payment and so is the Judgement that the Plaintiff should recover his Debt and so is the Writ and the count and the Capias also and to the end of Justices in Suum cuique tribuere And the party hath not any of these ends if the death of the Defendant in prison shall be satisfaction and in the 47. Ed. 3. Fitz. execution 41. Persey said that if in Trespasse the Plaintiff recover and the Defendant is taken for the Kings Fyne if he pray that the Defendant continue in Prison till he have made agreement with him perchance he shall not
Booke of 33 H. 6. 47. is but the opinion of Prisot and Lacon And the principall case there depends upon another point Fitz. 246. before cyted is but a quere and Eitz himself doubted of it and the book of 44 Edw. 3. Fitz. Execution 41. is but the opinion of Percye But the Judgment upon the principall point is otherwise And the principall case in Blunfields case 5 Coke was upon another point also as it appears by the Booke and so he concluded with the Judgment before cyted to be in the Kings Bench Pasche 43 Eliz. between Williams and Cuttris which was direct in the point according to his opinion and prayed Judgement for the Defendants in the Scire Facias and it is adjourned This Case was argued in Trinity Tearm next ensuing by all the Judges of the Common Pleas and first Foster the youngest Judg argned that the death of the Defendant in Prison being in Execution was no satisfaction but the Plaintiffe may have a new execution against his Executors for he said it was an old saying That debts went before deadly sinne And that every one ought to satisfie his debts by the Law of God before Legacies given to charitable uses And so by the Law of the Realm if it be not the default of the Plaintiffe as it was not in our Cause for the death of the Defendant in Prison was the act of God and the Executors have confessed by pleading that they have assets and the Plaintiff hath nothing but griefe and pain and he said as before that at the Common Law no Capias lay till the Statutes of Marlebridge Chap. 23. and Westminster the 2. Chap. 11. Capias was given in Accompt and then the statute of 25 Edw. 3. Chap. 17. gives such like Processe in debt which was in Accompt and then in Accompt Capias ad Computandum lyes and in debt Capias ad Satisfaciendum And if in Accompt the Defendant was adjudged to accompt and Capias ad Computandum be awarded and he taken by force of that and committed to Prison and here dyes a new Writ shall be awarded So in debt if the Defendant be taken by Capias ad satisfaciendum new Writ shall be awarded against his Executors see 1 Edw. 3. 24. 1 H. 7. 5 Coke 92. Blundfields case for it is only the default of the Defendant that the debt is not satisfied and for that it is no reason that the Plaintiff should be prejudiced by that and 11 H. 4. 44. and 45. by Skreene Debt upon an Escape doth not lye against the Executor of the Sheriff but new Processe shall be awarded against the Prisoner which is escaped for a man shall not take advantage of his own wrong as in the case of Littleton If the sonn makes disseisin and enfeoffs the Father which dyes the sonne shall not take advantage of this Discent because he was particeps criminis and he said it was no wrong to any if execution were made of the goods of the Testator and it is mischievous to the Plaintiffe for he shall loose his debt And to the Objections which have been made that there is an end of Processe when the Defendant is taken by Capias and dyes in Execution the which he agreed as long as the Defendant lived but after his death he may make new election 47 Ed. 3. Fitz. Execution 41. by Percye And it appears by the pleading in 17 Ed. 3. That Judgment Execution without satisfaction is no Plea in Bar. And also he cyted the Register 285. and Fitz. Na. Bre. 246. 19. Ed. 3. 21 H. 6. 5. where the Plaintiff had effectual execution which was satisfaction 44 Ed. 3. 21 Edw. 4. 1 Edw. 4. 8 H. 7. 16 H. 7. to the same purpose for which Dodridge cyted them before And also he said that the Judges have always had respect to the satisfaction of Debts and for that would not bayle one in Execution upon a Writ of Errour where Errour indeed was assigned but suffers him to remain in Prison till the Judgment were reversed But here the Plaintiff hath neither Bale nor any satisfaction but griefe and pain And in the 21 of H. 7. the Sheriff returned that the Defendant had no land but lands in use and was adjudged that he should execute the Elegit upon these Lands such was the respect that the Judges have to Executions and to the Case of 35 H. 6. 47. This is but the opinion of Lacon which erred in the principall case and may as wel erre in this point and his opinion also is so intricately penned that he cannot understand it And Martins opinion also in 7 H. 6. 7. is against the Judgment of the principall case And to the Objection that the Party had determined his Election by the Execution of the Capias he agreed to that with this difference that is if the Plaintiff sue Scire facias the Sheriff levyed part that this notwithstanding the Plaintiff may have Capias for the residue and so Elegit after Fieri facias or Capias for there is not any Entry made of awarding of fieri facias or Elegit But the Plaintiff only sued that out of the Court see 44 Edw. 3. 18 Ed. 4. 31 Ed. 3. 17 Ed. 3. 20 Ed. 2. 22 Assis 17. H. 7. 1. And so he coucluded that the Judgment shall be given for the Plaintiff in the scire facias Warburton Justice conceived the contrary that is that the Plaintiff in the Scire facias shall be barred And he agreed and said that none will deny but that Debts shall be paid but that ought to be according to the rules of the Law For by the Common Law the body of the Defendant was not lyable to execution and then it is to examine in what cases he is at this day subject to execution and though in Trespasse Capias lyes at the Common Law but in Debt no Capias lyes till the Statute of 25 Edw. 3. which gives the same processe which was in Accompt and this is as well in the Originall processe as in the Judiciall and Elegit was first given by the statute of Westminst 2. And this was of the half of the Land But Levari facias was at the Common Law of the profits of the Land That in debt Acceptance and Election binds the party and so this remains for the said Statutes being in the affirmative doth not take away that nor abate it and by that if Conusee of a statute accepts Land extended at too high a value he is bound by that 22 Edw. 3. 32. H. 6. 15 H. 7. And that when the Party hath Judgment he hath election to have execution by Fieri facias Elegit or Capias for he hath determined his Election So if he makes his Election of a Capias at first he cannot have Elegit after 30 Edw. 3. adjudged 32 Edw. 3. Processe 52. according Long 5 of Edw. 4. by Markeham and others and the reason which is given in
47 Edw. 3. 17 Edw. 4. and 21 H. 7. that have been remembred to the contrary is only that it is reason that the Plaintiff should have the same process which was at the Common Law and there was not any such processe as Capias in debt at the Common Law and 21 H. 7. may be understood that the Elegit was not returned and so no record of that And 50 Edw. 3. a man may recover in Debt and pray Elegit and after brings Debt upon the Record but it doth not lye And he agreed to the Book of 23 H. 6. For there the Defendant was bound in an Obligation to make satisfaction of Debt and hee dyed in Prison and this cannot be satisfaction according to the Condition And in the Case of Fitz. Nat. Brev. the same doubt of that and this was the more strong case then the case at the Barr and if he doubted of that is the cause that he doubts also And cyted Williams and Cuttis case Rot. 88. in the point where the reason of the Judgment was for that that the Plaintiff had his plain and full satisfaction and saith that it was apparent difference between that and Blunfields case for there was 2 Defendants and here if one dyes there shall be no satisfaction and so these reconciled And so if a man be taken upon a Statute Merchant and dyes in execution that shall not be satisfaction for this is speciall processe given by statutes And 14 H. 7. 1. If a man being in Execution escape he shall not be taken againe and in the 14 H. 7. in debt upon an Obligation Capias profine was awarded and the Defendant taken by that And the Plaintiff prayed that he might be in Execution for his debt also and could not for that he had sued Fierifacias and it doth not appear if the Sheriff have that executed or not And so he concluded that the Judgment should not be revived by the Scire facias against the Executors and that Judgment shall be given for the Defendants in the Scire facias Walmsley Justice accordingly He specially observed the forme of the Writ which suggests quod executio adhuc restat facienda c. And to that the Defendants in the Scire facias plead that Capiás was awarded at the suit of the Plaintiff and upon that the Defendant was taken in execution and there dyed by which it appears that the words and suggestion of the Writ was answered directly and upon that the strongly relyed and then said that there were 3 ways to have Execution that is by Fieri facias Capias and Elegit And there is a speciall order to be observed in the suing of that for a man may have Fieri ficias and if the Defendant have not goods may have Elegit or Capias But if he make his Flection to have Capias he cannot have Fieri facias nor Elegit or if he sue Elegit he cannot have a Fieri facias nor Capias In 33 H. 6. and 44 Edw. 3. which have been cyted the Plaintiff sues Elegit and after that would have sued Capias supposing that he had not accepted the Elegit but of the other part it was said that the Sheriff had made Execution of it the which he could not contradict it And if the Plaintiff had Fieri facias and goods delivered to him in Execution and the Writ returned he shall not have a second Execution and so if Elegit executed and returned 14 H. 7. 15 H. 7. and said that Executions are tickle things for if the party escape he delivers himselfe out of Execution and the Plaintiff shall not have other Execution against him for that he hath had one Execution 2 Edw. 4. And so if a man sues a Writ of Priviledg out of Parliament and by that is delivered out of Execution he shall not be taken again And so if a man be delivered upon a Writ of Error for when the Party hath made his Election to take processe against the body it was his folly that he made such Election for though that death be the act of God yet for that that statutum est omnibus semel mori and for that God hath done no wrong for he hath but performed his Eternall Decree and for that it is not the act of God only but the folly of the party to make such Election and the Book of 47 Edw. 3. by Percy is but his opinion and more other Books are against that and ãâã H. 6. Danby and Prisot are against Lacon and though that the death of the Party in Execution is no satisfaction in rei veritate yet in Law it is satisfaction for that that the party hath no other remedy the Writ in the Register is certiorari ad faciendum in omnia singula que secundum legem consuetudinem fieri c. And there is not any Law nor Custome to warrant any such Course and here is not any other proceedings upon it But if he may have a Writ of Scire facias ostensurus quare satisfactionem habere non debet then it may be that the Defendant's ought to give another answer but for that that there is not any such Writ it seems that Judgment shall be given for the Defendants Coke chief Justice seemed the contrary and he agreed with Foster and he said that it is vexata et spinosa questio for the Books vary and great arguments have been made of both parts There are three things considerable 1. Reasons 2. Authorities 3. Answers of Objections And for the Reasons First he considered in whom the default is for which the Plaintiff shall lose his Debt 2. That the Debt remains after the body is taken in Execution 3. If the body taken in Execution be satisfaction 4. If the dying in Execution be a discharge 5. The Mischiefs if so they shall be And to the Objections First Escape which is the wrong and act of the Party it is no satisfaction nor discharge and here is the act of God and election of the party 2. Execution by Elegit If Lands be extended upon that this is no satisfaction And so if he be delivered by a Writ of Error and so in this case And for the first the fault was in Jackeson for he did not keep his day in the Condition and upon this was sued then he pleaded a false plea and upon that Judgement was given against him in all which actions the default was in the Defendant and no default in the Plaintiff for he took the Body which is the visible execution not in satisfaction but to satisfie and the Defendants have not pleaded fully administred but confesse that they have Assets and there is more reason that the Plaintiff shall be satisfied then the Executors keep the goods to their own use for it is Summa Injustitia nocentem habere totum lucrum innocentem totum damnum Second reason was that it is no satisfaction for the Defendant to dye
against peter THis Case was argued this Tearme by Harris youngest Serjeant for the Defendants and by Haughton for the Plaintiffs And Serjeant Harris conceived that Sir Francis Barrington was within the Intent of the Act of 22. Ed. 4. chap. 17. For he hath grant of Trees of Inheritance and this was all the profit which rise upon the Soyl and for that it shall be intended of the Soyl it selfe And to prove that he cyted Parromor and Yardlyes Case in the Com. 542. and 543. 2. H. 8. 159. Crooke 11. Eliz. Dyer 285. Where it is agreed by three Justices that the Patentee or Grantee of Herbage in a Forrest shall have Trespasse against any which consumes and distroies the Grasse but not the Trees nor of the fruit of that and the Trespasse of that shall be Quare clausum fregit as well as iâ it were of Land And may inclose the Forrest by such Grant See 17. Ed. 4. 6. a. by Littleton that Vestura terrae doth not pass without Livery Also admitting that he is not owner of the Ground within the Statute yet it seemes by the Statutes that they are It shall be lawfull for the same Subjects Owners c. And to such other persons to whom such VVood shall happen to be sold Immediatly after the VVood so cut to fence and inclose the same Ground with sufficient Hedges able to keep out c. Upon which words he inferrd that S. Francis Barrington is such a Person to whom the VVood is sold and for that may inclose And also he conceived that the Statute is generall and concernes all persons in generall and also all Forrests and Chases whatsoever And for that it is not like to the Cases put in Hollands Case 4. Coke upon the Statute of 13. Eliz. VVhich concernes all Ecclesiasticall persons in generall that this is a generall Act and yet concernes but one Genus in particuler But the Statute of 1. Eliz. Is otherwise which concernes the Bishop which is but a species of this Genus as it is resolved in Elmers Case 5. of Coke And also he conceived that it shall be releeved by the Statute of 35. H. 8. And so prayed Judgement for the Defendant And Haughton conceived that the words of the Statute intend such a person to whom VVood is sold for one turne only And not he which hath Inheritance of Wood that there is no word in the statute to exclude Commoner and such a Vendee is not without remedy for he is within the statute of 35. H. 8. If he pursue his remedy according to the statute and so prayed Judgement for the Plaintiff And at another day Foster Justice argued that the Plaintiff in the Replegiare shall recover and said that the cause consists of three parts First the Arbitrement Secondly the assurance Thirdly the private Act of Parliament of 27. H. 8. And to those the Arbitrement and the assurance shall tye only those which are parties to it and no others and the Commoner is not party to that nor shall not be bound and the private Act confirmes the assurance saving the Right of all strangers by which the Commoner is exempted and also the statute is made only as confirmation of the Grant and for that it shall not extend to any other thing nor to other parties but those only which are parties to the Grant as if the Queen had made a voydable Patent and after had made a Lease for yeares and after by the statute of 18. Eliz. All Letters Patents made within such a time were confirmed this makes the Letters Patents good against the Queen but against the Lessee And also all the Covenants in the Grant extend only to the Lord Rich and his Heires and these which claim under him And for that it shall not extend to the Commoner and also the private Act saves the Right of all strangers by which the Right of the Commoner was saved And he conceived that the Commoner shal not be excluded by the statute of 22. Ed. 4. chap. 7. which recites that if any Subjects have any Woods growing in his own Ground within any Forrest Chase c. Shall cut the same VVood by lycense of the King or his Heires in Forrest Chases c. Or without lycense in the Forrest Chase c. of any other person or make any Sale of the same VVoods It shall be lawfull to the same Owners of the same Ground whereupon the VVood so cut did grow and to other such persons to whom the said Wood shall happen to be sold Immediatly c. to cut and inclose the same Ground with sufficient hedges able to hold out all manner of Cattell and Beasts and to continue the same by the space of seven yeares without suing of any other Lycense of him or of his Heires or of any other persons or of any their Officers of the same Forrest Chases c. By which words it appeares that the statute doth not extend to any Wood of the King but only to the Wood of the subject lying in Forrest of the King or of other person owner of the Forrest or Chase And if it be in the Kings case and he hath lycense from the King to cut the Wood then may he cut it without other lycense according to the perclose of the Act And the statute doth not give lycense to Inclose without the assent of the Commoner but without other lycense of other Officers of the Forrest And by this Statute the Owner of the Ground may first cut the Wood and then Inclose But by the Statute of 35. H. 8. Otherwise it is for by this he may first inclose and then cut within four Moneths and that Sir Francis Barrington hath no interest in the Soyle and that this Statute of 22. Ed. 4. is a private Statute and ought to be pleaded for it concernes only forrests and Chases and it is no other then if it had been of al Woods in Parks and resembled that to the statute of 1. Eliza. of the Bishop which concerns only the Bishop and it is resolved in Elmers case to be private and the same Judges shal not take notice of that without pleading and it is not like the statute of 13 Eliz. which concerns al manner of spiritual persons in general and also that this statute is repealed by the statute of 35. H. 8. which is a negative Law and Leges posteriores priores contrarius abrogant and it is agreed in Porters case 1. Coke and so he concluded that Judgment should be given for the Plaintiff Warburton Justice to the contrary and yet he agreed that neither the Arbitrement nor the conveyance nor the private act excludes the Commoners for these reasons which have been urged by Foster but he relyed only upon the statute of 22 Ed. 4. and to that he sayd that the statute gives power to the owner of Ground to inclose and it should be frivilous for him to inclose if the
Commoner shal not be by that excluded and he said that the persons mentioned in the statute are two The first is the owner of the ground and such person he agreed Sir Francis Barrington is not The second is such person to whom such wood shal happen to be sold and such Person it seems is Sir Francis Barrington and yet he agreed that he hath an Inheritance in the Trees and the Owner of the soyl cannot cut them nor dig the soyl from the Roots of the Trees for then the Grant could not take effect and he sayd there is no difference between sales of Wood though that the statute speaks of the Person to whom Wood shall be sold and another person to whom it shal be given without consideration and to that he resembled the statute Westminster 2. Chap. Si quis alienavit terram uxoris suae non deferratur c. sed expectet emptor c. though that the statute mention buyer only yet Donee without any consideration shal be intended in it and that the statute doth not intend within it and that the Statute doth not intend sale Vinca vice tantum but rather sale of Inheritance for such Vendee may rather intend the preservation of the wood then the other And he inferred upon these words of the statute to inclose the same Grounds with hedges sufficient to keep out al manner of Cattel and beasts out of the same Grounds and these words expound themselves for they shal not be intended Deer but Cattel which belong to Commoners and so is the statute of West 2. Chap. If Infant suffer Usurpation this shal not bind him but this shal be intended where he hath Advowson by discent and not by purchase and this appears by the words of the statute which are Cum aliquis vis presentandi non habens presentavit ad aliquam ecclesiam cujus presentatus sit admissus ipse qui verus est patronus per nullum aliud breve recuperare potuit advocationem quam per breve de recto quod debet perminare per duellum vel per magnam assisam per quod heredes infra etatem existentes per fraudem negligentiam custodis multities ex heriditatem patiebantur c. By which words it appears that there ought to be presentation which passeth by fraud and negligence of the Guardian which the Statute remedies and that is presentation which he had by discent and not by purchase and in the Time of Ed. 1. Fitz. trespas 239. It is said the Law of the Chase that none may inclose his own Wood without the view of the Forrester and if the statute of 22 Ed 4. Gives license to inclose and that notwithstanding the Commoner may put in his Beasts then is the statute made in vain and it is resolved in the 30 of Ed. 3. Fitz. trespas that if a man hunt in a Park or Chase that this is not within the statute of VVestminster 1. Chap. 21 Ed. 1. So the statute of 22 Ed. 4 Extends to the Kings Deere and also to other Beasts which shal be intended âhe Cattel of the Commoners and it is not repealed by the statute 35. H. 8. For these statutes are made for several purposes and consist upon several grounds and if the statute of 22 Edw. 4. be repealed then there cannot be inclosure in forrest or Chase at al And which is general Law and the Justices ought to take notice of that without pleading and that al Lawes to some respects may be intended to be special as the statute of 13 Eliz. Concerns only spiritual men and so Charta de foresta concerns only forrests and the statutè of 3 H. 7. Chapt. 1. Gives appeale to the Wife for the death of her Husband and though that al these statutes concern one thing only and for that to some intent may be said to be special yet they are al generall Laws and so he concluded that Judgment shal be given for the Defendant VValmesley agreed with Foster in al that is that Sir Francis Barrington hath nothing but profit In alieno solo and for this cause was not within the statute of 22 Ed. 4. Which might inclose and the Common Law doth not exclude the Commoner for the Lord Rich granted the Wood and this Transit cum onere to Sir Thomas Barington and sayd that it was in vain to dispute if the statute of 22 Ed. 4. was private Law or if it were repealed which makes nothing in the Case and so he breifly concluded that Judgment shal be given for the Commoner which is the Plaintiff Coke cheife Justice agreed that Judgment shal be given for the Plaintiff and did agree that the Arbitrement the Convaiance nor the private Act made nothing in the Case for by these the Commoner cannot be barred of his Common but for the statute of 22 Ed. 4. He would first consider how the Law was before the making of that and as to that it appears by the statute of Charta de foresta that by the Common Law no man which was Owner of Wood in which another had Common that they could not inclose but Assise of Common or action upon the case lyeth as it requires and if it be several Wood within the Kings Forrest in which none hath interest of Common then may he inclose by the view of the Forresters and this hold inclosed by the space of three years as it appears by the Preamble of the Statute of 22. Ed. 4. Cum parvo fossato bassahaia that is a Little Ditch and Low Hedge for that the Kings Deare are not shut out and this appears in the Register in the Writ of Ad quod damnum Fitz. Na. Bre. 226. f. And then comes the statute of 22 Ed. 4. and gives power to inclose with such sufficient Hedges able to keep out al manner of Beasts and Cattel And then considered between what persons the statute is made And to that he conceived it is made between the King and his Successors of one part and Subjects having woods growing upon their owne Grounds and such persons unto whom such woods shal happen to be sold of the other part and a Commoner is not named in the statute and also the Body of the statute is not general but there are some words in one sentence and this is but a sentence and cannot be divided the words are First The sayd Hedges so made may keep c. Secondly And repaire and maintain them as often as need shal be within seven years Thirdly without suing any other License of him that is the King or his Heirs or other persons that is which have forrests or Chases or any of their Officers and here the sentence concludes and there is no period before them so that this statute being made between the King and owners of forrests and Chases of one part and Owners of woods in their own soyl and other persons to whom such woods should be sold other
action is well maintainable Vi armis as Quare Impedit for disturbance by word or presentment by word And it is also found that the Defendants did take all the profits and that the Deputy of the Plaintiff came to the usual place where the Court was kept and that could not be intended to be out of the Mannor And so for these reasons he concluded that Judgement should be given for the Plaintiff And Coke cheife Justice argued to the same intent that is that the Plaintiff ought to have Judgment And first he conceived that the Patent is good notwithstanding the uncertainty that the Mannors are not named in what Counties they are either in England France or Ireland for the Mannor is named very certain by which it may be granted though it be in the Kings case as it appears by 32 H. 6. 20. where the King grants all Mannors Messuages c. which were parcell of the possessions of I. S. attaint and good And such grant was made to Charles Brandon Duke of Suffolke and adjudged good though that the person of a man is more incertain then the Mannor yet Id certum est quod certum reddi potest And 39 Ed. 3. 1. in the Abbot of Reddings case where a grant was made to the Abbot and his Successors that the Prior and Covent shall take the profits in time of vacation Fitz. Na. Bre. 33. b. And 23 Ed. 3. 20. The King grants to the Queen the Barrony and all Mannors c. till Iohn of Gaunt be able to govern himselfe and that shall be intended till the Law intends him able to govern himself and Mannor is very certain of which a view shall be awarded The second exception which was taken to the grant was for that that it was to take effect at the ful age of the Earl And after it is recyted in the Patent that he was of full age before the making of the Patent and so by consequence the Patent is to take effect from the time that it was past And to that he said that it shall be intended to the profits of the Office only for it appeares by the Patent that the Queene had granted it to another during his Minority That is the office And to the third mattter That is if hee cannot make a Deputy then he hath forfeited the said Office by the not using of it And to that he said it appeares by Waltons case 10 Eliz. Dyer fol. 270. That if a man grants a Fee pro concilio impendendo or keeping of Courts the Fee shall not be forfeited without speciall request to the Patentee to give Councell or to hold his Courts for hee doth not know if the Grantor will have his Courts held or not and so it is 39 H. 6. 22. Brewens case where it is also agreed that it shall be no forfeiture of an office without speciall request to hold the Courts or to give Councell But in the case of the Queen otherwise it is for she ought not to make demand in case of Rent nor Condition though that it be within the Statute of 32. H. 8. And yet it was argued in Sir Thomas Hennages case that if the King make a Lease for years upon condition to cease this shall cease without office upon the breaking of the Condition but a Lease for life shall not cease without office though that the Condition be broken And so if the King grants an Office for life this shall not be avoided without Office And he doubted the case of the Lease for yeares And also he agreed that the Grantee of a Stewardship cannot make Deputy to exercise his Office without speciall words in the Patent But if the Office be granted to him and his Heires or to him and his assignes it is sufââcient without other words to make a Deputy And also he sayd that the word Steward is the name of an Office and is derived of Steed and Ward which are Saxon words and intend the Keeper of the place which the party himselfe ought to hold and it appeares by Cambdem and Lambert And so the word Senescalls also signify for this is but a Custos sive officiarius loci See Fleta liber 2. chap. 72. Senescallum providebit Dominus circumspectum fidelem Modestum pacificum qui in consuitudinibus c. Jura Domini sui teneri c. Quique balivos suos instruere potest Cujus officium est curia maneriorum c. And a Deputy is a person authorised by the Officer in the name and right of the Officer and for all that he doth the Officer shall answer for he is but as a shaddow of the Officer But assignee is in his own right and he shall answer for himselfe and forfeiture by assignee of Tenant for life shall not be forfeiture of the reversion 39. H. 6. And he agreed that a Marshall Steward Constable Bayliff and such like cannot make Deputies without speciall wordes in the Grant as it appeares 39. H. 6. 11. Ed. 3. 10. Ed. 4. 14. 17. and 7. 21. Ed. 4. Nevills case in the Com. and Littleton And to the exceptions which have been taken to the Writ and Count he saith that an Action of Trespasse which is founded upon the case doth not lye Vi et armis where the point and cause is Action is supposed to be made Vi et armis and for that he takes difference between Causa causans and Causa causata for where the matter which is supposed to be done Vi armis is not the point of the Action But the cause of the Action there lies very well Vi armis But wherein the point of Action is supposed to be made Vi armis there the Writ shall abate As if a man brings an Action of Trespasse for casting dung into a River by which his Land is drowned in this case an Action of Trespasse upon the case Vi armis lyeth very well for here the casting in of the Dung is but Causa causans And the drowning of the Land is Causa causata 8. R. 2. And so disturbance to hold a Leet by which he hath lost his offerings 19. R. 2. 52. And the Earle hath election to have Trespasse or Assise though it be not Manurable As if a man prescribe to have seven pence of every Brewer which sells strong Beer for disturbance to have the seven pence Action upon the case lyes for this disturbance is Dissesin 15. Ed. 4. 8. 14. Ed. 3. 4. 1. Ed. 5. 5. 19. R. 2. Action upon the case 51. And to the objection which hath been made that disturbance found by the Jury is not the same disturbance which is mentioned in the Count for in the Count the disturbance is supposed to be made Vi Armis but the Jury do not find any distubance to be made Vi Armis But this notwithstanding it seemes that the Count is good As if a Sheriff enters a Franchise and executes
22 Assise 24. 48 Ed. 3. 8. Register 47. And in case that one common person hath any Office which he cannot exercise by a Deputy yet if he be imployed in the Kings service as if he be made Ambassador out of the Realm or other such imployment he may during his absence make a Deputy and this shal not be forfeiture of his Office and an Earl in ancient time was not only a Councellour of the King but by his Degree was Prefectus sive prepositus commitatus as it appears by Cambden 106 107. Comes prefectus Satrapas which is Prepositus comitatus and was in place of the Sherif at this day and when that he was Sherif though that he had the custody of the county committed unto him which was a great trust yet then by the Common Law he might make an under Sherif which was but a Deputy the like Holinsheads Chronicle 463. Amongst the customes of the Exchequer he called the under Sheriff Senescallus which agreed with the Definition before for he held the place of Sherif himself and by the statute of Westminster 8. chapt 39. It is sayd that Vice comes est viccarius commitatus and if a Barony discend upon the Sheriff yet he shall continue Sheriff 13. Eliz Dyer and Britton 43. If a Rybaud strike a Baron or a Knight he shall loose his Land And Tenant by Knights service may execute it by Deputy 7. Ed. 3. Littleton And if it be so in the case of a Sheriff which hath the County committed to him that he may make a Deputy by the Common Law upon that he inferred that the Steward which hath but the Mannors of the King committed to him that he may make a Deputy And also he said that the words in the last clause that is Volentes precipentes that the Officers and the Subjects should be attendant expoundes and declares the intent of the Queen for the words are Omnibus premisses and the Grant of the Office of the Stewardship is one of the premisses and so he concluded upon these reasons that Judgement shall be given for the Plaintiff and that the Grant was good and the Action wel maintainable And oâ this opinion were Warburton and Foster Justices And Judgement was given accordingly this Trinity Tearm 8. Jacobi And Coke cheife Justice remembred a Report made by him and Popham cheife Justice of England upon reference made to them that this Patent was good and that the Earle of Rutland might exercise this Office by Deputation and he conceived that there were other words in the Patent which were found by the Jury that the said Earle should have the said Office Cum omnibus Juribus Jurisdictionibus c. as full c. as any other Patent hath been had and withall the Appurtenances and it seemed that a former Patentee had power by expresse words to execute that by a Deputy and he conceived though these words Adeo plene c do not inlarge the Estate yet this inlargeth the Jurisdiction of the Officer as in 43. Ed. 3. 22. Grant is made by the King of a Mannor to which an advowson is appendant Adeo plene tam amplis modo forma c. And these words past the advowson without naming that and he said it was adjudged Hillary 40. Eliz. in Ameridithes case where the case was the Queen granted a Mannor Adeo plene intigre in tam amplis modo forma as the Countesse of Shrewshury or any other had the same Manno r and Queen Kathrin had the same Mannor and diverse liberties with it of great value during her life and adjudged that these liberties should passe also by this Patent by these words and so in the principall case if the former Patent had been found also by the Jury and so was the opinion of Popham and him and was certified accordingly FINIS A Table of the Second Part. ARch-Bishops Jurisdiction 1 2. 28. Admiralties Jurisdiction 10 11. 13 16 17. 26. 29. 31. 37. Arbitrement satisfaction what 31. 131. Assumpsit 40 41. 273. Arrianisme one committed for it 41. Assets 47. Almony 36. Apurtenant what shall be said 53 Action sur Case by a Commoner for words 55. 84. 100. 119. 122. Avowry the whole plea 62 63. 102 Agreement what 72 Account 76 Audita Querela 81. 83. 168 Atturnment good by one under age where and why 84 Award void 100 Age not allowed in Dower 118 Administration repealable 119 Accord with satisfaction good plea where where not 131 Attorney ought to finde Baile in an Originall not Bill 134 Action sur Assumpsit 137 Assuâpsit against an Executor where maintainable 138 Assets in Formedon what 138 Attachment 144. 168 Assent to a Legatee 173 Ayd prayer 191 Attachment for contempt of the Court 216 Accessary null unlesse there is Principall 220 Assignment of an estate suspended 225 Assise of novel Disseisin 229 Abatment of brief per entry 231 232 Abatement de facto and by plea differ in what 235 Agreement and Arbitrement good pleas where 132 Agreement by word to keepe backe tythes 17 Admiralls Commission for measuring of Corne 29 Administration during minority of c. 83 Atturney brings Debt for Trees 99. Arbitrement 130. 131. Arrest of Judgment 167. Acts what to make an Executor de seu tort 184. Attachment of Priviledge for an Estate against the Marshall c. 266. Assise where it may lye sans view 268. Assise the Recognitors challenged ibid Ajournment of the Tearm 278. Annuity or Writ of Covenant where 273. Arbitrement submission and revocation 290. Approvement of Common 297. Account 308. Award submission 309. Arbitrement 310 Arbitrement who it binds 323. Assise del Office 328. B BIshop not displaceable 7. Baron alone cannot sue for not setting forth Tithes without the feme proprietory 9 Ballast granted to Trinity House a Monopoly 13. Baron and Feme joyn where 66. Baron Judgment against an Executor 83 Baron how chargeable pur sa feme 92. 93. 95. Bar in trespass 121. By-Laws whom they bind 180. To what extended 258. Baron and feme take by intirity where 226. Barwick whether part of England or Scotland 270. Bayle 293 Banckrupt actionable 299. C CHase an action not to be divided 56 Cui in vita of Copy-hold 79. Custome for pound breach 90. Common Recovery 16. Copiholder shall hold charged where 208. Confirmation to a copiholder destroys common 209 210. Consultation after it no Prohibition grantable upon the same Libell 247. Cape grand Petit 253 Cause of a commitment traversable 266. Count in trespass after the teste del Breife 273. Covenant to pay Rent 273 Continuance Ibidem Chellenge 275 Customes of London argued by the Justices 284. 285. 286. Certiorari 312. Capias ad satisfaciendum no satisfactory execution 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. Copy-hold at common Law 44. Creditor may sue both heireand Executor 97. Court of Equity not proper after Judgment 97. Copyhold intayled 121. Covenants direct and collaterall how they differ 136.
extortion 151 Jeofailes stat 168 Judgment arrested 182 Joynt Tenants for years of a Mill and grants c. 212 Judgment in a Writ of errour 215 Intendment where 234 Judgment Sur breife abatest errour 235 Imprisonment unlawfull 20 Impropriation 24 Instruction for the Presidents of Wales 29 Judgment reversed for the Outlawry only and confirmed for the other 39 Joynture 52 53 Information sur stat 21. H. 8 chap. 13. For non-residency 54 Judgment voyd 127 Informer exhibits a Bill in the Star chamber 151 Imprisonment for a force when or not 266 Justices of Peace and Auditors ought to make Record where and when Ibid. Indemptitas nominas 270 Jurors from two countyes 272 Infant levies a Fine brings errour 278 279 K KIngs Grant voyd for defect in recitall 241 King is specially favored in the Law 249 Kings Patent how to be taken 250 L LIcense from the Ordinary where 1 License how many kinds 3 27 Legates Jurisdictions ibidem License to a Copyholder when pleadable by whom 40 Limitation and Condition their difference 68 Levant couchant what 101 Lease by a Dean 134 Livery voyd where 135 Libellous Letters 152 Law of England of what it consists 198 Lateran Councell concerning Tithes 24 License to appropriate 25 License to a Copy-holder 40 Lord of a Mannor inclose the Demesnes 168 Letter of Attorney cannot be made by a wife 248 London the custome for an Inn-holder 234 Lease to determine upon limitation 292 Letters Patents how expounded 323 License in a Forrest 323 M MArriage disagreed to at yeares of consenting c. 36 Misnosmer in an obligation what it effects 48 Marriage a gift of all goods personall 91 Merchant 4 sorts 99 Meale accounted dead victual within the stat 5 Ed. 6 chap. 14. 116 Mayme is fellony 220 Modus decimandi 33 Murther sur Thames where tryable 37 Maxime in law 43 Misnosmer of a corporation 243 Mainténance 271 Minister arrested 301 Marshall court its jurisdiction 125 126 127 N NOn-suit 41 Nisi prius record amended 41. Non-residencie the statute 21 H. 8. 13 expounded 54 Non-suit after verdict 219 Nisi prius by proviso for whom 276 Notice where requisite 278 O ORdinary cannot imprison 4 Ordinary may imprison a preist by 1. H. 7. 4. Ibid Obligation taken for a legacy incourt court Christian 11 Ordinary may transmit 28 Office granted by a Bishop 137 Occupancy where â02 Outlary in fellony was reversed 229 Offences exorbitant what 19 20 Obligation to performe covenants 167 Officers gradâall of the Kings bench who 282 Obligation with condition against law or impossible 281 Outlary 313 Office exerciseable by deputy where 334 335 P PRohibitionupon the stat of 13 H. 8 chap. 9 Polygamy punishable where and how 7 Prohibitionjoynt and severallcounts 7 Prohibition surle stat de simony 7 for not settingforth of tythes 9 Prescription for tythes 31 33 34 Prohibition to the admiralty 34 to court Baron 34 Prison private and common 41 Prescription for inhabitants 178 Prohibition for common 47 Prescription none after consultation duly granted 36 Parson deprived for drunknesse 37 Proofe what 57 Priviledg out of higher court to inferiour 101 Payment directed how 107 108 Patent of a Judge 122 Papist that not actionable 166 Possibility resonable where 173 Prescription and custome do differ wherein 198 Prescription 210 211 Prohibition to court Christans 215 Prerogative del roy 219 Prescription for waife and stray 219 Paunagium quid 236 Prohibition good sans action pendecit 17 Priviledg determined 22 Processe from the admiralty 29 Prohibition not grantable after consultation 36 Possessio fratris 43 Plurality with dispensation 45 Pardon of one attaint pro false verdict 47 Prescription where good where not 64 Per que servitia 84 Prescription for beasts sans number 101 Physitians colledge the authority 256 Physitans examined by whom 257 Priviledg of attorney allowed before the Deputy Marshall where 267 Partition without naming the parts good where 275 Prohibition to the Court of request 297 Copyholder prescribeth Pro ligno combustibuli 330 Q QUare impedit 45 Quo warranto 217 Quare ejecit infra terminum 133 Quare clausum fregit where it lieth 322 Quare Vi Armis where it will and of what 331 332 334 R RIght to a spirituall Office is temporall 12 Residency where 13 Ravishment against feme covert 59 91 92 93 Replevin 84 52 149 Right the Writ 138 Remainder in a Chattell 173 Release where not good 190 Release of one Church warden shall not bind the other 216 Restitution to the Heir of an accessory where the principall reversed the outlawry 220 Reservation of Rent at Michaelmas ten or dayes after 220 Reservation not taken strictly 221 Right to a tearm not grantable 226 Revocation the power when suspended 228 Return of the sheriff where good 145 Revocation of uses 157 Remainder of a Chattell 173 Request where necessary 176 Release of Dower by Fine 175 Replevin 248 Re-entry after possession executed 253 Release 254 Return of writs granted to a corporation 270 Replevin 297 Release 300 S STatutes ecclesiasticall by whom to be expounded 2 3 Surrender an attornment where 51 Scire fac by baile 76 Scire fac against an Executor 83 Surrender by Cognisor c. 97 Statutes pro bono publ taken by equity 110 111 Summons in Dower 122 Scire facias for whom 145 Seisin of a Rent p. vicâânt 237 Submission awarded 48 Survivorship not aâongst Merchants 99 Statute penall 112 Scire facias speciall non-tenure a goodplea 146 Seisin to have Assise what sufficient 241 Slaunder of an Attorney what 252 Slaunder 272 276 299 Sheriffs power what 281 Vnder sheriff how limited ibid Sheriff may limit the Authority of his Vnder Sheriff 282 Sheriff committed for taking undue Fees 283 Suit begân hanging another 293 Statutes how to be understood 305 306 307 T TYthes what Lands are free of them P. 8 21 22 23 24 Taxes for Church-Reparations and other like dutyes who are chargeable and how 10 Tithes not grantable P. Parol unless by way of Retainer 11 Tithes where discharged by unity of possession 26 Transmission of causes where 27 Tenant in Dower disseised 41 Tayl its incidents 67 By Copyhold custome 77 Its Creation and nature 79 Testibus lies what comes after no part of the Deed 99 Town cannot be corporate without the assent of the Major part c 100 Trespass for a commoner good 149 By the Lord against the commoner 168 Trespasse for assault 182 Tales challenged 235 Tythes their antiquity 24 Tythes of what not payable 32 33 Trespasse for breaking of a close 65 Teste of a ven fac amended post verdict 102 Trespasse for imprisonment 124 125 Tenant pur view with warranty 191 Testatum where no writ issued 209 Tythes not paid for seven yeares of what 257 Tayl 271 Trade with Infidells without licence 296 U VEn fa. amended after verdict 102 Voucher P. attorney 167 Voucher sur bre abateable the danger 185 Verdict speciall 187 188 189 Verdict doth not cast
a Book that ought not be given in evidence the Court above cannot remedie it except it be returned with the Postea A release to Tenant at sufferance void Commoner cannot chase the Lords Cattell if the surcharge be Common The Statute of 13 Eliz. for non-residence a generall law Where Husband and Wife shall be joyned and where severed in Action The Venire facias vicious no damages in Partition If the Jury find a man guilty in Trespass for a foot where it is layd in an Acre good enough and so in all Actions where damages onely are to be recovered Nota. Error assigned because in trespass nothing was entred of the Fine c. where it was a continued trespass and part of it was layd to be after the Pardon Nota. Nota. If the verdict find the tenure in substance though not in manner and form it is good intrespasse Difference between Replevin and Trespass In a writ to enquire of damages the Plaintif is not bound to prove the property of goods but the value only Where of his own wrong without such cause shall be a good issue and where not The Defendant prescribed for a passage over Land and naught it should have been for a way Nota. If the Lord cut the Wood in which the Commoner hath Estovers he shall have an Action of the Case but not an Assise Nota. Nota. Nota. An action will not lie for the counter-part of an Indenture without a speciall grant Nota. A man cannot Justifie the digging of a mans ground in hunting a Badger Nota. Nota. One Venu out of two places in the same County Whether a Copyholder may lop the trees growing upon his Copy-hold and held he might The Copy-holder is in by custome which is above the Lords estate The Copy-holder shall have trespas upon the Case against the Lord for cutting down of trees Nota. Nota. Nota. Nota. Nota. Nota. Waste in the Tenuit for digging of Sea coals Custodes Brev. Capital Prothon Sedi ' Prothon Try ' Prothon Cliri ' Warr. Cliri argenti Regi Cliri Error Cic. lib. 1. de Invent. Rhet. Prohibition upon the statute of 23. H. 8. Chap. 9. Prohibition to the High Commissioners High Commission Prohibition Joynt prohibitions and severall Counts Prohibition upon the statute of Symony upon the stat of 31. Eliz. Prohibition upon the Statute of 32 H. 8. for the dissolution of the Hospitall of Saint Johns of Jerusalem For not setting forth Tythes Husband sue only Prohibition to the Cort of Requests Against Forreiner for Ornaments for the Church and for Sextons wages Admiralty Contract for retaining of Tithes Admiralty Prohibition At the Archess discussed in right of Office Prohibition Admiralty for staying ships for Ballast High Commissioners and their power in Ministring Oâth and taking obligation High Commission Clandestine marriage Admiralty Coârt if a thing done beyond Sea shall be there tried Agreement by word ââ¦p back tithes Where a Prohibition shall be granted without Action hanging High Commissioners Alimony Adultery Houghton Shirley Barker Court of Admiralty's Jurisdiction Admiralty Prohibition Modus decimandi Prohibition to a Court Baron Replevin 2. Executors one refuses Waste 2. Executors one refuses Bargaine and sale upon Condâ⦠Ravishment of Ward Mich. ãâã Jacobi Rot. 213. Common of Pasture Trespasse Ejectione firmae Common Recovery Judgement in Debt Accompt See the beginning fol. Debt by Executor Administrators during the minority of the Executor Action upon the Case for words Replevin Attornement of Tenant being under age of 21. yeares Shirley Harris Harris Montague Hutton Surrender after Statute acknowledged Executors sued and also the Heire Court of Equity Debt upon a Bill Harris Shirley Fealty gives Seisin of all annuall Services Atturney brings Action of Debt for Fees Survivor doth not hold amongst Merchants to have all Award void Action upon the Case for words Devise that Executors shall sell Land A Towne incorporated with the consent of the greater part Action on the Case for slander Action upon the Case for suing one in a Court which hath no Jurisdiction Prescription for Common for Beasts without number Priviledge out of higher Court Fine amended Feoffinent to a Son and Heir for a valuable consideration Avowry Teste of a Venire facias amended after verdict Ejectione firme Ejectione firme Dodridge Houghton Replevin Grant without date Obligation Accompt Information Dodridge Hanghton Montague Dodridge Dower Debt against Administrator Commission to the Councell in Wales Caveat to a Bishop If administraon to the next of blood cannot be repealed Action for words Trespasse for breaking a House and taking a Cow Haughton Barker Barr not good Copy-hold intailed Extent upon a Statute Summons in Dower Patent of a Judge of the Common bench Action upon the case for slander Haughton Barker Periured Actionable Trespasse for imprisonment Dodridge Hutton Coram non judice Judgement void Shirley Wynch Foster Arbitrement Lease by the Dean and Chapter of Norwich Hutton Haughton Office granted by a Bishop Assumpsit Wilt of Right Haughton Nicholls Dower of titâe of Wooll Attachment Executrix during nonage Nicholls Harris Copy-holder Harris Dodridge Coke Replevin Waste Informer Lybell Debt against Administrator Copy-hold Coke Revocation of Uses Dodridge Nicholls Dodridge Nichols Wynch Warburton Coke Common Recovery Obligation to perferme Covenants Arrest of Judgment Audita querela Wast Estrepement awarded Ejectione firme Refusall Lord of a Mannor inclose the Demesnes adjoyning to the Common Warrantia Charte Dodridge Nicholls Devise of a Lease Dodridge Harris Assent to a Legatee Remainder of a Chattell Sherley Debt by Obligation Request is necessary for his Rent though that he have a bond for performing Covenants Nichols Debt Wynch Warburton Debt against Executors Davis What acts doe make an Executor De son tort what not Barker Warburton Wynch Trespasse Harriot Nicholls Harris Coke 253 Eliz. Dyer 193. a. Wrensfords case accordingly Warberton Wynch Release Cinque Ports Tenant for life with warranty Nicholls Haughton Wynch Warburton Ayd granted Coke Wynch Verdict uncertaine Falkland What is so called Warburton Coke Quod non occupantur conceditur Debt against Administrator for Rent in the Debet and Detinet Chibborne Detinet onely 2. Heire charged in Debet and Detinet 3. Towse Crook and Harris Joynt Covenant shall survive Copy-holder shall hold charge Error Elegit Testatum where no Writ had issued Confirmation to a Copy-holder destroys Common Expresse Covenant qualifies Covenant in Law Prohibition Defendant re-enters after Possession delivered by Habere facias possessionem Custome among Copy-holders Nonsuit after Verdict Reservation of Rent Michaelmasse or ten dayes after Grant of Common extinct Exposition of Usage Ejectione firme Errour Abatement of a Writ by entry Markhams Grant Earle of Rutlands Patent Challenge Earl of Rutlands Patent Challenge Abatement Errour Variance Seisin Abridgment of the Plaint in Assise Yelverton Fenner Challenge prin Flemming What matter shall be assigned for Error after Judgement Variante Challenge Seisin Misnaming of a Corporation Walter Yelverton Fenner Flemming Prohibition Prohibition A married Wife cannot make a Letter of Attorney Replevin Warburton Justice Walmesley Re-entry after possession executed Slander of Attorney Grand Cape Petit Cape Waging Law Release Inn-Keeper in London Action of false Imprisonment Serieant Harris the younger Walter Walmesley Coke Priviledge Assise View Coke Walmesley Challenge Errour in a Fine Barwick Returne of Writs Idemptitas nominis Fine Infant Tayle Maintenance Habeas Corpus Prohibition Trespasse for Slander Party Jury of two Counties Action upon the Case for Slander Errour Covenant for Rent Continuance Assumpsit Consideration Debt against Executors Errour Ve. fa. hab Carpus Formedon in Remainder Challenge Partition Dures Action upon the case for slander Prohibition Will. Devise Priviledge Postea 218. Adjournment of Tearm Infant levies Fine brings Errour Action upon the Case Action upon the Case Debt for Obligation Hutton Dodridge Court Sheriff committed to the Fleet. Grant of a Rent Priviledge of London Harris Hutton Where the Owner of Wood may Inclose Hutton Arbitrement Submissior Revocation Devise and grant âenures to bargaine and Sale Harris Lease to determine upon Limitation Grant of the King that the Burrough should be incorporated Bayle Suit begun hanging another Writ Casuall intire Services Harris Nicholls Foster Dauiell Warburton Walmesley Coke Trade with Infidels without License Prohibition to the Court of Requests Approvement of Common Walmesley Foster Action upon the Case for Slander Bankrupt actionable Grant of Reversion Error in Proclamation Forfeiture of Office of a Chiroghapher Release Error in a Writ of Dower Copy-hold Certificate of the Bishop Minister Arrested Grant of the King of Alnage Haughton Dodridges Statutes how to be understood c. Account Devise of a Teerme Award Submission Arbitrement Where the death of the Defendant in Execution shall be satisfactory Dodridge Certiorari Outlawry Hutton Foster Debt upon escape against whom Warburton Land extended at too high rate Walmsley Coke Harris Haughton Foster Justice Warburton Walmsley Coke Charta de Foresta Assise Office Trespasse Estovers Boote its signification c. Nicholls Walmesley Coke Fee when forfeited Trespass Grant le Roy.