and paid duly the said Annuity and then he surrendred his Estate in the said Scite to the said Dr. Drewry and after this did not pay the Annuity over and yet continued the possession of the said Scite And by all the Iustices the Defendant notwithstanding the Surrender made to the Obligee himself ought to have continued the payment of the Annuity to the said Dorothy for albeit the Term be drowned and merged in the Reversion and so hath no continuance as to him in the Reversion yet as to any thing heretofore done by the Defendant who was the Termor in Iudgment of Law it is to be said to have continuance As if he had granted a Rent-charge out of it to have continuance during the said Term although he surrender his Term to him in the Reversion yet the charge continues and as to it the Reversion shall be said to be in the Termor and albeit the Obligee himself shall not take advantage of his own or to have the advantage of the forfeiture of an Obligation there where his own act is the cause of his breach And if it had been that the said Dorothy during the said Term shall have the use of a Chamber within the Scite without the interruption of him or his Assigns there if after the Surrender the said Dorothy Drewry had interrupted him of the use of the said Chamber the forfeiture of the Obligation shall not be taken against the Defendant for it But here the Condition is of a collaterall thing to be done to wit the payment of the Annuity to a stranger with which the Land is not bound and therfore the breach comes meerly in default of the Obligor and of the Obligee in no part to wit and therfore the Obligation here is forfeited And by Popham the case here is more cleer upon consideration of the words of the Condition for the words are I the Defendant shall or may enjoy c. and this word may enjoy shall be alwaies intended reasonably to wit if it may without any thing to be done by him to the contrary and here if he had not made the Surrender he might have enjoyed the Scite untill the end of his Term and therfore because it cometh of his own act wherby he or his Assigns shall not enjoy it for the Term if it shall be said that he in the Reversion shall not be said in by the Termor of which he himself shall not take any advantage in as much as if this had not been he might have enjoyed for the whole Term. To which all the other Iustices also agreed and upon this Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff But if any had defeated the said Term by a lawfull entry by a Title Paramount the Obligation had not been forfeited for any default of payment after this Entry but if Rent had been reserved upon the Lease and for default of payment a Re-entry had been made yet by Popham the payment ought to be continued upon the perill of the forfeiture of the Obligation for the words may enjoy in as much as there it is the meer default of the Defendant himself there the Lease does not continue of which he shall not take advantage to save his Obligation But note the form of the Demurrer and that it might have been been better ioyned which is to be seen in the Record where it is entred Easter Term 36 Eliz. Geilles versus Rigeway IN debt for 306. l 6. s. 8 d. by William Geillies against Thomas Rigeway Esq late Sheriff of Devon For that wheras John Chaunder alias Chaundeler was in execution with the said Sheriff for the said summ the said Sheriff afterwards to wit the tenth day of December 34 Eliz. at London in such a Parish and Ward suffered him to escape the said Rigeway then being Sheriff of Devon and having him then in execution c. To which the Defendant pleaded how that he took him in Execution by the Proces at Stockram in the County of Devon as the Plaintiff hath alledged and there detained him in safe custody untill the 8th day of December 34 Eliz. at which day the said Chaundeler broke the Prison and escaped out of it contrary to the will of the said Defendant and that the Defendant did freshly pursue him and in this fresh pursuit did re-take him the 11th day of December then next ensuing at Stockram aforesaid and detained him in execution for the said 306 l. 6 s. 8 d. during the time of his Office and delivered him ever to the new Sheriff c. To which the Plaintiff replyed by protestation that he did not make fresh pursuit And for plea saith That after the going away of the said Chaundeler and before his re-taking by the said Defendant as aforesaid the said Chaundeler for a whole day and night to wit at London in the Parish and Ward aforesaid was out of the view of the said Defendant c. Vpon which it was demurred in Law And it was moved by Cook Attorney-generall that Iudgment ought to be given for the Plaintiff for in as much as it was alledged that he was out of the view of the Sheriff for a day and a night together there it shall be intended to be a default in the Defendant in the making of his pursuit and therfore chargable to the Plaintiff and yet he agreed that if the Sheriff had made his pursuit freshly although that at the turning of a Lane end of a house or the like the Prisoner had been out of the view of the Sheriff for a small time as untill the Sheriff commeth to this turning end of the house or the like yet the Sheriff may re-take the Prisoner and he shall be yet said to be in execution to the party against his will yet when he is for so long a time out of his view it shall be otherwise for the default which the Law presumes to be in him and therfore in this case the action lies To which it was answered by Popham Gawdy and Clench That if he makes fresh pursuit so that it doth not appear fully that there was a default in the Sheriff in his pursuit although he were so long out of his view yet he shall be said to be in execution for the party against his will upon the retaking of him As if be be pursued to a house where he is kept for a long time and the Sheriff set a guard upon the house and after this re-take him the next or any other day without departing from thence the Sheriff in such a case may re-take him upon his coming out of the house and he shall be in execution to the party against his own will And so in all like Cases As if he pursues him in the night so as he cannot see him and yet by the tract of the horse or enquiry he makes diligent pursuit to re-take him so that it cannot appear that there was any negligence or default in him
another 20. H. 6. 15. And a scilicet is but an Exposition of that which is once before and it shall not destroy the precedent matter but if it be contrary to it it is voyd Co. lib. 5. Knights case A scilicet shall not make an alteration of that which went before 15. Jac. B. R. Desmond and Iohnsons Case In a Trover and Conversion the Plaintiffe declared that he was possessed of the said goods 1 Jan. 15. Jac. and that Postea scil the first day of May hee in the yeare aforesaid lost them and that they came to the hands of the Defendant and upon issue joyned it was found for the Plaintiffe and this was moved in arrest of Judgement and by the Court the scil was agreed to be void and the Postea good and the like case was 17. Jac. in Debt The second Question is a man makes Conusance for Rent for him in remainder in taile and does not alledge the precise time when the Lessee for life died but onely that he died and I conceive that it is well enough 1. Because an Avowry which is in lieu of an action is a reall action and in reall actions no precise day need to be alledged 2. Because he avows for 4 s. rent due and the arreare to the remainder which implies that the Lessee for life is dead See 14. Eliz. Dyer The case of a person in one Arundalls case a man was Lessee for ninty years if the Lady Morley should so long live in an action brought by him as Lessee for years in his Declaration he did not averre that the Lady Morley was alive and yet awarded good Trin. 12. Jac. in Hord and Paramores case the defendant avowed as Heir of Sir John Arundell and alledged no time incertaine of the death of Sir John Arundell and yet awarded good for the reason aforesaid and therefore he prayed Judgment for the Avowant The same Terme in the same Court. Jenkin versus Vivian IN trespas Jermy for the Plaintiff took some exceptions to the Plea of the Intr. Hill 1. Car. Rot. 331. Defendant 1. That the Defendant claim common in Trigemore Moore ratione Vicinagii and doth not say a tempore cujus contrarium memoria hominum non existit 2. The Defendant alledgeth that he and all his Occupiers of Down-close had used to have common in the said Tridgemore Moore c. whereas he ought to have shown what estate they had in Down-close who have used to have this coÌ„mon Rol. there néed no prescriptioÌ„in this case no more then in a coÌ„mon appendant which case of a coÌ„mon appendaÌ„t was agreed by the whole Court for it is mixt 6. E. 4. 55. Co. lib. Intr. 625. tit trespas For the 2. exception I agree that if it be by way of prescription then it is not good as it is alledged here but if it be by way of custome as here it is then it is good for a custome goes to Land and a Prescription to persons Hill 11. Jac. Higgs brought an Action upon the Case for erecting of a new Mill and alledged a Custome that he and all the Inhabitants c. an exception was taken to it and it was there ruled that it was good because alledged by way of custome Co. lib. 6. Gatewards case and also Mich. 14. Jac. it way be alledged by way of custom as our case is and 15. E. 4. when it is by way of discharge it may be alledged in all Occupiers Jermy for the Plaintiff It cannot be a custom here for as it is in 23. Eliz. Dyer A custom cannot extend to a particular place and this was agreed by the whole Court But there is another exception he clayms common in Tridgemore Moore for cattle levant and couchant in Down-close and does not aver that these beasts were levant and couchant upon Down-close and per totam Curiam this ought to be averred and it was also agreed that in this case he ought to have prescribed But for the exception of all occupiers it was doubted but for the other exceptions Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff The same Term in the same Court. Chambers Case IT was said in this case that in debt upon a Recognizance acknowledged in Chancery or in any other Court the Defendant cannot demand Oyer of the condition for the Recognizance is not in Court as an obligation is when debt is brought upon it But if Debt be brought upon a Recognizance acknowledged in this Court then the Defendant may demand Oyer of the Recognizance The same Term in the same Court Harison versus Errington IN Error to reverse an Inditement of rescous and Riot taken in the County Palatine of Durham Bankes assigned the Errors whereof one was therâ— was a Warrant to three conjunctim divâ—sim to arrest the sayd Harison and two of them arrest him and therefore the Arrest was not well done for it ought to have been by one or all three and the reason is because it is a ministeriall act otherwise if it had been a judiciall act 14. H. 4. 34. 2. The Inditement of Riot was against three and the Iury found only one of them guilty of the â—â—â—ot this is a voyd verdict for one alone cannot make a riot like to the case in 11. H. 4. 2. Conspiracy against two and only one of them is found guilty it is voyd for one alone cannot conspire And at another day in the same Term Noy took other exceptions 1. Because the Inditement is Jurator pro Domino Rege presentant c. and doth not say that 12. Iurors presentant and peradventure but 11. did present 2. The names of the Iurors ought to have been certified for peradventure they are not probe legales homines but Villains and Outlawes 15. H. 4. 41. 3. It is sound that Rolson the Sheriff by vertue of a Writ directed to him came c. and upon this rescous was made by Harrison c. and it doth not appear what manner of Writ it was scilicet Elegit Capias ad satisfaciend on c. and if there were no Writ there can be no rescous and albeit he had a Writ yet if execution were done by vertue of another Writ which he had the Party may disobey it as if upon an habere facias seisinam the Sheriff makes a Warrant as upon a Capias the party is not bound to obey the Bayliffe if hee bee not a Bayliffe knowne but in case it appeares they were only Bayliffs pro hac Vice Nota that an Inditement before Coronâ—rs which found that the Earl of B. was felo de se was quasht because it did not appear that it was per sacramentum probor legal hominum And in the case of Sarum this Term an Inditement was quasht for the same cause The same Term in the same Court. Rochester versus Rickhouse IN a writ of Error to reverse a Judgement given in Ejectione firmae in Newcastle Banks assigned these errors 1. The Plaintiffe declares of
to the West eighteen foot ten inches which Messuage so newly built stood the day of the Writ purchased and yet stands c. And if upon the whole matter the said Demise of the said John Bradley and Anne be and in Law ought to be adjudged the Demise of the said Messuage newly built upon the said part of land where the Messuage of the said John Bradley and Anne stood then the Iury find that the said John Bradley demised to the said Thomas and Iohn Allen the said house newly erected as aforesaid as the Plaintiff hath alledged and if not then they find that he did not demise And upon this Verdict Iudgment was given there and an especiall Writ of Habere facias seisinam awarded of the said Messuage with the Appurtenances viz. 18 foot of it from the North to the South and 12 foot and an half of it from the East to the West upon which a Writ of Error being brought in the Kings Bench it was alledged for Eror by Coke Sollicitor that upon this Verdict Iudgment ought to have been given for the Tenant and not for the Demandant for what was remaining of that which was of the house is not a house but only a peece of a house and therfore it ought to have been demanded by the name of a peece of Land containing so much one way and so much another for a house wasted and utterly drawn away cannot be demanded by a Messuage but by the name of a Curtilage or so much Land of such contents for a Praecipe lies of a peece of Land containing so many feet in length and so many in breadth And also Land built during the possession of him which hath it by Tort cannot be demanded by the name of Land by him which hath right but by the name of a house nor e contra for every demand of Land ought to be made according to the nature of which it is at the time of the Action brought be it a Messuage Land Meadow Pasture Wood c. And if the Walls of a house be made upon the Land without any covering yet it shall be demanded but by the name of Land for he said that it cannot be a house without its perfection to be habitable which he said is not here because it stands upon the Land of the said Anne which hath not the perfection of a house habitable without the remnant But this notwithstanding the first Iudgment was affirmed for it was said by Popham and other Iustices that that which is erected upon the Land of the said Anne shal be said a house as to the right of the Heir of the said Anne for a house may be such to be demanded by the name of a house albeit it hath not all the perfection of a house as if it hath no doors so if it hath part of the side wals not made drawn away or fallen yet the remainder continues to be demanded by the name of an house so if part of the covering be decayed yet it shall be demanded by the name of an house and the rather here because with that which is upon the other Land it is a perfect house And I may have a perfect house although the side Walls belong to another as in London where a man joynes his house to the side walls of his Neighbours he hath a perfect house and yet the side walls belong to another and this commonly happens in London but it is otherwise if it were never covered or if the covering be utterly fallen or drawn away for without a covering a house cannot be said to be a house for the covering to keep a man from the Storms and Tempests over head is the principall thing belonging to a house And further suppose that a man hath a Kitchin or a Hall upon Land to which another hath right he which hath right ought to demand it by the name of a house suppose then that there is adjoyning to this upon other land a Parlor a Buttery a Shop a Closet and the like with Chambers over them this doth not change the form of the Writ that he is to have which hath right although before it was built by the name of a house and yet as to the rent both the one and the other was but a house but as to the demandant it is otherwise for they are severall so here And the Demise which before was made of the house drawn away shall be now upon the matter a Demise as to this part of it a new Messuage for if a man make a Lease for years of a house and the Tetmor pull it down and erect there a new house or if land be demised and the Lessee build a house upon it in an Action of Wast for Wast done in this new house the Writ shall suppose that he did wast in the Houses c. which were demised to him and yet in the one case it is not the Messuage which was demised to him and in the other the house was not demised but the Land only But he hath no term in the house but by the Demise before made And it seems to Popham that Allen the Defendant cannot pull down this part of the house erect upon his own land to the prejudice of the house which Hayes demands if this which is erected upon the land of Allen be of such a necessity that without it the house of Hayes cannot stand for a house but if he dies after that Hayes hath built it then Hayes shall have an Action upon the case against him for the damages which he sustained by it As if a man agree with me that I shall set the outer wall of my house upon his land and I do it accordingly and afterwards the party which grants me this licence breaketh it down if the Grant were by Deed I shall have an Action of Covenant for it and if but by Paroll yet I shall have an Action upon the case against him And here this being done by him which was then Owner and Possessor of the one and the other land it shall be taken as a licence in Law to the benefit of him which hath right which he cannot pull down after it is once made but he shall be subject to Hayes his Action for it or otherwise Hayes shall be at great mischief and prejudice by the Act of him which did the wrong which the Law will not suffer but rather shall turn this to the prejudice of him which did the wrong then to the prejudice of the other which shall have wrong by the doing of it for Volenti non fit injuria As if I am to inclose between my Neighbour and my self and my Neighbour pull down this inclosure or part of it wherby my Cattell escape into the land adjoyning and depasture there I shall be excused of this Trespasse in the same manner as if he had licenced me to have occupied it and whatsoever hapneth to this Land adjoyning
one part at one time and another part at another an Action of Wast may well lye Albeit Fitzherbert and Brook seem therin to be of a contrary opinion and that severall Actions of Wast ought to be in that case And the exception was taken because the Iudgment was entred that he shall recover the place wasted Per visum Jurator praedict wheras they had not the view of it in this case for this should be where it is given upon a Writ awarded to enquire of the Wast upon default made at the grand Distresse whereas here the Wast is not denied but acknowledged But as to this severall Presidents were shewn the one upon Demurrer for part Hill 1. Mariae Rot. 301. and another Tr. 31. H. 8. Rot. 142. in an Information in both which Cases the Iudgment was entred as here to wit Per visum Jur. praedict and yet in these the Wast was as acknowledged Whereupon it was ordered that the Iudgment should be affirmed 3. In an Ejectione firmae brought by Sir Moyle Finch Knight Plaintiff against John Risley Defendant for a Messuage and a Mill in Raveston in the County of Buckinghamshire the case for the matter in Law appeared shortly to be this The King and Queen Philip and Mary by their Letters Patents dated the eight of July 3. 4. of their Raign made a Lease of the Reversion of the Mannor of Raveston of which this was parcell to Sir Robert Throgmorton for seventy years from such a Feast after the death of the Countesse of Ormond who then had it for her life rendring yearly 73 l. 13 s. payable at the Feasts of Saint Michael the Arch-angel and the Annunciation of our Lady at the receit of the Exchequer by equall portions with a Proviso that the Lease shall cease if the said Rent or any part therof were arrear and not paid at the said Feast or a certain time after the Reversion descend to the now Queen and the said Countesse died 7 Eliz. part of the Rent then payable was not paid at the day nor within the time limited by the Proviso afterwards Queen Elizabeth by her Letters Patents dated 30. May 30 Eliz. granted the said Mannor to the said Sir Moyl and one Awdeley and their Heirs in Fee with a clause in it that the Letters Patents shall be good notwithstanding there be not any recitall of any Leases or Grants at any time before that made by her or any of her Progenitors after which an Office is found for the Queen that the Rent was arrear and not paid as before after which the said Sir Moyl and Awdeley assured the said Mannors by bargain and sale to Sir Thomas Hennage who demised the said Messuage and Mill to the said Sir Moyl upon whom the said Risley entred in right of the said Lease made by the said King Phillip and Queen Mary under Thomas Throgmorton who then pretended to have the term of the said Lease from Sir Robert his Father The case was well argued at the Bar and now at the Bench where Fennor moved first Whether it were a Condition 2. Whether an Office were requisite 3. Whether this Office found comes soon enough for time For the first he conceived that it was a conditional Limitation for a Limitation is that which limits an Estate certain oâ— doubtfull as Quandiu in manibus nostris fore contigerit quamdiu amicus sit or dummodo solverit And there dummodo was a Condition as appeareth 5 Ass plit 9. 2. Ass a Grant made to J. S. and his Heirs tam diâ— as the Grantor and his Heir shall enjoy such a Mannor this is a Limitation and a Limitation alwaies determines the Estate but a Condition albeit it be broken during the Estate yet it doth not determine the Estate and so it is of a conditional Limitation and therfore t is not in the King untill an Office be therof found for the King submits himself to the Law for Bracton saith Quod non debet judicare sed secundum legem and his Prerogative is so excellent that he cannot take a part with any thing but by matter of Record neither can he draw the Right or Possession of any one in question upon a bare surmise but by Office or other matter of Record for a Record alwaies carries credit with it And there is no diversity where two matters are limited in Deed and where one is limited in a Deed and the other by the Law And the contrary objections are easily answered for when the Tenant in tail of the King dies without Issue it is in the King without Office because the Law does not help them which contemn it But in case of an Office which is forfeited it is in the King to dispose without Office because the King is not to have the Office it self but the disposition of it and yet it is to be defeated by Scire facias in the Chancery If a Mill be demised for life upon condition that he shall not let it but to a Milner and he breaks the Condition in case of the King there must be an Office to avoid it and there the Office entitles the King to the Condition and not to the Entry for after the Office it is not in the King untill Entry And here the Rent may be paid to the Kings Bayly in the Country which is matter in fait and therfore shall not be defeated without Office And here the Office comes too late to give any advantage to the Patentee for the King cannot grant a Title of Entry before Office no more then the Assignes of a common person can take advantage of a Condition broken in the time of the Grantor of which the Grantor did not take advantage in his time And if the Queen makes a Lease durante beneplacito the Patentee shall not avoid it as it appears in the Lord Burgleighs case and therfore the Office herâ— shall not help the Patentee but the Queen for the mean profits for although nullum tempus occurrit Regi yet the Patentee shall not take advantage of this Prerogative Clench agreed cleerly that it was a Limitation but yet that it is at the Queens liberty to avoid or make it good for perhaps the Rent is better then the value of the Land and upon this reason a Lease from the King Probiâ— hominibus de dale or to a Monk rendring rent is good which otherwise had been meerly void And by the Office found the Election of the Queen appeareth without which the Lease is to continue and therfore the Patentee shall not defeat that which happened in the Queens time before Popham to say that the Office helps the Queen for the mean Profits and that now the Patentee shall not take advantage to avoid the Lease is too absurd for the Queen cannot take advantage to have the mean Profits but in respect of the avoidance of the Lease And if the Lease were made void or determined against the Queen it shall not
resolved by all the Iustices as he said that it shall passe and he said that himself was of this opinion also And to say that by grant of Land at Common Law the use had been raised out of the possessions of the Land which the Grantor then had and by it passe to the Bargainee and that it shall not be raised and passed to another by grant of Land in consideration of marriage which is a more valuable consideration then money is absurd and against all reason And for the solemnity Vses in such cases in respect of marriage were the cause that they alwaies were left as they were at Common Law and not restrained as the case of bargain and sale is which by Common intendment may be made more easily and secretly then that which is done in consideration of marriage which is alwaies a thing publike and notorious but it is not reasonable that every slight or accidentall speech shall make an alteration of any Vse As if a man ask of any one what he will give or leave to any of his Sons or Daughters for their advancement in marriage or otherwise for their advancement this shall be but as a bare speech or communication which shall not alter or change any Vse But where there is upon the Speech a conclusion of a Marriage between the friends of the parties themselves and that in consideration therof they shall have such Lands and for such an Estate there the Vse shall be raised by it and shall passe accordingly to the parties according to the conclusion which Fennor granted But by Popham If it may be taken upon the words spoken that the purpose was to have the Estate passe by way of making of an Estate as by way of Feoffment c. then notwithstanding the consideration expressed the use shall not change nor no Estate by it but at will untill the Livery made therupon And therfore if a man make a Deed of Feoffment with expresse consideration of marriage although the Deed hath words in it of Dedi Concessi with a Letter of Attorney to make Livery therupon there untill Livery made nothing passe but at will because that by the Warrant of Attorney it appeareth the full intent of the parties was that it shall passe by way of Feoffment and not otherwise if it be of Land in possession And if it be of Land in Lease not untill Attornment of Tenants which was granted by all the Iustices But if a man in consideration of money makes a Deed of Gift Grant Bargain and Sale of his Lands to another and his Heirs by Deed indented with a Letter of Attorny to make Livery if Livery be therupon made before Inrolement there it hath been adjudged to passe by the Livery and not by the Inrolement But by Popham where Land is to passe in possession by Estate executed two things are requisite The one the grant of the said Land the other the Livery to be made therupon for by the bare Grant without Livery it doth not passe as by way of making of an Estate And this is the cause that such solemnity hath been used in Liveries to wit if it were of a Messuage to have the people out of it and then to give Seisin to the party by the Ring of the door of the House and of Land by a Turff and a Twig and the like which may be notorious Yet I agree it shall be a good Livery to say to the party Here is the Land enter into it and take it to you and your Heirs for ever or for life or in tail as the case is And albeit Livery by the View may be made in such manner yet by the sealing of the Deed of Grant upon the Land or by grant of it upon the Land without Livery nothing passe but at will But if therupon one party saith to the other after the Grant or upon it Here is the Land enter upon it and take it according to the Grant this is a good Livery But he ought to say this or somthing which amounts to so much or otherwise it shall not passe by the bare Grant of the Land although it be made upon the Land Clench said That when Thomas said to Eustace Stand forth here I do give to thee and thine Heirs these Lands this amounts to a Grant and a Livery also and by the words of the Reservation of the Estate to himself and his wife for their lives in this the Law shall make an use in the said Thomas and his wife for their lives so that by such means it shal enure as if he had reserved the use therof to him and his wife and so it shall enure to them as it may by the Law according to his intent without doing prejudice to the Estate passed to the said Eustace And afterwards Term Mich. 36 37 Eliz. the Case was again disputed amongst the Iustices and then Popham said That the Case of Baâ—gains and Sales of Lands in Cities as London c. as appeareth in Dyer 6. Eliz. are as they were at Common Law To which all the Iustices agreed and therfore shall passe by Bargain by parole without writing And by Bayntons Case in 6 7 Eliz. it is admitted of every side that an Vse was raised out of a Possession at Common Law by Bargain and Sale by parole and otherwise to what purpose was the Statute of Inrolements and by the same case it is also admitted now to passe by parole upon a full agreement by words in consideration of Marriage or the continuance of Name or Blood For it is agreed there that the consideration of nature is the most forceable consideration which can be and agreed also that a bare Covenant by writing without consideration will not change an Vse therfore the force therof is in the consideration of which the Law hath great respect And therfore the Son and Heir apparant ex assensu patris onely may at the door of the Church endow his wife of his Fathers Land which he hath in Fee and this is good by Littleton although the Son hath nothing in it wherby an Estate passe to the wife which is more then an Vse Nature is of so strong consideration in the Law And therupon after advice Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff the Roll of this appeareth in Banco Regis 1 Hill 35. Eliz. Rot. 355. And upon this Iudgment a Writ of Error was brought and the Iudgment aforesaid reversed in the point of Iudgment in the Exchequer by the Statute of 27 Eliz. Kettle versus Mason and Esterby 6. IN a second deliverance between Joh. Kettle Plaintiff and George Mason Vide this case Coke lib. 1. 146 c. and Francis Esterby Avowants the case appeared to be this Thomas May was seised of the Mannor of Sawters and Hawlin in the County of Kent in his Demesne as of Fee and being so therof seised enfeoffed Thomas Scot and John Fremling and their Heirs
in themselves do purport And if it had been good for the matter yet it is not good for the form for want of a Traverse for without the Traverse the plea is not answered in that case which is laid to the charge of the Defendant But Popham and Clench held strongly to the contrary and that this Bar is good in matter and as the case is cannot be otherwise and that the form also is good enough and yet the two Affirmatives cannot make a good Issue but in case of two Affirmatives a Traverse shall not be but where the Affiâ—matives do not agree in one As if the Defendant in Trespasse Intitles himself by the Feoffment of a stranger and the Plaintiff reply and maintain that the same stranger did enfeoff him this cannot make a good Issue without a Traverse of the Feoffment alledged to be made to the Defendant But in the same case if the Plaintiff saith that true it is that the stranger enfeoffed the Defend an t but this was to the use of the Plaintiff and his Heirs there no Traverse shall be on the Plaintiffs part because as to the matter of the Feoffment it agrees with the Defendant in which case it shall not take any Traverse but there the Traverse shall come on the Defendants part to maintain the Feoffment to his own use Absque hoc that the Feoffment was to the use of the Plaintiff for now that which the Defendant saith albeit it be in the Affirmative yet it is a Traverse to that which the Plaintiff hath alledged and therfore he needs not traverse the plea And so a diversity where the Affirmative is to traverse that which is alledged by the other party and where not for in one case the conclusion shall be with a Traverse and in the other not Then in this case when the Plaintiff alledged that the Defendant spake these words which prima facie shall be intended to be spoken in this sence as the Plaintiff hath alledged although no Innuendo had been in the case for if it shall not be so intended without the Innuendo the Innuendo will not help it yet when the Defendant hath declared the circumstance wherupon these words were spoken and then the speaking of them therupon now he hath confessed the very words themselves to be spoken but upon the circumstance discovered to be in another sence then prima facie they are to be taken and therfore he shall not take a Traverse for he acknowledgeth the very words but not the intendment which the very Law prima facie presumes upon the words and therfore shall not take a Traverse for this intendment of Law being answered by matter expresly in the plea shall never be traversed as in the case put of a Feoffment prima facie it shal be intended to be to the use of the Feoffee yet when the other party maintains that this Feoffment was to his use he shall not take a Traverse to that which the Law intends and presumes And if a man upon speech had with a Hunter saith That he hath murthered all the Hares within 7. miles of his house and another answer and say he is a Murtherer indeed wherupon the Hunter brings an Action upon the Case against him for saying that the Plaintiff was a murtherer the Action will well lye Yet when the other shall discover the communication wherupon the words were spoken this shall be a good Bar without a Traverse yet if it be true that there were no such communication between the parties as is mentioned in the Bar the Plaintiff then hath good cause of Action and therfâ—re he may well say De injuria sua propria absque tali causa and this being sound it shall be against the Defendant So upon speech of a Butcher who had killed a 1000. Oxen in a year and one hearing it will say that he is a notable Murtherer this upon the matter disclosed is not actionable And it shall be mischievous by a Traverse or by pleading generally not guilty to put such speciall matter in the mouth of Lay-people to give their Verdict upon being ignorant and therfore easie to be miscarried in theâ—r judgment and therfore it shall be the rather admitted by speciall pleading to be put to the judgment of the barred Judges then into the mouths of lay Gents And here when Fletcher speaking of the order to be taken by the Councell upon the Petition said that the Earl would obey their order to which the Defendant answered that he knew not what the Earl would do the said Fletcher said therupon that he was a Subject and what was the intent of Fletcher in saying so no other but that because he was a Subject therfore he ought to obey and if it be so to be understood as of necessity it ought or else they were not spoken by Fletcher to any purpose which cannot be intended then shall the words following being spoken therupon by the Defendant be taken to be spoken in answer to the matter of the Speeches spoken by the said Fletcher and this is that he was sorry and it was his grief that he must be so subject as to be bound therby to obey their Order as if a man saith to another that he was sorry that he was so subject that he must obey a Iudgment against him in the Queens Court this is no cause of Action for this tends but to his subjection to the Law or good order or the like which do not give cause of Action As if one saith of another that he is of the Temple who alwaies rebell against the Governours of the said house then saith another to him Will you then say and maintain that he is a Rebell yes sayes one of the other I will do so If an Action be brought for the last words the Action will lye but if the other discover the circumstances of the Speech in the Bar wherupon it was spoken the Action will not lye And this the Defendant may well do without traversing that which is alledged because he acknowledgeth it although in another sense then the Law Prima Facie imports upon the Declaration And if in Speech between two one of them saith of a stranger that he hath treacherously betrayed his Friend in revealing all his secrets and councell wherupon the other then saith that he hath done as a Traytor therin and the other saith to him again he is a Traytor and he answering to it saith true he is a Traytor Now if the stranger brings an Action of the Case against him for saying of these last words Prima Facie it imports good cause of Action without any Innuendo as that he intended therby that he was a Traytor to the Queen because the words in common intendment have such a sence yet upon the matter disclosed by way of Bar with the circumstances how they were spoken the Plaintiff shall be barred if he cannot maintain that they were spoken without such a cause which
in his custody and offered to the said Sheriff to put him in the Indenture amongst his other Prisoners delivered to the new Sheriff but would hâ—ve had the said old Sheriff to have sent for the said new Sheriff to have taken him into his custody but the new Sheriff refused to receive him unlesse Dabridgecourt would deliver him into the common Gaol of the County which was in the Town of Warwick wherupon afterwards the Prisoner escaped And Dabridgecourt was charged with this Escape and not the new Sheriff for he is not compellable to take the Prisoners of the delivery of the old Sheriff but in the common Goal of the County and the old Sheriff remains chargeable with the Prisoner untill he be lawfully discharged of him and if the Sheriff dies the party shall be rather at a prejudice then the new Sheriff without cause charged with him And in such a case the party who sued the execution may help himself to wit by the remaining of the body by a Corpus cum causa wherby he may be brought to be duly in execution and this under a due Officer And Anderson Periam and other Iustices were also of opinion that the said Skinner and Catcher are to be charged with the escape in the principall case wherupon Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff which was entred Hillar 34 Eliz. Rot. 169. in the B. R. Fulwood versus Ward 2. IN a Writ of Annuity brought in the Common Pleas by George Fulwood Plaintiff against William Ward Defendant the Case was thus The Queen was seised of a Barn and Tithes of Stretton in the County of Stafford for the life of the Lord Paget and being so seised demised it by Letters Patents dated 21. June 29 Eliz. to the said William Ward for 21. years wherupon the said Ward by Writing dated 30. Iune 29 Eliz. granted to the said Plaintiff an Annuity or yearly Rent of 10 l. out of the said Barn and Tithes for 15. years then next ensuing payable yearly upon the 8. day of November with clause of Distresse The Lord Paget died the first day of March 32 Eliz. and for the Arrearages after his death the Plaintiff brought this Writ of Annuity and for the difficulty therof in the Common Pleas the Case came this Term to be argued before all the Iustices and Barons at Serjeants-Inn in Fleetstreet where it was agreed by Walmsley Fennor and Owen that the Annuity was gone by the determination â—â— his Estate in the Land who made the Grant for they said that presently upon the Grant made as before it was a Rent-charge for by such a Rent granted in Fee the Fee shall be in his Heirs albeit the Grantee dies before any Election made and such a Rent is payable from the beginning at the Land as appeareth by 12 E. 4. And by grant of Omnia terras tenementa hereditamenta such â— Rent will passe ergo it is a Rent-charge and not an Annuity untill the Election made and by the determination therof in the nature of a Rent the Election is gone as by Babington and Martin 9 H. 6. by the recovery of Lâ—nd charged with such a Rent by elder Title the Annuity is gone as it seeâ—s by their opinion and by them and by Littleton upon a Rent-charg◠〈◊〉 with Proviso that he shall not charge the person of the Grantor 〈…〉 exclude the charge of the person which proves that the Land is charâ—â—â— Originally and not the person for otherwise the Proviso would be void for the repugnancy And if so whensoever the Land is discharged as by 〈…〉 â—â—â—cent or the like the person therby is also discharged and therfore â—he Iuâ—gment here shall be that the Plaintiff shall be barred But by the chief Iustices chief Baron and all the other Iustices and Barons the Plaintiff ought to have Iudgment in this case to recover the Annuity for the Law gives him at the beginning an Election to have it as a Rent or an Annuity which matter of election shall not be taken from him but by his own Deed and folly as in case where he purchase part of the land charged in which case by his own Act he hath excluded himself of his Election But if a Feoffee upon condition grant a Rent-charge and presently break the Condition wherupon the Feoffor re-enter shall not the Feoffee be charged by Writ of Annuity surely it shall be against all reason that he by his own act without any folly of the Grantee shall exclude the Grantee of his Election which the Law gives at the beginning And they denied the opinion of 9 H. 6. to be Law But if the Disseisor grant a Rent-charge to the Disseisee out of the Land which he had by the Disseisen by his re-entry before the Annuity brought the Annuity is gone for this was his own act yet in effect all of them agreed that Prima facie it shall be taken as a Rent-charge of which the Wife shall be endowed as hath been said which passe by grant of Omnia hereditamenta and which is payable at the Land but the reason is because it is expresly granted out of the Land and also for the presumption of Law that it is more beneficiall for the Grantee to have it in such a degree then in the other But neither the presumption of Law nor the expresse Grant therof as a Rent shall not take away from the Grantee the benefit of his Election where no default was in him but that upon his Election he may make it to be otherwise as ab initio And therfore by Popham If a Rent-charge be granted in tail the Grantee may bring a Writ of Annuity and therby prejudice his Issue because that then it shall not be taken to be an Intail but as a Fee-simple conditionall ab initio And if a Termer for two years grant a Rent-charge in fee this as to the Land is but a Rent charge for two years and if he avow for it upon the determination of the Term the Rent is gone but by way of Annuity it remains for ever if it be granted for him and his Heirs and assets descend from him who granted it And if a Rent-charge be granted in fee and doth not say for him and his Heirs if the Grantee brings his Writ of Annuity the Heir shall never be charged therwith yet if he had taken it as a Rent-charge the Land had been charged with it in perpetuity And by him the cause why the Proviso that he shall not charge the person of the Grantor upon the grant of a Rent-charge is good is because the person is not expresly charged by such a Grant but by operation of Law But in such a case a Proviso that he shall not charge his Land is meerly void for the repugnancy because there the Land is expresly charged by precised words and therfore if it be expresly comprised in such a Grant that the Grantee may charge the Land or the person of the
the now Tenant Henry Gee as is before alledged and that the said Henry was then seised of the said Tenements in Fee in right of the said Eliz. then his wife and although that he alledge the said severall Feoffments to be made by Deeds indented with the reservation as aforesaid yet it is not mentioned in the Replication that he shews forth the Deeds wherby the reservation was made To which the Tenant by way of Rejoynder shew the Feoffment made by the said Eliz. Shalcroft to the said William Greenditch wherby he was seised at the time of the payment of the said Rent at the said Feast of the Annunciation of our Lady and traverse Absque hoc that the said Henry Gee was therof then seised in right of his wife in manner and form wherupon it was demurred in Law and adjudged by the Justices of Assise at Lancaster that the Plaintiff should be barred wherupon the Tenants have now brought their Writ of Error And by Popham and Clench the Iudgment is to be affirmed First because that the acceptance of the said Rent had been by the hands of one who was to pay it to wit the Tenant himself yet this shall not bar the right of Intail in the said Robert Holme as a release of his right should do but this acceptance shall only foreclose him of his Action to demand the Land during his life and therfore the right which the said Robert had being barred by the Fine the Son is without remedy for the Son shall never have remedy upon the Fine levied in time of his Father the five years after the Proclamations being passed But in case where the right begin first to be a right in the Son and not where there was right in the Father And further it seemed to them that the payment of him who had not any thing in the Land at the time of the payment as here shall make no conclusion to him who accept it because this payment is as none in Law And by them the Rejoynder of the Traverse Absque hoc that Henry Gee was seised at the time of the payment in Fee in right of his said Wife in manner and form as in the Replication is ailedged is good enough for he traverseth that which the Demandant hath specially alledged to destroy the Bar and contrary to that which is alledged it shall not be intended that they had other particular Estate at the time of the payment which may make the payment to be good And albeit the Traverse had been Absque hoc that the said Henry was seised in right of his said Wife Modo forma prout the Demandant hath alledged without saying in Fee as it is pleaded here yet the Iury shall be put to find it if he were seised in Fee In jure Uxoris and not of any other particular Estate as in 12 E. 4. 4. A Feoffment is pleaded by Deed the other makes Title and traverseth Absque hoc that he enfeoffed Modo forma not shewing forth the Deed yet he who pleads the Feofment by Littleton shall give no other Feoffment in evidence then that which is pleaded by the Deed. And by 18 E. 4. 3. In Trespasse the Defendant justifies the entry and sowing of Corn because that M. was seised in Fee and sowed the Land and the Defendant as his Servant entred and cut it the Plaintiff saith that it was his Free-hold at the time of the sowing Absque hoc that it was the Free-hold of the said M. and per Curiam it is not good for such matter was not alledged by the Defendant but he ought to traverse the Seisin in Fee which was alledged and good and so it is good here But it seems to Clench that the Replication is not good because he doth not say by the Writing upon which the Reservation was made which concludes Robert by his acceptance Hic in Curia prolat as by Hill 15. E. 4. 15. If a man will bar a woman of her Action for her Land after the death of her Husband by Feoffment made by the Baron and Feme during the Coverture by Deed rendring Rent by reason of acceptance of the said Rent after the death of the husband he ought to shew the Deed and say Hic in Curia prolat or otherwise the Plea is not good because that in such a case albeit it were a Gift in Tail the wife shall not be concluded by her acceptance unlesse that the Gift were by Deed. Popham True it is in case the party will demur upon it but suppose in this case the Tenants had expresly acknowledged the said Feoffments and then concluded afterwards as they have done here shall they afterwards take advantage of not shewing the Deed I think that not no more here where they admit it and plead the other matter to avoid the conclusion for if a double Plea be pleaâ—ed if the other party demur upon it he shall take the advantage of the doublenesse But if he passe it over and they proceed in pleading upon another point the doublenesse is gone And Fennor said that the right which is intended to be saved within the first branch of the Statute of 4 H. 7. is that upon which the party may pursue his Action or enter for his remedy the which the said Robert could not do in when the Fine was levied because he had accepted the Rent but the first right which was in such a case was that in the Demandant Stroud versus Willis 9. IN Debt upon an Obligation of 40 l. by William Stroud Plaintiff against John Willis Defendant the Condition wherof was If the said Willis his Heirs Executors or Assigns should pay or cause to be paid yearly to the said William Stroud the Rent or summ of 37 l. 10 s. of lawfull money at the Feasts of S. Michael and the Annuntiation by equall portions according to the Tenor true intent and meaning of certain Articles of agreement indented made between the said parties of the same date that the Obligation was that then the Obligation shall be void and the Defendant shews the Articles which were thus to wit that the said William Stroud had demised to the Defendants all such Tenements in Yeatminster of or in which the said William then had an Estate for life by Copy Anglice Copie des except according to the custom of the Mannor of Yeatminster from the Annunciation of our Lady then last past for forty years if the said William should so long live rendring yearly to the said William 37 l. 10 s. of lawfull money at the Feasts of S. Michael and our Lady by equal portions under the East-gate of the Castle of Taunton in the County of Somerset c. with divers things comprised in the said Articles To which points the Defendant pleaded that at the time of the making of the said Articles the Plaintiff had not any Estate in the Tenements in Yeatminster aforesaid for tearm of his life by Copy
Anglice Copie des except according to any custom of the said Mannor of Yeatminster and that the Obligation was made for the payment of the same Rent reserved by the said Articles and demands Iudgment c. wherupon the Plaintiff demurred in the Common Bench and there Iudgment was given that the Plaintiff should recover his Debt and Damages as appeareth there Mich. 36 37. Eliz. Rot. 312. upon which a Writ of Error was brought in the Kings Bench and there moved that the Iudgment was erroneous in as much as upon the matter he ought to have been barred of his Action for if an Action of Debt had been brought upon the Demise by the Articles the Defendant might have pleaded as here and the Plaintiff should be cleerly barred As if a man be bound to make an Estate or to assure to another all the Lands which he hath by descent from his Father or all the Lands which he hath by purchase from such a one or the like And of this opinion Gawdy was saying in as much as the Obligation is that he shall be paid according to the true intent of the Articles the intent of them is not that the Rent shall be paid if any Land be not passed by them for it should be paid as by 22 H. 6. if a man be bound to pay a Rent which is reserved upon a Lease made to him he ought to pay it at his peril But if it be to pay it accordingly to the Lease there he said it is not payable but upon the Bond and is to be paid as a Rent And if the Land be evicted in the interim before the day of payment the Obligor shall help himself by pleading of it upon such an Obligation to discharge the Bond so here But it seemed to Popham that the Iudgment was well given and yet he agreed the Cases that were put but he said there was a diversity where the Obligation goes in the generality and where it tends to a speciality for as by 2 E. 4. If a man be bound to be Non-suit in all Actions which he hath against such a one or to assure to another all his Lands in Dale he may say that he hath not any Suit or that he hath no Land in Dale But if it be that he shall be Non-suit in a Formedon depending or to enfeoff him of White acre there it is no plea because he refers to a special point And by 18 E. 4. If a man be bound to another to pay him 10 l. for which a stranger is bound to the said Obligee it is no plea for him to say that the stranger is not bound to pay him 10 l. for when the Condition refers to such a speciall matter this cannot be denied of him who is bound And therfore in this case the Defendant cannot say that there were not any such Articles contrary to that which is specially comprised in the Condition as by 28 H. 6. A man was bound to perform the Covenants comprised in a certain Indenture of Covenants he shall not say that there was not any such Indenture because it resorts to a speciall So I think if a man be bound to pay the Rent of 10 l. a year reserved upon an Indenture of Demise made of Lands in D. payable at such a Feast he shall not say against it that there was no such Demise made nor no such Rent reserved upon the Demise but is estopped of the one and the other And in Hill 3. Eliz. A man was bound thâ—t he shall pay to A. or the Obligee all such summs of mony as T. S. deceased stands bound to pay by his Obligation to the said A. and of one R. P. to the behoof of the Children of such a one according to the Will of the said party and in Debt upon this Obligation he saith that the said T. S. was never bound by any such Writing Obligatory to the said A. and R. P c. to pay c. Pro usu filiorum c. as in the Condition and per Curiam adjudged no good Bar because he is estopped to deny the speciall matter which is matter of Writing and not a bare matter in Deed. Kirton versus Hoxton and others 10. IN an Appeal of Mayhem brought by Kirton Plaintiff against Appeal of Mayhem Rob. Hoxton Esq and divers other Defen the one of the Defen plead Nul tiel in rerum natura as another of the Appellees and if it be not found then as to the Felony and Mayhem not guilty Agreed by the whole Court that such a manner of pleading is not to be suffered in an Appeal of Mayhem because no life is put in danger by the suit And yet it was objected that there are presidents that such form of pleading hath been admitted in Appeals of Mayhem But the Court had respect to it that the reason in all the Books of Law in which it hath been admitted in an Appeal of death and the like is that it stands in Favorem vitae and therfore it is admitted to be good or otherwise by the Books it shall not be admitted to be so for the doublenesse of it But no life is to be put in â—eâ—pardy in this case and therfore such a plea shall not be admitted but the Not guilty shall stand by which the other plea is waived Hillary Term 38 Eliz. Henry Earl of Pembrook versus Sir Henry Backley IN an Action upon the Case between Henry Earl of Pembrook Plaintiff See this Case Coke lib 5. 76. a. and Sir Henry Backley Knight Defendant the case upon the pleading appeareth to be thus The said Earl was seised in his Demesn as of Fee of the Mannor of Stocktrift in the County of Somerset to which Mannor the Office of the custody of the Forest of Selwood in the same County belongeth and also that there was before time of memory an Office within the same Forest called the Lievtenant-ship or Custody of the said Forest belonging to the said Mannor of which also the said Earl was seised in his Demesn as of Fee And that there was one part of the said Forest called the West part of the said Forest in which there were two Walks or Bayliwicks the one called Staverdale walk and the other Brewick walk And that the said Lievtenant had the charge of the Deer and the disposition and appointment of the Keepers of the said Forest And that the said Earl being so seised by his Writing bearing date 5. Novemb. 12. Eliz. reciting that his Father had granted the Office of Lievtenant-ship and Deputy-ship of the said West part of the said Forest Cum vadiis c. quando acciderit and the Keeper-ship of Brewick-walk aforesaid to the said Sir Maurice Barkley Knight and the Heirs Males of his body and instituted and ordained him and the Heirs Males of his body Lievtenant and Deputy therof to the said Earl and his Heirs confirmed the Grant aforesaid And further by the