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A47102 An explanation of the laws against recusants, &c. abridged by Joseph Keble ... Keble, Joseph, 1632-1710. 1681 (1681) Wing K115; ESTC R1584 133,989 274

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pl. 41. and Hob. 205. in Pie and Lovels Case and there was no limitation of time for the Informer Qui tam c. Upon 23 Eliz. 1. § 8. N. 1. until the said Statute of 23 Eliz. 5. § 5. N. 2. which limits him to a year after the offence committed and not a year and a day and altho this offence of Recusancy cannot in strictness be said to be committed for that in truth it is but a bare omission as hath been said supra 62. and therefore there needs not any place alledged yet in common parlance it it will pass well enough for an offence committed and seems to be within the meaning of 31 Eliz. 5. § N. 2. and in 23 Eliz. 1. § 11. N. 1. it s said the third part of the forfeiture for Recusancy shall be to the poor in the Parish where the offence is committed Infra 116. N. 2. 7. Now if it be objected that if the Recusancy be not an offence which is to be laid in the proper County by 31 Eliz. 5. § 2. N. 1. because it is not an offence that can be properly said to be committed by the same reason the Informer who is restrained by 31 Eliz. 5. § 5. N. 1. to a year after the offence committed is not restrained in the Case of Recusancy nor the poor of any Parish can take any benefit by 23 Eliz. 1. § 11. N. 1. as to the third part of the forfeiture for that there is no Parish wherein Recusancy can be said to be committed I answer there is a great difference betwixt the Cases for in the Cases of limitation of time when the offence must be prosecuted 31 Eliz. 5. § 5 N. 1. and that of the poor of the Parish 23 Eliz. 1. § 11. N. 1. where the forfeiture is to be distributed the word committed is no part of the substance of the matter and t is no more than if the Statute had said within a year after the offence and to the Parish where the offence was and there committed may be taken well in that sense but it cannot be so in that other Case supra 62. about the proper County for 31 Eliz. 5. § 2. N. 1. makes the Commission of the offence matter of substance and whither it were committed or not in the County where it is laid in the Information or popular suit goeth not to the merits of the Cause for if it were not committed in that County and the defendent alledg and traverse it and it be found for him the Plantiff shall be barred and those words That he may traverse that it was not committed shew clearly that offences which consist only in omission were not intended for otherwise neither Recusancy nor any other offence of that nature could be punished by any Information or popular Action for the Jury upon their Oaths must of necessity find that it was not committed in any County for that in truth and property of Speech it was not committed at all 8. By 31 Eliz. 5. § 5. N. 3. If the Informer Qui tam c. doth not prosecute within a year after the offence yet the King may at any time within two years after that year ended and therefore it was resolved in 2 Co. 366 in Syvedale and Sir Edward Lenthalls Case where an Information was brought in the Court of Exchequer Tam quam c. Upon 3 Jac. 4. § 3. N. 3. for three years forbearance to receive the Sacrament after Conformity that altho it was not good for the Informer yet it was well enough as to the King 9. Alien A natural born Subject or a denizen being defendent in any suit upon a penal Law in B. R. C. B. or Exchequer is not Compellable to put in special Bail but may appear by Attorny 29 Eliz. 5. § 21. N. 2. and 31 Eliz. 10. § 20. N. 3. Telverton 53. Saint Georges Case Bar. Feme 10. An Action of debt or Information Tam pro c. lieth upon 23 Eliz. 1. § 11. N. 1. against the Husband and Wife for the Recusancy of the Wife and the Husband in that case is lyable to pay the twenty pound per month notwithstanding he himself be no Recusant 3 Bulstrode 87. The King and Law 1 Rol. 93. pl. 41. Dr. Fosters Case Hob. 97. Moore and Hussey Savile 25. pl. 59. Infra 119. N. 2. But the Wife cannot appear by Supersedeas alone without her Husband for both must appear or both be outlawed Hob. 179. Lovedens Case Infra 173. N. 2. Nor can she plead or joyn issue without her Husband 2 Rol. 90. Sir G. Curson and Vxor's Case and therefore where in an Information brought against the Husband and Wife for the Recusancy of the Wife the Record was entred praedict J. M. veniunt praedicta M. dicit quod ipsa non est inde Culpabilis de hoc ponit se super Patriam this was alledged to be ill for the Husband pleads not at all but in this Case the Docket being Quod J. C. M. uxor ejus c. placitant non culp and it being manifest that they both appeared the record was amended by the Docket after verdict for it was but the mis-prision of the Clerk in drawing the plea 2 Cro. 530. the same Case with 2 Rol. 90. Crompt 14. a. At the end of the Case in 2 Cro. 530. a note is added that if Sir J. C. and his Wife had pleaded quod ipsi non sunt culpabiles it had been ill but yet it seems that the Law is Contrary to that opinion for where an Action or Information is brought against the Husband and Wife for an offence or wrong done by the Wife there the Husband is charged quoad poenam tho not quoad culpam and when they both plead quod ipsi non sunt culpabiles the meaning is that he is not chargeable quoad poenam and she is not Guilty quoad culpam and therefore it was resolved addition to Bendloes 148 in the Case of Brown and Audley and his Wife Trin. 22 Jac. in Action sur le Case for scandalous words by the Wife that where they both plead non culp and the Jury found the Feme guilty the Plantiff should have Judgment for the issue was good for the reason aforesaid and the finding of the Jury was a good ground for the Judgment for if the Wife were guilty quoad culpam as the Verdict must necessarily be understood she being the wrong doer the Husband by consequence was chargeable quoad poenam and Judgment shall be against both And the resolution 1 Cro. 417. in the Case of Needler versus Symnell and his Wife Mich. 11. Car. 1. is directly contrary to that opinion in the end of 2 Cro. 530. for 1 Cro. 417. it s adjudged that Ipsi non sunt culpabiles by Baron and Feme is a good issue altho the wrong were by the Wife alone 11. Alien An Information of Recusancy lyeth
qui tam c. afterwards 23 Eliz. 1. § 11. N. 1. in a distinct branch by it self without any reference to this 4. So that by 23 Eliz. 1. § 9. N. 2. and before 35 Eliz. 1. § 10. N. 2. which gave the Queen an Action of debt c. the Queen had no other remedy to recover the intire forscitures given hereby but by Indictment only 11 Co. 60. and 1 Rol. 91. pl. 41. Dr. Fosters Case 5. See Jones 193 pl. for that and the suit by the common Informer are the only wayes appointed by 23 Eliz. 1. § 9. N. 2. and § 11. N. 1. and the subsequent Clause 23 Eliz. 1. § 10. N. 1. of submission which names the Justices before whom the party is to submit viz. the Justices before whom he is Indicted Arraigned or Tryed shews what proceedings are meant which are to be had before the Justices here named that is by Indictment Hob. 205. Pie and Lovel 6. Talbot and Shelden were Indicted for Recusancy Contra formam Statuti 23 Eliz. 1. in which Indictment the penalty was demanded and in a Writ of Error the Judgment was reverst for the offence is made by 1 Eliz. 2. § N. and the penalty is given by 23 Eli. 1. § N. and therefore it should have been Contra formam Statutorum Owen 135. pl. Wests Case infra 79 § 4. Far. Feme 7. If a Feme Covert be Indicted at the Kings Suit for an offence within 23 Eliz. 1. § 5. N. 1. she may be charged with the penalty after her Husbands death but the Husband is not chargable nor shall pay the penalty for that he is no party to the Judgment and this was one of the Causes of making 35 Eliz. 1. § 10. N. 1. by which Statute the King may have an Action of debt and recover the forfeiture against the Husband 1 Rol. 93.94 Roy versus Foster Savile 25 pl. 59. LXXIII Treason Page 68. This Exception 23 Eliz. 1. § 9. N. 2. of Treason and misprision of Treason extends not to the Justices of Oyer and Terminer or of Assize and Goal-delivery as Wingate Crown 46. hath mistaken but only to Justices of Peace who are not to medle in th●●● two Cases but the other Justices may LXXIV ●onformity Page 69. Upon 23 Eliz. 1. § 10. Before Iudgment submit and conform himself c. But now by 1 Jac. 4. § 17. N. 1. If the Recusant conforms after Judgment it seems it shall be time enough to have the forfeiture 2. A man is convicted of Recusancy according to 29 Eliz. 6. § 2. N. 5. upon Proclamation and default of appearance and afterwards submits and conforms he shall by force of 23 Eliz. 1. § 10. N. 1. be discharged of the forfeiture of twenty pounds per month for this is a submission and conformity before Judgment the Conviction upon Proclamation being no Judgment but only in nature of a conviction by verdict as was resolved by all the Judges Mich. 37. and 38 Eliz. see 1 Rol. 94. pl. 41. Dr. Fosters Case 3. Page 69. Certain Persons were Indicted upon 23 Eliz. 1. § 5. N. 1. for not coming to Church and were outlawed upon the Indictment the Court of B. R. would not in this Case receive their submission upon 23 Eliz. 1. § 10. N. 1. but advised them to purchase their pardon for the Outlawry which they did and the their submission was accepted of and they were discharged 4 Leonard 54. pl. 138. Note in the report the Statute 13 Eliz. 2. is mistaken for 23 Eliz 1. for no Indictment for not coming to Church lyeth on 13 Eliz. 2. LXXV Certisicate Page 69 Upon 23 Eliz. 1. § 10. N. 1. If a man be Indicted for Recusancy before Justices of Peace and he submits and conforms before the Bishop of the Diocess be may remove the Indictment by Certiorari into B. R. and there plead his Conformity by Certificate under the Bishops hand and Seal Styles 26. pl. 2. For the manner of a Recusants submission and Conformity before the Bishop after Conviction and the Bishops Certificat thereupon see Co. Entr. 569. LXXVI Forfeitures Page 70.71 All forfeitures of any sums of mony limited by this Act. 23 Eliz. 1. § 11. N. 1. Shall be divied c. So that the distribution here appointed extends not only to the forfeitures of Two hundered and One hundred Marks for saying or hearing of Mass and the ten pound a month for keeping a School-Master Contrary to this Act but likewise to the twenty pound per month for not repairing to Church 2. In which last Case the Informer Qui tam c. shall have the third part as well as in the other Cases for altho by 23 Eliz. 1. § 5. N. 1. the whole Twenty pound per month is given to the Queen which the other forfeitures are not in express words yet that will not alter the Case nor make void the express appointment made here in what manner and to whom all the forfeitures limited by 23 Eliz. shall be disposed of 3. And it is usual in Acts of Parliament to give the whole penalty for any Criminal matter to the King and afterwards in the same Act to make distribution thereof and give part to him that will sue as in 3 H. 6.3 § 1. N. 1.2 and 3 H. 7.7 § 1. N. 5.10 and the subsequent distribution shall alwaies stand good notwithstanding the precedent words of limitation of the whole to the King 4. For those words in penal Statutes To the King or to the Queen are upon the matter but void and superfluous and give the King or Queen no other or stricter interest than they would have had if they had been omitted and it had been said shall forfeit without apointing to whom 5. And the reason is for that the Law devolves the forfeiture upon the King where no other person is appointed and shall forfeit without more saying is as much as shall forfeit to the King But when afterwards in the same Statute a particular appointment is made how the penalty shall be that qualifies the former and general words and such distribution shall be made as the Statute appoints 11 Co. 60. and 1 Rol. 89.90 pl. 41. Dr. Fosters Case and 1 Anderson 139.140 pl. 190. Cuff and Vachell supra 46. Page 71. Upon 23 Eliz. 1. § 11. N. 1. Scot was Indicted for Recusancy LXXVII Poor Anno. 26. Eliz. 2 Leonard 167. pl. 204. By the name of William Scot of Southwark Gent. and Exception was taken to the Indictment for that within Southwark are several Parishes and the third part of the penalty is to be applyed to the relief of the Poor of the Parish where the offence was committed But in this Case the Recusant being named generally of Southwark non potest constare Curiae where the offence was nor to what Parish the third part of the penalty belongs But the whole Court of B. R. were there of opinion
King die all proceedings in Suits depending between party and party shall stand But 2 Cro. 14. is to be understood of such Cases where after a Plea or demurrer by the defendent the Attorny General alone replies or joynes in demurrer there the proceedings shall be void and the defendent shall plead de novo But the Information it self shall stand to avoid a manifest inconvenience for that the Informer is limited to a certain time wherein to exhibit his Information and so these two opinions are reconciled 20. An Informer Release qui tam c. may be Nonsuited altho the King cannot 1 Inst 139. Hutton 82. Farrington versus Arundell If pending the popular action or Information the Plantiff or Informer qui tam c. be Nonsuited or release or Enter a nolie prosequi or die none of these shall bar the King but the Attorny Genaral may proceed upon the Information for the Kings part 1 Leonard 119. pl. 191. 3 Cro. 138. Stretton versus Taylor 3 Cro. 583. Hamond 3 Inst 194. Moor 541. pl. 715. and 11 Co. 66. Dr. Fosters Case 2 Bulstrode 261.262 Waller versus Hanger 2 Rol. 33. Smith versus Carter And therefore the opinions in 37 H. 6.5 and 38 H. 6.2 that if the Plantiff in a Decies tantum which is a popular Action be Nonsuit the King is without remedy but by Indictment or if such Plantiff will relinquish his Suit that the King hath nothing further to do seem not to be Law at this day 21. If a popular Information be brought upon a penal Statue in a wrong Court where the Informer cannot sue Courts yet it was held Moor 564 c. pl. 770. in Agar and Candishes Case that the King should not for that loose his advantage of the suit but the Information should be good for his part of the penalty By 18 Eliz. 5. § 3. N. 3. If an Informer or Plantiff Costs upon a penal Statute where any forfeiture is generally limited to him that will sue shall delay or discontinue his suit or be Nonsuit or shall have the Tryal or matter pass against him by Verdict or Judgment of Law he shall pay to the defendent his Cost Charges and Damages see the addition to Bendloes 141. Rhobotham and Vincent and if it be upon a special Verdict or demurrer those Cases are within 18 Eliz. 5. § 3. N. 3. and he shall pay Costs by force thereof Hutton 36. Pies Case But an Informer is not compellable to find Sureties to answer Costs howbeit the Court if they see Cause may order him to appear in person before the defendent answer the Information 2 Bulst 18 Martin and Gunnystons Case Savil 10. pl. 26. Wilkes Case it was held in the Exchequer Chamber that if a writ of Error be brought upon a Judgment given for the King at the Suit of an Informer a Scire facias ought to be awarded against the Informer LXXX Courts Page 82 83 84. By any Court of Record is here 23 Eliz. 1. § 11. N. 1. meant the four ordinary Courts of Record at Westminster For they are the general Courts of Record and the Courts where the Kings Attorny may acknowledge or deny and the words of 23 Eliz 1. § 11. N. 1. being general are left to the construction of law where the Rule is that verba equivoca in dubio posita intelliguntur in digniori potentiori sensie And in this sense shall these words Court of Record be construed in all penal Statutes where the penalty is to be recovered in a popular suit so that the Informer qui tam c. cannot sue before Justices of Assize Goal-delivery or Oyer and Terminer or Justices of Peace as in Borrough or corporate Towns or in a Court of Pipowders Stannary Courts c. Jones 193. And such a construction hath been made of those words Court of Record upon several Statutes as 6 Co. 19.20 and Moor 600. pl. 827. Gregories Case on 4 and 5 Ph. Mar. 5. § N. of Woolen Cloathes In 1 Cro. 149. Green versus Guy on 21 11.8.13 § 11. N. 2. of Non-resid nee In 1 Cro. 112.113 and Hutton 99 Farrington and Keymer on 23 H. 8.4 § 5. N. 3. of Brewers In Stiles 340. Buck stone and Shurlock on 7 Ed. 6.5 § 6. N. 3. of selling wine without Licence In 3 Cro. 737. Barnabee versus Goodale and 2 Cro. 538. Millors Case and Styles 383. upon 5 Eliz. 4. § 13. N. 3. of Trades In Moor 421. pl. 581 upon the Statutes for Tanning of Leather and divers others 2. It was held Mich. 6 and 7 Ed. 6. Dyer 236. pl. by all the Justices but three that where a Statute appoints a penalty for any offence made thereby which was not an offence at the common law to be Recovered in any of the Queens Courts of record by Action of debt and no other Court is appointed The Statute intends the sour ordinary Courts of Record at Westminster and the offence and penalty cannot be punished and determined by Commissioners of Oyer and Terminer in Patriam But Dyer makes a Quaere hereupon and Sir Edward Coke in Scarlets Case 12 Co. 98. saith 10 Jac. that the opinion of Catlin Sanders and Whiddon which were the three dissenting Justices before c. is at this day held for good law and the opinion of the rest of the Justices that any Courts of Record are restrained to the ordinary Courts at Westminster of Record is not held for law Continual Experience saith he being against it for that Justices of Assize in respect of their Commission of Oyer and Terminer have alwaies enquired of offences where the penalties is appointed to be sued in any Court of Record as upon 33 H. 8.9 § 18. N. 1. of unlawful Games 35 H. 8.17 § 9. N. 2. of words and 5 and 6 Ed. 6.14 § 9. N. 2. of forfeitures and other Statutes But under favor altho Commissioners of Oyer and Terminer may take Indictments for the doing of that which is made malum prohibitum by a Statute Law yet that part of the opinion in Dyer 236 which relates to the Action of debt and the Courts of Record where such Action must be brought is good law and where only Courts of Record are named such Action cannot be brought in any other Court then the four ordinary Courts of record at Westminster as appears by the several Cases and resolutions before recited 3. Sir Edward Coke 3 Inst 193. and 4 Inst 174. saith that this exception of Recusancy in 21 Jac. 4. § 5. N. 1. doth not extend to the Courts 21 Jac. 4. § 1. N. 5. wherein the Informer is to sue but only to the County where 21 Jac. 4. § 2. N. 1. the offence is to be laid So that notwithstanding that exception 21 Jac. 4. § 5. N. 1. the Kings Bench Chancery C. B. Exchequer or Exchequer Chamber cannot relieve or hold plea of any Information for Recusancy either by the Kings Attorny or
against an Alien upon 23 Eliz. 1. § 11. N. 1. If he inhabits within the Realm and if Judgment be had against him he may have a Writ of Error to relieve himself 1 Inst 1●9 12. Information When once the Informer qui tam c. hath commenced his suit he hath of a popular Action made it his own principal Action 11 Co. 65. Dr. Fosters Case Vaughan 343. Thomas and Sorrel And in this Case it is not necessary that the defendent be served with Process to answer it for if the Informer put his Information into Court t is enough to appropriate to him his share of the penalty Godbolt 158. pl. 216. But yet a Note ought first to be made of the day month and year when it was exhibited for before by 18 Eliz. 5. § 1. N. 5. it is not to be taken to be of Record nor shall operate any thing either in appropriating the penalty or barring any other Informer but when that is done no other Informer can sue for the same offence and t is a good plea in barr for the defendent to say that there is another Information depending against him for the same offence for as soon as the first Information is delivered in and entred upon record according to 18 Eliz. 5. § 1. N. 5. it shall be said to be depending altho it be not alledged that any Writ or process is such out against the defendent thereupon 3 Cro. 261. Mich. 33. and 34 Eliz. the Queen versus Harris Styles 417. Hob. 209. Parry versus Paris Palmer 40. Webbs Case Termes de la Leyverb Action popular The defendent in an Information pleads that heretofore another Information was hibited against him such a day in another Court for the same offence but mistakes and names in his plea a wrong day and not that wherein the first Information is exhibited The Plantiff replyeth nul tiel Record yet if it appears that in truth the Information pleaded in barr was exhibited before the other which is the substance of the matter this misprision shall not vitiate the defendent Hob. 209. Parry and Paris note this Case is cited in the late additions to Dolt cap. 191. Sect 6. N. to prove that one person cannot exhibit two Informations in the same or in several Courts but that was not the question there nor I think ever made a question but that the same person may exhibit too several Informations so they be not both for one and the same offence 3 Cro. 261. The Queen against Harris Mich. 33. and 34. Eliz. An Information was in B. R. upon 5 and 6. Ed. 67. § N. for buying of Wools the defendent pleads that there is another Information depending against him in C. B. at the suit of L. and avers that they are both for the same offence but in truth that in C. B. supposed the offence to be done at one time and that in B. R. at another time yet this is a good plea in Bar of the latter Information being with an Averment that they are both for the same offence for otherwise by the Informers false supposal of the day the defendent shall be put to double trouble And the same advantage no Question any man may take against whom two Informations are exhibited upon 23 Eliz. 1. § 4. N. 2. for hearing of Mass for perchance he never heard Mass above once in his life time and there is no reason he should be put to double trouble for one offence 13. But otherwise it seems to be in the Case of Recusancy for if an Information be on 23 Eliz. 1. § 5. N. 1. for not coming to Church for a month there if the defendent proves that he was at Church any time within that month it shall be sufficient to avoid the penalty of the 20 l. And as the defendents giving Evidence that he was at Church within the compass of any other month then that which is laid in the Information shall not excuse him so the Informers proof of his absence any other month shall not hurt him but the Evidence must go to the very same month which the Information mentions And the reason is for that this offence is punishable according to the time of its duration or continuance and the offendor is to forfeit for every month of his absence so that if another Information be exhibited against him for not coming to Church during another month it cannot be supposed to be for the same absence with that in the first Information but for the like absence at another time and therefore cannot be pleaded in bar thereof 14. If two Informers on one and the same day exhibit Informations against the same person for the same offence they are both void and may be pleaded the one in Bar of the other for that there is no priority to attach the Right of Action in one of the Informers more than in the other Hob. 128. Pie versus Coke 15. Altho Sunday be not dies Juridicus so as to award a Judicial process or enter a Judgment of record on that day yet an Information may be exhibited in Court on that day and Good Jones 156.157 Bedoe and Alpe 16. In C. B. an Information may by the course of the Court be brought in and delivered to one of the Judges there out of term and shall be dated then For 18 Eliz. 5. § N. forbids all antedates 2 Rol. 33. Smith versus Carter 17. An Information is brought by an Informer Qui tam c. upon 23 Eliz. 1. § 5. N. 1. for Recusancy and pending the Information the Recusant is convicted at the Kings suit upon an Indictment for the same absence the question is what remedy the Recusant hath in this Case that he may not Bis puniri pro uno delicto And to this it was answered by Coke Chief Justice B. R. in Dr. Fosters Case that he may plead this Conviction puis le darreine continuance to discharge himself of the Information 1 Rol. 9 5. pl. 41. But as the Reporter well observes there the Informer when he hath begun his popular Action hath appropriated the Action to himself And if it shall be admitted that the King can devest him of this Action when he pleaseth by Indictment at his own suit this would prove very mischievous to Informers Quaere therefore how in this Case the Recusant shall defend himself from being doubly punisht for one and the same offence But if the Recusant be once convicted at the Kings suit either by Indictment upon 23 Eliz. 1. § 5. N. 1. or according to 29 Eliz. 6. § 2. N. 5. or 3 Jac. 4. § N. upon Proclamation the Informer Qui tam c. Cannot afterwards charge him but is barred for ever after For the intention of 23 Eliz. 1. § 11. N. 1. is that the Informer may exhibit Informations against such only as are concealed or not charged at the Kings suit So that the Informer is neque falcator neque
messor but spicelegus a Gleaner And that in such Cases only where the King doth not prosecute pardon or release before the Informers Action is commenced 11 Co. 65. Dr. Fosters Case Bridgman 121.122 Parker against Sir J. Webb and uxor Lane 60. But whither this rule be general Bar. Fe● and will not admit of an Exception in the Case of a Feme Covert is a Question For by some opinions if a Feme Covert be Indicted and convicted of Recusancy that shall not barr the Informer of his popular Action upon 23 Eliz. 1. § 11. N. 1. against her and her Husband for the Recusancy of the Wife because upon the Conviction by Indictment the cannot be compelled to pay the forfeiture of twenty pound per month while her Husband lives nor can it be levied of her Goods and Lands for that during the Coverture she hath nothing of her own to forfeit but all is her Husbands Bridgman 122. Infra 270. N 9. The Condemnation or acquittal of the party at the suit of the Informer is a good Bar against the King and all others 11 Co. 66. 18. Before 4 H. 7.20 § 1. N. 7. Collusion It seems that if a popular Action had been brought by Covin and with the consent of the defendent and the defendent was for want of Evidence or other Cause found not guilty and the Covin appeared to the Court yet Judgment should have been given thereupon against the King and it should have been a good Bar against all others 9 Ed. 4.4 pl. but now by 4 H. 7.20 § 1. N. 7. If any person sue with good Faith any Action popular and the defendent Plead a Recovery in an Action popular in Bar or that before that time he had Barred the Plantiff in such Action the Plantiff may aver such recovery or Bar was by Covin and upon such Covin found the Plantiff shall have Judgment and the defendent attainted or condemned of Covin shall shave Imprisonment of two years by process of Capias or Outlawry as well at the Kings suit as any other and the release of the party shall not avail the defendent which Covin may be averred generally Com. 49.50 54 55. Wymbishe and Talbois If a man bring upon a penal Statute debt tam c. quam c. and the defendent pleads thereunto the Plantiff may reply without the Kings Attorny c. Princes Case In debt upon 23 Eliz. 1. § 11. N. 1. the defendents demurred and the Plantiff qui tam c. Joyned in demurrer without the Kings Attorny and held to be good 1 Cro. 10.11 Farringtons Case Trin. 1. Car. 1. but in an Information tam c. quam c. the Kings Attorny ought to reply 2 Rol. 33. Smith and Catter And this difference between debt and an Information was taken Hutton 82. in the said Farringtons Case but yet if in an Information the defendent plead a special plea and the Kings Attorny will not reply and prosecute for the Kings part the Informer shall be admitted to reply and prosecute for his part as was adjudged in Stretton and Taylors Case 1 Leonard 119. pl. 161. and 11 Co. 65. Dr. Fosters Case 3 Inst 194. 19. The King before any Information or other popular suit commenced may pardon or release the whole penalty incurred Priory and it shall be a good bar against all men 11 Co. 65.66 Dr. Fosters Case 3 Inst 194.195.37 H. 6.4 _____ 2 R. 312. _____ _____ 1 H. 7.3 _____ Termes de ley 102. Decies tantum And if the defendent in the Information do not take advantage of such pardon or release by his plea but is condemned in the suit and the Kings share of the penalty be put in the Pipe in magno rotulo yet he may then discharge himself thereof upon a Compertum suit in magno rotulo by shewing forth the whole matter by way of Plea and shall not loose the effect of his pardon or release Savile 23. pl. 56. Tirringhams Case But when once the Informer hath brought his popular Suit the King cannot discharge it and if he then pardon or release or his Attorny enter an ulterius non vult prosequi this is good for the Kings part only but is no Bar quoad the Informer who may proceed notwithstanding for his part of the penalty And therefore neither can the Kings Attorny discharge the Jury when they come to deliver their Verdict Hutton 82. Vaughan 343. Thomas and Sorrel 1 Leonard 119. pl. 161. and 3 Cro. 138. Stretton and Taylor 3 Cro. 583. Hammon and Grissith 3 Inst 194. 1 H. 7.3 Such Entry of a non vult prosequi by the Attorny General hath the same effect with a Nonsuit of a Private person but the King cannot be said properly to be Nonsuit because he is in Judgment of Law ever present in Court 1 Inst 139.227 Hutton 82. Goldsborough 53. pl. Leighs Case Savile 56. pl. 119. Weare against Adamson Upon the Death of Queen Elizabeth it was resolved by the Judges that where an Information tam pro Domina Regina quam c. was brought upon a penal Statute and pending the same and before Judgment the Queen dyed the Information it self should stand for that otherwise the Suit might be lost there being a time limited for the bringing of it but all the proceedings thereupon were lost and void and the defendent should plead de novo 2 Cro. 14. and 7 Co. 30.31 Of discontinuance of Process And to that purpose 5 Ed. 6. Rot. 38. is there cited where in a popular action the King dyed after demurrer upon the Evidence and before Judgment and the defendent pleaded de novo But yet 1 Cro. 10.11 and Hob. 82. Farringtons Case in a popular action of debt upon 23 Eliz. 1. § 11. N. 1. against Prince and his Wife where the defendent demurred upon the declaration and the Plantiff qui tam c. Joyned demurrer in Hillary Term and King James died the Vacation following It was resolved that not only the Writ and declaration but all the other proceedings thereupon should stand notwithstanding the demise of the King for that in such Case it is meerly the Suit of the party and is aided by 1 Ed. 6.7 § 1. N. 4. of Discontinuances and he only Joyned in demurrer Which Resolutions are in appearance flatly contrary each to other for 2 Cro. 14. seems to take in all popular Suits whatsoever and as well a popular Action of debt as an Information but yet t is observable that in 1 Cro. 10. the Plantiff only joyned in demurrer and not the Kings Attorny And this seems to be the reason why in that Case the proceedings should stand notwithstanding the demise of the King for where the party alone joyns in demurrer or replies and not the Kings Attorny there the Suit may properly be said to be depending between party and party and within the express words of 1 Ed. 6.7 § 1. N. 4. which provides that altho the
any Common Informer but the matter shall be heard and determined before Justices of Assize Nisi prius Goal-delivery or Oyer and Terminer or Justices of Peace in their general Sessions according to 21 Jac. 4. § 1. N. 3. but the Informer if it be for Recusancy may by force of that exception 21 Jac. 4. § 5. N. 1. lay or alledge such offence in what County he will for the said exception extends only to the County 21 Jac. 4. § 2. N. 1. and not to the Courts 21 Jac. 4. § 1. N. 5. where the Informer is to sue Which opinion of his touching the extensiveness of the exception is probable enough viz. that 21 Jac. 4. § 5. N. 1. extends only to the County and not to the Courts where the Informer is to sue for the latter part of it speaks only of the County but this is unaptly applied to popular Informations upon 23 Eliz. 1. § 11. N. 1. for they are not within the meaning of that branch of 21 Jac. 4. § 1. N. 5. touching the Courts where the Informer is to sue for 21 Jac. 4. § 1. N. 5. medles not with those Informations upon those penal Laws which give the Informer no other remedy for recovery of the penalty but by Debt Bill plaint or Information in the Courts of Record at Westminster Nor doth 21 Jac. 4. § 1. N. 3. give the Justices of Assize or other Justices there named any new or further power than they had before but only appoints that where Informations might have been brought before them or in the Courts of Westminster at the Election of the Informer now they shall be brought before Justices of Assize Nisi prius Goal delivery or Oyer and Terminer or at the Sessions of the Peace in the County where the offence was committed for the ease of the Subjects who are defendents and not in the Courts at Westminster 4 Co. 1. 1 Cro. 112.113 But in our Case of Recusancy there is no such Election given the Informer by 23 Eliz. 1. § 11. N. 1. but he is strictly tyed to take his remedy by debt Bill plaint or Information in one of the Courts at Westminster and therefore 21 Jac. 4 § 1. N. 5. extends not to it in that branch touching the Courts where the Informer is to sue And as for Sir Edward Cokes Opinion that since 21 Jac. 4. § 1. N. 5. the Courts at Westminster cannot receive or hold Plea of any Information brought by a Common Informer not only common Experience ever since that Statute is against it but the Judgments and resolutions both of B. R. Mich. 4. Car. 1. Greene and Guy 1 Cro. 146. pl. upon 21 H. 8.13 § 11. N. 2. and Fentons Case Mich. 27. Car. 2. upon this Statute of 23 Eliz. 1. and of C. B. in Farrington and Leymer 1 Cro. 112. Hutton 99. Trin. 4 Car. 1. upon 23 H. 8.4 § 5. N. 3. Are directly in point Contrary thereunto and so is the opinion of Rolls in Styles 340. Buck stone and Shurlock 7 Ed. 6.5 § 6. N. 3. and the resolution in Jones 193. And yet altho in penal Statutes any Court of Record shall be restrained to the ordinary Courts of Record at Westminster possibly in other Statutes those words may admit of a larger Construction 1 Rol. 51. pl. 21. Floyd and Best LXXXI Information Page 85 86. Upon 23 Eliz. 1. § 11. N. 1. by Action of debt Bill plaint or Information by 18 Eliz. 5. § 1. N. 3. it is enacted that none shall be admitted or received to prosecute against any person upon any penal Statute but by way of Information or original Action and not otherwise 6 Co. 19.20 Moor 412. pl. 565. and 600. pl. 827. Gregories Case 3 Cro. 544. Gadley versus Whitecote And this seems to extend as well to penal Statutes made afterwards as to those that were in force when 18 Eliz. 5. § 1. N. 3. was made for t is usual for a latter act of Parliament to be guided by a former as 4 Co. 4. Vernons Case But then it must be in such Cases where there are not express words in the latter act to controule the former and therefore altho the word of 18 Eliz. 5. § 1. N. 3 that the Informer shall not prosecute otherwise then by Information or original action yet the Affirmative words of this subsequent Statute 23 Eliz. 1. § 11. N. 1. that the Informer may sue by Bill hath taken away the force of that negative in 18 Eliz. 5. § 1. N. 3. in relation to the offence mentioned in 23 Eliz. 1. and the prosecutor qui tam c. upon 23 Eliz. 1. § 11. N. 1. may sue by Bill in B. R. as well as by Information which otherwise had there been no direct words here to that purpose he could not do as it seems by the resolution 3 Inst 194. in Woodson and Clerks Case In a suit brought by Bill in B. R. upon 23 H. 6.10 § 1. N. 12. of Sheriffs and in Moor 248. pl. 390. Vdeson and the Major of Nottinghams Case contrary to the opinion in Styles 381. Hill and Dechair LXXXII Imprisonment Page 86. Upon 23 Eliz. 1. § 11. N. 2. Qui non habet in aere luet in corpore And yet in this Case the Judgment shall be absolute that the King and the Informer recover c. 1 Anderson 140. pl. 190. Vachels Case 2. A Feme Covert Recusant if the forseiture be not paid within the time limited 23 Eliz. 1. § 11. N. 2. may be imprisoned by force of this Statute until she pay or conform 11 Co. 61. Dr. Fosters Case Hob. 97. Moor and Hussey And if she be convicted upon Indictment at the Kings suit in which Case the Husband is not bound to pay the penalty she ought by the opinion of Manwood to have hard and close Imprisonment and sequestred from all Company until she conform or forfeiture be paid Savile 25. pl. 59. But if the Husband and Wise be sued upon 23 Eliz. 1. § 11. N. 2. in a popular Action or Information for the Recusancy of the Wife and Judgment be had against them and the forfeiture is not paid within the three months the Husband in that Case may be Imprisoned likewise LXXXIII Assurances Page 87. Upon 23 Eliz. 1. § 13. N. 1. since the beginning of this Session of Parliament and yet a Covenons Conveyance tho made before that Session of Parliament should not have defeated the Interest right or Title which was given to the Queen by this Statute and therefore in the Case of Sir John Southwell 3 Leonard 147.148 pl. who in Anno 19 Eliz. Conveyed his lands to certain Feoffees and their heirs in trust for the maintenance of him and his Family Marriage of his Daughters payment of his debts c. and to answer him the surplusage of the mean profits with a Clause of revocation after which he granted Trees took Fines for leases c. And then
Convict any person upon Indictments for Recusancy or for saying hearing or being at Mass which they were enabled to do by 23 Eliz. 1. § 8. N. 1. but again disabled by these negative words in this Act 29 Eliz. 6. § 2. N. 2. and the hearing and determining of those offences commited only to the Justices of B. R. Assizes and general Goal-delivery But for Informations by a common Informer they were never intended here 29 Eliz. 6. § 2. N. 2. and the Justices of Assize and Goal delivery cannot hold plea of such Information as was resolved by the Judges Mich. 4. Car. 1. Jones 193. And yet 29 Eliz. 6. § 2. N. 2. did not wholly abrogate the power of the Justices of Peace or of any other Justices to whom Authority was given by 23 Eliz. 1. § 8. N. 1. surra 72. in relation to the offences of Recusancy or of saying or hearing Mass but that they might after 29 Eliz. 6. § 2. N. 2. take Indictments notwithstanding the negative words here for this Statute restraines them only from proceeding to Conviction but not from taking Indictments as was held in Sir Edward Plowdens Case cited 11 Co. 63. in Dr. Fosters Case and now by 3 Jac. 4. § 7. N. 1. the power of Justices of Peace to hear and determine the offences of not coming to Church is again restored to them Infra 103.165 XCXX Proces Page 102 103 104. This Statute 29 Eliz. 6. § 3. N. 1. medles not with any other way of Conviction than at the Queens suit by Indictment as hath been said and so is the Conviction here mentioned to be understood for this Statute is not Introductory of a new Law nor gave the Queen any new or other remedy than what she had against the Recusant by 23 Eliz. 1. § 5. N. 1. that is by Indictment but only gave her a more speedy way of proceeding upon that sundamental remedy 11 Co. 60. and 1 Rol. 93. Dr. Fosters Case So that a Conviction upon an Information against the Recusant upon 23 Eliz. 1. § 11. N. 1. or any other way save by Indictment doth not appropriate the penalty of twenty pound per month to the King for the time to come by force of 29 Eliz. 6. § 3. N. 1. Inrfa 165. supra 72. Hob. 205. Pie and Lovel nor for the same person by force of 3 Jac. 4. § 8. N. 1. where the same words are used and a Conviction by Indictment only intended as here 2. In Hob. 205. It s said that if a man at the making of 29 Eliz. 6. § 3. N. 1. had been Convicted of Recusancy by any other means then by Indictment he had not been bound by 29 Eliz. 6. § 3. N. 1. to pay the twenty shillings it should be twenty pound a month from the Conviction and if a man be now Convicted in B. R. by Indictment or otherwise he cannot be proclaimed nor otherwise his penalty run on which last words Inferr that the Conviction here intended is only a Conviction according to 29 Eliz. 6. § 5 N. 6. by Proclamation upon default 3. But if we compare together 29 Eliz. 6. § 2. N. 2. which speaks of a Conviction after the making of this Statute and 29 Eliz. 6. § 2. N. 1. which speaks of a Conviction before this Statute the Contrary will evidently appear for 29 Eliz. 6. § 2. N 1. must necessarily be intended of Convictions according to 23 Eliz. 1. § 5 N. 1. without any Proclamation for the Proclamation in the Case of Recusancy was not given until 29 Eliz. 6. § 5. N. 5. And if a man had been Convicted of Recusancy upon Indictment in B. R. or elsewhere before 29 Eliz. 6. § 5. N. 5. the forfeitures of twenty pound per month should by force of 29 Eliz. 6. § 3. N. 1. have run on from the time of the Conviction that is clear by the express words of the former clause 29 Eliz. 6. § 2 N. 1. Then comes 29 Eliz. 6. § 3. N. 1. which provides what shall be done upon Convictions for the future and appoints in that case likewise the forfeiture of twenty pound per month to run on from the time of Conviction Both which Convictions as well before as after this Statute are granted to be meant only of Convictions upon Indictment and there is no difference between the penning of these two Clauses 29 Eliz. 6. § 2. N. 1.2 but that one respects the time past and the other the time to come but both appoint the penalty to run on Now there is no reason to suppose that the makers of the Law intended the word Convicted in a more restrained sense in this Clause 29 Eliz. 6. § 3. N. 1. then in the former Clause 29 Eliz 6. § 2. N. 1. where the penalty should have run on upon any Conviction whatsoever upon Indictment or that the Conviction in 29 Eliz. 6. § 2. N. 1. by Indictment upon 23 Eliz. 1. § 5. N. 1. without Proclamation should be wholly shut out of the latter Clause 29 Eliz. 6. § 2. N. 2. By Conviction therefore in these Clauses 29 Eliz. 6. § 2. N. 1.2 seems to be meant such Convictions upon Indictment as were warranted by the Statutes in force at the several and respective times here mentioned that is to say in 29 Eliz. 6. § 2. N. 1. a Conviction upon 23 Eliz. 1. § 5. N. 1. without a Proclamation And in 29 Eliz. 6. § 2. N. 2. a Conviction either with or without a Proclamation In either of which Cases the penalty of twenty pound per month shall run on by force of this Act 29 Eliz. 6. § 3. N. 1. and consequently it shall run on if the Recusant be Indicted Convicted and adjudged in B. R. altho he cannot be Proclaimed there And accordingly it was agreed 1 Rol. 93. in Dr. Fosters Case that where the Recusant is Convicted upon Indictment the penalty should ever after run on and be appropriated to the King and t is not restrained there to a Conviction upon Proclamation only 4. But yet altho this Clause 29 Eliz. 6. § 3. N. 1. Extends as well to a Conviction upon 23 Eliz. 1. § 5. N. 1. as to a Conviction by Proclamation yet every Conviction upon 23 Eliz 1. § 5. N. 1. is not here Intended for if a man Indicted for Recusancy do upon his Arraignment confess the Indictment to be true and plead guilty Or upon trial a Verdict pass against him these are Convictions in Law but yet by these Convictions he forfeits nothing untill Judgment nor shall the penalty of twenty pound per month run on or be appropriated to the King until Judgment be given by Conviction Therefore is here 29 Eliz. 6. § 3. N. 1. to be understood Convicted by Proclamation or default or Convicted by Verdict Confession c and adjudged for so the word is here to be taken viz. For Adjudged or Attainted unless it be in case of Conviction upon Proclamation
receiving of the profits there it was said Copy-holds shall be included within the general words of Lands Tenements and Hereditaments 3. And yet see Owen 37. where this Case of Sulhard and Everet is otherwise reported and that it was at length after great debate adjudged that Copyhold Lands are not within 29 Eliz. 6 § 4. N. 3. nor are seizable for the Kings two parts And according to this Judgment I take the modern practice of the Exchequer to have been that neither the Land it self nor the profits of Copyhold Lands are lyable to such seizure CIII Process Page 107 108. If the same be taken at any Assize or Goal-delivery 29 Eliz. 6. § 5. N. 6. for if the Indictment had been taken before Justices of Peace no Proclamation thereupon could have been made upon this Statute by the Justices of Assize or Goal-delivery as was resolved in the Case of Sir Edward Plowden And therefore upon such an Indictment for Recusancy taken before Justices of Peace the Court was to remove the Indictment in B. R. and there process might have been made out against the Recusant and he Convicted for the Justices of Peace could do no more than Indict all other proceedings being taken away from them by this Statute 29 Eliz. 6 § 2. N 2.11 Co 63. and 1 Rol. 94. but now by 3 Jac. 4. § 7. N. 1. the Law is altered in this point and the Justices of Peace upon Indictments taken before them may proceed to proclaime and convict the Recusant as well as Justices of Assize and Goal delivery supra 95. N. 2. Page 108 CIV Upon such default 29 Eliz. 6. § 5. N. 6. that is upon his default of appearance of record at the next Assizes or Goal delivery For if he make such appearance that shall save his default of not rendring his body to the Sheriff And the not rendring himself to the Sheriff shall be no Conviction as Wingate Crowne 66. would make it Page 108. CV As sufficient a Conviction in Law 29 Eliz. 6. § 5. N. 6. that is as if he were Convicted by Verdict but not as sufficient as if a Judgment were had against the Recusant For altho by force of 29 Eliz. 6. § 5. N. 5. and other Statutes the Conviction upon Proclamation and default of appearance make a Recusant lyable to divers penalties and Incapacities and is in those respects as forceable as a Judgment yet it shall not in other Cases have the force or effect of a Judgment and therefore it was resolved 37 and 38 Eliz. in the Case of the general pardon Anno 35 Eliz. where there is an exception of all penalties and forfeitures due to the Queen and converted to a debt by Judgment that notwithstanding that exception a Recusant Convicted upon Proclamation was within the pardon and the forfeitures due upon such Conviction were thereby pardoned for the debt was not due to the Queen by Judgment but upon Conviction only but otherwise it had been if he had been Convicted according to 23 Eliz. 1. § 5. N. 1. without Proclamation and Judgment had been given thereupon 11 Co. 65. Dr. Fosters Case Page 109 110 111. CVI. Upon 29 Eliz. 6. § 6. N. 1. It was resolved by all the Judges Mich. 37 and 38 Eliz. 1 Rol. 94. in Dr. Fosters Case that if a man had been Convicted according to this Statute 29 Eliz. 6. § 5. N. 5. by Proclamation upon default and afterwards conformed himself he should be discharged of the penalty due upon his Conviction notwithstanding these words 29 Eliz. 6. § 6. N. 1. and full satisfaction of all the Arrearages and the reason of this is given by Coke Chief Justice B. R. for that 29 Eliz. 6. § 5. N. 6. saith that such Conviction should be as sufficient as if there were a Verdict recorded but 't is only a Judgment which converts the penalty into a debt and not a Verdict And here all the penalties are discharged upon Conformity unless such as are Converted into a debt 29 Eliz. 6. § 6. N. 1. But otherwise it would have been if there had been a Judgment against the Recusant upon Tryal or Confession upon 23 Eliz. 1. § 5. N. 1. for then his Conformity would have come too late to have saved the penalty Incurred by his Conviction for by the Judgment the penalty was Converted into a debt Quaere tamen Whither these words here 29 Eliz. 6. § 6. N. 1. Due and payable are to be understood due and payable upon a Judgment only However now by 1 Jac. 4. § 1. N. 1. if the Recusant confirm either before or after Judgment he shall be discharged of all penalties 2. But the profits of the Recusants Lands taken before his Conformity shall never be restored 3. It hath been questioned upon 29 Eliz. 6. § 6. N. 1. if a Recusant Convicted by Proclamation upon default had died before seizure of two parts of his Lands whither his lands might have been seized after his death for the Arrearages of the 20 l. per month or if they were seized in his life time whither they should have been discharged after his death without payment of such Arrears And the opinion of those who held that the seizure should neither ensue nor continue after his death but that the Arrears were discharged was pricipalpally grounded upon 29 Eliz. 6. § 6. N. 1. that due and payable extended only to Arrearages due and payable upon a Judgment and converted into a debt But when the Recusant was Convicted by Proclamation the penalty was never Converted into a debt and therefore when he died there were no Arrearges due in the sense of 29 Eliz. 6. § 6. N. 1. for the heir to pay and yet by such offendor here is generally intended all Recusants Convicted as well by Proclamation upon default as upon on Judgment and the heirs of either should have had the benefit of this Proviso viz. that upon the death of the Ancestor no seizure should ensue or be continued only in the Case of a Judgment the Arrears were to have been paid 4. But there seems now to be no further need of this Question for 1 Jac. 4. § 3. N. 1. meets with both these Cases For if there be no seizure of the Recusants Lands in his life time the discharge of the heir will depend upon his Conformity and if there were seizure the two parts shall continue in his Majesties possession till the Arrears are paid and satisfied But this 29 Eliz. 6. § 6. N. 1. is not intended of entailed Lands For without any aid of this Proviso if a Recusant Tenant in Tail be convicted by Proclamation upon default and dieth neither any Seizure for the Arrears of the 20 l. per month shall ensue after his death nor if they were seized in his life time shall the seizure be continued after his death nor is the heir in Tail bound to pay any such Arrears But if a Judgment be had
sufficient ground to record his appearance nor shall save his default for altho he be there personally present and openly confess himself to be the same person who was Indicted and against whom the Proclamation issued yet if he deny to appear upon the Proclamation or to consent that his appearance be entred of Record it seems that his appearance cannot be recorded but his default shall and he shall stand Convicted thereupon And this is no more an appearance than where a Prisoner is brought to Common pleas Bar by Habeas Corpus to the intent to have him appear to an Original brought against him and he denies to appear to the Action in which Case his appearance cannot be recorded as was resolved 43 Eliz. in Ascoughs Case Gouldsborough 118. pl. CLXX Process Page 165. Shall be as sufficient a Conviction in Law 3 Jac. 4. § 7. N. 3. That is a Recusant thus Convicted upon Proclamation and default of appearance shall be in the same condition as if he were Convicted by Verdict but no Judgment is given Bridgman 122. Parker versus Web. But this Conviction upon Proclamation is no Judgment as was resolved 11 Co. 65. in Dr. Fosters Case and altho it shall make the Recusant lyable to the several forfeitures penalties and incapacities inflicted on Recusants convict yet it shall not operate as a Judgment as hath been already shewed in divers instances For this reason it hath been questioned whither if a Recusant be Convicted upon Indictment and Proclamation the King may not waive his advantage of this Conviction and bring his Action of debt given him by 35 Eliz. 1. § 10. N. 1. for that such Conviction is no Judgment and consequently ought not to bind the King as a Judgment against the Recusant should have done Palmer 40.41 Sir John Webbs Case Worsley obtained a Patent to have all the penalties of Recusants Convict Altho such a Patent was illegal for that the King cannot grant the penalty of a penal Law to a Subject 1 Rol. 10 pl. 10. Roy versus Tollin Hob. 155. Colt and Glover c. Hob. 183. Davison versus Barber Yet admitting the Patent to be good it was resolved that the penalties of Recusants Convicted by Proclamation should not pass by those general words 1 Rol. 94.95 Dr. Fosters Case Page 166. Once Convicted 3 Jac. 4. § 8. N. 1. This extends to all Convictions whatsoever upon Indictment whither by Verdict Confession c. Whereupon Judgment is given as well as to Convictions upon Proclamation and default And the penalty of twenty pound per month shall in any of the said Cases run on forever after and be appropriated to the King CLXXII Days Page 166. Here 3 Jac. 4. § 8. N. 1. Easter and Michaelmas Is to be taken disjunctively for Easter or Michaelmas as it is in 29 Eliz. 6. § 4. N. 1. supra 97. for the meaning is not that the Recusant shall have both of the terms of Easter and Michaelmas next after his Conviction wherein to pay the forfeiture of twenty pound for every month contained in the Indictment but he ought to pay the whole into the Exchequer the next Easter or Michaelmas Term which shall first happen after his Conviction and therefore if he be Convicted in February he ought to pay the whole the next Easter Term unless where the King chuses to seize the two thirds of his Lands by force of 3 Jac. 4. § 11. N. 4. as was admitted Jones 24 25. in Standens Case Hil. 20. Jac. and Pasch 16. Jac. in the Lady Webbs Case Bridgman 121. who was Convicted in March the pleading was that in the Easter Term then next following the said Katherine did not pay into the Exchequer according to the rate of twenty pound per month without any mention of Michaelmas Term. Page 166 CLXXIII 167 168. For every month after such Conviction 3 Jac. 4. § 8. N. 2. by this Clause and 29 Eliz. 6. § 4. N 1. supra 96. N. 4. to the same purpose after the Recusant is once Convicted the penalty of twenty pound per month shall run on without any new Indictment or Conviction and shall be for ever afterwards appropriated to the King alone and paid into the Exchequer so that the Informer cannot bring any popular Action or Information for the twenty pound per month for any time incurred after such Conviction but is utterly barred 11 Co. 61. and 1 Rol. 93. Dr. Fosters Case Owen 37. Sulherd and Eveterds Bar Feme 2. 2 Cr. 481 482. The Lady Webb Pasch 16 Jac. was Indicted and Convicted of Recusancy upon Proclamation and default of appearance and afterwards an Informer Qui tam c. sued her and her Husband for a new offence of Recusancy in the Wife subsequent to such Conviction to which they both pleaded the said Conviction at the Kings suit the Question was whether the Informer should be barred by this plea or whether the Information was maintainable notwithstanding such former Conviction of the Wife for that the Wife seems not to be such an offender as is here intended 3 Jac. 4. § 8. N. 2. because she can have no Goods nor Lands during the Husbands life which may be seized for non-payment of the penalty but it was granted on all hands that if she had been a Feme sole this had been a good plea in Bar of the Informers popular suit for then she had been bound to pay the twenty pound per month into the Exchequer and she should not be doubly punished both that way and at the suit of the Informer and for the same reason it was urged that this Information would not lie against the Husband and Wife for after the Husbands death she would be lyable to pay into the Exchequer all the Arrears after the rate of twenty pound per month from the time of her Conviction and her Goods and two parts of her Lands might be then seized for non-payment thereof And if the Husband and Wife should in the mean time at the suit of the Informer pay twenty pounds per month for part of the same time for which the Wife was lyable to pay after the Husbands death this would be a double punishment for one and the same offence suprà 79. N. 10.17 Infra 270. N. 9. 3. And it was further said 2 Cro. 482. That it was usual where the Wife was Indicted and Convicted for Recusancy to seize by Exchequer-process the Lands and Leases which the Husband had in her right and one Woods Case was cited to this purpose which proves that a Feme Covert is within the meaning of the Act 3 Jac. 4. § 8. N. 2. and therefore after she is once Convicted upon Indictment shall be no more Subject to the Informers popular suit than a Feme Sole but this last point is much to be questioned for the Lands and Leases of the Wife are the Husbands during the Coverture and 't is a General rule that his
complicated Offence consisting of several Particulars 1. In giving just cause of Suspicion without which the Party complain'd of according to this Act 7 Iac. 6. § 26. n. 4 cannot be tendered the Oath by one Justice of Peace Then 2. In refusing the Oath before the Justice of Peace who tendered it And lastly 3. In refusing it upon the second Tender at the Assizes or Sessions all which must be comprized in the Indictment So that the cause of Suspicion is pars communis and that arising in the County where the Party dwelt and was complained of cannot be punished in another County unless the Statute 7 Iac. 6. § 26. n. 4. had expressly made it examinable there supra 184. True it is that some Statutes do enable Justices of Peace to punish an Offence done in another County but that is where they enable them likewise to examin the truth of the Fact and take Process and Evidence thereof So 1 Iac. 27. § 5. n. 2. and 7 Iac. 11. § 8. n. 3. and supra 255. impower the Justices of Peace where the Party is apprehended to examin and punish the Offence but in our Case the cause of Suspicion arising in one County is not made examinable and consequently not punishable in another County and if not punishable there no Justice of Peace of that other County can proceed upon that cause of Suspicion notwithstanding the Party happen to be within his Commission or Power But yet the Party so flying into another County may without any Complaint or cause of Suspicion be tendered the Oath and proceeded against there by two Justices of Peace Quorum unus c. by vertue of the fore-going words of this Clause 7 Iac. 6. § 26. n. 2. Altho he dwell in another County and that for the reason before given viz because this Oath sequitur personam non locum But Wingate Coron 150. saves the labour of this Question for he erroneously restrains the pawer of tendring the Oath in this Case to the Justice of Peace to whom the Complaint is made as if no other Justice of peace of that County could proceed therein which is contrary to the express words as well as the meaning of 7 Iac. § 26. n. 4. Note That Dalton 107. Cap. 45. saith it seems requisite that the Justice or Justices of Peace do make like Certificat as 3 Iac. 4. § 13. n. 5. at the next Assizes or Quarter-Sessions of such Persons as have taken this Oath before them by force of 7 Iac. 6. § 26. n. 4. But upon what ground Master Dalton thought this requisite to be certified at the Assizes I know not seing there is no such Certificate to be made by 3 Iac. 4. § 13. n. 5 but only to the General or Quarter-Sessions of the Peace And as for the Sessions I conceive neither the Justices of Peace if they proceed on 7 Iac. 6. § 26 n. 4. and not upon 3 Iac. 4. § 13. n. 5. are bound to make such Certificate nor the Clerk of the Peace or Town-Clerk to record it for it is not here required to be done But yet in such Cases where the same persons are impowered by both these Statutes to require and minister this oath as where the Party is convicted of Recusancy in which Case two Justices of the Peace Quorum unus c. may require the Oath by the Special words in this Clause of 7 Iac. 6. § 26. n. 2. or of the General words in this Clause of 7 Iac. 6. § 26. n. 2. And it doth not appear upon which of these Statutes they proceed as it may sometimes so happen there if the Party take it will be fafest for the two Justices to make such Certificate to the next General or Quarter-Sessions as is appointed 3 Iac. 4. § 13. n. 5. and for the Clerk of the Peace or Town-Clerk to record it Page 250. CCLXVII If any Person or Persons this Clause 7 Iac. 6. § 26. n. 5. is General and extends to all before So that if any of the Nobility refuse this Oath they may be committed to the Common Gaol c. by such as are by this Act Authorized to tender it 12 Co. 131. Page 251. CCLXVIII Shall refuse to take the said Oath duly tendered to him or her 7 Iac. 6. § 26. n. 5. If the Persons authorized to tender this Oath ask the Party whether he will take it and he saith he will not quaere whether this be such a Tender and Refusal as shall make the refuser liable to be imprisoned proceeded against by force of this Act unless he or they who tender it have in readiness both the Form of the Oath and the Book to swear on for it is to be presumed that the Act intends all requisite Circumstances ready to enable the one to minister and the other to take the Oath And 't is held that before there can be any such Refusal of this Oath as is here intended it ought to be read or offered to be read to the Party especially if he be illiterate or if he be not yet that at least it ought to be offered to him for himself to read it for perhaps the Party never saw or heard it And in such Case it would be against Reason that the Refusal should be penal and therefore in 9 Iac. upon the Tender of this Oath at Sarjeants-Inne in Fleet-Street it was read by Order of the Judges there Page 251. CCLXIX To the Common Gaol 7 Iac. 9. § 26. n. 5. The Justices of the Court of B. R. used to tender this Oath in Court as Justices of Peace of Middlesex and upon Refusal the Party is to be committed to the Prison of the Marshalsey which is the Ordinary Prison of that Court untill the next Sessions 2 Bulstr 155. Dyer 297. Page 252 253 254. CCLXX. Being lawfully Convicted as a Popish Recusant 7 Iac. 6. § 28 n. 1. That is upon Indictment at the King's Suit or a Popular Action or Information upon 23 Eliz. 1. § 5. and 11. or Debate at the King's Suit alone by 35 Eliz. 1. § 10. n. 2. supra 119 In which two last Cases the former Laws are somewhat altered by this Statute For by the former Laws 23 Eliz. 1. and 35. Eliz. 1. If a Person had been convicted of Recusancy any other way than by Indictment no more could have been demanded either by the King or Informer than for the Months mentioned in the Information or Count and the Penalty should not have run on in such Case for that 29 Eliz. 6. § N and 3 Jac. 4 § N. which appropriate the Penalty to the King after Conviction intend no other Conviction than by Indictment as hath been there said But by this Act 7 Jac. 6. § 28. N. 1. If a Popular Action or Information or Action of Debt c. at the King's Suit alone be brought against the Husband and Wife for the Recusancy of the Wife and Judgment be had