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A81909 Conscience eased: or, the main scruple which hath hitherto stuck most with conscionable men, against the taking of the Engagement removed. Where amongst other things is shewed, first, how farre the oath of allegiance, and the nationall League and Covenant are obligations; either in their legall intents unalterable or at this time no more binding and alterable. Secondly. How farre in a free people the subordinate officers of the state, have a right to judge of the proceedings of a king in that state. Thirdly, how Zedekia'es case in breaking his oath to the king of Babylon, and our case in making use of our freedome from the oath of allegiance, and supremacie to the king of England doe differ. / The author, John Dury. Dury, John, 1596-1680. 1651 (1651) Wing D2841; Thomason E625_4; ESTC R206464 25,629 40

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for no man can be ignorant that all Earthly matters and Relations are wholly alterable according to the Emergencies and circumstances whence followeth immediately that the Conscience cannot be everlastingly bound to intend the prosecution thereof but onely conditionally according to the main end for which such Obligements are allowed to be taken and according to the Rule by which they are to be prosecuted which in private men is not without the conduct of their Leaders who are instructed with the Supreme management of publique affaires if then the Leaders as heretofore they saw cause to abolish Monarchy should see cause hereafter to set it up again and thereupon should intend a new change in the State I think it would in this Case be lawfull for you to concurre with them therein whence we must conclude that as the Rulers of this State by taking the Engagement cannot intend to oblige themselves never to intend upon what Emergencies soever to alter the present Establishment so the Subjects thereof by taking the same Engagement cannot be supposed to bind up themselves from following their Leaders in the resolutions which in that kind they may take for if upon new Emergencies the Supreme Powers should lead the people to intend a new Change with them without all doubt they may lawfully doe it but except you suppose the conduct and guiding of these I see not how it can be lawfull in the aime of any private man to precure it by any meanes whatsoever because by so doing private men without their Leaders go beyond their Line Therefore still I conclude that private men may not attempt the restoring of that which by publique Authority hath been abolished otherwise then under the conduct of their Superiour Powers The third and last thing which you question is that which I say pag. 9. That if in order to the publique good I were bound by Oath to prosecute a businesse and should find that by my prosecution of it the publique would rather be hindred then advanced that in such a case my Oath would oblige me rather to desist from prosecuting 4 4. Concerning releasement from oaths upon a con●ition the businesse then to proceed therein To which you say thus That this being Dogmatically delivered doth seeme altogether unsound which you endeavour to shew by the Example of Zedekiah who is condemned for breaking his Oath upon such a pretence to the King of Babylon for you say No question Zedekiah became subject and And Zedekiah his Case plea for the breaking of his Oath was bound by Oath to the King of Babylon in Order to the common good of his Kingdome and afterward apprehending as we may be confident that it would be more usefull for the publique good of the Common-wealth to stand free from the Babylonian Yoke by the assistance of the King of Egypt he attempted the procurement of that freedome contrary to his Oath and became guilty of Oath and Covenant breaking before God for which he is deeply charged and threa●●●● by the Lord Ezech. 17. So then your Argument from hence is this If Zedekiah did behave himself in breaking his Oath according to the Rule which you lay down and yet was condemned by the Lord for so doing Then the Rule which you own is not sound But Zedekiah did so Ergo To answer this doubt I shall confesse that if Zedekiah his Case was the same with that which I suppose and if he followed the Rule which I give The argument raised upon Zedekiahs case in that Case and yet is condemned by the Lord for following that Rule then my Rule is not sound but I conceive you will find if you look somewhat neerer to the businesse that his Case is not the same with that which I suppose nor that he followed the rule which I gave in this Case nor that he is condemned by the Lord for following that Rule The case which I suppose is concerning a particular By shewing the difference of the case in hand with that of Zedekiah businesse which I am bound by Oath to prosecute as a private man in order to the publique good whereof I am supposed to be a competent Judge so farre as relates to that particular businesse I say if my Oath binds me to prosecute it in order to the publique good and I upon circumstances can judge that the prosecution will not advance but oppose the publique good then my Oath binds me not to proceed but to desist because the expresse condition of the Oath which is onely binding to the prosecution is desect●ve But in Zedekiah l. is case this cannot be supposed For first his Oath was not concerning my particular businesse but a generall submission to be a faithfull Subject to the King of Babylon nor was he a private man managing his own businesse but he was the Substitute or Vicegerent of the King of Babylon over the publique State of the Kingdome of Iudah nor was it left to him to be the sole competent Judge of the matter whether his submission to the Crown of Babylon should tend to the publique goodyea or no for that was already absolutely determined and he was sworne to be subject without any other condition but that he should be King to that effect The case then as it is by me proposed is not applyable to Zedekiah Therefore it comes not to be considered by my Rule nor had he the liberty left him to make use of my Rule for my rule speakes of a conditionall Oath and no such thing can be supposed in this case My rule supposes me to be free to prosecute or leave my businesse according to mine own judgement as I shall see it subordinate to a publipue good but the businesse to which he was sworne was not left to him to judge otherwise of then was already determined by his superiou● Lord the King of Babylon viz. that his subjection to him should be the safety of the Nation his Rebellion from him should be his and their destruction nor was the case when Zedekiah rebelled altered from what it was at first when he swore subjection which I suppose in my rule must fall out seeing therefore Zedekiah could not make use of my rule in his case I conclude that he could not be condemned for making use of it But because this matter is worth a further disquirie and And how our obligation to bee subject to the King by the Oath of Allegiance and the Covenant differ from Zedekiahs oath to the King of Babylon I see that the case which I have proposed undefinitely may bee applyed to the oath of Allegiance under which we stood for the publique good and to the Nationall covenant concerning which you may say perhaps of us as I have said of Zedekiah that they bind us absolutely to bee subjects to the King and leave it not to us to judge whether our subjection to him should tend to the publique good yea or no
therefore to resolve this doubt also I shall compare our condition of subjection and our Oath binding him thereunto towards the King of Babylon and then if the case bee found alike I shall confesse that we are now as much bound to the master of our Oath as he then was bound to the master of his but if his relation to the King of Babylon was wholly different from ours to our King if his Oath of submission to that King was of another kind then ours was to our King and if his way of freeing himself from his relation and from the bond of his Oath towards the King of Babylon was quite another thing then what hath been intended by us then I hope you will not make our case parallel to his but in all these matters a vast difference will be found between him and us ergoe his guilt cannot be made ours First his Relation to the King of Babylon was to be the vassall In respect of the relation wherein he stood to Nebuchadnezer and wee to the King of England of a Conquerour for the K. of B. having ruined the state of Iudah and subdued the Nation made Zedekiah his vassall to rule it in his name who bound himselfe by Oath so to do but wee stood not under our K. as a Conquered natio● by him but as free borne subiects under a King bound to rule by law Secondly the Oath by which Zedekiah did submit himself to the K. of Babylon was prescribed according to Nebuchadnezzars will and no doubt it was absolutely to keep the Nation in his subjection In respect of the oath which he tooke and wee tooke without any condition of Laws of Priviledges of Liberties or of any such thing supposed or imposed on Nebuchadnezzars part but the Oath by which the people of this Nation were bound to be subjects to their K. was by those that framed and imposed it made to be taken and kept under certain conditions viz. that we should be Subjects by Law and not otherwise and that our subjection to him should be consistent with the priviledges of Par. the native liberties of the nation no otherwise and to make this Oath binding those who imposed it upon the people had power to impose another Oath which was reciprocall thereunto upon the King that he might be bound to them to rule by law as well as they to him to be obedient according to law by which meanes the tye of the Oath was severall wayes limited and the K. himself as well bound up in his commands as they in their obedience by a Law but no such thing can be imagined between Zedekiah and Nebuchadnezzar Thirdly his way of freeing himself from his relation and oath was In respect of his way of breaking of his oath and of our way of being freed from it by a direct rebellion contrary to the intent of his Oath and Covenant but our way of freeing ourselves hath been Legall agreeable to the Tenor of the Law and to the sense of the Authority by which the Oath was given and made Legall for the Oath in the sense of the Legislative power was never absolute but conditionall it did not binde us to the Kings personall and arbitrary will and command but to his government and authority as he had a leg●ll standing and the sense of the Parl. touching the Oath of Allegiance how farre we are thereby intended to be made subordinate to the K. is expressed in the Nationall Covenant which makes it clearly conditionall and the Parl. it self hath freed us long agoe from the obligation of that condition by declaring that he had forfeited his right to govern any longer So that the difference between Zedekiah and us is so vast in this point of being free from the Oath that I can find no resemblance at all in the one to the other for as in our case if the K. kept not his Oath to his Subjects they were absolved De lure from their Oath to him in Zedekiah his Case there was no such contract between the K. of Babylon and him but the will of the Conquerour was his law in our case there was a Law to Regulate both the K. and us in keeping of our Oathes and Trustees in Parl. to see that law kept who herein were above the King and in cases of aberration empowered to see faults amended both in King and Subjects but in the case of Zedekiah there is no such thing the Authority of Nebuchadnezzar was above all Humane positive Lawes and Zedekiah was sworn to be absolutely his Subject in such things and to keep his people in subjection thereunto In our Case the King to whom we were sworne deserted his Station of Government and left his trust by leaving his Parliament and levying warre against it but in Zedekiah his Case no such thing is imaginable In our case the Parliament having the Supreme Authority of the Nation and having conquered the King doth oblige us to be true and faithfull to the free States without him but in Zedekiah his Case no such thing is conceiveable and many other things of a different nature might be insisted upon in our Case which cannot be brought home to Zedekiah his Case to free him from his Oath as we are freed from ours for his whole action was directly opposite to the cleare intent of his Oath and to all the circumstances of the publique good of the Nation oft he Iews as the Lord himself doth intimate in Ezech. Ch. 17. 4 5 6 7 8. but our actions in following the Parliament have been all along consonant to the Legall intentof our Oath by which we are absolved from our relation to the King as also by all the circumstances of his miscarriages of his illegall proceedings and of his breach of trust towards the publike by all the circumstances of the publike good to be procured without him not according to the iudgement of particular men for in this Case my Rule is not to make every private man a Iudge of the publique good but of the Supreme Authority of the Nation and by all the circumstances of his removall from the Throne and of our present standing under the Supreme power of the Nation which now is over us So that to Oblige the conscience of private men to intend the restauration of a royall governmēt upon the account of such an Oath from which we are made so many wayes Legally free is to me a great mistake of Duty and a dangerous snare to intangle weake spirits into the occasions of publique disturbances whereunto I know you are not inclined to give any the least Overtures but the danger is that other men who are of a turbulent disposition and by such a mistake of their dissol●ed relation and seeming Obligation to that which is contrary to their present Duty being otherwise personally discontented may st●enthen and heighten their distempers to a full resolution of publique disturbance and endeavours of distructive unsettlements from which I am sure your genius and pious thoughts do abhorre Thus you have that which I can at present suggest which I beseech the Lord so to addresse as it may tend most to your comfort if you be still unsatisfied and if you be already satisfied that it may be a meanes to confirme you in that which is agreeable to his holy Will and profitable to the good of the Common-wealth of Israel in the love of which I subscribe my self West minster this 8. Decem. 1650. Your faithfull and affectionate Servant I. D.