Selected quad for the lemma: judgement_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
judgement_n	according_a	law_n	rule_n	2,715	5	7.2240	4	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A91339	A political catechism, or, Certain questions concerning the government of this land, answered in his Majesties own words, taken out of his answer to the 19 propositions, pag. 17, 18, 19, 20. of the first edition; with some brief observations thereupon. Published for the more compleat setling of consciences; particularly of those that have made the late protestation, to maintain the power and priviledges of Parliament, when they shall herein see the Kings owne interpretation what that power and priviledges are. It is this twentieth day of May, An. Dom. 1643. ordered by the Committee of the House of Commons in Parliament concerning printing, that this booke entituled, A Politicall catechism, be printed. Iohn White.	Parker, Henry, 1604-1652.; Charles I, King of England, 1600-1649.; England and Wales. Sovereign (1625-1649 : Charles I); England and Wales. Parliament.	1643 (1643)	Wing P416A; Thomason E104_8a	9,843	18

priviledges of the house of Commons and the house of Peeres A. That the Prince may not make use of this High and perpetuall power to the hurt of those for whose good he hath it and make use of the name of publike Necessity for the gain of his priuate Fauourites and Followers c. page 19. Obs. 1. The Law then supposes that such Cases may fall out though it then Charge the Blame upon those Favorites and Followers and not upon the King as we shall see by and by 2. We need not wonder then why Private Favorites and Followers are such Enemies to Parliaments and their Priviledges which are on purpose to hinder their gains Of which also more anon 3. The two Houses are by the Law it seems to be Trusted when they Declare that the Power is made use of for the Hurt of the People and the Name of Publike Necessitie made use of for the Gain of Private Favorites and Followers and the like Q 18 What are the speciall priviledges of the House of Commons towards this A. The House of Comm●ns an Excellent conseruer of Liberty is solely Intrusted with the first propositions concerning the Leauies of Moneys which is the Sinnews as well of peace as of warre c page 19 Obs. 1. It seems then the House of Commons is presumed to be more carefull for the Subjects Liberties then either the King or the House of Peers 2. Then it must needs be strange for any to conceive as the Kings Declarations would Perswade that the House of Commons would Fight against and Subvert the Libertie and Propriety of the Subject and the Kings Favorites and Followers Fight for them and Protect them 3. Then no Moneys may be Levyed neither for Peace nor Warre no not under Pretence of Publike Necessity as Ship-money and Monopolies were without the House of Commons first propound and Grant it 4. If the House of Commons be an Excellent Conserver of Libertie it must Needs have some Power in some Cases to Levie Mony even without the Kings consent or else it will be utterly unpossible to conserve Libertie at all Of which likewise more anon Q. 19. But if the Kings Private Favorites and Followers have ●ctually perswaded him to any Thing against the Laws and Liberties of the Subject with what further Power and Priviledge is the House of Commons Intrusted toward the Conserving of Liberty A. With the Impeaching of those who for their own Ends though countenanced by any surreptitiously-gotten command of the King haue violated that Law which he is bound when he knowes it to protect and to the protection of which they were bound to aduise him at least not to serue him in the contrary page 19. Obs. 1. Then it is no Excuse to any that Violate the Laws that they serve the King in it 2. The Law counts all Commands from the King which are any way contrary to the Law Surreptitiously-Gotten 3. Then the Parliament speaks according to the Law when they constantly lay the Blame of all violations upon the Kings Favorites and Followers and their getting Surreptitiously Commands from him and not upon the King himself 4. No Command of the King is to hinder the Commons from Impreaching such as have violated the Law 5. The King is bound not to Protect any of his Followers and Favorites against the Commons Impeachment of them because he Knows and Affirms that he is bound to Protect the Laws and that this is the Law that the Commons are to Impeach such Qu. 20. What is the speciall Priviledge of the House of Peers in the former Case of such Favorites and Followers of the Kings as are Impeached by the Commons and so to decide all Matters in Questions between the King and the People A. The Lords being trusted with a Iudicatory power are an Excellent Screen and Bank between the Prince and the people to Ass●st●nch against any Encroachments of the other and by iust Iudgments to preserue that Law which ought to be the Rule of euery one of the three page 19. Qu. 21. But have the two Houses Power to put their judgements into Execution as well as to Impeach and Iudge A. The power of punishment is already in your hands according to Law page 20. Obs. 1. Then again it is no wonder that the Kings Favorites and Followers hate Parliaments who not onely Hinder their Gain but have Power to punish them when they have violated the Laws 2. Then the Lords and much more the two Houses together are supreme Judges of all matters in Difference between the King and the People and have Power to Prevent all the Kings Encroachments upon the People as well as the Peoples upon him 3. Then the King is Bound not to Protect any whom the Lords upon the Impeachment of the Commons have Judged Delinquents For he hath granted that he is bound to Protect the Law and that according to Law the Power of Punishing even of his Favourites and Followers 'fore spoken of is in their hands and they cannot punish them so long as he Protects them 4. Then the Law Allows them as the Supreme Judicatory even th●t which must be a Skreen between the King and the People and Assist the People against the Kings Encroachments and punish the Kings Favorites and Followers though countenanced by Surreptitiously-Gotten Commands from the King a Power to bring such as they have Judged or are to Judge to Condign Punishment which is granted to all Inferiour Judges in their Circuits and Iurisdictions 5. Then if those Delinquents get the King to Protect them or surreptiously get Commands of him to Raise Arms to Shelter themselves against the Iudgement of the two Houses the two Houses have Power by the Law to Raise not onely the Posse Comitatus of those Counties where such Delinquents are to apprehend them but also the Posse Regni the Power of the whole Kingdom if need be or else the Power of Punishment is not in their hands according to Law and it would be safer contemning and scorning and opposing the highest Iudicatory the Parliament then any Inferiour Court a Judge of Assize or the like and they that could get Commands to Violate the Law before would easily get Protection against the Parliament when they are Questioned if the Parliament had no Power to Raise Arms to suppresse them Qu. 22. But if there be an Attempt or Danger that the Kings Favorites and Followers go about to change this Regulated Monarchy into an Arbitrary Government and so into a Tyrannie is there Authoritie in the Houses sufficient according to what was sore mentioned to remedy this A. Power Legally Placed in Both Houses is more then sufficient to Preuent and Restrain the power of Tyrannie P. 20. Obs. 1. Then at least what ever Power is Necessary to Prevent or Restrain the Power of Tyrannie is confessed to be Legally placed in both Houses for else there is not Power sufficient much lesse more then sufficient 2. Then

it is Lawfull for the two Houses to Raise Arms to defend themselves in case an Army be Raised against them for else they have not Power sufficient to restrain the Power of Tyrannie There is no Greater Attempt of Tyrannie then to Raise Arms against the Houses of Parliament and there is no way to Restrain this Tyrannie but by Raising Arms in their own Defence Lesse then this cannot be sufficient 3. If a Legall Power be placed in them not onely to Restrain but prevent the power of tyrannie then they are the Legall Iudges when there is danger of Tyrannie and they have Legall Power to Command their judgement to be obeyed for Preventions as well as Restraint of Tyrannie 4. Then it is Lawfull for them to provide for their own and the Kingdoms safetie and they have Legall Power to command the People to this purpose not onely when Arms are Actually Raised against them but when they Discern and accordingly Declare a Preparation made towards it for if they let alone altogether the Exercise of their Power till Arms are Actually Raised against them they may in all likelihood finde it too late not onely to Prevent but even to Restrain the Power of Tyrannie 5. Then they have Legall Power in such Times of Danger to put into safe hands such Forts Ports Magazines Ships and Power of the Militia as are Intended or likely to be Intended to Introduce a Tyranny for else they cannot have Power sufficient to Prevent or Restrain the Power of Tyrannie 6. Then they have Legall Power to Levie Moneys Arms Horse Ammunitions upon the Subjects in such cases of Danger even without or against the Kings Consent for it cannot be imagined that in such cases when the Kings Favourites and Followers have gotten Commands from him to Protect them in their Delinquencies and Attempts to Introduce Tyrannie that ever he will consent to ●evies of Moneys against those Favourites and Fol●owers of his or to the Raising Arms against them specially he being still in their hands and among them and not with his Parliament and without such Levies of Moneys c. it is not possible for the two Houses of Parliament to Prevent or Restraine sufficiently the Power of Tyrannie 7 They that have made the Protestation to maintain and defend the Power and Priviledges of Parliament may see in all these Things Acknowledged by the King and clearly Following from his Acknowledgements what is that Power and what are Priviledges of Parliament which they have so solemnly in the Presence of Almighty God Vowed Promised and Protested to maintain c. 8. And finally since the two Houses of Parliament have so often and fully Declared their Intentions in settling the Militia securing Hull and the Magazine there and the Navie at Sea with the Ports and Forts and afterward in Raising Arms under the Command of the Earl of Essex and last of all Levying Moneys by voluntary Contibutions and Assessements they have onely used that Legall Power which is in them for the Punishment of Delinquents and for the Prevention and Restraint of the Power of Tyrannie of all which they are the Legall Judges and all the Subjects of this Kingdom are bound by the Laws to obey them herein and those doubly bound that have made the late Protestation That the Reader may the better discern how the Answers here applied do agree with the words of his Majesties Answer to the 19 Propositions I have here transcribed so much of it as concerns this particular Page 17. We call God to witnesse that as for our subiects sake these Rights are vested in Vs so for their sakes as well as for our own we are resolued not to quit them nor to subuert though in a parliamentary way the ancient equall happy well-poysed and neuer-enough-commended Constitution of the gouernment of this kingdom There being three kinds of gouernment amongst men Absolute Monarchy Aristocracy and Democracy and all these hauing their particular conveniences and inconveniences page 18. The experience and wisdom of your Ancestors hath so moulded this out of a mixture of these as to giue to this Kingdom as farre as humane prudence can prouide the conveniences of all three without the inconveniences of any one as long as the Ballance hangs euen between the three Estates and they run ioyntly on in their proper channell begetting Verdure and Fert●lity in the meadows on both sides and the ouer-flowing of either on either side raise no Deluge or Inundation The Ill of Absolute Monarc●y is Tyranny The Ill of Aristocracy is Faction and Diuision The Ills of Democracy are Tumults Violence and Licent●ousnesse The good of Monarchy is the Vniting a Nation under one Head to Resist Inuasion from abroad and Insurrection at home The good of Aristocracy is the coniunction of Councell in the Ablest persons of a State for the publike benefit The good of Democracy is Liberty and the courage and industry which Liberty begets In this kingdom the Laws are iointly made by a King by a house of Peeres and by a house of Commons chosen by the people all hauing free Votes and particular priviledges The gouernment according to these Laws is trusted to the King power of Treaties of war peace of making Peeres of chusing Officers Counsellours for State Iudges for Law Cōmanders for Forts Castles giving Cōmissions for raising men to make war abroad or to preuent provide against Invasions or Insurrections at home benefit of Consiscations power of pardoning some more of the like kinde are placed in the King Again Page 19. that the Prince may not make use of this high and pertetuall power to the hurt of those for whose good he hath it and make use of the name of publike Necessity for the gain of his priuate Fauorites and Followers to the detriment of his people the house of Commons an excellent Conseruer of Liberty but neuer intended for any share in Gouernment or the chusing of them that should gouern is solely intrusted with the first Propositions concerning the Leauies of moneys which is the sinews as wel of peace as warre and the unpeaching of those who for their own ends though countenanced by any surreptitiously-gotten cōmand of the King haue violated that Law which he is bound when he knows it to protect to the protection of which they were bound to aduise him at least not to serve him to the contrary the Lords being trusted with a Iudicatory power are an excellent screen and bank between the Prince and people to assist each against any Incroachments of the other and by iust iudgements to preserue that Law which ought to be the Rule of euery one of the three Pag. 20. Since therefore the Power Legally placed in both Houses is more then sufficient to preuent and restrain the power of Tyrannie since this would be a totall Subuersion of the Fundamentall Laws and that excellent Constitution of this Kingdom which hath made this Nation so many years both Famous Hapy to a great degree of envy since to the power of punishing which is already in your hands according to Law if since the encroaching of one of these Estates upon the power of the other is unhappy in the effects both to them all the rest Pag. 2● Our answer is Nolumus Leges Angliae mutari But this We promise that We will be as carefull of preserving the Lawes in what is supposed to concern wholly our Subiects as in what most concerns Our self For indeed We professe to belieue that the preseruation of euery Law concerns Vs those of Obed●ence being not secure when those of protection are Violated FINIS