Linguistic DNA - Concept Modelling Demonstrator

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
judgement_n	according_a	king_n	law_n	3,633	5	5.0197	4	true

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A91336	A political catechism, or, Certain questions concerning the government of this land, answered in His Majesties own words, taken out of his answer to the 19 propositions, Pag. 17, 18, 19, 20. of the first edition; with some brief observations thereupon. Published for the more compleat setling of consciences, particularly of those that have made the late protestation, to maintain the power and priviledges of Parliament, when they shall herein see the Kings own interpretation what that power and priviledges are. It is this twentieth day of May, Anno Dom. 1643. ordered by the Committee of the House of Commons in Parliament concerning printing, that this book entituled, A Political catechism, be printed. John White.	Parker, Henry, 1604-1652.; Charles I, King of England, 1600-1649.; England and Wales. Sovereign (1625-1649 : Charles I); England and Wales. Parliament.	1643 (1643)	Wing P416; Thomason E104_8b	14,645	17

Commons is intrusted with power to impeach such as have actually perswaded the King to any thing against the Laws and Liberty of the Subject c. Ends though countenanced by any surreptitiously-gotten command of the King have violated that Law which he is bound when he knows it to protect and to the protection of which they were bound to advise him at least not to serve him in the contrary page 19. Observ 1. Then it is no excuse to any that Violate the No excuse to any that violate the Laws to say they serve the King in so doing Laws that they serve the King in it 2. The Law counts all Commands from the King which What account the Law makes of all commands surreptitiously gotten from the King are any way contrary to the Law Surreptitiously Gotten 3. Then the Parliament speaks according to the Law The Parliament do legally lay the blame of all violation of Law upon the Kings Favorites that obtain unlawful commands when they constantly lay the blame of all violations upon the Kings Favorites and Followers and their getting Surreptitiously Commands from him and not upon the King himself 4. No Command of the King is to hinder the Commons No command of the Kings is to hinder the Impeachment of such from Impeaching such as have violated the Law 5. The King is bound not to Protect any of his Followers The King is bound not to protect any of his Followers or Favorites against Impeachments and Favorites against the Commons Impeachment of them because he knows and affirms that he is bound to Protect the Laws and that this is the Law that the Commons are to Impeach such Quest 20. What is the special Priviledge of the House of Peers in the former Case of such Favorites and Followers of the Kings as are Impeached by the Commons and so to decide all Matters in Questions between the King and the People A. The Lords being trusted with a Judicatory power are Judicature power is the special priviledge of the Lords house which is an excellent Screen and Bank between the King and People an Excellent Screen and Bank between the Prince and the people to assist each against any Encroachments of the other and by just Judgments to preserve that Law which uoght to be the Rule of every one of the three page 19. Quest 21. But have the two Houses Power to put their judgments into Execution as well as to Impeach and Judge The houses have power to put their Judgments in execution A. The power of punishment is already in your hands according to Law page 20. Observ 1. Then again it is no wonder that the Kings Favorites and Followers hate Parliaments who not only No wonder that the Kings Favorites hate Parliaments hinder their Gain but have Power to punish them when they have violated the Laws 2. Then the Lords and much more the two Houses togeaher The two Houses are supream Judges of all matters in difference between King and people are supreme Judges of all matters in difference between the King and the People and have power to prevent all the Kings Encroachments upon the people as well as the Peoples upon him 3. Then the King is bound not to Protect any whom the The King is boâ—nd not to protect Delinquents Lords upon the Impeachment of the Commons have Judged Delinquents For he hath granted that he is bound to Protect the Law and that according to Law the Power of punishing even of his Favorites and Followers before spoken of is in their hands and they cannot punish them so long as he Protects them 4. Then the Law allows them as the Supreme Judicatory The Law allows the upper house to be the supream Judicatory to be a Skreen between the King and People c. even that which must be a Skreen between the King and the People and Assist the People against the Kings Encroachments and punish the Kings Favorites and Followers though countenanced by Surreptitiously-Gotten Commands from the King a Power to bring such as they have Judged or are to Judge to Condign Punishment which is granted to all Inferiour Judges in their Circuits and Jurisdictions 5. Then if those Delinquents get the King to Protect The Power of both Houses is by Law to raise Arms if need be for the apprehending of Delinquents them or surreptitiously get Commands of him to raise Arms to Shelter themselves against the Judgment of the two Houses the two Houses have Power by the Law to raise not only the Posse Comitatus of those Counties where such Delinquents are to apprehend them but also the Posse Regni the Power of the whole Kingdom if need be or else the Power of Punishment is not in their hands according to Law and it would be safer contemning and scorning and opposing the highest Judicatory the Parliament then any Inferiour Court a Judge of Assize or the like and they that could get Commands to Violate the Law before would easily get Protection against the Parliament when they are Questioned if the Parliament had no Power to raise Arms to suppress them Quest 22. But if there be an Attempt or Danger that the Kings Favorites and Followers go about to change this Regulated Monarchy into an Arbitrary Government and so into a Tyranny is there Authority in the Houses sufficient according to what was fore-mentioned to remedy this A. Power Legally Placed in both Houses is more then A power legally placed in both houses is more then sufficient to prevent Tyranny sufficient to prevent and restrain the power of Tyranny page 20. Observ 1. Then at least what ever Power is necessary to prevent or restrain the Power of Tyranny is confessed to be Legally placed in both Houses fot else there is not Power sufficient much less more then sufficient 2. Then it is lawful for the two Houses to Raise Arms Lawful for both houses to raise an Army to defend themselves against any power raised against them to defend themselves in case an Army be raised against them for else they have not power sufficient to restrain the power of Tyranny There is no greater attempt of Tyranny then to raise Arms against the Houses of Parliament and there is no way to restrain this Tyranny but by raising Arms in their own Defence Less then this cannot be sufficient The Parliament are legal Judges in danger of Tyranny and have power to command their judgment to be obeyed c Lawful for the Parliament to provide for their own and the Kingdoms safety and to command the people to this purpose both when arms are actually raised and when they discern a Preparation there unto 3. If a Legal Power be placed in them not only to restrain but prevent the Power of Tyranny then they are the Legal Judges when there is danger of Tyranny and they have Legal Power to Command their judgment to

be obeyed for Preventions as well as Resâ—â—rint of Tyranny 4. Then it is lawful for them to provide for their own and the Kingdoms safety and they have Legal Power to command the People to this purpose not only when Arms are actually raised against them but when they Discern and accordingly declare a Preparation made towards it for if they let alone altogether the Exercise of their power til Arms are Actually raised against them they may in all likelihood find it too late not only to Prevent but even to Restrain the Power of Tyranny 5. Then they have Legal Power in such Times of danger to put into safe hands such Forts Ports Magazines Ships and Power of the Militia as are intended or likely to be â—ntended to Introduce a Tyranny for else they cannot have Legal power in times of danger to put into safe hands Forts Ports Magazines ships c. Power sufficient to Prevent or Restrain the Power of Tyranny 6. Then they have Legal Power to Levy Moneys Arms Legal power to leavy moneys Arms Horse Ammunition of the subjection such cases of danger without or against the consent of the King c. Horse Ammunitions upon the Subjects in such cases of Danger even without or against the Kings Consent for it cannot be imagined that in such cases when the Kings Favourites and Followers have gotten Commands from him to protect them in their Delinquencies and Attempts to Introduce Tyranny that ever he will consent to Levies of Moneys against those Favorites and Followers of his or to the raising Arms against them especially he being still in their hands and among them and not with his Parliament and without such Levies of Moneys c. it is not possible for the two Houses of Parliament to prevent or restrain sufficiently the Power of Tyranny 7. They that have made the Protestation to maintain and In all these things acknowledged by the King clearly following from his acknowledgments all men may see the power and priviledges of Parliment defend the Power and Priviledges of Parliament may see in all these Things acknowledged by the King and clearly Following from his acknowledgeenents what is that Power and what are Priviledges of Parliament which they have so solemly in the presence of Almighty God Vowed Promised and Protested to maintain c. 8. And finally since the two Houses of Parliament have so often and fully declared their Intentions in settling the Militia securing Hull and the Magazine there and the Navy That since the two houses have so often declared their intentions in settling the Militia sâ—â—uing of Hull c. at Sea with Ports and Forts and afterward in Raising Arms under the Commanp of the Earl of Essex and last of all Levying Moneys by voluntary Contributions and Assessments they have only used that Legal Power which is in them for the Punishment of Delinquents and for the Prevention and Restraint of the power of Tyranny of all which they are the All men may see that they have only used that legal power which is in them for punishing delinquents prevention and restraining of Tyranny c. Legal Judges and all the Subjects of this Kingdom are bound by the Laws to obey them herein and those doubly bound that have made the late Protestation That the Reader may the better discern how the Answers here applyed do agree with the words of his Majesties answer the to 19 Propositions I have here transcribed so much of it as concerns this particular Page 17. We call God to witness that as for our subjects Conceening the Government of the Kingdom sake these Rights are vested in Us so for their sakes as well as for our own we are resolved not to quit them nor to subvert though in a parliamentary way the ancient equal happy well-poysed and uever-enough-commended Constitution of the Government of this Kingdom Three kinds of Government amongst men There being three kinds of Government amoust men Absolute Monarchy Aristoceacy and Democracy and all these having their particular conveniences and inconveniences The providence of our Ancestors hath so moulded the Government of this Kingdom as by a mixture of all three kinds to give the convâ—â—iences of them all c. page 18. The experience and wisdom of your Aucestors hath so moulded this out of a mixture of these as to give to this Kingdom as far as humane prudence can provide the conveniences of all three without the inconveniences of any one as long as the Ballance bangs even between the three Estates and they run joyntly on in their proper channel begetting Uerdure a Fertility in the meadows on both sides and the over-flowing of either on either side raise no Deluge or Inundaâ—ion The ill of Absolute Monarchy is Tyranny The ill of Aristocracy is Faction and Diviâ—ion The Ills of Democracy are Tumuls Violence and Licentiousness The good of Monarhy is the Vniting a Nation under one Head to Resist Invasion from abroad and Insurrection at home The good of Aristocracy is the conjunction of Councel in the Ablest persons of a State for the publick benefit The good of Democracy is Liberty and the courage and industry which Liberty begets In this Kingdom the Laws are Joyntly made by a King How the Laws of this Kingdom are made by a house of Peeres and by a house of Commons chosen by the people all having free Votes and particular priviledges The Government according to these Laws is trusted to the Trust â—eposed in the King King Power of Treaties of War and Peace of making Peers of choosing Officers and Councellors for State Judges for Law Commanders for Forts and Castles giving Coâ—missions for raising men to make War abroad or to provent and provide against Invasions or Insurrections at homâ— benefit of Confiscations power of pardoning some more of Concerning the extent of the Princes liberty the like kind are placed in the King Again page 19. that the Prince may not make use of this â—igh and perpetual power to the hurt of those for whose good he hath it and make use of the name of publick necessity for the gain of his privats Favorites Followers to the dotriment of his people the house of Commons an excellent conserver of Liberty but never intended for any share in Government or the chusing of them that should govern is solely intrusted with the first Propositions concerning the Levies of Moneys which is the sinews as well of peace as war and the impeaching of those The Trust reposed in the house of Commons who for their own ends though countenanced by any surreptitiously-gotten command of the King have violated that Law which he is bound when he knows it to protect and to the protection of which they were bound to advise him at least not to serve him to the contrary and the Lords being trusted The Trust of the Lords with a Judicatory power are an excellent screen bank between the Prince people to assist each against any incroachments of the other by just judgments to preserve that Law which ought to be the Rule of every one of the three Page 20. Since therefore the Power Legally placed in both The sufficiency of the power placed in both houses Houses is more then sufficient to prevent and restrain the power of Tyrauny since this would be a total Subversion of the Fundamental Laws and that excellent constitution of this Kingdom which hath made this Nation so many years both Famous and Happy to a great degree of envy since to the power of punishing which is already your hands according Incroachment of Power to Law if since the encroaching of one of these Estates upon the power of the other is unhappy in the effects both to them and all the rest Page 22. Our answer is Nolumus Leges Angliae muâ—ari But this we promiâ—e that Careful to preseeve Laws we will be as careful of preserving the Laws in what is supposed to concern wholly our Subjects as in what most concerns our self For indeed we profels to believe that the preservation of every Law concerns Vs those of obedience being not secure when those of protection are violated FINIS

Selected quad for the lemma: judgement_n

Text snippets containing the quad