is not the Kings Law. For taking one Example for many every Leet or view of Frank Pledge holden by a Subject is kept in the Lords Name and yet it is the Kings Court and all the Proceedings therein are directed by the Kings Laws and many Subjects in England have and hold Courts of Record and other Courts and all their Proceedings be according to the Kings Laws and Customs of the Realm But there is a Material Objection or two yet to be answered 1. It is Objected That 2 Jac. the Judges declared in the Star-Chamber That the Deprivation of Non-conformists was lawful because the King had supreme Ecclesiastical Power which he hath delegated to the Commissioners whereby they had Power of Deprivation by the Canon Law of this Realm and the Statute of 1 Eliz. doth not confer any new Power but explain and declare the ancient Power And therefore they held it clear that the King without a Parliament might make Orders and Constitutions for the Government of the Clergy and might deprive them if they obeyed not To which I answer 1. Our Question is not Whether the King without a Parliament may not require the Observation of Canons passed the Convocation so as to deprive the Obstinate by Vertue of his Supreme Power in Ecclesiastical Matters but whether he may appoint a Commission with Power to deprive against an Act of Parliament which hath taken away the Legal Power of any such Commission 2. In matters of this nature it is safer trusting the Supreme Judicature of the Nation in Parliament than the Extrajudicial Opinion of the Judges And in this Case the Parliament hath declared it self another way as appears by the Canons 1640. which were not only condemned in Parliament afterwards which then might be imputed to the heat of the Times but in the most Loyal Parliament after the King's Return particular care was taken that neither the Canons of 1640. should be confirmed nor any other Ecclesiastical Laws or Canons not formerly confirmed allowed or enacted by Parliament or by the Established Laws of the Land as they stood in the Year of the Lord 1639. Which implies that the Sense of the Parliament then was that we are not to own any Canons but such as were confirmed allowed or Enacted by Parliament or by the Established Laws of the Land before 1639. And therefore no new Injunctions without a Parliament or Convocation can make the Clergy liable to a Legal Deprivation No not that which the Defender is so pleased with the thoughts of viz. to give their Assent and Consent to the King's Declaration on pain of Deprivation 3. The Temporalties of the Clergy especially the Bishops are secured by several Acts of Parliament without a Tryal at Law. Which because I see none of our great Lawyers take notice of I shall here set down 14 Edward the Third c. 3. We Will and Grant for us and for our Heirs that from henceforth We nor Our Heirs shall not take nor cause to be taken into Our Hands the Temporalties of Archbishops Bishops c. or other People of Holy Church of what Estate or Condition they be without a true and just Cause according to the Law of the Land and Judgment thereupon given 25 Edward the Third c. 6. The Title of the Statute is A Bishops Temporalties shall not be seized for a Contempt And this was received for good Law 9 E. 4. 28. Br. Ord. 12. Reg. f. 32. But a very late Writer tells the World That the Possessions of Ecclesiastical Persons are but Conditional Freeholds and although Absolute Freeholds require a due Course of Law yet Conditional do not so that if a Man chance to be deprived of his Office his Freehold is gone This is touching Clergymen's Freeholds to purpose and no doubt out of pure Zeal to the Church of England But see the Equity and Impartiality of this Man He had undertaken before to give Publick Assurance of Abby-Lands to the present Possessors And for what Reason Because the Pope granted a Dispensation with a non obstante to the Canon Law And yet in this Book he proves That a non obstante is no ways binding to the Supreme Power so that no Man could more effectually overthrow his own Assurance than he hath done himself For saith he Present Sovereigns whether King or Pope cannot bind their Successors And again Acts of Graces and Favours are alterable and suspendible at the Pleasure of the Succeeding Sovereign Why then should any be so weak as to think the Plenitude of the Pope's Power as to Abby-Lands can be bound up by the Act of any former Pope I confess the comparing these two Books together hath extreamly lessened his Assurance of Abby Lands with me And his Answers to the Power of Revocation are so weak that they come at last to no more than this It is a thing which cannot well be done at present therefore there is no fear it ever should be done Here is some Security at least till it can be done But as to the Possessions of the Ecclesiastical Persons of the Church of England he endeavours to prove That they can have no Security at all of their present Possessions notwithstanding any Promise or a Legal Title For if as he saith The King by his Paramount Jurisdiction can make any Exceptions null and so void a solemn Oath not to accept a Dispensation from that Oath why should he not as well make void any Promise of his own when it hinders as he thinks a greater Good especially if the Prerogative cannot be bound But then as to a Legal Title that is the vainest thing imaginable as to such Conditional Freeholds which Clergymen have for if the Commissioners deprive them by their Power ab Officio Beneficio their Attendent Frehold saith he is gone without any Course of Law. And the Defender saith The Commissioners may deprive if Clergymen should not assent and consent to all contained in the King's Declaration if he required it But it is to be hoped That Princes will not take the Measures of Justice and Wisdom and Honour from such Men We will therefore set aside the Omnipotent Engine of a non obstante which doth not batter so much as it undermines and consider the Legal Security of these Conditional Freeholds I. All Freeholds are in some Sense Conditional or else they could never be forfeited Which shews that there are none Absolute with Respect to the Law. And as to their Original among us it is agreed That by the Ancient Right of Tenures all Fees are Conditional for they suppose Fealty the non-performance whereof is Felony Which is not that which is done felleo animo as Sir Edward Coke trifles but it is the same with Falshood or Treachery The Laws of H. 1. c. 5. Si Dominus de Felonia vel Fide mentitus compellat hominem suum And in another Law the punishment of Felony is Forfeiture of the
he is not Lord over the Community but Governour 2. That for him to Dispense in a Law made for the Community without a just Cause is not only malum quia prohibitum sed ex se ex natura rei semper malum Therefore Suarez was far from thinking a Prince might Dispense with any thing that was not malum in se for he makes it to be so for him to dispense with a malum quia prohibitum if it be prohibited by a Law made for a Publick Good and there be no just Cause for it 3. That although a Prince sins in Dispensing with such a Law yet his Dispensation holds as to the Force of the Law which he supposes to depend on the Will of the Prince and therefore his Will being altered the Obligation ceaseth as to the Persons Dispensed with 4. That although such a Dispensation holds as to the Law yet he thinks a Prince bound in Conscience to Revoke such a Dispensation because it is unlawful for him to persist in such a Will it being repugnant to the Common Good and the Obligation of his Duty 5. That if such a Dispensation be to the Injury of a third Person then it is void in it self as being repugnant to Justice Vasquez saith They are all agreed That no Prince hath a Power to Dispense with his Laws according to his Pleasure or because they are his Laws But he saith There is a Dispute Whether an unlawful Dispensation be valid or not And he thinks not and that a Man's Action after the Dispensation is as faulty as if there had been none His Reason is because a Prince is bound by his own Laws so that he cannot Dispense with himself as to the Obligation of them for if he could at Pleasure Dispense with himself he could never be bound for how can a Man be bound to keep a Law in which he can Dispense with himself when he pleases And if he cannot Dispense with himself much less with any under him Having thus endeavoured to clear the Nature and Original of the Dispensing Power I now come 2. To the Reason assigned by Sir E. Coke from the Year Books why the King may Dispense with Laws because they be mala prohibita and not mala per se. My Lord Vaughan said Right concerning it That this Rule hath more confounded Men's Judgments on this Subject than rectified them Which I shall make appear by shewing I. That it alters the Frame of our Government II. That it takes away all Security by Law. III. That it contradicts the Sense of our Nation in former Ages IV. That the Rule is contrary to the Precedents in Law. I. That it alters the Frame of our Government For it goes upon a very false Ground viz. That the King may Dispense with any thing which is not Evil in its own Nature or antecedently to any Human Laws which is to suppose the whole Legislative Power to be lodged in the Person of the King For all who understand these Matters do agree That a Power to Dispense with Laws is the same with a Power to make them Dispensare hoc est lege solvere is solus potest qui ferendae abrogandaeque leg is potestatem habet saith H. Grotius Suarez saith He hath the Power of Dispensing qui legem tulit quia ab ejus voluntate potentia pendet Vasquez That the Dispensing Power lies in him qui habet Potestatem condendi abrogandi legem Pufendorf That none can Dispense with a Law but such as have the Power of making it But we need no Authorities in this Matter For to Dispense in the Sense it is here taken is to take away the Obligation of a Law and whoever takes it away must have the Power of laying it on And there is no Difference between the Dispensation with a Law and the Abrogation of it but that a Dispensation is an Abrogation of it to particular Persons while others are under the Force of it and an Abrogation is a General Dispensation that being no more than a Relaxation of the whole Law to those Persons who were bound by it before But if a part of the Law be taken away as to the whole Community then it is called a Derogation of it But if the Law be Relaxed only for a limited Time and under certain Conditions then it is not an Abrogation but an Indulgence or Suspension of the Law. To Dispense with a Law is more than to give an Equitable Sense or a Favourable Interpretation of a Law for he that Inteprets a Law supposes his Interpretation to agree with the Sense and Design of the Law he that Dispenses owns that which he dispenses with to be against the Intention of the Law but that he hath Power to take away the Force of it so far as he thinks fit He that saith Thou shalt not kill doth not reach to Legal Executioners of Justice interprets the Law according to Reason and Equity But when God said to Abraham Go and Sacrifice thy Son he must be supposed by virtue of his Supreme Authority to Dispense with the Law in his Case so as to make that Lawful upon his Command which would not have been so without it Some will not allow this to be called a Dispensation but an alteration of the Matter of the Law but when that Alteration comes from the Authority of the Law Makers it is the same so that to Interpret a Law is an Act of Discretion and Judgment but to Dispense with it of Authority and Jurisdiction And none can therefore Dispense in the Law of God but he that made it all that the Wisest and greatest Men can justly pretend to is no more than to give the true Sense of it and it is intolerable Prsumption for any Creature to pretend to more An Equitable Sense as to Human Law is not always that which seems to be most favourable to those who go against the Letter of it but that which most enforces the End and Design of the Law although it be not comprehended in the Words of it If a Law mentions a Crime of a lesser nature in regard of Circumstances and in regard of those Circumstances promises some Favour as Benefit of the Clergy it can be no Equitable Sense to extend it to such Acts which have worse Circumstances because the Ground of the Favour was the extenuation of the Fact by the Circumstances so that the chief Rule of Equity in the Interpretation of a Law is to attend to the Intention and Design of it more than to the bare Words The Intention and Design of the Law is not to be measured by Particular and Accidental Cases wherein some Inconveniencies are to be born but by the Publick and General Good which more than makes amends for them which is the Reason of that Maxim Better a Mischief than an Inconvenience which is false unless taken in such an Equitable Sense There are
Cases besides those which depended on the Canon-Law For saith he the Pope usurped such a Power in derogation of the Authority Royal and then that Power must be originally in the King otherwise in the Construction of the Act it could be no Usurpation But this is a very false way of Reasoning The Pope usurped such a Power on the Crown therefore the Crown hath it of Right For the Popes Usurpations were many of them unreasonable his Primacy according to Canons being allowed and our Law did restore to the King the ancient Right and Jurisdiction of the Crown and not put him into the Possession of all the extravagant Power which the Pope usurped For this Law charges the Pope with intolerable Exactions of great Sums of Money in Pensions Censes Peter-Pence Procurations Fruits Suits for Provisions and Expeditions of Bulls for Arch-Bishopricks and Bishopricks and for Delegates and Rescripts in Causes of Contentions and Appeals Jurisdictions Legantine as well as Dispensations Licenses Faculties Grants Relaxations Writs called Perinde valere Rehabilitations Absolutions c. Now all these were Usurpations in Derogation of the Crown but doth it therefore follow that the Crown hath a Right to them all But to go no further than the Business of Dispensations Hath the King a Right by this Statute to dispense as far as the Pope The Pope usurped a Power of dispensing in Matrimonial Contracts in Oaths in Vows in some positive Divine Laws which I suppose H. 8. by vertue of the Supremacy never pretended to So that it is a very mistaken Notion of some Men That the King had all the Power which the Pope usurped And as to the Act it is plain by the Words of it That the Original Power of Dispensing was lodged in the King Lords and Commons and the Ministerial Execution of it with the Arch Bishop of Canterbury even with respect to the King himself But if the King had pretended to all the Power which the Pope usurped he must have dispensed with himself But this Author offers to Prove That there is a Power in the Crown to dispense with Acts of Parliament even such as concern the Consecration of Bishops because it is said 8 Eliz. That the Queen by her Supreme Authority had dispensed with all causes or Doubts of any Imperfection or Disability in the Persons c. To give a clear Answer to this we must consider these Things 1. That 1 Eliz. 1. The Act of 25 H. 8. for the Order and Form of Electing and Making Arch-Bishops and Bishops was revived as appears by the same Act 8. Eliz. 1. 7. 2. That by another Act 1 Eliz. 2. The Book of Common-Prayer and Administration of Sacraments and other Rites and Ceremonies of the Church of England which were in use in the time of 6 E. and repealed by Queen Mary were re-inforced 1 Eliz. 2. 2. and the Repeal annulled But by the Act 5 and 6 E. 6. c. 1. § 5. the Form and Manner of making Arch-Bishops Bishops Priests and Deacons was added to the Book of Prayer as of like Force and Authority with it 3. That the Act of E. 6. being revived with the express mention of the Alterations and Additions made to it there was ro Necessity apprehended 1 Eliz. to make a distinct Act for that which was in force already by the Name of Additions therein added and appointed by that Statute And this I conceive was the true Reason why a Bill did not pass 1 Eliz. to that purpose For I find by the Journals of the House a Bill was prepared and read the third time in the House of Lords but upon Consideration it was laid a side as superfluous 4. That the Popish Party took Advantage of this and pretended That the Book of Consecration c. was not established by Law being not expresly mentioned and therefore the Bishops made by it were not Legal Bishops And upon this Bonner resolved to stand the Trial against Horn Bishop of Winchester as may be seen in Dyer R. f. 234. So that the Papists then stood upon it That the Crown could not dispense with Laws otherwise Bonner's Plea signified nothing For if there were such an Inherent Right in the Crown to Dispense with Laws in Ecclesiastical Matters then these were Legal Bishops having all the Queen 's Dispensing Power for them 5. The Clause in the Queen's Letters Patents for Dispensing with Imperfections and Disability was put in out of abundant Caution and not for any Necessity that we can find But it was Customary in the Popes Bulls to put in such kind of Clauses and therefore they would omit no Power in that Case which the Pope did pretend to which the Act faith was for avoiding all Ambiguities and Questions 6. But after all lest there should be any Colour for Disputing this Matter left according to the express Letter of the Law therefore it was declared 8 Eliz. 1. 3. That not only the Book of Common-Prayer but the Form of Consecrating Archbishops Bishops c. which was set sorth in Edward the Sixth's Time and added to the Common Prayer shall stand and be in full Force and Effect And all Acts done by it are declared to be Good and Perfect to all Intents and Purposes So that this Act of Parliament doth rather overthrow a Dispensing Power for if there were then such a Supreme and Absolute Power in the Crown as to Ecclesiastical Matters what need such an Act of Parliament to Confirm and Ratifie what our Author supposes done by virtue of it But to return to the 25th of H. 8. In the same Act of Parliament care is taken for the Visiting Exempt Places as Monasteries Colledges and Hospitals by a particular Commission under the Great Seal But that which comes nearest to our Business is That 26 H. 8. c. 1. another Act passed wherein the King's Supremacy is acknowledged and a Power given by Act of Parliament for him to Visit Redress and Amend all Errors Heresies Abuses Contempts and Enormities whatsoever which by any manner of Spiritual Authority or Jurisdiction ought or may lawfully be Reformed in any Usage Custom Foreign Laws Foreign Authority Prescription or any Thing or things to the contrary hereof notwithstanding If the King had this Power by virtue of his Supremacy and Prerogative Royal can we imagin H. 8. so weak a Prince and so little a valuer of his own Prerogative as to have that given him by Act of Parliament which was acknowledged to be in him before But the Words are express And that our Sovereign Lord c. shall have full Power and Authority from Time to Time to Visit c. From whence it follows That in the Judgment of H. 8. and the Parliament such a Power was not personally inherent in him but that it did belong to the Legislative Power and therefore an Act of Parliament was required for it so that the Supremacy as then setled by Law lay in a total rejecting any Foreign Jurisdiction