a fundamentall variance betwixt the Monarch and the Community he is ashamed to put the question home I demand of him if there be a variance betwixt the Monarch and any of the meanest person of the Community who shall be the Judge for instance The King commands me or gives judgment against me I reply His commands are illegall and his judgment not according to law who must judge if the Monarch himself judge then you destroy the frame of the State and make it absolute saith our Author and he gives his reason for to define a Monarch to a law and then to make him judge of his owne deviations from that law is to absolve him from all law On the other side if any or all the people may judge then you put the Soveraignty in the whole body or part of it and destroy the being of Monarchy Thus our Author hath caught himself in a plaine dilemma if the King be judge then he is no limited Monarch If the people be judge then he is no Monarch at all So farewell limited Monarchy nay farewell all government if there be no Judge Would you know what help our Author hath found out for p. 14. this mischief First he saith that a Subject is bound to yeild to a Magistrate when he cannot de jure challenge obedience if it be in a thing in which he can possibly without subversion and in which his act may not be made a leading case and so bring on a prescription against p. 17. publike liberty Again he saith if the act in which the exorbitance or transgression of the Monarch is supposed to be be of lesser moment and not striking at the very being of that Government it ought to be borne by publick patience rather then to endanger the being of the p. 49. State The like words he uses in another place saying if the will of the Monarch exceed the limits of the law it ought to be submitted to so it be not contrary to Gods law nor bring with it such an evill to our selves or the publick that we cannot be accessary to â— by obeying These are but fig-leaves to cover the nakednesse of our Authors limited Monarch formed upon weak supposals in cases of lesser moment For if the Monarch be to govern only according to law no transgression of his can be of so small moment if he break the bounds of law but it is a subversion of the government it self and may be made a leading case and so bring on a prescription against publick liberty it strikes at the very being of the Government and brings with it such an evill as the party that suffers or the publick cannot be accessory to let the case be never so small yet if there be illegality in the act it strikes at the very being of limited Monarchy which is to be legall unlesse our Author will say as in effect he doth That his limited Monarch must governe according to law in great and publick matters onely and that in smaller matters which concerne private men or poor persons he may rule according to his own will p. 17. Secondly our Author tells us if the Monarchs act of exorbitancy or transgression be mortall and such as suffered dissolves the frame of Government and publick liberty then the illegality is to be set open and redresment sought by petition which if failing prevention by resistance ought to be and if it be apparent and appeale be made to the consciences of mankind then the fundamentall laws of that Monarchy must judge and pronounce the sentence in every mans conscience and every man so farre as concernes him must follow the evidence of Truth in his own soul to oppose or not to oppose according as he can in conscience acquit or condemne the act of the governour or Monarch Whereas my Author requires that the destructive nature of illegall commands should be set open Surely his mind is That each private man in his particular case should make a publique remonstrance to the world of the illegall act of the Monarch and then if upon his Petition he cannot be relieved according to his desire he ought or it is his duty to make resistance Here I would know who can be the judge whether the illegality be made apparent it is a maine point since every man is prone to flatter himselfe in his owne cause and to think it good and that the wrong or injustice he suffers is apparent when other moderate and indifferent men can discover no such thing and in this case the judgement of the common people cannot be gathered or known by any possible meanes or if it could it were like to be various and erronious Yet our Author will have an appeale made to the conscience of all Man-kind and that being made he concludes the fundamentall Lawes must judge and pronounce sentence in every mans conscience Whereas he saith The Fundamentall Lawes must judge I would p. 18. very gladly learne of him or of any other for him what a Fundamentall Law is or else have but any one Law named me that any man can say is a Fundamentall Law of the Monarchy I confesse he tells us that the Common Lawes are the foundation and the Statute Laws are superstructive yet I think he dares not say that there p. 38. is any one branch or part of the Common Law but that it may be taken away by an Act of Parliament for many points of the Common Law de facto have and de jure any point may be taken away How can that be called Fundamentall which hath and may be removed and yet the Statute Lawes stand firme and stable it is contrary to the nature of Fundamental for the building to stand when the foundation is taken away Besides the Common Law is generally acknowledged to be nothing else but common usage or custome which by length of time onely obtaines authority So that it followes in time after government but cannot goe before it and be the rule to Government by any originall or radicall constitution Also the Common Law being unwritten doubtful and difficult cannot but be an uncertaine rule to governe by which is against the nature of a rule which is and ought to be certaine Lastly by making the Common Law onely to be the foundation Magna Charta is excluded from being a Fundamentall Law and also all other Statutes from being limitations to Monarchy since the Fundamentall Lawes onely are to be judge Truly the conscience of all Man-kind is a pretty large Tribunall for the Fundamentall Lawes to pronounce sentence in It is very much that Lawes which in their owne nature are dumb and alwayes need a Judge to pronounce sentence should now be able to speak pronounce sentence themselves such a sentence surely must be upon the hearing of one party onely for it is impossible for a Monarch to make his defence and answer and produce his witnesses in every mans conscience
in each mans cause who will but question the legality of the Monarchs Government Certainly the sentence cannot but be unjust where but one mans tale is heard For all this the conclusion is Every man must oppose or not oppose the Monarch according to his owne conscience Thus at the last every man is brought by this Doctrine of our Authors to be his owne judge And I also appeal to the consciences of all mankinde whether the end of this be not utter confusion and Anarchy Yet after all this the Author saith this power of every mans judging p. 18. the illegall acts of the Monarch argues not a superiority of those who judge over him who is judged and he gives us a profound reason for it his words are it is not authorative and civill but morall residing in reasonable creatures and lawfull for them to execute What our Author meanes by these words not authorative and civill but morall perhaps I understand not though I think I doe yet it serves my turne that he saith that resistance ought to be made and every man must oppose or not oppose according as in conscience he can acquit or condemn the acts of his governour for if it inable a man to resist and oppose his Governour without question t is authorative and civill whereas he addes that morall judgement is residing in reasonable creatures and lawfull for them to execute he seemes to imply that authorative and civill judgement doth not reside in reasonable creatures nor can be lawfully executed Such a conclusion fits well with Anarchy for he that takes away all Government and leaves every man to his owne conscience and so makes him an Independent in State may well teach that authority resides not in reasonable creatures nor can be lawfully executed I passe from his absolute and limited Monarchy to his division or partition for he allowes no division of Monarchy into simple and mixed viz. of a Monarch the Nobility and Community Where first observe a doubt of our Authors whether a firme p. 25. union can be in a mixture of equality he rather thinks there must be a priority of order in one of the three or else there can be no unity He must know that priority of order doth not hinder but that there may be an equality of mixture if the shares be equall for he that hath the first share may have no more then the others so that if he will have an inequality of mixture a primity of share will not serve the turne the first share must be greater or better then the others or else they will be equall and then he cannot call it a mixed Monarchy where only a primity of share in the Supream power is in one but by his own confession he may better call it a mixed Aristocracy or mixed Democracy then a mixed Monarchy since he tells us the Houses of Parliament sure have two parts p. 56. of the greatest legislative authority and if the King have but a third part sure their shares are equall The first step our Author makes is this The soveraigne power must be originally in all three next he finds that if there be an equality of shares in three Estates there can be no ground to denominate a Monarch and then his mixed Monarch might be thought but an empty title Therefore in the third place he resolves us that to salve all A power must be sought out wherewith the Monarch p. 25. must be invested which is not so great as to destroy the mixture nor so titular as to destroy the Monarchy and therefore he conceives it may be in these particulars First a Monarch in a mixed Monarchy may be said to be a Monarch as he conceives if he be the head fountain of the power which governs p. 26. executes the established Laws that is a man may be a Monarch though he doe but give power to others to govern and execute the established Laws thus he brings his Monarch one step or peg lower still then he was before at first he made us believe his Monarch should have the Supream power which is the legislative then he falls from that and tells us A limited Monarch must govern according to law onely thus he is brought from the legislative to the gubernative or executive power only nor doth he stay here but is taken a hole lower for now he must not govern but he must constitute Officers to govern by laws if chusing Officers to govern be governing then our Author will allow his Monarch to be a Governour not else and therefore he that divided Supream power into legislative and gubernative doth now divide it into legislative and power of constituting Officers for governing by Laws and this he saith is left to the Monarch Indeed you have left him a faire portion of power but are we sure he may enjoy this it seems our Author is not confident in this neither and some others doe deny it him our Author speaking of the government of this Kingdome saith The choice of the Officers p. 38. is intrusted to the judgement of the Monarch for ought I know he is not resolute in the point but for ought he knows and for ought I know his Monarch is but titular an empty title certaine of no power at all The power of chusing Officers only is the basest of all powers Aristotle as I remember saith The common people are fit for nothing but to chuse Officers and to take accompts and indeed in all popular governments the multitude perform this work and this work in a King puts him below all his Subjects and makes him the onely Subject in a Kingdome or the onely man that cannot Govern there is not the poorest man of the multitude but is capable of some Office or other and by that means may sometime or other perhaps govern according to the laws onely the King can be no Officer but to chuse Officers his Subjects may all Governe but he may not Next I cannot see how in true sense our Author can say his Monarch is the head and fountain of power since his doctrine is that in a limited Monarchy the publick society by originall constitution confer on one man power is not then the publick society the head and fountain of power and not the King Again when he tels us of his Monarch that both the other States as well conjunctim as divisim be his sworn subjects and owe obedience to his commands he doth but flout his poor Monarch for why are they called his Subjects and his Commons he without any complement is their Subject for they as Officers may governe and command according to Law but he may not for he must judge by his judges in Courts of Justice onely that is he may not judge or governe at all 2. As for the second particular the sole or chiefe power in capacitating persons for the Surpeame power And 3. As to this third
King he gives the like note upon him that he did upon the Aesymnet that he was in old time 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the heroick times The thing that made these heroicall Kingdomes differ from other sorts of Kingdomes was only the meanes by which the first Kings obtained their Kingdomes and not the manner of Government for in that they were as absolute as other Kings were without either limitation by law or mixture of companions Lastly as for Arist Barbaricke sort of Kings since he reckoned all the world Barbarians except the Graecians his Barbaricke King must extend to all other sorts of Kings in the world besides those of Greece and so may go under Aristotles fift sort of Kings which in generall comprehends all other sorts and is no speciall forme of Monarchy Thus upon a true accompt it is evident that the five severall sorts of Kings mentioned by Aristotle are at the most but different and accidentall meanes of the first obtaining or holding of Monarchies and not reall or essentiall differences of the manner of Government which was alwayes absolute without either limitation or mixture I may be thought perhaps to mistake or wrong Aristotle in questioning his diversities of Kings but it seemes Aristotle himselfe was partly of the same minde for in the very next Chapter when he had better considered of the point he confessed that to speake the truth there were almost but two sorts of Monarchies worth the considering that is his first or Laconique sort and his fift or last sort where one alone hath Supreame power over all the rest thus he hath brought his five sorts to two Now for the first of these two his Lacedemonian King he hath confessed before that he was no more then a Generalissimo of an Army and so upon the mater no King at all and then there remaines onely his last sort of Kings where one alone hath the Supreame power And this in substance is the finall resolution of Aristotle himself for in his sixteenth Chapter where he delivers his last thoughts touching the kindes of Monarchy he first dischargeth his Laconick King from being any sort of Monarchy and then gives us two exact rules about Monarchy and both these are point blanke against limited and mixed Monarchy therefore I shall propose them to be considered of as concluding all Monarchy to be absolute and arbitrary 1. The one rule is that he that is said to be a King according to Law Arist pol. l. 3. c. 16. is no sort of government or Kingdome at all 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2. The second rule is that a true King is he that ruleth all according to his owne will 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This latter frees a Monarch from the mixture of partners or sharers in government as the former rule doth from limitation by lawes Thus in briefe I have traced Aristotle in his crabbed and broken passages touching diversities of Kings where first he findes but four sorts and then he stumbles upon a fift and in the next Chapter contents himselfe onely with two sorts of Kings but in the Chapter following concludes with one which is the true perfect Monarch who rules all by his own will In all this we find nothing for a regulated or mixed Monarchy but against it Moreover whereas the Author of the treatise of Monarchy affirmes it as a prime principle that all Monarchies except that of the Jewes depend upon humane designment when the consent of a society of men and a fundamentall contract of a Nation by originall or radicall constitution confers power He must know that Arist searching into the originall of government shewes himselfe in this point a better Divine then our Author and as if he had studied the book of Genesis teacheth that Monarchies fetch their petigree from the right of fathers and not from the gift or contract of people his words may thus be englished At the first Cities were Governed by Kings and so even to this day are Nations also for such as were under Kingly Government did come together for every house is governed by a King who is the eldest and so also Colonies are governed for kindred sake And immediately before he tels us that the first society made of many houses is a village which naturally seemes to be a Colonie of a house which some call fosterbrethren or Children and Childrens Children So in conclusion we have gained Aristotles judgement in three maine and essentiall points 1. A King according to Law makes no kind of Government 2. A King must rule according to his own will 3. The originall of Kings is from the right of Fatherhood What Aristotles judgement was two thousand years since is agreeable to the doctrine of the great modern politician Bodin Heare him touching limited Monarchy Vnto Majesty or Soveraignty saith he belongeth an absolute power not subject to any Law chief power given unto a Prince with condition is not properly Soveraignty or power absolute Except such conditions annexed to the Soveraignty be directly comprehended within the laws of God and nature Albeit by the sufferance of the King of England controversies between the King and his people are sometimes determined by the high Court of Parliament and sometimes by the Lord Chief Justice of England yet all the estates remaine in full subjection to the King who is no wayes bound to follow their advise neither to consent to their requests It is certaine that the lawes priviledges and grants of Princes have no force but during their life if they be not ratified by the expresse consent or by sufferance of the Prince following especially Priviledges Much lesse should a Prince be bound unto the Laws he maketh himself for a man may well receive a Law from an other man but impossible it is in nature for to give a Law unto himself no more then it is to command a mans self in a matter depending of his owne will The Law saith Nulla obligatio consistere potest quae à voluntate promittentis statum capit The Soveraigne Prince may derogate unto the laws that he hath promised and sworn to keep if the equity thereof be ceased and that of himself without the consent of his subjects the Majesty of a true Soveraigne Prince is to be known when the estates of all the people assembled in all humility present their requests and supplications to their Prince without having power in any thing to command determine or give voice but that that which it pleaseth the King to like or dislike to command or bid is holden for Law wherein they which have written of the duty of Magistrates have deceived themselves in maintaining that the power of the people is greater then the Prince a thing which causeth oft true subjects to revolt from their obedience to their Prince and ministreth matter of great troubles in Common-wealths of which their opinion there is neither reason nor ground for if the King be subject unto the assemblies
in the whole body or p. 17. a part of it you destroy the being of Monarchy Now let us see if his mixed Monarchy be framed according to these his own principles First he saith in a mixed Monarchy p. 25. the soveraign power must be originally in all three Estates And again his words are the three Estates are all sharers in the Supream power the primity of share in the supream power is in One. Here we find that he that told us the supream power must be in one will now allow his mixed Monarch but one share only of the supream power and gives other shares to the Estates thus he destroies the being of Monarchy by putting the Supream power or culmen potestatis or a part of it in the whole body or a part thereof and yet formerly he confesseth that the power of Magistracy cannot p. 5. well be divided for it is one simple thing or indivisable beam of divine perfection but he can make this indivisable beam to be divisable into three shares I have done with the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 solus alone I have dwelt the longer upon this definition of Monarchy because the apprehending of it out of the Authors own grounds quite overthrows both his Monarch Limited by law and his Monarch Mixed with the States For to Govern is to give a Law to others and not to have a Lave given to Govern and limit him that Governs And to govern alone is not to have sharers or companions mixed with the Governor Thus the two words of which Monarchy is compounded contradict the two sorts of Monarchy which he pleads for and by consequence his whole Treatise for these two sorts of limited and mixed Monarchy take up in a manner his whole Book I will now touch some few particular passages in the Treatise Our Author first confesseth it is Gods expresse ordinance there p. 2. should be Government and he proves it by Gen. 3. 16. where God ordained Adam to rule over his Wife and her desires were to be subject to his and as hers so all theirs that should come of her Here we have the originall grant of Government the fountain of all power placed in the father of all mankind accordingly we find the law for obedience to government given in the tearms of honor thy Father not only the constitution of power in generall but the limitation of it to one kind that is to Monarchy or the government of one alone and the determination of it to the individual person line of Adam are all three ordinances of God Neither Eve nor her Children could either limit Adams power or join others with him in the government and what was given unto Adam was given in his person to his posterity This paternal power continued monarchicall to the Floud and after the Floud to the confusion of Babel when Kingdomes were first erected planted or scattered over the face of the world we find Gen. 10. 11. It was done by Colonies of whole families over which the prime Fathers had supream power and were Kings who were all the sons or grand-children of Noah from whom they derived a fatherly and regall power over their families Now if this supream power was setled and founded by God himself in the fatherhood how is it possible for the people to have any right or title to alter and dispose of it otherwise what commission can they shew that gives them power either of limitation or mixture It was Gods ordinance that supremacy should be unlimited in Adam and as large as all the acts of his will and as in him so in all others that have supream power as appears by the judgement and speech of the people to Joshuah when he was supream Governour these are their words to him All that thou commandest us wee will do whosoever he be that doth rebel against thy commandement and will not hearken unto thy words in all that thou commandest him he shal be put to death we may not say that these were evill Counsellours or flattering Courtiers of Joshuah or that he himself was a Tyrant for having such arbitrary power Our Author and all those who affirm that power is conveyed to persons by publick consent are forced to confesse that it is the fatherly power that first inables a people to make such conveyance so that admitting as they hold that our Ancestors did at first convey power yet the reason why we now living doe submit to such power is for that our Fore-fathers every one for himself his family and posterity had a power of resigning up themselves and us to a supream power As the Scripture teacheth us that supream power was originally in the fatherhood without any limitation so likewise reason doth evince it that if God ordained that Supremacy should be that then supremacy must of necessity be unlimited for the power that limits must be above that power which is limited if it be limited it cannot be supream so that if our Author will grant supream power to be the ordinance of God the supream power will prove it self to be unlimited by the same ordinance because a supream limited power is a contradiction The monarchicall power of Adam the Father of all flesh being by a general binding ordinance setled by God in him his posterity by right of fatherhood the form of Monarchy must be preferr'd above other forms except the like ordinance for other forms can be shewed neither may men according to their relations to the form they live under to their affections and judgments in divers respects prefer or compare any other form with Monarchy The point that most perplexeth our Author and many others is that if Monarchy be allowed to be the ordinance of God an absurdity would follow that we should uncharitably condemn all the cōmunities which have not that form for violation of Gods ordinance and pronounce those other powers unlawfull if those who live under a Monarchy can justifie the form they live under to be Gods ordinance they are not bound to forbear their own justification because others cannot do the like for the form they live under let others look to the defence of their own government if it cannot be proved or shewed that any other form of government had ever any lawfull beginning but was brought in or erected by rebellion must therefore the lawfull and just obedience to Monarchy be denied to be the ordinance of God To proceed with our Author in the 3 page he saith the Higher Power is Gods ordinance That it resideth in One or more in such or such a way is from humane designment God by no word binds any people to this or that form till they by their own act bind themselves Because the power and consent of the people in government is the burden of the whole Book and our Author expects it should be admitted as a magisteriall postulation without any other proof then a naked supposition
whose Will is the law doth set himself no law to rule by but by commands of his own judgement as he thinks fit 2. When he sets a law by which he will ordinarily governe reserving to himself a liberty to vary from it as oft as in his discretion he thinks FIT and in this the Soveraign is as free as the former 3. Where he not only sets a rule but promiseth in many cases not to alter it but this promise or engagement is an after condiscent or act of grace not dissolving the absolute Oath of subjection which went before it For the first of these three there is no question but it is a pure absolute Monarchy but as for the other two though he say they be absolute yet in regard they set themselves limits or laws to govern by if it please our Author to term them limited Monarchs I wil not oppose him yet I must tell him that his third degree of absolute Monarchy is such a kind as I believe never hath been nor ever can be in the world For a Monarch to promise and engage in many cases not to alter a law it is most necessary that those many cases should be particularly expressed at the bargain making Now he that understands the nature and condition of all humane laws knows that particular cases are infinite and not comprehensible within any rules or laws and if many cases should be comprehended and many omitted yet even those that were comprehended would admit of variety of interpretations and disputations therefore our Author doth not nor can tell us of any such reserved cases promised by any Monarch Again where he saith An after condiscent or Act of grace doth not dissolve the absolute Oath of subjection which went before it though in this he speak true yet still he seems to insinuate that an Oath only binds to subjection which Oath as he would have us believe was at first arbitrary whereas Subjects are bound to obey Monarchs though they never take oath of subjection as wel as children are bound to obey their parents though they never swear to do it Next his distinction between the rule of power and the exercise p. 7. of it is vain for to rule is to exercise power for himself saith p. 1. that Government is potestatis exercitium the exercise of a morall power Lastly whereas our Author saith a Monarch cannot break his promise without sin let me adde that if the safety of the people salus populi require a breach of the Monarchs promise then the sin if there be any is rather in the making then breaking of the promise the safety of the people is an exception implied in every Monarchicall promise But it seems these three degrees of Monarchy do not satisfie our Author he is not content to have a Monarch have a law or rule to govern by but he must have this limitation or law to be ab p. 12. externo from somebody else and not from the determination of the Monarchs own will and therefore he saith by originall constitution the society publick confers on one man a power by limited contract resigning themselves to be governed by such a law also before he told p. 13. us the sole means of Soveraignty is the consent and fundamentall contract which consent puts them in their power which can be no more nor other then is conveyed to them by such contract of subjection If the sole means of a limited Monarchy be the consent and fundamentall contract of a Nation how is it that he saith A Monarch may be limited by after condiscent is an after condiscent all one with a fundamentall contract with originall and radicall constitution why ye he tells us it is a secundary originall constitution a secundary originall that is a second first And if that condiscent be an act of grace doth not this condiscent to a limitation come from the free determination of the Monarchs will If he either formally or virtually as our Author supposeth desert his absolute or arbitrary power which he hath by conquest or other right And if it be from the free will of the Monarch why doth he say the limitation must be ab externo he told us before that subjection cannot be dissolved or lessen'd by an Act of grace comming p. 8. afterwards but he hath better bethought himself and now he will have acts of grace to be of two kinds and the latter kind may amount as he saith to a resignation of absolute Monarchy But can any man believe that a Monarch who by conquest or other right hath an absolute arbitrary power will voluntarily resigne that absolutenesse and accept so much power only as the people shall please to give him and such laws to govern by as they shall make choice of can he shew that ever any Monarch was so gratious or kind-hearted as to lay down his lawfull power freely at his Subjects feet is it not sufficient grace if such an absolute Monarch be content to set down a law to himself by which he will ordinarily govern but he must needs relinquish his old independent commission take a new one from his Subjects clog'd with limitations Finally I observe that howsoever our Author speak big of the radicall fundamentall and originall power of the people as the root of all Soveraignty yet in a better moode he will take up and be contented with a Monarchy limited by an after condiscent and act of grace from the Monarch himself Thus I have briefly touched his grounds of Limited Monarchy if now we shall aske what proof or examples he hath to justifie his doctrine he is as mute as a fish only Pythagoras hath said it and we must believe him for though our Author would have Monarchy to be limited yet he could be content his opinion should be absolute and not limited to any rule or example The maine Charge I have against our Author now remaines to be discussed and it is this That instead of a Treatise of Monarchy he hath brought forth a Treatise of Anarchy and that by his owne confessions shall be made good First he holds A limited Monarch transcends his bounds if he commands beyond the law and the Subject legally is not bound to subjection in such cases Now if you aske the Author who shall be judge whether the Monarch â—â—nscends his bounds and of the excesses of the soveraigne power His answer is There is an impossibility of constituting p. 16. p. 17. a judge to determine this last controversie I conceive in a limited legall Monarchy there can be no stated internall Judge of the Monarchs actions if there grow a fundamentall variance betwixt him and the community there can be no Judge legall and constituted within that form of government In these answers it appears there is no Judge to determine the Soveraignes or the Monarchs transgressing his fundamentall limits yet our Author is very cautelous and supposeth onely
the state of innocency they might not need the direction of Adam in those things which were necessarily and morally to be done yet things indifferent that depended meerly on their free will might be directed by the power of Adams command If we consider the first plantations of the world which were after the building of Babel when the confusion of tongues was we may find the division of the earth into distinct Kingdomes and Countries by severall families whereof the Sons or Grand-children of Noah were the Kings or Governours by a fatherly right and for the preservation of this power and right in the Fathers God was pleased upon severall Families to bestow a Language on each by it self the better to unite it into a Nation or Kingdome as appears by the words of the Text Gen. 10. These are the Families of the Sons of Noah after their generations in their Nations and by these were the Nations divided in the earth after the floud Every one after HIS TONGUE AFTER THEIR FAMILIES in their Nations The Kings of England have been gratiously pleased to admit and accept the Commons in Parliament as the representees of the Kingdom yet really and truly they are not the representative body of the whole Kingdom The Commons in Parliament are not the representative body of the whole Kingdome they do not represent the King who is the head and principall member of the Kingdome nor do they represent the Lords who are the nobler and higher part of the body of the Realme and are personally present in Parliament and therefore need no representation The Commons onely represent a part of the lower or inferior part of the body of the People which are the Free-holders worth 40s by the year and the Commons or Free-men of Cities and Burroughs or the major part of them All which are not one quarter nay not a tenth part of the Commons of the Kingdome for in every Parish for one Free-holder there may be found ten that are no Free-holders and anciently before Rents were improved there were nothing neer so many Free-holders of 40 s. by the year as now are to be found The scope and Conclusion of this discourse and Argument is that the people taken in what notion or sense soever either diffusively collectively or representatively have not nor cannot exercise any right or power of their own by nature either in chusing or in regulating Kings But whatsoever power any people doth lawfully exercise it must receive it from a supreame power on earth and practice it with such limitations as that superior power shall appoint To returne to our Author He divides Monarchy into Absolute Limited Absolute Monarchy saith he is when the Soveraignty is so p. 6. fully in one that it hath no limits or bounds under God but his owne will This definition of his I embrace And as before I charged our Author for not giving us a definition of Monarchy in general so I now note him for not affording us any definition of any other particular kind of Monarchy but onely of absolute it may peradventure make some doubt that there is no other sort but only that which he calls absolute Concerning absolute Monarchy he grants that such were the antient Eastern Monarchies and that of the Turk and Persian at this day herein he saith very true And we must remember him though he doe not mention them that the Monarchs of Judah and Israel must be comprehended under the number of those he calls the Eastern Monarchies and truly if he had said that all the antient Monarchies of the world had been absolute I should not have quarreld at him nor doe I know who could have disproved him Next it follows that Absolute Monarchy is when a people are absolutely resigned up or resigne up themselves to be governed by the will of One man where men put themselves into this utmost degree of subjection by oath and contract or are borne and brought unto it by Gods providence In both these places he acknowledgeth there may be other means of obtaining a Monarchy besides the contract of a Nation or peoples resigning up themselves to be governed which is contrary to what he after saies that the sole p. 12. mean or root of all Soveraignty is the consent and fundamentall contract of a Nation of men Moreover the Author determins that Absolute Monarchy is a lawfull government and that men may be borne and brought unto it by Gods providence it binds them and they must abide it because an oath to a lawfull thing is obligatory This position of his I approve but his reason doth not satisfie for men are bound to obey a lawfull Governour though neither they nor their Ancestors ever took oath Then he proceeds and confesseth that in Rom. 13. the power p. 7. which then was was Absolute yet the Apostle not excluding it calls it Gods ordinance and commands subjection to it so Christs commands Tribute to be paid and paies it himselfe yet it was an arbitrary â—ax the production of an absolute power These are the loyall expressions of our Author touching absolute or arbitrary Monarchy I doe the rather mention these passages of our Author because very many in these daies doe not stick to maintain that an arbitrary or Absolute Monarch not limited by law is all one with a Tyrant and to be governed by one mans will is to be made a slave It is a question whether our Author be not of that mind when he saith absolute subjection is servitude and thereupon a late friend to limited Monarchy affirmes in a discourse upon the question p. 54. in debate between the King and Parliament That to make a King by the standard of Gods word is to make the Subjects slaves for conscience sake A hard saying and I doubt whether he that gives this censure can be excused from blasphemy It is a bold speech to condemn all the Kings of Judah for Tyrants or to say all their Subjects were slaves But certainly the man doth not know neither what a Tyrant is or what a Slave is indeed the words are frequent enough in every mans mouth our old English Translation of the Bible useth sometimes the word Tyrant but the Authors of our new Translation have been so carefull as not once to use the word but onely for the proper name of a man Act. 19. 9. because they find no Hebrew word in the Scripture to signifie a Tyrant or a slave Neither Arist Bodin nor Sir Walter Rawleigh who were all men of deep judgement can agree in a definition or description of tyranny though they have all three laboured in the point And I make some question whether any man can possibly describe what a Tyrant is and then tell me any one man that ever was in the world that was a Tyrant according to that description I return again to our Treatise of Monarchy where I find three DEGREES of absolute Monarchy 1. Where the Monarch