living in the defiance of it The instance I have says he is of the defiance of a law in which some men live This word defiance therefore he hath up three or foure times besides the cotation in the margent and bidding us mark the word But I pray why must the Waggoner that every day transgresses the law concerning his Waggon or any other the like instance be accounted with this man only to live in the transgression of that law and the Non-conformist in his non observance of the Oxford act be adjudged to live in the defiance of it Alas who does not see here into what a pitiful shifting case he is driven or who does not perceive what is worse that is the animosity pevishness or overbeâ—tness to speak with candour of the manâ— mind against the Non-conformist which does hinder him the coming off here with that ingenuity as he should do which is by confession of several of his imprudent speeches and craving pardon for the intemperance he hath used But in the last place there are still degrees of sin and the man that breaks other laws may not be so deeply guilty as he that lives in the breach of the act at Oxford Let us see then what he can alledge for this The more needful a Magistrate judges a thing to be done or avoided or the more his will is set upon it the greater or less is the sin of him who breaks such a Law Now he argues from the Preface and the Penalty of the Oxford act how much the will of the law-giver is set upon the observation of that act unto which I answer besides that Dr. Taylor doth toll us that the greatness of the penalty doth sometimes show the smalness of a thing that is forbidden as thaâ— which else would not be regarded and not the haniousness of the transgression it does appear that the will of the law givers in that act was set upon the Non-conformist taking the oath there prepared as that they would have enforced them to by so great and present a danger and was the thing which seemed to them so apt to prevent the evil supposed in the preface when as for their living within five miles of a corporation otherwise we cannot think the minds of the Majority to be at all engaged in it Now this Debater should have endeavoured to give the Non-conformist satisfaction in referrence to his taking the Oath if he would have served the State according as the will of the law-givert were then set but this was a task which he hath declined although he was put upon it and directed to their objections in the defence of the proposition There is somthing after this which may be said that though this distinction or degrees of sins will stand him in no advantage for the opposing my determination or justifying his censure of the Non-conformist to be no good Christian yet may it be of use to him to alleviate the harshness of his judgement in the main that human laws do oblige the Conscience so as without discrimination he that observes them not does sin Hence when he proposes the case of a law-giver enjoyning a thing to some particular good for the publick and it appears that he is mistaken this Debater does continue still such an obedient Soul has he above others that though he be not bound to be of the lawgivers judgement yet does he take himself bound he means bound in Conscience to follow his will even while it were better for the publick it were other wife or dained There are casts we know sometimes wherein by the change of things and occasions as in Seiges that which was for the publick good does suddenly turn to its hurt In such instances we are not to obey a law sayes Aquinas which Dr. Taylor hath noted and there is no doubt to me in the Case where the lawgiver is mistaken in a matter the like reason ought to prevaile But if he be thus resolved let us know how the degrees of sin will help him out at a need Let me suppose a poor man who is render in his Conscience and fears God coming to this reverend Person and telling him this case His Grand-father got aâ—â—â—â—ttle mony and built him a small Cottage on such a waste ground his Father lived in it and bestowed more cost of it and hath left it him where he and his wife and children have lived comfortably uppon his labour but now it hath so hapned that being the other day at his Masters where he wrought he heard one read a certain book called the Friendly Debate where he perceived about the very begining that the Author was of the mind that a man could not live in the breach of the Law of the Land and be a good Christian and he hath understood long by his Father that it is against the Law for any cottage to be erected withot four acres of ground belonging to it Upon this he being afraid of his condition in regard of his open living in a known wilful transgression of a statute of the Realm wherein he cannot think but that it is a very plain defiance of a-Law as that book speaks he is come to him to see what he can offer for the reâ—eiving his Conscience If this author here deal roundly and plainly with the man he must tell him that there is no remedy but he must pull down his house and he and his wife and children be turned to beging rather then by his living in a known sin without amendment he should be damned It he deal otherwise then he may tell him that though indeed every transgression of a human Law be sin yet there are degrees of sin and this sin of his is a lesse sin then that of the Non-Conformist living in the breach of the Oxford Act and therefore he should be of good comfort and go home in peace I pray now will this indeed serve a Conscientious man It is nothing to him that another's sin is greater then his he is to look to his own soul and if he lives in the least sin with full knowledge and consent and hardens his heart in it he cannot see how he should be saved So that unless you satisfie him and that upon good ground that every transgression of a Law is not sin and then shew him how his transgression is but such a one you are not able to stand him in any stead in his Case I remember a text of our Lord which I haue often thought upon that by a mans words he shall be justified and by his words he shall be condâ—mâ—ed The â—harises were men very holy in their profession and did tye very heavy burthens upon others but when they were to perform the same themselves they were it is like backward enough our saviour Christ therefore meets with them for these shews without reality and words without performance Verily I say unto you that for every Idle word a man shall
Gods In morals the case is not thus whatsoever is not according to Gods will is against it But in civil and indifferent things a thing may not be against his will that is against any moral precept as our obedience I speak of to some human Laws and yet have none of his Authority for it Thus prudence the preservation of my self and the Magistrates honour may prevail with me to do a thing which I think otherwise I have no obligation to do in my Conscience I will yet add I distinguish my obediénce and my obedience out of Conscience or my obedience out of other generall rersons and my obedience out of Conscience to this particular command I do not resolve my obedience into a judgement of private discretion whether a Law be for the common good or no for I can apprehend easily that when God hath required the Magistrate to make no Law but according to this rule no unjust or unprofitable Law he hath not yet commanded that I should never obey such a Law I may obey out of a generall implicit apprehension of duty or a singular love to my superiors person for fear of his displeasure to avoid the danger of the Law or out of severall prudentiall considerations regarding the Magistrate my self or others when yet If I come to the point whether I am bound in Conscience to do the particular thing commanded that is whether there lyes a divine obligation on me as well as that from the Law to do it I am on necessity then to examine it by the rule which God hath set me and that being no other but the common good in politicalls I must resolve my obedience out of Conscience into this judgement when I resolve my prudentiall obedience otherwise It may suffice me therein so long as the thing is not sinfull that I am obliged by man It may be but very rare if I question my Rulers commandment which is like to be only perhaps in some grievous pressure If the Law be bad my obedience yet and my example may do good nor does the Magistrates abuse of his office I hope take away my liberty to endure it if I please The true ends moreover hapily of obedience may be obtained when the end of Ruling is neglected Nay the common good may be promoted possibly by my yeilding to a Law when the Law it self does cross it And farther my disobedience may do more hurt to the common good then the obeying that hurtfull command would do So farre am I from discouraging any from obedience to human Laws as a thing generally good and prudentiall when I would keep the Conscience free and not have it burdened with sin for every want of their performance I see indeed by this and other learned persons what an immagination they have got that if I resolve the question whether I am in Conscience obliged to obey such a Law by my private judging of the thing commanded whether it be agreeable or not to the common good I do usurpe the place of the Ruler and make myself only my own Law-giver as they are apt to speak But this is a mistake for besides that when I judge of the thing commanded by its Rule this judgement of mine is not the maker of my duty but the discerner of it and so I do not become any Law-giver to my self in the business I distinguish the obligation of a human Law and the obligation of Conscience formaliter simpliciter by that Law If I resolved the whole obligation of human Laws into this Ruâ—e and my judgement of the Law by it so that I held it must never be obeyed on other reasons or that if I were punished for not obeying I was not bound to submit then did I offer injury indeed to my Ruâ—er and usurped his Government But if I resolve only the obligation of my Conscience by that Law into this rule and my judgement of it accordingly I usurpe no power of the Magistrates which I leave him still over the exterior man but I keep God only as I ought in his own feat of the Conscience And verily if the Conscience of man be concerned in every human law I would fain know how any of our great Clerks can say that human laws bind not in the case of intollerable griveance If God does command me to do the thing it is not any griveance of minde can excuse me but if it be man indeed commands it only and not God the griveance will be reason enough for me to call it in question and to avoid it if I may but the reason of my non-obedience must not have this foundation that it is my grievance or that I cannot endure it but that consideratis considerandis I am not obliged to it in Conscience CAP. VII THus far his exceptions are but words let us pass now to his reasons against my answer His first reason is It is no easy thing to judge what is best for the Peoples good Kings themselves find it necessary to have their Councets to advise about it To judge what is best for the Peoples good is indeed a high matter To judge only whether a thing be for the common good or not is another matter The judgement of every one is free and any body may judge of any thing as he is able and as he will The Cock may pass his judgement on the Pearl he scraped up That which comes to carry any stress upon judging is the consideration of the effect that depends upon that judgement The judging of a thing which a Man himself hath to do hath this effect depending on it the doing his duty every one is to judge of all those things and circumstances which belong to his own acts whether or no they be agreeable to Gods will that he may do as he ought and the rule of this will in politicals I have declared There is the act now of the Magistrate and the act of the Subject There is a great difference of the concern or moment that lies on a judgement of the same thing when the act of the one depends upon it and when there depends upon it the act only of the other The act of the Magistrate is to make the law and see it executed the act of the People is to obey it By this first reason of his against my answer do I see good reason for it and the sufficiency of it The Magistrate judges whether a thing be for the common good or according to our supream rule in reference to his passing it into a law and then to cause it to be executed The People and every particular person does judge whether the thing commanded be for the common good in reference only to the obligation of their Consciences to obedience Upon the judgement of the Magistrate there does depend an effect of universal concernment that is the obligation of a whole Nation to live according to the Law he makes upon the
judgdement of each particular when the law is made there depends no concern but a mans own and that respecting his inward man only Now its certain that the Magistrate in regard of such an effect as depends upon his judgement hath need indeed of the greatest wisdome and the ablest Councel and he cannot be too cautions in his proceeding seeing if he be mistaken and the Consciences of the Subjects be not obliged by such a law yet are their persons liable to be compelled and they must not resist which may prove a vast inconvenience and to be avoided only by a right information at first about the matter But as for a private person who judges not what is best for the peoples good as he speaks right in regard to the Magistrate but onely judges of the thing commanded whether it be agreeable or not to the will of God or the rule of his which he hath given to the world about Politicals if they forget not to minde it to wit that it be in â—eneral for their good the effect which I have said does attend such a judgement is of that nature onely as requires no greater understanding or discretion then every man hath for himself to act by in all the rest of his life and conversation He judges here according to his Rule in these things as he doth in other of his actions according to the word whether he be bound or not bound in Conscience to them And God requires of him to judge and act but according to his talent in all business whatsoever He will acknowledge the outward man to be bound and in a matter of his soul which concerns no body but him or the inward obligation of his Conscience you must leave him to God and his own Judgement His next reason is That when Men know what is conducing to their good they are not apt to do it without a Law And what does this prove or contradict It proves it good therefore that the people have a Law-giver or Governor and that he should be wiser and better then they as Plato may urge it But does it follow they may not therefore judge whether the thing commanded be for their good Surely this will be a good reason why the people should judge of it For if the good they conceive in it is the reason they admit to have any Law and the argument to press them to obey it then must they judge of that good and whether it be conducive to that good or not In the mean while the difference of the reason and ends which is distinguished in the Magistrates judging of a thing to be for the common good or not and the peoples does sufficiently declare the weakness and vanity of such speeches as this Man hath several of He that makes every Man judge of what is for the peoples good takes away the principal power of the Magistrate And why so as if it were an act of power and that usurped for any but the Prince to have a judgement of discretion over his civil actions Again if the people be able to judge of that there is no need of any Law or Law-giver As if when men knew their duty they needed no Magistrate to make them do it and that while himself too is telling us the need of Laws because men aâ—e not like to prefer the publick good though they comprehend it before that of their own particular persons I cannot I perceive be throughly intent to answer what is insignificant but the substance in the main of these two reasons comes to this that every man is not able to bring the thing commanded by the Magistrate to the rule so as to judge whether it be for the common good or not and therefore they must act only upon the judgement of the Law-giver and consequently be no reasonable agents in their Political obedience For satisfaction therefore to this Let us conceive the Magistrate commanding something moral or Religious there are no Protestants but do hold that every man for himself must bring here what is commanded to the rule of the moral Law and Scripture and according as himself believes it consonant or not to the rule he judges it so is he bound to obey it or not to to obey it Now let any man who hath but the heart to think and speak with integrity consider whether a rude and illiterate man that never could read a word in the Bible be more able to judge whether a thing commanded by the Magistrate be agreeable or not to the word of God or whether it be conducive or not to the common good suppose the Waggoner as unlearned as any man I will ask whether such a man be not more able to judge of the Law concerning Waggons that is whether it be good for the high wayes and consequently whether he had best or not observe the act then to judge whether the Doctrine and Discipline of the Church of England or whether whatsoever is contained in the whole Book of Common Prayer with the Rites and Ceremonies be agreeable or not to the Scriptures of the old and New Testament I suppose there is no man will have the hardiâ—sse to oppose such a manifest conviction And if in regard to his practice this man and every other that uses the Common-prayer must judge as well as he can of the lawfulness of it or else he cannot act in faith and so likewise of all those doctrines or practises he yields unto them then will there I hope be no stumbling block left here upon this account I do advance therefore and rest upon this one argument if the incapacity unfitness or little ability that some men have to judge of what is required by the Magistrate whether it be agreeable or no to the common good be a reason sufficient for the denying to the subject such a judgement then must the lesser ability of such to judge whether that which is required be agreeable to the word of God be a reason sufficient to discharge them from judging of it by the word But the consequent is false and therefore the antecedent By the way observe if any man distinguish between judging of a Law whether it be for a common good and judging of the thing commanded by a law or rather of a mans own doing the thing commanded whether it be for the publick good or not I am to be understood of the last when I say the Magistrate judges of the thing in reference to his passing it into a law and we judge of it so passed in reference to our obedience or obligation by it His third reason is the same with the first The people are so far from being able to judge that the wisest Princes find it difficult only we have more words for the enlargement which consist partly in a grave kind of discourse from a passage of a Bishop Bramhall of the severall things and circumstances that the Law-giver is to weigh in
order to our civil happiness but our everlasting salvation VVhen God says Thou shalt have no other Gods but me a Roman or a Greek might not say no it is son the good of our Country that many Gods be worshipped and the common good must take place of other Laws For besides that it is false to think it for the good of any state to have more then one God The Law of the common good is to take place over the Common wealths Law or is the supream Law I say to all human Laws but not to Gods Laws which comes not under any subordination to such good but do concern the salvation of Mens souls Now it is the Law or command of God that Magistracy be set up that we be in subjection to the powers that are that is the present Magistrate that we have and that we resist not This is no less his Commandment then that we have no other Gods but him If there be any then will argue we are not obleiged in Conscience to obey a Law which is not for the common good upon the account of this maxime Therefore we are not obleiged in Conscience to subjection to the Magistrate if he rule not for the common good upon account of the same he is greatly mistaken Because this maxime as we are to know was Originally intended so is to be understood on necessity in reference to the Laws of men or the Common wealths Laws only and not in reference to the Commandments of God Again when a human Law passes for the good of the community the common good being the supream rule and measure of all every one judges and ought to judge upon the pinch of the question whether the thing commanded be for the common good that is whether it be agreeable to the supream Law and according as he judges and believes it to be or no so is he obliged in Conscience or not to it But when a Magistrate rules not as he ought and so we are free as to his inordinate commands there is no man may judge whether he himself or the Government it self be for the good or no. You will say why Because the powers that be are of God and his Ordinance and whether the Ordinance of God be for our good or no there is no mortal may question or is to iudge God hath himself declared this that he is the Minister of God for our good even Nero was and no man may once offer to determine contrary to Gods declared word or tell the Almighty he sayes not truth Consequently when a Law sometimes doth pass that is not for the common good and a man judging of it according to truth is not obliged in Conscience to obedience vet the Magistrate himself being for our good God having determined so and mans judgement being confined by his even by this maxime it self that the common good is the supream Law he must be still bound to subjection And what now is become of this mans reproach which he hath laid to my charge with so much falshood and little judgement as if Dr. Saunderson and he were for this maxime in the right sense and I was for it in the perverse meaning when it is plain that indeed neither he nor Dr. Saunderson how worthy soever in their pacts otherwise understood this maximâ— in the full import of it seeing else he would have determined the main case no otherwise then I do And this brings me to another passage of this Debater which I was willing to reserve â—ill now both for the agreement of it here â—nd for making a discovery of some of this â—uthours strong reasonings who counts mine â—o weak It is resolved by the Casuist that if the Magistrate command any thing for the Peoples hurt there lies no obligation upon the Conscience to obey and they are made judges of what â—s for their hurt If then he require them not â—o resist and they find this is for their hurt they are not bound in Conscience not to resist Is not this very goodly Does not the Gentleman shew us here indeed what a fathome it is that he has as he speaks somewhere why this can be no less sure then Bonaventures Son or Bradwardines brother What if the Magistrate should require us not to resist If it were the Magistrate only required this there were no doubt but we might resist if he hurt or wrong us as well as not obey his Laws if they be for our hurt But it is Gods Commandment that we resist not and if he shall do us wrong or hurt we must bear it upon that account It is but suffering according to his well and that is the reason why the Magistrate and Government it self safe when the Conscience is yet at liberty 〈◊〉 avoid if we can any unjust unreasonabâ—â— noxious or unprofitable Law for the peopâ—â— You will say are we not bound to obey hâ—â— Laws as well as not to resist his authorityâ— I answer there is this difference we haâ—â— no command from God that sayes you mâ—â— obey this or that particular Law of the Common-wealth or that you must indefiniteâ— obey them all seeing some may be unjust some wicked some vain But there is a Laâ— or command from God to be subject to the powers that are whatsoever they are and 〈◊〉 whatsoever they are that is rightful power for else the devil may come in and thâ— we must net resist I say moreover that to be ruled by the common good in civil affairs designed by his Minister I take to be a Law of God of the same Nature as to be subject to the Magistrate and to fear himself After this there is one passage more I will not pass because it looks lightly and is a concession against himself but does not satisfie if the word may nto offend without a farther remove upon it It is this It is supposed when a case of intollerable inconvenience happens that it being not the intention of a Prince to make his Subjects miserable he would not have made that Law if he could have foreseen such a mischeif and upon that account it ceases to be a Law and looses its obligation I remember well that some indeed speak thus and when any take a Latitude in applying it to an individual case it will come to this that supposing the Law-giver to consider the circumstances that this or that particular man is in it is presumed that he would consent to the breach of his Law by that person and upon this presumption there may be many perhaps that absolve themselves from several peices of obedience That which may be said for this is that if the Law-giver is to be supposed not to intend to make his subjects miserable by a Law he is to be supposed not to intend to make any one miserable for he cannot simply do the one any more then the other Eadem est ratio unius cujusque Universorum If such a Law makes
THE OBLIGATION Of Human LAWS Discussed By J. H. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We are to give to Princes and the Powers that are set over us by God such Honor and obedience as may not hurt us Polycarpus Too rigorous were it that the breach of every Law should be held a deadly sin a mean there is between these extremities if so be we could find it out Hooker London Printed in the Year 1671. Reader THese Papers were prepared against Easter Term last year but the Printers failed us Nevertheless the Subject being of perpetual occasion and so long as there is any Common-Wealth and Laws there is none can say I have need of thee I see no reason to hinder the coming out now to the same publick advantage The Author I Have perused this Discourse and do judge it will be of singular use unto all such as desire conscienti-ously to order their obedience unto Magistrates in civil things For although it is written in the way of a defence of what was formerly more breifly offered unto the same purpose yet the subject matter of it is so managed and the truth asserted in it so vindicated from the opposition of another that the understanding Reader will be satisfied in the proper Rule of civil things and in the reasonableness of every Man making a Judgement of their own actions in reference thereunto J. O. THE Obligation of human Laws discussed CAP. I. WE have before us a famous question which is not only of great moment constant use and concernment but of so much difficulty and doubtful dispute as that some learn'd men of great note in the Romish Church have judged it fit only for the Pope in Cathedra to determine it I am not furnisht so much as with my own books which are from me and much less with so many others as it would require to inform my self or my Readers in the several judgements of all or the cheif Doctors in the Schools with other Divines and Lawyers who have written of this point But this I take to be notorious that there are many of very great magnitude in the Church or Schools with multitudes of several sorts of Divines who have or do hold that humane Laws bind not the Conscience whereof God only is the Lord and which can be bound be nothing but his authority as will be confessed On the contrary there be others and perhaps of no less or of greater eminence and number who yet on both sides when they oppose one another may not defend themselves from extremity but that there is a mean according to the judgement of sober and indifferent men to be sought in these things if we can light of it I must confess I should very hardly expect any thing but confusion in my own thoughts if I trusted my self altogether to books among such variety By the little I sometimes read concerning this dispute I must need say it did but serve to leave me at a loss and how I have since retired my thoughts more into my own mind to look upon that writing which is congenial with us even those principles of truth which nature and so God hath implanted in mans own heart and having proposed from the result of all a determination so plain and in the middle path being careful that neither conscience should be left loose and dissolute nor tyed by Mans command or Laws any farther then God doth tye it It hath pleased the reverend Author of the friendly debate by an opposition in a Post-script to his Appendix to draw me out to my defence and a farther explication mainly of what I have in a lesser room before written I perceive there is an expression fell from me among others of respect concerning the Debater that hath moved him to so much indignation that I know not how I shall pacific him for a man shall not lightly see two or three sheets of paper written thus tetrically upon so small an occasion I receiv'd a case from you a very weighty one it is and as weightily and solidly resolved if the casuist may be his own Judge So he goes on I must confess I lookt on this person as a Man of a most modest humble pious ingenuous calm temper and I have the same opinion as to his worth and abilities as I had but I do not like the spirit of this appendix there is in the Apologist so much gentleness and care of offending as hath seemed too much On the contrary here is in these papers such a deal of animosity indignation and that indeed which in women we call vixenish humour but especially such an inveterate espousing of a party with that disdain and contempt of every man and thing that appears against himself or cause that there is no do with him Nevertheless I must needs say for my own part I am not yet converted to his opinion but that I must think still that a Nonconformist who hath not taken the Oxford Oath may live within five miles of a corporation and yet be a good Christian or Minister of Christ And what is the ground for such an imprudent expression as this was and that he should continue the justification of it The ground of all doth lye on this single point as himself has it whether humane Laws bind the conscience In the resolving which point he is come here to an acknowledgement that there is difficulty He that finds none sayes he may well suspect that he does not fully understand it And why is he so angry then when he laid down his matter so inconsiderately in his first book without any distinction or provision for any that I should say only he was not so reflective as he ought upon all the things at least as he was to look to in so great an undertaking Alas that there should be so much vanity and elation of mind in impotent man that if you commend him never so much for what is worthy in him you must give him more then he deserves or he will accompt what is due but a disparagement to him If you will praise a Man for his valour and say he is as valiant as Hector or Judas Maccabeus it will not serve unless you say also he exceeds Hercules and make him wiser too withall then Solomon and all Kings I could be contented to have wanted his good word says he upon condition he had not said What why something that is innocently true he names but that which sticks is that I count him one more happy in his expression and other abilities then in his depth or reflectiveness on the things he offers Whether I have herein judged amiss or not I will be content to come to some tryal with him and that I may treat with this Post-script in some method it is convenient I should in the first place propose the determination of this case or question as I have tendred it together with his conception understanding or apprehension of it In
This meaning is not certain but some have believed thus and some otherwise In the upshot then this is that I have been brought in my last thoughts to conclude that if a Man after the best means he can use for the understanding the Imposers meaning can take what is imposed in that sence which he verily believes in his own heart to be their meaning he shall do well and ought to take it if he cannot he must for bear and choose to suffer Being thus prepared in order to the determining a mans own act about the taking an imposition when the question lyes upon the meaning of the Law-giver and the subject I count being changed only into his generall end in this I had no cause to stick here where there is but one and the same answer to be given to all such questions To wit that notwithstanding there may be severall good cautions of thinking reverendly of our superiours judgments and not leaning too much on our own with the like words used in the way we must come to this result at last that according as every man for his own part after the best enquiry or exercise of his reason he can make does believe in his very Conscience whether the thing commanded in a Law be for the publick good or no I mean it in reference to his own doing it that is most plainly according as he believes in his own soul that the doing the thing which is commanded by his example or otherwise is conducive to the publick good or not so must he account it agreeable or not to Gods will and his Conscience accordingly be bound or loosed in regard to the performance I will convince the Debater from his own mouth and from the thing it self From his own mouth we have a Case hath fallen very luckily before mentioned What if Magistrate mistake in a Law and the matter be not conducive to that end for the publick he ordained it He answers he is not bound to be of the Magistrates opinion but may judge it better the Law were otherwise yet thinks he is bound to obey it But if this man and so another may be and is of a contrary opinion to the Magistrate that the thing commanded is not for the publick benefit as he acknowledges in that Case of his own putting then hath he acknowledged in effect all that for which he cavills so much at me upon my answer to this question For the thing it self In the first place no mortal man on Earth can have power to make me or him or any understand to think or believe otherwise then we do If I do think then that such a thing commanded be not for the common good so I shall think and must think do what the Magistrate can or my self either And it 〈◊〉 do believe so then do I judge or believe that iâ— is not according to Gods will and consequently that I am not bound in Conscience 〈◊〉 If you say I should not think so it is unlawful to judge so you contradict this man who says he is not bound absolutâ—ly to be of the Law-givers opinion that all such things are for the publick good as he decrees which is as truly as stoutly said against himself for the matter will not bear it to be otherwise In the second place Conscience is a faculty which God hath put into Man to judge of his own actions in reference to his approving or condemning him for them Whatsoever actions then are accountable unto God at the great day are to be judged at present by Conscience We are accountable now no doubt to God for our civil actions as well as others and when in matters that are civil those things have or have not his approbation as they do or do not conduce to the common good it follows that every man must judge of the things commanded him whether they be or they be not to the common good that he may be accountable unto God according to what he is bound or not bound in Conscience by them In the third place our Protestant Divines in their cont oversy which the Papist Do judice do allow to every man a judgement of private discretion which is the same with this judgement of Conscience that what means soever we use for our information we must be the last judges our selves of the things we do whether they are agreeable to Gods will or not and according to our own belief must resolve upon the practise or forbearance of them It seems to me now a thing unreasonable and injurious unto mankind if we shall take away from the subject this judgement of private discretion in things that are political which we cannot but allow them in all other their morall and religious actions If there be an infallible judge in Civils we may expect one in religions matters But if there be no Pope nor Counsels but may erre in their Canons there are no Law-givers but may erre in their Laws and there is no cause why any should indeed be more shy of granting the subject this judgement of discretion in reference to what the Prince hath Enacted any more then what the Church hath declared but only that they could not so well tell the rule to judge of things Civill as they could to judge of Doctrines and morall Precepts As God therefore hath given us the Scriptures for a rule of religion that when any thing is required of us to believe or practise as necessary to Gods worship or our salvation we may and are to try it by this rule and can be obliged thereby no farther then we do judge it agreeable to this rule and as in morals he hath given the law of nature for our rule so hath the Almighty given to man his rule also in things politicall which he hath written in his fleshly tables as sure as there is any law of nature and that is Gods will as the scripture is whereby the Laws of every Common-wealth are to be tryed and judged the Law-giver being accountable to God according as he acts by it and the People obliged in Conscience so far to obey his will as he commands agreeably to it and this Rule or Law as I have before said is the common good Things are religiously good or evill as they agree or agree not with the Scriptures Things are moraly good or evill as they agree or agree not with the Law of nature Things politically good or evill as they agree or agree not to the publick advantage If I am commanded any thing about my religion I will go to the Scripture if that commands me otherwise I cannot obey it I will go to the morall Law in matters of vertue and vice In politicall things or things required by human Laws I must go to this rule I have proposed I must judge of them as good or evill in their kind by that If my doing the thing will not answer the rule I am not bound
his making of a law which the people cannot consider and attend unto and then in an idle descant upon this that it is not fit therefore that laws should be suspended till the subjects be agreed they are for their good with the like words as if there were any indeed ever dream'd that a Law-giver who is with us the Parliament could not make a law untill they had consulted the people first whether they all of them judged the matter such that if it were passed into a law they should be bound in Conscience to the performance and before they had an affirmative answer from them who must be made loath too to be satisfied about it they could pass no act or statute of the Realm This is the sense in which this man let his pen run here and then concludes The Prince is in an ill case who hath such subjects and he is not in very good whose Divines begin to instill such doctrine into them If there be any thing in those more words and the same reason that seems of moment it is already answered I count by distinguishing the part of the Law-giver the subject whose judgement of a thing commanded in a law already passed for the satisfiying himself whether he be obliged in Conscience to the doing can by no means prejudice the act of the Law-giver in the passing the law as is manifest nor does it throw it down being passed For this is a mistake in this person very palpable as if a human law could not be of force unless a mans Conscience be obliged by it I observed this in him before where he said Laws while they do oblige tye the Conscience and that the cause of his error was the want of present knowledge to distinguish between Political and morall obligation The obligation which is on the Conscience is morall and can be no other and passes on it I have said from Gods institution of our generall duty but the obligation which is Political belongs to the outward man and may stand good when the morall ceases and for as much as this obligation of the outward man it self does so arise from the commandment of God for subjection and that we should not resist it may appear to the impartial that will consider aright of what is said that the question or single point between this man and I concerning the obligation of human Laws in reference only to the conscience is really and in good earnest very little or not at all material to the Magistrate or the civill Government which way soever it is determined And when there are so many learned men of divers sorts who exercise their liberty in maintaining the opinion of either extream without controle or prejudice to the world it s a thing hardly becomming either a temperate minde or modest Learning or that I should have most expected from this Authour a free Theology to express himself in this manner as if a man could not endeavour the finding out a middle way that is so needfull in such a controversie but he must be adjudged one that is broaching of something against the State and deserved correction His fourth reason is Grant the subjects such a power that is a power only of judgeing of their own civill acts and in a little time no law shall be observed He proceeds Taxes will not be paid He goes on There will be Insurrections and Rebellion Upon this he brings in certain narrations of the Subsidy of Head money in Richard the Seconds time and what followed of the aid granted to Henry the Seventh in his third year and the Northern Rebellion then of a subsidy in his thirteenth year when the Cornish-men took up arms then of the case of Henry the eight about Aliens and of one John Lincoln a Broaker that was hanged See more in a certain dialogue between a Couceellor of state and a Justice he has in his study for this it is for the man to light on a new book he must by all means be teling us of what he was reading last And thus had we at the begining of these Papers from the tenth argument of Bellarmine against Image worship the relation of the Iconomachi and what befell them in the time of Leo Isaurus in the time of Constantinus Copronomus in the time of the horrible cold and freezing of the Pontick Sea the drought after and the death of the Emperour The man hath a strange fruitful application This brings to my remembrance an advice once I received from an ingenious and prudent Woman who seeing me over ingaged in dispute sometimes with an Anabaptist who was a man of much talk and being not willing I should be so much concerned you must not says she argue with these men in the way you do you lay down the subject and speak upon that and then think to hold them to it and are moved when they speak from the point and so are confounded but you should sayes she give them leave to speak so long until you can lay hold on something that they say and whatsoever it is you must speak of that and by this means while you take them up still upon their last words whether it be to the point or not you will never want matter no more then they do and by the use of their own weapon may deal with them I must profess if this man who hath so apt an expression do come to get this knack of it as he appears to have in these continuations and apendix he may continue his continuations while he lives and I know no body able to dispute with him unless I could light on the fellow that would preach with any body but it should be he said in a Negative way And Peter went to Antioch He went not to be drunk here he speaks of drunkenness gluttony and all manner of excess He went not to lye with women there he speaks of fornication and uncleanness and all other deadly sin But he went to preach there he speaks of the Scriptures from Genesis to the Revelation of the Fathers the Schoolemen the Councels and all the books that ever he read to this day For the reason it self without its appurtenance I have I account prevented it in the state of my opinion The state alone of what I have said will wipe off any such mistaken consequence which he would injuriously bring upon it It is one question whether we are to observe a law another whether we are bound in Conscience to observe it The question between us in the bottom of the point is not concerning outward observation but the inward obligation of Consciences And the truth is as I was saying at the close of the other reason that this business does not really concern the Magistrate or the Common-wealth directly at all though indirectly and ex consequenti any thing may concern any body for what is it to the Magistrate or the community so long as he can
as I believe he is If you will say that this Law now is antiquated through disuse I will ask then what think you of those Brewers that disused it at first was they all damned necessarily who willfully brought it into disuse the Case is a frequent Case as to all the like Laws and you must come at length to this that those who observed not this Law at first did judge it was not good for the Nation or not fit to be kept and upon that judgement are to be justified It follows then both that a Law against the common good binds not the Conscience and that every man for himself may judge whether it be so or no in reference to his own acting Another instance shall be this suppose a Father or a Master lays some strict charge on his Son or Servant to lay out a Thousand pounds on a Commodity which is more perhaps but for his Credit then he is worth by half This Son or Servant in going to do it bears of the growing or coming in of this Commodity by great quantities in some parts of the Kingdome and upon his own discretion alone and good consideration of what may fall our forbears his Father or Master perhaps now at present is grievously chased but within few days the price of the Commodity falls half and then he sees that if he had been obeyed he had been undone From hence doe there appear not only the necessity but benefit of allowing a judgement of discretion unto Persons of capacity under the commands of their Superiours and that I say not meerly to judge whether the thing commanded be lawful or unlawful in reference unto God whereof there is no question but whether it be convenient or inconvenient to that end or outward good which by that command is designed It appears also from both these instances that the commands of men do not by vertue of the fifth Commandement it self bind the Conscience immediately and absolutely but mediately and ex hypothesi to wit upon supposition those commands are good human laws Dr. Taylor will have it bind the Conscience directly and properly I do not love to dispute about terms but if any think he intends immediately he is out for they do bind only by the intervention of Gods will he argues the authority of the Magistrate is Gods authority I answer the authority which is in the person of the Magistrate as Gods Minister is Gods authority and binds directly and immediatly to subjection but the commands of the Magistrate have not Gods authority unless the things commanded be agreeable to his will and then it is by the intervention of his will I say that the Conscience is bound to obedience A third thing appears that the Conscience of man is not bound by vertue of Gods authority unto every command of our Superiors though the thing commanded be in a matter sometimes which of it self or its own Nature is indifferent because the consideration then of the external commodity or discommodity only could not justifie the breaker of any of them If as soon as a Father or Master had forbidden any thing the Commandment of God took place immediatly and he thereby is to be reckoned to forbid it too this Son or Servant might not break such a command though he did gain a thousand pounds or though either that Master or Father should be undone by it There be several examples might be fech't from Histories of great Commanders and Embassadors that to a chieve some great exploits have been forc't to leave the instructions of their Princes for which though at their return they have begged their pardon out of form as being obnoxious to the Law yet have they had that Conscience of their own fact towards them and toward God as not only to be free from sin in that disobedience but to expect some signal reward for the service of such transgressions CAP. VLT. THus much for his grand exception I must now look out for others or any passage else that requires Animadversion At the first there comes to my view in General the cavilling way which he uses toward me as if when a Man wanted a good answer he should shew an ill Spirit which I would not believe in this Author I perceive he pretends often that the Apologist doth wrong him and so accuses him of falsifyings and impertinences which are his frequent words But in the mean while I wonder he should not see how notoriously he is guilty of both these fine things himself It would be no great matter says he if the Casuist imitated not these men only in their phrase and not in their weak reasonings and then produces an observation I have of providence in transitu as if I argued something from thence which if he could tell what he would confute no doubt and he well might wherefore it is manifest I lay that passage down and make no reasoning at all upon it neither do I imitate any bodies phrase nor tye my self to any part And if this then be not falsifying neither shall his four or five sides after about Image worship be any impertinency nor his six or seven pages in another place about the Taxes and Insurrections there has been in this Nation no though he should tell you the whole Life and Death of Wat Tyler and Jack Straw with a more perfect Narration yet of that Dr. Standish unto whom John Lincoln the Broker came when he was to preach at the Spittle on a Monday in Easter week This should also be no impertinency but a forceable confutation of whatsoever is said by the Apologist or me He may next tell us any other story as well out of the Chronicles Of Jack Cadâ— and his Cozen Mortimer Of Lambert Simuel and the Lady Margret his Aunt How might he have mauld us with the Relation of Perkin Warbâ—ck and Thomas Plammâ—ck and Robert Ket with his Oak of Reformation and then kil'd us quite dead with an arrow our of Robin Hoods bow In the Reign of Richard the first there was the noble Earl Robin Hood and one little John and an hundred stout Fellows more robbed the Passengers upon the High way And what indeed is it that we may well think of such a Roving faculty we see in this Authors last books but that the Mans pen hath got a leoseness and that is the reason he hath so be spattered the poor Apologist whose ill luck and my good one it was that he came between him and me This is the reason that makes him come abroad so often in a Debate a continuation of that debate a continuation of that continuation an appendix to that continuations continuation and a Post-script to that appendix to that continuation of the continuation of the Friendly Debate Nec dum finiâ—us Orestes I must needs say here I have been tempted to use some expressions that perhaps might be grateful to many who are willing to have a person as they are
themselves from what they please no Laws will be observed and all Government come to the ground Unto this as his substance besides my answer I have already given I shall crave leave to offer a few considerations In the first place this is certainly a shalâ—â—w apprehension which must suffer a conviction from the constant experience of the world For how is the world governed there is not one of a hundred that observes the Laws out of Conscience if they did then must they for ought I know be careful to gâ—t the Statutes and read them as their bibles which one of a thousand never do But men understand it they do such or such things they are lâ—able to be sued or to be bound to the Sessions or the like and to avoid the danger of the Law they observe it Now it is a foolish thing to say the Laws will not be observed or the world will not be governed unless by another means then that by which it is governed and the Law are observed Our Nations and Heathen Nations and those Nations which never had the fear of God to believe a judgement to come have been kept under the observation of the Laws of their Country by these means In the second place this is not only against universal experience but it confronts the very institution of God the appointment of the Magistracy God hath made the Magistrate his Minister and put the sword into his hand for the ordering and governing Societies and Common wealths and if this indeed will not serve that purpose then you render his institution insufficient and make his Minister to bear the sword in vain The Law sayes the Apostle is not made for the righteous but the disobedient and unrighteous If all were righteous and would of themselves make Conscience of doing what they should do there would be no need of Magistrate or Law but when the Law and Magistrate is appointed for this end to bring the refractory to order and those that make no Conscience of what they do to be ruled how fond must the imagination be which conceits unless men do first beleive themselves bound in Conscience to obey they will not observe the Laws In the third place if it be for some persons particular interest to break the Laws it will be the concern of others that they be forced to keep them if they be indeed for the common good so shall they joyn with the Magistrate in his causing the execution of them This indeed is that which upholds all Laws that are good The publick interest being greater then the private does uphold them Whereas if a Law be not really for the publick good this is one certain reason at the bottom of its invalidity and decay because it hath not root enough upon the publick utility to maintain it self against particular enchroachments If a Non-conformist come within five miles of a Corporation there is no body hurt by it and no body like to be concerned at it were this a thing truly conducing to the publick good then must the publick be disadvantaged in their breach of that Law and if the publick then must some more eminently and those should be as much concerned that they obey as themselves to avoid the observation By the way when the advantage for the publick does not countervaile and exceed the private loss or dammage that particular persons shall suffer by a Law such a Law I take to be unjust or at least Politically evil and binds not the Conscience However that which I here affirm is that whether men make a Conscience of a Law or not if the Law be good the publick advantage will prevail when the Magistrate is minded or cause it to be observed In the fourth place it is a thing very unpolitick to offer to the world any principle upon which it should be governed which is other then that which does govern it If the world be governed by the Magistrates sword and the Conscience only that we must not rebell and is governed as well as ever it is like to be governed it is but an unhinging the world to pretend they must receive this principle that human laws bind the Conscience or else there will be no need to obey seeing the People may joyn and chuse not to be forced as he speaks It is a saying if a Horse knew his strength what might he not do he would not let man ride him and use him as he does If the world knew their strength that the Magistrate indeed could not punish them whatsoever they did unless they joyned with him one against another when there is just cause for it they might shake off every yoke but as the whole body of the People cannot be made to know this so as at once to agree upon it any more then the Horse can though every particular man does know it so were it an utterly ruinous thing to speak of it if they could It is true if the people did agree together which agreement is their strength and they cannot know one anothers present minds all that they would not be forced they might choose but then when they made no Conscience to resist how should this man think upon his principle that they would make such Conscience to obey In the first place it does seem to me a pernicious thing to the souls of pious and tender Christians to lay any such load upon the Conscience which is more then it can bear I say there is no temptation hardly more dangerous to the undoing of a soul then to press it upon such things as goes beyond it and over sets it If a man does believe he is bound to make Conscience of every command of his superiour and Law of the Realm or else he doth sin it is enough to make him cast off all the Laws and when his duty is made so grevious to him that it seems impossible for him but to live in sin to be ready for resistance next and then all Magistracy is gon The way to have some Laws obeyed out of Conscience is to take off its obligation from others and if a Magistrate indeed might choose whether his Subjects Consciences should be bound by all his Laws or not there is good reason for him to be content that the matter should be as it is They are bound in Conscience not to resist and he knows not his own strength if he desire any more although when a Law is for the common good then is there Gods command also which takes place There is one thing I cannot but add which might make another consideration what if a despotical Prince was so wicked as resolving to be damned himself to seek the damnation of all his people and should thereupon make so many Laws and about such trivial things on purpose that none of his Subjects might regard to keep them but live and die in the wilful breach of them I pray let this Debater tell me
really whether according to his opinion it does not lye in the power of such a Divel as this is to carry a whole Nation to Hell with him In the sixth place let us suppose the Consciences of men were bound indefinitely to all Laws does this Author think really that the belief of this would make the world to observe them and so maintain Government more then the Magistrates sword I doubt me he is here more wide we see too well that when the worldly or carnal interest of men is concerned what little regard Conscience has It were happy indeed for the Earth if the fear of God Almighty did but prevail more with the Generality then the fear of a suite at Law or a Penalty of twenty shillings If interest will prevail with a man to judge a thing commanded him to be against the common good when it is for it the same interest of his it is like with such a man would prevaile still upon him not to observe the Law though he were bound in Conscience to it In the seventh place then those few honest persons that would observe a Law if they thought themselves bound in Conscience to it not withstanding their private interest be against it will likewise make the like Conscience in their judging of a Law so as not to be byassed by their particular concernment to think otherwise of it then does comport with the publick advantage And this in effect will come to the same issue In the last place I will offer you one president to pinne the basket It pleased God in the late times that this case became Dr. Saundersons own case The Act of Uniformity bound the Minister to read Common Prayer This Law the Dr. acknowledges to be of force for all the Times but if he observes the Law he must loose his living Upon this he considers of the Act and when he looks on the immediate particular end of it he can find nothing but that their remains obliged to it He then looks on the general and ultimate end and that he conceives right to be the publick good wch is intended or is to be supposed to be intended in all laws Upon this end he comes to the consideration whether all circumstances being weighed it be conducive for the common good for him to observe this Law or not and being in the result fully perswaded in his own mind that the benefit to the publick could no wayes countervail his particular loss and suffering he concludes it lawful by the neglect of that Law to retain his living There is a sober person having read my Case shewed me a Manuscript of the Doctors but would not let me write any thing out of it for the confirmation of my judgement I cannot relate either the whole matter or words of it but these two things I affirm for truth in it That be comes off upon the consideration of the general end of the Law the publick benefit and judges himself whether his observing that Law were conducive to that end in reference to the determining his own practice And here I have I account my full weight for my self and think I had best to fetch the poor man before also who finding no sufficient relief from this Authour about his Cottage may meet with it from this instance to his satisfaction and it will come to this whitâ— seems a little more then I have yet quite saiâ—â— that not only when a Law is politically â—â—vil but when it is good in regard of its general observation yet if a man be perswaded fully in his Conscience upon such duâ—â— considerations and cautions as he ought to take that his particular keeping of it under the present circumstances he lyes is not so much for the common good really as his not keeping of it is which I will take to be plainly this poor mans case instanced who if he holds not his house must with his Family presently fall on the Parish he is not to charge his soul with sin for his wholesome breach of it After this I will yet subjoyn a little more in reference also to some others When the Apostle gives us this precept obey those that have the rule ovér you though there be no words added by way of exception it is to be supposed the things they command are for our edification this being a condition necessarily implyed to all rightful obedience that the Ruler hath authority in what he injoynes But the Minister hath authority only for mens edification and hath none in things against their spiritual good according to our authority sayes the Apostle for edification not destruction The Case is the same with the Magistrate His commands that have authority must be to our civil good It is a mistake therefore how ingenious and ordinary soever it may seem in some that say the people have liberty to judge indeed whether a thing commanded be lawful but not at all whether it be convenient That by all means they count it to be denyed as if the allowing any such thing would presently as this author fancies too subvert all Government I hese Persons I perceive therefore distinguish not between judging what is sit for the general or universality which judgment indeed is proper to the supream Magistrate and judging what is fit for a mans self only to doe All things are lawful for our sayes the apostle But all things are not expedient I will not be brought under the power of any a Christian judges for himself of both these of the lawfulness and of the expedience of his own actions If this be not granted then must he be brought under the power of indifferent things which he ought not to be and then does he submit himself unto the Ordinance of man or the human Creature as his servant and not as free and as the Servant of God Again these persons have not yet considered what I have been telling still in these papers that this liberty is assumed of us in reference only to the Conscience or to our obligation in for interiori and that while the outward man iâ— still acknowledged to be bound there is nâ— danger at all to Government in the matter On the contrary side there is this intollerable snare or evil consequence does follow on the denyal hereof that every time any human Law the matter whereof is not for bidden of God is not observed the subject must sin and consequently if he live and dyes knowingly and wilfully in his neglect he must be damned I will yet propose therefore one or two instances There is a Statute in Henry the eights time if I mistake not which remains unrepealed that no man shall brew with Hopps I do ask hereupon whether there be any Brewer in this Nation knowing of this that can be saved I do not find my Debator can answer me this question and I do not doubt but there are many Brewers that are honest men and good Christians as well
this or that particular man miserable if he keep it he will judge it to be the Law-givers intention that he be dispensed with that those should observe it who are made happy or at least not so distressed as he by it There is something I suppose of solidity in this if we can find out for it a right bottom There is no particular person can say if the Law-giver had foreseen this or the particular mans inconvenience he would no have made the Law because Laws in the nature are confinements and streightninâ— to particular persons for the good of the community But this he must say thâ— notwithstanding the will of the Law-giver is indeed that the generality should keep the Law being for their good yet it is to be understood with exception to such a caâ—â— or cases as his is If he can give a reason now for this that will hold it is well The saying he made not his Law to make anâ— simply miserable is true but in Relation to the publick he passed it though some should be distressed by it He cannot say therefore that he made not this Law to make him miserable but this he may say that he made not this Law to make him or any man miserable but for the advantage of the community seeing for the benefit of the publick 〈◊〉 any one may be made to suffer dammage whereas to make a Law that any might suffer it without advantage to the publick is unjust There is necessity then to come here to my foundation and that is this That the general end of every Law and Law-giver is or ought to be and so is supposed to be the publick advantage VVhen any case then general or particular is such that it is not for the publick benefit that a Law be observed or that it is more for the publick good that it be not observed rather then observed the Law-givers intention is to be supposed from the general end that it should not be obligatory to the Subject His intention is to oblige us to such a thing for the publick good But if such a thing in such a case be not for the publick good the obligation ceases being forsaken of his intention There is much may be said here beside what we insist on before from the will of God At the close he presents us with the testimonies of two or three learned men for obedience to all lawful commands of our superiours He might have taken the harmony of confessions or most Diuines common places and added as many more as he pleased of greater authority He might find expressions too as strict as any from some of our Nonconformist Divines But that which is to be answered to all is this that we are to apprehend such passages to be still spoken upon supposition that the Laws or commands of the superiours be good and wholesome Laws They may put in the word lawfull only but under it this must also be implyed The honest and learned Mr. Perkins therefore when he speaks of our duty to the Magistrate does judiciously use such terms VVe are bound to observe the good and wholesome Laws of the Nation wheâ—ein we live When he and others speaks thus it is plain that in the bottom of their minds they apprehend that if the Laws and commands of men be not good and wholesome Laws or commands they are not accordingly bound to them that is not in Conscience bound though the outward man be at the Magistrates service And this I take it is that Light which does even almost Universally flow into the Souls of men at the first consideration of these matters and as it is of Nature it is from God But who shall judge whether a Law be a good or wholesome Law or no This I know may be again askt It is a good and wholesome Law I account when the thing commanded be for the common good And I reply who shall judge whether that which be commanded be lawful or not It will be a thing most foolish to say that he who hath passed the Law as good already must be judge for then it might be no question You will say that every man must indeed be judge of that I say then that if every man must judge whether the thing commanded him in a Law be according to Gods word or not which is a matter of so much more difficulty and concernment to his Soul and where of the most of men are so much more indeed uncapable to judge with soundness and yet every one must judge for himself according to his ability in reference to his own practice why should any scruple to have the same said in the question whether it be for the common good being what is easier done and a less matter The sum of the whole sheets will come to this The most both of Religious and Learned men are at a loss through their dispute and jangling I suppose when the matter else perhaps were more plain in their conceptions about the obligation of human Laws Two extreams we hear The one that they bind not the Conscience at all the other that they bind indefinitely that is all bind under pain of sin A middle path I have effered in resolving the case We see where it is the opposer does pinch They will not allow the subject to be a reasonable agent in Politicals when they cannot deny him to be so in Morals and things Religious If they will allow us a judgement of discretion in Civils They must be ignorant or consider not that the common good is the supream Law That the supream must over-rule the subservient So long as any know not this they are in darkness and bondage But the Scintillations of this truth and Doctrine that I here have brought are the feeds of Light and Liberty to the World In which liberty the considering Christian will stand fast and the tender will rejoyce in consolation THE END Reader BEfore I sent these Sheets to the Press at first I shewed them a Learned Dr. a person of note as of ability and I received his thoughts of them in the words which you find in the beginning Being returned from the Printer I had opportunity to shew them to another of the like eminency and I received presently a full Sheet from him upon the subject I will make bold to set down thus much of it which follows The Office to wit of the Magistrate and exercise or administration being distinguished you truly say that he that is not bound in a particular case to obey yet may be a Subject still which is the relation of one bound to ordinary obedience and Rebellion which is the casting off this subjection iâ— forbidden notwithstanding a particular Law may be disobeyed A Law made against God or the safety of the Common-wealth is no Law in sensu uni voco but it is in sensu aeâ—â—â—vâ—â—o vel analogico and does not pâ—â—perly bind the Subject All men in their wits that are masters of such discourse are agreed that judicium est vel publicum vel provatum Publicum est vel civile Magistratus per gladium exe quendum Vel ecclesiastum Pastorum per verbum clares exequendum Et privatum discretionis est omnium No Man ever obeyed without it for authoritas imperantis agnita is the objectum formale obedientiae and answereth the question Quare obedis The Magistrate being by Office intrusted with the bonum pubeicum the Subject is not called to try every one of his Laws whether they are suited to the bonum publicum or not much less to be critical and busie out of his place But being not bound to be blind or or careless in a notorious case or such of which he hath full and lawful cognizance he may and must discern what command is against the common good R. B.