Ordinance then it follows that the Governours were Supreme and not the King Or if it be said that both King and Governours are sent by God then they are both equal and so neither of them Supreme Therefore St. Peter's meaning is in short obey the Laws of the King or of his Ministers By which it is evident that neither St. Peter nor S. Paul intended other-Form of Government than only Monarchical much less any Subjecton of Princes to Humane Laws That familiar distinction of the Schoolmen whereby they Subject Kings to the Directive but not to the Coactive Power of Laws is a Confession that Kings are not bound by the Positive Laws of any Nation Since the Compulsory Power of Laws is that which properly makes Laws to be Laws by binding men by Rewards or Punishment to Obedience whereas the Direction of the Law is but like the advice and direction which the Kings Council gives the King which no man says is a Law to the King 4 There want not those who Believe that the first invention of Laws was to Bridle and moderate the over-great Power of Kings but the truth is the Original of Laws was for the keeping of the Multitude in Order Popular Estates could not Subsist at all without Laws whereas Kingdoms were Govern'd many Ages without them The People of Athens as soon as they gave over Kings were forced to give Power to Draco first then to Solon to make them Laws not to bridle Kings but themselves and though many of their Laws were very Severe and Bloody yet for the Reverence they bare to their Law-makers they willingly submitted to them Nor did the People give any Limited Power to Solon but an Absolute Jurisdiction at his pleasure to Abrogate and Confirm what he thought fit the People never challenging any such Power to themselves So the People of Rome gave to the Ten Men who were to chuse and correct their Laws for the Twelve Tables an Absolute Power without any Appeal to the people 5. The reason why Laws have been also made by Kings was this when Kings were either busyed with Wars or distracted with Publick Cares so that every private man could not have accesse to their persons to learn their Wills and Pleasure then of necessity were Laws invented that so every particular Subject might find his Prince's Pleasure decyphered unto him in the Tables of his Laws that so there might be no need to resort to the King but either for the Interpretation or Mitigation of Obscure or Rigorous Laws or else in new Cases for a Supplement where the Law was Defective By this means both King and People were in many things eased First The King by giving Laws doth free himself of great and intolerable Troubles as Moses did himself by chusing Elders Secondly The people have the Law as a Familiar Admonisher and Interpreter of the King's pleasure which being published throughout the Kingdom doth represent the Presence and Majesty of the King Also the Judges and Magistrates whose help in giving Judgment in many Causes Kings have need to use are restrained by the Common Rules of the Law from using their own Liberty to the injury of others since they are to judge according to the Laws and not follow their own Opinions 6. Now albeit Kings who make the Laws be as King Iames teacheth us above the Laws yet will they Rule their Subjects by the Law and a King governing in a setled Kingdom leaves to be a King and degenerates into a Tyrant so soon as he seems to Rule according to his Laws yet where he sees the Laws Rigorous or Doubtful he may mitigate and interpret General Laws made in Parliament may upon known Respects to the King by his Authority be Mitigated or Suspended upon Causes only known to him And although a King do frame all his Actions to be according to the Laws yet he is not bound thereto but at his good Will and for good Example Or so far forth as the General Law of the Safety of the Common-Weale doth naturally bind him for in such sort only Positive Laws may be said to bind the King not by being Positive but as they are naturally the Best or Only Means for the Preservation of the Common-Wealth By this means are all Kings even Tyrants and Conquerours bound to preserve the Lands Goods Liberties and Lives of all their Subjects not by any Municipial Law of the Land so much as the Natural Law of a Father which binds them to ratifie the Acts of their Fore-Fathers and Predecessors in things necessary for the Publick Good of their Subjects 7. Others there be that affirm That although Laws of themselves do not bind Kings yet the Oaths of Kings at their Coronations tye them to keep all the Laws of their Kingdoms How far this is true let us but examine the Oath of the Kings of England at their Coronation the words whereof are these Art thou pleased to cause to be administred in all thy Iudgments indifferent and upright Iustice and to use Discretion with Mercy and Verity Art thou pleased that our upright Laws and Customs be observed and dost thou promise that those shall be protected and maintained by thee These two are the Articles of the King's Oath which concern the Laity or Subjects in General to which the King answers affirmatively Being first demanded by the Arch-bishop of Canterbury Pleaseth it you to confirm and observe the Laws and Customs of Ancient Times granted from God by just and devout Kings unto the English Nation by Oath unto the said People Especially the Laws Liberties and Customs granted unto the Clergy and Laity by the famous King Edward We may observe in these words of the Articles of the Oath that the King is required to observe not all the Laws but only the Upright and that with Discretion and Mercy The Word Upright cannot mean all Laws because in the Oath of Richard the Second I find Evil and Unjust Laws mentioned which the King swears to abolish and in the Old Abridgment of Statutes set forth in Henry the Eighth's days the King is to swear wholly to put out Evil Laws which he cannot do if he be bound to all Laws Now what Laws are Upright and what Evil who shall judge but the King since he swears to administer Upright Justice with Discretion and Mercy or as Bracton hath it aequitatem praecipiat misericordiam So that in effect the King doth swear to keep no Laws but such as in His Iudgment are Upright and those not literally always but according to Equity of his Conscience join'd with Mercy which is properly the Office of a Chancellour rather than of a Judge and if a King did strictly swear to observe all the Laws he could not without Perjury give his Consent to the Repealing or Abrogating of any Statute by Act of Parliament which would be very mischievable to the State But let it be supposed for truth that Kings do swear to observe
according to the Rules and Presidents of Antient Times And where Presidents have failed the Judges have resorted to the General Law of Reason and accordingly given Judgment without any Common Law to direct them Nay many times where there have been Presidents to direct they upon better Reason only have Changed the Law both in Causes Criminal and Civil and have not insisted so much on the Examples of former Judges as examined and corrected their Reasons thence it is that so no Laws are now obsolete and out of use and the Practice quite contrary to what it was in Former Times as the Lord Chancellor Egerton proves by several Instances Nor is this spoken to Derogate from the Common Law for the Case standeth so with the Laws of all Nations although some of them have their Laws and Principles Written and Established for witnesse to this we have Aristotle his Testimony in his Ethiques and in several places in his Politiques I will cite some of them Every Law saith he is in the General but of some things there can be no General Law when therefore the Law sqeaks in General and something falls out after besides the General Rule Then it is fit that what the Law-maker hath omitted or where he hath Erred by speaking Generally it should be corrected or supplyed as if the Law-maker himself were Present to Ordain it The Governour whether he be one Man or more ought to be Lord over all those things whereof it was impossible the Law should exactly speak because it is not easie to comprehend all things under General Rules whatsoever the Law cannot Determine it leaves to the Governours to give Iudgment therein and permits them to rectifie whatsoever upon Tryal they find to be better than the Written Laws Besides all Laws are of themselves Dumb and some or other must be trusted with the Application of them to Particulars by examining all Circumstances to pronounce when they are broken or by whom This work of right Application of Laws is not a thing easie or obvious for ordinary capacities but requires profound Abilities of Nature for the beating out of the truth witness the Diversity and sometimes the contrariety of Opinions of the learned Judges in some difficult Points 10 Since this is the common Condition of Laws it is also most reasonable that the Law-maker should be trusted with the Application or Interpretation of the Laws and for this Cause anciently the Kings of this Land have sitten personally in Courts of Judicature and are still Representatively present in all Courts the Judges are but substituted and called the Kings Justices and their Power ceaseth when the King is in place To this purpose Bracton that learned Chief Justice in the Reign of Henry the Third saith in express terms In doubtful and obscure points the Interpretation and Will of our Lord the King is to be expected since it is his part to interpret who made the Law for as he saith in another place Rex non Alius debet Iudicare si Solus ad id sufficere possit c. The King and no body else ought to give Iudgment if He were able since by vertue of his Oath he is Bound to it therefore the King ought to exercise Power as the Vicar or Minister of God but if our Lord the King be not able to determine every cause to ease part of his Pains by distributing the Burthen to more Persons he ought to chuse Wise men fearing God c and make Iustices of them Much to the same purpose are the words of Edward the First in the beginning of his Book of Laws written by his appointment by Iohn Briton Bishop of Hereford We will saith he that our own Iurisdiction be above all the Iurisdictions of our Realm so as in all manner of Felonies Trespasses Contracts and in all other Actions Personal or Real We have power to yield such Iudgments as do appertain without other Process wheresoever we know the right truth as Iudges Neither may this be taken to be meant of an imaginary Presence of the King's Person in His Courts because he doth immediately after in the same place severally set forth by themselves the Jurisdictions of his Ordinary Courts but must necessarily be understood of a Jurisdiction remaining in the King 's Royal Person And that this then was no New-made Law or first brought in by the Norman Conquests appears by a Saxon Law made by King Edgar in these words as I find them in Mr. Lambert Nemo in lite Regem appellato nisi quidem domi Iustitiam consequi aut impetrare non poterit sin summo jure domi urgeatur ad Regem ut is Onus aliqua ex parte Allevet provocato Let no man in Suit appeal to the King unless he may not get Right at home but if the Right be too heavy for him then let him go to the King to have it eased As the Judicial Power of Kings was exercised before the Conquest so in those setled times after the Conquest wherein Parliaments were much in use there was a High-Court following the King which was the place of Soveraign Justice both for matter of Law and Conscience as may appear by a Parliament in Edward the First 's time taking Order That the Chancellour and the Iustices of the Bench should follow the King to the end that He might have always at hand able men for His Direction in Suits that came before Him And this was after the time that the Court of Common-Pleas was made Stationary which is an Evidence that the King reserved a Soveraign Power by which he did supply the Want or correct the Rigour of the Common Law because the Positive Law being grounded upon that which happens for the most part cannot foresee every particular which Time and Experience brings forth 12. Therefore though the Common Law be generally Good and Just yet in some special Case it may need Correction by reason of some considerable Circumstance falling out which at the time of the Law-making was not thought of Also sundry things do fall out both in War and Peace that require extraordinary help and cannot wait for the Usual Care of Common Law the which is not performed but altogether after one sort and that not without delay of help and expence of time so that although all Causes are and ought to be referred to the Ordinary Processe of common Law yet rare matters from time to time do grow up meet for just Reasons to be referred to the aid of the absolute Authority of the Prince and the Statute of Magna Charta hath been understood of the Institution then made of the ordinary Jurisdiction in Common Causes and not for restraint of the Absolute Authority serving only in a few rare and singular Cases for though the Subjects were put to great dammage by False Accusations and Malitious Suggestions made to the King and His Council especially during the time of King Edward the Third whilst he
our Soveraign Lord the King in his Parliament by their Petition that for his Profit and the Commodity of his Prelates Earls Barons and Commons it may please him to provide remedy our Soveraign Lord the King desiring the profit of his people by the assent of his Prelates Earles Barons and other Nobles of his Council being there hath ordained In the Parliament primo Edwardi the Third where Magna Charta was confirmed I find this Preamble At the Request of the Commonalty by their Petition made before the King and His Council in Parliament by the assent of the Prelates Earles Barons and other Great Men Assembled it was Granted The Commons presenting a Petition unto the King which the King's Council did mislike were content thereupon to mend and explain their Petition the Form of which Petition is in these words To their most redoubted Soveraign Lord the King praying the said Commons That whereas they have pray'd Him to be discharged of all manner of Articles of the Eyre c. Which Petition seemeth to His Council to be prejudicial unto Him and in Disinherison of His Crown if it were so generally granted His said Commons not willing nor desiring to demand things of Him which should fall in Disinherison of Him or His Crown perpetually as of Escheators c. but of Trespasses Misprisions Negligences and Ignorances c. In the time of Henry the Third an Order or Provision was made by the King's Council and it was pleaded at the Common Law in Bar to a Writ of Dower The Plantiffs Attorney could not deny it and thereupon the Iudgment was ideo sine die It seems in those days an Order of the Council-Board was either parcel of the common-Common-Law or above it The Reverend Judges have had regard in their Proceedings that before they would resolve or give Iudgment in new Cases they consulted with the King 's Privy Council In the Case of Adam Brabson who was assaulted by R. W. in the presence of the Iustices of Assize at Westminster the Judges would have the Advice of the Kings Council For in a like Case because R. C. did strike a Juror at Westminster which passed in an Inquest against one of his Friends It was adjudged by all the Council that his right hand should be cut off and his Lands and Goods forfeited to the King Green and Thorp were sent by Judges of the Bench to the Kings Council to demand of them whether by the Statute of 14. Ed. 3. cap. 16. a Word may be amended in a Writ and it was answered that a Word may well be amended although the Statute speak but of a Letter or Syllable In the Case of Sir Tho. Oghtred Knight who brought a Formedon against a poor Man and his Wife they came and yielded to the Demandant which seemed suspitious to the Court whereupon Iudgment was stayed and Thorp said That in the like Case of Giles Blacket it was spoken of in Parliament and we were commanded that when any like Case should come we should not go to Iudgment without good advice therefore the Judges Conclusion was Sues au Counseil comment ils voillet que nous devomus faire nous volume faire auterment nient en cest case Sue to the Council and as they will have us to do we will and otherwise not in this Case 18. In the last place we may consider how much hath been attributed to the Opinions of the Kings Iudges by Parliaments and so find that the Kings Council hath guided and ruled the Iudges and the Iudges guided the Parliament In the Parliament of 28. Hen. 6. The Commons made Suit That William de la Poole D. of Suffolke should be committed to Prison for many Treasons and other Crimes The Lords of the Higher House were doubtful what Answer to give the Opinion of the Iudges was demanded Their Opinion was that he ought not to be committed for that the Commons did not charge him with any particular Offence but with General Reports and Slanders This Opinion was allowed In another Parliament 31. Hen. 6. which was prorogued in the Vacation the Speaker of the House of Commons was condemned in a thousand pound dammages in an Action of Trespass and was committed to Prison in Execution for the same When the Parliament was re-assembled the Commons made suit to the King and Lords to have their Speaker delivered the Lords demanded the Opinion of the Judges whether he might be delivered out of Prison by priviledge of Parliament upon the Judges answer it was concluded That the Speaker should still remain in Prison according to the Law notwithstanding the priviledge of Parliament and that he was the Speaker Which Resolution was declared to the Commons by Moyle the King's Serjeant at Law and the Commons were commanded in the Kings Name by the Bishop of Lincolne in the absence of the Arch-bishop of Canterbury then Chancellour to chuse another Speaker In septimo of Hen. 8. a question was moved in Parliament Whether Spiritual Persons might be convented before Temporal Iudges for Criminal Causes There Sir Iohn Fineux and the other Judges delivered their Opinion That they might and ought to be and their Opinion was allowed and maintained by the King and Lords and Dr. Standish who before had holden it the same Opinion was delivered from the Bishops If a Writ of Errour be sued in Parliament upon a Judgment given in the Kings Bench the Lords of the higher House alone without the Commons are to examine the Errours the Lords are to proceed according to Law and for their Judgment therein they are to be informed by the advice and counsel of the Judges who are to inform them what the Law is and so to direct them in their Judgment for the Lords are not to follow their own Opinions or Discretions otherwise So it was in a Writ of Errour brought in Parliament by the Dean and Chapter of Lichfield against the Prior and Covent of Newton-Panel as appeareth by Record See Flower Dew's Case P. 1. H. 7. fol. 19. FINIS 1 Kings 20. 16. Gen. 27 29. Arist. Pol. Lib. 1. c. 2.
of the People or by any other way whatsoever or whether some Few or a Multitude govern the Commonwealth yet still the Authority that is in any One or in Many or in All these is the only Right and Natural Authority of a Supreme Father There is and always shall be continued to the End of the World a Natural Right of a Supreme Father over every Multitude although by the secret Will of God many at first do most unjustly obtain the Exercise of it To confirm this Natural Right of Regal Power we find in the Decalogue That the Law which enjoyns Obedience to Kings is delivered in the terms of Honour thy Father as if all power were originally in the Father If Obedience to Parents be immediately due by a Natural Law and Subjection to Princes but by the Mediation of an Humane Ordinance what reason is there that the Laws of Nature should give place to the Laws of Men as we see the power of the Father over his Child gives place and is subordinate to the power of the Magistrate If we compare the Natural Rights of a Father with those of a King we find them all one without any difference at all but only in the Latitude or Extent of them as the Father over one Family so the King as Father over many Families extends his care to preserve feed cloth instruct and defend the whole Commonwealth His War his Peace his Courts of Justice and all his Acts of Sovereignty tend only to preserve and distribute to every subordinate and inferiour Father and to their Children their Rights and Privileges so that all the Duties of a King are summed up in an Universal Fatherly Care of his People CHAP. II. It is unnatural for the People to Govern or Chose Governours 1. ARistotle examined about the Freedom of the People and justified 2. Suarez disputing against the Regality of Adam 3. Families diversly defined by Aristotle Bodin and others 4. Suarez contradicting Bellarmine 5. Of Election of Kings 6. By the Major part of the People 7. By Proxy and by silent Acceptation 8. No Example in Scripture of the Peoples chosing their King Mr. Hooker's Iudgment therein 9. God governed always by Monarchy 10. Bellarmine and Aristotle's Iudgment of Monarchy 11. Imperfections of the Roman Democratie 12. Rome began her Empire under Kings and perfected under Emperours In danger the People of Rome always fled to Monarchy 13. Whether Democraties were invented to bridle Tyrants or rather that they came in by Stealth 14. Democraties vilified by their own Historians 15. Popular Government more bloody than Tyranny 16. Of a mixed Government of the King and People 17. The People may not judge or correct their King 18. No Tyrants in England since the Conquest 1. BY conferring these Proofs and Reasons drawn from the Authority of the Scripture it appears little less than a Paradox which Bellarmine and others affirm of the Freedom of the Multitude to chose what Rulers they please Had the Patriarchs their Power given them by their own Children Bellarmine does not say it but the Contrary If then the Fatherhood enjoyed this Authority for so many Ages by the Law of Nature when was it lost or when forfeited or how is it devolved to the Liberty of the Multitude Because the Scripture is not favourable to the Liberty of the People therefore many fly to Natural Reason and to the Authority of Aristotle I must crave Liberty to examine or explain the Opinion of this great Philosopher but briefly I find this Sentence in the Third of his Politiques Cap. 16. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It seems to some not to be natural for one man to be Lord of all the Citizens since a City consists of Equals D. Lambine in his Latine Interpretation of this Text hath omitted the Translation of this word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by this means he maketh that to be the Opinion of Aristotle which Aristotle alleadgeth to be the Opinion but of some This Negligence or Wilful Escape of Lambine in not translating a word so Material hath been an occasion to deceive many who looking no farther than this Latine Translation have concluded and made the World now of late believe that Aristotle here maintains a Natural Equality of Men and not only our English Translator of Aristotle's Politiques is in this place misled by following Lambine but even the Learned Monsieur Duvall in his Synopsis bears them company and yet this Version of Lambine's is esteemed the best and Printed at Paris with Causabon's corrected Greek Copy though in the rendring of this place the Elder Translations have been more faithful and he that shall compare the Greek Text with the Latine shall find that Causabon had just cause in his Preface to Aristotle's Works to complain that the best Translations of Aristotle did need Correction To prove that in these words which seem to favour the Equality of Mankind Aristotle doth not speak according to his own Judgment but recites only the Opinion of others we find him clearly deliver his own Opinion that the Power of Government did originally arise from the Right of Fatherhood which cannot possibly consist with that Natural Equality which Men dream of for in the First of his Politiques he agrees exactly with the Scripture and lays this Foundation of Government The first Society saith he made of Many Houses is a Village which seems most naturally to be a Colony of Families or foster Brethren of Children and Childrens Children And therefore at the beginning Cities were under the Government of Kings for the eldest in every house is King And so for Kindred-sake it is in Colonies And in the fourth of his Politiques cap. 2 He gives the Title of the first and Divinest sort of Government to the Institution of Kings by Defining Tyranny to be a Digression from the First and Divinest Whosoever weighs advisedly these passages will find little hope of Natural Reason in Aristotle to prove the Natural Liberty of the Multitude Also before him the Divine Plato concludes a Commonweal to be nothing else but a large Family I know for this Position Aristotle quarrels with his Master but most unjustly for therein he contradicts his own Principles for they both agree to fetch the Original of Civil Government from the prime Government No doubt but Moses's History of the Creation guided these two Philosophers in finding out of this Lineal Subjection deduced from the Laws of the First Parents according to that Rule of St. Chrysostom God made all Mankind of One Man that he might teach the World to be Governed by a King and not by a Multitude The Ignorance of the Creation occasioned several Errors amongst the Heathen Philosophers Polybius though otherwise a most profound Philosopher and Judicious Historian yet here he stumbles for in searching out the Original of Civil Societies he conceited That Multitudes of Men after a Deluge a Famine or a Pestilence met together like Herds of Cattel without any
the same because by Nature no Barbarian is fit to Govern It is fit the Grecians should rule over the Barbarians for by Nature a Servant and a Barbarian is all one their Family consists only of an Ox for a Man-Servant and a Wife for a Maid so they are fit only to rule their Wives and their Beasts Lastly Aristotle if it had pleased him might have remembred That Nature doth not always make one Thing but for one Use he knows the Tongue serves both to Speak and to Taste 4. But to leave Aristotle and return to Suarez he saith that Adam had Fatherly Power over his Sons whilst they were not made Free Here I could wish that the Jesuite had taught us how and when Sons become Free I know no means by the Law of Nature It is the Favour I think of the Parents only who when their Children are of Age and Discretion to ease their Parents of part of their Fatherly Care are then content to remit some part of their Fatherly authority therefore the Custom of some Countreys doth in some Cases Enfranchise the Children of Inferiour Parents but many Nations have no such Custome but on the contrary have strict Laws for the Obedience of Children the Judicial Law of Moses giveth full power to the Father to stone his disobedient Son so it be done in presence of a Magistrate And yet it did not belong to the Magistrate to enquire and examine the justness of the Cause But it was so decreed lest the Father should in his Anger suddenly or secretly kill his Son Also by the Laws of the Persians and of the People of the Upper Asia and of the Gaules and by the Laws of the West-Indies the Parents have power of Life and Death over their Children The Romans even in their most Popular Estate had this Law in force and this Power of Parents was ratified and amplified by the Laws of the Twelve Tables to the enabling of Parents to sell their Children two or three times over By the help of the Fatherly Power Rome long flourished and oftentimes was freed from great Dangers The Fathers have drawn out of the very Assemblies their own Sons when being Tribunes they have published Laws tending to Sedition Memorable is the Example of Cassius who threw his Son headlong out of the Consistory publishing the Law Agraria for the Division of Lands in the behoof of the people and afterwards by his own private Judgment put him to Death by throwing him down from the Tarpeian Rock the Magistrates and People standing thereat amazed and not daring to resist his Fatherly Authority although they would with all their Hearts have had that Law for the Division of Land by which it appears it was lawful for the Father to dispose of the Life of his Child contrary to the Will of the Magistrates or People The Romans also had a Law that what the Children got was not their own but their Fathers although Solon made a Law which acquitted the Son from Nourishing of his Father if his Father had taught him no Trade whereby to get his Living Suarez proceeds and tells us That in Process of Time Adam had compleat Oeconomical Power I know not what this compleat Oeconomical Power is nor how or what it doth really and essentially differ from Political If Adam did or might exercise the same Jurisdiction which a King doth now in a Commonwealth then the Kinds of Power are not distinct and though they may receive an Accidental Difference by the Amplitude or Extent of the Bounds of the One beyond the Other yet since the like Difference is also found in Political Estates It follows that Oeconomical and Political Power differ no otherwise than a Little Commonweal differs from a Great One. Next saith Suarez Commnnity did not begin at the Creation of Adam It is true because he had no body to Communicate with yet Community did presently follow his Creation and that by his Will alone for it was in his power only who was Lord of All to appoint what his Sons should have in Proper and what in Common so that Propriety and Community of Goods did follow Originally from Him and it is the Duty of a Father to provide as well for the Common Good of his Children as the Particular Lastly Suarez Concludes That by the Law of Nature alone it is not due unto any Progenitor to be also King of his Posterity This Assertion is confuted point-blank by Bellarmine who expresly affirmeth That the First Parents ought to have been Princes of their posterity And untill Suarez bring some Reason for what he saith I shall trust more to Bellarmine's Proofs than to his Denials 5. But let us Condescend a while to the Opinion of Bellarmine and Suarez and all those who place Supreme power in the Whole People and ask them if their meaning be That there is but one and the same power in All the people of the World so that no power can be granted except All the Men upon the Earth meet and agree to choose a Governour An Answer is here given by Suarez That it is scarce possible nor yet expedient that All Men in the World should be gathered together into One Community It is likelier that either never or for a very short time that this power was in this manner in the whole Multitude of Men collected but a little after the Creation men began to be divided into several Commonwealths and this distinct power was in Each of them This Answer of Scarce possible nor yet Expedient It is likelier begets a new doubt how this Distinct power comes to each particular Community when God gave it to the whole Multitude only and not to any particular Assembly of Men. Can they shew or prove that ever the whole Multitude met and divided this power which God gave them in Gross by breaking into parcels and by appointing a distinct power to each several Common-wealth Without such a Compact I cannot see according to their own Principles how there can be any Election of a Magistrate by any Commonwealth but by a meer Usurpation upon the privilege of the whole World If any think that particular Multitudes at their own Discretion had power to divide themselves into several Commonwealths those that think so have neither Reason nor Proof for so thinking and thereby a Gap is opened for every petty Factious Multitude to raise a New Commonwealth and to make more Commonweals than there be Families in the World But let this also be yielded them That in each particular Commonwealth there is a Distinct Power in the Multitude Was a General Meeting of a Whole Kingdom ever known for the Election of a Prince Is there any Example of it ever found in the Whole World To conceit such a thing is to imagine little less than an Impossibility And so by Consequence no one Form of Government or King was ever established according to this supposed Law of Nature 6. It may be
all the Laws of their Kingdoms yet no man can think it reason that Kings should be more bound by their Voluntary Oaths than Common Persons are by theirs Now if a private person make a Contract either with Oath or without Oath he is no further bound than the Equity and Justice of the Contract ties him for a man may have Relief against an unreasonable and unjust promise if either Deceit or Errour or Force or Fear induced him thereunto Or if it be hurtful or grievous in the performance Since the Laws in many Cases give the King a Prerogative above Common Persons I see no Reason why he should be denyed the Priviledge which the meanest of his Subjects doth enjoy Here is a fit place to examine a Question which some have moved Whether it be a sin for a Subject to disobey the King if he Command any thing contrary to his Laws For satisfaction in this point we must resolve that not only in Human Laws but even in Divine a thing may be commanded contrary to Law and yet Obedience to such a Command is necessary The sanctifying of the Sabbath is a Divine Law yet if a Master Command his Servant not to go to Church upon a Sabbath-day the Best Divines teach us That the Servant must obey this Command though it may be Sinful and Unlawful in the Master because the Servant hath no Authority or Liberty to Examine and Judge whether his Master Sin or no in so Commanding for there may be a just Cause for a Master to keep his Servant from Church as appears Luke 14. 5. yet it is not fit to tye the Master to acquaint his Servant with his Secret Counsels or present Necessity And in such Cases the Servants not going to Church becomes the Sin of the Master and not of the Servant The like may be said of the King 's Commanding a man to serve him in the Wars he may not Examine whether the War be Just or Unjust but must Obey since he hath no Commission to Judge of the Titles of Kingdoms or Causes of War nor hath any Subject Power to Condemn his King for breach of his own Laws 8. Many will be ready to say It is a Slavish and Dangerous Condition to be subject to the Will of any One Man who is not subject to the Laws But such men consider not 1. That the Prerogative of a King is to be above all Laws for the good only of them that are under the Laws and to defend the Peoples Liberties as His Majesty graciously affirmed in His Speech after His last Answer to the Petition of Right Howsoever some are afraid of the Name of Prerogative yet they may assure themselves the Case of Subjects would be desperately miserable without it The Court of Chancery it self is but a Branch of the Kings Prerogative to Relieve men against the inexorable rigour of the Law which without it is no better than a Tyrant since Summum Ius is Summa Injuria General Pardons at the Coronation and in Parliaments are but the Bounty of the Prerogative 2. There can be no Laws without a Supreme Power to command or make them In all Aristocraties the Nobles are above the Laws and in all Democraties the People By the like Reason in a Monarchy the King must of necessity be above the Laws there can be no Soveraign Majesty in him that is under them that which giveth the very Being to a King is the Power to give Laws without this Power He is but an Equivocal King It skills not which way Kings come by their Power whether by Election Donation Succession or by any other means for it is still the manner of the Government by Supreme Power that makes them properly Kings and not the means of obtaining their Crowns Neither doth the Diversity of Laws nor contrary Customs whereby each Kingdom differs from another make the Forms of Common-Weal different unless the Power of making Laws be in several Subjects For the Confirmation of this point Aristotle saith That a perfect Kingdom is that wherein the King rules all things according to his Own Will for he that is called a King according to the Law makes no kind of Kingdom at all This it seems also the Romans well understood to be most necessary in a Monarchy for though they were a People most greedy of Liberty yet the Senate did free Augustus from all Necessity of Laws that he might be free of his own Authority and of absolute Power over himself and over the Laws to do what he pleased and leave undone what he list and this Decree was made while Augustus was yet absent Accordingly we find that Vlpian the great Lawyer delivers it for a Rule of the Civil Law Princeps Legibus solutus est The Prince is not bound by the Laws 9 If the Nature of Laws be advisedly weighed the Necessity of the Princes being above them may more manifest it self we all know that a Law in General is the command of a Superior Power Laws are divided as Bellermine divides the Word of God into written and unwritten not for that it is not Written at all but because it was not Written by the first Devisers or Makers of it The Common Law as the Lord Chancellor Egerton teacheth us is the Common Custom of the Realm Now concerning Customs this must be considered that for every Custom there was a time when it was no Custom and the first President we now have had no President when it began when every Custom began there was something else than Custom that made it lawful or else the beginning of all Customs were unlawful Customs at first became Lawful only by some Superiour which did either Command or Consent unto their beginning And the first Power which we find as it is confessed by all men is the Kingly Power which was both in this and in all other Nations of the World long before any Laws or any other kind of Government was thought of from whence we must necessarily infer that the Common Law it self or Common Customs of this Land were Originally the Laws and Commands of Kings at first unwritten Nor must we think the Common Customs which are the Principles of the Common Law and are but few to be such or so many as are able to give special Rules to determine every particular Cause Diversity of Cases are infinite and impossible to be regulated by any Law and therefore we find even in the Divine Laws which are delivered by Moses there be only certain Principal Laws which did not determine out only direct the High-priest or Magistrate whose Judgment in special Cases did determine what the General Law intended It is so with the Common Law for when there is no perfect Rule Judges do resort to those Principles or Common Law Axiomes whereupon former Judgments in Cases some-what like have been delivered by former Judges who all receive Authority from the King in his Right and Name to give Sentence