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judgement_n	according_a	body_n	soul_n	1,459	5	5.0500	4	false

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ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A39389	To en archy: or, An exercitation upon a momentous question in divinity, and case of conscience viz. whether it be lawfull for any person to act contrary to the opinion of his own consicence, formed from arguments that to him appear very probable, though not necessary or demonstrative. Where the opinions of the papists, Vasquez, Sanches, Azonius, &c. are shewed, as also the opinions of some Protestants, viz. Mr. Hooker, Bp Sanderson, Dr. Fulwood, &c. and compared with the opinions of others; the negative part of the question maintained; the unreasonableness of the popish opinions, and some Protestants, for blind obedience, detected; and many other things discoursed. By a Protestant.	Protestant.; Collinges, John, 1623-1690, attributed name.	1675 (1675)	Wing E718; Wing C5314_CANCELLED; ESTC R214929	62,722	96

Now we would ask how we shall know what the Will of God in his Word is but by the Judgment of our particular consciences at last be the Will of God in it self what it will The Will of God to us must be Interpreted as to Practise by our own Judgments and apprehensions Hence Dr. Ames saith well that he who acteth against his Conscience Interpretatively acts against the Will of God And Filiucius saith right such Actions declare that Men chuse and love sin For so far as they know what is sinful they do sin and if they miss of sinning in their Actions it is but as the blind Man hits the Crow there 's no thank to them out of choyce they sin It is involuntarily if they do that which is right No Action materially good can possibly be so formally if done contrary to the Judgment of our Conscience because it is impossible it should have the concurrence of the Will whiles the Practical Conscience faith it ought not be done The Will cannot will what it judgeth evil it may indeed be mis-guided by the Understanding but it cannot will evil sub ratione mali and so consequentially cannot will what the Conscience telleth the Man he ought not to do So as indeed it is but a Natural Principle That the Practical Conscience is and must be the Proximate Rule of our actions Filiucius saith right that the Law of God and the Law of Nature respecteth our Actions as they are free which they cannot be unless they proceed a Principio cognoscente from a knowing Principle within our selves We proceed to a second Argument § 3. That Principle which allowed perverteth the whole Order of Nature in the operations of a Reasonable soul must be false But this opinion That it is Lawful for us to act contrary to what appears to us Lawful from probable arguments perverteth the whole Order of Nature in the Operations of a Reasonable Soul Ergo. The Major needeth no proof to any who will believe that it is not the Will of God a Man should be Metamorphosed into a Beast So that all our business must be to prove the Minor To which purpose let us but take a view of the Noblest Empire in the World I mean that of Reason in Man and Observeth the Order which God hath by the Law of Nature prescribed by which Reason sitting as a Queen should Rule there The Will is the great Minister in this State the great wheel which by its imperate Acts moveth the whole Man The Object of it is Good or Evil about these two it is Exercised chusing the former refusing the latter and then Commanding all the Inferiour Faculties of the Soul and Members of the Body to move according to its Judgment and Choice The Philopsoher telleth us The Will is blind and that its work is onely to keep its Seat and Judge and Command The Understanding serves it with the Notion of things that takes cognisance of them discerns and represents them as true or false whether reference to Speculation or Practice The Understanding in its work is served by the Interior and exterior Senses So then this is the Order of the Ceasonable Soul in Man whereas all Objects are either Sensible Rational or Spiritual The exterior Senses the Eye and Ear c. bring Intelligence of sensible Objects The Fancy Memory and Imaginative Power bring Intelligence of Objects proper to their Sphear The Understanding takes notice of all Propositions thus brought in to it discerneth them and judgeth concerning them whether they be true or false according to Principles of Sense Reason and Revelation according to the variety of the Matter upon this the Will maketh its choice Those which the Understanding discerneth true and good it willeth and chuseth what it discerns false and evil it refuseth nillete and rejecteth and accordingly Commandeth the Soul to believe or not believe to love or hate to desire or fl●e from whatsoever the Understanding discerneth and judgeth evil and noxious Here now is the Government of a Reasonable Soul Now let us Observe how guilty the Principle we oppose is of Treason and Sedition against this Noble Government of the Soul instituted in it by God himself We cannot make a better Judgment than by putting a particular case Suppose this the Proposition It is or it is not Lawful for Persons once Ordained to be re-ordained The Case now is to be Judged in the Court of Reason 〈◊〉 Senses bring in this Proposition as what they have some where seen or heard to be brought into Practice Upon this the Court of the Reasonable Understanding taketh cognisance of it The Understanding discerns it a Proposition relating to Instituted Worship and that the Truth concerning it is to be determined not from Principles of Sense or Principles of Natural Reason but from Scripture and Reason working upon things Revealed and comparing things Spiritual with Spiritual The Eye is therefore employed to Read what can be The Ear to hear on all sides what is spoken about it The Fancy or Imagination is also set on work to find out Mediums to prove the one part or other and so the thing cometh with all these helps to be Discoursed by the soul within it self Then the Vnderstanding discerneth and judgeth which part of the Proposition is true and consequently fit to be Practised which is false and fit to be rejected It either concludes one part Demonstratively and certainly false or probably and in all likelihood false or else it hangs in equilibrio not knowing what to determine In the present Case we suppose the Vnderstanding to bring in its report in this Sense As to this Practical Question Whether it be Lawful for them who by Ministers have been Ordained and made Ministers to be re-ordained and made first Deacons then Priests by Bishops I have done my best to try the Truth or Falshood of either part The Eyes and Ears have given me an account of what they have seen in any Books or heard from any Discourses of Learned Men about it The Fancy hath also been employed to weigh and consider Propositions to consider Arguments brought by others on one side and the other and devise Mediums for one part and for the other Now upon my utmost Judgment of the thing from weighing Arguments on all sides it is not demonstratively certain that this Proposition is false That Persons once Ordained may not be re-ordained and that a Submission to such a re-ordination would be sinful But it doth appear to me very probably so I cannot Answer the Arguments which I have thought on or others have brought to prove it so and though I dare not arrogate infallibility to my self and determine the Arguments I have for the Negative unanswerable yet I can find no Answer I can acquiesce in and so far as I can judge it is sinful and will certainly issue in horror of Conscience or Eternal Damnation or both without pardoning Mercy Now the business is

Foundation of the Popish Religion which almost wholly owes it self to Blind Obedience Reader we shall not complement thee Read acquit or condemn us as thou seest cause upon weighing what we say and judge what is against us praeter merum imperium convitia Whether it be lawful to act contrary to an Opining Conscience CHAP. I. The Question shortly stated The terms Conscience and Opining opened The Various complexions of Conscience arising from the different mediums by which light shines into a soul about a Practical Proposition The terms of Faith Science Opinion Doubting Suspition Scruple opened The true notion of a Fixed Conscience an Opining Conscience a doubting and a Scruputons Conscience The Schoolmens Notion of an Opinion The Question fully stated The method propounded for handling it SECT I. THe question is shortly and plainly this Whether without sinning against God a man can act contrary to the dictate of his own Conscience though but Opining By Conscience not to trouble our Reader with the various Notions and Homonymies of it which have little relation to our intended discourse we mean That Judgement in man by which he determineth concerning good or evil as it relateth to practice according to the Dictate of Natural or enlightened Reason We think it well described by the Schoolmen Judicium quo aliquid bonum esse vel malum judicamus Sanehes in Op. mor. lib. 1. cap. 9.1 Reason is a noble faculty in man by which he discourseth Conclusions from Principles and these either Connate or Natural or acquired from exercise reading and comparing things with things Now the work of Reason is when a practical Proposition is exhibited to it to sit as a Judge upon it enquiring either upon the Truth or falshod of it by comparing it with these Principle hence it maketh up a Judgement whether the Proposition be true or false good or bad This Judgment Divines call Judicium singulare or Judicium conscientiae practicum The Judgment of Conscience or Conscience it self Sect. 2. This Judgment is made up by certain Mediums or arguments which do not in all cases shine with the like degree of light upon the soul for as there is a difference in Propositions some are True some are false of those which are some are necessarily so So as it is impossible they should be false Some are contingently so which are true but it is possible they may be or might have been false as now That God is good is a Proposition necessarily true That Peter was good is true but no more than contingently so for he was bad So there is likewise a great difference in the minds assent to Propositions some it agrees to some it denieth Of those to which it agreeth There are some to which it agreeth firmly and fixedly without the least doubt of them Now these are either such as are Propositions of faith being things plainly revealed in the word of God or Matters evident to sense Thus every man will agree the fire is hot and that the Sun shines at noon day or else such which have a certain cause of their truth which we can see The Assent of the mind to the first is called Faith which is the minds assent to the truth of a Proposition upon the authority of God revealing it The Assent of the mind to the two latter is called Science Now there are other Propositions for which the soul can have no such Mediums as these to discern them by But either some Humane Authority or some probable Reason The Assent which the mind giveth upon either of these accounts is called Opinion which is but the Judgement of Conscience from probable Arguments usually called dialectick arguments for there are not many things capable of demonstration § 3. Hence the certainty of the Mind as to the Truth or Falshood of any proposition is 1. Either Supernatural from Divine Revelation or 2. Natural from the Evidence of Sense or Demonstration or 3. Moral from probable Authority or Arguments But now in regard of the differing Force of Arguments and the variety of them for or against the same proposition This assent is capable of various degrees and may variously be incumbred A Christian may give some Credit to a proposition yet have some scruples about it which like little stones in the shooe from whence the term is borrowed may trouble his Practice Or may have some doubts whether the thing be true or no Or I may have an Opinion that is verily judge the thing to be so or not so § 4. The Philosopher tells us that in Moral things a Moral certainty is enough to Act upon and indeed it must be so for as to most things of particular practice we can neither be Naturally nor Supernaturally ascertained Not Naturally because we cannot see the certain Causes Not Supernaturally for it had been impossible that God's Word should have set every individual Man a particular Rule for every individual Action In these Cases therefore as we said a Moral certainty is ground enough for Action which is or may be consistent with some Scruples or Fears For Example suppose this the Question Whether a Man be sit to Receive the Supper of the Lord It may be he cannot fully satisfie himself but he may have some fears and jealousies and Scruples of the Reasonableness of which he can give himself no very good Account but yet he finds so much ground to conclude he is that he is Morally certain In this case he is bound not to omit it Suppose one sick of a Quinsie or Pleurisie or some other Disease usually Mortal without timely Bleeding and application of means He is not Mathematically or Demonstratively certain that he shall dye if he doth not use such means his Natural strength may Conquer it but he may be Morally certain and so Obliged to Act. Whether a Man may be said to know that of which he is onely Morally certain is a little Velitation among Critical Philosophers Aristotle tells us that what falleth under Science considered as an Habit of the Mind must be something demonstrable but this is onely a strife about words § 5. Much in the present Debate depending upon the term Opining the fixing of the true Notion of an Opinion or at least such a one as we understand in the Question is of great Consequence It is sometimes used to signifie a sudden and rash assent of the Vnderstanding to a proposition But in this sence we have nothing to do with it 2. It is taken for the assent of the Mind to one part of a proposition as true yet not without fear of being mistaken 3. But Thirdly in which sence we use it It is also taken to signifie the Souls assent to a proposition upon probable Arguments That is such Arguments as do not demonstrate the thing to the Soul so as to put it out of all possibility of doubting but make it appear very like to be true Probabile est quod quum certum

was unquestionably a wilful Error but such a●one as those Learned Men saw necessary to be maintained or the Doctrine of Blind Obedience could not stand § 5. Azorius Institut Moral lib. 2. cap. 26. In this Case determines That we may follow an Opinion that is less certainly safe if it be more probable or certain from which we might conclude that in regard the Opinion of our own Consciences is always to us more probable and certain than the Opinion of any other is or can be though there be a possibility of our sinning in following our own and no possibility in following of anothers yet we may follow it 2. He concludes That if both Opinions be Equally safe we are not bound to prefer that which is more probable Yet he confesseth that Major Corduba and Medina think otherwise he thinks the probability of an Opinion is enough to guide our Practice and that we are not bound to follow that which is most probably true But besides that some of his own Brethren tell him and that truly that That Opinion which is though not demonstratively yet most probably true hath least danger of sin in it Whether an Opinion can to any be probably true by extrinsick Arguments which at the same time we judge from intrinsick Arguments probably not true as Question not yet resolved We do not at all doubt but the Judgment and Testimony of others may give a Proposition some shew of Probability to be true If we have no Arguments against what they say from some appearances at least of Scripture or some Logical Topicks But when we have such Arguments that yet their Opinions in the contrary should seem probable to us is a great Riddle and seems a great baffling of a Reasonable Soul Especially considering that these Forreign Arguments are but Common and may be brought in most Cases on both sides § 6. And indeed here all the Popish Doctors are at a great loss viz. To determine what those Doctors must be how many must concurr in an Opinion before they may over-rule us in Practice against the Judgment of our own Consciences formed from proper intrinsecal Arguments Sanchez saith one Doctor is enough and quotes on his side Anges Sylv. Navarrus Valentia and Sa yea and he proveth it by this Learned Argument That is a probable Opinion which is not built upon a light Foundation Now saith he the Opinion of one Doctor is not a light Foundation Ay but what if one Doctors Opinion be for us another be against us They will tell you They are both probable Take then the summe of the Jesuites Doctrine 1. A probable Opinion is that which is not built upon a light Foundation So saith Sanchez 2. Any one Doctors Opinion is a considerable and no light Foundation That is Sanchez his medium 3. Let a man have never so many intrinsecal proper Arguments not demonstrative to prove a thing unlawful yet he may do it if he can but find one Doctor who judgeth it Lawful 4. If one Doctor judgeth it Lawful another judgeth it unlawful he may do what he pleaseth in it for both parts are probable Hence Sanchez raiseth these Conclusions 1. That if a Man according to the Judgment of his own Conscience perfectly doubteth from intrinsecal Arguments which in a practical case he can find on the one side or the other Yet if he can from Extrinsecal Arguments perswade himself that either part is Lawful he may do either 2. That he who probably judgeth it unlawful to Act according to a less probable Opinion may yet Act according to that which he judgeth less probable if he judgeth That it is probably Lawful for him to follow that which is less probab●e 3. That Learned Men may advise others to act contrary to what themselves the Adviser● think Lawful if another Doctor hath judged it Lawful These and many other damnable and absurd Opinions they most impudently conclude from these most wretched premises And now let any Judge whether according to these Principles there be any thing Vnlawful or no and one would think that they do not judge any thing Vnlawful that will but read their Escobar Layman Diaena Filucius Azorius Sanchez Or a breviate of some of their Propositions p. 17. in the Additionals to the Mystery of Jesuitism where he shall be directed also to the Authors § 7. But hitherto they have onely told us what a Man May do Let us hear shortly their Opinion of what Men Must do and particularly where Superiours Command us to act contrary to what we from proper intrinsecal Arguments judge Lawful Adrianus as he is quoted by Vasquez positively affirmeth That none can Lawfully Obey their Superiours against the Opinion of his own Conscience he tells us also That Corduba saith the same in effect though he would save himself from this inconvenience by asserting That what in it self absolutely considered is evil may by some Circumstances be good as when it is necessary for us of two evils to chuse one here the lesser evil is made good comparatively and that saith he is the Case here Vasquez 12. disp 62. cap. 6. It is an evil thing for a man to act contrary to the opinion of his own Conscience And it is an evil thing to disobey our Superiours but one of these we must do in this case saith he It is Lawful for a man to act against his own opinion in obedience to his Superiours thus far the Jesuite A Man might have expected such an unboyled Mess of Divinity from a John of Leiden or a Knipperdolling but is this spoken like Divine Can there then be any necessity of sinning where 's Man's free-will in the mean time doth God ever bring the Soul into such a strait Is it not a known Rule That of two evils of punishment we may indeed chuse the least but of two evils of sin none An Erroneous Conscience indeed is under a necessity of sinning but surely he hath no choice in the case whether he will sin this way or that way but must follow the dictate of his Conscience Whether the distinction of Ligat non obligat be worth any thing or no surely all will say he cannot Act against his fixed erring Conscience Is it not a known Rule That nothing can be made good by a Circumstance though indeed Circumstances may make a thing evil because Bonum esse Causis integris Malum e quolibet defectu Therefore Vasquez who Diana saith is instar omnium explodes this Doctrine of Corduba telling us truly That the Obedience which any Man oweth to his Superiours supposeth the matter of the Superiors Command not to be contrary to the Command of one who is higher than he for in such Cases no Obedience is due nor is it any sin to disobey viz. where the thing required is contrary to the Law of Nature the Law of God or the Law of a Superiour in an higher Order Again it is very possible as Vasquez

saith that it may be a greater sin to contradict my own Conscience than not to Obey my Superiours supposing my Conscience telleth me the thing required is contrary to the Law of Nature But yet Vasquez himself thinketh that in case the Superiour Commandeth a thing otherwise probably Lawful that is as we before heard which some Doctor or Doctors judge so then it is Lawful for a Man to Obey contrary to the private Opinion of his own Conscience because he might do it in such case though it were not Commanded and this is his Principle That when the Precept of a Superiour may Lawfully be Obeyed he is then bound to do it and it becomes necessary This indeed is a strong Argument if we could yield the premises viz. That a Man may Lawfully contrary to the probable Opinion of his own Conscience follow the Opinion of another Quod adhuc est Demonstrandum We shall anon shew the Cursed Fruit of this Root yet Vasquez limiteth this Doctrine a little by telling us 1. That the Superiour must be unquestionably our Superiour 2. That the Subject must know and believe that the Supirour Commandeth according to a probable Opinion and must not think it probable meerly because he is his Superiour for saith he The Dignity of the Superiour Commanding doth not make an Opinion probable Thus far now we have heard the Judgment of the Popish Casuists and School-men in this Case The Summe is this That it is Lawful for a Man to do what his own Conscience from intrinsick probable Arguments judgeth Vnlawful if one or more Doctors do but Judge it Lawful and in such Cases if the Superiour Commandeth he is bound to do what he in his own Conscience judgeth unlawful if it be not apparently and demonstratively so How near this comes to the Sentiments of some Modern Protestant Doctors we may enquire hereafter but before we come to that let us enquire what the Ancienter Protestants have judged in the Case CHAP. III. The Opinion of former Protestants about the lawfulness or unlawfulness of Mens Acting contrary to the Opinion of their own Consciences Such Acting condemned by all former Protestant Casuists Baldvinus Alstedius Amesius Perkins The difference of some later Divines from their Fore-Fathers particularly Mr. Hooker The Vanity of his Proof from Deut. 17.18 Acts 15. Or from Reason Bishop Sanderson agreeing with Ancient Protestants So Mr. Fulwood in his Cases The differing Expressions of some Divines of this present Age The tender touching of the Question and nibbling at the Opinion of the Popish Doctors in the Case by others The Question again stated and made ready for Debate § 1. WE will begin with Fredericus Baldvinus Professor at Wittenbergh he in his Cases l. 1. cap. 9. Professedly disputeth this great point he takes Notice of the two sorts of pretended probable Arguments and determineth in reference to both 1. That an Opinion onely raised from the multitude of others Testimonies in the Case bindeth no Man 2. That an Opinion taken up upon probable Reasons doth bind and so bind that a man cannot Act against it His words in Latine are these Cùm ergo opinionem aliquam non ob assensum aliorum sed ob causas probabiles pro verâ habes Obligatus es in Conscientiâ ne contra eam agas licet Superiores aliud a te exigant donec rationes veriores audias in contrarium ad quas tamen audiendas semper paratus esse debes Et opinionem tuam auditâ meliore sententiâ deponere That is When thou hast taken up any Opinion for true not for the Testimony of others but for probable Reasons thou art bound in Conscience not to act against it no not though Superiours require thee to act till thou hearest better Reasons to the contrary To hear which thou oughtest to be always ready and lay down thy Opinion hearing a better The Opinion of this Grave and Learned Professor is what we take it will be found to have been the Opinion of all Protestants of former Ages For the Observing Reader will find as to this point the same proportionable difference betwixt Ancient Protestant Divines and a Modern brood as betwixt the Old Fathers and School-men and the later Jesuites who have traded in Scholastical and Moral Divinity The latter professing wholly to differ from the former We shall I say find that all former Protestants have agreed That although he that is possessed of an opinion that the thing which is by his Superiours required is unlawful out of Reverence to his Superiours ought throughly to Examine his Opinion and to hear better Reasons if they can be brought and being by them convinced to lay down his opinion Yet while he can do that he cannot do the thing § 2. Let us in the next place enquire of Alstedius He distinguisheth concerning Opinion as relating to a more External Court or to the Court of Conscience As to the former he saith In Disputations c. the Common Opinion is to be preferred before our own But as to Conscience he saith Whatsoever is done against our Consciences is sinful whether our Conscience be Erring Opining or Rightly informed vid. Theol. casuum cap. 2. n. 2. Dr. Ames cas l. 1. c. 5. determines That it is never Lawful for the Authority of other Men to act against our own Opinion be it certain or onely probable We do not remember more than four Protestant Casuists we had whose Writings are more than forty Years Old These were three the fourth was Judicious Mr. Perkins who seems to reduce this to a doubting Conscience and determines That it is sin to act against it because he cannot act in Faith if his Conscience be doubting or erring or gain-saying These being all our former Divines who wrote Treatises of Cases further Testimony is not to be expected It were easie to produce multitudes collaterally speaking the same things But for them we shall but refer the Reader to any Protestants that have formerly wrote upon Rom. 14.23 and see what they say upon these words Whoso doubteth is damned if he eateth because he eateth not of Faith For whatsoever is not of Faith is sin And v. 5. Let every Man be fully perswaded in his oven mind he will find enough we pass it over intending our selves to make some use of that Text anon § 3. But as we said before look as in this very point there is a very great difference betwixt the Ancient Fathers and School-men and the Modern Jesuites in so much that the latter will not allow the Judgment of any of the Ancients in these Cases and both Vasquez and Sanchez think fit to Caution their Readers against it and both Cellot and Reginaldus expresly determine That in Moral Questions the Modern Casuists are to be preferred before the Ancient Fathers though they lived nearer the times of the Apostles So we shall Observe that some later Protestant Divines have delivered themselves either something odly or expresly contrary

us Deut. 17.8 Acts 15. we will Examine both these Texts § 8. The words in Deut. 17.8 9 10 11 12. are these If there arise a Matter too hard for thee in Judgment betwixt Blood and Blood betwixt plea and plea betwixt stroke and stroke being matters of Controversie within thy Gates Then shalt thou arise and get thee up unto the place which the Lord thy God shall chuse And thou shalt come unto the Priests the Levites and unto the Judge who shall be in those days and enquire and they shall shew the Sentence of Judgment And thou shalt do according to the Sentence which they of that place which the Lord shall chuse shall shew thee and thou shalt Observe to do according to all that they shall inform thee According to the Sentence of the Law which they shall teach thee and according to the Judgment which they shall tell thee thou shalt do thou shalt not decline from the Sentence which they shall shew thee to the right hand nor to the left And the Man that will do presumptuously and will not hearken unto the Priest that standeth up to Minister before the Lord thy God or unto the Judge even that Man shall dye and thou shalt put away evil from Israel These words are fully that Text. As to which we desire our Reader to Observe 1. That this is Bellarmines first Text to prove Blind Obedience the Duty of Christians So that we may easily judge which way the Face of these Disputants doth stand It might suffice but to refer our Reader to Chamer or any that have Answered Bellamine for an Answer to this Objection 2. Secondly In case this Text will serve the turn now it will infallibly prove the Lawfulness of Priests and Judges putting to death such as shall not do what they have once determined in any case that is indifferent of it self and once by them made necessary But surely this must be asserted by none that value their words at any rate But to come close to the Text if any Argument in this case can be drawn from it it must be this What the Israelites were bound to do upon any determination by the Priest or Judge in the place where the Lord should chuse In hard Matters between plea and plea blood and blood That Christians under the Gospel are bound to do upon the final decision of the Priest or Judge in hard matters between plea and plea blood and blood trespass and trespass stroke and stroke But the Israelites were bound to do according to the final decision of the Priest or Judge sitting in the place which the Lord should chuse and Judging in hard Matters between Plea and Plea Blood and Blood c. Ergo. If the Argument be thus laid it concludeth nothing like the Question but is transitus degenere in genus Our Question is not about Civil things in Controversie where a Man may take any part and not sin against God and where Submission onely inferreth Sussering in matters of a temporal concern but about Religious Actions where a Practice is required which the Party Commanded Judgeth sinful And hazarding the damnation of his Soul Whence also it may be Observed That no Conclusion can from hence be fetched from any purity of Reason But if Mr. Booker intends from that Text to conclude the Question his Argument must be laid thus What the Israelites were bound to as to hard Case● in Judgment betwixt plea and plea blood and blood trespass and trespass stroke and stroke That Christians are bound to do in all Litigious Controverted Cases of Religion or at least in such Cases where the Superiours Judge the things by them Commanded to be in themselves of an indifferent Nature But the Israelites in hard Cases in Judgment betwixt plea and plea Blood and Blood trespass and trespass stroke and stroke were Obliged to do according to and not decline from the Sentence of the Law which the Priests the Levites or the Judges should teach them and according to the Judgment which they should shew them though in the Opinion of their own Consciences it swerved utterly from that which was right Ergo. Christians also under the Gospel in all Litigiout controverted Cases especially of such Quality where the Superiour Judgeth the things indifferent are bound to do according to and not to decline from the Sentence of the Law which the Civil or Ecclesiastical Superiours now adays shall teach them though in the Opinion of their own Consciences it utterly swerveth from that which is right To which we Answer 1. The whole concludeth nothing to the purpose for it concludeth not that they ought to do any thing contrary to the Sentence of the Divine Law That was of Old to the Priests a Regula Regulans an Original Rule and must be so to all Superiours and it is impossible any should be Obliged to Act contrary to it But lest any should say they were bound to take the Priests and Levites and Judges Sentence to be the Sentence of the Divine Law we further Answer § 9. By denying the Major which is most notoriously false and before it can be made good those that inherit Mr. Hooker's Spirit must make good these things 1. That there it the same Reason or Equity for Superiours final decision and a Christians submission as to his Practice to a final decision in things of a Religious Nature which the Superiour Judgeth indifferent and the Inferiour from Arguments which in the Judgment of his particular Conscience seem probable judgeth unlawful As there was for a final decision amongst the Jews and their submission to such decision in Matters between Blood and Blood plea and plea trespass and trespass stroke and stroke which apparently there is not a determination in the latter being absolutely necessary for upholding the Beings of Polities the Course and Order of Justice the preservation of Humane Society and not making the World a Den of Thieves and Murtherers But no such things can be pretended for things in Religion by the Superiours owned in their own Nature but indifferent and so left by God Neither is there the same Equity or Reason for the Inferiours Submission For what harm could the Inferiour have by submitting to the final decision of the Priests Levites and Judges in those Civil things He might possibly be inforced to put up a wrong to part with a little Money or with some part of his Inheritance or suffer in case of Blood operatly which was his due by a Divine Law He was in no danger by such submission of damning his Soul or wounding his Conscience by finning against God though he might judge he were severely or unrighteously dealt with He might possibly think the part contrary to the decision more just and right But what was he to do Nothing but part with his own Right in Temporal things for the sake of publick Justice and Order and Peace which is every good Christians Duty and Choice But here

ripe for the Will 's Election What shall the Will do Shall it can it notwithstanding this chuse the thing and command the soul to will desire embrace it or the outward Man to do it because it is Commanded If this be not to turn a Man into a Beast to turn the Rational soul out of doors and set a Man with his heels upward and to pervert the Natural Order of the Souls Operations we know not what is § 4. Willany say the Case is here partially represented because under the Circumstance of Superiours Command The Understanding hath also a report to bring in about that Proposition That it is by Divine Precept necessary to Obey Superiours We Answer if the Proposition be laid down so Universal the Understanding must either Deny it or distinguish about it It must therefore be onely laid down thus In all Lawful things it is necessary to obey Superiours Now it hinders not for this is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 this is the Question whether the thing be Lawful or no The Soul judgeth otherwise Now we would gladly know of our Modern Casuists Whether the Law of Nature having obliged the Will to move According to the dictate of the Vnderstanding is be possible that a rational Soul without presumptuous sinning and offering violence to the very Law and Principles of Humane Nature should will chuse command or allow a thing so represented to it as before probably unlawful What we cannot apprehend good I hope we cannot will it for this were to will evil under the Notion o● evil a thing Naturally impossible Now how shall●● judge that good being to take all its Evidence from the ●●●●llect which the understanding judgeth false and naught Will any one say that it is possible that from extrinsecal Arguments such as the Authority and Testimony of Men the Will and Command of Superiours c. it may judge that true and good which from intrinsecal Arguments it judgeth false and naught This is indeed the Jesuites Doctrine Yet they will not allow a Superiours merum imperium a sufficient Topick in the case but as was said before it is justly abominated by all Protestants of what sort size or perswasion soever § 5. Exabundanti if any will be so vain as to say the Soul hath warrant enough to judge the thing probably Lawful because Superiours bave Commanded it when in the mean time from Arguments appearing to it very probable it judgeth it sinful and unlawful We would gladly know from what Principles it should form such a Judgment the Principle must be one of these 1. Either these Superiours are Infallible so am not I in the Exercise of my Reason So inded the Papists hold as to the Pope and so may be justified in their perverse Judgments in this case from that Maxime 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Granting one absurdity a thousand will follow But all Protestants reserve Infallibility from him who is Truth it self and deny it to any Creature 2. It must therefore be this Principle Though Superiours be fallible yet it is better their Judgments though in following them there be a danger of a troubled Conscience and eternal damnation than my own But is it possible an ingenuous Rational Soul should so Judge This being neither sensibly not rationally demonstrable It is impossible that the Soul should apprehend any such thing but upon Revelation It must teerefore as Hooker saith appear to be The will of God and to that as to the highest Reason if it can be shewed Reason Sanctified and Regulated by Religion will submit Aut alas who shall shew us any such Text Ante retro Simoeis stuet c. Will they urge Rom. 13. Let every Soul be subject to the Higher Powers and other Texts of the like import We allow the Scripture we say the matter to be our Duty but we say it must be in things which do not appear to us sinful and wicked this were to set up some higher than the highest Otherwise the Apostles Acts 3. much erred not onely in their Practice but in their Principle too there laid down It is better to obey God than Man In vain had they said that if every Obedience to Man as a Superiour were co nomine Obedience to God will any say But this was where a Magistrate Commanded a thing unlawful How did that appear but by the dictate of their Consciences It indeed now doth otherwise appear to us because the Scripture so represents it since written but how did it appear to them otherwise Why might not the Magistrate have then told them as some now Interpret that revealed will of God to us He that doubteth is damned if he eateth that is except his Superiour Commands ●●m to eat And why might not Nebuchadnezzar have told the three Children It is true God had forbidden them to Worship Graven Images but it must be understood excegt the Magistrate Commanded them so to do But this Objection is too ridiculous to Answer further Let this be enough for our Second Argument § 5. We proceed to a Third Argument which we form thus For any Person to do that in the doing of which he can never have any quiet and peace in his own Conscience is sinful and wicked But for a Man to Act under any Circumstance contrary to the Opinion of his own Conscience is to do that in the doing of which he can never have any quiet and Peace in his own Conscience Ergo. We are much at loss to fancy which Proposition any can be hardy enough to deny Will any deny the Major Surely Charity begins at home and every Man in the first place is bound to keep Quiet within himself if he can Thou art bound to the Peace of thy own Conscience Thou canst not Obey saith Mr. Fulwood in the place before cited a very remarkable Sentence for the Author of the Doctrine of Schism to think upon professing so much oneness of mind with Mr. Fulwood in that Book and certainly he is the greatest Self-destroyer in the World that doth not first look in his Actions to secure the Peace of his Conscience Next throwing a Man's self into Hell the greatest mischief he can do himself is to set his Conscience upon a continual belching in his Face § 6. For the Minor It is as plain for he must have a dull a very dull and lazy Conscience that will let him Act contrary to its Judgment and yet be quiet and not continually tell him thou subjectest thy self to the wrath of God thou sinnest wilfully presumptuously and there is nothing remains for thee but either a quick Repentance a sorrow for what thou hast done and a leaving off to do it any more or a certain dreadful looking for of Divine and fiery Indignation § 7. Will any say why should not a Man's Conscience be as unquiet while a man contrary to the Command of God for Obeying Superiours doth not Obey them The Answer is easie No Law of God Obligeth

them if he Judgeth them in their Circumstances but such as he may do or Omit he is bound to do them or omit them according to the Nature of the Superiours Precept But if the Inferiour Judgeth them unlawful for him to do though this his Judgment be formed but from probable Arguments that is such as to him so appear not from indubitably certain Arguments he cannot Obey but is bound patiently to submit to the penalty imposed upon him for Disobedience So that these Objections are perfectly vain and no incumbrances at all upon our Proposition § 3. But we say It is one thing for us to allow a Power in Superiours to determine us where both we and they agree the thing in its own Nature and cloathed with such Circumstances of a middle and indifferent Nature And quite another thing for us and that as to the things of God too and such things where for doing or not doing the danger of sin and Eternal Damnation lyeth to make him Our Judge what is and what is not Indifferent It is impossible any intelligent Soul should allow the latter to his Superiour without also making him a Judge both of Good and Evil. For Indifferency being a middle betwixt those two extremes there 's no possibility of his being a Judge of it without also determining concerning the extremes And if we could allow this we should as to private Christians use see little need of the Scriptures for the Superiour must Interpret them too or all will come to nothing § 4. Nay we further say that there may be some stresses of Providence as to which the being of Polities and the Preservation of Justice lyes at stake where some things may be Lawful which in Ordinary Cases God will not allow You know saith our Saviour what David did when he was an hungry how he did eat the Shew-bread which was not Lawful for any in Ordinary Cases to eat but for the Priests onely It was a Case of real Necessity to save his Life It would have been a sin both in David upon a lighter pretence to have done it and for the Priest to have suffered it § 5. We have been the more willing to search this business to the bottom because of that andacious Liberty which some have taken either openly to assert or cunningly to insinuate the contrary a thing undoubtedly of as i●l a tendency as can well be imagined leading directly to a Blind Obedience one of the Capital Errors of the Church of Rome and possibly a more sottish and brutish Errour than any other which they have as devesting Man of his Humane Nature and that which is the Mother of most other of their abominable Doctrines any absurdities as Naturally following that first as the Thread follows the Needle If it can be supposed that there may be a Superiour absurd in his Sentiments or Practice which that it may be we need no other Evidence than what the Infallible Choyce it self hath given the wiser part of the World often enough Evidence of § 6. We have been amazed to Observe how tenderly Modern Writers have touched this Question Mr. Hooker indeed as we have before said is peremptory enough against us to that degree as we find none of his Posterity in that thing approving his saying The Author of the Pulpit Conceptions Popular deceptions fairly skips it over telling us what should be done by us if we scruple our Obedience but not a word what we should do if we from probable Arguments judge the thing unlawful Freeman as we shewed before is peremptory enough beyond all Reason or Religion But another writing a Book professedly about Tenderness of Conscience when he comes to Answer the Case of Doubting speaks almost to every thing else but prudently leaves out this Case Others tell us that if the thing Commanded be apparently demonstratively indisputably evil if it tends to debauch us in our Sentiments concerning the God-head c. we must not Obey but if otherwise either they say nothing or else tell us we ought to Obey The Reverend Bishop Sanderson and Mr. Fulwood are the onely two Modern Divines that we have met with daring to state the Case distinctly and speaking to it in the Dialect of Protestants But others in their Writings either shew little of Divines stating the Case falsly and not speaking ad idem Or little of Protestants saying that which no Protestant Divines ever durst say before them § 6. And from hence to every considerate Reader will be inevitably concluded the Reasonableness if not the Necessity of an Indulgence from all Superiours who will think themselves under any Obligation to the Royal Law of Love For as that Law will Oblige them not to suffer sin in their Inferiours Lev. 19.17 So. it will also Oblige them not to lay a stumbling block before them that are weak by which they both sin against Christ 1 Cor. 8.9 10 11 12 13. and do not walk Charitably Rom. 14.15 Nor yet to make them to suffer because they dare not sin For to Act against their Conscience though but Opining is sin For all this Suffering must unquestionably be a Suffering for Righteousness sake for to depart from Iniquity is unquestionably a piece of Righteousness Hence though the Superiour upon the first Account be bound to Oblige his Inferiours by his Civil Sanction to do all that which the Law of God hath made necessary for them to do and to forbear what the same Law hath forbidden otherwise he should suffer sin upon them Yet if he thinks fit to Command other things in Religion which possibly himself and some of his Inferiours Judge not sinful and tendent to some State or Decency but the want of them makes not the Servite indecent or disorderly according to any Light or Law of Nature or the general guise and Custom of the place and many other his Inferiours Judge so far from tendency to Order and Decency that they from Arguments which to them appear very probable judge them sinful and unlawful and so capable of no such Notion how he can possibly exact an Obedience to any such Commands without 1. Either putting his Inferiours upon sin and continual disturbance of their Consciences 2. Or making them Sufferers because they dare not sin against God which is as we said before a species at least of Suffering for Righteousness-sake We must confess our selves which possibly is our weakness not Divines sufficient to understand and should thank any one that could inform us Now betwixt these there lyeth no Medium but a Gracious Indulgence the very Remedy which His Most Excellent Majesty hath suited to this fore Evil. § 7. And here we would have finished our Discourse but for a late Book called The Cases of Scandal and Persecution which yet hath no such depths in it as to ask us long time to sound The Author spends one part of his Book in perswading us to believe what we know none ever doubted viz. That

Understanding affirmeth neither part we wonder how it should Opine then § 10. This is a great point in Popery Jesuitisme especially and of no small gain to them for by this mea●● they can resolve Cases as they list absolve Mens Consciences as they please and Interpret the Law of God into a very pleasing consi●tency with the Lusts and Passions of all Men If it were admitted for true it would open a wide door for Men to do what they listed without any check or controul of Conscience There being but few things in practice which one Doctor or other under one Circumstance or other hath not judged Lawful There are few actions but are disputable saith Mr. Freeman in his Reasonableness of Divine Service p. 33. And if one or more Doctors affirm it lawful say the Popish Casuists the private Christian may assent to it as probably Lawful though at the same time from Artificial Intrinsick Arguments formed in his own Breast he judgeth it probably unlawful And we wish some professing themselves Protestant Divines did not cant after this Tune though it may be they will not as the Papists rest it upon the Opinion of one Doctor but many Learned Men if they did not a little linger after this we cannot tell what means their constant choaking of us with the bare Opinions of others contrary to ours in which surely we are no further concerned than as quickned by them to re-examine our own Intrinsecal Arguments more strictly § 11. We must declare our selves in the Negative of this Question and do affirm That it is Naturally impossible for a Rational Soul in a practical proposition to Judge that part from Extrinsecal in-artificial Arguments Probably Lawful which at the same time from Intrinsecal artificial Arguments formed in its own Breast it judgeth Probably Vnlawful and in this Judgment we are confirmed § 12. Because it is contrary to the innate Principles of a reasonable Soul 1. We suppose every one will without difficulty grant it a Principle of a Reasonble Soul To Conclude nothing but from Rational Foundations Reason is a Power within us Discoursing Conclusions from Principles It acknowledged there is a God and that he hath revealed his will in those Books which we call The Holy Scriptures and must acknowledge it the most reasonable thing imaginable that he should be acknowledged true in his word Hence it concludes many Propositions of Faith upon the bare Authority of God revealing them and exerciseth it self no further than to compare Spiritual things with Spiritual But having not that Evidence for other things it maketh use of inbred Notions and from those Principles raiseth Conclusions Now let us consider from what Principle it is possible that Reason should infer such a Conclusion as this That is probably Lawful for me to do which such or such Divines be they more or fewer more or less Learned think is Lawful or which Superiours require under that Notion notwithstanding any Artificial Intrinsick Arguments which make my own Conscience Judge it very probably unlawful It must be this Those Doctors or those Superiours know better than I. Doth Reason in a man allow any such conclusion Modesty indeed upon such an Account may make a reasonable Soul Jealous and Suspitious and to issue out a Writ for a better enquiry upon its Arguments but it is impossible that it should rest in such a Conclusion to guide its Practice where the hazard of the Eternal Felicity of a Soul is concerned Reason speaketh in the Language of Job to his Friends Job 12.3 I have Vnderstanding as well as you and be it what it will gradually compared with all the Doctors reason it is the Candle of the Lord set up in my Soul according to the Light of which I must walk Or in the words of Elihu Job 32.8 There is a Spirit in Man and the Inspiration of the Almighty gives him Vnderstanding Reason saith Bring forth your strong arguments and I will answer them or hear mine and do you answer me § 13. Besides Reason saith If this were belonging to all Doctors or all Superiours that Wisdom as Job saith must dye with them how is it they are not agreed amongst themselves Such and such are on my side if it doth not agree to all Superiours and all Doctors how shall I be assured that it more agrees to those on the adverse side than to those on my fide to Dr. Vasquez more than to Pope Adrian S. 14 Further saith Reason do not know and see that there are many Doctores who are not Docti and that many Learned men in all Ages have been in Factions doth not Dr. Vasquez himself tell me in 12. disp 62. Cap. 4. That he cannot deny but a whole rout of Doctors may embrace an Opinion without any Reason against whom saith he another Doctor of great Authority may bring into the Schools an Opinion maturely deliberated Vasquez need not be Credited if we did not upon Experience find daily that not one of many Doctors examines things but follows some Leader as diligently as Sheep do one another over an Hedge that many either understand not the true Question about which they will be Writing in this Age or of choice mistake it write far more passion than Divinity or Reason which made Vasquez some others of his Brethren deliver their Opinion That a Learned Man may act according to his own Opinion though contrary to the Opinions of other Doctors §. 15 Reason tells a Man that Reason is not entailed to the Relation of a Superiour or the Degree of a Doctor Animae rationales sunt aequales in perfectione Substantiali and Superiority or Doctorship make no difference Experience teacheth us that improvement by Study makes not a difference as to the Exercise of Reason between all Superiours and Inferiours nor between all those who are Doctors and no Doctors It remaineth therefore that the particular Reason of every Soul must stand up in defence of it self especially in matters of Practice as to which Eternal Salvation or Damnation are concerned so as it is not Naturally possible that a Reasonable Soul should from Forreign Authority conclude a thing probably Lawful which from its own Rational conclusions it judgeth probably Vnlawful § 16 But further yet certainly it is repugnant to the connate Principles of Reasonable Souls to assert contraries both at the same time to be true because it is of the Nature of contraries to destroy one another Now the Understanding which shall thus assert must at the same time speak these two things which are manifest contradictions This is Lawful This is not Lawful I think and Judge it Lawful because A B C D c. say so I think it Vnlawful because my own Reason comparing things Spiritual with Spiritual or concluding from confessed Principles tells me it is so Must not this be a very odd Soul that can Discourse after this rate Vasquez was aware of this and thought to avoid it by