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A28548 Anicius Manlius Severinus Boetius, Of the consolation of philosophy in five books / made English and illustrated with notes by the Right Honourable Richard, Lord Viscount Preston.; De consolatione philosophiae. English Boethius, d. 524.; Preston, Richard Graham, Viscount, 1648-1695. 1695 (1695) Wing B3433; ESTC R3694 155,933 280

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increased by several Rivers amongst the rest Pactolus it enters into the Aegean Sea by the Bay of Smyrna and is said to have Golden Sands Nec pulcher Ganges atque auro turbidus Hermus Virgil. Georg. l. 1. v. 151. Hermus in his yellow way Can to the World convey Or India with its warmer Hand Which Diamonds yields and Pearls both Can never clear the Mind But rather doth it blind And in thick Darkness doth it clothe That which doth raise our Thoughts so high The mighty shining Bait Which so doth captivate Doth in Earth's lowest Caverns lie But the gay Light which Heaven doth rule From which its Force it hath Doth in no obscure Path But by clear Light conduct the Soul He then who sees that Source of Light And will it comprehend Compar'd to it he 'll find That the Sun's Rays are wrap'd in Night PROSA XI Boet. I Assent and am overcome by the Strength of thy Reasons Phil. At how great a rate wouldst thou value this Good if thou didst rightly know it Bo. At an infinite rate if at the same time I might attain to the Knowledg of God who is the true Good Ph. That thou shalt do so I shall make clear to thee by undeniable Reasons if thou wilt but grant me those things which a little before I have laid down as Conclusions Bo. I grant them all Ph. Have not I made it clear that those things which are desired by most are not therefore true and perfect Goods because they differ amongst themselves and that when one is absent the other cannot confer absolute Happiness And then that they are the perfect Good when they are molded up into one Form that is to say when Self-sufficiency Power Veneration Renown and Pleasure collectively meet For if they be not one and the same thing they have nothing to recommend them or to make them to be numbred amongst desirable things Bo. I grant thou hast demonstrated these things nor can they by any means be doubted of Ph. These things then when they are distinct not being Goods and when they meet immediately being made Goods do not they owe their Beings of Good to Unity Bo. So it seems to me Ph. But wilt thou yield that every thing which is good is so by the Participation of the sovereign Good or not Bo. It is certainly so Ph. Thou must then by the same Reason acknowledg Unity and Good to be the same thing for the Substance of those things must be the same whose Effects do not naturally differ Bo. I cannot deny it Ph. Knowest thou then that every Being doth so long endure and subsist as it is entire and knit together by Unity but that as soon as it looses that Bond it is dissolv'd and Privation follows Bo. How dost thou make out that Ph. Thus As in Animals or sensitive Creatures it is plain the Soul and Body being united and continuing together the Being then is called Animal a living Creature but so soon as this Unity is dissolved by the Separation of these it immediately perisheth ceasing to be what it was before The Body also it self which whilst it remains in one Form by the Conjunction of its Members retains the Form and Resemblance of a Man but if by dissevering and segregating the Parts that Oneness is distracted it is no more what before it was In the same manner if we run through all other Beings it will surely appear that every thing as long as it preserveth Unity doth subsist and if that dies the other must also die with it Bo. Though I consider never so long yet I can see no other thing Ph. Is there then any thing which inasmuch as it lives naturally doth forgo its Desire of Subsisting and affect Corruption and Annihilation Bo. If I consider those living Creatures which have any Power of willing or refusing I do not in Nature find any thing which without some foreign Impulse or the Concurrence of outward Accidents doth cast away its Intention and Desire of subsisting and willingly hasten to Destruction for every Animal is endowed with that great Principle of Self-preservation and pursues it and doth eschew Mischief and Death But if I casting an Eye upon the Vegetative World consider Herbs and Trees and other inanimate things I confess I am under a doubt and know not well what to think of them Ph. But even of these there is no Cause that thou shouldst doubt for behold Herbs and Trees first choose a convenient Place to grow in where their Nature as much as it can hinders them from withering and perishing soon for some spring in the Fields others upon Mountains others rise in Lakes and Marshes others put forth amongst the Stones some choose the most barren Sands for the Place of their Birth and all these if any Hand should endeavour to transplant them to any other place would forthwith wither But Nature gives to every thing that which is agreeable to and convenient for them and endeavours that they should not perish before their time Dost thou not know that all Herbs and Trees as if their Mouths were fastned downward in the Earth do draw up their Nourishment by the Root and diffuse their Strength and Bark as through their Marrow And also that the softest and most tender Matter as the Pith or Marrow is is always laid up in the most inward Cabinet and covered by a strong Coat of Wood and the uppermost Garment of Bark is opposed to the Storms and Weather as being fitted best to endure them And canst thou not here behold and admire the Diligence and Care of Nature which propagates all things by a Multiplicity of Seeds which all Men know are as a Foundation for a Building not to remain for a time but as if it were for ever And even those things which are thought to be inanimate do not they by the same Reason desire that which properly belongs to them and to preserve their Beings For why should Levity carry the Flames upward and Gravity make the Earth tend downwards towards its Centre but that these Places and Motions agree with their several Bodies Furthermore whatsoever is agreeable to the Nature of any thing that preserves that thing as that which hath an Abhorrency from it corrupts and destroys it Now that which is hard as a Stone doth most tenaciously adhere together in all its Parts and resists an easy Dissolution but what things are liquid or flowing as Air and Water yield easily to those who would separate them but soon again return and slide back to those things from which they were divided but Fire doth utterly refuse any such Division And now I do not treat of the voluntary Motions of a knowing and discerning Soul but of natural Intention and Instinct Thus we swallow our Meat without thinking of it and draw our Breath in our Sleep without perceiving it For the Love of Life is not derived to living Creatures from the Inclinations and Bent of
threefold Nature not that it consists of three Elements as some think but because it is one and the middle one also of three things which by our natural Light we can know and distinguish to wit it is placed betwixt the Mind which we cannot perceive by our Senses and the Body which we may Thirdly it is said cuncta movere not because all Bodies are moved by this Spirit or Soul for many are solid whose Parts do therefore rest and are quiet but because no Bodies may be moved unless this do move Fourthly it is said a Deo connecti because as no Body doth move but by Touch or Contact so this Soul or Spirit of the World cannot move unless it be connected with the Body to be moved but it was connected by God by whom when it was first made it was moved by those Laws of Nature which God himself did constitute Fifthly it is said per consona membra resolvi because this anima mundi is a most liquid Body whose Parts as they are moved and resolved into divers Places so they enter the different Members of the informed Body But these Members are agreeing as amongst themselves so with this Soul or Spirit by which they are to be moved so that the lesser Members have Motion first from the Soul then the greater from the lesser Members and also from the Soul Lastly it is said secta circuire because joining its End to the Beginning of its Motion it may seem to form that Motion into a round And it is cut or divided because it being liquid as Water or Air it is a Mass or Congeries of several little Bodies which as they are moved are separated one from the other This Soul is said to circulate through the Body in which it doth reside because every Body unless it be resisted continueth its Motion So the Sap of a Tree doth rather chuse to ascend to the Top of it than to press it self through the Bark and it is easier for this Spirit or Soul to circulate in its Body than to go out of it several Bodies being ready every where to resist it Middle Soul firmly connect Of th' threefold Nature which each thing doth move Then by agreeing Numbers it resolv'st When that is done and cut into two Orbs It moves about returning to it self And then incompassing the Mind profound Doth by that fair Idea turn the Heaven Thou by such Causes dost produce all Souls And (k) All Souls and lesser Lives Our Philosopher meaneth by this humane Souls and those also of vegetative and sensitive Creatures and he giveth to them the Epithet of Minores because they are included in lesser Vehicles or Machines putting this Difference however between Man and other Creatures that there is in him besides this corporeal Spirit which is subservient to principal Form a Mind which hath the Faculty of thinking from whence it is that this corporeal Spirit loseth in a Man its Name and Dignity and therefore it may be said that in a Man there is only one Soul and that endowed with Reason Esse apibus partem divinae mentis haustus Aetherios dixêre Deum namque ire per omnes Terrasque tractusque maris coelumque profundum Hinc pecudes armenta viros genus omne ferarum Quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcessere vitas Virg. l 4. Georg. v. 220. lesser Lives thou mak'st them to be fit To their light Vehicles and them dost sow In Heaven and Earth they then again to thee By a kind Law and Ordinance benign Like a recoiling Flame gladly revert O Father let our Minds ascend on high And view thy Throne august let them behold The Fountain of all Good and when we have Found the true Light may our Minds Eyes on thee The noblest Object be for ever fix'd Dispel the Mists remove the mighty Bulk Of Earth-bred-weight and in thy Splendor shine For thou art ever clear thou to the Good Art Peace and Rest whoever seeth thee Sees End Beginning Bearer Leader Path in one PROSA X. NOW that thou hast had the Character of the true and also of the false Felicity truly represented to thee I think it time to shew thee in what the Perfection of Happiness is placed And whilst we are in quest of this I think our best Method will be to examine whether there can in Nature be such a Good as that which thou hast before defin'd lest the Vanity of Imagination and Heat of Thought should deceive us and carry us beyond the Truth of the Matter subjected to our Inquiry But that such a thing doth exist and that it is as it were the Fountain of all Good cannot be denied for every thing which is said to be imperfect is proved to be so by the Diminution of that which is perfect Hence it is that if any thing in any kind be said to be imperfect it is presently understood that in it there is also something perfect For if Perfection be taken away no Man can tell in what that which is said to be imperfect can exist For Nature doth not derive her Origine from things diminished and inconsummate but proceeding from an intire and absolute Substance she extends her self in the remotest and most fruitless Beings So that if as before I have demonstrated there be a certain imperfect Felicity a fading Good there must also be without doubt a solid and perfect one It is most logically and truly concluded said I But where this doth reside continued she thus consider That God the Governour of all things is good is proved by the universal Opinion of all Men. For since nothing can be found out which is better than God who will deny Him to be good than whom nothing can be better Reason then doth so clearly demonstrate that God is good that at the same time it evinceth the sovereign Good to be in him For if it were not so he could not be the Ruler of all things for there would be some Being excelling him which would possess the perfect Good and in this World seem to excel him and be antienter than he We have already shewn that all perfect things excel those which are less perfect Wherefore that we may not infinitely produce our Reasons it must be confess'd that the great God is full of the greatest and most perfect Goodness But we have already shewn that perfect Goodness is true Happiness Therefore it necessarily follows that true and consummate Happiness resides only in the great and most perfect God This returned I I apprehend aright nor can I by any means say against it Then I pray thee saith she see how well and irrefragably thou canst prove what I have said to wit that God is wholly replenished with the sovereign Good How shall I do that replied I Dost thou presume said she that the Father of all things hath received this sovereign Good with which he is proved to abound from any thing without himself or that he
equal in all Beings for in supernal and divine Substances such as Spirits and Angels are there is a clear Judgment and an incorrupt Will and a ready and efficacious Power of doing things which are desired But the Souls of Men must necessarily be more free when they continue to exercise themselves in the Contemplation of the Divine Mind and they must be less so when they are withdrawn from that noble Speculation and slide into corporal Substances and yet less free when they are incompassed by and closely bound up in earthly Members But the last and meanest Slavery is when they give themselves over to Vice and so fall from the Possession of their proper Reason for as soon as they remove their Eyes from the Light of the highest Truth and fix them upon low dark and base Objects they are immediately wrapt in a Cloud of Ignorance are disturbed with pernicious Desires and Affections to which when they approach and agree they help forward and increase that Servitude which they bring upon themselves and in some manner even under the Liberty proper to them they are Captives But yet the Eye of Providence which beholds all things from Eternity sees this and disposeth according to their Merits all things as they are predestinated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is Homer Iliad γ. He seeth and heareth all things METRUM II. Puro clarum lumine Phoebum Melliflui canit oris Homerus c. The sweet-tongu'd Homer's flowing Verse Doth sing of Phebus and his purer Light Yet the Sun's Rays can never pierce Into Earth's Bowels nor his Sight Reach to the secret Chambers of the Deep Where Thetis doth her choicest Treasure keep But with the World 's great Maker 't is not so He all things from the Heights of Heaven doth see Nor Earth nor Clouds impede he 'l know What is what was and what shall be Since God doth every Being then alone Clearly behold call him the Only Sun PROSA III. Boet. NOW I am distracted with a more difficult Doubt than ever Ph. What is that I pray thee for I do conjecture at what thou art troubled Bo. It seems to be repugnant and adverse to Reason that God should have a Fore-knowledg of all things and at the same time there should be any such thing as Free-will For if God foresees all things and can in no manner be deceived then that which Providence hath foreseen must necessarily come to pass Wherefore if from Eternity God doth not only fore-know the Deeds but also the Counsels and Wills of Men there can be no Liberty of Will nor can there be any other Deed or any other Will than that which Divine Providence which can by no means be deceived hath foreseen or forethought For if things may fall out contrary to such Foreseeing and be wrested another way there can be no firm Prescience of Futurities but rather an uncertain Opinion of them and I take it to be impious to believe this of God Nor do I approve of that Reason by which some think themselves able to unloose the Knot of this Question For they say that a thing is not necessarily to happen because God hath foreseen that it will be but rather on the contrary because a thing is to happen it cannot lie hid from the Divine Providence and so the Necessity slides upon the other side it not being necessary that those things should happen which are foreseen though it be so that those things should be foreseen which are to happen And it is just as if Men busied themselves to enquire which thing is the Cause of which thing as whether Prescience be the Cause of the Necessity of things to come or otherwise the Necessity of things to come were the Cause of Providence But I shall now endeavour to evince by Demonstration that however the Order of Causes may stand the Event of things foreseen is necessary although Prescience doth not seem to impose a Necessity upon future things to fall out For if a Man sit the Opinion of him that conjectures that he doth sit must necessarily be true And again on the contrary if that Opinion be true of any one because he sits it is of necessity true that he doth sit In both of these then there is a Necessity lodged for in one is the Necessity of Sitting and in the other is that of Truth But a Man doth not therefore sit because the Opinion of his sitting is true but the Opinion is rather true because the Man did sit before So that although the Cause of Truth ariseth from the other part yet there is in both a common Necessity seated Thus may we reason also concerning Providence and future Events For if therefore because things are future they are foreseen they are not therefore because they are foreseen to arrive Nevertheless it is necessary that things to come should be foreseen of God or if foreseen that they should happen and this thing alone is enough to destroy the Doctrine of Free-will But how preposterous a thing is it now that the Event of temporal things should be said to be the Cause of eternal Prescience For what other thing is it to imagine that God doth foresee future things because they are to happen than to imagine that what hath happened before hath been the Cause of God's all-searching Providence Add also to this that when I know that any thing is it is necessary that it should be So also when I know that such a thing shall come that must of necessity arrive Hence it therefore follows that the Event of a foreknown thing cannot be avoided Lastly if any Man doth think otherwise of a thing than it really is that is not only not Knowledg but a false Opinion differing far from the Truth of Knowledg Wherefore if any thing be so to come that its Arrival be not certain and necessary how can it be foreseen that it will come For as pure Knowledg is not mingled and confounded with Falsity so also that thing which is conceived by it and derived from it can be no otherwise than according to its Conception And this is the Cause that Science abhors Lies and Falsity and cannot be mistaken in what it knows because it is necessary that every thing should be so as that comprehends it to be What follows then In what manner doth God know these uncertain Contingencies For if he believes that a thing shall inevitably fall out which possibly may not fall out he is deceived but to believe or to speak this is impiously to blaspheme But if Providence discerneth that so as things are to come they shall come so that he knows that many may or may not be done what then is this Fore-knowledg which comprehends nothing certain nothing stable Or what doth this differ from the ridiculous Divination of (d) Tiresias He was a Prophet of Thebes who was feigned to be made blind by Juno and to be endowed with the Faculty of