increased by several Rivers amongst the rest Pactolus it enters into the Aegean Sea by the Bay of Smyrna and is said to have Golden Sands Nec pulcher Ganges atque auro turbidus Hermus Virgil. Georg. l. 1. v. 151. Hermus in his yellow way Can to the World convey Or India with its warmer Hand Which Diamonds yields and Pearls both Can never clear the Mind But rather doth it blind And in thick Darkness doth it clothe That which doth raise our Thoughts so high The mighty shining Bait Which so doth captivate Doth in Earth's lowest Caverns lie But the gay Light which Heaven doth rule From which its Force it hath Doth in no obscure Path But by clear Light conduct the Soul He then who sees that Source of Light And will it comprehend Compar'd to it he 'll find That the Sun's Rays are wrap'd in Night PROSA XI Boet. I Assent and am overcome by the Strength of thy Reasons Phil. At how great a rate wouldst thou value this Good if thou didst rightly know it Bo. At an infinite rate if at the same time I might attain to the Knowledg of God who is the true Good Ph. That thou shalt do so I shall make clear to thee by undeniable Reasons if thou wilt but grant me those things which a little before I have laid down as Conclusions Bo. I grant them all Ph. Have not I made it clear that those things which are desired by most are not therefore true and perfect Goods because they differ amongst themselves and that when one is absent the other cannot confer absolute Happiness And then that they are the perfect Good when they are molded up into one Form that is to say when Self-sufficiency Power Veneration Renown and Pleasure collectively meet For if they be not one and the same thing they have nothing to recommend them or to make them to be numbred amongst desirable things Bo. I grant thou hast demonstrated these things nor can they by any means be doubted of Ph. These things then when they are distinct not being Goods and when they meet immediately being made Goods do not they owe their Beings of Good to Unity Bo. So it seems to me Ph. But wilt thou yield that every thing which is good is so by the Participation of the sovereign Good or not Bo. It is certainly so Ph. Thou must then by the same Reason acknowledg Unity and Good to be the same thing for the Substance of those things must be the same whose Effects do not naturally differ Bo. I cannot deny it Ph. Knowest thou then that every Being doth so long endure and subsist as it is entire and knit together by Unity but that as soon as it looses that Bond it is dissolv'd and Privation follows Bo. How dost thou make out that Ph. Thus As in Animals or sensitive Creatures it is plain the Soul and Body being united and continuing together the Being then is called Animal a living Creature but so soon as this Unity is dissolved by the Separation of these it immediately perisheth ceasing to be what it was before The Body also it self which whilst it remains in one Form by the Conjunction of its Members retains the Form and Resemblance of a Man but if by dissevering and segregating the Parts that Oneness is distracted it is no more what before it was In the same manner if we run through all other Beings it will surely appear that every thing as long as it preserveth Unity doth subsist and if that dies the other must also die with it Bo. Though I consider never so long yet I can see no other thing Ph. Is there then any thing which inasmuch as it lives naturally doth forgo its Desire of Subsisting and affect Corruption and Annihilation Bo. If I consider those living Creatures which have any Power of willing or refusing I do not in Nature find any thing which without some foreign Impulse or the Concurrence of outward Accidents doth cast away its Intention and Desire of subsisting and willingly hasten to Destruction for every Animal is endowed with that great Principle of Self-preservation and pursues it and doth eschew Mischief and Death But if I casting an Eye upon the Vegetative World consider Herbs and Trees and other inanimate things I confess I am under a doubt and know not well what to think of them Ph. But even of these there is no Cause that thou shouldst doubt for behold Herbs and Trees first choose a convenient Place to grow in where their Nature as much as it can hinders them from withering and perishing soon for some spring in the Fields others upon Mountains others rise in Lakes and Marshes others put forth amongst the Stones some choose the most barren Sands for the Place of their Birth and all these if any Hand should endeavour to transplant them to any other place would forthwith wither But Nature gives to every thing that which is agreeable to and convenient for them and endeavours that they should not perish before their time Dost thou not know that all Herbs and Trees as if their Mouths were fastned downward in the Earth do draw up their Nourishment by the Root and diffuse their Strength and Bark as through their Marrow And also that the softest and most tender Matter as the Pith or Marrow is is always laid up in the most inward Cabinet and covered by a strong Coat of Wood and the uppermost Garment of Bark is opposed to the Storms and Weather as being fitted best to endure them And canst thou not here behold and admire the Diligence and Care of Nature which propagates all things by a Multiplicity of Seeds which all Men know are as a Foundation for a Building not to remain for a time but as if it were for ever And even those things which are thought to be inanimate do not they by the same Reason desire that which properly belongs to them and to preserve their Beings For why should Levity carry the Flames upward and Gravity make the Earth tend downwards towards its Centre but that these Places and Motions agree with their several Bodies Furthermore whatsoever is agreeable to the Nature of any thing that preserves that thing as that which hath an Abhorrency from it corrupts and destroys it Now that which is hard as a Stone doth most tenaciously adhere together in all its Parts and resists an easy Dissolution but what things are liquid or flowing as Air and Water yield easily to those who would separate them but soon again return and slide back to those things from which they were divided but Fire doth utterly refuse any such Division And now I do not treat of the voluntary Motions of a knowing and discerning Soul but of natural Intention and Instinct Thus we swallow our Meat without thinking of it and draw our Breath in our Sleep without perceiving it For the Love of Life is not derived to living Creatures from the Inclinations and Bent of
equal in all Beings for in supernal and divine Substances such as Spirits and Angels are there is a clear Judgment and an incorrupt Will and a ready and efficacious Power of doing things which are desired But the Souls of Men must necessarily be more free when they continue to exercise themselves in the Contemplation of the Divine Mind and they must be less so when they are withdrawn from that noble Speculation and slide into corporal Substances and yet less free when they are incompassed by and closely bound up in earthly Members But the last and meanest Slavery is when they give themselves over to Vice and so fall from the Possession of their proper Reason for as soon as they remove their Eyes from the Light of the highest Truth and fix them upon low dark and base Objects they are immediately wrapt in a Cloud of Ignorance are disturbed with pernicious Desires and Affections to which when they approach and agree they help forward and increase that Servitude which they bring upon themselves and in some manner even under the Liberty proper to them they are Captives But yet the Eye of Providence which beholds all things from Eternity sees this and disposeth according to their Merits all things as they are predestinated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is Homer Iliad γ. He seeth and heareth all things METRUM II. Puro clarum lumine Phoebum Melliflui canit oris Homerus c. The sweet-tongu'd Homer's flowing Verse Doth sing of Phebus and his purer Light Yet the Sun's Rays can never pierce Into Earth's Bowels nor his Sight Reach to the secret Chambers of the Deep Where Thetis doth her choicest Treasure keep But with the World 's great Maker 't is not so He all things from the Heights of Heaven doth see Nor Earth nor Clouds impede he 'l know What is what was and what shall be Since God doth every Being then alone Clearly behold call him the Only Sun PROSA III. Boet. NOW I am distracted with a more difficult Doubt than ever Ph. What is that I pray thee for I do conjecture at what thou art troubled Bo. It seems to be repugnant and adverse to Reason that God should have a Fore-knowledg of all things and at the same time there should be any such thing as Free-will For if God foresees all things and can in no manner be deceived then that which Providence hath foreseen must necessarily come to pass Wherefore if from Eternity God doth not only fore-know the Deeds but also the Counsels and Wills of Men there can be no Liberty of Will nor can there be any other Deed or any other Will than that which Divine Providence which can by no means be deceived hath foreseen or forethought For if things may fall out contrary to such Foreseeing and be wrested another way there can be no firm Prescience of Futurities but rather an uncertain Opinion of them and I take it to be impious to believe this of God Nor do I approve of that Reason by which some think themselves able to unloose the Knot of this Question For they say that a thing is not necessarily to happen because God hath foreseen that it will be but rather on the contrary because a thing is to happen it cannot lie hid from the Divine Providence and so the Necessity slides upon the other side it not being necessary that those things should happen which are foreseen though it be so that those things should be foreseen which are to happen And it is just as if Men busied themselves to enquire which thing is the Cause of which thing as whether Prescience be the Cause of the Necessity of things to come or otherwise the Necessity of things to come were the Cause of Providence But I shall now endeavour to evince by Demonstration that however the Order of Causes may stand the Event of things foreseen is necessary although Prescience doth not seem to impose a Necessity upon future things to fall out For if a Man sit the Opinion of him that conjectures that he doth sit must necessarily be true And again on the contrary if that Opinion be true of any one because he sits it is of necessity true that he doth sit In both of these then there is a Necessity lodged for in one is the Necessity of Sitting and in the other is that of Truth But a Man doth not therefore sit because the Opinion of his sitting is true but the Opinion is rather true because the Man did sit before So that although the Cause of Truth ariseth from the other part yet there is in both a common Necessity seated Thus may we reason also concerning Providence and future Events For if therefore because things are future they are foreseen they are not therefore because they are foreseen to arrive Nevertheless it is necessary that things to come should be foreseen of God or if foreseen that they should happen and this thing alone is enough to destroy the Doctrine of Free-will But how preposterous a thing is it now that the Event of temporal things should be said to be the Cause of eternal Prescience For what other thing is it to imagine that God doth foresee future things because they are to happen than to imagine that what hath happened before hath been the Cause of God's all-searching Providence Add also to this that when I know that any thing is it is necessary that it should be So also when I know that such a thing shall come that must of necessity arrive Hence it therefore follows that the Event of a foreknown thing cannot be avoided Lastly if any Man doth think otherwise of a thing than it really is that is not only not Knowledg but a false Opinion differing far from the Truth of Knowledg Wherefore if any thing be so to come that its Arrival be not certain and necessary how can it be foreseen that it will come For as pure Knowledg is not mingled and confounded with Falsity so also that thing which is conceived by it and derived from it can be no otherwise than according to its Conception And this is the Cause that Science abhors Lies and Falsity and cannot be mistaken in what it knows because it is necessary that every thing should be so as that comprehends it to be What follows then In what manner doth God know these uncertain Contingencies For if he believes that a thing shall inevitably fall out which possibly may not fall out he is deceived but to believe or to speak this is impiously to blaspheme But if Providence discerneth that so as things are to come they shall come so that he knows that many may or may not be done what then is this Fore-knowledg which comprehends nothing certain nothing stable Or what doth this differ from the ridiculous Divination of (d) Tiresias He was a Prophet of Thebes who was feigned to be made blind by Juno and to be endowed with the Faculty of
stretcheth it self to the four Quarters of the World East West North and South Thus Virg. Aen. l. 6. En hujus nate auspiciis illa inclyta Roma Imperium terris animos aequabit Olympo Hic vir hic est tibi quem promitti saepius audis Augustus Caesar Divûm genus aurea condet Saecula qui rursus Latio regnata per aâ—va Saturno quondam super Garamantas Indos Proferet imperium jacet extra sydera tellus Extra anni solisque vias ubi coelifet Atlas Axem humero torquet stellis ardentibus aptum Lands gave Law Which Phebus in his daily Voyage saw Stretching along from the remotest East To th' utmost Point of the Sea-beaten West And all those other Countries did controul Which tow'rds the South reach from the Northern Pole Could Nero's Power remove his Passions Sway Or force his Rage his Reason to obey Power should not added be to him whose Will Before did prompt and urge him to do ill PROSA VII Boe. THOU knowest well that I did the least of any Man covet mortal and fading Possessions I only desired an honourable Occasion of being employed in Business and fit Matter to exercise my Vertue lest it should silently grow useless and old Phi. This is one thing which may tempt I had almost said debauch some Minds naturally well inclin'd and endowed though not yet arrived at the Perfection of Vertue I mean the Desire of Glory and the Fame of having deserved well of ones Country and the Common-wealth but how small and how truly void of Weight even that is do but from hence observe Thou hast learnt from Astrological Demonstrations that the whole Circuit of the Earth bears the Proportion only of a Point to the Greatness of the Heaven that is if it be compar'd to the Magnitude of the Celestial Globe it may be judged to have no Space or Compass And of this small Region of the World almost the fourth Part is inhabited by living Creatures known to us as Ptolomy hath seemed to prove And if thou shalt abate also all which is overflown by the Sea and Marshes and Lakes and also all that Space of the Globe which is desart and overspread with Sands or burnt up by the too near Vicinity of the Sun thou wilt find that what is left for the Habitation of Men is but a very small Proportion And do you who are placed in and confined to the least Point of this Point think of nothing but of propagating your Fame and exerting your Names and making your selves renowned What is there august or magnificent in Glory confined to so small and narrow Bounds Add to this that this little Enclosure is inhabited by several Nations differing in Tongue in Manners and in way of Life to whom as well by reason of the Difficulties and Inconveniencies of Journying as by the Diversity of Languages and the Unfrequency of Commerce not only the Fame of particular Men but even the Names of great Cities cannot arrive In the time of Marcus Tullius as himself in his Writings tells us the Fame of the Roman Common-wealth which was then well grown and robust and redoubled by the Parthians and several other Nations in these Parts was not yet known to those who inhabited beyond the Mountain Caucasus Thou seest then how narrow and strait that Glory is which thou labourest so much to propagate and dilate Dost thou think that the Glories of a Roman Man shall reach those Places where the Fame and Story of the illustrious Roman Common-wealth would never reach Do not the Customs and Institutions of several Countries disagree among themselves so that that which with some is adjudged to be Praise-worthy with others is thought to deserve Disgrace and Punishment Hence it appears that it is not the Interest of any Man who desires Renown to have his Name spread through many Countries and divers People but that he should be content with that Glory and Fame which he can arrive at amongst his Country-men and not care to have the Immortality of it extended beyond the Bounds of one Country But how many Men great and famous in their Generations hath the Carelesness and Neglect of Writers passed by in Silence Although indeed one may justly ask what can such Memorials profit a Man which with their Authors must at length yield to the Powers of Age and be with them buried in Oblivion But Men imagine that they have obtained Immortality if their Names shall but live in future Ages But if they would compare this to the infinite Progress of Eternity what have they which should make them pleased at the Diuturnity of their Fame For if the Duration of one Moment be compared with that of ten thousand Years the Spaces of both being definite it hath some though a very little Portion of it But yet this very Number of Years and as many more as can by Numbers be multiplied cannot at all be compared to endless Duration For there may be some Comparison betwixt finite Beings amongst themselves but there can be none at all betwixt Infinite and Finite Hence it is that Fame however durable and lasting considered with infinite Eternity will seem not only to be little but indeed nothing But you think you cannot do well unless you have the empty Applause of the People and forgoing the Pleasures of a good Conscience and the Consideration of the innate Worth of Vertue and the Pleasure of Actions resulting from it you look for a Reward from the partial Breath and vain Discourses of the Many Observe now how one once ingeniously plaid upon the Lightness and Folly of such Arrogance A certain Person accosted another with contumelious Language who had assumed to himself the Name of a Philosopher not out of a Principle of Vertue but for the itch of Vain-glory and he added that he should now know if he were a true Philosopher by bearing patiently the Injuries offered to him he putting on for a while a counterfeit Patience said then to the other Dost thou now believe me to be a Philosopher He answered smartly again I had indeed believed it if thou couldst still have held thy Tongue What then is it that great and worthy Men for of such I speak who would by vertuous ways acquire Glory what is it I say of Advantage which they receive by a great Name after the Body is resolved into Dust For if which our Reason and Religion forbids us to believe the whole Fabrick of Man Body and Soul is dissolv'd and dies together then is there no Glory nor can there be when he to whom it belongs doth no more exist But if the Soul which hath deserved well when it 's enlarg'd from its earthly Prison doth take a swift and unimpeach'd Flight to Heaven will it not despise the Earth and its Businesses and being wrapt in the Joys of Heaven rejoice that it is wholly exempt from sublunary Considerations and Concerns METRUM VII Quicunque solam mente
praecipiti petit Summumque credit gloriam c. I. Who Glory vainly doth pursue And dreams it is the Sovereign Good Let him the starry Countries view And then 't will soon be understood How small Earth is compar'd to that vast Frame And then he will despise not seek a glorious Name II. Why to be freed from Death should Man desire For though his Fame doth widely fly Though splendid Titles he acquire At last the mighty thing must die And in the Grave is no Distinction made Betwixt the Great Low the Scepter the Spade III. Where is the good (f) Fabritius He was a Roman Consul and celebrated by both Orators and Poets especially for his Fidelity and Truth First because he was tempted with the Offer of great Gifts by Pyrrhus King of the Epirotes and even of the Promise of the fourth part of his Kingdoms if he would leave the Interest and Service of his Country which he refused And also because he sent back to the same King Pyrrhus Tymochares his Physician who offered for a Reward to give Poison to his Prince Which generous Action was so admired by that King that he said it was more easy to divert the Sun from its Course than Fabritius from the Paths of Honesty From whence Claud. Carm. 26. v. 130. Et nulli pervia culpae Pectora Fabritii donis invicta vel armis Fabritius now And where the noble (g) Brutus This was Lucius Brutus so called for the Stupidity which he acted for fear of the Tarquins It was he who after the Expulsion of the Tarquins for the Rape committed upon Lucretia did assert the Roman Liberty together with Collatinus for which Reason they were constituted the first Consuls Brutus Where Is (h) Cato As Brutus had his Name imposed from his feigned Stupidity so Cato derived his from his Wisdom because catus signifieth Wise from whence Cato There were two excellent Men who were famous by this Sir-name of one or both of whom Philosophy may here speak viz. Cato major and Cato minor sprung both at different times from the Portian Stock settled at Tusculum now called Trascat within a few Miles of Rome where there are many pleasant Villa's magnificent Palaces Gardens adorned with Grotto's Cascades and other Water-works belonging to the Roman Princes and Nobility The first who was called the Censor flourished about the Year 570 from the building of the City and arrived at a great old Age. Cato minor who was called Praetorius lived in the very time of the Civil Wars betwixt Caesar and Pompey of whom Lucan singeth something too profanely Regard being had to the Heathenish Superstition of those times thus Victrix causa Deis placuit sed victa Catoni Horace also l. 2. Carm. Ode 1. thus Audire magnos jam videor duces Non indecoro pulvere sordidos Et cuncta terrarum subacta Praeter atrocem animum Catonis Cato with his rugged Brow 'T is little of them doth appear In a few Letters now their Fame doth live But nothing of their Persons can the knowledg give IV. Men lie in dark Oblivion's Shade Nor are their Vertues spread by Fame Nor can they think t' outlive their Fate By a poor airy dying Name To conquering Time that fancied Life must yield So Death will twice victoriously have won the Field PROSA VIII BUT lest thou shouldst believe that I am an inexorable Enemy to Fortune and wage an endless War against her I shall confess that there are sometimes when that faithless One may deserve well of Men then I mean when she opens and discovers her self and freely confesses her self to be what she really is Thou dost not perhaps yet understand what I am about to say The thing is wonderful which I desire to tell thee and therefore I almost want Words to express this Paradox to wit that adverse Fortune doth more profit and truly more advantage Men than prosperous For this under the Cloak and Shew of Happiness when she smileth and caresses lies and deceives the other always fairly and openly declares her Enmity and shews her Instability by her constant Changes That deceives this instructs that by a precious Shew of Good binds the Minds of those she favours this by the Knowledg of her Fickleness frees and absolves them therefore thou mayst observe the one always faithless airy wavering and ignorant of its own Condition the other sober stay'd and even prudent in managing and making the best use of Adversity Lastly prosperous Fortune by her Allurements and Blandishments draws Men from the right aside and out of the direct way leading to that which is the sovereign Good whilst for the most part the other doth not only lead Men but as it were draw them with a Hook to true and genuine Happiness Further thinkest thou that it is to be esteemed the least Good which we receive from this hard and at the first sight horrible Fortune that she doth discover to thee the Hearts of thy faithful Friends since she distinguisheth between the constant and doubtful Countenances of thy Companions and Acquaintance and when she departeth that she taketh away her Friends and leaves thine At what rate wouldst thou have bought the knowledg of this when thou wert as it seemed to thee in thy prosperous Estate Forbear then to deplore the Loss of thy Riches and Honours since thou hast found the most valuable Jewel the most pretious kind of Riches I mean the Knowledg of thy unalterable and sincere Friends METRUM VIII Quod mundus stabili fide Concordes variat vices c. That this great Fabrick of the Vniverse Doth by a constant Order suffer Change That Elements which by Nature disagree Are by a Line perpetual firmly bound That Phebus in his Chariot brings the Day And that the Moon doth rule the sable Night Which Hesperus officiously leads on That the salt Waves are kept within their Bounds Lest they should on the Right of Earth encroach Is all the Effect of Love which rules the Sea Which doth command the many-peopled Earth And even to Heaven its Empire doth extend If he his Reins should carelesly remit Those things which now affectionately love Would presently declare an open War And would the well-mov'd Machine soon dissolve This People of a different Lip doth bind With sacred Cords this ties the Nuptial Knot And with chaste Vows does what is bound confirm This doth to Friendship dictate binding Laws O happy Men if Love which rules in Heaven Had an Ascendant o'r your noble Minds The End of the Second Book ANICIUS MANLIUS SEVERINUS BOETIUS OF THE Consolation of Philosophy BOOK the Third The ARGUMENT Philosophy now urgeth stronger Arguments to wit that all Men do seek after Happiness but that they do very much err in the way of obtaining it whilst some believe to find it in Riches others in Dignities in the Favour of Kings in the Glory of great Atchievements in Nobility or in the Pleasures of the Body
Force which doth behold Each Being then or whence is that Which doth divide those things when known Or that again which recollects Divided things changing its way Alternately for sometimes it Raiseth its Head to higher things Then to the lowest doth descend And when t' it self it doth return Confuteth false things by the true This Cause now efficacious is More powerful too than that which doth Admit the Characters impress'd Like servile Matter yet the Sense Which in the living Body doth remain Doth go before and doth excite And move the Forces of the Mind As when the Light doth strike the Eye Or as the Voice doth strike the Ear Then is the Force of Thought awak'd Calls out the Species which it hath within It self to move about and act Applies them to the outward Notes Mingling and joining all those Images Fix'd in it self in foreign Forms PROSA V. BUT if in knowing and perceiving of Bodies although the Qualities objected from without may affect the Instruments or Organs of the Senses and the Passion or Suffering of the Body may go before the Strength and Vigour of the acting Soul which may call forth the Act of the Mind or Thought residing within it self and may in the mean time excite the Forms which lie quietly within If I say in the perception of bodily things the Soul is not by the Impression of Passion made to know these things but by its own Power judgeth of the Passion and Suffering of the Body how much more then shall those things which are absolved and free from the Passions and Affections of Bodies and from any Commerce with them not in discerning be guided by outward Objects but accomplish and execute purely the Acts of their own Minds and Thoughts By this Reason then there are several sorts of Knowing to several and differing Substances For Sense which is alone destitute of all other Knowledg is allotted to those Creatures which cannot move such as are Shells of the Sea and other things which are nourished by sticking to the Rocks But the imaginative Power is possessed by Beasts which can move of themselves and who seem to have some kind of Faculty of desiring or refusing things but Reason is the Talent of Mankind alone as Intelligence only appertains to the Divine Nature Hence it is that that Knowledg exceeds all other which by its own Nature is not only acquainted with the Matter of that which properly belongs to it but also with that which is subjected to all others But how will it then fall out if Sense and Imagination oppose and are contrary to Reason affirming that that Universal is nothing which Reason thinks it so perfectly sees For Sense intimates that that which is sensible and imaginable cannot be universal Then therefore the Judgment of Reason must be true that nothing can be sensible Or else because she knows that many things are subject to Sense and Imagination the Conception of Reason must be vain which considereth that which is sensible and singular as an Universal But if Reason should again answer to those things and say that she truly comprehends what is sensible and imaginable within the Compass of Universality but yet she cannot aspire to the Knowledg of Universality because Knowledg of the former cannot exceed corporeal Figures But as to the Knowledg of things we ought to give Belief to the more firm and perfect Judgment of them In a Contest of this kind therefore ought not we who have in us all the Powers of Reason Imagination and Sense rather to approve and support the Cause of Reason Like this it is when humane Reason imagines that the Divine Understanding beholdeth or knoweth not things to come but just as they are beheld or known by her For thus thou arguest What things do not seem to have certain and necessary Events they cannot be foreknown certainly to happen Of these things therefore there is no Fore-knowledg or if we believe that there be any then is there nothing which doth not happen of Necessity If therefore we might have the Judgment of the Divine Mind as we are Partakers of Reason we should judg as we have already judged that Imagination and Sense ought to yield to Reason and also judg that it is most just that humane Reason ought to submit it self to the Mind of God Wherefore if we may let us advance our selves to the Height of the highest Intelligence and there Reason shall see that which she cannot find in her self and that is in what manner the Prescience of God seeth and defineth all things although they have no certain Event nor let this be looked upon as an Opinion but rather the Purity and Simplicity of the Supreme Knowledg which can be included within no Bounds METRUM V. Quam variis terras animalia permeant figuris Namque alia extento sunt corpore pulveremque verrunt c. In Shapes how differing Creatures wander thrô the Earth Some with extended Bodies go and sweep the Dust And by th' Impression of their Breasts a Furrow make Some beat the yielding winds with nimbleness of wing And with a moister Flight swim through the Air Some with their Feet affect to press the softer ground Or in the verdant Meads or in green Woods to walk Yet thô thou seest them differ in their various Forms They do in this together centre and agree That their Looks downward bent their heavier Sense makes dull But Man alone doth raise his noble Head on high Light and erect he stands and doth despise the Earth Thou art admonish'd by this Figure then unless Thy earthly Mind doth thee deceive that whilst towards The Heavens thy Face thou raisest and thy Forehead dost Advance thou shouldst advance thy Mind on high Lest whilst thy Body tow'rds the starry Regions looks Thy noble Mind should tow'rds the Centre be deprest PROSA VI. Phil. BEcause therefore as I have demonstrated a little before that every thing which is known is not by its own Nature known but by that of him who comprehendeth it let us now behold as far as it is lawful for Philosophers what the Estate is of the Divine Substance that we may better see what this Knowledg is It is the common Judgment then of all those who live by the Rules of Reason that God is Eternal Let us then consider what Eternity is for this would lay open to us at the same time the Nature of God and his Knowledg Eternity therefore is a total and a perfect Possession of a Life which shall never have an End which appears more clearly from the Comparison of temporal things For whatsoever liveth in time proceedeth to the present from what is past to what is to come And there is nothing under the Laws of Time which can at once comprehend the whole Space of its Life For a Man doth not yet possess to Morrow and what was Yesterday he hath already lost and in the Life of this Day you live no
more but as in this passing and transitory flowing Moment Whatever therefore is subject to a temporal Condition although as Aristotle thought of the World it never began to be nor shall ever have end but its Life shall be drawn out to an Infinity of Time yet it is not that which Men may rightly judg to be Eternal for although it comprehends the Space of an infinite Life yet it doth not embrace altogether at the same time for it wants the future things which are not yet arrived Whatsoever then comprehends and possesses together and at the same time the Fulness of an endless Life which wants nothing of Futurity and from which nothing that is past is escaped ought justly to be esteemed Eternal For it is necessary that that should always be present to it self and Master of it self and that it have always with it the Infinity of movable Time Therefore they err who when they heard that Plato believed that this World neither had Beginning nor shall have End in this manner they make that which is created Coeternal with its Creator For it is one thing to be led on through an interminable Life which Plato granted to the World and another to comprehend at the same time together the Presence of such an one which it is manifest is only proper to God Nor ought it to seem to us that God is antienter than the created World by quantity of Time but rather by the simple Propriety of his Nature The infinite Motion of temporal things imitates the present State of immovable Life and since it can neither counterfeit nor equal it from Immobility it passeth into Motion from the Simplicity of a present it goeth into an infinite Quantity of future and past Time And since it cannot together possess the Fulness of it self yet in this since it never ceaseth in some measure to be it seems faintly to emulate that to whose Perfection it cannot attain and which it cannot fully express binding it self to some kind of Presence of this small and swift Moment which because it bears some Resemblance of that durable and present Time it giveth to those things to which it happens a seeming Existence And because this small Moment may not stay it doth therefore proceed in the infinite way of Time And hence it is that it continues it self in Progression to the Fulness of which it could not attain by being fixed If then we would following Plato impose Names sutable to things let us say that God is only Eternal and the World is Perpetual Since then every Judgment comprehends those things which are subject to it according to its own Nature there must always be allowed to God an eternal and ever present State His Knowledg also exceeding all the Motions of Time remaineth in the Pureness and Simplicity of its Presence containing the infinite Spaces of present and past Time and considereth all things by the Purity of that Knowledg as if they were now doing If therefore thou wouldst rightly consider of that Prescience by which he fore-knoweth all things thou shalt not esteem it as a Fore-knowledg of what is to come but more rightly thou wilt find it to be the Knowledg of the present and never failing NOW Therefore it is not to be called Praevidentia but rather Providentia which being placed far above all inferiour things doth as it were behold all from the very Heights of the World What is it then that thou wouldst have that these things should be attended by a necessary Event which are view'd by the Divine Eye since Men do not make those things necessary which they behold For doth thine Eye which beholdeth a present thing add any thing of Necessity to it Bo. No it doth not Ph. But if Men do make a just Comparison betwixt the Divine and Humane Prescience then as you see something by your temporal one God seeth all things by his eternal one Therefore this Divine Fore-sight doth not change the Nature and Property of things but only beholds those things as present to him which shall in time be produced Nor doth it confound the Judgment of things but knoweth at one View what is necessarily and what is not necessarily to arrive So you when at the same time you see a Man walk upon the Earth and the Sun to rise in the Heaven although both were seen at the same time yet you discern and judg that the Action of the one was voluntary and that of the other was a necessary one So therefore the Eye of God looking down and beholding all things under him doth not at all disturb the Qualities of things which to him are present but in respect of Time to you are future Hence it is that this is not an Opinion but a certain Knowledg grounded upon Truth that when God knoweth that any thing is to be at the same time he knoweth it not to be under a Necessity of existing And here if thou sayst that what God doth foresee shall happen it cannot but happen and that which cannot do otherwise than happen must of Necessity come to pass and so must bind me to a Necessity I will confess that this is a most solid Truth but it is such an one that scarce any one can attain to unless he be acquainted with the Mind of God For I will answer thee thus That the Thing which is to arrive being referr'd to the Divine Knowledg becomes necessary but if it be taken according to its own Nature it seems altogether absolute and free For there are two kinds of Necessities one simple as that it is necessary for all Men to die the other is conditional as if thou knowest any one doth walk it is necessary that he do walk What then any one knows it cannot be otherwise than it is known to be But this Condition doth not at all draw that simple one along with it For its proper Nature doth not constitute this Necessity but the Addition of the Condition For no Necessity compels a Man to walk who walks voluntarily although it must be necessary that he should walk when he doth Therefore in the same manner if Providence seeth any thing present it is necessary that it should be although in its own Nature there be nothing to constitute that Necessity but all Futurities which proceed from Free-will God sees as present to him These things therefore Relation being had to the Divine Sight are made necessary by the Condition of the Divine Knowledg but being considered by themselves they do not recede from the absolute Liberty of their Nature All things therefore shall come to pass which God foresees shall have a Being but many of them proceed from Free-will which although they do happen yet they do not by existing lose any thing of their Nature by which it was in their Power before they did happen not to have happened Bo. What then is it to the purpose if things be not necessary in their own Nature since