Selected quad for the lemma: heaven_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
heaven_n	chapter_n	hell_n	verse_n	5,924	5	10.8274	5	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A44006	Of libertie and necessitie a treatise, wherein all controversie concerning predestination, election, free-will, grace, merits, reprobation, &c. is fully decided and cleared, in answer to a treatise written by the Bishop of London-derry, on the same subject / by Thomas Hobs.	Hobbes, Thomas, 1588-1679.	1654 (1654)	Wing H2252; ESTC R20187	27,647	98

a man that deliberateth but one while proceed toward action another while retire from it as the hope of greater good draws him or the fear of greater evil drives him away A Child may be so young as to do what it does without all deliberation but that is but till it have the chance to be hurt by doing of somewhat or till it be of age to understand the rod for the actions wherein he hath once had a check shall be deliberated on the second time Fools and Madmen manifestly deliberate no less than the wisest men though they make not so good a choice the images of things being by disease altered For Bees and Spiders if my Lord Bishop had had so little to do as to be a spectatour of their actions he would have confessed not onely election but art prudence and policy in them very near equal to that of mankinde Of Bees Aristotle saies their life is Civil Again his Lordship is deceived if he think any spontaneous action after once being checked in it differs from an action voluntary and elective for even the setting of a mans foot in the posture for walking and the action of ordinary eating was once deliberated of how and when it should be done and though afterward it became easie habitual so as to be done without fore-thought yet that does not hinder but that the act is voluntary and proceedeth from election So also are the rashest actions of cholerick persons voluntary and upon deliberation for who is there but very young children that hath not considered when and how farr he ought or safely may strike or revile Seeing then his Lordship agrees with me that such actions are necessitated and the fancie of those that do them determined to the action they do it follows out of his Lordships own doctrine that the liberty of election does not take away the necessitie of electing this or that individual thing And thus one of his Arguments fights against another The 2 Argument from Scripture consisteth in histories of men that did one thing when if they would they might have done another the places are two One is 1 Kings 3.11 where the history saies God was pleased that Solomon who might if he would have asked Riches or Revenge did nevertheless aske wisdom at Gods hands the other is the words of S. Peter to Ananias Acts 5.4 After it was sold was it not in thine own power To which the answer is the same with that I answered to the former places that they prove there is elction but do not disprove the necessity which I maintain of what they so elect The fourth Argument for to the 3 and fifth I shall make but one answer is to this effect If the decree of God or his foreknowledge or the influence of the stars or the concatenation of causes or the physical or moral efficacy of causes or the last dictate of the understanding or whatsoever it be do take away true liberty then Adam before his fall had no true liberty Quicquid ostendes mihi sic incredulus odi That which I say necessitateth and determinateth every action that his Lordship may no longer doubt of my meaning is the summ of all things which being now existent conduce and concurr to the production of that action hereafter whereof if any one thing now were wanting the effect could not be produced This concourse of causes whereof every one is determined be such as it is by a like concourse of former causes may well be called in respect they were all set and ordered by the eternal cause of all things God Almighty the Decree of God But that the foreknowledge of God should be a cause of any thing cannot be truely said seeing fore-knowledge is knowledge and knowledge depends on the existence of the things known and not they on it The influence of the Starres is but a small part of the whole cause consisting of the concourse of all Agents Nor does the concourse of all causes make one simple chain or concatination but an innumerable number of chains joyned together not in all parts but in the first link God Almighty and consequently the whole cause of an event doth not always depend on one single chain but on many together Natural efficacy of objects does determine voluntary Agents and necessitates the will and consequently the action but for moral efficacy I understand not what he means The last dictate of the judgement concerning the good or bad that may follow on any action is not properly the whole cause but the last part of it and yet may be said to Produce the effect necessarily in such manner as the last feather may be said to break a horses back when there were so many laid on before as there wanted but that one to do it Now for his Argument that if the concourse of all the causes necessitate the effect that then it follows Adam had no true liberty I deny the consequence for I make not onely the effect but also the election of that particular effect necessary in as much as the will it self each propension of a man during his deliberation is as much necessitated and depends on a sufficient cause as any thing else whatsoever As for example it is no more necessary that fire should burn than that a man or other creature whose limbs be moved by fancy should have election that is liberty to do what he hath a fancy to do though it be not in his will or power to choose his fancie or choose his election and will This doctrine because my Lord Bishop saies he hates I doubt had better been suppressed as it should have been if both your Lordship and he had not pressed me to an answer The Arguments of greatest consequence are the third and the fifth and they fall both into one namely If there be a necessity of all events that it will follow That praise and reprehension and reward and punishment are all vain and unjust and that if God should openly forbid and secretly necessitate the same action punishing men for what they could not avoid there would be no belief among them of Heaven and Hell To oppose hereunto I must borrow an answer from S. Paul Rom. 9.11 From the 11 verse of the Chapter to the 18 is laid down the very same objection in these words When they meaning Esau and Jacob were yet unborn and had done neither good nor evil that the purpose of God according to election not by works but by him that calleth might remain firm it was said unto her viz Rebecca that the elder should serve the younger c. What then shall we say Is there injustice with God God forbid It is not therefore in him that willeth nor in him that runneth but in God that sheweth mercy For the Scripture saith to Pharaoh I have stirred thee up that I might shew my power in thee and that my name might be set forth in all the