hill nor yet sparing the open side and the matter brought to a narrow issue without any meanes or succour to relieue them he tooke a target from one of the hindmost souldiers for he himselfe was come thither without one and pressing to the front of the battell called the Centurions by name and incouraging the rest commanded the ensignes to be aduanced toward the enemie and the Maniples to be inlarged that they might with greater facilitie and readinesse vse their swordes THE FIRST OBSERVATION THis Publius Sextus Baculus was the chiefest Centurion of the 12 legion being the first Centurion of that Maniple of the Triarij that was of the first Cohort in that legion for that place was the greatest dignitie that could happen to a Centurion and therefore he was called by the name of Centurio primipili or simplie Primipilus and sometimes Primopilus or Primus Centurio By him were commonly published the mandates and edicts of the Emperour and Tribunes and therefore the rest of the Centurions at all times had an eie vnto him and the rather for that the eagle which was the peculiar ensigne of euerie legion was committed to his charge and carried in his Maniple Neither was this dignitie without speciall commoditie as may be gathered out of diuers authors We reade further that it was no disparagement for a Tribune after his Tribunality was expired to be a Primipile in a legion notwithstanding there was a law made I know not vpon what occasion that no Tribune should afterward be Primipile But let this suffice concerning the office and title of P. S. Baculus THE SECOND OBSERVATION ANd heere I may not omit to giue the Target any honour I may and therefore I will take occasion to describe it in Caesars hand as in the place of greatest dignitie and much honouring the excellencie therof Polybius maketh the Target to containe two foot and an halfe in breadth ouerthwart the conuexsurface thereof and the length foure foote of what forme or fashion soeuer they were of for the Romans had two sortes of Targets amongst their legionarie the first caried the proportion of that figure which the Geometricians call Ouall a figure of an vnequall latitude broadest in the midst and narrow at both the endes like vnto an egge described in Plano the other sorte was of an equall latitude and resembled the fashion of a guttertile and thereupon was called Scutum imbricatum The matter whereof a target was made was a double board one fastened vpon another with lint and Buls glew and couered with an Oxe hide or some other stiffe leather the vpper and lower part of the target were bound about with a plate of yron to keepe it from cleauing and in the middest there was a bosse of yron or brasse which they called Vmbo Romulus brought them in first amongst the Romans taking the vse of them from the Sabines The wood whereof they were made was for the most part either sallow alder or figtree whereof Plinie giueth this reason for as much as these trees are colde and waterish and therefore any blow or thrust that was made vpon the wood was presently contracted and shut vp againe But for as much as the Target was of such reputation amongst the Roman Armes and challenged such interest in the greatest of their Empire let vs enter a little into the consideration of the vse and commoditie thereof which cannot be better vnderstood then by that conference which Polybius hath made betweene the weapons of the Romans and the Macedonians and therefore I haue thought it good to insert it in these discourses And thus it followeth Of the difference of the Roman and Macedonian Weapons I Promised in my sixt book that I would make a comparison between the weapons of the Romans and Macedonians And that I would likewise write of the disposition of either of their armies how they do differ one from another in what regard the one or the other were either inferiour or superiour which promise I wil now with diligence endeuour to performe And for as much as the armies of the Macedonians haue giuen so good testimonies of themselues by their actions by ouercomming the armies as wel of those of Asia as of Greece and that the battailes of the Romans haue conquered as well those of Africa as all the Easterne countries of Europe It shall not be amisse but very profitable to search out the difference of either especially seeing that these our times haue not once but many times seene triall both of their battailes and forces that knowing the reason why the Romans do ouercome and in their battailes carie awaie the better we doe not as vaine men were wont to do attribute the same to fortune and esteeme them without reason happy victors but rather looking into the true causes we giue them their due praises according to the direction of reason and sound iudgment Concerning the battels betweene Hanniball and the Romans and concerning the Romans their losses there is no neede that I speake much For their losses are neither to be imputed to the defect of their Armes or disposition of their Armies but to the dexteritie and industrie of Hanniball but wee haue entreated therof when we made mention of the battels themselues and the end it selfe of that warre doth especiallie confirme this our opinion For vvhen they had gotten a captaine equall vvith Hanniball euen consequentlie vvith all his victories vanished And hee had no sooner ouercome the Romans but by and by reiecting his owne weapons hee trained his Armie to their weapons and so taking them vp in the beginning he continued them on vnto the ende And Pyrrhus in his war against the Romans did vse both their weapons and order and made as it were a medlie both of the cohort and phalanx but notwithstanding it serued him not to get the victory but alwaies the euent by some meanes or other made the same doubtfull concerning whom it were not vnfit that I should saie something least in being altogether silent it might seeme to preiudice this mine opinion But notwithstanding I will hasten to my purposed comparison Now touching the phalanx if it haue the disposition and forces proper to it nothing is able to oppose it selfe against it or to sustaine the violence thereof as maie easily by many documents be approued For when an armed man doth stand firme in the space of three foote in so thicke an array of battell and the length of their pikes being according to the first basis or scantling sixteene foote but according to the true and right conueniencie of them 14 cubits out of which are taken foure allowed for the space betweene the left hand which supporteth the same and the butte ende thereof vvhiles he standes in a readinesse to attend the incounter being thus ordered I saie it is manifest that the length of tenne cubites doth extend it selfe before the bodie of euerie armed man where with both his
place are able to effect any thing of moment but the Romaine army is apt for all these purposes For euerie soldiour amongst them beeing once armed and ready to fight refuseth no place time nor occasion keeping alwaies the same order whether he fight togither with the whole body of the army or particularlie by himselfe man to man And hence it happeneth that as the commodity of their disposition is aduantagious so the end doth answere the expectation These things I thought to speake of at large because many of the Grecians are of an opinion that the Macedonians are not to bee ouercome And againe many wondered how the Macedonian phalanx should bee put to the worst by the Romaine army considering the nature of their weapons Thus far goeth Polibyus in comparing the weapons and imbattailing of the Romaines with the vse of armes amongst the Macedonians wherein we see the Pike trulie and exactlie ordered according as the wise Grecians could best proportion it with that forme of battell which might giue most aduantage to the vse thereof so that if our squadrons of Pikes iumpe not with the perfect manner of a phalanx as wee see they doe not they fall so much shorte of that strength which the wisedome of the Grecians and the experience of other nations imputed vnto it But suppose wee could allow it that disposition in the course of our wars which the nature of the weapon doth require yet forasmuch as by the authority of Polybius the said maner of imbattailing is tied to such dangerous circumstances of one time one place and one kinde of fight I hold it not so profitable a weapon as the practise of our times doth seem to make it especially in woody countries such as Ireland is where the vse is cut off by such inconueniences as are noted to hinder the managing thereof And doubtles if our commanders did but consider of the incongruity of the Pike Ireland they would not proportion so great a number of thē in euery company as there is for commonly halfe the company are pikes which is as much to saie in the practise of our wars that halfe the army hath neither offensiue nor defensiue weapōs but only against a troupe of horse For they seldom or neuer come to the push of pike with the foot cōpanies where they may charge offende the enemy for defence if the enemy think it not safe to buckle with thē at hād but maketh more aduantage to play vpon thē a far off with short it affordeth smal safety to shake a long pike at them and stand faire in the meane time to entertaine a volleie of shot with the body of their battailion As I make no question but the pike in some seruices is profitable as behind a rampier or at a breach so I assure my selfe there are weapons if they were put to triall that would counteruaile the pike euen in those seruices wherein it is thought most profitable Concerning the Target we see it take the hand in the iudgement of Polybius of all other weapons whatsoeuer aswell in regard of the diuers and sundrie sortes of imbattailing as the qualitie of the place whersoeuer for their vse was as effectuall in small bodies and centuries as in grosse troupes and great companies in thinne and spacious imbattailing as in thicke thronged Testudines Neither could the nature of the place make them vnseruiceable for whether it were plaine or couert leuel or vnequall narrow or large if there were any commodity to fight the Target was as necessarie to defend as the sword to offend besides the conueniency which accompanieth the Target in any necessitie imposed vpon an armie whether it bee to march through places of all natures to make a fast march or a speedie retraite to incampe themselues to possesse places of aduantage to besiege and to be besieged as Polybius saith with manie other occasions which necessarilie accompanie an armie The vse of this weapon hath beene too much neglected in these latter ages but may be happilie renued againe in our nation if the industrie of such as haue laboured to present it vnto these times in the best fashion shall finde anie fauour in the opinion of our commaunders Concerning which Target I must needes saie this much that the light Target will proue the Target of seruice whensoeuer they shall happen to be put in execution for those which are made proofe are so heauie and vnwieldie although it be somewhat qualified with such helpes as are annexed to the vse thereof that they ouercharge a man with an vnsupportable burthen and hinder his agilitie and execution in fight with a waight disproportionable to his strēgth For our offensiue weapons as namely the Hargebusiers and musketiers are stronger in the offensiue part then any armes of defence which may be made manageable and fit for seruice Neither did the Romains regard the proofe of their Target further then was thought fit for the readie vse of them in time of battel as it appeareth in many places both in the ciuill warres and in these Commentaries for a Romaine pile hath often times darted through the Target and the bodie of the man that bare it and fastened them both to the ground which is more then a musket can wel do for the bullet commonly resteth in the bodie And although it may be said that this was not cōmon but rather y e effect of an extraordinary arme yet it serueth to proue that their Targets were not proofe to their offensiue weapons when they were well deliuered and with good direction For I make no doubt but in their battailes there were oftentimes some hinderances which woulde not suffer so violent an effect as this which I speake of for in a volley of shotte wee must not thinke that all the bullets flie with the same force and fall with the like hurt but as armour of good proofe will hardly hold out some of them so slender armes and of no proofe will make good resistance against others And to conclude in a battell or incounter at hand a man shall meete with more occasions suting the nature and commoditie of this light Target then such as will aduantage the heauie Target of proofe or counteruaile the surplus of waight which it earieth with it Some men will vrge that there is vse of this Target of proofe in some places and in some seruices which I deny not to those that desire to bee secured from the extremity of peril but this falleth out in some places and in some particular seruices and hindereth not but that the vniuersal benefit of this weapon consisteth in the multitude of light Targetiers who are to manage the most important occasions of a warre This much I am further to note concerning the sworde of the Targetiers that according to the practise of the Romaines it must alwaies hang on the right side for carying the Target vpon the left arme it cannot be that the sword should hang on the
the women and such as were vnmeete for the fielde they bestowed in a place vnaccessible for any armie by reason of fens and bogs and marishes Vpon this intelligence Caesar sent his discouerers and Centurions before to choose out a fit place to incampe in Now whereas many of the surrendred Belgae and other Galles were continuallie in the Romaine army certaine of these as it was afterward known by the captiues obseruing the order which the Romaines vsed in marching came by night to the Neruij and tolde them that betweene euerie legion went a great sort of cariages and that it was no matter of difficultie assoone as the first legion was come into the campe and the other legions yet a great way off to set vpon them vpon a suddaine before they were disburdened of their cariages and so to ouerthrowe them which legion being thus cut off and their stuffe taken the rest would haue smal courage to stande against them It much furthered this aduice that forasmuch as the Neruij were not able to make any power of horse that they might the better resist the caualrie of their borderers whensoeuer they made any roade into their marches their manner was to cut yong trees halfe asunder bowing the tops down to the ground plashed the boughes in breadth and with thornes and briers planted between them they made them so thicke that it was impossible to see through them so hard it was to enter or passe through them so that when by this occasion the passage of the Romaine army must needes be hindred the Neruij thought the foresaid counsell not to be neglected CAESARS march where in euery Legion had his Cariadges in front CAESARS march where the Enemy was neerer at hand The place which the Romaines chose to incampe in was a hill of like leuell from the top to the bottome at the foot whereof ran the riuer Sabis and with the like leuell on the other side rose an other hill directly against this to the quantity of 200. paces the bottom whereof was plaine and open and the vpper part so thicke with wood that it could not easilie be looked into within these woods the Neruians kept themselues close and in the open grounde by the riuer side were onely seene a fewe troupes of horse and the riuer in that place was about 3. foot deepe Caesar sending his horsemen before followed after with all his power but the maner of his march differed from the report which was brought to the Neruii for inasmuch as the enemy was at hand Caesar as his custom was led 6. legions alwaies in areadines without burthen or cariage of any thing but their armes after them hee placed the impediments of the whole army And the two legions which were last inrolled were a rereward to the army and garded the stuffe OBSERVATIONS THis trecherous practise of the surrendred Belgae hath fortunatelie discouered the maner of Caesars march as well in safe passages as in dangerous and suspected places which is a point of no smal consequence in martiall discipline being subiect to so many inconueniences and capable of the greatest arte that may be shewed in managing a war Concerning the discreet cariage of a march by this circumstance it may bee gathered that Caesar principally respected safetie and secondly conueniency If the place affoorded a secure passage and gaue no suspicion of hostilitie hee was content in regarde of conueniency to suffer euery legion to haue the ouersight of their particular cariages and to insert them among the troupes that euery man might haue at hand such necessaries as were requisite either for their priuate vse or publike discipline But if he were in danger of any sodain attempt or stood in hazard to be impeached by an enemy hee then omitted conuenient disposition in regard of particular vse as disaduantageous to their safety caried his legions in that readines that if they chanced to be ingaged by an enemy they might without any alteration of their march or incumbrance of their cariages receiue the charge in that forme of battell as was best approoued by their military rules the ancient practise of their fortunate progenitors The old Romains obserued likewise the same respects for in vnsafe suspected places they caried their troupes agmine quadrato which as Liuie seemeth to note was free from all cariage and impediments which might hinder them in any sodaine alarum Neither doth that of Hirtius any way cōtradict this interpretation where he saith that Caesar so disposed his troupes against the Bellouaci that 3. legions marched in front after them came al the cariages to which the 10. legion serued as a rereward so they marched pene agmine quadrato Seneca in like maner noteth the safety of agmen quadratū where he saith that where an enemie is expected wee ought to march agmine quadrato readie to fight The most material consequence of these places alleadged is that as ofte as they suspected anie onset or charge their order in a march little or nothing differed from their vsuall maner of imbattailing and therefore it was called agmen quadratum or a square march inasmuch as it kept the same disposition of parts as were obserued in quadrata Acie For that triple forme of imbattailing which the Romaines generally obserued in their fights hauing respect to the distances between each battel contained almost an equal dimension of front and file and so it made Aciem quadratam and when it marched Agmen quadratum Polybius expresseth the same in effect as often as the place required circumspection but altereth it somewhat in regard of the cariages for he saith that in time of danger especially where the countrey was plaine and Chāpion and gaue space free scope to cleere themselues vpon anie accident the Romains marched in a triple battel of equal distāce one behind an other euery battel hauing his seueral cariages in front And if they were by chance attacked by an enemy they turned themselues according to the oportunity of the place either to the right or left hande and so placing their cariages on the one side of their army they stood imbattailed ready to receiue the charge The contrary forme of marching where the place afforded more security gaue scope to conueniency they named agmen longum when almost euery maniple or order had their seueral cariages attending vpon them stroue to keep that way which they found most easie both for thēselues their impediments Which order of a march as it was more commodius then the former in regard of particularity so was it vnsafe and dangerous where the enemy was expected And therfore Caesar much blamed Sabinus and Cotta for marching when they were deluded by Ambiorix longissimo agmine as though they had receiued their aduertisements from a friend and not from an enemy And albeit our moderne wars are far different in quality frō them of
handes he doth aduance it readie to charge the enemie By vvhich meanes it followeth that some of the pikes doe not onely extend themselues before the second third and fourth ranke but some before the formost if the phalanx haue his proper and due thicknesse according to his naturall disposition both on the sides and behinde as Homer maketh mention vvhen he saith that one target doth enclose and fortifie another one headpiece is ioyned to another that they maie stande vnited and close together These circumstances being rightly and truely set downe it must follow that the pikes of euerie former ranke in the phalanx doe extend themselues two cubites before each other which proportion of difference they haue betweene themselues by which maie euidently be seene the assault and impression of the whole phalanx what it is and what force it hath consisting of 16 rankes in depth or thicknesse the excesse of which number of rankes aboue fiue For as much as they cannot commodiously couch their pikes without the disturbance of the former the points of them not being long inough to enlarge themselues beyond the formost rankes they grow vtterly vnprofitable and cannot man by man make any impression or assault but serue onely by laying their pikes vpon the shoulders of those which stand before them to sustaine and hold vp the swaies and giuing backe of the former rankes which stand before them to this end that the front may stand firme and sure and with the thicknes of their pikes they doe repell all those dartes which passing ouer the heads of those that stand before would annoy those rankes which are more backward And farther by mouing forward with the force of their bodies they doe so presse vpon the former that they doe make a most violent impression For it is impossible that the formost rankes should giue backe This therefore being the generall and particular disposition of the phalanx we must now speake on the contrarie part touching the properties and differences as well of the armes as of the whole disposition of the Roman battell For euerie Roman soldier for himselfe and his weapon is allowed three foot to stand in and in the incounter are moued man by man euery one couering himselfe with his target and mutually moouing whensoeuer there is occasion offered But those which vse their swordes do fight in a more thinne and distinct order so that it is manifest that they haue three foote more allowed them to stand in both from shoulder to shoulder and from backe to bellie that they maie vse their weapons with the better commoditie And hence it commeth to passe that one Romaine soldiour taketh vp as much ground as two of those which are to encounter him of the Macedonian Phalanx so that one Romain is as it were to oppose himselfe against tenne pikes which pikes the said one soldior can neither by any agilitie come to offende or else at handy blowes otherwise annoy And those which are behinde him are not onely vnable to repell their force but also with conueniencie to vse their owne weapons Whereby it may easily be gathered that it is impossible that any battaile being assaulted by the front of a phalanx should be able to sustaine the violence thereof if it haue his due and proper composition What then is the cause that the Romaines do ouercome and that those that doe vse the phalanx are voyde of the hope of victorie Euen from hence that the Romaine armies haue infinite commodities both of places and of times to fight in But the the phalanx hath only one time one place and one kinde whereto it may profitablie applie it selfe so that if it were of necessitie that their enemy shoulde incounter them at that instant especiallie with their whole forces it were questionlesse not only not without danger but in al probabilitie likelie that the phalanx should euer carrie away the better But if that may be auoided which is easily done shal not that disposition then be vtterlie vnprofitable and free from all terror And it is farther euident that the phalanx must necessarily haue plaine champion places without any hinderances or impediments as ditches vneuen places vallies little hils and riuers for al these may hinder disioine it And it is almost impossible to haue a plaine of the capacity of 20. stadia much lesse more where there shall bee found none of these impediments But suppose there bee found such places as are proper for the phalanx If the enemy refuse to come vnto them and in the meane time spoile and sacke the cities and countrie round about what commodity or profit shal arise by an army so ordered for if it remaine in such places as hath beene before spoken of it can neither relieue their friends nor preserue themselues For the Conuoies which they expect from their friends are easily cut off by the enemy whiles they remaine in those open places And if it happen at any time that they leaue them vpon any enterprise they are then exposed to the enemy But suppose that the Romaine army should find the phalanx in such places yet would it not aduēture it selfe in grosse at one instant but would by little little retire it selfe as doth plainly appeare by their vsual practise For there must not bee a coniecture of these things by my words only but especially by that which they do For they do not so equally frame their battaile that they doe assault the enemy altogether making as it were but one front but part make a stande and parte charge the enemie that if at any time the Phalanx doe presse them that come to assault them and bee repelled the force of their order is dissolued For whether they pursue those that retire or flie from those that do assault them these doe disioyne themselues from part of their armie by which meanes there is a gap opened to their enemies stauding and attending their opportunitie so that nowe they neede not anie more to charge them in the front where the force of the phalanx consisteth but to assault where the breach is made both behind and vpon the sides But if at any time the Romaine armie may keepe his due proprietie and disposition the phalanx by the disaduantage of the place being not able to doe the like doth it not then manifestlie demonstrate the difference to be great betweene the goodnes of their disposition and the disposition of the phalanx To this may bee added the necessities imposed vppon an army which is to march through places of all natures to encampe themselues to possesse places of aduantage to besiege and to be besieged and also contrary to expectation sometimes to come in viewe of the enemie For all these occasions necessarilie accompanie an armie and oftentimes are the especial causes of victory to which the Macedonian phalanx is no way fit or conuenient Forasmuch as neither in their generall order nor in their particular disposition without a conuenient