he that is known to act for himself only will be trusted and assisted no further than his own present Interest is perceived unavoidably to concur with another Man's And lastly the Happiness a Religious Man proposes to himself in another Life is such as he is firmly persuaded exceeds all Experience Imagination or possibility of Comprehension and consequently the Hopes of attaining it being strong and vigorous in proportion to his Belief must afford him greater Pleasure here than the Hopes of any other Enjoyment of this Life and a well grounded Hope of the greatest and happiest Condition a Man can frame to himself here gradually increasing by a successful Advance of the finest best-form'd Designs for the Attainment of it is I believe compar'd with any actual Enjoyment whatsoever the highest pitch of Pleasure we can be sensible of without a future Prospect which must be all this and as much higher as this Religious Hope is greater and more durable in the Possession and the present Assurance of it less liable to Disappointment and Defeat as it certainly is there being no external Accidents or Endeavours that can deprive us of it This being the State and Condition of a Religious Man he must be generally happier than the Wicked in Truth and Reality tho perhaps not in their Judgment of him as enjoying more Ease and Satisfaction in himself by a constant unalterable Success in the pursuit of his main End as being less exposed to the Injuries of others by assisting some and a due Care not to intrench upon the Happiness of any and being better able to bear those real Calamities and Miseries that may happen by a certain comfortable expectation of such Happiness as will infinitely outweigh all he can suffer within the Compass of this Life This I think abundantly sufficient for the Proof and Establishment of Religion but for a further confirmation of the Truth and that I may leave no room for the Enemies of God and Mankind to glory in their Strength as if they had as much to say for their Opinions if they might be heard V. I shall in the next place consider the Grounds and Pretences of Irreligion what can be alleged in defence of it and what are the usual Pleas for it and from thence shew the Absurdity and Folly of their Principles and Actions who have no better Reasons for what they believe and do than those upon examination will be found to be In the Prosecution of which Subject I shall observe these Steps or Measures 1. I shall enquire how far Irreligion is capable of being proved what Kind or Degree of proof it admits of 2. I shall consider the common Ways and Methods of defending it 3. I shall answer some of the principal Objections made use of against Religion 4. I shall make some general Reflexions upon the different Grounds and Foundations Religion and Irreligion stand upon and the different Conduct of those who act under the Influence of the one and the other 1. First then I am to enquire how far Irreligion is capable of Proof that is how far a Man is able to prove there is no God no Obligation of acting such a way if there be or no future State of Happiness or Misery Was a Man disposed to believe all or any of this or had a mind to convince others of the Truth of these Propositions what way or Method could he take to satisfie his own or their Understanding 'T is plain that none of the things enquired into are Objects of Sense or Internal Consciousness we cannot see with our Eyes nor feel with any intimate Perception that there is no God Religion or Future State and therefore no new Experiments or Observations of this nature nor any old Testimonies or Authorities grounded upon such have any place upon this Subject any further than they furnish Matter for Reasoning and Reflexion from whence we must immediately derive all the Knowledge we can have of any of the Propositions in question all which being negative there 's no other way of proving the Truth of them but by shewing either their Repugnancy or Disagreeableness to our Reason and those other Principles of our Knowledge which we cannot possibly doubt of the first way we demonstrate them to be certain the latter we make them appear probable As to Demonstration there 's no way of demonstrating a thing not to be but by proving 't is impossible and a Contradiction to be and who will undertake to convince the World that 't is impossible there should be a God or supposing there be that Religion and a Future State are downright Contradictions What is there in any of these Notions that shocks our Reason and restrains our Assent What other more certain Knowledge have we that makes our Belief of these things inconsistent with it There was never any Proof of this kind offered or pretended to yet the Vanity of all such Attempts being easily discoverable upon the first Trial of our Understandings that way All that remains then to be done is to produce such Reasons and Arguments for the Doctrines of Irreligion to shew such Marks and Characters of Truth upon them as shall render them suitable and agreeable to our Minds so that upon a fair Proposal we shall be easily inclined to embrace and assent to them tho the Evidence be not so strong as irresistibly to determine us This we call arguing from Probability which is nothing else but an Appeal to the common Reason of Mankind so that what the generality of Wise Men in all Ages have upon due examination assented to as most agreeable to right Reason that opinion is most probable and in matters of pure Reflexion deduced from the first Principles of Knowledge which are common to all Men alike that have the same use of their Faculties this must be acknowledged to be a very good Rule and Measure of Probability But Atheism and Irreligion will never stand this test the wise and learned part of the World having constantly rejected and condemned them But supposing the Disquisition was to begin now and Men were to chuse their Opinions again how would a Person go about to prove that 't is more agreeable to Reason and the Nature of Things that there should be no God no Religion nor Future State than that there should be any of these All the Arguments that can be made use of upon this occasion must be drawn from our own Existence and Constitution and from the Existence Frame and Disposition of the World and all things without us We are certain that we are and we know not our Original or by what Power we came at first to be We perceive a great many things without us the Beginning of which we know not nor by what means they came to exist Is it therefore more likely and probable that there should be no such Being as we conceive to be the Author of all these things than that there really is some such
as denied all this where should he first set out in his Proof What Order should he give his Thoughts Where must he take his Rise when he is to prove original Foundation-Truths What Evidence will be powerful enough to prevail upon those who love a Lye and hate to be reform'd How are they to be attempted who are strongly fortified with their Prejudices and have hardly left a Man that would attack them any Ground to stand upon Such an unreasonable Defiance of the common Sense of Mankind is justly thought by the Wisest Men to deserve no other Confutation but that of Punishment However since those who are yet innocent or indifferent may be corrupted and those who are just entring upon the ways of Irreligion may be farther advanc'd and confirm'd in them by more settled Atheists the same is to be done for the Security of those as should be applied to the Conviction of these if they were judged capable of being convinc'd and therefore the Method to be used upon this Occasion must be such as will surest destroy the Pretences of Atheism as well as give the easiest Account and most undeniable Proofs of Religion that so the Arguments made use of by the Perverters of Mankind may lose all their Power and Force upon others by losing the Advantage of coming unanswer'd In order therefore to satisfy those who have not quite renounc'd their Reason of the Truth of Religion according as I have before described and stated it and the Falshood of those Grounds upon which it is opposed I shall proceed in this manner First I shall give some Account of the Nature of Man the Nature of God and that Relation there is between them so far as is necessary to establish the Notion of Religion Secondly I shall prove that there is a God or a Being of such a Nature as I before supposed Thirdly From the Knowledge I have shewn we have or are capable of having concerning the Humane and Divine Natures I shall deduce a positive and direct Proof of Religion Fourthly I shall farther evince the Truth of Religion from a Comparison of it with Irreligion and the necessary Consequences arising from thence Fifthly I shall consider the Grounds and Pretences of Irreligion what can be alledged in Defence of it and what are the usual Pleas for it and from thence shew the Absurdity and Folly of their Principles and Actions who have no better Reasons for what they Believe and Do than those upon Examination will be found to be Sixthly I shall make some Enquiries into the Causes of Atheism and Irreligion or the Reasons that induce Men to take up such Opinions And conclude with a short Explication of the different Notions of Atheism and Deism I. First then I am to give some Account of the Nature of Man the Nature of God and the Relation there is between them so far as is necessary to establish the Notion of Religion The Knowledge of Religion as of all other Things whatsoever must begin from the Consideration of our Selves Now our Existence being granted the same Consciousness that satisfies us of this if we carefully attend to what passes within us will farther inform us that we are capable of Thinking Perceiving and Knowing which Capacity is usually stiled Understanding and that we have a Power of determining our selves to Think and not to Think or Perceive and not Perceive certain Objects or Ideas and to move and not to move certain parts of our Body and by that means other contiguous Bodies as likewise a Power of Acting and not Acting according to our own Determination that is we can actually entertain a Thought or dismiss it cause a Motion or hinder it when we have so determin'd with our selves and that barely by determining so to do which general Power of determining our Selves and executing our own Determinations or Commands is call'd the Will and includes all that is active within us And upon further Reflexion we may find that in several Instances we have an equal Power to determine our selves to Think or not to Think to Move or not to Move and in several Instances an equal Power to Act or not to Act according to such Determination but in several others we can determine our selves but one way and in some where we can determine our selves either way we can obey but one Determination In the first Cases we act with Liberty in the latter we are under a Necessity But all our Actions in all the several Instances before mention'd are stiled voluntary as proceeding immediately and effectually from our selves only when the Acting or not Acting proceeds wholly from some extrinsick Violence surmounting the Strength of our Bodies which is properly call'd Force as distinguish'd from Necessity the Effects of which cannot truly be said to be ours but belong to those Beings who employed that Force upon us 'T is plain also from Experience that we are capable of Pleasure and Pain by which I mean all manner of agreeable and disagreeable Sentiments whether caus'd by our selves or occasion'd by any thing without us that these are the first and only Springs of Action which set all our Powers a-work and give Rise to all our Determinations the obtaining the one and avoiding the other being the whole Employment of the Soul and that there are some Things which we are naturally by our very Frame and Make pleas'd or displeas'd with without being taught by one another to be so and consequently that we desire and do are averse from and forbear several things in Compliance with these first original Sentiments From whence it follows that there is something antecedent to all manner of Action begun within our selves which is the Reason of it without which it had not been which when taken away or ceasing the Action ceases too and there follows a Rest Acquiescence or Satisfaction This Reason or Motive of Action is call'd an End the Perception of which at a distance or future as such as would be all things consider'd more agreeable to the Mind when present than any thing it feels now is the Cause of all those Actions which are look'd upon as requisite for the Attainment of it Now if this Representation be true and the Actions proper and fit a Man is said to act wisely and for his true Interest and Advantage but when either of these Conditions is wanting he acts foolishly and to his Disadvantage But since by the same Experience we are inform'd that we may and often do act foolishly and to our own Prejudice by lessening or discontinuing our present Satisfaction or bringing more Pain and Trouble upon our selves than we already feel and that the only Cause of this is the different Representation of things future from what they are perceived to be when present both in themselves and in their Consequences and Dependances we are from hence convinc'd that there is no other way of remedying this Evil and preventing our being accessory to our
a distant matter of fact and a natural Hypothesis of something out of the present Reach of our Senses are hardly ever known to the greatest part of Mankind taken in general and therefore a general Belief of them can respect only the Learned whereas the Being of a God has in every Age been actually and expresly believed by the generality of all sorts of Men besides all this I say the Notion and Existence of a God being Matters of Reason and Reflexion only do not depend upon any such particular Circumstances of Time or Place or other external Helps and Instruments of Knowledge as are the peculiar Privileges of a few to whom the rest of the World must be beholding for all they know concerning several Truths as is plain in the Cases before mention'd All the Observations of Sense upon which the Belief of a God is founded lie open to every man and are the same now they ever were and the Inferences drawn from them are very easie and within the reach of common Capacities If some have refined upon them and carried their Reasonings much farther than others it has been only to satisfie the unwarrantable Scruples and Suspicions of a few Pretenders to Learning who make use of that little Knowledge they have to argue themselves out of all But the Generality of Mankind both Learned and Ignorant have so firmly believed upon the first plain obvious grounds of Assent as not to require or stand in need of farther Satisfaction and therefore their Faith cannot be owing to the plausible Colours or specious Reasonings of any first Inventors of false Notions and Opinions But after all allowing the Supposition to be true tho' I think it impossible that it should that there was a time in which God was no where acknowledged in the World whoever invented the Notion whatever were the Motives it was first invented upon or the Arguments upon which it was first believed the Propagation of it afterwards and the Constancy and Universality of the Belief ever since must be owing to the Agreeableness of such an Opinion to the common Reason of Mankind and all their other Knowledge and to the Strength and Sufficiency of those Reasons upon which it is now and has been so long received For all the first Motives and Arguments if they were any other than what we have now and which have been the same in all Ages we have any Knowledge of left have been all lost and consequently their Influence spent long ago neither in any of the ancient Discourses yet extant concerning the Being of a God is there any Appeal made to Authority or Antiquity as if Men were obliged to believe this Truth because it was so antient or because such and such eminent Persons had first recommended or enjoyned the Belief of it But all the Arguments made use of are wholly built upon the Reason of the thing which is always the same the same plain Reasons for the Being of a God have always had the same Influence which upon Examination will be found to have no Art or Sophistry in them and every body may examine them that will Nothing then remains but to enquire into the Force and Validity of those Reasons upon which our Belief of a God is originally founded I suppose it now but a probable Perswasion arising from that Readiness and Assurance of Assent with which we embraced this Truth and yielded to the first obvious Proofs of it upon a bare Proposal of them to the Understanding in which Perswasion we are very much confirm'd by knowing that all Mankind have constantly agreed with us in it being fully satisfied from hence that no peculiar Temper of Mind or Scheme of Thoughts no private Interest or national Byass has disposed us to make a wrong Judgment but something common to the whole humane Nature This is all the ground the Generality of the World believe upon and tho' to a nice Examiner of things it is not certain irresistible Conviction yet 't is sufficient to justify a full and entire Assent and to warrant our acting according to it For to suspect a thing to be false and act as if it were so upon a bare Possibility imaginable that it may be so or rather because we have not received the highest degree of Proof the thing is in its own Nature capable of when at the same time we have no manner of Reason to distrust what we have can be neither rational prudent nor safe However Since there are Persons whose Actions and at least pretended Opinions come up to this Character we will consider the common Proofs of a Deity more closely and throughly and see if what upon the first View appears so probable and makes so strong an Impression upon the Mind may not upon farther Examination strike us with that Certainty and Evidence that we cannot resist without questioning all our other Knowledge and disclaiming all manner of Distinction betwixt Truth and Falshood which is III. The Third Consideration I proposed in treating of this Argument Whether it is not only a possible or probable Opinion that there should be a God but a certain and infallible Truth that there is one All the common natural Arguments and Reasons upon which the general Belief of a God is founded are taken from the visible frame of things called the World and those several parts of it which fall under every man's Notice and Observation upon a slight Survey of which any man that is in the least capable of Reflexion where-ever his Thoughts light will perceive or imagine that he perceives plain Marks and Tokens of Power and Wisdom much of the same kind tho' in proportion far greater than he has observ'd in any of the most wonderful Effects of humane Skill and Strength the immediate Result of which I believe would be this Conclusion That certainly there is some Being exceedingly more powerful and knowing than Man who was the Author and Contriver of this stupendous Fabrick And if Admiration and Curiosity invite him to farther Enquiries as 't is difficult to suppose they should not the Compass and Extent of the whole Work the Variety of Objects in it the Constancy and Uniformity of some Appearances and regular Changes and Revolutions of other the Connexion and Dependence of the several parts the Union and Confederacy of multitudes of different kinds towards some common Production and the various particular Ends and Uses of things all assistant to one another and subservient to some general Design all these I say well consider'd and weigh'd together would strengthen and confirm his former Judgments and farther dispose him to conclude That the Author of all these Instances of Power is able to do whatever else can be conceived possible nothing else conceivable seeming more difficult to this Inquirer than what he sees already done That a Being of so much Knowledge as his Works declare him so vastly exceeding Man's is able to do Things which are far above Man's
be prescribes any farther than he has a Power of contributing to the Happiness or Misery of that Being he so prescribes to Thus we are led to conclude by all we know concerning God and our selves For first as to God I am not able to comprehend how he can any otherwise induce an Obligation upon Men to obey him or live according to the Rules he prescribes than by making them know that he has it in his Power to render them happy or miserable according as they obey or disobey him and that he will certainly make them the one or the other as their Actions shall deserve 'T is not his great and supereminent Power in creating Men and giving them Being which is solely in its self the ground and foundation of his Title to their Obedience This without a capacity of being happy could never become a Reason or Motive of acting to them and consequently could never 〈◊〉 found any Obligation For was Misery the certain unalterable Condition of their being and they were sure their Misery was to have no End and was capable of no Increase how could the Author of their Being be imagined to oblige them to obey his Commands or act one way rather than another when he could not offer or propose any thing to them which would determine them so to act all degrees of Pleasure or lesser Pain being supposed impossible so that which way soever they acted there could be no ground for approving themselves for it because they were not capable of that or any other Pleasure nor for condemning themselves because their Misery was not capable of that or any other Addition They might indeed by an overruling Power be forced to such and such Actions but this is not a rational Obligation which is acknowledged and submitted to as suitable and agreeable to Reason and performed with the full Concurrence of the Will of those that obey it In vain then and very falsly do some nice abstracted Thinkers magnify the metaphysical Excellence and Perfection of pure Being or Existence even when joined with the extreamest degree of Misery a Moment's Experience would soon convince them that to be was no otherwise the Perfection of a rational Being than as it gave him a Capacity of being happy but if they could be supposed to continue in their Opinion in such a State and think it better to be miserable than not to be at all the Satisfaction of knowing themselves to be must out-ballance the other Misery they felt and consequently upon that account give the Author of their Being a Title to their Obedience but then his Right of obliging them would be solely founded in his Power of making them less or more miserable by giving continuing or taking away that Satisfaction they enjoy which confirms the Truth of what I assert This will farther appear if in the next place we consider the Right and Power of obliging that Men have or pretend to have over one another which whatever kind or extent it be of must be all founded in and commensurate to their power of contributing to the Happiness or Misery of one another But oftentimes it so happens that some Men demand to be obeyed by others and require them to live according to their Orders and Directions when at the same time they have no Power nor ever will have to reward their Obedience or punish their Disobedience so as to make it more for their Interest while they live here to obey than disobey them Upon which account the Right of obliging is oftentimes lookt upon as existing separate from the Power of obliging but without any ground For if there be a God that will judge the Actions of Men and give to every one according to his work and the Persons requiring Obedience from others are commission'd by him to require it they have a Power as well as a Right of obliging them to it for they have a Power of proposing such Motives and Raesons for their acting as are sufficient to determine them to obey rather than disobey viz. the Rewards and Punishments annexed by God to their Obedience or Disobedience and consequently they have a Power of contributing to their Happiness or Misery tho' they cannot be the immediate Instruments of either themselves But if there be no God then are they not commission'd by him to command others but they usurp upon the common Liberty and Equality of Mankind and in this cafe they have no more a Right than they have a Power of obliging those whose Interest it is with respect to this Life not to obey them as will more fully appear hereafter under another Head Another Instance there is where the Power of obliging is or may be exercised without the Right and that is when some Men by the Advantages of more Skill and Strength than others without any Authority from God command their Obedience upon the prospect of great Rewards and Punishments in such things where the Persons so commanded are left to their Liberty by God to act either way as shall seem best or most for their Advantage to them in this Life In which case those that prescribe such particular Actions to others have a Power of obliging them to obey because they have a Power of determining them to act by the Consideration of greater Happiness to be obtained or Misery to be avoided by acting that particular way they prescribe than would attend the contrary way of acting but they have no Right to use this Power because they are themselves under greater Obligations with respect to God not to employ it than those upon whom it is exercised are with respect to them to obey it but if there be no God then is their Power their Right From all which it follows that where-ever there is a Right of obliging there is a Power of obliging and where there is an absolute uncontroulable Power of obliging there is for that very Reason a Right also but where there is a subordinate dependent Power of obliging it may be exercised without Right that is contrary to some Obligations which the Persons who exercise it owe to a Superiour Power But here by a Right of obliging I would be understood to mean a Liberty of offering such Motives and Considerations to rational Beings as when duly applied will determine them to act according to them with the full Consent of their Mind and make them infallibly approve and be pleased with themselves for so doing not a title to order and dispose of them and their Actions by an irresistible Force according to the free and unlimited Pleasure of that Being to whom the Title is supposed to belong Whether God has such a Right as this over his Creatures is no part of the Enquiry now but that he has such a Right and Power of obliging as I have explained is sufficiently proved from the necessary Attrilutes of God before specified and from the Nature and Ground of all Obligation of which I have
here given a particular account Whether God has a Right and Title to our Obedience upon any other Foundation but that of his Power to make us happy whether 't is possible for Man to act voluntarily upon any other Reason or Motive but that of his own Happiness and whether Happiness be the ultimate End of all our Actions and the ultimate Ground of all Obligation or only a subordinate but necessary and inseparable Consideration if what I have already said upon these Matters does not satisfy I shall no farther dispute because I am very well assured that whatever other Grounds or Motives of our Obedience to God may be imagined by some who pretend to act upon more noble and disinteressed Principles than that of their own Happiness 't is impossible to persuade a Man who does not yet believe any Religion at all to become religious except it can be plainly or probably at least made out to him that he shall better his Condition by it This I am sure is the only Argument that can prevail upon an Unbeliever to embrace Religion and I sirmly believe whoever fairly consults himself will find that he neither does nor can act upon any other ground 'T is true indeed we often act without knowing or considering what the Consequences will be and we are made and disposed after such a manner that we readily acknowledge our selves obliged to submit to the Will and Commands of God without any express Consideration of future Happiness to be obtained by our Obedience but if it could be evidently prov'd to us that Misery would be the certain Consequence of those Actions we thought our selves upon the first View obliged to we should then be forced to acknowledge that we were mistaken in our first Judgments and that it would be more reasonable to act another way which we were assured would be more for our Happiness These Things being premised I return to the main Question Whether we are actually under any Obligations to God or which is the same thing in other terms Whether there be any such thing as Beligion And in this manner I shall prove there is First I shall shew that there is such a particular way of acting such a course of Actions or Scheme and Model of living which whoever duly and fairly reflects upon will be forced to acknowledge that if he did live after That manner he should approve himself for so doing and if he lived otherwise he should condemn himself for it and therefore he that finds himself necessarily determin'd to approve such a particular way of living and to condemn the contrary must acknowledge that he ought or is obliged to act accordingly From whence I shall draw this Inference that therefore all things considered it must be more for his Happiness to act this way than any other because were it not his free unbiassed Judgment could not upon a fair Ballance of all the several Reasons and Motives of Action approve him when he did so act and condemn him when he did not there being nothing else but the different Motives of Happiness and Misery that can determine the Mind to these different Acts And from thence it follows that he is truly and really obliged to act as he judges he ought to act Secondly I shall prove that God who was the Author of our Being gave us such a Nature by which we are neceflarily determined to judge after this manner with that End and Design that we should exercise and employ those other Faculties and Powers he has furnish'd us with suitably hereunto and that consequently what our Reason tells us ought to be done we are commanded by God to do that 't is God who proposes those prevailing Reasons and Motives which determine us to act and gives them all the Power and Influence they have over us and therefore what God has made to appear reasonable or unreasonable to us to do will accordingly conduce to our Happiness or Misgry and upon that account oblige us to act or not to act And farther I shall endeavour to shew under this Head that God purposely created us after such a manner with a Design to oblige us to such and such Performances not only from the general Consideration of the Make and Nature of Man but from many other Tokens and Indications of such an End or Design plainly visible in the World And the Sum of what we are thus obliged to by God is what we call our Religion Thirdly I shall positively and directly prove from the Nature of Religion it self that a regular Practice of all those Duties or Obligations of which it consists would certainly conduce to the greatest Happiness Man is capable of considered only in his present Condition as included within the Bounds of this Life Fourthly I shall shew that the Defect of such a Practice and the Consequences of it do necessarily lead us to the Acknowledgment of such a future State as is sufficient to determine us to prefer one particular way of acting before another upon such Reasons and Motives that is such Degrees of Happiness and Misery as we are sure greater and more powerful cannot be offered to us From all which Considerations the Certainty and Necessity of Religion will be plainly and fully evinced 1. First then I am to shew that there is one particular way of acting which we are necessarily determined to prefer to any other so that upon a clear and impartial View of pure natural Reason we cannot but like approve or be pleased with this way of acting and dislike condemn or be displeased with the contrary and farther that we must judge or acknowledge that what we thus like or approve we ought or are obliged to do and what we dislike or condemn we ought or are obliged not to do and consequently that we are really obliged to act according to such Judgments because it must be more for our Happiness so to act That there are some natural Notions of Good and Evil Right and Wrong or some such certain Distinctions founded in or resulting from the Natures and Relations of things as cannot be altered or destroyed by any arbitrary Agreement or Institution whatsoever and that these are perceivable by the bare use of our Reason the same way that any other part of our Knowledge is are Truths which the greatest and wisest part of Mankind have constantly owned however they may have differ'd in assigning which they were and what were the true Grounds and Foundations of them Now to put these Matters beyond all reasonable doubt and to cut off all occasion of Contest concerning them I only desire this may be granted me that there are some things so clearly and fully proposed to the Mind that a Man cannot deny or with-hold his Assent to them and that where-ever this happens there is the greatest Certainty we are capable of This being granted it necessarily follows that we may be as certain that such or such Things ought or
ought not to be done as that such or such Things are or are not after this or that manner or are so and so related to one another As for Example I may be as fully satisfied that I ought to desire and endeavour after my own Happiness and that I ought not to take away the Happiness of another Man when I know I shall not add to my own by it as I can be of the Truth of these Propositions that every thing that moves is that 't is impossible the same thing should exist and not exist at the same time that is in both these Instances the things assented to have the same Suitableness or Agreeableness to our Reason and the same Force or Violence would be offered to our Understandings by a Denial of either Which is all the Ground and Criterion of Certainty assignable by us Several other moral Propositions might be brought or deduced from these that carry an irresistible Conviction along with them not to be over-ruled by any after Considerations But the common Rules and Maxims of Morality which are look'd upon as natural are not so general as those before instanced in nor have in all respects the same degree of Certainty belonging to them but what they are how they are known and how far they partake of Certainty and Evidence I shall now give a short Account and from thence prove that we are necessarily determined to assent to and approve these also and to condemn and deny the contrary of them and consequently that we have all the Reason in the World to believe it will conduce more to our Happiness to act up to these Principles than to pursue a different course of Life The highest and most general moral Duties commonly instanced in are such as these That God is to be worshipped that Parents are to be obeyed and all other natural and civil Relations proportionably to be respected that we ought to abstain from all sorts of Intemperance and Excess and provide all things necessary for the continuance of our Life that we should not do any other man an Injury but contribute all we can to the Happiness of Mankind and more particularly that Society we are of Now these and such like Propositions as these are known or found out by the Use and Employment of our natural Faculties the same way that all other Truths are that is Men are taught or made to have the Ideas these Terms belong to or they get them by their own Observation and then by comparing them together they immediately acknowledge such or such a Relation betwixt them without being influenced by any other Motive to judge so but what results from the Things themselves The Relations indeed of moral Ideas as well as the Ideas themselves are commonly learnt from others first before Men are capable of finding them out themselves but this is no more an Argument that their Assent to such kind of Propositions is only the Effect of Education and consequently a meer Prejudice and no right Judgment than it would be an Argument to prove that all the Mathematical Knowledge a Man has is nothing else but a Set of false Notions thrust upon his Understanding by Education because he happen'd to be taught the first Grounds and Elements of this Science while he was young before he was capable of finding them out by his own Observation for when we afterwards come to review the moral Knowledge we got when we were Children let us be never so jealous over our selves and take all the Care we can to deliver our selves from the Prejudices of Education we shall still adhere to and be farther satisfied of most of those Truths we were then taught as is sufficiently proved by the Experience of several thus educated the Certainty and Impartiality of whose Judgment has been strengthen'd by the joint Assent of several of a contrary Education And for a farther Illustration of this Point should we suppose a Person entirely ignorant of all such Matters but capable of understanding them when proposed and one of these moral Rules or Maxims should be barely explained to him without any Reasons offered to move or incline his Assent either way I believe 't is very difficult to imagine how he could judge otherwise than we do As for Example Suppose such a Person as this was justly inform'd concerning his own Nature and the Nature of God and what was meant by Worship and all the Notions contrary to it and he was ask'd which he should rather do perform such Acts as would express this Worship or neglect slight and omit them or else ridicule dishonour and blaspheme that Being we call God or suppose he was told what a Parent was and that such a Person was his Parent and that he was himself sensible of a great many Kindnesses he had received from him and it was proposed to him after a due Explication of what was meant by these things to murder him defend him from some imminent Danger without any hazard to himself or stand still and do neither who is there that would not believe that in these Cases fairly proposed and stated such an unprejudiced Person as this would not chuse to worship his God and defend his Parent We have therefore the same Reason to conclude that moral Truths concerning humane Action are knowable the same way that all other Truths are which terminate in Speculation only and that Men know more or fewer of them according to the different Capacity and Application of those that are employed in these Enquiries And as to the Certainty and Evidence of such Truths as these 't is as in all other kind of Knowledge greater or less according as the Propositions considered are nearer to or farther from the first general Axioms or Rules of Morality from whence all the rest are deduced such as are those before mention'd of seeking our own Happiness and not taking away another Man's when we cannot add any thing to our own by it and such as immediately follow from hence as that we ought to prefer a greater Good or Pleasure to a less a lesser Evil or Pain to a greater and the like the Evidence of which is as great as of any Metaphysical or Mathematical Axioms whatever But the other moral Duties I had occasion to instance in concerning the Worship of God Obedience to Parents c. which are less general have not the same degree of Evidence because the Certainty and Necessity of the Connexion of those Actions with our own Happiness which is the original Foundation of all Action and Duty is not so clearly discoverable that we immediately perceive it impossible it should be otherwise but the Evidence of such Propositions as these which I have mention'd before as the common Principles of Morality is so great that when they are fairly offered to the Understanding without any Consideration of our own Happiness being concern'd in them if this may be supposed as in several Instances no
perfect Being which was the Cause of these Effects we perceive Can we from the Oeconomy of the World and the Course of Nature infer that there is no governing and directing Power in the Universe Can we from the Frame and Disposition of our own Minds prove that we are under no Law or Obligation of acting or that Religion is destructive of our Happiness Can we from the Circumstances of our Nature or the Constitution of things without us make it reasonable to think we shall not live again be conscious of all our former Actions and be happy or miserable according to the different Kinds of them However true these things may or are supposed to be in themselves they will by no means follow from the forementioned Principles and there can be no other but these imagined antecedent to them For if God Religion and a Future State are all possible as they must be acknowledg'd to be the real Existence of any thing else will never furnish any Argument for their Non-existence 2. In vain then do we expect any direct Proof of Irreligion In the next place therefore I shall consider the usual Ways and Methods of defending it which are these Four 1. Ridiculing Religion 2. Requiring a more certain Mathematical proof of it 3. Endeavouring to shew the Possibility of things subsisting without it 4. And raising some loose Objections against it which chiefly aim at the present Profession and Practice of it in the World 1. As to the First of these ways 't is certain that the Generality of those who advance or any of the forementioned Opinions contain'd under the Notion of Irreligion are such as barely deny the contrary Truths without giving any Reason for their Disbelief they speak a bold thing against God and Religion and so fall to their Sins without ever examining the Truth of what they say a light Word or Phrase applied to a serious Thing an odd Simile or Comparison a ridiculous Turn or Allusion is all they pretend to Now there 's nothing so well establisht or confirm'd but may be ridicul'd tho it cannot be confuted and the greater and more sublime the Subject is the fitter for Burlesque the Boldness of the Raillery heightens the Wit of it But I need not spend time to prove that a Jest is no Argument Besides I shall have occasion to consider the Persons of this Character in another place and so shall pass on 2. To the Second Way made use of by the Patrons of Irreligion to justifie their Infidelity and that is by alleging that the Doctrines of Religion and the Proofs given of it have not that Degree of Certainty they ought to have in order to their Conviction Why say they are not such important Points as those in which the Happiness of Mankind is so far concern'd made as plain and evident to our Understandings as any Proposition in the Mathematicks prove them to us in the same manner and we will believe them The Insufficiency and Absurdity of which Plea will manifestly appear from these following Considerations For first of all 't is very absurd for Persons to call for more and greater Proof towards confirming the Truth of any thing before they have confuted one of those Arguments that are already advanced and therefore the Proof that has been given of Religion whatever it be is sufficient till it is overthrown by contrary Allegations In the next place 't is ridiculous to ask for other Kind of Proof than the Nature of the Thing will bear it being the same as to desire that the Nature of Things should be chang'd and therefore to call for Mathematical Demonstration in Points of Religion is as much as to say let Religion be turn'd into Mathematicks and we will believe it the Meaning of which is only this that such Men as these like Mathematicks better than they do Religion For indeed the Persons that call for this kind of Proof in Religion will allow of no such thing as Demonstration any where but in Numbers and Figures whereas we have as clear Ideas of many other things and do as evidently perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of them and make as certain Deductions from them and that particularly in the present Subject where we have as clear and distinct Notions of Knowledge Will Power Duration and all those other original Ideas from whence we took our first Rise in the Proof of Religion as we have of Number and Figure we are also as certain of the Truth of those Propositions that Nothing can make it self that Something must be eternal that Motion must begin from Will and several other from whence all our Arguments for Religion are deduced as we are of such Mathematical Axioms as these that the Whole is bigger than any of its Parts that when equal Numbers are added to equal the whole is equal and the like and the Deduction of other Propositions from those former is in all the intermediate links of Connexion as evidently perceived there as here and the main Conclusions as certain as any Mathematical Conclusion at the same Distance from the first Principles of that kind of Knowledge In the Proof of a God this is very plain and if the Obligations of Religion and a Future State will not be allowed to have the same degree of Evidence yet they have all the Certainty 't is conceivable they should have by way of Deduction from any Ideas our Minds are furnisht with so that supposing them true they cannot be proved any otherwise from bare unassisted Reason and therefore 't is very unjust to require a further Demonstration of them when the rational Grounds they stand upon cannot be overthrown by contrary Proofs I do not mention the additional Advantage of Revelation not to be disproved by any Counter-revelation because that belongs to another place But besides all this where we are under a necessity of judging one way as we are in all such matters where it concerns our Happiness to act or not to act 't is contrary to Reason not to be determined by that degree of Evidence whatever it be that appears on one side when we have nothing on the other side to ballance it and therefore it must be very foolish and absurd to take the Party of Irreligion for no other reason but this that the Proofs of Religion have not all that Strength and Evidence of Conviction which some other Truths seem to have And yet this is the only Defence some People make for their Impiety and Unbelief 3. But others there are that pretend to build their Irreligion upon positive Principles some of which have made new Schemes or Hypotheses wherein they endeavour to explain the original Disposition and Conduct of things without a God but all that they prove is that they who only denied the common Doctrines concerning God Providence c. without advancing any other in their stead were the wiser Men For all these new Notions of theirs either signifie