been needless as also by carrying into his Leaguer what was in the Villages and Countrey Neighbouring on his Works to deprive his Enemies Army of all sustenance but what they brought along with them or were daily to be fetch'd by them to their Camp from a great distance And lastly to have still in his Leaguer more Victuals than the Besieged could then have within the Town thereby to compel the Relieving Army to attack those almost unconquerable Works or the Town to surrender for want of Food in the sight of the Army which came for the Succor These necessary performances together with his often fighting against such Forces as almost hourly Night and Day made numerous Sallies and were obliged to do it both to harass and lessen Caesar's Army and to retard the finishing of his Works which when compleated would render it highly difficult if possible to relieve the Besieged I say and I think with reason all these Economies of War were at least as difficult in the Actings as the making those laborious Fortifications Yet all were to be done and done at one and the same time and in so short a space that I scarce know to which of the two my Admiration is justlier due At length the Relieving Army appear'd which consisted of 248000 men as Caesar who condescended to be the Commissary of their Musters reckons them to be and also writes how many every State of Gallia did particularly send so that at once he was to withstand 320000 of his Enemies and which was more to fight with them at the same time when they attacked him in Front and Rear This formidable Relieving Army was led by four Generals viz. Comius Veridomarus Eporedorix and Vergesilaunus All great Captains and accustomed to make War even against Caesar himself where they could not but have learn'd much having to do with such a General and yet for many Years continued the War against him and one of them viz. Comius had learn'd the Rudiments of War under Caesar himself and acquired so much Honour in serving the Romans that Caesar rewarded him with the Principality over the Morini The Gaules seated their Camp on a Hill half a mile from Caesar's Works and sent their Cavalry into a Plain under it and their nimblest Archers conceal'd behind their Troops Caesar makes his Cavalry match out to fight them lest the Gaules by having their Cavalry unfought with even under Caesar's Works might grow too insolent and his own Army be intimidated The Roman Horse were worsted by the help of the Gaules Archers but Caesar's German Horse Relieved them Routed the Gaules and cut in pieces their Archers and then all Caesar's Troops return d within their Line The Gaules made three several General Assaults on Caesar's Camp the first by Day the second by Night and the third at full Noon Vercingetorix every time Sallying out at the same hour with his Army In these three Attacks all that Valor Skill and Industry could perform on both sides was not omitted Some Particulars I shall enumerate the Gaules finding the Rows of Stakes and Holes and the Galthorps destroyd many of their Men flung up so much Earth over them as covered them and thereby made them useless to the Romans Then filling their Ditches with Fagots Hurdles and Earth raised the Outside on which they went to the Assaults higher than the Line they assaulted and so went on advantageous Ground to the Attack and Caesar when he found his Men distressed in Front by the Enemies over-numbring him and fighting on equal Ground would often command his Cavalry sometimes his Legionary Infantry to sally out of his Line and to fall on them in the Rear whereby he routed them The last dayes Attack seem'd several Battels rather than one General Assault such great Bodies fighting at once both within and without the first Lines towards the Field and towards the Town for the Gaules having discover'd the weakest or more properly the least strong part of Caesar's Line while all the residue of their Army were assaulting the rest of the Works Vergesilaunus who was Vercingetorix's near Kinsman in the obscurity of the preceding Night had marched behind a Hill and concealed himself there with 60000 select men who at Noon-day when the Romans were with all their Forces defending their Works both against the Besieged and Comius c. assaulted them unexpectedly entred the Line whose Ditch they had filled and with many shouts daunted Caesar's Soldiers as he himself confesses But Caesar at last by the Valor and Expertness of his men and by his excellent Conduct relieving them in all parts where they were oppressed and leading them in Person to many Charges was Victorious and Chaced the Gaules to the very Works of their Camp and to the Gates of the Town and adds If his Soldiers had not been quite spent with that dayes hot Service few of all the Gaules had scaped They lost in that last dayes attempt above 60000 men so that despairing to perform what they came for they did that Night abandon their Camp and many were kill'd by Caesar's Cavalry who pursued them in the obscurity and the next day Vercingetorix capitulated and yielded he himself gallantly mounted and armed at all points having first leisurely rid round about the Chair of State in which Caesar sate to receive him alighted off of his Horse and as an evidence of his being Conquer'd disarm'd himself and then went and sate down on the Ground at Caeâ—…ar's feet without speaking one word Some of those many Reasons which induced Caesar in my opinion to continue within his Lines and not to give the Enemy Battel in the Field I shall here set down I. He could not shut up in Alesia a much greater Army than his own without making very strong Lines of Countervallation against it II. Having made these wonderful â—…ines and knowing of the vast Relief which was certainly hastening to succor the Besieged he with so small an Army as his own which probably could not consist of above 30000 Foot and 6000 Horse for he never had above 10 Legions at once in all Gallia could not reasonably hope both to keep in Vercingetorix with 80000 chosen men and fight against Comius c. with 248000 good men unless by prodigious Works he could supply what he wanted in Numbers of men and also by so posting his Army between his Lines of Circumvallation and â—…ountervallation as to be thereby ready to resist both wayes and often with the same Reserve Battalions and Squadrons For whatever Justus Lâ—…psius computes That the space between these two Lines must be 5000 Foot yet in reason I am fully convinced they were much nearer each other for else they could not answer the end for which they were made since no Squadrons of Reserve can 〈◊〉 answer both wayes a distance of a Mile much less do it as often as need requires and our modern Lines of Circumvallation and Countervallation which are but Copies after
imitation of the Roman Discipline when the Army or Forces were to march I observed these following Rules where I had the Honour to command in Chief Soon after the Reveill was beaten I caused all the Troopers and Wagoners or Men that tended the Baggage to take up their Horses and Oxen and to make ready to load At the sounding to saddle all began to take down their Tents and to load At the sounding to Horse all the Troopers did mount and the Foot Soldiers draw into Arms under their Colours When the Trumpets sounded to the Standard all the Soldiery marched out of the Ground they Quartered or Camped on into the Field or Fields appointed to draw up in and there were formed into as many and large Squadrons and Battalions as the time and ground would admit still those Forces of Horse and Foot having the Right which were to have the Van all day and the Guard at night all the Ordnance Wagons and Baggage being drawn up on one side by themselves ready to fall into the centre of the Foot as the Army or Forces marched off Those which had had the Guard the preceding night being drawn up in Battalia till the Army fell into their marching order and till the Ground was cleared and then they brought up the Rear all that day and commanded out a Rear-guard of Horse and Foot during that dayes march who were still to bring up all sick or lame Soldiers who could not keep pace with the Body And where any was unable to go to carry him behind a Trooper till he came to the Camp and then to deliver him to his Captain also to seize upon and secure all straglers and to give them to the Provost Marshal that they might be punish'd If I march'd through a Countrey which had narrow Cause-wayes Bridges Rivers or Passes I made those Forces which were on those Cause-wayes Bridges and Passes double the quickness of their march till they were gotten out or over them and then immediately draw up on the right or left hand as the Ground would permit till all the rest were got over in case I suspected the Enemy was near or watched my motion If I did not apprehend an Enemy then I made only every Regiment of Horse and Foot draw up when they had passed over those straights till the intire Regiment were got over and then to continue their march the like I practised over any fordable Rivers But still when the stream was rapid or above knee-deep I made the strongest Horse by turns in Files stand firm in the River on the upper and lower sides of the Ford that the Foot might pass the safelier between them the upper Files breaking much the rapidness of the stream and the lower catching up those Foot Soldiers who might be cast down by the violence of the Current by which means many Foot Soldiers Lives have been saved I did also order the Horse in the Van of all when they had gotten over the Ford to send out small Parties to discover while the rest of the Army were marching over the Fords or Bridges and if the Countrey were enclosed or hilly to be the more diligent and expeditious in such searchings and discovery For an Enemy cannot wish for a greater advantage than to fall upon an Army which is separated by a Ford Bridge or such narrow passage since then they are his at a cheap price therefore great and constant circumspection must be observed in all such cases and all the Forces as fast as they get over must be in a posture to fight in formed Squadrons and Battalions while the rest are getting over It ought also to be the constant care in a chief Commander especially marching through an Enemies Countrey or when an Enemy is near often to make short halts that the Army may not march disorderly and that it may be as short in its long march as possible for 't is better to make short and sure dayes marches than long ones and hazardous 'T is impossible to give one certain and standing Rule for the most advantageous and safe way of marching an Army for the form must vary according to the Country you march in and the Enemy you have to do with If I suspect he means to assault me during my march in my Front Rear or Flanks I must fortifie those several parts accordingly If he be an Enemy not strong enough to give me Battel and will only by his Horse and Dragoons possess the Passes and Bridges and Fords to obstruct and retard my march I would then have some Ordnance with their Necessaries march with the Foot which are in the Van of all the better and sooner to drive him from his Defences and I would march my Army in two or three several Bodies divers wayes which the French call Columes but we and I think more properly Lines yet still no farther distant the one from the other than to be ready speedily to unite if the need require and at evening all to Camp in one Field or quarter it conveniently whereby the whole would move the more expeditiously safely and at ease and the Enemy would be the less encouraged to defend a Bridge Ford or narrow Pass against one of the three Lines since while he is doing that one or both the others may encompass him and cut off his retreat There are several other Cases which must be provided against as the emergencies happen by the care knowledge and foresight of the Commander in chief for which no positive Rules can be set down but the Orders must be given on the place and proportionably to the Ground the Enemy and the Occasion In an Enemies or doubtful Countrey especially I would still have a general Officer with the Quartermaster general attended upon by the Quartermasters of the respective Regiments of Foot and Troops of Horse and Train to be on the ground to Camp on at night some convenient space of time before the Van of the Army comes up both to view the Ground thorowly to take all the advantages of it and to appoint the several places for the Guards for the general Officers the Regiments and Train to incamp in that against the Army comes up every one may know where to pitch his Tent for which end the several Quartermasters should near the first Avenue of the Camp attend and be ready to shew their men respectively as they come up where the Ground is and how much is allowed them to lodge in that all may go readily and without confusion to their several stations and that there may be no dispute those should be staked or marked out else too often quarrels or animosities do arise on those occasions And if an Enemy be near I would have the several Regiments draw up within the Camp or near it till the Rear be ready to enter into it to be the fitter to resist if assaulted or to relieve the Rear if fallen upon and only admit some of every
their Shot if not with their Pikes gaul your Enemy while under their Covert your Horse may Rally and come again and again to the Charge and possibly recover the day Nay it makes your Cavalry fight with more Confidence when they know that one or more disastrous Charges may by thus ordering some of your Infantry be repaired by their own Rallying in the Rear of them and those who know what belongs to War will not be over-forward to Charge the second Line of your Wing leaving at once such Battalions of Infantry and the disorder'd Cavalry Rallying at their backs but on the contrary will hardly judge it adviseable to attempt your second Line till they have intirely swept out of the Field your whole first Line I did frequently though unworthy of the Honour command Forces in Chief and therefore I esteem'd it my duty to be often thinking and arguing how they might be employed to the best advantage and though in the Wars I was in we alwayes were or at least thought our selves to be superior to the Enemy in Cavalry Yet I was not seldom busying my thoughts how we might best fight in case he should be at any time stronger than I in Horse and I stronger than he in Foot The Result of those Thoughts I will presume to Present my Reader with The Checquering my first Line of Cavalry with small Battalions of Shot I judg'd was not the most secure or the most effectual way and therefore I concluded the Impaling as it were my Musketeers by my Pikes as is before-mentioned was much the better And because whatever is new and surprising to your Enemy is still of considerable advantage especially at the instant in which you are going to Charge him I resolved had I ever had an occasion to do it to have acted when the Ground allow'd of it as followeth I. I would have drawn up all my Cavalry a-breast either two or three deep as I should have esteem'd it the best as things were circumstantiated II. I would have appointed previously what Squadrons should have composed my first Line and what Squadrons should have composed my second Line and what Officers should lead or be in the Rear of every Squadron in both Lines and have communicated to them respectively my Orders therein III. I would then have drawn up those small Battalions of Pike and Shot order'd as I formerly mentioned just in the Rear of every such Squadron only as was to compose the first Line of my Wing and just as many in a Rank as might fill up the intended Interval when it was made and have caused my Pike-men to trail their Pikes that they might not have been seen by the Enemy which if shoulder'd or ported they would be IV. I would then have advanced towards the Enemy as if I had had no second Line or Reserved Squadrons but just when I was come so near him as that it was time to form my first and second Line I would at the Trumpets sounding the Charge which should be the Signal for the doing it have composed my said two Lines of my Wing by the Squadrons of the Front Line continuing their motion and by the Squadrons of the second Line making a Stand or Halt V. As the first Lines would be forming it self by the Squadrons of it continuing their motion and the second Lines would be forming it self by standing I would in the Interval of Ground made thereby have caused my small Battalions of Pike and Shot behind every Squadron of the first Line to march up and made an even Front with the fame Squadrons in whose Rear they had till then marched and so have begun the Battel advancing with the Horse and those Foot my Shot firing under their Pikes inoessantly This I esteem'd would have been both new and surprizing for it would have been thought strange by the Enemy and likely have given him an ill opinion of my Conduct to see me bring all my Cavalry to fight at onde which the first Form of my advancing would probably make him believe was my intention But when he unexpectedly saw that I composed my two Lines orderly in my advancing it might amaze and surprize him And in all likelihood both those Productions might he heightned when he should also see my small Battalions of Pike and Shot appear unexpectedly from behind my Squadron and advance in an even Front with them to the Charge so that his Horse singly must endure the joint shock of my Horse Pikes and Musketeers If this method of Checquering my Squadrons in the first Line of my Wing with small Battalions of Pike and Shot order'd as I have set it down should be approved and that you have Infantry enough so to Checquer your second Line also and that you shall esteem it necessary to have it done by reason of your Enemies exceedingly overpowring you with Horse you may also observe the like method of doing it in your second Line as you did in your first by having such small Battalions of Pike and Shot drawn up and marching in the Rear of those Squadrons which are to compose your second Line who may advance by the Interval Ground between the Squadrons to the Front of them when by your first Lines continued motion they have left the Ground free In the doing of all this there are some Particulars I would recommend to be alwayes observed I. That your Pikes which are to be trail'd during your advancing behind the Squadrons that the Enemy may not discover by those long Weapons what you would conceal from his sight be ported as soon as ever you begin to appear between the Intervals between which you are to march up to make an even Front with your Cavalry that thereby they may be the readier to be Charged against the Enemy who will by that time be very near and therefore such preparative readiness to receive him is very needful II. I would have all my Firelocks load their Muskets with Pistol Bullets for the Enemy against whom you Fire will be alwayes very near and therefore several Pistol Bullets out of one Gun will do as much Execution as one Musket Bullet at a time out of many Guns III. Those commanded Pikemen which are to impale your Shot ought to be of the resolutest and strongest men for on their Courages will depend much of the safety of your Horse and of your Shot and therefore if I had Pikemen armed defensively with Back Breast Pott and Faces I would choose to place them there since they are also to endure the shock of your Enemies Cavalry IV. The shot of these small Battalions must be still bestowed on those Squadrons of your Enemies Wing which compose his first Line for those are the nearest and the most pressing and the Muskets being loaden with Pistol Bullets they will not do certain Execution on any Squadrons of the Wing of his second Line which are usually about 100 Yards less advanced than his first Line
exactly obedient to it to keep silence And when the Parties are numerous enough to compose Battalions and Squadrons to observe in going to the Charge the just wideness of the Intervals for the Reserves or second Line to relieve the first Line But if there must be any Error therein to be sure the Interval ground be rather inlarged than streightned For 't is better the Reserves should have too much room to march up to the Front than too little since the latter will render them almost useless But before I come to Treat of that part of Disciplining the Soldiery which consists in drawing them up into Battalions and Squadrons which I intend to discourse of when I come to Treat of Battels I shall crave leave to offer some Considerations on what we generally observe and seldom or never alter whatever the occasion requires And that is the drawing up our Shot and Pike six deep and our Horse three deep And this I should not presume to do had not I been emboldened to it by some Experiments of my own which God did bless with success For when I found my self over-winged by the Enemy they drawing up their Foot six deep and their Horse three deep I judged it best for me to Fight my Foot four deep and my Horse two deep whereby I added one third of more hands to the Front and Breadth of my Battalions and Squadrons For I was fully satisfied that it was likelier I should be worsted by the Enemy if he fell into my Flanks and Rear holding me also to equal Play in the Front than if four Ranks of my Foot should be broken or two Ranks of my Horse that the third Rank of the Horse and the fifth and sixth Ranks of my Foot should recover all again for I had often seen Battalions and Squadrons defeated by being overwinged But I never saw the last Rank of the Horse and the two last Ranks of the Foot restore the Field when the four first Ranks of the Foot and the two first Ranks of the Horse were Routed For commonly if the two first Ranks of the Horse are Routed they themselves for they still are broken inward Rout the third Rank and though the like cannot truly be said of the Foot in all points yet in a great measure it usually follows But I must confess that he who makes such an alteration in Military Discipline unless he be a Sovereign Prince or have sufficient Orders to do it ought to resolve his success only must Apologize for it that is to be victorious or be kill'd I should therefore humbly desire that fighting no deeper than four for the Foot and two for the Horse where the ground is fit might well be considered and then let true Reason give the Rule For my own part I will ingeniously acknowledge that after having as throughly weighed all the Arguments for and against it as my weak judgment could suggest to me I would without hesitation if it were left to my own Election fight my Foot and Horse no deeper than four and two in any case where the ground would admit me to extend my Battalions and Squadrons to the full For if I fight against equal Numbers and equally good Soldiers to my own 't is more likely falling into their Flanks and as much into their Rear also as I overwing them the depth of a File in each Flank that I shall Rout them then it is that before I perform that they shall have pierced through my four Ranks since Rank to Rank of equally good Soldiers and equal in Number will more probably hold longer play one with the other than Soldiers equally good can defend themselves at once if briskly charged in Front Flanks and Rear and since the Flanks and Rear of Foot them selves fight with great disadvantage against those who Charge them there all at once but when Horse are Charged in the Flanks and in the Rear 't is next of kin to a miracle if they 'scape being broken For the Troopers in the Ranks when they go to Charge are as close as the Riders knees can endure it and therefore 't is impossible for the Flanks to do any thing or the last Rank to face about and consequently they must have their backs expos'd to the Shot and Swords of their Enemy The Foot indeed will easily face about but then if the depth of Files be the advantage I have it who Charge every where four deep and they every way defend but three deep at the most If this way of fighting will afford me solid and great advantages against an Enemy equal to me in the goodness and number of his Soldiers I do not think it can be denied but if I fight against fewer or worse men than mine but greater and more certain benefits will result from it The chief Objection to this way of fighting that I know of is as to the Musketeers who being but four deep and advancing firing the first Rank cannot have loaded their Muskets again by that time the fourth Rank has done firing so that there will be an intermission of shooting To that I answer Let the Musketeers Charge their Muskets with such Cartridges as I have mentioned and the first Rank will be as soon ready if you are but four deep as the first Rank will be if you are six deep loading with Bandeleers especially if I use the Fire-lock and the Enemy the Match-lock Besides you will still have a Rank to fire till you fall in if you begin to fire but at a short distance which I would do to choose if I were six deep Lastly were both these denied which yet I must say I have on Experiment found to be true and a demonstration is the strongest proof It is not enough to say one method hath such Objections to it which the other hath not but all Objections to both methods are to be examined and that Rule is to be observed which on the whole matter has the least For how few things in the world would be entertained as best if only such were so against which no Objection could be made The first of the Ancients which I have read of who found it much more advantageous when the ground allowed it rather to extend the Ranks than deepen the Files was that great Captain Cyrus in his famous Battel against Cressus King of Lydia for Cyrus finding himself over numbred took off half the depth of his Files and added them to his Front whereby he won the Victory by overwinging Cressus As the drawing up the Infantry but four deep and the Cavalry but two deep where the ground will allow it has great advantages in Fight over those who draw up the Foot six deep and the Horse three deep so it has in marching for the shallower the Files are in the several Divisions the shorter the Army or Regiment must be in their long march which is a great ease to the Soldiers in and towards the Rear of
not with Reason be altered I have sometimes done it and found good effects by it For I have made the Horse and Foot which were to have the Guard the succeeding Night lead the Van of the Army all the dayes march and not as is the usual custom given those Horse which were to have the Guard at Night the Van of the Horse and those Foot which were to have the Guard with them the Van of the Foot but made both the Horse and Foot which were to have the Guard march in one Body in the Van of all the rest of the Army for I could not see any one inconvenience by it but I found it had many advantages especially if the Army were numerous or the Countrey through which we marched was inclosed or full of Passes since if the Army were great and the wayes narrow or full of bad steps it would usually take up two miles distance from the Van of the Horse to the Van of the Foot whereby if the Regiment or Regiments of Foot which were to have the Guard at Night marched but in the Van of the Foot they would be long ere they came to the ground where they were that Night to do the Duty and consequently might probably fail of those advantages which by early coming they would have had In the next place if the Countrey have narrow wayes or many Passes all the Horse which march in the Van of the Army if assaulted by the Enemies Foot might be too much exposed while the Foot are coming up from the Van of the Foot to relieve them whereas if the Regiments of Horse and Foot which are to have the Guard march together in the Van of all the Foot are as it were at hand to shelter the Horse of the Van. Lastly there may be some Bridge Cause-wayes or Passes to be secured for the better marching of the Army which possibly the Enemy when he finds which way you move may attempt to seize upon and though your Horse should get thither before them yet if you have not Foot or Dragoons to justifie it the Enemy will quickly beat you from it especially if he has Ordnance Probably also your march may lie thorow Woods or Copses or Moorish Grounds where the Van of the Horse may suffer much unless the Foot be with them and because the Horse are useless in Woods Copses and deep Moorish Grounds if your Enemy understands his work he will in such places fall on your Horse with his Foot and do it with safety to his Men and certainty of success unless you have Foot ready to hold his Foot play till the rest of the Army comes up When ever I marched with Horse and Foot thorough Woods Copses or deep Moorish Grounds I still sent out wings of shot to the right and left hand above a Musket shot from the Road in which I marched my Horse the better to shelter them These are some of the many advantages which follow from having the Horse and Foot which are to be on the Guard at night to march all the day in a Body in the Van of all but as to the inconveniences of doing it I leave it to those to set them down who have found or shall find them out for I am therein to seek The having of many good Guides and to distribute them well and on their informations diligently compared to resolve on the way to march are very requisite things especially if you march to attack an Enemy in the night I say many good Guides and well distributed for want of both which I have known some great designs not only fail but those who were to attempt them run great hazard and suffer the loss of many Men For if you have but one Guide or two Guides at most that are taken up in the Countrey they may be corrupted or give you the slip unless you be very careful and if they be the first or do the last not only you lose your design but may also lose your selves therefore I would always if I could never have less than three Guides one with the Forlorn one in the Van of the Army and one with the General who may have many things to ask him and to be informed of by him during the march which it might well be impossible for him to have inquired into till he saw the Countrey through which he marches but if you have but two Guides or but one and that you are not on certain grounds secure of his or their honesty you must be more careful to keep him safe lest if he or they should escape the prejudice and danger be great I earnestly recommended the ordering the daily marches of any Army in such manner as alwayes to come early to the place you will Camp or Quarter in but in a most especial manner indeed if the Enemy be near you or that you march in a Countrey that belongs to the Enemy or is better inclined to him than to you or is at best a doubtful Countrey for so many mischiefs and inconveniences have hapned and may happen thereby that nothing but down-right and meer necessity should ever make me do otherwise I shall enumerate a few that by the Pattern one may judge of the Piece Your Horse generally are by late coming to Quarters unprovided of Forage and one dayes march with the succeeding nights Fasting and Duty does cast them down more than six dayes ease and good Feeding will raise them again If they ramble out of the Camp to seek it 't is ten to one it being in the dark they fail of it and if any Enemy be near twenty to one he fails not to cut them off Your Men generally will want firing both for the dressing of their meat and for the Guards the hindmost and straglers having no Guides usually lose their way and if the Countrey be false or the Enemy near themselves also The confusion will be great in every Regiments finding and taking down his Baggage in the night but if you have not Tents and must Hutt or lie open 't is more than odds you do the latter The danger of overthrowing the Cannon or Wagons in the dark which may also happen in such places as it may stop the whole march of that part of the Army which is hindermost as I have known it sometimes do and thereby expose both the Van and the Rear to be cut off by being divided and in the dark Lastly not any longer to attempt to make that evident which is in it self but too plain if when you are incamped or quartered and are in the night assaulted by your Enemy on all parts though having well viewed the ground and disposed of your men in case of a real Attack it be difficult and uneasie enough to make a fitting defence judge what it must be when to the brisk Attack on all sides from an Enemy without is added the confusion and disorder within the Camp And if your Enemy
understands his business he will never fail of making his attempt that night in which you come late and consequently tired and disordered into your Camp especially when it has no Line about it To prevent therefore this fatal mischief of coming late to Quarter I would practise three things indispensibly The first is to be moving very early The second is to send the Carpenters of the Train and most of the Pioneers with the Van to mend Bridges that need it to support and prop such as without those helps shall be judged insufficient to bear the Wagons Ammuninition and Cannon And when there are any bad steps for the Horse or Train to mend them against the Army comes up And when the wayes are narrow to leave those wayes if it be possible only for the Cannon and Baggage and to make several large gaps to the right and left hand of the Highwayes for the Troops to march in the Fields Thirdly whenever the ground allows it to march in Battalia and if all the Army cannot yet at least that the Horse and Foot march in as large Squadrons and Battalions as the Countrey will admit which will not only hasten your march by shortning the length of your Army but also habituate your Soldiers to march orderly in Bodies against there is need Yet if all these Precautions do not accelerate your intended dayes march as that you apparently see you cannot come early enough to your intended place to Camp or Quarter in for many such Accidents may happen then I would much rather Camp short of the station I intended in the first convenient Ground I found for Fire Water and Foâ—…age which three must still be minded than expose my Men to all the fatal mischiefs and inconveniences of a late Incamping or Quartering If I am to Camp or Quarter at night in an Enemies Countrey or a doubtful one or that an Enemy be near I would strictly observe these two following particulars First That none should know the Ground I intend to Camp or Quarter in at night but the chief Officers Secondly That if my Guide or Guides be not of my Army or Men thorowly known to me and trusted by me I would let him or them speak with none after I concluded they might guess at the way I intended to march and consequently near what place I intended to Camp or Quarter in and to have them in safe custody all the march I would allow no Soldiers during the march to straggle much less to stay behind unless on meer necessity and by his Officers leave and this I would firmly observe whether I marched through a Friend or Enemies Countrey not only to keep up that excellent part of Military Discipline but also to preserve my Men from receiving or doing the Country any harm since Soldiers but too generally are apt to do amiss when they have the power to do it especially if not under the eye of their Officers And I have known Countries which being ill us'd by the Soldiers of their own Party but well by those of the Enemy have therefore been Friends to their Foes and Enemies to their Friends who in effect made themselves their Enemies for the People of the Countrey judge chiefly by their senses As the Van has a Forlorn of Horse and Foot so the Rear should have a Rear-guard of Horse and Foot to be composed out of such as were the precedent night on duty and I would still send out small Parties of Horse on the wings to discover By this method the Van Rear and Flanks cannot be attacked without having timely notice to put themselves into order to resist an Enemy As to the Baggage I know 't is too usually practised for the convenience of the Regiments to have the Baggage of every Regiment march in the Rear of the Regiment which I think very unfit especially if an Army marches in an enclosed Countrey or where there are Woods Copses Moorish Grounds Rivers Bridges or Passes since the Baggage so placed must hinder the Regiments from coming up expeditious to oppose the Enemy and second such as may be assaulted in the Van or Rear whereby the ruine of the Army may probably ensue Iulius Caesar when he marched especially in an Enemies Countrey that was enclosed or cumbersom to move in by reason of Woods Copses Bridges c. made all his Legions march in a Body and in the Rear of them disposed of his Baggage leaving only for their Guard some new raised Men. This did well where he was sure the Enemy could only attempt him in the Van but not knowing where he will make his impression yet being certain he is likeliest to make it where he will find least resistance and where he may do most mischief in my opinion 't is best to have the Baggage as also the Cannon and Ammunition march in the Centre of the Foot where they are likeliest to be safe from all attempts and if the Attack be in the Van or Rear or both half the Army will be free from the incumbrances of the Carriages and will be ready to make head where the need requires The Romans were so exact in the order of their marches as that every Morning at the first sounding of the Trumpet every one took down his Tent and began to make up his Baggage at the second sounding every one loaded his Baggage and at the third sounding the Legions moved out of their Quarters and put themselves in the form and order they were that day to march in But none were to take down their Tents till the Consul and Military Tribunes had first took down theirs whether for the greater respect or because their Tents and Baggage being larger than the rest they should be the first at work and thereby have their Baggage as ready to march at the third sound of the Trumpet as the private Soldiers For Commanders who give Rules to all the rest ought to be the most exact themselves in observing them since if they break their own orders they encourage others to lose their reverence to them and Example operates more than Precepts for most men see better than they understand as when among Clergymen vicious Livers are good Preachers many think they themselves do not believe what they seem to inculcate since they practise contrary to what they teach Therefore it seems to me exceeding requisite that whatever Rules are made in an Army by a General he and his servants ought most punctually to observe them for else with what justice can he punish in another for the breach of the same orders which he himself does violate But when the Soldiery finds the General keeps strictly the Rules he gives they do the more inviolably observe them also for they conclude since he will not therein indulge to himself he will not do it to others And they implicitely believe such orders are good and necessary because he that gave is so punctual an observer of them In
should resolve to give his Enemy Battel but on rational or at least very probable Grounds that he shall win it and also when the advantages of gaining it will be greater than the prejudices will be if he should lose it for whoever elects to fight a Battel on other Considerations cannot answer the doing it to his Prince to the Army he leads or to his own Judgment and Conscience III. The third is Whoever has his Enemy at such an advantage as he must submit in a short time without hazarding a Field ought on no terms to expose his Army to a Battel but should derive that from Time and Patience which else he must leave to the decision of Fortune As within my own memory I have known That a General greedy of Honour and impatient of Delay when by the wise conduct of those under him or the ill conduct of those against him his Enemies Army was so coop'd up that it could not long subsist nor Force its way he drew his own Army off of the Passes which shut up his Adversary that he might come out and decide it by a Battel which he lost and deservedly For the turns in a Battel are so many and are often occasion'd by such unexpected Accidents which also proceed from such minute Causes that a wise and great Captain will expose to Chance only as much as the very Nature of War requires IV. The fourth is When a Battel is resolved upon the Field to fight it in ought to be answerable to the Numbers of your Army and the quality of your Forces As for Example You should never choose a Ground to fight on if you can possibly avoid it which you cannot fill up with your fighting and reserve Squadrons and Battalions or as 't is now usually call'd your first and second Line That is you must still endeavor to cover the outward flanks of your Wings with a River a Wood a moorish Ground or something equivalent for else you will expose your Army too much if your Enemy does overwing you Whereas if you cannot be charg'd but in front you will have the less to fear and your Adversary the less to hope For Instance If I found my Army drawn up in Battalia would take up in its utmost extent but 15000 Foot I would not choose to fight in a Plain that was 20000 Foot wide if my Enemies Army were either more numerous than mine or were stronger in Cavalry than I But if by some Accident which I could not foresee or possibly avoid I were to fight on such a Ground I would immediately cover one or if possibly both of my Flanks with what the Nature of the Place afforded as besides a River a Brook a moorish Ground a Wood or Coppice or a steep Ground with a Ditch or Trench or some place so incumbred as my Adversaries Horse could not fall on that Flank without disordering himself before and in his doing of it But in case the Ground was so level and clear as it afforded me none of those Advantages which would be an extraordinary thing I would then by my Carriages or by immediately casting up a long and large Ditch or Trench on my Flanks supply by industry what I could not otherwise attain And if I had leisure at the two ends of each of these Ditches or Barricade of Wagons especially at the Front end I would cast up a Sconce Redoubt or Fort and stuff it with Musketeers whereby the Flank of my Wings would be covered and the Front and Rear of them defended by those Musketeers 'T was almost thus that Lewis Prince of Conde acted in the Battel at St. Denis in the Reign of King Francis the First of France And had not only thereby the Resolution with an handful of the French Protestants to fight the Constable of Montmorancy whose Army was three times as great as his but also to make it so disputable who had the Victory that the Historians of those Times give it without seruple to the Party they were of and wrote for And it seems indeed but doubtful who had the Victory for the next morning the Prince and the Admiral Chastillion by Andelot's being joined with them who brought them not above 1000 men with which until then he made the River of Seine useless to the Parisians drew up their Army again in the Field of Battel and shot some Peals of Cannon even into Paris yet none of that King's Forces came out to fight them so that the Protestants having for a few hours brav'd the French King's Forces and that vast City marched away towards Champagne to meet their German Relief But on the other hand the Historians who were Royallists attribute this wholly to the death of the Constable and not only to the Consternation which it caused but also to the Irresolution of the Counsels who should succeed him since the Duke of Anjou who at last did was by many judged too young for so weighty a Charge and it is reasonably to be believed he would not then have been nominated but that the Queen Regent was irremoveably setled not to lodge in such intricate times the absolute Military Power in any of the House of Guise or in that of Montmorancy but in one who intirely depended on her and would be guided by her And 't is probable that the Protestants who doubtless had been much disordered in the Battel durst not have made that Bravade depending only on their own strength but at least as much on the irresolution and disputes of their Enemies who should be their new General And therefore having set the best face they could on their tottering Affairs for a short time judged it not adviseable to continue playing that part any longer than they believed they might do it safely by the King's Army being without a Head I have only instanced this Particular to manifest how a lesser Army may oppose a much greater in Battel if the Flanks of the lesser be so well covered as that it can only be charged in Front which ought alwayes indispensibly to be provided for Nor is it only needful where a Battel is to be fought to pitch on a Ground answerable to the Number of your Army but also answerable to the quality of those Forces which compose it and to those of your Enemies with whom you must have to do As if my Enemy were stronger than I in Cavalry I would avoid all I might fighting him in a Plain or if I were the stronger in Horse I would use my utmost industry to engage him in an open Countrey And on the contrary if I were stronger in Infantry I would shun the Combat unless it were in an inclosed Country or incumbred by Woods Brooks Coppices Rocks or moorish Grounds so if he were the stronger in Foot I would avoid fighting in a place where he who has the most Infantry may therefore have the most hopes of Victory But if you are commanded to fight by your
ground to believe he will attempt you during the obscurity and while you are unintrenched to cause great Piles of Wood or Fagots or some such combustible stuff to be ready to be kindled in fit places and at fit distances that if he advances you may the better see how to point your Cannon and dispose of your small Shot most effectually and by such Fires also terrifie and disorder his Horses which generally are frighted at the sight of Fire especially in the Night This I find was practised near Lorges in Beausse by Anthony King of Navarre Francis Duke of Guise and the Constable Montmorancy when Lewis Prince of Conde and the Admiral of Chastillion prest by the necessity of their Affairs went to attack the Royal Army by Night and which so much disheartned the Assaulters as they retreated The Quartering of your Army at all times but especially when that of the Enemies is very near ought to be in such manner as that the Soldiers may be soonest in Battalia to receive him and therefore to lodge it in the Form you will fight is still the very best that is that such Forces as compose your Wings and Body may have only to go out of their Hutts Tents Villages or Houses to be in the Figure you will fight in else in case of an Alarm the disorders will be many and dangerous but this way there can be but few if any The nearer you draw towards your Enemy or your Enemy to you your Quarters must alwayes be brought closer and your advanced Guards of Horse and Foot the stronger and your discovery the more vigilant III. The third is To be the first drawn up on the Ground you will fight in which is constantly attended with three considerable benefits The point of Honor which you gain by being the earliest on the spot which animates your own Party and often daunts your Enemies The being thereby enabled without opposition to possess all the advantages of the Ground either for the planting of your Cannon or for casting up Parapetts on some Eminencies which command all about it as Sir Francis Vere did at the Battel of Newport or by drawing up your Carriages or making a Ditch to cover one or both the Flanks of your Wings which you cannot well do if your Enemy be earlier or as early as you on the place The being thereby sometimes in a posture to fall upon and cut off your Enemies Squadrons and Battalions or to Rake them with your Cannon while they are drawing up which is an advantage when it may be taken that is of great use IV. The fourth is That your Squadrons of Horse ought not to be too great for the Reasons which I have formerly mentioned in that Chapter which Treats of the Disciplining of your Soldiery Yet if that need requires two nay three of the small ones may be put into one great one but still I would advise that the same Officers should command the same Squadrons when united as they did before By which means they will retain the Agility which is in small Parties and yet when there is need have the force of great ones and this I propound to be observed because whoever has been practically versed in fighting will hardly deny but that 150 Horse in two Squadrons will be likely to rout and beat 200 Horse in one Squadron And the reason to me seems very evident for besides the opportunity you have thereby to fall into his Flank and Rear whatever Body of Men does fight or has fought disorders it self though it gets the better and being disorder'd a less Number that is not to speak humanely must if the Men be equally good overthrow a greater that is And daily Experience shews how difficult if possible it is suddenly to Rally great Squadrons when by Fighting they have been disorder'd especially if but a small Squadron is at hand to fall on them and improve their being so discomposed Nor indeed can great Squadrons march many Paces though the Ground be clear and level without disordering their Ranks but if it be uneven or rugged they are almost out of their fighting Order before they come to fight which are mischiefs that less Squadrons are not so liable unto But Battalions of Foot as being more Governable may be large according to the occasion and need especially those which are composed of Pikes for a great Battalion or Stand of those in the Vanguard the Battel and the Rearguard of the Infantry are the safety of the whole and under their shelter All Rallyings may be best made V. The fifth is A General must never omit in the drawing up of his Army so to dispose of his Squadrons and Battalions as probably every one of them may come to fight again and again if the need requires before they are totally overthrown It is also observable that in a Battel whoever keeps in Reserve a Body of Men that are not led to fight until all the Enemies Squadrons have fought rarely misses to carry away the Victory and whoever has the last Reserves is very likely at last to be the Victorious One signal Illustration of this Truth among many I shall instance At the Battel of Dreux in France where the Constable Montmorancy assisted by Francis Duke of Guise the greatest Captains of that Age commanded the Royallists and Lewis Prince of Condé and the Admiral the Protestants He and the Admiral defeated all the Forces they saw took the Constable Prisoner past over the Bellies of the Swissers who made almost a miraculous resistance and concluded they had therefore won the Victory In the mean while the Duke of Guise who led the Left Wing of the French King's Army either by design as his Enemies said or as an act of high conduct so cover'd his Troops with the Village of Blainville and the Trees and Shrubs about it that he was not so much as seen by the Protestants nor moved from thence until the Constable was taken Prisoner the Mareschal de St. André killed and all those Forces which were considered by the Protestants as the whole Army of the Royalists were intirely routed and so confusedly flying as he was in no danger to have his Squadrons disordered by the Runawayes of his own Party but then advancing his Troops which were entire he soon turned the Fortune of the day took the Prince of Condé Prisoner and overthrew all that opposed him For 't is a tedious and difficult if not an impossible task to put into good order again an Army that has newly fought so as to bring it suddenly to fight again some being busied about the Pillage and Prisoners they have taken or are pursuing others being loth to return to new dangers and all in effect being so heated and disordered that they do not or will not hear the Commands of their Superiors VI. A sixth is A General must never bring all his Troops to fight at once and therefore is still to draw up his
and then if they had not the Field Word they might be kill'd by those of their own Party who knew them not personally Besides the Field Mark of each Army is seen by All of both Armies before they engage and the matter of it being to be had in all places by private Soldiers as a green Branch a piece of Fern or a handful of Grass or a piece of white Paper c. If you Rout your Enemy he may while he is pursued take off his own Field Mark put up yours in the stead of it and so scape if not do you hurt But the Field Word he cannot know unless it be told him by some of your own men and therefore the giving of both before the Battel must never be omitted I remember once when some Forces I had the Honor to Command obtained by the blessing of God the Victory against the Enemy an Officer of mine having kill'd an Officer of the Enemies and finding he had a good Beaver he tyed his own Helmet to his Saddle Bow and put on so hastily the dead Mans Beaver as he forgot to take out of it the green Branch which was their Field Mark and to put on a white Paper which was our Field Mark and following the Execution with his Sword all bloody a Captain of Horse of my own Regiment taking him by his Field Mark for one of the Enemy and judging he had done no little slaughter by his Sword being all gored to the Hilt undertook him in the pursuit and turning short on him before he could see his face ran him through and through with his Tuck whereof he dyed in a few minutes But finding the Enemies 〈◊〉 Mark had caused his death he own'd his fault and so acquitted my Captain from any Guilt Whatever can be done before a Battel to distract or intimidate your Enemies Army ought not to be omitted some Examples of this way of proceeding I shall mention The Archdâ—…ke before the Battel of Newport having cut off several Companies of the Prince of Orange's Army sent undeâ—… Count 〈◊〉 to secure some Passes on the way the Enemy was to march caused a Trooper of his on purpose to be taken Prisoner just as the Armies were going to Engage who being brought to the Prince did with a loud voice tell him That Count â—…st was defeated and that immediately the Battel would be given him and exceedingly magnified in the hearing of all which were present the Numbers Bravery and Resolution of his own side and though the Prince immediately caused his mouth to be stopped yet so many had heard what he said as it was in an instant diffus d over the States Army and struck into it no little damp if not terror If the Ground admits of it it were adviseable if it can be done safely the Night before the Battel to lodge in a Wood or Coppice or hollow Ground some of your men concealed on the Flank or towards the Rear of your Enemies Army who by falling on just as you are engaging or newly after you are engaged may be of great benefit to you and prejudice to him as it was done in that great Battel between Ieroboam and Abijah and in many others But then great Caution must be had that the Enemy discover not this Ambush lest he cut it off before the Battel and thereby weaken you and animate his own Party as it hapned to the Suedes near Lindâ—…w in the Year 1632 and to many other parts of Armies in other Countries For whoever goes upon designs whose success depends on very fine and nice management must be exceeding wary else he had better never attempt them and therefore though they may be and have been practised with good success yet I am in my own private judgment no over-great Friend to any such Policies in War where I may in the management of them be discovered and not possibly know of it timely enough to receive no detriment thereby For where the Fate of a Kingdom and the Lives of thousands are at stake as in Battels the first too usually is and the last alwayes is I would still act on solid Reasons and Principles and in Stratagems embrace such methods only as if they had success would be of great advantage and if they failed yet I should thereby lose nothing but my hopes The making a Speech by a General to a whole Army before a Battel is often read of in our best Histories as well as Romances but ought in my belief to be onely found in the latter since 't is impossible for any General to speak audibly in an open Field to above a Regiment at once and if he makes an Harangue to every Regiment he will employ that time in talk which is more usefully spent in ordering his Forces and in Action Not but that I think it highly useful that the Officers and Soldiers of an Army before the Battel should be told all that may heighten their Courages as the Goodness of the Quarrel they fight in the beneficial Consequences of their Victory the fatal Effects which must attend their being worsted the Honour they have gained in many an Action which is too precious to be all lost in one c. But because I esteem such Orations impossible to be made by one to many thousands at once therefore I think it is the duty of a General to infuse these Incentives to Victory into his chief Officers first and then to order their imparting them convincingly to the subordinate ones and those to inculcate them on all occasions into the private Soldiers and especially on their Guards and a little before they go to fight and to do it but to a Troop or a Company at a time and in these wayes I do not only approve of such Oratory but esteem it very practicable and highly useful before a Battel Besides when all the Officers thus discourse to their Soldiers it shews an Unanimity which cannot be so practicably evidenced when the General singly speaks to them The Shouting to the Battel is very ancient and we read of the practice of it in most Warlike Nations as amongst the Iews in the time of David amongst the Romans in the time of Caesar c. The English are so much inclined to it as I have but once in those Actions I have been in seen them omit the doing it as soon as ever they came within Cannon-shot of the Enemy they were to fight with and then I minded them of that Neglect which they immediately amended such shoutings bring not only a kind of terror on the Nations which do not use them as being commonly an evidence of great joy in those who make them but also it stirs up the blood and spirits before and heats them during the Fight But though such Shoutings are useful going towards the Enemy yet a deep silence must be observed by the Soldiery when you are about to engage that the Officers Orders and the Words of