〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Test of Truth the very Proposition almost in Terms of my Fourth Chapter or to be opposed to the Accounts receiv'd from profane Antiquity much less to the inspired writings For notwithstanding that several particulars relating to the eldest Condition of the VVorld and its great Catastrophe's examine'd and compared with so much Philosophy as was till lately known were plainly unaccountable and naturally speaking impossible yet we see now Nature is more fully more certainly and more substantially understood that the same things approve themselves to be plain easie and rational 'T is therefore Folly in the highest degree to reject the Truth or Divine Authority of the Holy Scriptures because we cannot give our Minds particular satisfaction as to the Manner may or even possibility of some things therein asserted Since we have seen so many of those things which seem'd the most incredible in the whole Bible and gave the greatest Scruple and Scandal to Philosophic Minds so fully and particularly attested and next to demonstrated from Certain Principles of Astronomy and natural Knowledge 't is but reasonable to expect in due time a like Solution of the other Difficulties 'T is but just sure to depend upon the Veracity of those Holy VVriters in other Assertions whose Fidelity is so intirely establish'd in these hitherto equally unaccountable ones The obvious plain or literal Sense of the Sacred Scriptures ought not without great reason to be eluded or laid aside Several of those very places which seem'd very much to require the same hitherto appearing now to the Minutest Circumstances true and rational according to the strictest and most literal Interpretation of them VVe may be under an Obligation to believe such things on the Authority of the Holy Scriptures as are properly Mysteries that is though not really Contradictory yet plainly unaccountable to our present degree of Knowledge and Reason Thus the Sacred Histories of the Original Constitution and great Catastrophe's of the VVorld have been in the past Ages the Objects of the Faith of Iews and Christians though the Divine Providence had not afforded so much light as that they could otherwise Satisfie themselves in the Credibility of them till the new improvements in Philosophy And this is but just and Reasonable For sure the Ignorance or Incapacity of the Creature does by no Means afford sufficient ground for Incredulity or justifie Men in their rejecting Divine Revelation and impeaching the Veracity or Providence of the Creator With which weighty and to the present purpose very pertinent words of this worthy Author I Seal up my own and leave them both to the Consideration of the Reader FINIS Corrections PAge 176. line 22. after describe read its p. 250. l. 11. r. confuted p. 206. l. 17. after Perfections r. are as p. 273. l. 1. r. proceeds p. 287. l. 12. for as his Vicar does r. whatever his Vicar may do p. 289. l. 23. after or r. as p. 292. l. 9. r. 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upon the internal Light and Evidence of the thing but upon Authority and so agree in the general Nature of 〈◊〉 only as the Authority differ 〈…〉 Faith also varies and Human Authority differing from Divine just as much as Fallible differs from Infallible the same in proportion will also 〈…〉 between Human and Divine â—aith That is the former will always be a Fallible and the latter an Infallible Assent 8. Human Faith though sometimes as actually undeceiv'd as Divine is yet always liable to Error and Deception and so doubtful hazardous and uncertain even when actually true like a Conclusion drawn from uncertain Premisses in which respect it resembles Opinion and that so much that some have confounded it with it though I think illogically enough since though there be a like uncertainty in both Assents yet they differ extremely in their Formal Motives one being grounded upon Reason and the other upon Authority And the Distinction of these Assents is not taken from the degree of Certainty wherein they agree but from the Quality of the Motive wherein they differ However tho' this makes a great difference in Notion it makes None in the Affairs of Civil Life and the Faith of him that believes the Testimony of a Man will as to all real intents and purposes go for no more than his Opinion And that because though different Assents as to the Formality of their Motives they are yet Much at one rate for Certainty being both Fallible in their Grounds and so subject to Error and Deception 9. But the Case is quite otherwise as to Divine Faith whose Foundation stands too sure not only to be overturn'd but even so much as shaken This Faith is strictly and Absolutely infallible not subject to the least Error or Possibility of Erring as having the very Ground and Pillar of Truth it self the Omniscience and Veracity of God for its Security than which there neither Needs nor Can be Greater 'T is Most Certain that God is both Actively and Passively Infallible his Omniscience will not suffer him to be deceiv'd himself and his infinite Veracity and Truth will not suffer him to deceive us And therefore he that builds his Faith upon his Authority goes upon the Most sure Grounds and cannot possibly Err in his Assent And as he is secure from Error so he is also from all just reason of Scruple or Fear and leaning upon a firm and indefectible Support may stay and repose himself upon it with full Acquiescence So that there is all the Certainty that can be in this Faith both Objective and Subjective that of the Thing and that of the Person The thing assented to is most undoubtedly true in it self and he that assents to it may be most firmly assured and perswaded of the Truth of it in his own Mind and among all Temptations to Doubt and Distrust may with great Triumph and Confidence say with the Apostle I know whom I have believ'd 10. It was observ'd a little before of Humane Faith that it resembles Opinion in as much as they are both dubious and uncertain Assents as proceeding upon grounds of like uncertainty though otherwise of different Natures Now as this Faith resembles Opinion so in like manner it may be observ'd of Divine Faith that it resembles Science or rather that Second Assent for so I am forc'd to call it for want of a better Name which we lately discours'd of and plac'd between Opinion and Faith The Comparison here bears the same proportion as to Certainty as it did in the other Case as to uncertainty Divine Faith has all the Certainty that is possible and therefore to be sure as much as Science or that Second Assent can have There is as much Certainty in the thing assented to and there may be as much Assurance and firmness of Perswasion in the Assent it self or in other words what a man believes upon the Authority of God is in it self as certain as what he knows and he may also be as Certain of it For he that assents to a thing upon full evidence can but assent fully and perfectly without suspense or hesitation and so also can he that assents to a thing upon Divine Authority only His Ground is every whit as Firm and Sure as the others and why then should the Measure of his Assurance be less It cannot possibly be if he Knows and Considers upon what Ground he stands So that thus far both in regard of the Certainty of the Object and the Firmness of the Perswasion Divine Faith may be justly placed upon a level with the Most Evident Assent whatever 11. Nor I suppose will this be thought an undue Elevation of Divine Faith On the Contrary I expect to be Complain'd of for setting the Dignity of it at too low a Pitch by those who say that Divine Faith is Firmer than Science But 't is for want of the Latter that these Men so excessively exâ—ol the Former I call it excessively because 't is what strictly and exactly speaking cannot be For what I Perceive or Know is even by that very supposition unquestionably true or else I cannot be said to Know it and what I believe upon the highest Authority can be no more To say therefore that Faith is Firmer than Science is like saying that one streight Line is streighter than another But perhaps their Meaning only is that 't is safer relying upon the Autâ—ority of God than upon our own Rational Faculties which indeed is right and I heartily wish all Men were convinc'd of it For though what I do actually and really Know be to the full as true and certain as what I Believe and I can no more be out in one than in the other yet it is More Certain in the general that God cannot deceive me than that my Reason cannot be deceiv'd Not that what I assent to by Divine Faith can have a greater Objective Certainty than what I clearly and distinctly Perceive or Know but only that there is a Possibility not to say Danger of my taking that for a clear and distinct Perception which â—ndeed is Not so and so though I cannot be deceiv'd in what I do truly know yet I may be deceiv'd in thinking that I know when I do not So that Divine Faith though not more Certain than Knowledge it self is yet of greater Certainty than our Knowing Faculties and generally speaking the Believer goes upon surer grounds than the Man of Reason and Demonstration Because his Reason may possibly lead him into Error whereas the Other 's Authority cannot And when they are both in the right yet still there will be this difference between them that his Reason is only not Deceiv'd whereas the Other 's Faith is Infallible 12. And thus far we have taken a view of the more bright and perfect side of Divine Faith I mean that of its Firmness and Certainty in respect of which it stands upon a just level with Science But it has
of Reason we must Assent to nothing but what has an internal Evidence and what in its self and by its own Lights is Comprehensible by us as they seem to mean or else their distinction of the Case of Reason and the Case of Revelation is here impertinent then I conceive that they set too narrow limits to our Assent in Matters of Reason when they allow it to be given only to things which in this sense are Evident to us For 't is plain that there are many things in Nature which we fee are True and must be True and so not only may but cannot help Assenting to them though at the same time we are not able to Comprehend how they are or can possibly be 7. Not that our Assent is then Blind and wholly without Evidence for then we might as well Assent to the contrary as to what we do and would do better not to Assent at all but only that it has none from within and from the intrinsic Nature of the Object but only from some External Consideration much after the same manner as it is in â—atch In both which there may be a Clear Reason why we should Assent to an Obscure thing But then as the internal Obscurity does not destroy the External Evidence so neither does the External Evidence strike any Light into the internal Obscurity or in other words as the Reason for Assenting is never the less Clear because the Matter assented to is Obscure so neither is the Matter assented to ever the less Obscure because the Reason for assenâ—ing to it is Clear And yet notwithstanding this internal Obscurity of the Matter we assent to it because of the prevailing Light of the External Evidence And this we do not only in Matters of Faith according to the Restriction of some but in the things of Nature and Reason too where we are oftentimes forced by the pressing urgency of certain External and Collateral Considerations to assent to things internally obscure and whose very possibility we cannot Comprehend as is plain in the great Question of the Divisibility of Quantity and other Instances whereof every Thinking Man's Obseâ—â—ation cannot but have already furnish'd him with variety The Incomprehensibility then of a thing is non just Objection against our Assent to it even in Matters of a Rational Nature much less then is it in Matters of Faith For if not in Matters that belong to the Court of Reason and where she sits as Judge then much less in things that are not of her proper Jurisdiction and if notwithstanding the internal inevidence of an Object we think fit to assent to it upon Rational Considerations much more may we and ought we upon the Authority of the Infallible God 8. Indeed if whatsoever is Above our Reason were also as some pretend as Contrary to it and there were nothing true but what was also Comprehensible and so the Incomprehensibility of a thing were an Argument of its not being true then I conâ—ess we could not as Rational Creatures assent to an incomprehensible Proposition upon any Consideration whatsoever No not even that of Divine Authority 'T is true indeed there could then be no such Authority for Incomprehensible things But if there were 't is impossible we should regard it because we could not have greater assurance either of the Existence or of the Truth of it than we have already upon this Supposition that the things reveal'd are not true But now if this Supposition be no more than a Supposition if to be above Reason does not involve any Contrariety to it if there are incomprehensible Truths and Consequently the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument oâ— it s not being true all which has been already proved then 't is plain that what is an incomprehensible may yet be a Believable Object because within the Possibility of Truth and then to render it actually believ'd there needs only some External Evidence either from Reason or Authority For what should hinder our Assent to an Incomprehensible thing when we have plain Evidence from without for it and its own internal Obscurity is no Argument against it 'T is plain therefore that we ought to give our Assent And since we do so oftentimes upon a Ground of Reason much more ought we upon that more Firm and Immoveable ground of Revelation The short is whatever is no Objection against the Truth of a thing is none against the Credibility of it since Truth is the General Object of Faith unless you will say that a thing is unfit to be believ'd upon any other account besides want of Truth and therefore since we have already shewn that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument against the Truth of it it visibly follows that it is no Argument against the Belief of it neither Therefore an Incomprehensible thing may be believ'd and accordingly he that refuses to believe any thing is bound to give a better Reason for it than because it is Incomprehensible 9. If it be said that this is reason enough because Faith is a Rational Act and therefore what is above the Comprehension of Reason is as much above a Rational Belief to this besides what I have already remarqu'd upon this Occasion in the Chapter of Faith I here further reply that it is true indeed and on both sides agreed that Faith is a Rational Act but in what Sense is the Question There are two very different Senses according to which it may be said to be so either in regard of the Clearness of its Formal Reason or in regard of the Clearness of its Object Either because it is founded upon an External Evidence or Argument for believing or because it proceeds upon an Internal Evidence that appears in the very Nature of the thing Believ'd Iâ— Faith be said to be a Rational Act in the latter Sense the Assertion is then False for so that â—s in respect of the Object we have shâ—wn it to be an inevident Assent But i◠〈◊〉 be said to be a Rational Act in the former Sense then indeed it is true but nothing to the purpose since nothing hinders but that this External Evidence may well consist with an Internal Inevidence or in other words that the Clearness of the Reason for Believing may stand with the Obscurity of the Object Believ'd And therefore though Faith be a Rational Act yet it does not hence â—ollow that what is Above Reason is also above Faith and cannot rationally be believ'd because the Act of Faith is said to be Rational Not in respect of the Evidence of the Object but only that of its Formal Reason or Motive And therefore though there be no Evidence in the Object yet it is not thereby render'd uncapable of being the Matter of Faith because the Evidence which Faith as a Rational Act supposes is wholly of another kind There seems indeed a kind of opposition as to the Sound between Faith's being an Act of Reason
a desperate Argument when there is nothing else to be said for it 2. Which of these is the Evasion either the denying or the allowing this Distinction will best appear by the Examination of it which besides its Serviceableness to our Clearer proceeding in what we are now upon I am the rather induced to undertake because as Mr. Boyle Observes in a little Treatise upon this Subject there are divers that employ this Distinction few that have attempted to explain it and none that has taken care to justifie it Indeed He himself is the only Person that I know of that has written professedly about it and I cannot but wonder that a thing of such Curiosity and Importance should be so little Consider'd though I think he has not gone to the Bottom of the Subject nor is sufficiently clear even as far as he goes However because he has some Considerable Observations upon it as indeed his Thoughts are generally very good and there is no reason why we should refuse any additional Light in so dark and untrodden a way I shall for the further advantage and illustration of the Matter first draw up into a short view what that Excellent Person has Meditated concerning it with such Occasional Remarques as I shall think necessary and then proceed to state the thing according to my own Conceptions hoping that between us both it will be sufficiently clear'd and that nothing of any Consequence will be overlook'd that belongs to the Consideration of this so little consider'd and almost Virgin Subject 3. To give you then in the first place the Sum of Mr. Boyle's Account He proposes in general two things 1. To declare in what sense the Distinction is to be understood 2. To prove that it is not an Arbitrary or illusory Distinction but grounded upon the Nature of things As to the first he tells you that by things Above Reason he Conceives such Notions and Propositions as Mere Reason that is unassisted by Revelation would never have discover'd to us whether those things be to our Finite Capacities clearly comprehensible or not And that by things Contrary to Reason he understands such Conceptions and Propositions as are not only undiscoverable by mere Reason but such as when we do understand them do evidently appear repugnant to some Principle or to some Conclusion of right Reason 4. Now before I go any further I would here by this great Man's leave and with due deference to his high Character remarque that though things undiscoverable by mere Reason without Revelation may in a Certain sense be said to be above Reason in as much as they surpass the Natural ability of the Understanding to make the first Discovery of them yet this is not what Divines mean by Above Reason as they use the Phrase in this Distinction opposing it to Contrary to Reason For this Distinction was intended against the Socinians who generally reject the Mysteries of Faith as contrary to Sense and Reason to which we reply that they are not Contrary to Reason but only Above it They cry out that this is no Distinction but a mere Shift and Evasion pretending that the I arts of it fall in together and that what is above Reason is also contrary to it and therefore not to be believ'd Now 't is most plain that both they that use this Distinction and they against whom it is used do not Mean by things Above Reason such as are beyond the first invention or Discovery of it For besides that to mean that our Mysteries are only undiscoverable when we say they are above Reason would be too little a thing to oppose to Contrary to Reason it is also too little a thing to intend by Mystery since though the undiscoverableness of them by Reason might be a sufficient ground of their being so call'd before their Revelation it can be none now after they are reveal'd And therefore if we say of these Mysteries now that they are above Reason we cannot be presumed to intend it in respect of their undiscoverableness And 't is as plain that that our Adversaries do not so understand us For they deny that things above Reason are to be believ'd and that because according to them above Reason and contrary to Reason are all one But now no Socinian that understands his own Principle would deny the Credibility of things above Reason as that signifies only undiscoverable by Reason alone much less would he say that what is above Reason in that Sense is also contrary to it No without doubt they will in this sense both allow us the Distinction and the Mysteries if they may be so call'd that are built upon it But then this plainly shews that they do not understand it in this Sense any more than we 5. Instead therefore of saying undiscoverable he should have said incomprehensible by Reason Into which he slips unawares in the account of the other part of the Distinction things Contrary to Reason by saying that they are such as when we do understand them do appear repugnant c. which plainly implies that the former things that were said to be above Reason are such as we do not understand even when discover'd and not such as we are not able only to Discover since otherwise there will be no Antithesis in the Second part in which there is nothing amiss except those words as are not only undiscoverable which in my judgment ought to be expung'd as the Production of the first Mistake 6. Mr. Boyle proceeds to illustrate his Explanation of this Distinction by a Comparison drawn from Sight He supposes a Man to be askt by a Diver what he could see in a deep Sea To which the Man is supposed to reply that he could see into a Sea-green Liquor to the depth of some yards and no further So that if further ask't if he could see what lies at the Bottom of the Sea his Answer no doubt would be in the Negative But then if the Diver should let himself down to the Bottom and bring up thence and shew him Oysters or Muscles with Pearls in them he would easily acknowledge both that they lay beyond the reach of his Sight and that the Pearls were Genuin and Good But if the Diver should further pretend that each of these Pearls was bigger than the Shells they were contain'd in this would be thought not only undiscernible by the Eyes but contrary to their Informations and to admit this would argue the Sight not only to be imperfect but false and delusory and accordingly 'tis presum'd that this he would not admit 7. Now I not only allow this Comparison but even admire it for the singular Aptness and Pertinency of it to illustrate even to the Sense the difference between things above and things contrary to Reason only I think it seems to proceed upon the supposition that by things above Reason are meant such only as are incomprehensible by it which certainly would make the Comparison
Observation not lightly to be pass'd over that if this One Distinction of things above Reason and things contrary to Reason be once admitted or shewn to be real Solid and well-grounded the main part of the Socinian Controversie is immediately or at least in the very next Consequence at an end For the Reason why they will not believe things above Reason is because as they pretend Above Reason differs nothing in reality from Contrary to Reason and so those things that are above Reason are also as much contrary to it as above it and what is Contrary to Reason is on both sides acknowledg'd impossible to be believ'd Well but then if it be made appear as I think by this time is sufficiently done that these two are quite different things and that to be above Reason is not the same as to be contrary to it then even by their own Confession there can be no pretence why what is above Reason may not be Believ'd Which I take to be the true inducement that makes these Men stand out so fiercely and obstinately against this Distinction for they are aware what mischief it will do 'em as it is also the reason why I have bestow'd so much care and pains to clear and justifie it 28. And thus having given an Account of these great and Fundamental things what Reason is what Faith is and what it is to be Above and what Contrary to Reason we have now prepared the way to the more full and direct Consideration of the Belief of things above Reason the true state of which Question by what has been hitherto discours'd appears to be this Whether we may not Assent upon the Authority of Divine Revelation to such things as our Understanding or Reason cannot perceive or Comprehend as to the Truth or Manner of them Or whether our not being able thus to Comprehend them be a sufficient Reason why we should not believe them For the Resolution of which we have already laid the Grounds and shall now proceed more directly to build upon them in the following Chapter CHAP. IV. That Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth 1. WE have gain'd a most wonderful Point in the foregoing Chapter by proving the Distinction between things Above and things Contrary to Reason and such as of it self alone is sufficient Not only immediately to decide but even forever to Silence the Controversie between us and our Socinian Adversaries concerning the Belief of things above Reason For the only Objection that is or can possibly be pretended against the Belief of things above Reason being the supposed Contrariety of the same things to Reason if it be shewn that to be above Reason involves no such Contrariety then the Objection against the belief of such things is fairly and wholly removed and consequently there remains no Reason why they may not be Believ'd So that I cannot but look upon the Substance of my Work as most effectually done already and those of our Adversaries that have any reasonable Measure of Penetration and Sincerity must needs be sensible of it And I dare appeal even to their own Consciences whether they are not However considering the importunity of those I have to deal with as well as the weight of the Cause it self I shall endeavour the further establishment of it upon some other Considerations whereby I shall also give further Confirmation and so repay what I am endebted to the Point contended for in the preceding Chapter since we may as well argue backwards from the Believableness of things above Reason to their not Contrariety as forwards from their not Contrariety to their Believableness the Consequence being full as good thus Above Reason Believable therefore not Contrary as thus Above Reason not Contrary therefore Believable Now in order to the fuller Conviction and demonstration of the Believableness of things above Reason I set out upon this Ground that Humane Reason is not the Measure of Truth 2. 'T is agreed among the Masters of Reason that as all Proof ought to be only of such things as need it so there are Propositions so Clear and Evident of themselves that they have no need of being demonstrated and that there are some again that are not capable of Demonstration the Fulness and immediateness of their Evidence rendring them strictly indemonstrable And it has been charged by one of the most Considerable of them as a Fault in the Method of the Geometricians that they set themselves to prove things that have no need of Proof whereof he gives an Instance in Euclid who goes formally to work to prove that two sides of a Triangle taken together are greater than one although this be most Evident even from the Notion only of a Right Line which is the shortest that can possibly be between two Points and the Natural Measure of Distance from one Point to another which it could not be if it were not also the shortest of all Lines that can be drawn from Point to Point 3. Now though I cannot say that the Proposition of this Chapter is so Evident of it self as not to be capable of Demonstration yet I must Confess I cannot but think it of the Number of those that do not need any that is I mean to those who will but take the Pains to consider it with Attention and are withal so sincere as to say ingenuously what they inwardly think For to unattentive or Captious Persons nothing is plain since there is Nothing but what some will contradict and there are those who profess to doubt of every thing and even the Sun it self can't make a Man see if either he want eyes or will shut ' em I cannot therefore say that to such men either this or any other Proposition is plain but I would venture to be tried by any competent and indifferent Considerer whether this be not indeed a very plain and certain Proposition as plain as most of those which pass for Principles and Maximes in Discourse that Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth And accordingly I should justly fear incurring the same Censure that is charged upon the Geometricians of going to prove what is evident were there not something peculiar in the present Case that makes it very different from theirs For they dealing in Matters of an Abstract and indifferent Nature and such wherein the Lusts and Passions of men are altogether uninteressed have no real need to prove evident things because for that very reason their Evidence is never Contested whereas the Point I have now in hand being of a Moral Concernment and such as incounters the Partialities and false Biasses of Humane Nature particularly that great and governing one of Self-Love though it should be of equal evidence with some of their Maxims will yet not be equally secure from Opposition and pass alike uncontested And so there may be need of proving it if not to do any necessary Service to the Proposition it self yet to satisfie
do you think of your Principle Is it not a goodly one and richly worth all the Passion and Zeal you have express'd for it You know very well that M. Abbadie in his Excellent Treatise of the Divinity of Christ has shewn you that upon one of your grounds viz. the denial of that Article the Mahumetan Religion is preferable to the Christian and indeed that you are Obliged by it to renounce Christianity and turn Mahumetans This truly was a home-thrust But yet you see the Consequence of your general Principle reaches further as leading your not only out of Christianity but out of all Religion whether Natural or Reveal'd even beyond Deism even into Atheism it self If it does not actually lead you thither the fault is not in the Principle whose Connexion with that Consequence is natural enough but 't is because you are not so Consistent with your selves as to follow it And indeed 't is a great Happiness that you do not since if you were here better Logicians you would be worse Men though it would be a much greater if for the danger of being more Consistent with it you would be perswaded to lay it down 13. And that you may be so be pleased further to Consider that though this Principle of yours does not eventually carry you as far as Atheism because perhaps the Horridness of the Conclusion may be a Counterweight against the Force of the Premises though you see it Naturally tends that way yet there is very great danger of its leading you Effectually into Deism that not being not accounted now-a-days such a very frightful thing For as long as you hold that what is above Human Reason is not to be Believ'd and upon that Account reject the Christian Mysteries because they are above Reason you lie at the Mercy of that Argument that shall prove to you that these Mysteries are indeed Reveal'd and that the Genuin and Natural Sense of the Sacred Text declares for them For if you once come to be convinc'd of that you will then be Obliged in Consequence of your Principle to renounce that Religion which reveals such incredible things that is the Christian which will be a shrew'd indeed an invincible Temptation to you to throw up all Reveal'd Religion and so to turn perfect Deists And I pray God it may not have that Effect upon you 14. But as to the parting with Christianity that you will be further tempted to do upon another account For when you have by your Principle stript it or I may say rather unbowell'd it of its great and adorable Mysteries it will appear such a poor lank slender thing to you that you will hardly think it Considerable enough to be reveal'd as a New and more perfect Institution by God or to be receiv'd as such by thinking and Considering Men. For what will such find so considerable in Christianity especially as a new Institution what so visibly peculiar and assuredly distinguishing what that may infallibly set it above an Humane Institution if it be once robb'd of its Mysteries They may indeed think it a good plain piece of Morals and such as exceeds any other of a known Humane Composure but how are they sure but that the Invention of Man may be able to rise so high as to Compose such a System as this if you set aside its Mysteries Which therefore I cannot but look upon of all the things that are intrinsic to it for I do not here Consider Miracles as the greatest Characters of its Divinity And some perhaps would be apt to think them such as without which it would hardly be thought worthy of reception especially as a New Institution even with the help of Miracles which Men are always ready and not without reason to suspect when the Matters for whose sake they are wrought bear not sufficient Proportion to them Which they would also perhaps be inclined to think to be the present Case For what would they say is there in the Christian Religion that deserves so great ado what that should ingage an Omnipotent Arm to introduce it into the World by such mighty Signs and Wonders if there be indeed nothing Wonderful in it that is if you take away its Mysteries What cannot a good System of Morality especially if only a Second and a little more Correct Edition of a Former be Communicated to the World without Alarming Heaven and Earth and giving disturbance to the Course of Nature And if Christianity be no More what Proportion say they will it bear to its Miraculous Introduction And what will it be found to have so very Considerable as either to deserve or justifie such an Apparatus It must indeed be allow'd by all to be a good wholsom Institution for the Direction of Manners but what is there so very Great and Admirable in it what that either deserves or answers to so many Types and Figures and Prophetical Predictions what that so Copiously sets forth the Manifold Wisdom of God and the Glory of his Attributes and the Nothingness of the Creature and where are those Deep things of God that Eye hath not seen nor Ear heard nor have enter'd into the Heart of Man a place which the Apostle applies out of the Prophet Isaiah to the Revelations of the Gospel where I say are those profound things which the Spirit of God only that Searches all things could reveal and which even now they are Reveal'd the Angels desire to look into You 'l hardly find any thing of so rais'd a Character in Christianity if you devest it of its Mysteries which therefore may justly be reckon'd as the Main Pillars of it without which it will have much ado to support it self So that in short Christianity Not Mysterious how fond soever a Certain Author is of such a Religion will make but a very little Figure in Proportion to its Pomp and External Splendor and indeed will almost dwindle down into Nothing 15. It may indeed even without the Mysteries make a shift to subsist as a mere System of Precepts and Rule of Life though even thus Consider'd it will be greatly impair'd and suffer much disadvantage as wanting those Convincing Demonstrations of God's hatred of Sin and of his Love towards Mankind and withal those indearing and perswasive Arguments for their returns of Love Gratitude and Obedience towards him which can only be deriv'd from the Redemption of the World by the Death and Satisfaction of its Divine Undertaker but as a Covenant of Grace establish'd betwixt God and his Offending and Estranged Creature it cannot possibly stand but must fall to the ground So that though the Moral or Legal part as I may call it of Christianity may at a hard rate Continue after the downfall of its Mysteries yet its Federal part and all that is properly Gospel in it must needs be involv'd in the Ruin and Fall with them that being all built upon the Satisfaction of Christ as that again