Affection pre-requisit to Faith derogates nothing from it's Certainty but is perfectly consistent with the Evidence of those Motives which are to generate it and that the Governours and Officers of the Church though proposing the most convincing reasons in the world for the Authority conveying down Faith to us can prevail nothing unless the Great Governour of the world and Giver of every good gift by his peculiar Power plant antecedently in their hearts this good disposition and prepare terram bonam that their endeavours may take effect and the Sowers Seed take root no more than Paul though miraculous could convert all that saw his Miracles or heard his Preaching but only such whose hearts God open'd as he did Lydia's It appears also by the same discourse how the Acts of Faith are free that is as depending on this pious disposition of the Will which sets the Understanding on work to consider the Motives and so produce them The whole Humane Action is free because the Will orders it though she do not produce it all or though freedom be not formally in the Body so the Act of Faith is free because it is order'd by the Will which is free though no freedom be found in the Understanding which is incapable of such a qualification but pure necessity of assenting when the Motives are seen to be Conclusive No need then is there upon any account of a pious disposition of the Will to peece out the defect of the Reasons why we believe and to oblige the Understanding to assent beyond the Motive that is assent to a degree beyond what it had reason to do An Impossibility in Humane Nature rightly and connaturally govern'd and I much fear no small disgrace to Christian Faith considering the obstinate bent of the Church's Adversaries to confound the Speculative Thoughts of Divines explaining Faith and its Grounds less carefully with their Sentiments issuing naturally from them as Christians nay with the Doctrin of the Catholick Church it self What can revincingly be reply'd to an Atheist objecting on this occasion that Christians make the Evidence of Faith's grounds stand need to be pecc'd out by Obscurity our Knowledg of them by Ignorance and the Rationality of them by Will without Reason that is Willfulness Wherefore I carnestly obtest and beseech even per viscera Christi all who shall read this Treatise and yet have Speculatively held and maintain'd this Opinion I here impugn for practically and as Christians they hold the contrary Conclusion seriously to weigh the Point once more and not to obstruct the Resolving Christian Faith into immoveable Principles or absolutely Certain Grounds by an Opinion onely sprung from the conceited difficulty in making out those Grounds to be Impossible to be False which yet themselves to a man profess and hold as they are Christians I humbly beg leave to propose to them these few Considerations First 'T is Certain Faith is no less Faith or an Assent upon Authority though that Authority be demonstrated to be Infallible but on the contrary that 't is both firmer and more rational even for that very regard Secondly 'T is Certain that the Generality of Christians hold their Faith to be True or Impossible to be False that is 't is True to us and withall perfectly Rational and consequently that its Grounds or Principles are so able to ascertain it that they place it beyond Possibility of Falshood Thirdly 'T is no less evident that an inclination or motion of the Will being of such a nature that it can have neither Truth nor Falshood in it can be no Rational Principle or Ground of our Assents or Acts of Faith that is apt to ascertain them or indeed apt to establish the Truth of any Tenet Fourthly That 't is most evident from my foregoing Discourse that an antecedent pious disposition of the Will is still requisite to Faith notwithstanding the perfect Conclusiveness of the Grounds on which 't is built and that all Acts of Faith depend on this quoad exercitium at least as the Schools speak which in the Judgment of many Divines is sufficient Fifthly That 't is the common Opinion of the solidest Divines that Faith consists with Evidence in the Attester Sixthly That Faith or a firm and immoveable Assent upon Authority is not thoroughly rational and by consequence partly faulty if the Motives be not alone able to convince an Understanding rightly dispos'd without the Will 's Assistance for what can be said for that degree of Assent which is beyond the Motive or Reason Is it not evident from the very Terms that 't is Irrational or without any Reason But the worst is that whereas all good Christians hold their Faith Impossible to be False or judge their Acts of Faith Immoveable Assents these Authors as Speculaters put all the Reasons for Faith to leave it still Possible to be False and make this pious Affection the onely thing which elevates it to Impossibility of Falshood which is vastly higher in point of Certainty as if a rational Creature not deviating totally from its nature but acting according to right Reason ought therefore to hold a Point Impossible to be False because it self has an Affection or as we say a great mind it should be so Seventhly This Assertion renders the Impossibility of Faith's Falshood not only unmaintainable as hath been now shown but also unperswadable to others for how shall I be able to give account to others that my Affection which works this Perswasion in me is rational and not apt to mislead me when as the very Position obliges me to profess the contrary and to grant that this Affection pushes forward my Understanding to assent beyond the reason it has that is as to this degree in my Assent which is no small one since it raises it from judging Faith possible to be false to judge it Impossible to be such without reason Or will not this Speculative Tenet seem to force this Inference that the Grounds of Faith as to its most intrinsecal consideration viz. the Impossibility of its Falshood is made by this Doctrin full as dark a hole as 't is to alledge the private Spirit Nor can the Reverence due to the Divine Authority suffice for such an Effect both because 't is Impossible God should will that Mankind for his sake should act irrationally as also because there is no poison in the world so pestilent as an Errour abetted by the most Sacred Patronage of God's Authority as the Histories of the Fanaticks in all ages and our home-bred experience testifies Whence that very Reverence to the Divine Authority obliges us to be so sure 't is engag'd for a Truth e're we admit it for such that we may securely though with an humble truth say with Richardus de Sancto Victore Domine si error est quod credimus à te decepti sumus so that there is indeed no greater injury and abuse to the Divine Name imaginable than to hazard the making it
had the Word of God for its Basis which they honestly understood to have the same Certainty as if God himself had spoke it yet being drest up by their plausible Rhetorick and advanc'd in a circumstance when they were confuting the Papists the middle sort of Protestant Readers at unawares let it pass as meritorious to their party and the wiser sort embrac'd it both as a real Truth and also as making best for the Interest of their Cause when they would oppugn us what disservice soever it did tot he Common Cause of Religionor Christianity For they were not at all sollicitous so strangely did faction transport them so they could in their conceit overthrow the Infallibility of the Catholick Church though they reduc'd all Faith into Incertainty and all the Grounds on which 't is built into a tottering Contingency It seem'd to threaten a Mischief considerable enough to Christianity that such a pernicious Tenet should be publickly own'd in Controversy to taint the wiser sort of Readers with Atheism in which it hath been too successful but it grew intolerable when it durst take the boldness to appear in Sermons pronounc'd in very Honourable Assemblies and afterwards publish'd in Print where under the Title of The Wisdom of being Religious and a great many seeming shows and I heartily think very real Intentions of impugning Atheism by an ill-principled and in that circumstance imprudent and unnecessary confession in equivalent Terms of the possible falshood of Faith nay even as to the chiefest and most Fundamental point the Tenet of a Deity Religion receives a deep wound and Atheism an especial Advantage as may perhaps more particularly be shown hereafter I envy not that Sermon and some other Productions of Mr. Tillotson their Authour their due commendations though he be my Adversary I acknowledge that in his clear Method or disposition of his matter and the cleanness of his style which fit him for an Excellency in Preaching he hath few Equals and that had he good Principles he would deliver them as intelligibly as any man I know onely I could wish he had right Principles to Ground his discourse without which he can never make a Controvertist but must needs undermine the solid Foundation of Christianity if he undertake to meddle with the Grounds of it even while he goes about to defend it What I am on this occasion chiefly to reflect on is my own obligation which is the boldness of owning and publishing the Incertainty of Christian Faith being come to the height to assert it's Absolute Firmness and Certainty in the best manner God shall enable me and his Providence seems to require it of me at present In regard 't is expected I should reply to Mr. Tillotson 's pretended Answer to Sure Footing whose first Principle in that Reply seems to be this that what he deems the Rule of Christian Faith and consequently that Faith it self is possible to be False for by virtue of this Position which he defends p. 118 and in diverse other places implies and builds on he more oppugns my discourse than by any other Thesis whatever The contrary to which if I evince then the Protestants own confession that they have no Absolutely-Certain Ground or Rule of Faith confutes them without more ado and concludes them to have relinquish'd its onely right because its onely truly certain Rule TRADITION Yet were it not my chief design to establish the Absolute Truth of Christian Faith in it self by all the Arguments I can imagin and not meerly to confute Protestant Controvertists I needed not take the pains thus to multiply Demonstrations or even alledg so much as one For since whatever they pretend seemingly to Antiquity or Authority of Fathers by their voluminous quotations yet they will finally and heartily stand to nothing in contests about Faith as Conclusive but their own Interpretations of Scripture Which being so weak a Ground that every dayes Experience shows it's Failings an ordinary Probability is abundantly enough to overthrow their Discourses whose very Principle is not onely Improbable but evidently a False one Whence the meanest Catholick writer cannot fail to have the advantage over their Best in a Prudential man's Esteem because he cannot possibly miss of a Medium more probable than is their main Ground I declare then that my Chief End in this Treatise is to settle Christian Faith or to demonstrate that it must be truly or Absolutely Certain and that my applying it now and then to my Opposers is onely a Secundary Intention and meerly Occasional Ere I fall close to my Proofs that Faith cannot possibly be False to avoid Equivocation in the words I declare that by the word Faith I am not sollicitous whether be meant our Act of Faith or the Points of Faith that is the Object of that Act but judg that distinction wholly Impertinent in this present discourse and the reason is because I cannot affirm a Point True or False but as it stands under Motives able to make me judge assent or beleeve 't is such or such which Motives if they be such as are able to convince that the Point cannot but be so then my Iudgment or Assent tothose Points thusconcluded that is my Act of Faith cannot but be True because it depends intirely on Grounds Impossible to be False viz. those Motives But if those Motives are not of such a nature as is absolutely Conclusive the thing is then both the Thing Object Point or Proposition of Faith as being onely Knowable by virtue of them may be otherwise and also my Act of Faith or Belief of those Points may be a wrong or erroneous Iudgment that is both of them may be False To ask then if Faith can possibly be False is to ask whether the Motives laid by God's Providence for Mankind or his Church to embrace Christian Faith must be such as of their own nature cannot fail to conclude those points True and to affirm that Faith is not possible to be False is equivalently to assert that those Motives or the Rule of Faith must be thus absolutely Conclusive Firm and Immovable Hence is seen that I concern not my self in this discourse with how perfectly or imperfectly diverse persons penetrate those motives or how they satisfy or dissatisfy some particular Persons since I onely speak of the Nature of those Motives in themselves and as laid in Second Causes by Gods Providence to light Mankind in their way to Faith to which the dimness of eye-sight neglect to look at all or looking the wrong way even in many particular men is Extrinsecal and Contingent Lastly to avoid Mistake and Confusion I declare that there being two sorts of Questions one concerning the Existence of a thing call'd An est viz. whether there be any Certainly-Conclusive Rule of Faith or no and the other about what is the Certain or truely-Conclusive Rule of Faith call'd Quid est I am not now discoursing about the later that was the work
vast Oceans on either side America to overswell the Continent and so destroy it they are forc'd to confess interiourly America may for any thing they know possibly not be whence they are forc'd to suspend as to its Existence and only Assent to it's extream Likelihood of existing § 4. The use I make of this discourse at present is this that though Likelyhoods have a great latitude yet Assent being the terminus of those Inclinations towards it which gradually exceed one another consists in an Indivisible as does the notion of is on which either seen or deem'd to be seen 't is built and to which it goes parallell That all Acts falling short of Assent to the Existence of a thing advance no farther than great Assents to it's Likelihood and fall under the head of suspensive Acts as to that things Existence as the Soul will discover upon reflexion and that when we mistake one for the other 't is for not distinguishing well the great resemblance between assenting as to outward Action and as to the speculative Truth as also between assenting to the extream Likelihood of a thing and assenting to its Existence That whensoever we see the Possibility of a things being False or not-Existent which in our case is all one we cannot have an Assent to it's Existence but to the likelihood of it only and suspend as to its Existence or actual being and that therefore they who acknowledg that notwithstanding all the Means used and all the Grounds it has Faith may possibly be false to us cannot be held to assent to the Existence or Truth of those points but to suspend concerning their truth and to assent only to their likelihood to be true Which whether it be a sufficient disposition to denominate such persons Christians will easily and best be determin'd by the vulgar of Christianity who possess the genuin and natural meaning of the word Faith untainted with the frantick conceits sprung from such speculations as are taken out of Fancy not as they ought from the nature of the Thing § 5. The same Argument may be made from the nature of firmly Holding as was from Assent and the self-same discourse mutatis mutandis since 't is most Evident none can firmly hold a thing to be true which he sees and acknowledges that is holds may be False however he may hold it Very likely to be True § 6. The same is evinc'd from the notion of knowing which word I take here abstractedly unconcern'd what kind of knowledg it be provided it be True and proper knowledg and not abusively so call'd For since nothing can be known to be but what is nor known to be such but what is such again since Christians if they have either Honesty or Wit in them must some way or other know points of Faith to be true whose truth they esteem themselves bound to profess and stand to even with the loss of their lives it follows those points must be what they are known to be that is True and consequently unless knowledg can be Ignorance impossible not to be or to be False § 7. What hath been said of Assent and Holding and Knowing may also be discours'd from the notion of Certainty for this has the same nature with the former as it is a determination of the Understanding I mean Intellectual determination is the common Genus to them all and they differ only in this that Knowledg and Certainty are proper Effects of Evidence whether sprung from the thing or from the Attester nor can they be where there is wanting the Intellectual Light issuing from that First Principle of all Evidence so oft spoken of whereas Hâ—lding or Assenting can proceed from the Blindness of Passion or from Ignorance as well as from the clear Sight of the Understanding Now that the Nature of Certainty consists in an Intellectual Determination thus originiz'd and consequently when put excludes all possibility of being otherwise which is the point I aym to evince appears partly from the Etymology and most evidently from the Use of the Word For Certus signifies Determinate As then when the matter spoken of restrains that word to Volition it signifies an Absolute Determination of Will or Resolution as certus â—undi so when we are speaking of the Ground of Intellectual Certainty and say the thing is Certain we intend to express full as much as when we say the thing is which speaks Ultimate Determination and Actuality in the Object consider'd in it self and in like Manner when the same word is intended to signifie Formal Certainty in Us or that Disposition of the Understanding whereby it is said to be Certain it must necessarily signifie unless contrary to the nature of Words it's most formal Notion be less rigorous then those which are less formal a Determinate state of the Understanding or an Intellectual Determination Whence as a thing is then Certain or Determinate when it is so the Understanding is then Determin'd according to it's Nature or Certain when the Thing is seen to be as it is which immediate Effect of the other is impossible but by virtue of the first Principle of Evidence making that clear discovery and This engaged all Intellectual Potentiality or Possibility of not being seen to be is totally and formally that is most absolutely excluded The true and genuine Notion then of Certainty imports an absolute impossibility that that judgment which so fixes and determines the Understanding should be an Errour or False Since nothing can be seen to be but what really is § 8. Again since Determination in any kind is the Terminus of all Indetermination in the same kind and so beyond it it follows that Certainty or Intellectual Determination is plac'd beyond all possible degrees of Indetermination of the mind or Uncertainty Certainty therefore is not attain'd till all possible degrees of Uncertainty and consequently Possibility of Falshood to us or Errour be transcended and overcome Faith then must be deny'd to be Certain if it be put Possible to be False §9 And as my former Discourse has endeavour'd to display the Nature of Certainty from its Genus and Difference which compound it's Definition so the same will be still more satisfactorily evinc't from observing the Language of Mankind when they use the word Certain For that being most evidently the signification of a word which the intelligent Users of that word intend to express by it if by divers sayings of theirs we can manifest that they meant to signifie such a Conception by that Word that will infallibly be the true meaning of it and that Conception will have in it the true Nature of Certainty Let us observe then attentively what is at the bottom of their hearts when they use these and the like familiar Discourses which naturally break from them How frequent is it when any one asks another Is such a thing true and the other replies I verily think it is he returns
are not reducible to these Grounds nay are made use of by Persons who declare against having any such Grounds for Faith signifie just as much as if they should say I beseech you Sir be so good natur'd as to believe me though to tell you true I acknowledg sincerely neither can I bring nor can there possibly be brought any Ground able to make good what I say or any undeniable Premisses to force my Conclusion Third Eviction § 1. THus far Logick Let 's see next what Nature and Metaphysicks say to the Point in which Quest yet we must not leave Logick's Assistance And first these Sciences assure us that as all Capacity of different Beings springs from First Matter so all Capacity of contrary Determinations arises from what we call Potentiality or Indifferency in the Subject Now the Subject in our present case is not so much our meer Faculty of Understanding as the Points of Faith it self in our Soul or the judging Power of our Soul consider'd precisely as affected with these Points for 't is these or our judging Power taken meerly as conversant about These that is our Judgments which our Opponents must affirm True yet Possible to be False Since therefore both the Points themselves and our Judgments consist formally in Affirmation and Negation that is in is and is not which are indivisible and constituted such by a Formality the most formal and actual that can be as hath been shown they can have as such no Indifferency or Potentiality in them to the contrary neither Natural nor Metaphysical nor consequently Possibility of Falshood § 2. The Position of our Adversaries is still render'd more absurd by this Consideration that even in Nature where there is the greatest Potentiality that is viz. First Matter the Subject is not yet capable of opposit Qualities at once but successively at least in the same part Whereas their Position is not that Faith which is now True is possible to be False afterwards upon the Alteration of some Contingent Matter but that 't is Possible now to be False or possible to be now False for any thing any man knows that is the understanding may have possibly Truth and Falshood in it at once and as to the same Part or Point § 3. But 't is still far more irrational in regard these seeming Contraries True and False apply'd to the Propositions we speak of have in them the perfect nature of Contradictories it being necessary that in those which speak de praesenti one should be exprest by is existent the other by is not existent as 't is in those which speak preteritly and futurely that one should be exprest by hath been or shall be the other by hath not been or shall not be To think then they can at once be True and False is to judg that Contradictories may be verified of the same or that both sides of the Contradiction may be true § 4. Again Truth being a Conformity of the mind to the Thing and Falshood a Disconformity to say a Proposition is True and yet possible to be False is to say that the mind consider'd as judgingly conversant about that Proposition may be at once Conformable and Disconformable to the same thing Too wild a Position to be introduc'd into a rational nature by any thing but such a wilful and blind passion as must first actually corrupt and in fine tend to destroy the very nature it self § 5. And to void this Thesis from all possible evasion here can be no different Respects according to which these Affirmations and Negations may be made so to avoid Contradiction but all such Respects are excluded both out of the nature of the Predicate in most of those Propositions as hath been shewn Evict 1. § 5. as also out of the nature of the Points of Faith which standing in the abstract descend nor to nor meddle with subsuming Respects but have their Notions compleated in the common words which express them And lastly because Truths and Falshoods are not capable of Distinctions and Respects For however a Proposition taken into Consideration and scanning whether it be true or no may admit Respects and Distinctions and so be affirm'd to be in this regard True in that False yet what is once accepted to be True cannot in any Respect afterwards be affirm'd possible to be not True or False For example this Proposition An Ethiopian is white is distinguish'd by Respects to several parts and in regard to his Teeth 't is true to his skin 't is false But after those Respects have distinguish'd the Ambiguity of it and so by dividing it into two Propositions settled one to be True the other to be False there can be no further use of Respects or Distinctions which are to antecede to Truth and Falshood by clearing the doubtfulness of Propositions and can have no place after the Truth is once acknowledg'd or supervene to it He then that once acknowledges Points of Faith to be Truths can have no Assistance from recourse to this and the other Respect to evade a Contradiction when he affirms they may be False § 6. Again 't is particularly opposite to the nature of a Soul to have such an Act in her as to judg a thing True yet possible to be False at the same time For our Soul as to her Judging Power is essentially a Capacity of Truth whence the First Principles which ground all Truths are so connatural to her that she cannot but embrace them and judg them true Nothing therefore being more opposit to Truth than a Contradiction it follows that nothing is more impossible to be receiv'd or subjected in the Soul according to her Judging Power than a Contradiction that is no implicatory or contradictory Act can settle there Now to judg a Proposition or Point to be true is to judg the thing to exist just as it affirms and to judg it Possible to be False is to judg it Possible not to exist as it affirms and this not in order to different times but the same that is to judg a Proposition or Point true yet possible to be false is the same as to judg the thing actually is and yet perhaps is not at the same time and this as appears by our former Discourse not to be avoided in our case by difference or diversity of Respects Wherefore since such an Act is not possible to be in the Judging Power of the Soul 't is most manifest that he who holds one side of the Contradiction cannot possibly hold the other that is he who holds Faith may be False cannot hold that 't is True and that if it be held and profest to be True it ought also to be held and profest Impossible to be false § 7. Moreover the Soul antecedently to its being inform'd by the Object was indifferent and undetermin'd to judg it True or False that is to be or not to be but when it
or the clearness of the Proposal of it which only can oblige connaturally the Understanding to conceit it as it ought and consequently the Will to love it accordingly in which conceiting and heartily loving not onely the Intending and Commanding part of the Action is plac'd in our case as it happens in our acting for material Goods but also the Executive and Assecutive Parts of it Not the same sleightness of Motive therefore or Moral Certainty will here serve the turn but true Certainty or Impossibility of Falshood is requir'd this being the best and properest to beget a hearty lively steady and all-over-powering Affection for Heav'n and such as may as it ought make Christians practically repute all other things as Dung in comparison of That § 9. But the main consideration which forces the Certainty of Faith and the Motives which are to beget it that is of the Rule of Faith above those which ground our Action of pursuing Temporary Goods is the unconceivable Mysteriousness of the Points of Faith Truths exalted above the ordinary Course of Nature as far as Heav'n is above the Earth Many of them looking so odd and uncouth to our course Humane Reason unrefin'd by Faith that as they seem'd of old to the Greeks Foolishness so still they are acknowledgedly most unsuitable to the grossness of Fancy by which the Generality of the world especially those who are yet unelevated by Christian Principles are led and confessedly above Reason insomuch as it costs the best Wits of Christianity no small pains to maintain them not to be Contradictory or Impossible to be True Putting then the Motives of Faith and consequently Faith it self Possible to be False the only seeming Certainty I might say the confest want of Certainty of the Motives to believe would be so counterballanc'd by the Incredibleness and seeming Contradictâ—riness of the Thing or Object or rather indeed overballanc'd in the Conceit of all those who are yet to embrace Faith that there would be no over-plus of weight left to incline them to hold those Points True rather than False much less to make them absolutely hold they are Certain Truths And he that shâ—uld assert the contrary I wonder how he would go about to prove it or by what Standard he would measure whether is the greater of the two counterpos'd Unlikelihoods viz. that the possibly false Motive of Faith should hap to be actually such or that the seeming-Impossibility in the Objects should chance to be a real one For 't is not enough to say here that we are in reason to expect the Divine Nature should be exceedingly exalted above its Creatures and incomprehensible and therefore we are not to measure his Perfections by the ordinary Rules found in Creatures but think it reasonable he should infinitely exceed them For however this has weight in Points of Faith which concern the Divine Nature and its Perfections as in it self yet here it will not serve the turn in regard Faith teaches us many other Points seemingly repugnant to the Divine Nature it self and most strangely debasing and vilifying it as that God infinitely happy in himself should be expos'd to injurious Bufferings Scourgings and an ignominious Death for a Creatures sake that in comparison of him is a meer Nothing and that Omniscience and Omnipotence could not invent and practice some easier and more honorable way to work the End they intended and lastly that it should beseem Infinite Goodness that a Person superlatively innocent should be so severely punisht to do an undue favour to those who were enormously wicked This consideration then necessitates plainly the Impossibility of Faith's being false for else 't would be irrational to believe it And lastly it shews the case of Christian Interiour Acts utterly unparallel to that of Acting Exteriourly for sensible and material Goods which one may apprehend to be attainable and also comprehend the Way to attain them without puzz'ling his Understanding with any unconceivable mysteriousness in the business to check his Assent E're I leave this Point I must desire the Reader to reflect well on the condition those persons are in who are yet to embrace Faith They have no Light but their pure Natural Reason and to this are propos'd for Objects to the one side the Motives to Faith or the Authority in our case that God has spoke it on the other the strangeness of the Mysteries Let then those persons understandings no better elevated go about to scan the profound Mysteries of Faith 't is clear and I think confest by all they must needs seem to them Impossible to be True which therefore nothing but a Motive of its own nature seemingly Impossible to be false can conquer so as to make them conceit them really True But this Motive or this Rule of Faith is confest by our Adversaries Possible to be false nor it being a fit and proportion'd Object for Humane Reason is there any thing to make it seem better than it is or Impossible to be false 't is then against all reason to believe were Faith and its Grounds Possible to be false the Motives of Dissent being in that case evidently greater than are the Motives of Assent § 10. Again since 't is incomparably more easie to throw down than to build or less difficult for the Understanding to comprehend an Objection than 't is to lay orderly in the Soul a severely-connected frame of Discourse forcing the Truth of a Point particularly when those Points are utterly unsuitable to Fancy and even exalted above Reason and so lie open to very plausible and easily penetrable Objections on which disadvantage or disproportion to weak Judgments that is indeed a high excellency on the Object 's side Atheists ground their drollery against the Mysteries of our Faith It follows that were not the chief motives to Faith or Rule of Faith practically self-evident and so Impossible to be False there would be considering the rudeness and unelevatedness of the Generality of those who are to come to Christian Faith and the unsuitableness of the Mysteries to their fancyled Understandings greater Temptations and more plausible that is to them stronger motives laid to make them dissent to those Mysteries than to make them assent The motives to Faith then must be Practically self-evident and so Faith it self must be Impossible to be False Seventh Eviction § 1. PErhaps the Language and Practise of Christianity expressing most manifestly their sentiments may give to some a more natural and penetrable satisfaction that 't is Impossible Faith should be false than all the Speculative and Scientifical Proofs hitherto deduc'd § 2. For their Language then I onely hint to the memory of my prudential Readers for to transcribe them were endless all those Expressions so frequent in Scriptures Fathers Councils and the mouths of the Faithful to these very days viz. That Faith is the Knowledg of God his Will and of revealed Truths Nor will I streighten the signification
of the Mysteryes themselves exceedingly enhauncing the other 't is manifest there would be a high disadvantage on Faith's side Nay granting a pretty high Probability which is perhaps as much as they care for yet the not-onely Improbability but seeming-Impossibility of the Mysteries of Faith if taken not as standing under Authority but as Objects of our Humane Reason as in this counter-ballancing case they ought to be would quite overpoise the Probable motive and incline the Soul strongly towards Dissent unless Interest Custom or some other Affection come in to the Assistance of the weaker Motive Printing it in a bigger Letter and diminishing the difficulty in the Object by not letting it be considered or penetrated that is by hindring the working of Right Reason Now in this case if this Discourse holds a Protestant may with a safe Conscience lay odds and wager two to one at least his Faith is all a Fâ—lshood A strange Impiety but yet the natural Consequence of that impious Tenet Faith is possible to be False as this is the genuine Sequel of denying the right Rule of Faith § 10. The same is deduc'd from the very notion of a Martyr and the proper signification of that word which is to be a witness and this as appears by his Circumstances of all witnesses the most Solemn and serious and the perfectest under that Notion that can be imagin'd as engaging not onely his word but his Life and dearest Bloud for what he testifies Now all witnessing or Attestation being most evidently of what the Witnesser knows to be True and nothing sounding more unnaturally or being more disagreeable to the nature of that kinde of Action than to have a Likelyhood for its object or to witness what he knows not as will appear by the constant practice of it in all other occasions it follows that a Martyr or Witness of the Truth of Christs Faith must know it to be True that is he must know it to be more than likely to be True and consequently nothing being more Impossible than that one can know what is not Impossible not to be True or to be False § 11. No less unnaturally would it sound should we gather together and make use of all the Equivalent Speeches to this Proposition Faith is Possible to be False such as are There is no Certain way to Heaven No man knows there is a Heaven a Hell a Iesus Christ a Trinity c. No man sees any reason securing Faith from being a lye The Ground of all our Hope is unstable and may be overthrown Absolutely speaking it may be there is no such thing as that which Christians are to profess and ought to dye for It may be Points of Faith are so many lyes and false as so many old-Wives Tales The Light of Faith may be Spiritual Darkness and Errour What we hold to come from God the Author of all Truth may perhaps come from the Devil the Author of all Lyes All our Supernatural Truths may be Diabolical Falshoods Faith has no Principles The Points of Faith are not Truths but Likelihoods onely These and innumerable such others are all Equivalent Periphrases to this Proposition Faith is Possible to be False as in this Treatise has been manifested but how horrid and blasphemous needs no proof but thebare rehearsing of them § 12. From the Language and Practise of the Generality of the Faithful professing Faith we come next to the Practise of the Wits of Christianity not proceeding as Speculaters and Scholars a most trifling impertinent Topick when we are speaking of Faith yet most frequently us'd by our Adversaries especially Mr. Stillingfleet and Mr. Pool who are obstinately bent to practise that wilful mistake but as Christians or Faithful and this not only acting or speaking in Abstraction from Humane Knowledg but as in direct Opposition to it and as it were in defiance and despight of it Now with these intelligent Persons 't is very solemn after by penetrating the Grounds of Faith they have come to embrace Faith itself immediately to discard renounce all Tenets opposit to the said Faith how Certain soever they held them formerly Nay to stand with a mind prepared to disassent to anypiece of Humane Learning how Scientifical soever it look't which they saw evidently to thwart any of those Believed Truths Making account it was their duty captivare Intellectum in obsequium Fidei to captivate their Understandings to the Obedience of Faith or to yeild them totally up by an absolute and perfect Assent to the Truth of those Mysteries and not to heed or credit any objections or Proposals of Humane Reason to the contrary when once the stable and immovable Grounds or Motives of Divine Belief that is the Rule of Faith had subdu'd their Judgments to that invincible Assent but to rest well assur'd that all reasons were fallacious and all Positions False which went against those Sacred and Establish't Truths This was ever their unanimous and constant Profession particularly the Fathers are full of Expressions of that kind An Evident Argument that as Christians they ever held Faith and it's Grounds Impossible to be False for otherwise they had bin oblig'd by Honesty and their love of Truth not to have so readily rejected their formerly-conceited Truths nor to have stop'd their ears so obstinately to new Reasons against Faith but as long as Faith was possible to be False they ought in due candor to have still weigh'd the Opposit Thesis and the Objections perpetually alledg'd against the strength of Faith and it's Rule and consider'd which was more likely to be true and not have still concluded so partially on Faiths side and obstinately resolv'd to hear nothing against it bearing themselves as if all must needs be True which Faith's Rule teacheth us that is indeed as if Faith could not possibly be false § 13. Whence follows that all who hold Faith is possible to be false ought in Conscience and their natural duty or love to Truth remain Seekers all their Lives For however they may hope at present that what they adhere to is true yet since they hold 't is possible to be false for any thing they know they ought the affair and its concern being so weighty to be still examining it's Grounds and casting about to see whether this Possibility of Falshood which they already see be not indeed Actually such though as yet they see it not or at least whether some other Profession may not after long consideration appear less possible to be False and another still less than that that so they may go as near Truth as they can weighing discreetly and impartially what Deism Paganism Turcism and such others wisely represented without their Poetical Fancyes and Fooleries can say for themselves Or lastly if they come to such a Scepticism in Religion which I doubt is the true case as to judg such a quest lost labour because when all 's done the sullen Dame Truth
overthrown or shown False by any Reasons brought against it both which equivalently imply Impossibility of Falshood Again 't is deny'd that Catholick Divines even as Speculaters hold Faith Possible to be False since they all to a man whatever they hold besides hold the Catholick Church Infallible and that we ought to receive our Faith from her Living Voice and Practice Now the Tenet of Infallibility in the Proposer necessarily draws after it the Tenet of Impossibility of Falshood in what is propos'd that is in Faith But because it may be said this is their Sentiment as Catholicks not as Schoolmen let the Angel of the Schools speak for the Schools themselves his Expressions are common and so reach all Scientia saith he Sum. Theol. 2â 2e q. 1â a. 50 ad 4m cum opinione simul esse non potest simpliciter de eodem quia de ratione scientiae est quòd id quod scitur ex â—stimetur Impossibile esse aliter se habere de ratione autem opinionis est quod id quod est opinatum existimetur possibile aliter se habere sed id quod fide tenâ—tur propter fidei certitudinem existimatur etiam Impossibile aliter se habere And again in the same Question ao 4o. ad 2o. Ea quae subsunt Fidei dupliciter considerari possunt uno modo in speciali sic non possunt esse simul visa credita alio modo in generali scilicet sub communi ratione credibilis et sic sunt VISA ab eo qui credit non enim crederet nisi VIDERET ea esse credenda vel propter EVIDENTIAM signorum vel propter aliquid hujusmodi It were easie for me to avail my self by these Testimonies to confirm the main of my Doctrine but what method will permit me and leads me to at present is only this to show that this Great Father of the Church and Doctour of all Schools declares the common Sentiment drawn out of the conceit of Faith's Certainty to be this that 't is Impossible that Points of Faith should be otherwise or false and that we must e're we believe have Evidence of the Grounds of our Belief which amounts to the same All then that can be objected from some of our Divines is this that they explicate their Tenet so as by consequence Faith is left possible to be false but what is this to the purpose since 't is one thing to hold a Tenet and another thing to make it out In the former they all agree in the later as is the Genius of Humane Understandings where our heavenly Teacher has not settled them they disagree with one another sometimes with themselves Nor can it bear any Objection nor breed scandal that the Ground of Faith should be more particularly and distinctly explicated now than formerly for since Controversie is a Skill why should it be admir'd nay why should it not be expected that it should receive Improvement that is better explain its proper object the Rule of Faith than formerly since we experience a progress in all other Arts and Sciences which are frequent in use as this has been of late dayes Objection IV. A great part of the First Eviction in case it proceed concerning Truth in us as it ought supposes the vulgar Skilful in Logick and to frame their Thoughts and Assents in the same manner as Artificial Discoursers do Answer It supposes no Skill or Art in the vulgar or Generality of Christians but onely declares artificially what naturally passes in rational Souls when they Assent upon Evidence And this it ought to do For the Art of Logick frames not it's Rules or Observations at randome but takes them from the Thing or it's Object as all other Skills do that is from what is found in rational Souls as rational or apt to discourse by observing the motions of which when it behaves it self rationally the Logicians set down Rules how to demean our Thoughts steadily and constantly according to right Reason So that the manner of working in Artificial discoursers in this onely differs from that of Natural ones that the one acts directly the other reflectingly For example a vulgar Soul when it assents interiourly a thing is or affirms has truly in it what a Logician call's a Proposition and that Proposition has truly in it what corresponds to the notions of Subject Copula and Predicate though he reflects not on it as does a Logician In the same manner when he gathers the Knowledg of some new Thing he has truly in that discourse of his what corresponds to Major Minor and Conclusion nay he has practically in him what necessitates the Consequence or that Maxim The same is the same with it self of whose Truth it being a Principle of our Understanding he cannot possibly be ignorant Though all this while he reflects not how or by virtue of what he acquires this Knowledg And hence Light is afforded us to understand in common how the vulgar come to have Practical Self-Evidence of divers Truths For the Maxims which even scientifical men have of the Objects of several Sciences being taken from the Things or the Objects of those Sciences and those Maxims being Common or General ones from the obvious or common Knowledg of those things which the vulgar who convers with them cannot chuse but have Again nature imbuing them with the Knowledg of that Principle on which the force of all Consequences is Grounded as also with the knowledg of all those we call Principia Intellectûs or Principles of our Understanding hence their rational nature is led directly by a natural course to see evidently and assent to divers Conclusions without any Reflexion or Speculation which rude but unerring draught of Knowledg is call'd by me in Sure Footing and elswhere Practical Self-evidence because 't is a natural Result of Practice or ordinary converse with those things An Instance would at once clear this and if rightly chosen be serviceable to the Readers of Sure Footing An unlearned person that cannot read a word believes fully there was such a man as K. Iames and that we may not mistake the Question we will put him to be one that has a handsom degree of conversation in the world We finde him assent to the Affirmative heartily But the point is how he is led into that Assent and whether rationally To ask him a reason why is bootless for this puts him to behave himself like a Reflecter on his own Thoughts which he is not whence we shall find him upon such a question at a puzzle to give the particular reason though as taught by Experience he will stand stiffly to it in common that he has a reason for it and a good one too To help him out then the way is to suggest the true reason to him for then he will easily acknowledg it finding it experimentally in himself which done deny the Goodness of it and you shall find he will as taught by nature
stand to it and deliver himself in some rude saying or other in behalf of it For example tell him he believes there was a K. Iames because those who pretended to live then have told us so but what if they were mistaken His answer would in likelihood be to this purpose what a God's name were they blind in those dayes that they could not see who was King then Which expresses naturally his conceit of their Inerrableness in such a point in case they had eyes which nature taught him men generally have Insist farther Perhaps they were not mistaken but had a mind to cozen all England that came after them Nature will lead him to this or some such kind of Reply To what purpose should they all make fools of every body Which words though rudely exprest yet couch in themselves the full reason given in Sure Footing as far as 't is built on Nature For first it implies that man's nature with which he hath a fair acquaintance in common is to do a thing for a purpose end or reason Next his Interrogatory way is in his rude style equivalent to a Negative and so it signifies there could be no reason for it and lastly his standing to his former Tenet implies virtually a Conclusion from the reason given that the thing could not be done which involves necessarily a knowledg of that First Principle on which all force of consequence is grounded and also of that Principle no Effect can be without a due Cause both perfectly suppos'd and held by him though not exprest in his rude Enthymeme From this discourse is collected what this Practical Self-evidence is and that 't is distinguish'd from Experience in this that Experience is onely found of what uses to make the Minor in this virtual discourse but Practical Self-evidence is of Conclusions deduc't as it were from a common maxim naturally known as the Major and a Minor for the most part experientially or else Practically known which joyn'd with the Self-evident Principle in which the force of Consequence consists make up that virtual discourse Again it differs from Science in that a man of Science reflectingly sees a Medium identifying the two Extreames and is aware of the virtue of those Causes which beget Evidence whereas the other is rather Passive from Natural Impressions than Active by any Self-industry in these Knowledges and rather feels the force of those Causes in his own Adhesion than sees it Secondly 'T is collected that this Practical Self-evidence is notwithstanding True Knowledge though perhaps it be the sleightest kind of it in which 't is differenc't from Opinion built on probabilities For seeing such Assenters have both by Experience or by Common Conversation true Knowledg of the natures of diverse things in common which make the Minor as also by Nature of all the Principles of our Understanding which countervail the major and force the Consequence it comes to pass that this Practical Self-evidence is intirely and adequately grounded on true Knowledges both as to Premises and Consequence and cossequently 't is it self a True Knowledg likewise Which consideration will help to explain my later Postulatum and shew by what means 't is possible all Christians may know their Faith to be True or the same the Apostles taught by the Churches Testimonie because they know the Inerrableness and Veracity of vast and grave multitudes in open matters of Fact which are practiceable daily And lastly 't is collected that what is Practically Self-evident to the Unlearned is Demonstrable to the Learned in regard These are capable of seeing by what virtue the causes of this Self-evidence bred that Knowledg which the other 's incultivated Reason would give no account of Objection V. That first Principle Every thing while it is is necessarily what it is seems to be often times misapply'd particularly Evict 2. § 11. 13. to Truth at present whence the Arguer would conclude that 't is Impossible that a thing should be also at present False Which is true if it be meant of Objective Truth but then it seems to miss the Question But the consequence holds not in case the Discourse be of Formal Truth that is of Truth in us or of Truth to us that is of Certainty for none pretends that his Judgment can at the same time be Conformable and Disconformable to the thing which speaks those inrintsecall Dispositions call'd Truth and Falshood in us or that himself can be Cetrain or Uncertain of it at once which expresses Truth and Falshood to us this being put those Motives which only he had at present in his Understanding able to prove the Point true and false both or at once whereas what is pretended by the Objecter is only this that though upon present Motives he now judges it True and Certain yet afterwards upon other Motives he may come to see it False Answer I mean in those places Truth to us or Certainty But the Objection proceeds as if there were but one man in the world or as if True False Certain and Uncertain could be relative to one person only First then my Position is that whoever puts a thing True to himself yet possible to be False to another puts no less a capacity of the thing 's being at once thus True and False though in several Subjects than as if it were in one Subject onely Next he supposes each of those different Judgers to have possibly just Grounds for so judging since he puts in one Motives sufficient to evince the Truth of the thing in the other possible ones to conclude it's Falsehood For our Question is not to what degree weak Souls can miscarry in assenting but what degree of strength is found in the Motives to Faith which the Objecter as a Christian that is as a Holder that Points of Faith are Truths must affirm to be sufficient to conclude it True and yet as himself contends leaves it still Possible to be False that is proveable by other Grounds to be so for else the word False cannot mean False to us or in the Subject as is pretended that is he must make it possible to be justly or in right reason held by one True by the other False Now 't is the Impossibility of such opposite Grounds I constantly maintain or that the Grounds of Faith are Impossible to be False Thirdly hence I go farther and urge that if those different Motives can oblige justly one man to hold Faith True the other to hold it False then putting them in the same man it ought to oblige him to hold both sides of the Contradiction and this enforces my proofs of this nature in my Third Eviction I know it will be readily answe'rd that this will not follow because the Motives being disparate the more probable one would when in the same subject over-power the other and so hinder the opposite Assent But I desire it may be consider'd that Intellectual Motives or Reasons have their power to
impossibility of distinguishing the Predicate pertinently excluding here all possibility of divers respects § 7. The same is demonstrated from the impossibility of distinguishing the Subjects of those Faith-Propositions for those Subjects being Propositions themselves as was shown § 3. and accepted for Truths as is suppos'd they are incapable of Distinction as shall be particularly shown hereafter Evict 3. § 5. Besides those Subjects being Points of Faith and so standing in the Abstract that is not descending to subsuming respects even in that regard too they are freed from all pertinent distinguishableness § 8. The same is demonstrated from the nature of Truth which consists in an Indivisible Whence there is nothing of Truth had how great soever the conceived approaches towards it be till all may-not-bees or Potentiality to be otherwise be utterly excluded by the Actuality of Is or Existence which put or discover'd the Light of Truth breaks forth and the dim twilights of may-not-bees vanish and disappear § 9. The same is demonstrated out of the nature of Connexion found in the aforesaid Propositions For 't is evident their Truth consists in the connexion of those Notions which make the Subject and Predicate Whoever therefore sees not the Connexion between those Notions in the Principle of Faith sees not the truth of any of those Propositions that is those Propositions are not to such a man True Wherefore Connexion excluding formally Inconnexion so that 't is clearly impossible they should be found together in the self-same Subjects and the falshood of such Propositions consisting in the Unconnectedness of their Terms it follows that he who is oblig'd to profess those Faith-Propositions True must see the Connexion between their Terms and consequently that they cannot possibly be inconnected or false Again since all approaches or vicinity to Connexion by how near degrees soever they are made are not Connexion it follows that all Connexion consists in an Indivisible and can admit no Latitude for a Possibility to be otherwise to be grounded on Lastly all Connexion being necessarily Immediate or seen by virtue of Immediateness and to see Immediate Connexion being the Producer of Certain Knowledg or of Assurance the Thing cannot but be so it follows that to see the Truth of such Propositions or which is all one the Immediate Connexion of their Terms is to see they cannot but be so or that they are absolutely void of all Possibility of Falshood § 10. By this time we are brought orderly to look into the nature of Opinion Which word I take not here in a large sense for any kind of Assent however produc 't but for an Assent or Adhesion to a Tenet without sufficient Grounds to evince the Thing is so as the Opiner judges as it is taken in that Proverb Turpe est opinari Now 't is most evident that there would be sufficient Grounds to convince in case the Term or Point were seen to be deduc't by immediate steps or a Train of immediate Connexions to that very Conclusion 'T is manifest then that 't is therefore Opinion and blame-worthy because its Grounds as they are laid in the understanding of the Assenter want or fall short of this immediate Connexion So that Opinion is a judgment upon remote or unimmediate Considerations By which means it comes to pass that the most necessary verity of that Grand Principle The same is the same with it self upon which all Certainty both of first Principles and of Deduction is built and whose perfect Self-Evidence and Interessedness in whatever belongs to right discourse seem to make the very Light of Reason consist originally in It is not engag'd in the Opiners discourse whence wanting Immediateness it becomes unconnected incoherent weak and slack or rather indeed null No wonder then if all Opinion how near soever it approaches seemingly to Immediate Connexion and how strongly soever it be supported by an experienc'd seldomness of such Effects or the conceiv'd unaptness and fewness of Causes fit to produce them yet it admits Possibility of being otherwise in regard it fails in its very Root and Basis by not relying on the main Principle and Foundation of all steadiness in humane Discourse and which is of so necessary a Truth that 't is impossible to falter or give way to uphold and exempt it from a liableness to disconnexion of those Notions which it pretended and ought to Identify that is from a liableness to Errour § 11. From this declaration of the nature of Opinion it is render'd manifest out of what Fountain-head all Rational Assents flow namely from seeing the Immediate Connexion of one Term with another or which is all one that this Principle The same is the same with it self stands engag'd for their verity Also that the Light of Reason consists fundamentally in this and formally in deriving the perfect Visibleness of this to make other Propositions also visible to the Eye of our Understanding Likewise that Assents not springing from this Light of Reason must be as such Irrational and arise necessarily from the Will taken as not following the Light of Understanding but as prompted and put forward by some passion viz. some irrational desire or inclination the thing should be so which prest and precipitated the understanding into Assent before due motives forc't it As likewise that since none can be bound constantly to profess what he cannot steadily see to be true a Christian who is thus bound to profess his Faith True must see that the First Principle now spoken of which gives all Steadiness to our Intellectual Sight is interessed in the patronage of the Proposition he assents to Whence true Faith by reason of its Immoveable Grounds can bear an asserting the absolute Impossibility of its being False whereas who ever affirms Faith may possibly be false makes it built upon remote mediums that is such as are either not immediate or which is all one not seen to be immediate to the two Terms of the Proposition assented to and so they become destitute of the Invincible strength of that first Principle which establishes all deduc't Truths and legitimates all Assents to them Whence follows inevitably that he turns all Faith into Opinion makes Faith absurd preternatural and irrational importing that 't is a thing which men must assent to or say interiorly 't is so and yet see no solid Grounds why it must be so profess stoutly 't is true and that they are sure of it and yet if they will speak truly profess with all that it may be false and that the whole world may be mistaken in it and lastly he leaves all Christs Doctrine Indefensible and utterly unmaintainable to have absolutely speaking either any solidity or steadiness in its Grounds or one true word in it self Second Eviction § 1. FRom this not-seeing the Connexion of the two Terms in the Conclusion by a Medium immediately connected to them both but by distant Glances onely which have not