the very Notion of Infinite implies that we can set no bounds to our Thoughts and therefore although the Infinity of the divine Attributes be evident to our Reason yet it is likewise evident to our Reason that what is infinite must be above our Comprehension II. I come now to the last enquiry which is that if we allow things above our Reason what stop can be put to any absurd Doctrine which we may be required to believe And this is that which our Vnitarians object in all their late Pamphlets In answer to my Sermon they say That on our principles our Reason would be in vain and all Science and Certainty would be destroy'd which they repeat several times And from hence they do so frequently insist on the Parallel between the Doctrine of the Trinity and Transubstantiation They say That all the defence we have made for one will serve for the other or any other absurd and impossible Doctrine That what we say will equally serve all the Nonsense and impossible Doctrines that are to be found among Men and they particularly instance in Transubstantiation I need mention no more But I did not expect to have found this Parallel so often insisted upon without an answer to two Dialogues purposely written on that Subject at a time when the Doctrine of the Trinity was used as an argument to bring in Transubstantiation as that is now alledged for casting off the other But I must do them that right to tell the World that at that time a Socinian Answer was written to those Dialogues which I saw and wish'd might be Printed that the World might be satisfied about it and them But they thought fit to forbear and in all their late Pamphlets where this Parallel is so often repeated there is but once that I can find any notice taken of those Dialogues and that in a very superficial manner For the main Design and Scope of them is past over and only one particular mention'd which shall be answer'd in its due order But in answer to the general Enquiry I shall endeavour to state the due Bounds between Faith and Reason and thereby to shew that by those grounds on which we receive the Doctrine of the Trinity we do not give way to the Entertainment of any absurd Opinion nor overthrow the Certainty of Reason 1. We have no difference with them about the Vse of our Reason as to the Certainty of a Revelation For in this case we are as much as they for searching into the grounds of our Faith for we look on it as a reasonable Act of our Minds and if we did not allow this we must declare our selves to believe without grounds And if we have grounds for our Faith we can express them in Words that are intelligible and if we can give an account of our Faith in an intelligible manner and with a design to give others satisfaction about it I think this is making use of our Reason in matters of Faith 2. We have no difference with them about the use of our Reason as to the true Sense of Revelation We never say that Men are bound to believe upon the bare sound of Words without examining the Sense of them We allow all the best and most reasonable ways of attaining to it by Copies Languages Versions comparing of Places and especially the Sense of the Christian Church in the best and purest Ages nearest the Apostolical Times and express'd in solemn and publick Acts. By these Rules of Reason we are willing to proceed and not by any late and uncertain methods of interpreting Scripture 3. We differ not with them about the right use of the Faculties which God hath given us of right Vnderstanding such matters as are offer'd to our Assent For it is to no purpose to require them to believe who cannot use the Faculties which are necessary in order to it Which would be like giving the Benefit of the Clergy to a Man with a Cataract in both his Eyes And it would be very unreasonable to put his Life upon that Issue whether he could read or not because he had the same Organs of Seeing that other Men had for in this case the whole matter depended not on the Organ but the Vse of it This needs no Application 4. We differ not with them about rejecting some Matters proposed to our Belief which are contradictory to the Principles of Sense and Reason It is no great argument of some Mens Reason whatever they pretend to talk against admitting seeming Contradictions in Religion for who can hinder seeming Contradictions Which arise from the shallowness of Mens Capacities and not from the repugnancy of Things and who can help Mens Understandings But where there is evident proof of a Contradiction to the Principles of Sense and Reason we are very far from owning any such thing to be an Article of Faith as in the case of Transubstantiation Which we reject not only as having no foundation in Scripture but as repugnant to the common Principles of Sense and Reason as is made to appear in the two Dialogues before-mention'd But our Vnitarians find fault with the Author of them for laying the force of his argument upon this That there are a great many more Texts for the Trinity than are pretended for Transubstantiation whereas many other arguments are insisted on and particularly the great Absurdity of it in point of Reason Dial. 2. from p. 33. to the end And it is not the bare number of Texts which he relies upon but upon the greater Evidence and Clearness of the Texâ—s on one side than on the other which depends upon figurative Words not capable of a literal Sense without overthrowing the Doctrine designed to be proved by it See with what Ingenuity these Men treat the Defenders of the Trinity and the Enemies to Transubstantiation which they call only a Philosophical Error or Folly but the Doctrine of the Trinity is charged with Nonsense Contradiction and Impossibilities But wherein then lies the difference in point of Reason For thus far I have shew'd that we are far from overthrowing Reason or giving way to any absurd Doctrines It comes at last to the point already treated of in this Chapter how far we may be obliged to believe a Doctrine which carries in it something above our Reason or of which we cannot have any clear and distinct Ideas And of this I hope I have given a sufficient Account in the foregoing Discourse FINIS Consideraton the Ezplications of the Doctrine of the Trinity by Dr. W. c. p. 10. P. 9. P. 13. Discourse concerning the Real and Nominal Trinitarians A. D. 1695 p. 3. Letter to the Universities p. 15. Discourse of Nominal and Real Trinit p. 7. P. 10. P. 11. P. 13. Tritheism charged c. p. 157. Animadvers p. 245. Animadv c. p. 243. Ibid p. 240. Basil Ep. 64. Considerat on the Explication p. 23. Animadv p. 291. Tritheism
Question his Fidelity in reporting however he might be unhappy in his Explications 3. Tertullian himself saith Schlichtingius in other Places where he speaks of the rule of Faith doth not mention the Holy Ghost and therefore this seems added by him for the sake of the Paraclete But this can be of no force to any one that considers that Tertullian grounds his Doctrine not on any New Revelation by the Paraclete but on the Rule of Faith received in the Church long before and upon the Form of Baptism prescribed by our Saviour Will they say the Holy Ghost was there added for the sake of Montanus his Paraclete And in another of his Books he owns the Father Son and Holy Ghost to make up the Trinity in Vnity Wherein Petavius himself confesses That he asserted the Doctrine of the Church in a Catholick manner although he otherwise speaks hardly enough of him The next I shall mention is Novatian whom Schlichtingius allows to have been before the Nicene-Council and our modern Vnitarians call him a great Man whoever he was and very ancient And there are two things I observe in him 1. That he opposes Sabellianism for before his time Praxeas and Noetus were little talked of especially in the Western Church but Sabellius his Name and Doctrine were very well known by the opposition to him by the Bishops of Alexandria and Rome He sticks not at the calling it Heresie several times and Disputes against it and answers the Objection about the Vnity of the Godhead 2. That he owns that the Rule of Faith requires our believing in Father Son and Holy Ghost and asserts the Divine Eternity of it and therefore must hold the Doctrine of the Trinity to be the Faith of the Church contained in the Form of Baptism For he saith The Authority of Faith and the Holy Scriptures admonish us to believe not only in the Father and Son but in the Holy Ghost Therefore the Holy Ghost must be considered as an object of Faith joyned in the Scripture with the other two which is no where more express than in the Form of Baptism which as S. Cyprian saith was to be administred in the full Confession of the Trinity in the place already mentionâ—d And it is observable that S. Cyprian rejects the Baptism of those who denied the Trinity at that time among whom he instances in the Patripassians who it seems were then spread into Africa The Dispute about the Marcionites Baptism was upon another ground for they held a real Trinity as appears by Dionysius Romanus in Athanasius and Epiphanius c. but the Question was whether they held the same Trinity or not S. Cyprian saith That our Saviour appointed his Apostles to baptize in the Name of Father Son and Holy Ghost and in the Sacrament of this Trinity they were to baptize Doth Marcion hold this Trinity So that S. Cyprian supposed the validity of Baptism to depend on the Faith of the Trinity And if he had gone no farther I do not see how he had transgressed the Rules of the Church but his Error was that he made void Baptism upon difference of Communion and therein he was justly opposed But the Marcionites Baptism was rejected in the Eastern Church because of their Doctrine about the Trinity In the Parts of Asia about Ephesus Noetus had broached the same Doctrine which Praxeas had done elsewhere For which he was called to an account and himself with his Followers we cast out of the Churches Communion as Epiphanius reports which is another considerable Testimony of the Sense of the Church at that time Epiphanius saith he was the first who broached that Blasphemy but Theodoret mentions Epigonus and Cleomenes before him it seems that he was the first who was publickly taken notice of for it and therefore underwent the Censure of the Church with his Disciples When he was first summon'd to answer he denied that he asserted any such Doctrine because no man before him saith Epiphanius had vented such Poison And in the beginning he saith that Noetus out of a Spirit of Contradiction had utter'd such things as neither the Prophets nor the Apostles nor the Church of God ever thought or declared Now what was this unheard of Doctrine of Noetus That appears best by Noetus his answer upon his second appearance which was That he worshipped One God and knew of no other who was born and suffer'd and died for us and for this he produced the several places which assert the Vnity of the Godhead and among the rest one very observable Rom. 9.5 Of whom as concerning the flesh Christ came who is over all God blessed for ever From whence he inferr'd that the Son and the Father were the same and the same he affirmed of the Holy Ghost But from hence we have an evident Proof that the most ancient Greek Copies in Noetus his time which was long before the Council of Nice had God in the Text. Epiphanius brings many places of Scripture to prove the Distinction of Persons in the Unity of the Godhead but that is not my present business but to shew the general Sense of the Church at that time I do not say that Noetus was condemned by a general Council but it is sufficient to shew that he was cast out of the Church where he broached his Doctrine and no other Church received him or condemned that Church which cast him out which shews an after Consent to it Now what was this Doctrine of Noetus The very same with that of Praxeas at Rome Theodoret saith this his Opinon was That there was but One God the Father who was himself impassible but as he took our Nature so he was passible and called the Son Epiphanius more fully that the same Person was Father Son and Holy Ghost wherein he saith he plainly contradicts the Scriptures which attribute distinct Personalities to them and yet assert but one Godhead The Father hath an Hypostasis of his own and so have the Son and Holy Ghost but yet there is but one Divinity one Power and one Dominion for these distinct Persons are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the same individual Essence and Power But Epiphanius was no Ante-Nicene Father however in matters of Antiquity where there is no incongruity in the thing we may make use of his Authority and I think no one will question that Noetus was condemned which was the thing I produced him to prove But although Noetus was condemned yet this Doctrine did spread in the Eastern parts for Origen mentions those who confounded the Notion of Father and Son and made them but one Hypostasis and distinguished only by thought and Denomination This Doctrine was opposed not only by Origen but he had the Sense of the Church concurring with him as appears in the Case of Beryllus Bishop of Bostra who fell into this Opinion and was reclaimed by Origen and Eusebius gives this
Essence yet taking the Sense of those Articles as the Christian Church understood them from the Apostles times then we have as full and clear Evidence of this Doctrine as we have that we receiv'd the Scriptures from them CHAP. X. The Objections against the Trinity in Point of Reason answer'd HAving in the foregoing Chapters endeavour'd to clear the Doctrine of the Trinity from the Charge of Contradictions and to prove it agreeable to the Sense of Scripture and the Primitive Church I now come in the last place to Examine the remaining Objections in Point of Reason and those are 1. That this Doctrine is said to be a Mystery and therefore above Reason and we cannot in reason be obliged to believe any such thing 2. That if we allow any such Mysteries of Faith as are above Reason there can be no stop put to any absurd Doctrines but they may be receiv'd on the same Grounds 1. As to this Doctrine being said to be above Reason and therefore not to be believ'd we must consider two things 1. What we understand by Reason 2. What ground in Reason there is to reject any Doctrine above it when it is proposed as a Matter of Faith 1. What we understand by Reason I do not find that our Vnitarians have explained the Nature and Bounds of Reason in such manner as those ought to have done who make it the Rule and Standard of what they are to believe But sometimes they speak of clear and distinct Perceptions sometimes of natural Ideas sometimes of congenit Notions c. But a late Author hath endeavour'd to make amends for this and takes upon him to make this matter clear and to be sure to do so he begins with telling us That Reason is not the Soul abstractedly consider'd no doubt of it but the Soul acting in a peculiar manner is Reason And this is a verâ— peculiar way of explaining it But farther we are told It is not the Order or Report respect I suppose which is naturally between all things But that implies a Reason in things But the thoughts which the Soul forms of things according to it may properly claim that Title i. e. such thoughts which are agreeable to the Reason of things are reasonable thoughts This is clear and distinct And I perfectly agree with him That our own Inclinations or the bare Authority of others is not Reason But what is it Every one experiences in himself a Power or Faculty of formâ—ng various Ideas or Perceptions of things of affirming or denying according as he sees them to agree or disagree and this is Reason in General It is not the bare receiving Ideas into the Mind that is strictly Reason who ever thought it was but the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our Ideas in a greater of lesser Number wherein soever this Agreement or Disagreement may consist If the Perception be immediate without the Assistance of any other Idea this is not call'd Reason but Self-Evidence but when the mind makes use of intermediate Ideas to discover that Agreement or Disagreement this method of Knowledge is properly call'd Reason or Demonstration And so Reason is defined to be that Faculty of the Soul which discovers the certainty of any thing dubious or obscure by comparing it with something evidently known This is offer'd to the World as an Account of Reason but to shew how very loose and unsatisfactory it is I desire it may be consider'd that this Doctrine supposes that we must have clear and distinct Ideas of whatever we pretend to any certainty of in our Minds and that the only Way to attain this certainty is by comparing these Ideas together Which excludes all certainty of Faith or Reason where we cannot have such clear and distinct Ideas But if there are many things of which we may be certain and yet can have no clear and distinct Ideas of them if those Ideas we have are too imperfect and obscure to form our Judgments by if we cannot find out sufficient intermediate Ideas then this cannot be the Means of Certainty or the Foundation of Reason But I shall keep to our present Subject and our certainty of it in Point of Reason depends upon our Knowledge of the the Nature of Substance and Person and the Distinction between them but if we can have no such clear Ideas in our Minds concerning these things as are required from Sensation or Reflection then either we have no use of Reason about them or it is in sufficient to pass any Judgment concerning them 1. I begin with the Notion of Substance And I have great Reason to begin with it for according to this Man's Principles there can be no certainty of Reason at all about it And so our new Way of Reason is advanced to very good Purpose For we may talk and dispute about Substance as long as we please but if his Principles of Reason be true we can come to no certainty since we can have no clear Idea in our Minds concerning it as will appear from his own Words and the method he proceeds in 1. He saith That the Mind receives in Ideas two ways 1. By Intermission of the Senses as Colours Figures Sounds Smells c. 2. By the Souls considering its own Operations about what it thus gets from without as knowing doubting affirming denying c. 2. That these simple and distinct Ideas thus laid up in the great Repository of the Vnderstanding are the sole matter and Foundation of all our Reasoning Then it follows That we can have no Foundation of Reasoning where there can can be no such Ideas from Sensation or Reflection Now this is the Case of Substance it is not intromitted by the Senses nor depends upon the Operations of the Mind and so it cannot be within the compass of our Reason And therefore I do not wonder that the Gentlemen of this new way of reasoning have almost discarded Substance out of the reasonable part of the World For they not only tell us That we can have no Idea of it by Sensation or Reflection but that nothing is signified by it only an uncertain Supposition of we know not what And therefore it is parallel'd more than once with the Indian Philosophers He knew not what which supported the Tortoâ—se that supported the Elephant that supported the Earth so Substance was found out only to support Accidents And that when we talk of Substances we talk like Children who being ask'd a Question about somewhat which they know not readily give this satisfactory Answer that it is Something If this be the truth of the Case we must still talk like Children and I know not how it can be remedied For if we cannot come at a rational Idea of Substance we can have no Principle of certainty to go upon in this Debate I do not say that we can have a clear Idea of Substance either by Sensation or Reflection but from hence I argue that
Nestorius were agreed and that he did not deny the Word to be Conâ—substantial with God but that he was not the Son of God till Christ was born in whom he dwelt By which we see how little reason our Vnitarians have to boast of Photinus as their Predecessor As to the boast of the first Unitarians at Rome that theirs was the general Doctrine before the time of Victor it is so fully confuted by the ancient Writer in Eusebius who mentions it from the Scriptures and the first Christian Writers named by him that it doth not deserve to be taken notice of especially since he makes it appear that it was not heard of among them at Rome till it was first broached there by Theodotus as not only he but Tertullian affirms as I have already observed Thus I have clearly proved that the Doctrine of the Trinity was so far from being embraced only on the account of force and fear that I have shewed there was in the first Ages of the Christian Church a free and general Consent in it even when they were under Persecution and after the Arian Controversie broke out yet those who denied the Pre-existence and Co-eternity of the Son of God were universally condemned even the Arian Party concurring in the Synods mention'd by Hilary But our Vnitarians are such great Pretenders to Reason that this Argument from the Authority of the whole Christian Church signifies little or nothing to them Therefore they would conclude still that they have the better of us in point of Reason because they tell us that they have clear and distinct Perceptions that what we call Mysteries of Faith are Contradictions Impossibilities and pure Nonsense and that they do not reject them because they do not comprehend them but because they do comprehend them to be so This is a very bold Charge and not very becoming the Modesty and Decency of such who know at the same time that they oppose the Religion publickly established and in such things which we look on as some of the principal Articles of the Christian Faith CHAP. V. Of their Charge of Contradiction in the Doctrine of the Trinity BUT I shall not take any Advantages from thence but immediately proceed to the next thing I undertook in this Discourse viz. To consider what Grounds they have for such a Charge as this of Contradiction and Impossibility In my Sermon which gave occasion to these Expressions as is before intimated I had undertaken to prove that considering the infinite Perfections of the Divine Nature which are so far above our reach God may justly oblige us to believe those things concerning himself which we are not able to comprehend and I instanced in some Essential Attributes of God as his Eternity Omniscience Spirituality c. And therefore if there be such Divine Perfections which we have all the Reason to believe but no Faculties sufficient to comprehend there can be no ground from Reason to reject such a Doctrine which God hath revealed because the manner of it may be incomprehensible by us And what Answer do they give to this They do not deny it in general that God may oblige us to believe things above our Comprehension but he never obliges us to believe Contradictions and that they Charge the Doctrine of the Trinity with and for this they only referr me to their Books where they say it is made out But I must say that I have read and consider'd those Tracts and am very far from being convinced that there is any such Contradiction in this Doctrine as it is generally received in the Christian Church or as it is explained in the Athanasian Creed And I shall shew the unreasonableness of this Charge from these things 1. That there is a Difference between a Contradiction in Numbers and in the Nature of things 2. That it is no Contradiction to assert three Persons in One Common Nature 3. That it is no Contradiction to say that there are three distinct Persons in the Trinity and not three Gods If I can make out these things I hope I may abate something of that strange and unreasonable confidence wherewith these men charge the Doctrine of the Trinity with Contradictions 1. I begin with the first of them And I shall draw up the Charge in their own words In one of their late Books they have these Words Theirs they say is an Accountable and Reasonable Faith but that of the Trinitarians is absurd and contrary both to Reason and to it self and therefore not only false but impossible But wherein lies this Impossibility That they soon tell us Because we affirm that there are Three Persons who are severally and each of them true God and yet there is but one true God Now say they this is an Error in counting or numbring which when stood in is of all others the most brutal and inexcusable and not to discern it is not to be a Man What must these men think the Christian Church hath been made up of all this while What were there no Men among them but the Vnitarians none that had common sense and could tell the difference between One and Three But this is too choice a Notion to be deliver'd but once we have it over and over from them In another place they say We cannot be mistaken in the Notion of One and Three we are most certain that One is not Three and Three are not One. This it is to be Men But the whole Christian World besides are in Brutal and Inexcusable Errors about One and Three This is not enough for they love to charge home for one of their terrible Objections against the Athanasian Creed is That here is an Arithmetical as well as Grammatical Contradiction For in saying God the Father God the Son and God the Holy Ghost yet not three Gods but one God a Man first distinctly numbers three Gods and then in summing them up brutishly says not three Gods but one God Brutishly still Have the Brutes and Trinitarians learnt Arithmetick together Methinks such Expressions do not become such whom the Christian Church hath so long since condemned for Heresies But it may be with the same Civility they will say It was brutishly done of them But can these Men of Sense and Reason think that the Point in Controversie ever was whether in Numbers One could be Three or Three One If they think so I wonder they do not think of another thing which is the begging all Trinitarians for Fools because they cannot count One Two and Three and an Vnitarian Jury would certainly cast them One would think such Writers had never gone beyond Shop-books for they take it for granted that all depends upon Counting But these terrible Charges were some of the most common and trite Objections of Infidels St. Augustin mentions it as such when he saith the Infidels sometimes ask us what do you call the Father We answer God What the Son
and therefore comprehends the whole three Persons so that there is neither a Grammatical nor Arithmetical Contradiction And what say our Vnitarians to this Truly no less Than that the Remedy is worse if possible than the Disease Nay then we are in a very ill Case But how I pray doth this appear 1. Say they Three personal Gods and one Essential God make four Gods if the Essential God be not the same with the personal Gods and tho' he is the same yet since they are not the same with one another but distinct it follows that there are three Gods i. e. three personal Gods 2. It introduces two sorts of Gods three Personal and one Essential But the Christian Religion knows and owns but One true and most high God of any sort So far then we are agreed That there is but One true and most high God and that because of the perfect Vnity of the Divine Essence which can be no more than One and where there is but One Divine Essence there can be but One true God unless we can suppose a God without an Essence and that would be a strange sort of God He would be a personal God indeed in their critical Sense of a Person for a shape or appearance But may not the fame Essence be divided That I have already shew'd to be impossible Therefore we cannot make so many personal Gods because we assert one and the same Essence in the three Persons of Father Son and Holy Ghost But they are distinct and therefore must be distinct Gods since every one is distinct from the other They are distinct as to personal Properties but not as to Essential Attributes which are and must be the same in all So that here is but one Essential God and three Persons But after all why do we assert three Persons in the Godhead Not because we find them in the Athanasian Creed but because the Scripture hath revealed that there are Three Father Son and Holy Ghost to whom the Divine Nature and Attributes are given This we verily believe that the Scripture hath revealed and that there are a great many places of which we think no tolerable Sense can be given without it and therefore we assert this Doctrine on the same Grounds on which we believe the Scriptures And if there are three Persons which have the Divine Nature attributed to them what must we do in this Case Must we cast off the Vnity of the Divine Essence No that is too frequently and plainly asserted for us to call it into Question Must we reject those Scriptures which attribute Divinity to the Son and Holy Ghost as well as to the Father That we cannot do unless we cast off those Books of Scripture wherein those things are contained But why do we call them Persons when that Term is not found in Scripture and is of a doubtful Sense The true Account whereof I take to be this It is observed by Facundus Hermianensis that the Christian Church received the Doctrine of the Trinity before the Terms of three Persons were used But Sabellianism was the occasion of making use of the name of Persons It 's true That the Sabellians did not dislike our Sense of the Word Person which they knew was not the Churches Sense as it was taken for an Appearance or an external Quality which was consistent enough with their Hypothesis who allow'd but One real Person with different Manifestations That this was their true Opinion appears from the best account we have of their Doctrine from the first Rise of Sabellianism The Foundations of it were laid in the earliest and most dangerous Heresies in the Christian Church viz. that which is commonly called by the name of the Gnosticks and that of the Cerinthians and Ebionites For how much soever they differ'd from each other in other things yet they both agreed in this that there was no such thing as a Trinity consisting of Father Son and Holy Ghost but that all was but different Appearances and Manifestations of God to Mankâ—nd In consequence whereof the Gnosticks denied the very Humanity of Christ and the Cerinthians and Ebionites his Divinity But both these sorts were utterly rejected the Communion of the Christian Church and no such thing as Sabellianism was found within it Afterwards there arose some Persons who started the same Opinion within the Church the first we meet with of this sort are those mention'd by Theodoret Epigonus Cleomenes and Noëtus from whom they were called Noeâ—ians not long after Sabellius broached the same Doctrine in Pentapolis and the Parts thereabouts which made Dionysius of Alexandria appear so early and so warmly against it But he happening to let fall some Expressions as though he asserted an Inequality of Hypostases in the Godhead Complaint was made of it to Dionysius then Bishop of Rome who thereupon explained that which he took to be the true Sense of the Christian Church in this matter Which is still preserved in Athanasius Therein he disowns the Sabellian Doctrine which confounded the Father Son and Holy Ghost and made them to be the same and withal he rejected those who held three distinct and separate Hypostases as the Platonists and after them the Marcionists did Dionysius of Alexandria when he came to explain himself agreed with the others and asserted the Son to be of the same Substance with the Father as Athanasius hath proved at large but yet he said That if a distinction of Hypostases were not kept up the Doctrine of the Trinity would be lost as appears by an Epistle of his in S. Basil. Athanasius saith That the Heresie of Sabellius lay in making the Father and Son to be only different Names of the same Person so that in one Respect he is the Father and in another the Son Gregory Nazianzen in opposition to Sabellianism saith We must believe one God and three Hypostases and commends Athanasius for preserving the true Mean in asserting the Vnity of Nature and the Distinction of Properties S. Basil saith That the Sabellians made but one Person of the Father and Son that in Name they confessed the Son but in Reality they denied him In another place that the Sabellians asserted but one Hypostasis in the Divine Nature but that God took several Persons upon him as occasion required sometimes that of a Father at other times of a Son and so of the Holy Ghost And to the same purpose in other places he saith That there are distinct Hypostases with their peculiar Properties which being joyned with the Vnity of Nature make up the true Confession of Faith There were some who would have but One Hypostasis whom he opposes with great vehemency and the Reason he gives is That then they must make the Persons to be meer Names which is Sabellianisn And he saith That if our Notions of distinct Persons have no certain Foundation they are meer Names such as