of Reason we must Assent to nothing but what has an internal Evidence and what in its self and by its own Lights is Comprehensible by us as they seem to mean or else their distinction of the Case of Reason and the Case of Revelation is here impertinent then I conceive that they set too narrow limits to our Assent in Matters of Reason when they allow it to be given only to things which in this sense are Evident to us For 't is plain that there are many things in Nature which we fee are True and must be True and so not only may but cannot help Assenting to them though at the same time we are not able to Comprehend how they are or can possibly be 7. Not that our Assent is then Blind and wholly without Evidence for then we might as well Assent to the contrary as to what we do and would do better not to Assent at all but only that it has none from within and from the intrinsic Nature of the Object but only from some External Consideration much after the same manner as it is in â—atch In both which there may be a Clear Reason why we should Assent to an Obscure thing But then as the internal Obscurity does not destroy the External Evidence so neither does the External Evidence strike any Light into the internal Obscurity or in other words as the Reason for Assenting is never the less Clear because the Matter assented to is Obscure so neither is the Matter assented to ever the less Obscure because the Reason for assenâ—ing to it is Clear And yet notwithstanding this internal Obscurity of the Matter we assent to it because of the prevailing Light of the External Evidence And this we do not only in Matters of Faith according to the Restriction of some but in the things of Nature and Reason too where we are oftentimes forced by the pressing urgency of certain External and Collateral Considerations to assent to things internally obscure and whose very possibility we cannot Comprehend as is plain in the great Question of the Divisibility of Quantity and other Instances whereof every Thinking Man's Obseâ—â—ation cannot but have already furnish'd him with variety The Incomprehensibility then of a thing is non just Objection against our Assent to it even in Matters of a Rational Nature much less then is it in Matters of Faith For if not in Matters that belong to the Court of Reason and where she sits as Judge then much less in things that are not of her proper Jurisdiction and if notwithstanding the internal inevidence of an Object we think fit to assent to it upon Rational Considerations much more may we and ought we upon the Authority of the Infallible God 8. Indeed if whatsoever is Above our Reason were also as some pretend as Contrary to it and there were nothing true but what was also Comprehensible and so the Incomprehensibility of a thing were an Argument of its not being true then I conâ—ess we could not as Rational Creatures assent to an incomprehensible Proposition upon any Consideration whatsoever No not even that of Divine Authority 'T is true indeed there could then be no such Authority for Incomprehensible things But if there were 't is impossible we should regard it because we could not have greater assurance either of the Existence or of the Truth of it than we have already upon this Supposition that the things reveal'd are not true But now if this Supposition be no more than a Supposition if to be above Reason does not involve any Contrariety to it if there are incomprehensible Truths and Consequently the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument oâ— it s not being true all which has been already proved then 't is plain that what is an incomprehensible may yet be a Believable Object because within the Possibility of Truth and then to render it actually believ'd there needs only some External Evidence either from Reason or Authority For what should hinder our Assent to an Incomprehensible thing when we have plain Evidence from without for it and its own internal Obscurity is no Argument against it 'T is plain therefore that we ought to give our Assent And since we do so oftentimes upon a Ground of Reason much more ought we upon that more Firm and Immoveable ground of Revelation The short is whatever is no Objection against the Truth of a thing is none against the Credibility of it since Truth is the General Object of Faith unless you will say that a thing is unfit to be believ'd upon any other account besides want of Truth and therefore since we have already shewn that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument against the Truth of it it visibly follows that it is no Argument against the Belief of it neither Therefore an Incomprehensible thing may be believ'd and accordingly he that refuses to believe any thing is bound to give a better Reason for it than because it is Incomprehensible 9. If it be said that this is reason enough because Faith is a Rational Act and therefore what is above the Comprehension of Reason is as much above a Rational Belief to this besides what I have already remarqu'd upon this Occasion in the Chapter of Faith I here further reply that it is true indeed and on both sides agreed that Faith is a Rational Act but in what Sense is the Question There are two very different Senses according to which it may be said to be so either in regard of the Clearness of its Formal Reason or in regard of the Clearness of its Object Either because it is founded upon an External Evidence or Argument for believing or because it proceeds upon an Internal Evidence that appears in the very Nature of the thing Believ'd Iâ— Faith be said to be a Rational Act in the latter Sense the Assertion is then False for so that â—s in respect of the Object we have shâ—wn it to be an inevident Assent But i◠〈◊〉 be said to be a Rational Act in the former Sense then indeed it is true but nothing to the purpose since nothing hinders but that this External Evidence may well consist with an Internal Inevidence or in other words that the Clearness of the Reason for Believing may stand with the Obscurity of the Object Believ'd And therefore though Faith be a Rational Act yet it does not hence â—ollow that what is Above Reason is also above Faith and cannot rationally be believ'd because the Act of Faith is said to be Rational Not in respect of the Evidence of the Object but only that of its Formal Reason or Motive And therefore though there be no Evidence in the Object yet it is not thereby render'd uncapable of being the Matter of Faith because the Evidence which Faith as a Rational Act supposes is wholly of another kind There seems indeed a kind of opposition as to the Sound between Faith's being an Act of Reason
upon the internal Light and Evidence of the thing but upon Authority and so agree in the general Nature of 〈◊〉 only as the Authority differ 〈…〉 Faith also varies and Human Authority differing from Divine just as much as Fallible differs from Infallible the same in proportion will also 〈…〉 between Human and Divine â—aith That is the former will always be a Fallible and the latter an Infallible Assent 8. Human Faith though sometimes as actually undeceiv'd as Divine is yet always liable to Error and Deception and so doubtful hazardous and uncertain even when actually true like a Conclusion drawn from uncertain Premisses in which respect it resembles Opinion and that so much that some have confounded it with it though I think illogically enough since though there be a like uncertainty in both Assents yet they differ extremely in their Formal Motives one being grounded upon Reason and the other upon Authority And the Distinction of these Assents is not taken from the degree of Certainty wherein they agree but from the Quality of the Motive wherein they differ However tho' this makes a great difference in Notion it makes None in the Affairs of Civil Life and the Faith of him that believes the Testimony of a Man will as to all real intents and purposes go for no more than his Opinion And that because though different Assents as to the Formality of their Motives they are yet Much at one rate for Certainty being both Fallible in their Grounds and so subject to Error and Deception 9. But the Case is quite otherwise as to Divine Faith whose Foundation stands too sure not only to be overturn'd but even so much as shaken This Faith is strictly and Absolutely infallible not subject to the least Error or Possibility of Erring as having the very Ground and Pillar of Truth it self the Omniscience and Veracity of God for its Security than which there neither Needs nor Can be Greater 'T is Most Certain that God is both Actively and Passively Infallible his Omniscience will not suffer him to be deceiv'd himself and his infinite Veracity and Truth will not suffer him to deceive us And therefore he that builds his Faith upon his Authority goes upon the Most sure Grounds and cannot possibly Err in his Assent And as he is secure from Error so he is also from all just reason of Scruple or Fear and leaning upon a firm and indefectible Support may stay and repose himself upon it with full Acquiescence So that there is all the Certainty that can be in this Faith both Objective and Subjective that of the Thing and that of the Person The thing assented to is most undoubtedly true in it self and he that assents to it may be most firmly assured and perswaded of the Truth of it in his own Mind and among all Temptations to Doubt and Distrust may with great Triumph and Confidence say with the Apostle I know whom I have believ'd 10. It was observ'd a little before of Humane Faith that it resembles Opinion in as much as they are both dubious and uncertain Assents as proceeding upon grounds of like uncertainty though otherwise of different Natures Now as this Faith resembles Opinion so in like manner it may be observ'd of Divine Faith that it resembles Science or rather that Second Assent for so I am forc'd to call it for want of a better Name which we lately discours'd of and plac'd between Opinion and Faith The Comparison here bears the same proportion as to Certainty as it did in the other Case as to uncertainty Divine Faith has all the Certainty that is possible and therefore to be sure as much as Science or that Second Assent can have There is as much Certainty in the thing assented to and there may be as much Assurance and firmness of Perswasion in the Assent it self or in other words what a man believes upon the Authority of God is in it self as certain as what he knows and he may also be as Certain of it For he that assents to a thing upon full evidence can but assent fully and perfectly without suspense or hesitation and so also can he that assents to a thing upon Divine Authority only His Ground is every whit as Firm and Sure as the others and why then should the Measure of his Assurance be less It cannot possibly be if he Knows and Considers upon what Ground he stands So that thus far both in regard of the Certainty of the Object and the Firmness of the Perswasion Divine Faith may be justly placed upon a level with the Most Evident Assent whatever 11. Nor I suppose will this be thought an undue Elevation of Divine Faith On the Contrary I expect to be Complain'd of for setting the Dignity of it at too low a Pitch by those who say that Divine Faith is Firmer than Science But 't is for want of the Latter that these Men so excessively exâ—ol the Former I call it excessively because 't is what strictly and exactly speaking cannot be For what I Perceive or Know is even by that very supposition unquestionably true or else I cannot be said to Know it and what I believe upon the highest Authority can be no more To say therefore that Faith is Firmer than Science is like saying that one streight Line is streighter than another But perhaps their Meaning only is that 't is safer relying upon the Autâ—ority of God than upon our own Rational Faculties which indeed is right and I heartily wish all Men were convinc'd of it For though what I do actually and really Know be to the full as true and certain as what I Believe and I can no more be out in one than in the other yet it is More Certain in the general that God cannot deceive me than that my Reason cannot be deceiv'd Not that what I assent to by Divine Faith can have a greater Objective Certainty than what I clearly and distinctly Perceive or Know but only that there is a Possibility not to say Danger of my taking that for a clear and distinct Perception which â—ndeed is Not so and so though I cannot be deceiv'd in what I do truly know yet I may be deceiv'd in thinking that I know when I do not So that Divine Faith though not more Certain than Knowledge it self is yet of greater Certainty than our Knowing Faculties and generally speaking the Believer goes upon surer grounds than the Man of Reason and Demonstration Because his Reason may possibly lead him into Error whereas the Other 's Authority cannot And when they are both in the right yet still there will be this difference between them that his Reason is only not Deceiv'd whereas the Other 's Faith is Infallible 12. And thus far we have taken a view of the more bright and perfect side of Divine Faith I mean that of its Firmness and Certainty in respect of which it stands upon a just level with Science But it has
not to be comprehended or accounted for by it But this will cross my way again in another place and therefore I shall not anticipate here what further Considerations I may have occasion to bestow upon it there 16. To return therefore I say that this Obscurity and inevidence that is in Faith and upon whose account it is commonly said to be an inevident Assent does not belong to its formal Reason which you see may be clear enough as clear as any Principle of Natural Science but only to the Matter or Object of it That is in other words the inevidence does not lie in the Reason of Believing but in the Nature of the thing Believ'd Not that the matter of Faith again is wholy and all over without Evidence for then there would be no reason to believe it but only that it has no evidence from within and from the Nature of the thing it self as was remarqu'd before Not that this again is so to be understood neither as if the Proposition to be believ'd were not so much as simply intelligible as to the very litteral sense and direct signification of its Terms No we are no more to believe we Know not what than to believe we Know not why and whatever Darkness there may be in Faith it is still so much a Luminous Assent and an Act of Reason as to require that we understand the simple Meaning of the Proposition we are to believe as well as the Grounds of Credibility upon which it Challenges our Assent For the general Object of Faith is Truth and Truth is the relation of Connexion between Ideas I say Ideas for Truth does not lie in Sounds or Words but in Things Therefore to believe such a Thing to be True is the same as to believe that there is a Connexion between such Ideas But then a Man must know what those Ideas are or else how can he believe they are connected Therefore he must understand something more than the Terms themselves he must also have the Ideas of those Terms which is the same as to under stand the Meaning and Signification of them And indeed he that has no Idea or Conception of what he believes believes he knows not what and he that believes he knows not what cannot be properly said to believe any thing In all Faith therefore the Proposition Must be simply intelligible and though the Truth of it be to be Believ'd yet the Meaning of it must be understood 17. For we are again Carefully to distinguish between the Meaning of a Proposition and the Truth of a Proposition The meaning of a Proposition is only the Determination of the Ideas that are signified by such Terms the Truth of it is the Union or Connexion that is between those Ideas Now though a Man does not see the Connexion that is between the Ideas of that Proposition he is said to Believe yet he must in some measure perceive the Ideas themselves because in believing the Proposition he is supposed to believe that such Ideas are so related and Connected together When therefore 't is said that the Matter of Faith is inevident as to the intrinsic Nature of the thing the inevidence must not be thought to lie in the Ideas whereof the Proposition to be Believ'd Consists but in the Connexion of those Ideas that is not in the Meaning of the Proposition but in the Truth of it which is properly the Object of Faith as the Ideas themselves are of Perception Which again by the way may serve to discover another Instance of Impertinency in the Reasoning of those who when they are Maintaining that there can be no Article of Faith above Reason divert into pompous Flourishes and Declamations about the Intelligibility of the Objects of Faith and the utter impossibility of Believing what is not intelligible As if we denied the simple intelligibility of the Proposition or would have Men believe they know not what which certainly would be a strange degree of Implicit Faith and more Nonsensical than that of the Collier or as if that Proposition which is clear enough as to its simple Meaning might not be inevident and so above Reason as to its Truth or in other words as if Clearness of Ideas might not consist with Obscurity of their Connexion 18. But then it must be observ'd again that when we say that the Inevidence that is in the Matter of Faith respects the Truth of the Proposition not the Meaning of it or the Connexion of the Ideas and not the very Ideas themselves this is not so to be understood neither as if the Matter of Faith even thus consider'd were Absolutely and in its self necessarily inevident and such as could not possibly be known without altering its Nature and ceasing to be any longer the Object of Faith I know the contrary Supposition has prevail'd in some Schools where it passes almost for Principle and Maxim that Knowledge and Faith are mutually Exclusive of each other that the same thing cannot be at once the Object of both and that therefore if a thing be believ'd it cannot be known and if known that it cannot be believ'd St. Austin was of this Opinion and has in many places declared his mind to this purpose particularly in his XL Treatise of his Exposition upon St. Iohn's Gospel And his Authority has recommended it as it did most other things to several of the Schoolmen particularly Aquinas whence it has been transmitted down among many Modern Writers of the Systematical way both Philosophers and Divines But we must follow Reason before Authority and whoever can be prevail'd with to lay the latter quite aside and to use the other as he ought will I believe clearly perceive that nothing hinders but that the same Proposition may be at once the Object of both Faith and Science or that the Same thing may be at the same time both Known and Believ'd provided it be by different Mediums according to the diversity of the respective Acts. 19. For not to enter into the wrangle and Dust of the Schools upon this Occasion it may be sufficient to consider that there is no manner of Opposition between Faith and Knowledge or the Most evident Assent as to the Essence of the Proposition that being not supposed to be denied in the one which is Affirm'd in the other or the contrary but only as to the Medium of the Act. And that 't is not the Absolute Nature of the thing Believ'd but the Quality of the Motive that specifies Faith and distinguishes it from other Assents So that 't is no matter what the Absolute Nature of the thing be in it self whether it be evident or not evident Knowable or not Knowable provided it be assented to upon the proper Medium and Motive of Faith that is upon Authority without any respect had to the Natural evidence of the thing though otherwise never so evident in its own Absolute Nature so as to be the Object of Science
though upon a different Medium at the same time For as I said before 't is not the Nature of the thing but the Quality of the Medium that specifies Faith and tho' the same thing cannot have two Natures or be in it self at once evident and not evident yet why may it not sustain two different Relations or be consider'd in two different Mediums so as to be said to be known when perceiv'd by its Evidence and to be believ'd when assented to upon Authority Which certainly may be done as fully and with as little regard to its evidence as if there were no evidence in the thing at all So that the Evidence of the thing does not hinder the Belief of it supposing the Belief not to proceed upon that Evidence but upon its own proper Medium Authority 20. But to use a way of Arguing less Abstract though it may be with some more pressing and convincing Suppose God should reveal to me a Geometrical Truth as that two Triangles having the same Base and being within the same Parallels are equal and I who at first receiv'd it upon his bare Authority should come afterwards to be able to demonstrate it my self upon the known Principles of Art who that well considers the Natures of these things would say that my Science evacâ—â—ted my Faith and that I ceas'd to be a Believer assoon as I became a Mathematician For though I am now supposed to Know what before I only Believ'd yet why should this Knowledge destroy my Faith since I may still have as much regard for the Authority of God and as little to the Evidence of the thing as I had before the Demonstration and would still be ready to assent to it though there were no evidence to be produced for it only upon the Ground of Divine Authority And to use another Sensible though not so Artificial way of arguing I would fain know whether any one of those who are of the Contrary Sentiment would refuse a Demonstrative Account of a Reveal'd Truth suppose the Creation of the World merely for fear of injuring or destroying his Faith which yet he were bound in Conscience to do if Knowledge and Faith were so exclusive of each other and inevidence and Obscurity were so absolutely of the Essence of Faith as some pretend For then it would not be lawful to acquire the Natural Knowledge of any reveal'd Truth because 't is unlawful to destroy one's Faith and every Believer would have just reason to fear all further Light and Information about what he believes which yet I think would be acknowledg'd by all an extravagant Scruple such as can hardly enter much less stay long in any Considering head And is withal Contrary to a plain Exhortation of the Apostle who bids us add to our Faith Knowledge 21. When therefore the Matter of Faith as it is taken for the Truth of the Proposition Believ'd is charged with Obscurity and Faith it self upon that account is said as it commonly is to be of inevident things the Meaning ought not to be of an Absolute but of a Relative inevidence Not that what is Believ'd is so all over dark and obscure that it cannot while Believ'd absolutely be known but only that it cannot under that Formality and so far as it is Believ'd being necessarily in that respect inevident how bright or clear soever it may be in other respects That is in other words though the thing Believ'd absolutely consider'd may be Evident yet it is not so as Believ'd or in relation to Faith because that has no regard to the Evidence how bright soever it may shine but proceeds wholy upon another Argument between which and the Evidence of the thing there is not the least Affinity or Communication The short is the Object of Faith simply and absolutely speaking may admit of Evidence but then though it be never so evident and demonstrable in it self yet as Believ'd it is always Obscure Faith having no regard to the proper light and Evidence of the thing but only to the Testimony of the Revealer whose bare Authority is the only Motive that determines her Assent and the only Ground upon which she lays the whole weight of it though the Truth of the thing in it self absolutely Consider'd may also stand upon other Foundations be rationally accounted for by Arguments from within and so be seen by its own Light But let the Light shine never so bright upon the Object from other sides Faith lets in none nor has any regard to that which she finds there but connives at it and walks as I may say with her eyes shut contenting her self with the certainty of Revelation and leaving to Science if there be any the Evidence of the thing So that the Object is always dark to her how clear and bright soever it may be in it self or appear when absolutely consider'd to a Philosophic Eye In which respect it falls very short of the Perfection of Science though in respect of Firmness and Certainty it be equal to it as was said before All which is briefly couch'd in that excellent Account of Faith given by the Author to the Hebrews when he says that it is the Substance of things hoped for and the Argument of things not seen Where by Substance and Argument he equals it with Science in regard of the Firmness and Certainty of the Assent but by saying that 't is of things not seen he makes it vail and stoop to it in point of Evidence in which respect indeed Faith as Firm and as Certain as it is is as much inferiour to Science as Darkness is to Light 22. To gather up then what has been here discours'd at large concerning the inevidence of Faith into one view When we say that Faith is an inevident Assent we are not to understand this inevidence of the formal Reason of Faith but of the Matter of it And when we say that the Matter of it is inevident we should not intend by it that it is wholy and all over without Evidence but only that it has none from within or from the intrinsic Nature of the thing And when we say that the Matter of Faith is inevident from within this again is not to be intended of the simple Meaning of the Proposition but of the Truth of it And when we say that the Truth of it is inevident this again lastly is not to be understood as if it were always and necessarily so in its own Absolute Nature but only so far forth as it is Believ'd or as 't is consider'd under the formality of an Object of Faith Or in other words the inevidence of the Matter of Faith in respect of the Truth of the Article is not an Absolute but a Relative inevidence Not that the Matter of Faith is Never Absolutely and in the Nature of the thing inevident for it may be so too as will be seen afterwards but only that it is not necessarily so there
be expected that these Men should embrace a Religion which they see thus continually deserted by its own Disciples Or rather instead of converting themselves to Christianity will they not look every day when the Christians shall come over to them For truly this seems to be the state of the Christian World at this time We are posting as fast as we can into Heathenism and stand even upon the brink of Infidelity The great Articles of our Religion are giving up every day and when Men have parted with these we are very much beholden to them if they retain any of the rest there being nothing in Christianity considerable enough when the great Mysteries of the Trinity Incarnation c. are taken away to make it appear an Institution worthy of God or to challenge the Assent of any thinking and consideringâ— Man But why do I talk of running into Heathenism I am afraid we are tending further For as from a Socinian 't is easie to commence a Deist so he that is once a Deist is in a hopeful way to be an Atheist whenever he please 5. I do not speak these things out of a Spirit of Peevishness and Dissatisfaction as some who being full of a Querulous Splenetick Humour and knowing not how better to dispose of it to their ease give it vent upon the Times of which they are always complaining right or wring No the deplorable and dangerous state of Christianity and the too visible growth of Socinianism and Deism among us extort these Reflections from me and have given me many a troublesome and uneasie Thought in my private Retirements For my Satisfaction under which my best Salvo has been to consider that God governs the World and that Jesus Christ who is the Head of his Church will preserve it from all the Powers of Earth and even from the Gates of Hell And that tho' now he seems to be asleep in this Sacred Vessel while the Tempest rages and the Waves beat against it and almost cover it yet 't is to be hoped he will awake and rebuke the Winds and the Sea and make all calm and quiet again However in the mean time 't is fit the Mariners should work and neglect the use of no means that are necessary to the safety of their Ship some by Writing others by private Discourse and all by Prayers and a good Life 6. But now whereas all Rational Method of Cure is founded upon the knowledge of the Cause of the Distemper he that would contribute any thing to the stopping this Contagion of Religious Scepticism that now reigns among us ought in the first place to consider the Reason of it what it is that makes Men so disposed to waver in their Religion and so ready to part with the great Articles and Mysteries of it Now to this purpose I call to mind a very considerable Observation of Descartes concerning Atheism which I take to be equally applicable to Infidelity particularly to this of the Mysteries of the Christian Faith The Observation is this That those things which are commonly alledged by Atheists to impugne the Existence of God do all turn upon this that either we attribute some Humane Affection to God or else arrogate so great force and penetration to our own minds as to go about to comprehend and determine what God can and ought to do So that if we would but carry about us this Thought that our Minds are to be consider'd as Finite but God as Incomprehensible and Infinite there would be no further difficulty in and of their Objections Thus that very Acute and Judicious Person concerning the Grounds of Atheism And in like manner I think it may be said of Infidelity as to the Mysteries of Christianity That the great Reason why so many that call themselves Christians do so obstinately cavil at them and dispute them is that either they think too meanly of God or too highly of themselves that either they ascribe something Humane to his Nature or something Divine to their own that either they set too narrow limits to the Divine Power and Greatness or carry out too far those of their own understandings in one word that either they Humaniâ—e God or Deify themselves and their own Rational Abilities 7. And they confess in effect as much themselves For the Reason that these Men commonly give out and pretend for their not allowing the Mysteries of the Christian Religion any room in their Creed is that they are above the reach of their Understandings They cannot comprehend them or conceive how they can be and therefore will not believe them having fix'd it as a Law in the general to believe nothing but what they can comprehend But now where does the Ground of this Consequence rest at last or upon what Principle does it ultimately depend How comes the Incomprehensibility of a Point of Faith to be a presumption against it why is its being above their Reason in Argument that it is not true Why I say but only because in the first place they attribute so much to their Reason at least by a Confuse Sentiment as to presume it to be the Measure and Standard of all Truth and that nothing that is True can really be above it Here I say the stress of the matter will rest at last For should the Argument of these Men be reduced to a Syllogistical Form it must necessarily proceed thus Whatever is above our Reason is not to be believ'd as true But the Reputed Mysteries of Christianity are above our Reason Therefore the Reputed Mysteries of Christianity are not to be believ'd as true Now the only contestable Proposition in this Syllogism is the Major which can be prov'd by no other Principle than this That our Reason is the Measure of all Truth and whose Proof must be in this Form Whatever is above the Measure of all Truth is not to be believ'd as true But our Reason is the Measure of all Truth Therefore whatever is above our Reason is not to be believ'd as true By this Analysis of their Argument into its Principle it is plain that this their Reason of disbelieving the Mysteries of the Christian Religion viz. Because they are above their Reason does at last resolve into this That their Reason is the Measure of all Truth and that they can comprehend all things For otherwise how should their not being able to comprehend a thing be an Argument that it is not true This I presume is a Principle our Adversaries would be loth to own and indeed with good Reason it being the most extravagantly absurd and self-arrowgating one that can possibly enter the Thought or proceed from the Mouth of a Man And accordinly I do not know any Socinian that had the immodesty in terms openly to assert it But this is what they must come to if they will speak out and what in the mean time they do vertually and implicitly say So then their procedure in short seems
being no reason from the Nature of Faith that requires it should which may consist with Evidence though it proceeds not upon it and has no regard to it as a Motive So then the formal Reason of Faith is always Clear the Matter of it Absolutely consider'd may be clear or not clear as it happens according as the Nature of the thing is but as Believ'd or as Consider'd under the formality of being the Object of Faith so it is always inevident and Obscure as being not supposed to be assented to for the sake of its Evidence even when it has any but wholy upon another Account already sufficiently represented 23. And thus having struck some Light into the Darkness of Faith by stating and explaining with what exactness I could in what Sense it is an inevident Assent I cannot forbear Observing by the way though a little of the soonest of what Service this Account may be towards the grand Question of Believing things above Reason For if Faith be an inevident Assent so far at least as not to respect the Evidence of its Object why may not a thing be believ'd though it be above Reason For what though it be above Reason is it therefore above Faith Has Faith any regard to Evidence Or is it determin'd by any Rational Motive I mean that is taken from the Nature of the Object Even when a thing is evident Faith is not supposed to assent to it because of its Evidence and why then may not a thing be believ'd though it be not evident Some Contend that Faith and Evidence cannot possibly consist together and according to them Not only what is inevident may be believ'd but whatever is believ'd must be inevident But this I look upon and have already shewn to be a Mistake And 't is a Mistake in the Extremity too For I take it to be every whit as much an Extreme to say that the Object of Faith is always inevident as to say that it is always evident However it is always inevident so far as Believ'd which is the Middle Point between the two extremes The Nature of Faith requires at least this Relative inevidence of the Object whatever it be in its own Nature and we need no More For if the Object of Faith be alwayes inevident so far as Believ'd then will it not follow that it May be believ'd though inevident For my part I see nothing that should hinder this Consequence if the Principle it proceeds upon be right The Principle is and a very moderate one sure the generality of Writers straining the Matter a great deal higher that the Object of Faith is inevident as far as Believ'd The Consequence is that therefore a thing may be believ'd though inevident 'T is true indeed one of these is an Absolute and the other only a Relative inevidence But this signifies Nothing to the Argument For why may not a thing really and in it self inevident be believ'd when even that which is Evident is Consider'd by Faith as inevident Why then 't is all one as to Faith as if it were so indeed For what does the Evidence signify or what real alteration does it make if Faith has no regard to it nor Consideration of it And what should hinder then but that a thing really inevident may be believ'd especially if reveal'd by God himself and concerning himself The short is Faith as Faith has no regard to Evidence I mean that of the thing and Faith as Divine has no need of it and therefore why an inevident thing may not be believ'd is what I do not understand and would be glad to Learn 24. But to return for I look upon this as too much a digression from the present and too much a Prevention of what is to follow to be further pursued after having thus discours'd of the Nature of Faith in General and the double Distribution of it into Humane and Divine with proper Considerations upon each of them it remains that it be now further consider'd that each of these may be either Explicit or Implicit Then we are said to believe Explicitly when we believe determinately such or such a thing in particular distinctly knowing what that Particular thing is And then Implicitly when we believe indeterminately and at large whatever is proposed to us by such an Authority not knowing what in particular is proposed or what it is we Believe Which though it seems to carry the Appearance of an Assent too blind and hood-winkt to be the act of a Reasonable Creature may yet in its proper place become him as much as the other and indeed is every whit as rational an Assent in its Ground and Principle For all Explicit Faith is founded upon Implicit and has Implicit Faith in it 25. To understand both this and the Nature of Implicit Faith the better we are to Consider what has been already intimated that Faith proceeds upon Premisses as well as Science and is the Conclusion of a Syllogism And I further Note what perhaps may not be unworthy the Observation of the Curious that the Major Proposition in Faith Explicit is the Conclusion in Faith Implicit as may be seen in the Syllogism before set down Whatever is reveal'd by God is true This is Reveal'd by God Therefore this is true The Major Proposition here whatever is reveal'd by God is true is the Conclusion of Implicit Faith whose act is as much to believe to be true whatever God reveals as the act of Explicit Faith is to believe that this or that in particular is so So that Explicit Faith proceeds upon Implicit borrows from it its Conclusion for its Principle and begins where the other leaves off Just as in the Subalternation of Sciences that which is a Conclusion in one is a Principle in the other so 't is here in the Subalternation of these two Faiths whereof that which is Explicit may be said to be Subalternated to that which is Implicit Let not any therefore vilify or disparage Implicit Faith as a blind and irrational Assent since it lays a ground for Explicit which serves it self of it using its Conclusion as a Principle even as what is a Conclusion in Geometry is a Principle in Perspective And as Geometry is therefore accounted the Superiour Science so ought implicit Faith to be reckon'd as the Superiour Faith upon whose Conclusion the other proceeds and which it self proceeds thus Whatever is reveal'd by him that is Infallible is true God is Infallible Therefore whatever is reveal'd by God is true Here besides that 't is plain to be seen that the Conclusion of this last Syllogism is the Principle of the precedent One and that Explicit Faith supposes what is proved in Implicit it may be further noted that Implicit Faith as being the highest degree of Faith is due only to the highest that is to an Infallible Authority the reason why whatever is reveal'd by God is here Concluded to be true being
a desperate Argument when there is nothing else to be said for it 2. Which of these is the Evasion either the denying or the allowing this Distinction will best appear by the Examination of it which besides its Serviceableness to our Clearer proceeding in what we are now upon I am the rather induced to undertake because as Mr. Boyle Observes in a little Treatise upon this Subject there are divers that employ this Distinction few that have attempted to explain it and none that has taken care to justifie it Indeed He himself is the only Person that I know of that has written professedly about it and I cannot but wonder that a thing of such Curiosity and Importance should be so little Consider'd though I think he has not gone to the Bottom of the Subject nor is sufficiently clear even as far as he goes However because he has some Considerable Observations upon it as indeed his Thoughts are generally very good and there is no reason why we should refuse any additional Light in so dark and untrodden a way I shall for the further advantage and illustration of the Matter first draw up into a short view what that Excellent Person has Meditated concerning it with such Occasional Remarques as I shall think necessary and then proceed to state the thing according to my own Conceptions hoping that between us both it will be sufficiently clear'd and that nothing of any Consequence will be overlook'd that belongs to the Consideration of this so little consider'd and almost Virgin Subject 3. To give you then in the first place the Sum of Mr. Boyle's Account He proposes in general two things 1. To declare in what sense the Distinction is to be understood 2. To prove that it is not an Arbitrary or illusory Distinction but grounded upon the Nature of things As to the first he tells you that by things Above Reason he Conceives such Notions and Propositions as Mere Reason that is unassisted by Revelation would never have discover'd to us whether those things be to our Finite Capacities clearly comprehensible or not And that by things Contrary to Reason he understands such Conceptions and Propositions as are not only undiscoverable by mere Reason but such as when we do understand them do evidently appear repugnant to some Principle or to some Conclusion of right Reason 4. Now before I go any further I would here by this great Man's leave and with due deference to his high Character remarque that though things undiscoverable by mere Reason without Revelation may in a Certain sense be said to be above Reason in as much as they surpass the Natural ability of the Understanding to make the first Discovery of them yet this is not what Divines mean by Above Reason as they use the Phrase in this Distinction opposing it to Contrary to Reason For this Distinction was intended against the Socinians who generally reject the Mysteries of Faith as contrary to Sense and Reason to which we reply that they are not Contrary to Reason but only Above it They cry out that this is no Distinction but a mere Shift and Evasion pretending that the I arts of it fall in together and that what is above Reason is also contrary to it and therefore not to be believ'd Now 't is most plain that both they that use this Distinction and they against whom it is used do not Mean by things Above Reason such as are beyond the first invention or Discovery of it For besides that to mean that our Mysteries are only undiscoverable when we say they are above Reason would be too little a thing to oppose to Contrary to Reason it is also too little a thing to intend by Mystery since though the undiscoverableness of them by Reason might be a sufficient ground of their being so call'd before their Revelation it can be none now after they are reveal'd And therefore if we say of these Mysteries now that they are above Reason we cannot be presumed to intend it in respect of their undiscoverableness And 't is as plain that that our Adversaries do not so understand us For they deny that things above Reason are to be believ'd and that because according to them above Reason and contrary to Reason are all one But now no Socinian that understands his own Principle would deny the Credibility of things above Reason as that signifies only undiscoverable by Reason alone much less would he say that what is above Reason in that Sense is also contrary to it No without doubt they will in this sense both allow us the Distinction and the Mysteries if they may be so call'd that are built upon it But then this plainly shews that they do not understand it in this Sense any more than we 5. Instead therefore of saying undiscoverable he should have said incomprehensible by Reason Into which he slips unawares in the account of the other part of the Distinction things Contrary to Reason by saying that they are such as when we do understand them do appear repugnant c. which plainly implies that the former things that were said to be above Reason are such as we do not understand even when discover'd and not such as we are not able only to Discover since otherwise there will be no Antithesis in the Second part in which there is nothing amiss except those words as are not only undiscoverable which in my judgment ought to be expung'd as the Production of the first Mistake 6. Mr. Boyle proceeds to illustrate his Explanation of this Distinction by a Comparison drawn from Sight He supposes a Man to be askt by a Diver what he could see in a deep Sea To which the Man is supposed to reply that he could see into a Sea-green Liquor to the depth of some yards and no further So that if further ask't if he could see what lies at the Bottom of the Sea his Answer no doubt would be in the Negative But then if the Diver should let himself down to the Bottom and bring up thence and shew him Oysters or Muscles with Pearls in them he would easily acknowledge both that they lay beyond the reach of his Sight and that the Pearls were Genuin and Good But if the Diver should further pretend that each of these Pearls was bigger than the Shells they were contain'd in this would be thought not only undiscernible by the Eyes but contrary to their Informations and to admit this would argue the Sight not only to be imperfect but false and delusory and accordingly 'tis presum'd that this he would not admit 7. Now I not only allow this Comparison but even admire it for the singular Aptness and Pertinency of it to illustrate even to the Sense the difference between things above and things contrary to Reason only I think it seems to proceed upon the supposition that by things above Reason are meant such only as are incomprehensible by it which certainly would make the Comparison
Observation not lightly to be pass'd over that if this One Distinction of things above Reason and things contrary to Reason be once admitted or shewn to be real Solid and well-grounded the main part of the Socinian Controversie is immediately or at least in the very next Consequence at an end For the Reason why they will not believe things above Reason is because as they pretend Above Reason differs nothing in reality from Contrary to Reason and so those things that are above Reason are also as much contrary to it as above it and what is Contrary to Reason is on both sides acknowledg'd impossible to be believ'd Well but then if it be made appear as I think by this time is sufficiently done that these two are quite different things and that to be above Reason is not the same as to be contrary to it then even by their own Confession there can be no pretence why what is above Reason may not be Believ'd Which I take to be the true inducement that makes these Men stand out so fiercely and obstinately against this Distinction for they are aware what mischief it will do 'em as it is also the reason why I have bestow'd so much care and pains to clear and justifie it 28. And thus having given an Account of these great and Fundamental things what Reason is what Faith is and what it is to be Above and what Contrary to Reason we have now prepared the way to the more full and direct Consideration of the Belief of things above Reason the true state of which Question by what has been hitherto discours'd appears to be this Whether we may not Assent upon the Authority of Divine Revelation to such things as our Understanding or Reason cannot perceive or Comprehend as to the Truth or Manner of them Or whether our not being able thus to Comprehend them be a sufficient Reason why we should not believe them For the Resolution of which we have already laid the Grounds and shall now proceed more directly to build upon them in the following Chapter CHAP. IV. That Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth 1. WE have gain'd a most wonderful Point in the foregoing Chapter by proving the Distinction between things Above and things Contrary to Reason and such as of it self alone is sufficient Not only immediately to decide but even forever to Silence the Controversie between us and our Socinian Adversaries concerning the Belief of things above Reason For the only Objection that is or can possibly be pretended against the Belief of things above Reason being the supposed Contrariety of the same things to Reason if it be shewn that to be above Reason involves no such Contrariety then the Objection against the belief of such things is fairly and wholly removed and consequently there remains no Reason why they may not be Believ'd So that I cannot but look upon the Substance of my Work as most effectually done already and those of our Adversaries that have any reasonable Measure of Penetration and Sincerity must needs be sensible of it And I dare appeal even to their own Consciences whether they are not However considering the importunity of those I have to deal with as well as the weight of the Cause it self I shall endeavour the further establishment of it upon some other Considerations whereby I shall also give further Confirmation and so repay what I am endebted to the Point contended for in the preceding Chapter since we may as well argue backwards from the Believableness of things above Reason to their not Contrariety as forwards from their not Contrariety to their Believableness the Consequence being full as good thus Above Reason Believable therefore not Contrary as thus Above Reason not Contrary therefore Believable Now in order to the fuller Conviction and demonstration of the Believableness of things above Reason I set out upon this Ground that Humane Reason is not the Measure of Truth 2. 'T is agreed among the Masters of Reason that as all Proof ought to be only of such things as need it so there are Propositions so Clear and Evident of themselves that they have no need of being demonstrated and that there are some again that are not capable of Demonstration the Fulness and immediateness of their Evidence rendring them strictly indemonstrable And it has been charged by one of the most Considerable of them as a Fault in the Method of the Geometricians that they set themselves to prove things that have no need of Proof whereof he gives an Instance in Euclid who goes formally to work to prove that two sides of a Triangle taken together are greater than one although this be most Evident even from the Notion only of a Right Line which is the shortest that can possibly be between two Points and the Natural Measure of Distance from one Point to another which it could not be if it were not also the shortest of all Lines that can be drawn from Point to Point 3. Now though I cannot say that the Proposition of this Chapter is so Evident of it self as not to be capable of Demonstration yet I must Confess I cannot but think it of the Number of those that do not need any that is I mean to those who will but take the Pains to consider it with Attention and are withal so sincere as to say ingenuously what they inwardly think For to unattentive or Captious Persons nothing is plain since there is Nothing but what some will contradict and there are those who profess to doubt of every thing and even the Sun it self can't make a Man see if either he want eyes or will shut ' em I cannot therefore say that to such men either this or any other Proposition is plain but I would venture to be tried by any competent and indifferent Considerer whether this be not indeed a very plain and certain Proposition as plain as most of those which pass for Principles and Maximes in Discourse that Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth And accordingly I should justly fear incurring the same Censure that is charged upon the Geometricians of going to prove what is evident were there not something peculiar in the present Case that makes it very different from theirs For they dealing in Matters of an Abstract and indifferent Nature and such wherein the Lusts and Passions of men are altogether uninteressed have no real need to prove evident things because for that very reason their Evidence is never Contested whereas the Point I have now in hand being of a Moral Concernment and such as incounters the Partialities and false Biasses of Humane Nature particularly that great and governing one of Self-Love though it should be of equal evidence with some of their Maxims will yet not be equally secure from Opposition and pass alike uncontested And so there may be need of proving it if not to do any necessary Service to the Proposition it self yet to satisfie
much Heathenized Religion of some Christians may also very deservedly retire behind the Curtain and decline coming to the Light for fear the Absurdities and Monstrous Inconsistencies of it should be laid open But certainly there is not any thing neither Doctrine nor Precept in that true Religion that is reveal'd by God in Evangelical Christianity that need fly the Light of Reason or refuse to be tried by it Christian Religion is all over a Reasonable Service and the Author of it is too reasonable a Master to impose any other or to require as his Vicar does that Men should follow him blindfold and pull out their eyes to become his Disciples No he that Miraculously gave Sight to so many has no need of nor pleasure in the Blind nor has his Divine Religion any occasion for such Judges or Professors For it is the Religion of the Eternal and uncreated Wisdom the Divine Word the true Light of the World and the Universal Reason of all Spirits and 't is impossible that he should reveal any thing that Contradicts the Measures of sound Discourse or the immutable Laws of Truth as indeed it is that any Divine Revelation should be truly Opposite to Right Reason hower it may sometimes be Above it or that any thing should be Theologically true which is Philosophically False as some with great profoundness are pleas'd to distinguish For the Light of Reason is as truly from God as the Light of Revelation is and therefore though the latter of these Lights may exceed and out-shine the former it can never be Contrary to it God as the Soveraign Truth cannot reveal any thing against Reason and as the Soveraign Goodness he cannot require us to believe any such thing Nay to descend some degrees below this he cannot require us to believe not only what is against Reason but even what is without it For to believe any thing without Reason is an unreasonable Act and 't is impossible that God should ever require an unreasonable act especially from a Reasonable Creature 5. We therefore not only acknowledge the use of Reason in Religion but also that 't is in Religion that 't is chiefly to be used so far are we from denying the Use of it there And it is a little unfairly done of our Adversaries so much to insinuate the Contrary as they do For I cannot take it for less than such an Insinuation when they are arguing with us against the Belief of the Christian Mysteries to run out as they usually do into Harangues and Flourishes whereof by the way I know none more guilty than the Author of Christianity not Mysterious about the Reasonableness of the Christian Religion and the Rational Nature of Faith what a Reasonable Act the One is and what a Reasonable Service the Other is c. as if we were against the Use of Reason in Religion or were for a Blind Groundless and Unaccountable Faith or if because we hold the Belief of things above Reason therefore we are for having no Reason for our Belief This I say is an unfair Insinuation and such as argues some want either of Judgment or Sincerity I don't know which in those that suggest it For they seem plainly by running so much upon this Vein to imply as if it were part of the Question between us whether there be any Use of Reason in Religion or whether Faith is to be Founded upon Reason or No. But Now this is no part of the Controversie that lies between us we acknowledge the Use of Reason in Religion as well as they and are as little for a Senseless and Irrational Faith as they can be This therefore being Common to us both is no part of the Question and they do ill to insinuate that it is by so many Popular Declamatory Strains upon the Reasonableness of Religion and in particular of Faith whereas they do or should know that the thing in Question between us is not whether there be any Use of Reason to be made in Believing but only what it is or wherein the true Use of it does Consist 6. Now this we may determine in a few words having already laid the grounds of it For since the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Concluding Argument against the Truth of it nor Consequently against the Belief of it as is shewn in the three foregoing Chapters it is plain that the proper Office and Business of a Believers Reason is to Examin and Inquire Not whether the thing proposed be Comprehensible or not but only whether it be Reveal'd by God or No since if it be the Incomprehensibleness of it will be no Objection against it That therefore ought to be no part of its Questistion or Deliberation because indeed it is not to the purpose to Consider whether such a thing be when if it were it would be no just Objection The only Considerable thing then here is whether such a Proposition be indeed from God and has him for its Author or no. And here Reason is to clear her Eyes put the Matter in the best Light call in all the Assistance that may be had both from the Heart and the Head and determine of the thing with all the Judgement and all the Sincerity that she can But as to the Comprehensibility or Incomprehensibility of the Article this is quite besides the Question and ought therefore to be no part of her scruting or debate since if it were never so much above her Comprehension it would be never the less proper Object for her Belief 7. The Sum is the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument against the Belief of it therefore in the believing of a thing the proper work of my Reason is not to Consider whether it be incomprehensible But when a thing is proposed to me as from God all that my Reason has to do in this Case is Seriously Soberly Diligently Impartially and I add Humbly to Examine whether it comes with the true Credentials of his Authority and has him for its real Author or no. This is all that Reason has to do in this Matter and when she has done this she is to rise from the Seat of Judgement and resign it to Faith which either gives or refuses her Assent Not as the thing proposed is Comprehensible or not Comprehensible but as 't is either Revealâ—d or not Reveal'd CHAP. IX An Application of the foregoing Considerations to the Mysteries of Christianity 1. HAving thus raised the Shell of our Building to its due â—itch we have now only to Roof it by making a Short Application of the Principles laid down and setâ—led in the Former Chapters to the Mysteries of the Christian Religion against the Truth and Belief of which it plainly appears from the Preceding Considerations that there lies now no Reasonable Objection For if Human Reason be not the Measure of Truth and if therefore the Incomprehensibility of a â—hing to Human Reason be no Argument of its 〈◊〉 being True
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Test of Truth the very Proposition almost in Terms of my Fourth Chapter or to be opposed to the Accounts receiv'd from profane Antiquity much less to the inspired writings For notwithstanding that several particulars relating to the eldest Condition of the VVorld and its great Catastrophe's examine'd and compared with so much Philosophy as was till lately known were plainly unaccountable and naturally speaking impossible yet we see now Nature is more fully more certainly and more substantially understood that the same things approve themselves to be plain easie and rational 'T is therefore Folly in the highest degree to reject the Truth or Divine Authority of the Holy Scriptures because we cannot give our Minds particular satisfaction as to the Manner may or even possibility of some things therein asserted Since we have seen so many of those things which seem'd the most incredible in the whole Bible and gave the greatest Scruple and Scandal to Philosophic Minds so fully and particularly attested and next to demonstrated from Certain Principles of Astronomy and natural Knowledge 't is but reasonable to expect in due time a like Solution of the other Difficulties 'T is but just sure to depend upon the Veracity of those Holy VVriters in other Assertions whose Fidelity is so intirely establish'd in these hitherto equally unaccountable ones The obvious plain or literal Sense of the Sacred Scriptures ought not without great reason to be eluded or laid aside Several of those very places which seem'd very much to require the same hitherto appearing now to the Minutest Circumstances true and rational according to the strictest and most literal Interpretation of them VVe may be under an Obligation to believe such things on the Authority of the Holy Scriptures as are properly Mysteries that is though not really Contradictory yet plainly unaccountable to our present degree of Knowledge and Reason Thus the Sacred Histories of the Original Constitution and great Catastrophe's of the VVorld have been in the past Ages the Objects of the Faith of Iews and Christians though the Divine Providence had not afforded so much light as that they could otherwise Satisfie themselves in the Credibility of them till the new improvements in Philosophy And this is but just and Reasonable For sure the Ignorance or Incapacity of the Creature does by no Means afford sufficient ground for Incredulity or justifie Men in their rejecting Divine Revelation and impeaching the Veracity or Providence of the Creator With which weighty and to the present purpose very pertinent words of this worthy Author I Seal up my own and leave them both to the Consideration of the Reader FINIS Corrections PAge 176. line 22. after describe read its p. 250. l. 11. r. confuted p. 206. l. 17. after Perfections r. are as p. 273. l. 1. r. proceeds p. 287. l. 12. for as his Vicar does r. whatever his Vicar may do p. 289. l. 23. after or r. as p. 292. l. 9. r. 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Avis Stir le Tableâ—â— du Socinianisme Traité 1. pag. 14 L' Art de Penser p. 432. Cogit Rational de Deo p. 296. Mr. Malebranche * Veritas immortalis est veritas incommutabilis est veritas illud verbum est de quo dicitur in principio erat verbum verbum erat apud Deum Deus erat verbum S. Austin in Psal. 123. Iob 11. 7. Psal. 97. 2. Rom. 11. 33. * I the rather Instance in the Divine Immensity because the Dâ—vout Psalmist does herein partiâ—ularize his Ignorance making it the Subject of his Astonishment rather than his Curiosity Such Knowledge is too wonderful for me it is high I cannot attain unto it Psal. 139. â—erardi de Vries Prasessoris Vâ—tra◠〈◊〉 exercitationes rationales de Deo Divinisque Perfectoinibus Pag. 248. Psal. 4. Le Clerks Physics Pag. 14. 〈…〉 Recherche de la Verité Tom. 2. p. 165. 〈…〉 Psal. 32. 10. 〈…〉 Christianity not Myâ—ter p. 90. Serm. of the Mysteries of the Christian Faith Life of Christ p. 184. 1 Cor. 2. 9 10. 1 Pet. 1. 12. p. 379.