THIRD REMARKS UPON AN ESSAY CONCERNING Humane Understanding IN A LETTER Address'd to the AuTHOR LONDON Printed for M. Wotton at the Three Daggers in Fleet-street MDCXCIX THIRD REMARKS UPON AN ESSAY CONCERNING Humane Understanding SIR I Have not yet receiv'd the Favour of your Answer to my Second Letter or Second Remarks upon your Essay about Humane Vnderstanding You ruffled over the First Remarks in a domineering Answer without giving any Satisfaction to their Contents but the Second being more full and explicit I was in hopes you would have been more concern'd to Answer them and to Answer them more Calmly and like a Philosopher You best know the reason of your Silence but as it will be understood in several ways so it may be subject to that Construction amongst others That you could not satisfie those Objections or Queries without exposing your Principles more than you had a Mind they should be exposed You know there is a Sect or Party of Men among us whom we have much ado to bring to a fair and distinct Account of their Doctrine and Principles They cannot or will not fix their Notions and declare them freely to the World that they may be impartially examin'd I hope you do not approve that Method nor think it worthy of imitation Yet if to find out Truth be the End and Design of your Writing as I believe it is it must be first known what you Affirm and what you Deny before the Matter can be examin'd especially as to those grand Points that are of common Concern and which I have made the Subject of my Enquiries I mean the Grounds of Morality and Religion And in Prosecution of the same Argument that we may have a little more Light into your Doctrine I now desire to know what Natural Conscience is according to your Principles I told you in my former Remarks That I thought it was Necessary as a Ground for Morality to allow a natural distinction betwixt Good and Evil Right and Wrong turpe honestum Vertue and Vice And this distinction I thought was manifested and supported by Natural Conscience whether amongst those that have or have not External Laws This I think is taught us plainly by the Apostle of the Gentiles when Rom. ii 14 15. he says Those that were without a Law were a Law to themselves doing by nature the things contained in the Law which show the Law written in their hearts Their Consciences bearing witness and their thoughts accusing or excusing them The Gentile Philosophers and Poets have said the same things concerning natural Conscience as you cannot but know And that you must go against the best Authors Divine or Humane if you deny to Man natural Conscience as an original Principle antecedently to any other Collections or Recollections I do not deny that you allow such a Principle as Conscience in some sence or other but consider pray how you define it or what you say is to be understood by it Conscience you Pag. 18. §. 8. say is nothing else but our own Opinion of our own Actions But of what sort of Actions I pray and in reference to what rule or distinction of our Actions whether as Good or Evil or as Profitable or Unprofitable or as Perfect or Imperfect Or of all promiscuously of natural Actions and about things of indifferency as well as others As for instance whether we have play'd well in a Game at Chess or in a party at Tennis is this matter of Conscience yet we make a judgment of our Actions in these cases as well as other But tho' they were imperfect in their kind or not well managed we feel no Accusation or Remorse of Conscience for it Surely therefore that Principle ought to be better described and distinguish'd than by such a loose Character of it as makes all our Actions indifferently the Objects of Conscience I take Conscience to relate to our Moral Actions only and to the distinction of moral Good and Evil and such other Differences Accusing excusing or justifying us according as we have observ'd neglected or contemn'd those Differences This we understand by natural Conscience and take it to be the Foundation of natural Religion as that is of Revealed Now I do not remember that in this sence you have once nam'd natural Conscience in your Book tho' you had a fair opportunity for it in your large Discourse about Practical Principles in your Third Chapter Book I. But it may be you think there is none truly natural in this Acceptation However seeing you own natural Religion let 's consider what you understand by it and how you can make it subsist without natural Conscience in that Sence and notion we have given of it You place natural Religion I think in the Belief of the Being of a Pag. 277. §. 23. God and of Obedience due to him This is good so far as it goes and is well supported But the Question is what Laws those are that we ought to obey or how we can know them without Revelation unless you take in natural Conscience for a distinction of Good and Evil or another Idea of God than what you have given us That Principle of Conscience and a true Idea of God with Moral Attributes being admitted we have a Foundation for natural Religion But not being admitted I do not see by what ratiocination you can collect antecedently to Revelation what the Will of God is what his Laws are how Promulgated and made known to us And consequently what we have to direct our Obedience if we do not know wherein that Obedience consists I may know there is a King and that I am bound to obey him yet if I do not know his Laws nor what his Pleasure is I cannot tell when I please him or displease him obey him or disobey him if I know not I say in what particulars my Duty and Allegiance are to be express'd and practis'd Neither can we think Natural Religion a matter of small concern or consequence seeing in virtue of that Principle without any External Laws so far as we know Noah and Job not to mention more have been accounted Just and Upright in the sight of God and mark'd as the particular Favourites of Heaven by one of the Prophets Ezek. xiv 14. If they had no other Guide or Motive to Vertue and Piety than your Idea of God and of the Soul with an arbitrary difference of Good and Evil I wonder how they could attain to such a degree of Righteousness as would bear that eminent Character from God and his Prophets Upon this occasion also we may reflect upon Natural Faith and the Nature of it You know how it is describ'd by the same Apostle of the Gentiles He that cometh to God must believe that he is and that he is a Rewarder of them that diligently seek him And without this Faith he says 't is impossible to please him Heb. xi 6. Now how shall a Man in
the state of Nature have just grounds of this Faith if he have no other Idea of God than that he is an All-powerful All-knowing and Eternal Being How from this can he prove that he will be a Rewarder of those that seek him If Goodness and Justice belong to his Essence as well as those other Perfections he may from the Idea of God have a good foundation and support of his Faith and consequently of his Vertue and Piety But without these he is left in the dark as to his fate or future Reward in another state Lastly As to Providence we cannot tell from your Principles how far it will extend We see Provision is made for the Subsistence of Creatures here that the World may be kept upon the Wheels and still going But as to their Happiness as we see it uncertain here so we cannot prove from the bare Power and Knowledge of their Maker what it will be hereafter So much for Natural Religion We return now to Natural Conscience and to what you call Practical Principles whereof you discourse amply in the foremention'd Chapter As to that B. 1. c. 3. Controversie about Natural Principles I think it may turn either way according as they understand the Terms of the Question which in my mind you have not fairly represented If by Principles you understand distinct Knowledge that is distinct Idea's and distinct Propositions we do not hold innate Principles in that sence Yet so you seem to represent them and their Idea's and you call them Characters fair Characters indeleble Characters stampt imprinted engraven in the Mind Ch. 2 3. for all those Expressions you use upon that occasion Now all these Expressions seem to signifie clear and distinct Representations as Pictures or Sculptures represent their Originals Does any one assert that there are such express Idea's express Propositions in the Mind of Man and an express discernment of their connexion or inconnexion before the use of Reason or as much before it as after it I say as much before it as after it for the fullest clearest and most distinct Knowledge that we have after the use of Reason cannot be more amply express'd than to say it is imprinted or engraven upon the Mind in fair and indeleble Characters You exaggerate the matter and set the question at what height you please that you may have the fairer mark to shoot at If you had reflected upon that common distinction of Knowledge as clear or obscure general or particular distinct or indistinct whereof we have daily Instances in the Life of Man you might have represented more softly and more easily conceiv'd those Natural Impressions which indeed compar'd with perfect Knowledge are but general obscure and indistinct Notices and yet sufficient for the Purposes to which they are design'd When a Child feels the difference of bitter and sweet he knows and understands that difference in some kind or degree for it hath its Consequences and becomes a Principle of Action to him Now whether you please to call this Principle Knowledge or Sense or Instinct or by any other Name it still hath the effect of Knowledge of some sort or other and that before this Child hath the Name of Bitter or Sweet Pleasant or Unpleasant much less can he define what either of them is We suppose these original Impressions to be like Gold in the Oar that may be refin'd or rough Diamonds that by polishing receive a further lustre or to come nearer to your similitude like Monograms or Sketches that want their full Lines and Colours to compleat them and yet one may discern what or whom they are made to represent though imperfectly drawn I say this only by the bye that the Question may be better stated for my Design at present is only to speak of Practical Principles or what I call Natural Conscience in reference to the distinction of Moral Good and Evil. Accordingly I understand by Natural Conscience a Natural Sagacity to distinguish Moral Good and Evil or a different perception and sense of them with a different affection of the Mind arising from it and this so immediate as to prevent and anticipate all External Laws and all Ratiocination And when I say Moral Good and Evil I mean it in contradistinction to Natural Good and Evil Pleasure or Pain Conveniences or Inconveniences which are things of another order and character This inward Sense we speak of is simple and irrespective as to those Natural Evils or Goods They are not its proper Objects They may be frequently in conjunction but not necessarily By these Rules and Marks I think it appears sufficiently what I mean by Natural Conscience and I wish you would as freely and fully tell us your Notion of it so far as it is opposite or different from this that by a just state of the Question we might come more easily to the discovery of Truth For there are some Questions that are harder to state clearly and distinctly than to resolve when so stated You will not now say I believe That if there was such a Natural Principle in the Soul of Man Infants or young Children would be able to distinguish Moral Good and Evil For you might as well expect that in a Seed there should be Leaves Flowers and Fruit or that in the rudiments of an Embryo there should be all the Parts and Members of a compleat Body distinctly represented which in continuance are fashioned and brought to perfection This is the case we represent Such a Principle as Natural Conscience we say is seated in the Soul of Man as other original Principles are which shew themselves by degrees in different times and differently according to other circumstances Whether you will call this Principle Knowledge or by any other name as we told you before is indifferent to us but 't is a Principle of distinguishing one thing from another in Moral Cases without Ratiocination and is improveable into more distinct Knowledge We may illustrate this from our Outward Sensations We can evidently distinguish Red and Yellow Colours and yet are at a loss how to define either of them or to express their difference in words And so in Tastes Odours Sounds and other sensible qualities We are differently affected by their Impressions and so is a Child before any Reflection or Ratiocination though neither of us can give an Idea of the Affection we feel nor of the particular Modification and Action of the Object whence it arises This shews us that there may be a power in the Soul of distinguishing one thing from another without Ratiocination And if in Sensible Qualities why not also in Moral and Intellectual Relations such as Good and Evil True and False As our Outward Senses are sufficient without distinct Idea's and Propositions to give us notice of what is convenient or inconvenient to the Body So those Inward Sensations were design'd to direct us as to what is agreeable or disagreeable good or hurtful
and tell us Every thing is possible to God 'T is true every thing that is possible is possible to God but we must also consider the Capacities or Incapacities of the Subject Quicquid recipitur recipitur ad modum Recipientis And what you suppose possible may be suppos'd actual Possibili posito in actu nihil sequitur absurdi Pardon these old Axioms by which you are oblig'd to vindicate the actual existence of such Powers and Properties as we are treating of from absurdity and to make them intelligible if you would have them receiv'd I formerly mentioned in the first Letter a general Consideration which might justly induce us to believe that Matter is not capable of the Powers of Cogitation For if it were the existence of Finite immaterial Spirits would be superfluous seeing Matter alone or certain parcels of Matter with this Power or Impress would be able to perform all their Operations But I leave that to your further Thoughts However I conceive such a Power acting in Matter or impress'd upon it could not be call'd the Power of Matter no more than Motion is the Power of Matter In Motion you know properly so call'd besides the change of Situation there is a Vis movens which is not the Power of Matter nor any Modification of it but the Power of a Superior Agent acting Matter In like manner If there was a Vis cogitans in the Body or in any other Matter it would not be a Power of Matter nor any Modification of it any more than the Vis movens is Suppose Light piercing and illuminating a transparent Body that Light is not the Power of the Body but of the Sun or some other Luminary The Body is only Passive whereas Power always signifies something Active We can distinctly conceive the Mechanical Properties of Matter and what results from them but as Cogitation cannot be any of those nor an effect of any of them so neither can I any more conceive the Power of Intellection or Ratiocination communicated to certain Systems of Matter than I can conceive Penetration of Dimensions communicated to certain Parts or Systems of Matter or a Power of being in several places at once Both which you know are by some made communicable to a Body If we grant such Arbitrary Powers whereof we have no Idea or Conception to be communicable to Matter there will be no end of imputing Powers to Matter according to every one's Fancy or Credulity Let us take another instance about Occult qualities suppose one say That certain Stones which he knows have an attractive or expulsive Power at a Thousand Miles distance without any contact or pressure mediate or immediate upon the Bodies they attract or expel we must take the liberty to disbelieve or dissent from this Vertuoso as asserting a thing unconceivable to our Faculties For if we do not bound our Philosophy by some Rules and give some Reason or Ground for what we affirm or deny we do but ramble in a Wilderness without Rule or Compass and what we call Science is nothing but Conceit and imaginary Suppositions As to the state of that Question How far Cogitation is communicable to Matter We allow that a Spirit may act and Cogitate in Matter and be so united to some Systems of it that there may be a reciprocation of Actions and Passions betwixt them according to the Laws of their Union But still all these Cogitations are the Powers of the Spirit not of the Matter Suppose in Voluntary Motion which proceeds from the Will If that Will may be the Power of Matter then it may have the Power of Motion or of the Determination of Motion And it seems to me an easier Supposition to make a Vis movens communicable to Matter which I think cannot be allow'd than a Vis cogitans If they both be the Powers of Matter Innate or Superadded God and Matter are the whole of the Universe without particular Spirits or Spiritual Substances permanent and distinct in their Individuation And this under favour I cannot but think is the Mystery aim'd at all along but conceal'd from us Nor do I find any easier Key to decypher this Philosophy and to make it consistent one part with another than to take that Supposition That God and Matter are the whole of the Vniverse as a general Ground of it And especially of those Parts that I have had occasion to reflect upon or such others as depend upon them If I have mistaken your sence in this 'T is owing either to my want of Discernment and Penetration or to your Reservedness and Ambiguity of Expression But however you may ease us in either case by declaring frankly what your Sentiments are as to this grand Point Which if you please to do as I know the Opinion is not new or unheard of before a known Sect of the Jews and another of the Arabians besides some Greeks and Romans having been noted for it So I shall not load it with Odium but only examine it fairly according to the best Light I have for a further Discovery or Confirmation of the Truth ' This Notion that One Infinite Mind and Matter make up the Universe feems to me I say the common Centre wherein the great Lines of your Discourse meet and terminate And this same Notion I take to be the Root of Philosophical Deism properly so call'd for I do not oppose it here to Christianity or Reveal'd Religion which as it springs up spreads it self into several Branches You disown and very well refute the Materialist who would have but one single Substance in the World namely Matter But as to the Philosophical Deists who are more considerable and moderate holding two Principles Matter and universal Mind I do not find that your Notions do at all disagree with that Hypothesis Nay if I be not mistaken this is the common source from whence they rise or the common Receptacle into which they run Let us compare them a little if you please to observe their Agreement or Disagreement The grand Principle of that Deism we speak of I conceive is this There 's one Infinite universal Spirit that actuates Matter always and according to the different dispositions and Systems of Matter it exercises different Operations Rational Sensitive or Vegetative So as these are not the Powers or Operations of particular and individual Spirits distinct from the Universal but the several Influences and Effects of the universal Spirit as the different Compositions and Modifications of Matter will permit This Doctrine Virgil is thought to have express'd and makes Anchises among the Dead to deliver it as an Arcanum to his Son Aeneas in these words Principio caelum ac terras camposque liquentes Aeneid 6. Lucentemque globum Lunae Titaniaque astra Spiritus intus alit totamque infusa per artus Mens agitat molem magno se corpore miscet Inde Hominum pecudumque genus Vitaeque volantûm Et quae marmoreo â—ert
Passions and vitious Inclinations Though they have not only the Terrors of another Life to keep them in awe and order but see before their eyes Gaols Gibbets Irons Whips Racks and Torturing Engines Examples also of miserable Creatures suffering actually for those very Crimes If all these united Forces and Restraints cannot keep them from extravagant Evils can we think it strange that the single Principle of Natural Conscience should be suppress'd or suffocated by the Stupidity or Vices incident to Humane Nature In your next Section you call for a List of the Laws or Principles §. 14. of Conscience And so the Papists do for a Catalogue of Fundamentals And it would be easie to give them one if there was but one Fundamental as a certain late Author supposes As to the Dictates or Principles of Natural Conscience call them Laws of Nature or what you please we say in general that they are for the distinction of Moral Good and Evil But the Cases are innumerable as in other Cases of Conscience wherein there may be occasion for their Exercise The general Rule is Appeal with Sincerity to your Conscience for your Direction If that be obscur'd perverted or sear'd we cannot help it So your great Topicks or Demands of Universal Consent §. 11. Universal Practice Invincible Evidence are not to be found in this miscellaneous World and under all the corruptions of Humane Nature These Principles of Conscience are Seeds as we said before that may die or may thrive and spring more or less according to the Soil they are set in and according to the care and culture that is had of them This minds me of your Dilemma in a following Section which §. 20. you propose as very powerful or conclusive in these words But concerning Innate Principles I desire those Men to say whether they can or cannot by Education and Custom be blurr'd and blotted out If they can we must find them clearest and most perspicuous nearest the fountain in Children and illiterate People who have receiv'd least impression from foreign Opinions Let them take which side they please they will certainly find it inconsistent with visible Matter of Fact and daily Observation The Close you hear is in an high Tone But for trial of this Argument let us use the same method here which we did before And as then we put Christianity in the room of Innate Principles so put now in their place the Power and Principle of Reasoning So the Sentence will run thus But concerning this Power or Principle of Reasoning I desire these Men to say whether it can or cannot by Education and Custom or contrary Principles for that we must take in if we speak of Natural Conscience be blurr'd or blotted out If they cannot says he they must be alike in all Men. If they can they must be clearest in Children before they are corrupted We say neither of these will follow These Powers may be weak in Children and may be blurr'd or blotted in several Persons and yet be Natural Principles as we see it is in the Principle of Reason or Reasoning All Men will distinguish betwixt a Power and the Actual and Prevailing Exercise of that Power which may be hindred by various Circumstances and tho' Natural to Rational Creatures may be weak in some and ineffectual in others by contrary Principles or other Impediments I see this word Innate is still a Stumbling-stone And we must ask again whether you allow any Powers to be Innate to Mankind We say thos◠foremention'd Powers are Innate but the Exercise of them more or less is Conditional and depends upon the Disposition of the Body Culture and other Circumstances Thus much I have said in defence of Natural Conscience and Natural Religion I must now ask leave to reflect upon a Passage in my last Letter I there told you That I writ as a private Person without conference or confederacy with any other any more than I suppose you to do But I told you also That I could not blame any other whosoever they are or may be that desire such Principles of Humane Understanding as may give them good Proofs and Security against such a System as this Cogitant Matter a Mortal Soul a Manichaean God or a God without Moral Attributes and an Arbitrary Law of Good and Evil. As to the Arbitrary Law of Good and Evil I gave you my Thoughts against it in that Letter And what is now said about Natural Conscience tends to the same effect As to a Manichaean God if he have no Moral Attributes we cannot tell from your Idea of him but he may prove so Then for the Immortality of the Soul you seem now to have declar'd your self uncertain of it without Revelation Lastly for Cogitant Matter this you propose as a Problem which you are unable or unwilling to decide I do not willingly dispute about what is Possible or Impossible to God for we cannot comprehend an Infinite Nature but rather what is Conceivable or Unconceivable to us And I will not assert any thing Possible that is Unconceivable unless I have positive Assurance Divine or Humane that it is Possible Now you bring no positive Evidence of this Possibility of Cogitation in Matter and I think it unconceivable according to our Faculties and Conceptions that Matter should be capable of Cogitation as a power of Matter either Innate or Impress'd My Reasons are these That Unity we find in our Perceptions is such an Unity as in my judgment is incompetent to Matter by reason of the Division or Distinction of its Parts All our Perceptions whether of Sense Passions Reason or any other Faculty are carried to one Common Percipient or one common Conscious Principle For we compare them all one with another and censure them all which cannot be done without one Common Judge or Percipient Pray then tell us what part of the Body is that which you make the Common Percipient Or if that be too much tell us how any one part of the Body may or can be so If you say they are many then let us know how they conferr Notions or tell one another what they have perceiv'd in their several Districts Still they must come however to one Common Percipient either by Conference or at the first Perception and you are oblig'd to assign this part of the Body that we may examine whether it be capable of such a Function or no. I know it hath been attempted by some Persons but not so if I understand them right as to make that Corporeal part the Percipient but the Soul exercising her Functions there But if the Body be Cogitant some one part must be the Grand Cogitant or Common Percipient Now seeing this Percipient what or wheresoever it is consists of many Parts or Particles it is obnoxious to the same Exceptions we made before and is still upon the same grounds incapable of performing that function In one part of your Essay
you seem to have ratified this Pag. 359. §. 17. Argument and apply it to Motion You say in a System of Matter 'T is impossible that any one Particle should either know its own or the Motion of any other Particle or the whole know the Motion of every particular Put Cogitation now in the place of Motion and the same Argumentation holds good As thus 'T is impossible that any one part or particle should know the Cogitations of any other Parts or Particles or the whole know the Cogitations of every particular Therefore there must be some other Common Percipient that is not material both for the Regulation of the Motions of the Body and for the recollecting and judging of the several different Perceptions that come to the Soul I may further add That not only the different Perceptions that come to the Soul from different Parts and Motions of the Body but also the different Operations of the Mind or Understanding Simple Apprehension Judgment Ratiocination must all lie under the Prospect Intuition and Correction of some one Common Principle and that must be a Principle of such a perfect unity and simplicity as the Body any part of the Body or any particle of Matter is not capable of And as Matter is not capable of the Operations of the Understanding so far as we can judge so neither is it capable of the Operations of the Will 'T were an odd thing to fansie that a piece of Matter should have Free Will and an absolute Power like a little Emperor on his Throne to command as his Slaves about him all other Parts of Matter Say to one come and he cometh to another Go and he goeth and to a third Do this and he doeth it Yet such a Liberty of Will and such a Dominion we experience in our Soul namely a Power of commanding or countermanding her own Thoughts and the Motions of the Body Now suppose this Power transferr'd to Matter A Power first to determine its own Motions and then to determine its supposed Cogitations As to the motions of Matter The general Rule is that it moves always in a straight Line till it be determin'd otherwise by some external Agent or impulse But if it have a Power of determining its own Motions it may move in a Curve line or any sort of Curve of its own accord without any external Determination If this be admitted all our rules in Philosophy or Mechanicks are in vain and we must assert things whereof we have no Idea or Conception And what is said of Motion may also be said of Figure or Situation A Globe may change it self into a Cube or a Cube into a Pyramid or any other figure by its own Free Will For we find the Soul hath that Power of changing the Conformation of the Eye for instance or of the Hand or other Parts But if you say That Power indeed is not granted to all Matter but to certain Systems of Matter still seeing those Systems are compos'd of common Matter we must judge their Powers to be the same with those of common Matter till the contrary be made out by Positive Evidence However you must fix this Self-moving Faculty to some one part of that System for every part hath not that Power and Free Will upon any Supposition and when you have assign'd that Divine Self-moving Part or Particle of the Body we shall examine the Powers and Capacities of it Thus much concerning the capacity of Free Will in matter with respect to Motion As to our Cogitations which have been partly spoken of before we find that the Determination of them lies under the command of Free Will in a great measure we turn our Thoughts from one Object to another we recall past Thoughts and retrieve lost or half-lost Notices And we consider and deliberate about our Actions which is best and then make our choice Upon these accounts there must be a common Percipient and a common Volent in Conjunction for these must communicate and be in one and the same Subject What then is said before to prove that no Part of the Body is capable of being the common Percipient is now strengthen'd when we add Volition to all the other Operations it must be conscious of For the more the direct Operations are that must be united in one and the same Subject and the more reflex Operations are superadded upon those direct still under the Cognizance and Dijudication of the same Principle the greater unity and simplicity is requir'd in that Principle or the Grand Cogitant that performs them all and receives them all without confusion And you say Pag. 359. §. 16. your self Unthinking Particles of Matter howsoever put together can have nothing thereby added to them but a new relation of Position which 't is impossible should give Thought and Knowledge to them Upon this it may be said If being put together in a System add nothing new but a new Position then as it does not add Thought and Knowledge so neither does it add a new capacity of Thought or Knowledge But enough hath been said concerning the Incapacities of Matter whether in or out of a System to perform the Functions of a Spirit I will only add this as to Free Will If Matter be capable of it If it can deliberate consult chuse or refuse then Matter is capable of Vertue and Vice Duty and Religion Merit and Demerit and also of Punishments and Rewards Which Hypothesis about the Powers of Matter as to the Will would pervert all our rules in Moral Philosophy as the former about the Understanding all in Natural Neither do I see a Capacity in any Part of the Body for Memory or Remembrance especially as to some Idea's Take what part you please to be Cogitant and Reminiscent I suppose 't will be some part in the Brain all our new acquir'd Idea's must work some change in that Part and leave some Marks there for a foundation of Memory But we have some Idea's that have no Corporeal Marks in the Brain as those of Relations Proportions universal and abstract Notions Yet of these and such like we have both Perception and Memory And as to those Objects which leave some Impressions upon the Brain 't is still unconceivable how those Impressions whatsoever they are should be fixt and continue so long as our Memory does in a piece of fluxile Matter that wasts spends and changes day after day And yet this is not all that is in Memory for there is a Relative Sense besides whereby we perceive that we had formerly perceiv'd the same thing Which reduplication of the Act and relative Perception the Brain bears no part in nor hath it any Mark there but must be the Action of another Substance distinct from it and from all Matter To these Reflections upon the Nature of our Faculties and the Powers of Matter It would not be fair nor satisfactory to give us a short Answer