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A61523 The bishop of Worcester's answer to Mr. Locke's second letter wherein his notion of ideas is prov'd to be inconsistent with itself, and with the articles of the Christian faith. Stillingfleet, Edward, 1635-1699. 1698 (1698) Wing S5558; ESTC R3400 77,917 185

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and why not Certainty as well as Assurance I know no reason but that you have appropriated Certainty to the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas in any Proposition and now you find this will not hold as to Articles of Faith and therefore you will allow no Certainty of Faith which I think is not for the Advantage of your Cause But you go on and tell us That if this Way of Certainty by Ideas doth not hold yet it cannot affect Matters of Faith which stand immoveable upon other Grounds Faith in your own words stands still upon its own Basis and every Article of it has just the same unmoved Foundation and the very same Credibility that it had before This will appear to be an extraordinary Answer when we have throughly examin'd it Here we see Faith is taken not with respect to the general Grounds of Certainty but to the particular Articles of Faith i. e. the Propositions contained in that Revelation which we embrace on the Account of its Divine Authority now these Propositions are of several Kinds 1. Some that are more clearly expressed therein but such as might be attained to by the Light of Reason without Revelation And such are the fundamental Principles of natural Religion viz. The Being of God and Providence and the Rewards and Punishments of a future State These Mankind may attain to a Certainty in without Revelation or else there can be no such thing as natural Religion in the World but these things are more fully and plainly revealed in the Scriptures Let us now suppose a Person by natural Reason to attain to a Certainty as to the Being of God and Immortality of the Soul and he proceeds upon your general Grounds of Certainty from the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas and so from the Ideas of God and the Soul he is made certain of those two Points before mention'd But let us again suppose that such a Person upon a farther Examination of your Method of Proceeding finds that the Way of Ideas in these Cases will not do for no Idea proves the Existence of the thing without it self no more than the Picture of a Man proves his Being or the Visions of a Dream make a true History which are your own Expressions And for the Soul he cannot be certain but that Matter may think as you affirm and then what becomes of the Soul's Immateriality and consequently Immortality from its Operations But for all this say you his Assurance of Faith remains firm on its own Basis. Now I appeal to any Man of Sense whether the finding the Uncertainty of his own Principles which he went upon in Point of Reason doth not weaken the Credibility of these fundamental Articles when they are consider'd purely as Matters of Faith For before there was a natural Credibility in them on the Account of Reason but by going on wrong Grounds of Certainty all that is lost and instead of being certain he is more doubtfull than ever And if the Evidence of Faith falls so much short of that of Reason it must needs have less Effect upon Mens Minds when the subserviency of Reason is taken away as it must be when the Grounds of Certainty by Reason are vanished Is it at all probable that he who finds his Reason deceive him in such Fundamental Points should have his Faith stand firm and unmoveable on the account of Revelation For in Matters of Revelation there must be some Antecedent Principles supposed before we can believe any thing on the Account of it And the first is that there is a God but this was the very thing he found himself at a loss in by his way of Certainty by Ideas and how can his Faith stand firm as to Divine Revelation when he is made Uncertain by his own Way whether there be a God or no Besides to suppose Divine Revelation we must be certain that there is a Principle above Matter and Motion in the World but here we find that upon the Principles of Certainty by Ideas he cannot be certain of this because he doth not know but Matter may think and consequently all Revelation may be nothing but the Effects of an Exalted Fancy or the Heats of a disordered Imagination as Spinoza affirmed Again before there can be any such thing as Assurance of Faith upon Divine Revelation there must be a Certainty as to Sense and Tradition for there can be no Revelation pretended now without immediate Inspiration and the Basis of our Faith is a Revelation contained in an Ancient Book whereof the Parts were delivered at distant Times but conveyed down to us by an Universal Tradition But now what if your Grounds of Certainty can give us no Assurance as to these things I do not mean that they cannot demonstrate Matters of Fact which it were most unreasonable to expect but that these Grounds of Certainty make all things uncertain for I think I have proved that this way of Ideas cannot give a satisfactory Account as to the Existence of the plainest Objects of Sense because Reason cannot perceive the Connexion between the Objects and the Ideas How then can we arrive to any Certainty in perceiving those Objects by their Ideas And I was in the right when I said this Way tended to Scepticism and I do not think that consistent with the Assurance of Faith But this is an Imputation you take very ill and say that I have brought no Argument for it but only that my great Prejudice against this Way of Certainty is that it leads to Scepticism Sceptism is the New Mill'd Word This is very strange when that Expression is only the Introduction to the Arguments from p. 125 to 132 to which no Answer at all is given And so I leave it There are other Propositions or Articles of Faith which wholly depend on the Sense of Words contained in the Scripture and we are to enquire whether the Assurance of Faith as you call it be consistent with the overthrowing your Grounds of Certainty i. e. whether those who embrace the Articles of Faith in the Way of Ideas can retain their Certainty of those Articles when these Ideas are quitted And this alone will be a plain Demonstration in the Case that the Certainty of Faith cannot stand with such Men if this way of Certainty by Ideas be destroyed And by this which I am now to make out let any one judge how true your Words are like to prove when you say Let the Grounds of Knowledge or Certainty be resolved into what they please it touches not your Faith the Foundation of that stands as sure as before and cannot be at all shaken by it Of this we shall judge by some important Articles of Christian Faith according to your Ideas The first shall be that of the Resurrection of the Dead The Reason of believing the Resurrection of the same Body upon your Grounds is from the Idea of Identity which I take to
Words are to be understood of the Substance of that Body to which the Soul was united and not to those Individual Particles So St. Paul For we must all appear before the Iudgment Seat of Christ that every one may receive the things done in his body according to that he hath done whether it be good or bad Can these words be understood of any other Material Substance but that Body in which these things were done How could it be said if any other Substance be joyned to the Soul at the Resurrection as its Body that they were the things done in or by the Body Curcellaeus his Copy reads it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Complutensian 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and several of the Fathers so took it either way it must relate to that which was the real Body in which the Person lived and acted whether Good or Evil. And St. Paul's Dispute about the manner of raising the Body might soon have been ended if there were no necessity of the same Body If there be no Resurrection of the Dead then is not Christ raised It seems then other Bodies are to be raised as his was and can there be any doubt whether his Body were the same material Substance which was united to his Soul before And the Apostle lays so much weight upon it that he saith if Christ be not raised your Faith is vain doth he mean if there were not the same personal Identity as to the Soul of Christ and the Matter united to it after the Resurrection That cannot be his meaning for then there would have been no necessity of Christs own Body being raised which he asserts and proves by undoubted Witnesses Were they Witnesses only of some material Substance then united to his Soul He saith He was seen of five hundred Brethren at once What He was this It was Christ that died Yes the Person of Christ but personal Identity doth not require the same Substance but the same Consciousness and so if Christ were conscious to himself in another Substance there was no necessity of the same Body And so truly from the seeing the Person of Christ they could not prove it was the same Individual Body But Thomas said Except I shall see in his hands the print of the Nails and put my Finger into the print of the Nails and thrust my Hand into his side I will not believe The doing whereof convinced him it was the same Individual Body but there will be no such proof at the great Day And there is no Reason there should since the Resurrection of Christ was a sufficient proof of God's Power to raise the Dead and the Dissimilitude of Circumstances can be no Argument against it since the Power and Wisdom of God are concerned in it But the Apostle insists upon the Resurrection of Christ not meerly as an Argument of the Possibility of ours but of the Certainty of it because he rose as the first Fruits Christ the first Fruits afterwards they that are Christs at his coming St. Paul was aware of the Objections in Mens Minds about the Resurrection of the same Body and it is of great Consequence as to this Article to shew upon what Grounds he proceeds But some Man will say How are the Dead raised up and with what Body do they come First he shews that the seminal Parts of Plants are wonderfully improved by the ordinary Providence of God in the manner of their Vegetation They sow bare Grain of Wheat or of some other Grain but God giveth it a Body as it hath pleased him and to every Seed his own Body Here is an Identity of the Material Substance supposed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that proper Body which belongs to it every Seed having that Body in little which is afterwards so much inlarged and in Grain the Seed is corrupted before its Germination but it hath its proper Organical Parts which make it the same Body with that which it grows up to For although Grain be not divided into Lobes as other Seeds are yet it hath been found by the most Accurate Observations that upon separating the Membranes these Seminal Parts are discerned in them which afterwards grow up to that Body which we call Corn. St. Paul indeed saith that we sow not that Body that shall be but he speaks not of the Identity but the Perfection of it And although there be such a difference from the Grain it self when it comes up to be perfect Corn with Root Stalk Blade and Ear that it may be said to outward Appearance not to be the same Body yet with regard to the Seminal and Organical Parts it is as much the same as a Man grown up is the same with the Embryo in the Womb. And although many Arguments may be used to prove that a Man is not the same because Life which depends upon the course of the Blood and the manner of Respiration and Nutrition is so different in both states yet that Man would be thought Ridiculous that should seriously affirm that it was not the same Man And you grant that the variation of great parcels of Matter in Plants alters not the Identity and that the Organization of the Parts in one coherent Body partaking of one common Life makes the Identity of a Plant so that in things capable of any sort of Life the Identity is consistent with a continued succession of Parts and so the Wheat grown up is the same Body with the Grain that was sown And thus the Alteration of the Parts of the Body at the Resurrection is consistent with its Identity if its Organization and Life be the same and this is a Real Identity of the Body which depends not upon Consciousness From whence it follows that to make the same Body no more is required but restoring Life to the Organized Parts of it And you grant likewise That the Identity of the same Man consists in a Participation of the same continued Life by constantly fleeting Particles of Matter in Succession vitally united to the same Organized Body So that there is no difficulty as to the sameness of the Body if Life were continued and if by Divine Power Life be restored to that Material Substance which was before united by a Re-union of the Soul to it there is no Reason to deny the Identity of the Body Not from the Consciousness of the Soul but from that Life which is the Result of the Union of Soul and Body But St. Paul still supposes that it must be that Material Substance to which the Soul was before united For saith he It is sown in Corruption it is raised in Incorruption It is sown in Dishonour it is raised in Glory It is sown in Weakness it is raised in Power It is sown a Natural Body it is raised a Spiritual Body Can such a Material Substance which was never united to the Body be said to be
own Mind in your former Letter that must guide us in your Notion of Nature and Person where you undertook to explain them For if Nature and Person be abstract and complex Ideas as you say and such are only Acts of the Mind I do not see how it is possible for you to reconcile these Notions with the Articles of the Trinity and Incarnation I do not go about to accuse you of denying these Doctrines I hope you do not But I impute all this Hesitancy and doubting only to your Notions of Ideas which you had been so long forming in your Mind that as it often happens in such Cases one darling favourite Notion proves too hard for some Points of far greater Consequence when they are found inconsistent with it And because you had first fixed your Notion of Ideas and taken much Pains about them you thought all other things were to be entertained as they appear'd consistent with them But you could not but find that the Articles of three Persons and one Nature and two Natures and one Person were not reconcileable with your Ideas of Nature and Person which is that they are complex Ideas which depend upon the Act of the Mind for this were to make the two Natures in Christ to be only two complex Ideas For if Nature as you say be a Collection of several Ideas combined into one complex abstract Idea then two Natures can be nothing else but two such Collections or two abstracted and complex Ideas It may be said that when you make Nature an abstracted and complex Idea you speak of a specifick Idea but the Humane Nature in Christ was a particular Substance and this you assert to be a real thing and not to depend on the Act of the Mind But this doth not clear the Matter For in your former Letter you said that all the Ideas we have of particular distinct Substances are nothing but several Combinations of simple Ideas which in Corporeal Substances are sensible Qualities in Incorporeal are Operations of the Mind The utmost then which the Idea of Humane Nature in Christ comes to is that there were in him the sensible Qualities and Intellectual Operations of a Man with an unknown Substance to support them which belongs not to the simple Ideas but is supposed by them This is all I can make of your way of Ideas and so the Incarnation of Christ is the assuming the sensible Qualities and intellectual Operations of a Man to which a Substratum doth belong but is no Part of the simple Ideas So that we can have no Idea at all of the Humane Nature of Christ but only an Inference that since those are but Accidents there must be a Substratum to support them and consequently there was a particular Substance in him made up of Mind and Body But if this had come in the Way of Ideas yet it cannot make out the Humane Nature of Christ. For if it were in him no otherwise than in other Men then the Mystery of the Incarnation is quite gone and Christ is to be consider'd but like other Men which doth not answer to what the Scripture saith of the Word 's being made Flesh and that God was manifest in the Flesh. There must be therefore something beyond the meer Humane Nature in him and either it must be only some Divine Operation upon and with it and that is no Substance or if it be a Substance it must either cohabit with it or else be united to it If it only co-habits then there are two Persons dwelling together in one Body and the Actions of one cannot be attributed to the other If there be a real Union between them so as the Acts belong to one Person then there must be such a Manner of Existence in the Humane Nature of Christ which is different from it in other Persons For in all others the Acts belong to the Humane Person but if it were so in Christ then the Divine Acts of Christ must flow from the Humane Nature as the Principle of them which is to confound the Divine and Humane Nature and Operations together If they come from the Divine Person then the Humane Nature must have another kind of Subsistence than it hath in others or else there must be two Persons and Person being as you say a Forensick Term there must be two different Capacities of Rewards and Punishments which is so absurd an Opinion as I think no one will assert If there be then but one Person and two Natures how can you possibly reconcile this to your Way of Ideas Person say you in it self signifies nothing but as soon as the common use of any Language has appropriated it to any Idea then that is the true Idea of a Person i. e. Men may call a Person what they please for there is nothing but common use required to it They may call a Horse or a Tree or a Stone a Person if they think fit but since the common use of Language hath appropriated it to an Intelligent Being that is a Person And so you tell us That Person stands for a Thinking Intelligent Being that hath Reason and Reflection and can consider it self as it self the same thinking Being in different times and place How comes Person to stand for this and nothing else From whence comes Self-consciousness in different times and places to make up this Idea of a Person Whether it be true or false I am not now to enquire but how it comes into this Idea of a Person Hath the common use of our Language appropriated it to this Sense If not this seems to be a meer Arbitrary Idea and may as well be denied as affirmed And what a fine pass are we come to in the Way of Ideas if a meer Arbitrary Idea must be taken into the only true Method of Certainty But of that afterwards We now proceed in the Way of Ideas as you give it us But if this be the true Idea of a Person then there can be no Union of two Natures in one Person For if an Intelligent Conscious Being be the Idea of a Person and the Divine and Human Nature be Intelligent Conscious Beings then the Doctrine of the Union of two Natures and one Person is quite sunk for here must be two Persons in this Way of Ideas Again if this be the Idea of a Person then where there are three Persons there must be three distinct Intelligent Beings and so there cannot be three Persons in the same individual Essence And thus both these Doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation are past recovery gone if this Way of Ideas hold So great a difference there is between forming Ideas first and then judging of Revelation by them and the believing of Revelation on its proper Grounds and interpreting the Sense of it by the due Measures of Reason You may pretend what you please that you hold the Assurance of Faith and the Certainty by
Ideas to go upon very different Grounds but when a Proposition is offered you out of Scripture to be believed and you doubt about the Sense of it Is not Recourse to be made to your Ideas As in the present Case whether there can be three Persons in one Nature or two Natures and one Person what Resolution can you come to upon your Principles but in the Way of Ideas You may possibly say That where Ideas are clear and distinct there you are to judge of Revelation by them and this is what you assert in your Essay That in Propositions whose Certainty is built on clear and perfect Ideas and evident Deductions of Reason there no Proposition can be received for Divine Revelation which contradicts them from hence you conclude it impossible for the same Body to be in two Places at once And yet there is a Person who hath lately told the World that there is one certain secret Way how by Divine Power the same Body but not the same Person may be in very distant Places at once but he is advised to keep it up as a Secret which was good friendly Advice But till it be discovered there is no judging of it Here I observe that you require clear and distinct Ideas and yet we find if a Man's Word may be taken these clear and distinct Ideas do not prove the thing impossible But what is to be said when the Ideas are not clear and distinct You say Your Method of Certainty is by the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas where they are not in all their Parts perfectly clear and distinct And this is your Secret about Certainty which I think had been better kept up too For I pray in the Case now before us Are your Ideas of Nature and Person clear and distinct or not if they are then it is plain from your own Doctrine that if Revelation be pretended you are to reject it How then comes the Certainty of Faith to be preserved firm and immoveable although the Grounds of Certainty be disputed But suppose they are not clear and distinct What is to be done in a Matter of Revelation contrary to your Ideas Are you to submit to the Revelation or not Whatever God hath Revealed is most certainly true no doubt can be made of it This is the proper Object of Faith but whether it be a Divine Revelation or no you say Reason must judge Yes Reason proceeding upon clear and distinct Ideas But suppose you have Ideas sufficient for Certainty in your Way but not clear and distinct what is to be done then In things that are above Reason you say when they are Revealed they are proper Matters of Faith What is here being above Reason Either above the Discovery of Reason as the Fall of Angels the Resurrection of the Body c. and about these you say Reason hath nothing to do What not if there be an Idea of Identity as to the Body Or such as are above the Comprehension of Reason when discovered And they are either such as we have no Natural Ideas of and then you grant that they are pure Matters of Faith or they are such as you have certain Ideas of but not clear and distinct Now here lies the pinching Difficulty as to your Way of Ideas You say indeed That Revelation must carry it against meer Probabilities to the contrary because the Mind not being certain of the Truth of that it doth not evidently know but is only probably convinced of is bound to give up its Assent to such a Testimony which it is satisfied comes from one who cannot err and will not deceive I pray observe your own Words you here positively say That the Mind not being certain of the Truth of that it doth not evidently know So that it is plain here that you place Certainty only in Evident Knowledge or in clear and distinct Ideas and yet your great Complaint of Me was that I charged this upon you and now I find it in your own Words which I observed before But let us allow you all you desire viz. That there may be Certainty by Ideas where they are not clear and distinct and let us now suppose that you are to judge of a Proposition delivered as a Matter of Faith where you have a Certainty by Reason from your Ideas such as they are Can you assent to this as a Matter of Faith when you are already certain by your Ideas of the contrary How is this possible Can you believe that to be true which you are certain is not true Suppose it be that there are two Natures in one Person the Question is Whether you can Assent to this as a Matter of Faith If you had said there had been only Probabilities on the other side I grant that you then say Revelation is to prevail but when you say you have Certainty by Ideas to the contrary I do not see how it is possible for you to Assent to a Matter of Faith as true when you are certain from your Ideas that it is not true For how can you Believe against Certainty The Evidence is not so great as when the Ideas are clear and distinct but the Bar against Assent is as strong because the Mind is actually determined by Certainty And so your Notion of Certainty by Ideas must overthrow the Credibility of a Matter of Faith in all such Propositions which are offered to be believed on the account of Divine Revelation I shall now summ up the Force of what I have said about this Matter Your Answer is That your Method of Certainty by Ideas shakes not at all nor in the least concerns the Assurance of Faith Against this I have pleaded 1. That your Method of Certainty shakes the Belief of Revelation in general 2. That it shakes the Belief of Particular Propositions or Articles of Faith which depend upon the Sense of Words contained in Scripture Because you do not say that we are to believe all that we find there expressed but in case we have any clear and distinct Ideas which limit the Sense another way than the words seem to carry it we are to judge that to be the true Sense But in case our Ideas are not clear and distinct yet you affirm as your proper Doctrine That we may come to Certainty by Ideas although not in all Respects perfectly clear and distinct From whence I infer That where you have attained to a Certainty by your imperfect Ideas you must judge of a Matter of Faith by those Ideas and consequently if the Union of two Natures and one Person or three Persons in one Nature be repugnant to your Ideas as I have shewed that they are you must by virtue of your own Principles reject these from being Matters of Faith And thus I hope I have proved what I undertook viz. That your Notion of Certainty by Ideas is inconsistent with these Articles of the Christian Faith But you have this