A Friend of mine inclin'd to the Sentiments which I labour to refute is wont to insist much on the glorious saying That a good Man loves Virtue for its own sake When I press him to explain clearly what he means he is wont to enlarge elegantly and well upon the agreableness and fitness of Virtue for instance of Justice Charity and Mercy and thus far he is very right Justice Charity and Mercy are the most agreable and fit things in the World for a rational Man to practise But now let me ask What is it which makes these Virtues so agreable to human Nature and so fit to be practis'd by rational Man or I am strangely mistaken or all that can be assign'd is the natural Tendency which they have to benefit Mankind and to establish the Foundations of Society firm and sure If so then I must observe that every good Man who loves Virtue for its own sake i. e. for its agreableness to human Nature i. e. for its tendency to benefit Mankind and establish the Foundations of Society he loves Virtue mercenarily for he himself is a Member of the Society and his private Benefit is included in that of the publick But my Friend tells me and I believe him that in Acts of Justice which he always in Acts of Charity and Mercy which he frequently performs he has no regard to any advantage upon those accounts likely to accrue to him either in this present or a future State I answer that to a Man in easy Circumstances the practice of these Virtues yields an immediate and a very great Pleasure and they may be practis'd by an habitual good Man such as I reckon my Friend without any regard had to the future Advantage and farther Pleasure which may accompany them An habitual good Man may be so taken up with the present Satisfaction of virtuous Deeds as that he shall be frequent in the practice of them without giving himself time to consider whether he may not reasonably hope for a future Compensation But then it ought to be taken notice of that a great part perhaps much the greatest part of Virtue consists in doing good at the price of suffering Evil and few very few in my poor opinion would practise Virtue under severe present Discouragements if they had no Hope beyond this Life I am not surpriz'd to read in antient Story that Men of the fairest Fame as soon as advanc'd under some Princes have chang'd their Manners and lost their Reputation For when there 's no keeping an honest Reputation and a gainful Post of Honour both it must be Hope in a future State or nothing that can perswade them to take care of the former and let the latter go I confess it is easy for a Man to be good in easy Circumstances to be just when he is not very poor to be charitable when he has more than a Competence to be merciful when he is likely to gain Friends and Fame by it but he that is content that Virtue should never be practis'd but in such Cases is content that the World should be much more wicked than it is and every good Man more uneasy and more unable to do the Good to which he is inclin'd In this place I think it proper to transcribe some Lines from Bishop Taylor in his Ductor Dub. not that I hope to gain my Point by his Authority tho I can't but be pleas'd to find so wise a Man in my Sentiments yet let the Reader only weigh what is said It is impossible a Man should do great things or suffer nobly without consideration of a Reward and since much of Virtue consists in suffering evil things Virtue it self is not a Happiness but the way to one He does a thing like a Fool that does it for no end and if he does not choose a good one he is worse and Virtue it self would in many Instances be unreasonable if for no material Consideration we should undertake her Drudgery I omit his Quotation from St. Austin and give his next words with some little addition Sensual Pleasures those sensual Pleasures which trespass on the Rights of others are while they can be made to consist with the safety of our Persons and the health of our Bodies highly eligible and all difficult Virtue to be avoided if in this Life only we have hope The Author I have quoted assigns two Causes of Amability and says there are no more viz. Perfection and Usefulness I think there is but one Cause of Amability and that is Usefulness for Perfections which do not relate to me I may admire but nothing can attract my Love and prompt my Desires but that which I know to be useful to me at present or hope to find so hereafter The Reason why a thinking Person loves and desires to practise Virtue is because he tastes Pleasure now or expects it hereafter Perhaps the present Pleasure may effectually recommend some easier Instances of Virtue in happy and blessed times to the practice of well-dispos'd Men but in most Cases and to the Many Virtue will ever need to be recommended by the reasonable Hopes of a better Portion in a future State Let me put a Case which I fancy does sometimes tho but rarely happen A married Man loves his Wife first for the sake of her Friends or her Fortune or her agreable Features or his own solemn Vow but afterwards he loves her for her own sake finding her to be good-natur'd and fruitful obedient and wise Now meaning no more than that he admires these great Perfections that is not in strict speaking loving them or the Wife because she possesses them then only the Husband may be properly said to love these amiable Perfections and his Wife who is Mistress of them when he considers that he is delighted and pleased with the Perfections of his Wife and made happy by her In short let us speak strictly and properly and then we must affirm that Love is Relative I may admire what I am never like to be the better for but what I love I love because I find great Satisfaction in it at present or hope to do so hereafter The present Pleasures of Virtue are not sufficient to recommend it so much as but a tolerable Condition of the World does necessarily require and if we endeavour to disprove the reasonableness of future Hopes we open a Flood-gate to a world of Iniquity more than abounds at present and trouble our own Enjoyments and Ease as well as the Welfare of the Publick I would be glad to be taught how Men may be perswaded to difficult Virtue for instance to do their Country Service to preserve it or deliver it from Slavery when they are like to ruin themselves and their Families by it Indeed I read of one Codrus who by his own death purchas'd a happy Victory to his People But the Historian says Athens never had another King after him because they never expected another Codrus
infinite Power Wisdom and Goodness The Belief of such a Being he says must of necessity be highly effectual to the creating or farthering of good Affections and to the removing of contrary ones by rendring every thing that is of Virtue more lovely splendid and attractive and every thing that is of Vice more ignominious and deform'd Now the Loveliness of Virtue consists wholly in its Advantageousness Advantageousness of one sort or other or else 't is an empty Phrase mere insignificant Cant. Such as the Advantageousness of Virtue is such and no other is its Loveliness and on the other side answerable to the Disadvantageousness of Vice is its Ignominy and Deformity By the belief of a Being all-intelligent all-seeing of infinite Power Wisdom and Goodness a rational Creature becomes perswaded of a greater Advantageousness in Virtue Disadvantageousness in Vice than he could possibly be perswaded of without it The belief of a Being with the abovementioned Perfections makes Man's future Existence credible for I have already prov'd that all things are not according to a good order if Man shall not exist again I add now if Man's future Existence be necessary to justify God's Wisdom it is not hard to be conceiv'd how the same is as necessary to justify his Goodness For the worldly Prosperity of free Agents who make the worst use of their free Will and the worldly Adversity of free Agents who make right use of it are as unanswerable Arguments against the Goodness as against the Wisdom of God if free Agents must not exist again I need not make words to show how the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God join with his infinite Wisdom and Goodness to ascertain us of our future Existence Now if there be a God who is as our Author allows the word to signify a Being all-intelligent all-seeing of infinite Power Wisdom and Goodness then we shall exist again and after this Life receive Rewards or to speak with them whose nicer Philosophy excepts against that term Rewards we shall become inconceivably happy by our Virtue and unexpressible Losers by our Vice And this Perswasion is evidently powerful to engage Men to the practice of the most difficult Virtue and to restrain them from the most pleasing secret and secure Vice Such a Man as this may have nay using Reflection cannot but have Honesty Faith and Justice of the greatest note and worth cannot but have many generous and good Passions not without a love to Virtue for its own sake But he that has not the Opinion or Belief of an intelligent Principle or God may perhaps be capable of some cheap and easy Virtue such as sutes best with his natural Temper and does not much trouble the Condition of his Affairs but is certainly incapable of that more noble and more difficult Virtue which threatens ruin to his Fortunes or an untimely end to his Life I determine thus because there is in every Creature to use our Author's Phrase a certain Interest or Good which is as an end in that Creature to which God or Nature design'd him That certain Interest or Good to which God or Nature design'd his rational Creature Man Man is bound in duty to pursue to this end if his Passions and Affections are wisely primarily directed it is his duty it is that which he ought to do and for which he ought to be commended If there be any such thing as God or Virtue then there must be a future State this Consequence I have in some measure already prov'd and mean to confirm it further but I will take no advantage of it now If there be any such thing as a future State then it is the Duty and Virtue of a rational Man primarily to direct his Passions and Affections for the securing his Interest in that State because his Interest in that State supposing such a thing is immensly more considerable than his Interest in this but if there be no future State then the certain Interest or Good or chief End of Man is such as his Nature is capable of in this Life and his pursuing that is what he ought to do is his Virtue or else Virtue is but a Name of which no body knows what to make If Man's chief Interest Good or End be in a future State then he ought not cannot dispense with his Care to purchase that for the sake of any Interest of any others If Man's chief Interest Good or End be in this present Life then he ought not cannot dispense with his preferring that before any Interest of any others and thence it will undeniably follow that he is utterly incapable of practising any instance of noble and difficult Virtue which happens to threaten ruin to his Fortunes and an untimely end to his Life But I will search into this matter yet more nicely that I may take from my Adversaries all subtil specious pretence of Reply The chief Interest Good or End of Man in this Life is either corporeal or mental if the Mind be a Principle distinct from Body then this distinction is just and ought to be admitted and may be thus desin'd or describ'd Mental Interest is the Pleasure which the Mind receives by reflecting on its Virtue Corporeal Interest is the Pleasure which the Mind tasts by mediation of the Senses If the Mind is not a Principle distinct from Body then all our Interest in this Life is only Corporeal and all Pleasure no other than bodily Pleasure and then a Man ought to prefer his bodily Pleasure before any Interest of any others because if there be no future Existence bodily Pleasure is his chief Interest Good or End But perhaps some Friends of our Author tho they admit nothing but Body in Nature and esteem Thinking and Arguing to be the effects only of Matter and Motion may yet distinguish as I have done and make the Pleasure which Human Nature is capable of twofold the Pleasure which is tasted by means of the Senses and the Pleasure which is tasted by Reflection Hereupon perhaps they may say that the Pleasure which is tasted by Reflection which they will call too the Pleasure of the Mind is the chief Interest Good or End of Man and then conclude that tho the Pleasure of the Mind which is tasted by Reflection cannot but be prefer'd by a reasonable Man before all other Considerations whatsoever that may happen to come in competition with it yet Corporeal Pleasure the Pleasure which is tasted by mediation of the Senses is a meaner Interest and End which a reasonable Man ought not to pursue before the Interests of Society tho there be no Life after this These Gentlemen and I think our Author accords with them throout his second Book determine that the present mental Satisfaction which good Men receive by reflecting on their virtuous Actions is sufficient to perswade all considering Persons to the practice of Virtue tho there be no Life after this I reply it may be sufficient
to perswade the most considering Persons in most cases but in all cases it is not so I have given some instances I am able to give many more and shall if that be stood upon but thinking it may not by impartial Readers I chuse to argue closely and carry on my Reply That Consideration which is not sufficient to prompt thinking Persons to Virtue in all cases does in effect if there be no other to be offer'd betray the Cause of Virtue for if the necessity of Virtue be not in all cases as well as in some in the most difficult cases as well as in the most common and easy provided for the Cause of Virtue is as good as given up For who shall draw the Line and measure Distances set out the exact Bounds and nicely determine that if Circumstances be so and so discouraging Dangers so and so pressing a good Man need not hazard his Fortunes or his Life to serve his Friend the starving Mobility or the Liberty and Property of the Freeholders of his Country but in all cases one moment less discouraging less pressing and hazardous it becomes him to be resolutely virtuous honest and good 'T is precarious Impertinence for any Man to pretend any thing of this nature for the reasonableness of being true to one's Friend just to all Persons charitable to the Necessitous and bold in the defence of Liberty and Property is not at all alter'd by the different Circumstances of Times Things or Places but remains always one and the same be they more or less discouraging pressing and hazardous without any alteration unless that it greatly becomes a virtuous honest and good Man when his Duty happens to be more difficult and dangerous to exert himself so much the more And to do this he shall never want Motive sufficiently powerful if he be throly convinc'd of the certainty of a future State but if he be not a cheaper easier Virtue shall content him Now to prevent an Objection which I suspect and to take away all ansa of Cavil I own that now and then an eminent Person may in an odd humour and in an unthinking heat venture on a glorious Action that not only looks well but is also highly useful and beneficial to the Publick which may cost him his honourable Station in the Commonwealth the loss of his Fortunes and perhaps of his Life tho he believes no future State but I positively affirm that this can be done by no Man who disbelieves a future State when he acts deliberately and I defy all my Adversaries round together with the Author of the Inquiry and his Favourers to assign a Reason sufficient to prompt a deliberate thinking Man to do it I have discours'd with some of them Men of as singular Learning and of as acute Parts perhaps as any that now live and nothing could I ever hear from them as an Argument for Virtue the future State not being suppos'd but that Virtue was its own present sufficient Reward which as I have shewn holds but in common cases I have also shown to how little purpose they affect the use of that fam'd saying Virtue is its own Reward and to be lov'd for its own sake To love Virtue for its own sake as the brave Heathen Philosophers us'd to speak and to love God for his own sake as we now commonly word it signifies nothing but to love God without low secular Regards to love Virtue when it is discountenanc'd when it is the Enemy of a Man's temporal Ends and Prosperities this he only can constantly do who believes a future State But I am amaz'd to hear our Author expose his own Argumentation as he does in the close of the Passage by me last cited A Man says he who has not the Belief of a God may possibly love Virtue for its own sake as well as for being believ'd advantageous Can any thing deserve to be lov'd for its own sake which is not advantageous If so then our Author will incur this gross Absurdity that a thing may deserve to be lov'd for its own sake which is not at all lovely Certainly this is the oddest distinction that ever was coin'd by a Man of Letters and good Sense which every one that reads our Author 's Inquiry concerning Virtue must grant him to be If Advantageousness be not that which makes Virtue deserve to be lov'd for its own sake then for ought I know Vice may deserve to be lov'd for its own sake in which there is nothing truly advantageous But I leave it to our Author's second thoughts whether he will forgo this Distinction or explain it for my part I know not what to make of it as it lies Just at this moment a Gentleman that knows what Subject I am writing upon and has seen some of my Papers is pleas'd to tell me that I have imitated an absurd Practice of the Papists proving one Doctrine by another that needs proof The Papists says this Gentleman having a gainful Interest in the Doctrine of praying to Saints and thereupon a great inclination to believe it did defend the same when the Protestants objected that the Saints could not hear Prayers by this Invention The Saints understood all things viewing them in the mirror of Divinity or as others are pleas'd to phrase it in speculo Trinitatis in the Looking-glass of the Trinity So I having an inclination to believe a future State and not being able to demonstrate it by direct proof endeavour to make it good by this fetch There must be a future State or there can be no such thing as Virtue Now by the favour of this Gentleman whose singular Learning I highly honour I shall show that there is no manner of similitude between the Practice of the Papists in the Instance before us and mine in managing the Argument I have attempted There might be a similitude perhaps if he would put it thus The Papists prove that Saints ought to be pray'd to because else there 's no such thing as a Mirror of the Divinity or Looking-glass of the Trinity wherein all things are visible to them And I prove the truth of a future State because else there 's no necessity of Virtue But then I desire this Gentleman to consider that both he and I laugh at the Mirror of the Divinity or Speculum Trinitatis as much as at the Doctrine of praying to Saints whereas tho he questions the future State yet we both admit the necessity of Virtue therefore if I show that there is no Argument sufficient to prompt Men to Virtue and restrain them from Vice in the most difficult Times and Places but the Belief of a future State I appeal to all impartial Judges whether I don't gain my point One of my Friends who is as I am fully perswaded that we shall exist again in a more blessed or sad State according as we frame our Spirits and demean our selves in this Life did once let me know that he
had some Meditations in hand whereby he thinks he shall demonstrate the Immortality of the Soul But what he has farther than such moral Demonstration as I have offer'd Demonstration from the generally receiv'd Idea of God and from the Concessions of all Men of Sense who are not such Enemies to Virtue as in some Cases to free Mankind from the Obligation also what he has farther than high Probabilities from Topics Philosophical with regard to which Men of Sense are in Prudence bound to act I cannot conceive and to speak ingenuously I do not think it agreable to the infinite Wisdom which we acknowledg in God to have made the Notions of a future State and the Immortality of the Soul so clear obvious and certain as to put them beyond dispute For where Notions are but high Probabilities or such moral Demonstrations as require Thought and Labour to make out Attention and quitting all Prejudices before they can be admitted there is room for the exercise of Consideration Prudence and Industry But were all bright Demonstration concerning the Notions of future State and the Soul's Immortality the matter is so vastly so immensly momentous that we should be irresistibly carried to secure our chief Interest without reasoning and considering upon it and then our Happiness would be our Fate not the Attainment or Reward of our wise Meditation and virtuous rational Choices If it be agreeable to the infinite Wisdom of God to create a Creature with the Powers of considering thinking and reflecting and to leave him much in the hands of his own Free Will so that he may consider think reflect and act wisely or let it alone then to me it seems necessary that the Notions of future State and Immortality of the Soul should be no clearer nor more obvious nor more certain than they are i. e. but demonstrably certain upon the supposition that all Men are oblig'd to be morally honest in all Times Circumstances and Places and also but highly probable from Philosophical Arguments The Use that I make of this is That I hope my Adversaries will not deny but that all Men are oblig'd to be morally honest in all Times and Circumstances and Places and that it becomes wise Men to consider think and reflect and that where they are not govern'd by the greatest Probabilities there they are not wise and if they can give me a cogent Argument which shall oblige Men to Virtue and restrain them from Vice in all Times Circumstances and Places a future State not being suppos'd I promise to discard it Our Author in the 2 d part of his Book professedly proposes to show what Obligation there is to Virtue and how any one may have reason to embrace Virtue and shun Vice In this part he ingenuously and appositely to this Design expatiates upon many useful Notices which have no small Influence to perswade to Virtue and restrain from Vice but offers at no Reason which comes up so high as to perswade Men to the one and restrain them from the other in those difficult Cases which I have stated Now tho I think that I have sufficiently secur'd my Discourse already from what might be objected out of this Author for his 2 d Book has no new Notions in abatement of what I have advanc'd concerning a future State yet I purpose to look into this second part that I may not seem knowingly to have overlook'd any Obligation to Virtue which might perhaps be thought powerful enough to influence considering Persons in all Times Circumstances and Places without the intervention of a future State P. 83. His Preface in short runs thus To be virtuous is for a rational Creature in the use of good Vnderstanding and Judgment to have the disposition and temper of his Mind sutable and agreeing with the good of his Kind A rational Creature whose Affections are sutable and agreeing to the good of his Kind has also other Affections towards the private Nature or Self-system and in following the first of these the Creature must often contradict and go against the latter it may seem therefore that the pursuing the common Interest or good of his Kind is a hindrance to the attainment of private Good I do here and shall abridg keeping very close to his Phrase not in the least varying his Sense P. 85. Affections to the good of the Publick do often expose to Hardships and Hazards by over-ruling their Opposites the Self-preservative Passions and by necessitating the Creature to Self-denial and as it were Self-desertion Well! the Truth of this we subscribe to but now we want to know what that is setting aside the Notion of a future State which has a force of sound Reason powerful enough to perswade considering Men to cherish their good Affections to the Publick when the doing so exposes them to Hardships and Hazards and forces them to deny themselves and quit their self-preservative Passions which by the way is Self-desertion with a witness Self-desertion without the abatement in that Phrase As it were To solve this Difficulty after some Amusements our Author addresses himself thus P. 90 91. The natural Affections towards the private System or Self may be in a too great and therefore vitious degree they may also be too weak in a degree too low and vitious that way He makes this out by several Instances but I need not trouble my self with his Instances for I admit the Notion Natural Affections to the private or Self-system may be too strong or too weak and then are vitious This being laid down I was expecting how he would manage it in proof of this difficult Proposition which lies upon his hands viz. That a Man was oblig'd to cherish good Affections towards the Publick when the doing so would expose him to Hardships and Hazards force him to deny himself and quit his self-preservative Passions but instead of this all that our Author proposes to himself to prove is p. 101. That to have excellent Affections such as have bin mention'd just Affections both to publick and private is to have the chief enjoyment of life 2. To have the Self-passions excessive and beyond a just degree is injurious to the Creature and of Self-ill 3. To have no Affections towards the Kind nor self-ones is prejudicial to the Creature Now let all these Propositions be granted him I do not see that he has made the least step towards solving the Difficulty which he had rais'd he offers not one word to prove that a Man ought to cherish good Affections to the publick when the doing so will expose him to Hardships and Hazards and make him quit his self-preservative Passions All that I can collect from the whole course of his Reasonings in what follows is That a Man's Affection to private good is too high or too low and thereby irregular and vitious when his serving and taking care of himself takes off his Affection from the Publick i. e. in short according to our Author