which is the only way to perceive their agreement or disagreement And Self evident Principles or Propositions and the use that can be made of them to help us to Certainty are so far from having any opposition to the way of Ideas that neither their Truth can be known nor any Profitable Use with respect to Truth be made of them but by the way of Ideas § VI. The second Charge produced against this Proposition is That it is of dangerous consequence to and inconsistent with the Articles of the Christian Faith This Charge seems to be grounded on the last words of Mr. Lock 's Proposition viz. As expressed in any Proposition Now some Propositions come to us by Divine Revelation and several of these Propositions are such we cannot perceive by comparing the Ideas signify'd by the words of which they consist that they do so agree or disagree as the Propositions do express It follows therefore from Mr. Lock 's Proposition that we cannot be certain of or know the Truth of those Propositions and this is said to be inconsistent with or of dangerous consequence to the Articles of the Christian Faith but I cannot understand for what reason it is said to be so For as the truth of all Propositions come they to us by what way soever consists in what hath been before mentioned so our being certain of or knowing the truth of any Proposition let it come to us by what way soever must consist in that wherein our being certain of or knowing the truth of any Proposition doth consist For the way how a Proposition is brought to us doth not alter its nature consider'd as a Proposition nor the nature of Certainty or Knowledge which are fixed and unchangeable and always the same and therefore cannot make Certainty or Knowledge of its truth to consist in any thing but what Certainty or Knowledge of the truth of a Proposition brought to us some other way doth consist in If it shall now be ask'd Whether seeing there are certain Propositions which come to us by Divine Revelation and we cannot perceive that the agreement or disagreement of the Ideas signify'd by the words in those Propositions is such as the Propositions express Mr. Lock 's Proposition is not inconsistent with and of dangerous consequence to those Articles of the Christian Faith I answer That when an account is given of the determined Ideas for which those phrases inconsistent with and of dangerous consequence do stand whether they are used in different senses or both be designed to signify one and the same thing And what that or those precise Ideas are which are meant by them distinct and proper Answers may be given to the Question or Questions propounded If by inconsistent with those Articles is meant inconsistent with the truth of those Articles and so the Question amounts to this Whether that Proposition of Mr. Locks can be true and those Articles true too The Answer is Yes very well for the truth of those Propositions doth not depend on our being certain of or knowing the truth of them If by inconsistent with those Articles be meant that we cannot be certain of or know the truth of those Articles then the Question will be Whether it will not follow from Mr. Lock 's Proposition that we cannot be certain of or know the truth of those Articles To which the Answer is Yes But the Proposition for all that is inconsistent enough with those Articles tho' it cannot conâ—ist well with Peoples pretending to know what God hath set out of their reach and which they cannot attain to know It is no wrong at all to those Articles to say we cannot be certain of or know the truth of them it is a speaking of the truth and an attributing unto them the preâ—eminence which God hath given them If Peâ—sons are resolv'd they will use this phrase inconsistent with Articles of the Christian Faith in this sense there is no help for it yet Mr. Lock 's Proposition will continue true and cannot do any injury to any one Article of the Christian Faith But what will become then may some say of those Articles of the Christian Faith or of those Propositions which come to us by Divine Revelation and the truth of which we cannot be certain of or know Answer They will continue just as they are very great even Divine and Incomprehensible Truths and they are to have all the Entertainment given them by us that Divine Revelation designs they should have Whatever Propositions are brought to us by Divine Revelation and proposed to us by it to be the Objects of our Knowledge they are so formed that we may perceive that the agreement or disagreement of the Ideas signified by the words of which they do consist is such as the Propositions express And we have no other way to be certain of or to know the truth of those Propositions but by perceiving that the Ideas do so agree or disagree as the Propositions express But as for those Propositions which come to us by Divine Revelations and are such that we cannot perceive that the Ideas signify'd by the woâ—ds of which they consist have such agreement or disagreement as the Propositions express they are not proposed to us by Divine Revelation to be Objects of our Knowledge but only of our Faith And tho' we do not nor can know or be certain of the truth of these Propositions yet if we do firmly and with full assurance believe them to be true because we have good satisfaction that God hath revealed them and if our belief of their truth hath all that efficacy and influence on us which Divine Revelation requires we do fully answer the design of Divine Revelation with respect to these Articles of the Christian Faith But is not Faith may some say a Reasonable Act Yes But all reasonable Assent is not Certainty or Knowledge My assent to the truth of a Proposition or my believing it to be true is a Reasonable Act not because I am certain or do know that it is true but because my Assent is founded on such Evidence that it is true as is every way sufficient to justifie my Assenting to it There cannot be a more Reasonable Act than to believe the truth of that Proposition which we are on good grounds satisfied is declared to be true by that God who cannot Lye Let any Man produce a Proposition that Divine Revelation hath brought to Light and make it appear to me that it came to Men by Divine Revelation I shall believe it or assent most firmly to the truth of it tho' I cannot know the truth of it and my doing so will be a most Reasonable Act because my assent will be grounded on Divine Testimony But let that Person or any other Persons frame another Proposition in Philosophical Terms concerning the same matter and then pretend that that Proposition declares something more concerning that matter than God hath revealed concerning it
created Substance can have any thing more than God is pleased to give it It is not very intelligible to me that God should give to any thing that which its nature is not capable of especially if by Nature be here meant what I find some Persons do sometimes mean by that word viz. Substance for what Substance is capable of even after that solidity is added to it is more than any Man can know And if Omnipotency can add a power of Thinking to solid Substance â—itly disposed no Man can be certain that solid Thinking Substance is not of its own nature capable of Immortality but whether a created Being shall be Mortal or Immortal is not to be determined by our considering its nature but by understanding the pleasure of God concerning it The Humane Nature is the same now it was in the first Ages of the World but that Men do not now ordinarily live above a hundred Years is not to be resolved into this that the Humane Nature is not capable of being continued longer in Life than that space but into the pleasure of God that now Men shall not ordinarily live to a greater Age for Men did ordinarily in the first Ages of the World live many hundreds of Years and that they did so was purely to be attributed to the Divine Pleasure And had it been the pleasure of him who kept Men then so long in Life that Men should not die they would have been Immortal If the evidence of Immortality consists in Immateriality the Immateriality of the Soul must be demonstratively proved before Persons can perceive the evidence of the Souls Immortality For if any person takes it for granted that the Souls Immateriality may be demonstratively proved from or by certain Principles of Reason and from thence perswades himself that the Soul is Immortal and upon after-trial and examination he shall find that his Principles he depended on are uncertain and cannot afford him such proof as he was perswaded they would yield his discovering the uncertainty of his own Principles which he went upon in point of Reason will according to a Notion lately advanced weaken the Credibility of the Souls Immortality when considered purely as a Matter of Faith And if this be true great and speedy care should be taken to produce demonstrative proof that the Soul is an Immaterial Substance not only to make Men certain that their Souls are Immortal but to secure the Credibility of Divine Testimony But blessed be God we have a sure Foundation for our Faith to rest on for the Testimony of God will never fail but always remain firm and true how short soever the Principles of Reason may fall of bringing us to Certainty or Knowledge concerning several Articles of Faith or Propositions which come to us by Divine Revelation It may be proved to the highest degree of probability that the Soul is Immaterial but no demonstrative proof being yet produced in the way of Reason that the Soul is Immaterial I cannot understand why any person should pretend it must follow that the Soul must be Mortal if it be a Material Substance with a superadded power or faculty of Thinking and in that respect or on that account a Spiritual Substance tho' not Immaterial for Material and Mortal have no necessary connection And therefore we cannot be certain by contemplating the Ideas those words stand for that every Material Substance must be Mortal And he who shall affirm that every Material Substance must necessarily be Mortal will if he adhere to his Assertion find himself obliged to deny at least two Articles of the Christian Faith or two Propositions which come to us by Divine Revelation 1. That Man became Mortal by Sin or that the Wages of Sin is Death for it is past doubt that one part of Man when first created was Material And if every Material Substance must necessarily die Man must have died tho' he had never sinned 2. That after the Resurrection Men will be Immortal for after the Resurrection one part of Man will be Material § XIV Secondly It is pretended that this passage in Mr. Lock 's Essay which I have been discoursing of may from the Nature of Matter be proved to be false I will 1st Say something of this point in general and then 2dly Consider particularly what the last Author I have seen who finds fault with this passage doth say concerning it who I think takes in the whole strength of what others have proposed who have on this Account formed objections against it § XV. First I will say something concerning this point in general Substance I conceive will be acknowledged on all hands to be rightly divided into Material and Immaterial but how many various different Powers or Faculties these sorts of Substances are capable of receiving is what surpasses Man's Understanding Yet whatever Powers they are capable of receiving God can give or superadd unto them if he pleases whether he hath given to either sort all the Powers it is capable of is more than we can be certain of by the bare Exercise of our Reason He may for any thing we know to the contrary give to certain Material Systems fitly disposed some Powers which he also gives to Immaterial Substances Amongst these we may reckon the power of Thinking which neither Material nor Immaterial Substances can have whether God will or no. And whether it hath been his pleasure to superadd this power only to the Idea we express by Immaterial Substance or also to the Idea we express by Material Substance is a point we cannot be fully assured of but by Divine Revelation The power of Thinking added to a Substance whether Material or Immaterial makes that Substance Spirit Material Substance Immaterial Substance and Spirit are terms which stand for three distinct Ideas And tho' Spirit or Spiritual Substance doth not imply Matter or Material Substance in its Idea yet the power of Thinking being superadded to Matter will make it Spirit or Spiritual Substance Just as Spirit doth not imply Immaterial Substance in its Idea yet the power of Thinking being superadded to Immaterial Substance makes it Spirit or Spiritual Substance which it could not be without a power of Thinking added to it To ask therefore peremptorily whether Matter can think or not is to propose an obscure Question which wants explaining If by the Question be meant Can God add a power of Thinking to Matter or no The Answer will be We have no demonstrative proof for either part of the Question and therefore cannot be certain concerning the Matter But if by the Question be meant Can Matter Think without having a power of Thinking superadded to it The Answer is plainly No. But the way of Arguing that then the Substance which Thinks must be Immaterial is not very clear for Immaterial Substance can no more Think than Matter can without a power of Thinking added to it And whether it be Material or Immaterial Substance to which the
if I cannot perceive that the Ideas signify'd by the words of that Proposition do agree or disagree as the Proposition expresses I cannot be certain or know that the Proposition is true nor will my assenting to the truth of it upon his or their saying it is true be a Reasonable Act. For the Proposition being about a matter out of his or their reach I have not sufficient evidence to assure me that it is true yet notwithstanding the latter Proposition doth consist of different words from the former if it be declared that neither more nor less is meant by these words than is signify'd by those in the other Proposition I can assent to the truth of it and my assent will be a Reasonable Act because tho' they are two distinct Propositions consider'd as to the words yet as to sense they are but one and exactly the same Well but at this rate what becomes of the Certainty of Faith Answer Certainty and Faith are two words which stand for or signifie two distinct Acts of the Mind and they can no more be properly affirmed of one another than those distinct Acts can be said to be one and the same Indeed a Person may use the word Certainty or Knowledge if he please for Assent grounded upon probable Evidence or for Assent founded on Authority or for any other Idea he hath a mind to call by that Name and if he certifies what the Idea is he hath a mind to signifie by that word his Discourse may be Intelligible if he constantly use the word in that sense But if he will oppose another Person who hath declared that he useth the word Certainty and Knowledge strictly taken in the same sense and doth not declare that he takes the word Certainty in another sense his Discourse will unavoidably be very obscure if not perfectly unintelligible For it will be presumed he useth the word in that sense in which the other Person had declared he did use it when all the while he means another thing by it § VII When it is said that Mr. Lock 's Proposition is of dangerous consequence to the Articles of the Christian Faith if something else is signify'd by it than what was meant by the former phrase a distinct Account should be given of what is intended by this phrase If any shall pretend that the true and just consequence of Mr. Lock 's Proposition is this That the Arcles of the Christian Faith are not to be believed the Proposiâ—ion preâ—ended to be deduced is a very wicked Proposition But then it is as plain and certain as any thing can be That it can no way be drawn from Mr. Lock 's Proposition which has no relation at all to any Articles of Faith or Belief eiâ—her Christian or other If Mr. Lock 's Proposition can concern or affect any Christian Articles they must be Articles of Christian Knowledge not of Christian Faith And his Proposition is so far from being of dangerous consequence to Articles of Christian Knowledge that it gives the true Account wherein the knowledge of those Articles doth consist as will most evidently appear when any of those Articles shall be instanced in and considered If it shall be pretended that from Mr. Lock 's Proposition it may be regularly inferred That no Man ought to believe that any Proposition is true but what he can attain to know the truth of and that he ought not to assent to the truth of it till he attains to be certain of or to know the truth of it and that this is what is meant when it is said to be of dangerous consequence to the Articles of the Christian Faith then in the first place it is to be acknowledged that the Proposition intended to be regularly deduced from the other is certainly of most dangerous consequence to those Persons who shall â—ufâ—er themselves to be enslaved by it and this with respect to Articles of the Christian Faith But then in the second place it is great Injustice to charge Mr. Lock 's Proposition with that which can only in Justice be laid to the charge of another Proposition especially to do so before it is proved and made to appear that that dangerous Proposition can regularly be inferred from Mr. Lock 's Proposition which is a point altogether uncapable of being proved for there is no possibility of shewing any connection between them The two Propositions are as far distant from one another as the East is from the West From what hath been already said I think it may with reason enough be concluded that the principal Accusations advanced against Mr. Lock 's Proposition are altogether groundless § VIII Certainty or Knowledge did and will always consist in what Mr. Lock declares it doth consist and the way to attain Certainty was always by comparing Ideas What measures of knowing soever those have who speak most slightingly of the way of Ideas all their knowledge is owing to it how little soever they are aware of it or how strongly soever they are inclined to attribute it to something else There were Persons in all Ages who attained to certain measures of knowledge and were never able to declare distinctly and fully how they came by their Knowledge They generally stopped in their Accounts at the Artificial Methods whereby they were assisted in comparing of Ideas tho' they took no notice of that which was the true and natural way by which they perceived their agreement or disagreement and obtained knowledge Mr. Lock is the first Person I have heard of who hath observed and acquainted the World in what Knowledge or Certainty doth consist By which discovery he hath done Mankind so great a kindness in directing Men plainly to the most certain easie â—and speedy way to attain Knowledge so far as they are capable of it And how to bound their Enquiries so as not to spend their Labours in fruitless Endeavours to know what is out of Humane reach and what they can never attain to certainty in that Men will never be able to pay him thanks enough for the good Offices he hath done to the World nor to testifie sufficient Praises unto God for the Light and Favour he hath reached forth and imparted unto Mankind by him § IX The second passage which hath been thought faulty in Mr. Lock ' s Essay of Humane Understanding is this We have the Ideas of Matter and Thinking but possibly shall never be able tâ— know whether any meer Material Being thinks oâ— no it being impossible for us by the contemplation of our own Ideas without Revelation to discover whether Omnspotency has not given to some Systemâ— of Matter fitly disposed a Power to perceive anâ— think or else joyned and fixed to Matter so disposed a thinking immaterial Substance It being in respecâ— of our Notions not much more remote from our comprehension to conceive that God can if he pleases superadd to our Idea of Matter a Faculty of Thinking than that he should