you say now that you did I hope you will forgive me that Wrong if at least it be a Wrong to you for after all there are several Passages in your Essay which suppose clear Ideas necessary to Certainty For in one Place you say That the mind not being certain of the Truth of that it doth not evidently know What is this but to make clear Ideas necessary to Certainty In another yet more plainly That which is requisite to make our Knowledge certain is the Clearness of our Ideas In a third Place you say For it being evident that our Knowledge cannot exceed our Ideas where They are either imperfect confused or obscure we cannot expect to have certain perfect or clear Knowledge In a fourth But obscure and confused Ideas can never produce any clear and certain Knowledge because as far as any Ideas are confused or obscure the mind can never perceive clearly whether they agree or disagree What can be more express And yet you have complained of me in near twenty Places of your second Letter for charging this upon you By this the World will judge of the Justice of your Complaints and the Consistency of your Notion of Ideas 2. I answer'd That it is very possible the Authour of Christianity not mysterious might mistake or misapply your Notions but there is too much reason to believe he thought them the same and we have no reason to be sorry that he hath given you this occasion for the explaining your meaning and for the Vindication of your self in the matters you apprehend he had charged you with Here you enter upon a fresh Complaint and say This can be no Reason why you should be joyned with a Man that had misapplied your Notions and that no Man hath so much mistaken and misapplied your Notions as my self and therefore you ought rather to be joyned with me But is this fair and ingenuous dealing to represent this matter so as if I had joined you together because he had misunderstood and misapplied your Notions Can you think me a Man of so little Sense to make that the Reason of it No Sir it was because he assigned no other Grounds but yours and that in your own Words however now you would divert the meaning of them another way And although I was willing to allow you all reasonable Occasions for your own Vindication as appears by my Words yet I was sensible enough that you had given too just an Occasion to apply them in that manner as appears by the next Page But because these words follow some I had quoted out of your Postscript you fall into a nice Piece of Criticism about them which you say in Grammatical Construction must refer to the Words of the Postscript but any one that reads without a design to cavil would easily interpret them of your Words and Notions about which the Debate was and not of the Postscript which comes in but as a Parenthesis This looks like Chicaning in Controversie which no Man who knows his Cause is good ever falls into But if you say by an unintelligible new Way of Construction the word Them be applied to any Passages in your Book What then Why then whoever they are you intend to complain of them too But the Words just before tell you who they are viz. The Enemies of the Christian Faith And is this all that you intend only to complain of them for making you a Party in the Controversie against the Trinity But whether you have not made your self too much a Party in it will appear before we have done I had with great Kindness as I thought taken notice of a Passage in your Postscript in which I was glad to find that in general you owned the Mysteries of the Christian Faith and the Scripture to be the Foundation and Rule of it From whence I inferr'd that I could not believe you intended to give any Advantage to the Enemies of the Christian Faith This Passage you say you were surprized to find in a Paragraph design'd to give you satisfaction There are some Persons I find very hard to be satisfied For I speak of my satisfaction in this Passage and that I was glad you agreed so far with me although you could not come up in all things to what I could wish But what Reason have you to express so much dissatisfaction at these Words You call it an extraordinary sort of Complement and that they seem to intimate as though I took you for a Heathen before How like a cavilling Exception is this Do not we know that in the Debate about the Mysteries of Faith our Adversaries are no Heathens but they deny any Mysteries I was glad to find that you owned them and resolved your Faith into the Scripture as the Foundation of it Did not this look more like a good Opinion of you as to these matters than any Inclination to suspect you for a Heathen But you say It must not be taken for granted that those who do not write or appear in Print in Controversies of Religion do not own the Christian Faith and the Scriptures as the Rule of it I was far enough from any such Apprehension but the Case is quite otherwise with those who are not sparing of writing about Articles of Faith and among them take great Care to avoid some which have been always esteem'd fundamental Articles by the Christian Church And I think it was no want of Humanity or Christian Charity in me that I was so glad to find you own the Mysteries of the Christian Faith in general which shews at least that you cannot object against any Articles of Faith because they contain something mysterious in them But I said That in all things your Answer doth not come fully up to what I could wish And I think I gave sufficient Proof of it as to your Idea of Substance the Nature of Ideas the Materiality of the Soul the disparaging some Arguments to prove the Existence of God the Tendency of your Principles and the Ground of Certainty c. Which are put off to another Letter except the last which is therefore now to be examin'd 3. The third Answer I gave was That your own Grounds of Certainty tend to Scepticism and that in an Age wherein the Mysteries of Faith are too much exposed by the Promoters of Scepticism and Infidelity it is a thing of dangerous Consequence to start such new Methods of Certainty as are apt to leave Men's minds more doubtfull than before These words you say contain a farther Accusation of your Book which shall be consider'd in its due Place But this is the proper Place of considering it For I said That hereby you have given too just occasion to the Enemies of the Christian Faith to make use of your Words and Notions as was evidently proved from your own Concessions And if this be so however I was willing
and why not Certainty as well as Assurance I know no reason but that you have appropriated Certainty to the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas in any Proposition and now you find this will not hold as to Articles of Faith and therefore you will allow no Certainty of Faith which I think is not for the Advantage of your Cause But you go on and tell us That if this Way of Certainty by Ideas doth not hold yet it cannot affect Matters of Faith which stand immoveable upon other Grounds Faith in your own words stands still upon its own Basis and every Article of it has just the same unmoved Foundation and the very same Credibility that it had before This will appear to be an extraordinary Answer when we have throughly examin'd it Here we see Faith is taken not with respect to the general Grounds of Certainty but to the particular Articles of Faith i. e. the Propositions contained in that Revelation which we embrace on the Account of its Divine Authority now these Propositions are of several Kinds 1. Some that are more clearly expressed therein but such as might be attained to by the Light of Reason without Revelation And such are the fundamental Principles of natural Religion viz. The Being of God and Providence and the Rewards and Punishments of a future State These Mankind may attain to a Certainty in without Revelation or else there can be no such thing as natural Religion in the World but these things are more fully and plainly revealed in the Scriptures Let us now suppose a Person by natural Reason to attain to a Certainty as to the Being of God and Immortality of the Soul and he proceeds upon your general Grounds of Certainty from the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas and so from the Ideas of God and the Soul he is made certain of those two Points before mention'd But let us again suppose that such a Person upon a farther Examination of your Method of Proceeding finds that the Way of Ideas in these Cases will not do for no Idea proves the Existence of the thing without it self no more than the Picture of a Man proves his Being or the Visions of a Dream make a true History which are your own Expressions And for the Soul he cannot be certain but that Matter may think as you affirm and then what becomes of the Soul's Immateriality and consequently Immortality from its Operations But for all this say you his Assurance of Faith remains firm on its own Basis. Now I appeal to any Man of Sense whether the finding the Uncertainty of his own Principles which he went upon in Point of Reason doth not weaken the Credibility of these fundamental Articles when they are consider'd purely as Matters of Faith For before there was a natural Credibility in them on the Account of Reason but by going on wrong Grounds of Certainty all that is lost and instead of being certain he is more doubtfull than ever And if the Evidence of Faith falls so much short of that of Reason it must needs have less Effect upon Mens Minds when the subserviency of Reason is taken away as it must be when the Grounds of Certainty by Reason are vanished Is it at all probable that he who finds his Reason deceive him in such Fundamental Points should have his Faith stand firm and unmoveable on the account of Revelation For in Matters of Revelation there must be some Antecedent Principles supposed before we can believe any thing on the Account of it And the first is that there is a God but this was the very thing he found himself at a loss in by his way of Certainty by Ideas and how can his Faith stand firm as to Divine Revelation when he is made Uncertain by his own Way whether there be a God or no Besides to suppose Divine Revelation we must be certain that there is a Principle above Matter and Motion in the World but here we find that upon the Principles of Certainty by Ideas he cannot be certain of this because he doth not know but Matter may think and consequently all Revelation may be nothing but the Effects of an Exalted Fancy or the Heats of a disordered Imagination as Spinoza affirmed Again before there can be any such thing as Assurance of Faith upon Divine Revelation there must be a Certainty as to Sense and Tradition for there can be no Revelation pretended now without immediate Inspiration and the Basis of our Faith is a Revelation contained in an Ancient Book whereof the Parts were delivered at distant Times but conveyed down to us by an Universal Tradition But now what if your Grounds of Certainty can give us no Assurance as to these things I do not mean that they cannot demonstrate Matters of Fact which it were most unreasonable to expect but that these Grounds of Certainty make all things uncertain for I think I have proved that this way of Ideas cannot give a satisfactory Account as to the Existence of the plainest Objects of Sense because Reason cannot perceive the Connexion between the Objects and the Ideas How then can we arrive to any Certainty in perceiving those Objects by their Ideas And I was in the right when I said this Way tended to Scepticism and I do not think that consistent with the Assurance of Faith But this is an Imputation you take very ill and say that I have brought no Argument for it but only that my great Prejudice against this Way of Certainty is that it leads to Scepticism Sceptism is the New Mill'd Word This is very strange when that Expression is only the Introduction to the Arguments from p. 125 to 132 to which no Answer at all is given And so I leave it There are other Propositions or Articles of Faith which wholly depend on the Sense of Words contained in the Scripture and we are to enquire whether the Assurance of Faith as you call it be consistent with the overthrowing your Grounds of Certainty i. e. whether those who embrace the Articles of Faith in the Way of Ideas can retain their Certainty of those Articles when these Ideas are quitted And this alone will be a plain Demonstration in the Case that the Certainty of Faith cannot stand with such Men if this way of Certainty by Ideas be destroyed And by this which I am now to make out let any one judge how true your Words are like to prove when you say Let the Grounds of Knowledge or Certainty be resolved into what they please it touches not your Faith the Foundation of that stands as sure as before and cannot be at all shaken by it Of this we shall judge by some important Articles of Christian Faith according to your Ideas The first shall be that of the Resurrection of the Dead The Reason of believing the Resurrection of the same Body upon your Grounds is from the Idea of Identity which I take to
THE Bishop of Worcester's ANSWER TO Mr. Locke's Second Letter Wherein his NOTION of IDEAS Is prov'd to be Inconsistent with it self And with the ARTICLES OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH LONDON Printed by I. H. for Henry Mortlock at the Phoenix in St. Paul's Church-Yard MDCXCVIII THE Bishop of Worcester's ANSWER TO Mr. Locke's Second Letter c. SIR I Was not a little surpriz'd at the length of your Second Letter considering the shortness of the Answer contained in it But it put me in mind of the Springs of Modená mention'd by Ramazzini which rise up with such a plenty of Water upon opening a Passage that the Undertaker is afraid of being overwhelm'd by it I see how dangerous it is to give occasion to a Person of such a fruitfull Invention to write for Letters become Books and small Books will soon rise to great Volumes if no way be found to give a Check to such an Ebullition of Thoughts as some Men find within themselves I was apt to think the best way were to let Nature spend it self and although those who write out of their own Thoughts do it with as much Ease and Pleasure as a Spider spins his Web yet the World soon grows weary of Controversies especially when they are about Personal Matters Which made me wonder that one who understands the World so well should spend above fifty Pages of a Letter in renewing and enlarging a Complaint wholly concerning himself Suppose I had born a little too hard upon you in joyning your Words and anothers Intentions together had it not been an easie and effectual way of clearing your self to have declared to the World that you owned the Doctrine of the Trinity as it hath been Received in the Christian Church and is by ours in the Creeds and Articles of Religion This had stopt the Mouths of the Clamorous and had removed the Suspicions of the Doubtfull and would have given full Satisfaction to all reasonable Men. But when you so carefully avoid doing this all other Arts and Evasions do but leave the Matter more suspicious among the most Intelligent and Impartial Readers This I mention not that you need be afraid of the Inquisition or that I intend to charge you with Heresie in denying the Trinity but my present Design is to shew That your Mind is so intangled and set fast by your Notion of Ideas that you know not what to make of the Doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation because you can have no Idea of One Nature and three Persons nor of two Natures and one Person as will fully appear afterwards And therefore out of regard to Publick Service in order to the preventing a growing Mischief I shall endeavour to lay open the ill Consequences of your Way of Ideas with respect to the Articles of the Christian Faith But I shall wave all unnecessary Repetitions and come immediately to the Matter of your Complaint as it is renewed in this Second Letter which I shall briefly answer before I proceed to that which I chiefly design Your Complaint you say was That you were brought into a Controversie wherein you had never meddled nor knew how you came to be concerned in I told you It was because the Person who opposed the Mysteries of Christianity went upon your Grounds and made use of your Words although I declared withall that they were used to other purposes than you intended them and I confess'd that the reason why I quoted your Words so much was because I found your Notion as to Certainty by Ideas was the main Foundation on which the Author of Christianity not Mysterious went and that he had nothing that look'd like Reason if that Principle were removed which made me so much endeavour to shew that it would not hold and so I supposed the reason why I so often mention'd your Words was no longer a Riddle to you These Passages you set down in your Second Letter but you say all this seems to you to do nothing towards the clearing of this matter Whether it doth or not I am content to leave it to any indifferent Reader and there it must rest at last although you should write Volumes about it But for what cause do you continue so unsatisfied You tell us It is that the Author mentioned went upon this Ground That clear and distinct Ideas are necessary to Certainty but that is not your Notion as to Certainty by Ideas which is That Certainty consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas such as we have whether they be in all their Parts perfectly clear and distinct or no And you say that you have no Notions of Certainty more than this one This is no more than what you had said before in your former Letter and I took particular notice of it and gave three several Answers to it which I shall here lay together and defend because you seem to think I had not answered it 1. That those who offer at clear and distinct Ideas bid much fairer for Certainty than you do according to this Answer and speak more agreeably to your Original Grounds of Certainty For it is a very wonderfull thing in point of Reason for you to pretend to Certainty by Ideas and not allow those Ideas to be clear and distinct You say the Certainty lies in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas How can I clearly perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas if I have not clear and distinct Ideas For how is it possible for a Man's Mind to know whether they agree or disagree if there be some parts of those Ideas we have only general and confused Ideas of And therefore I had great reason to say that if Certainty be placed in Ideas we must have clear and distinct Ideas You may as well say a Man may be certain of the Agreement and Disagreement of Colours in a confused or uncertain Light For so much as the Idea fails of Clearness and Distinctness so much it fails of that Evidence which it is necessary to judge by Where-ever there is Obscurity Confusion or Imperfection in the Ideas there must be so much Uncertainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of them And to pretend to Certainty by Ideas without pretending to clear and distinct Ideas is to judge without Evidence and to determine a thing to be certainly true when we cannot know whether it be so or not for how can you be sure that your Ideas agree with the Reality of things wherein you place the Certainty of Knowledge if there be no such Ideas of those things that you can perceive their true Nature and their difference from all others For therein you will not deny that the Notion of clear and distinct Ideas consists But you say more than once or twice or ten times That I blame those who place Certainty in clear and distinct Ideas but you do it not and yet I bring
to have had you explained your self to the general Satisfaction yet since you decline it I do insist upon it that you cannot clear your self from laying that Foundation which the Author of Christianity not mysterious built upon For your Ground of Certainty is the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas as expressed in any Proposition Which are your own Words From hence I urged That let the Proposition come to us any way either by Humane or Divine Authority if our Certainty depend upon this we can be no more certain than we have clear Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas contained in it And from hence the Author of Christianity not mysterious thought he had Reason to reject all Mysteries of Faith which are contained in Propositions upon your Grounds of Certainty By this it evidently appears that although I was willing to allow you all fair ways of interpreting your own Sense yet I by no means thought that your Words were wholly misunderstood or misapplied by that Author but rather that he saw into the true Consequence of them as they lie in you Book And what Answer do you give to this Not a word in the proper Place for it But afterwards for I would omit nothing that may seem to help your Cause you offer something towards an Answer For there you distinguish the Certainty of Faith and the Certainty of Knowledge and you humbly conceive the Certainty of Faith if I think fit to call it so hath nothing to do with the Certainty of Knowledge and to talk of the Certainty of Faith seems all one to you as to talk of the Knowledge of Believing a way of speaking not easie for you to understand So that if I shake never so much the Certainty of Knowledge it doth not at all concern the Assurance of Faith that is quite distinct from it neither stands nor falls with Knowledge Faith stands by it self and upon Grounds of its own nor can be removed from them and placed on those of Knowledge Their Grounds are so far from being the same or having any thing that when it is brought to Certainty Faith is destroyed 't is Knowledge then and Faith no longer So that whether you are or are not mistaken in the placing Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas Faith still stands upon its own Basis which is not at all alter'd by it and every Article of that hath just the same unmoved Foundation and the very same Credibility that it had before This is the Substance of what you say about this Matter and is the most considerable Passage in your Book towards clearing this Matter But I was aware of this as appears by these Words Is Faith an unreasonable Act Is it not an Assent to a Proposition Then if all Certainty in Acts of Reason be derived from the perceiving the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas contained in it either there can be no Certainty in the reasonable Act of Faith or the Grounds of Certainty must be laid some other Way But this is a Matter of too great Weight and Consequence to be easily past over because the main strength of your Defence lies in it and therefore I shall more strictly examine what you say and set this Point of the Certainty of Faith in as good a Light as I can and shew the Inconsistency of your Notion of Ideas with the Articles of the Christian Faith To talk of the Certainty of Faith say you seems all one to you as to talk of the Knowledge of Believing a way of speaking not easie for you to understand But how comes the Certainty of Faith to become so hard a Point with you Have not all Mankind who have talked of Matters of Faith allow'd a Certainty of Faith as well as a Certainty of Knowledge although upon different Grounds In your former Letter you told us that if we knew the Original of Words we should be much helped to the Ideas they were first applied to and made to stand for Now what is there in the Original of the word Certainty which makes it uncapable of being applied to Faith I had thought that our Word was taken from the Latin and that among the Romans it was opposed to doubting Nil tam certum quam quod de dubio certum And therefore where the Mind upon examination of the Grounds of Assent saw no Reason for doubting it might properly be said to be certain If it sees no Cause to doubt from the Evidence of the Thing it self or the clear Deduction of Consequences that is Certainty of Knowledge but where it sees no Reason to doubt from the Authority of him that speaks that is Certainty of Believing and the greater the Authority of him that speaks the less Reason there is to doubt and therefore the greater Certainty of Faith And this I think is very easie to be understood and so have the Generality of Mankind thought to this Day But it seems our old Words must not now pass in the current Sense but then it is fit they be called in and new stampt that we may have none but New milled Words to talk with but in common Justice a competent Time ought to be allow'd for it that none be surprized and in the mean time they ought to pass in their current Sense and that is all the Favour I desire in this Matter But I am utterly against any Private Mints of Words and think those Persons assume too much Authority to themselves who will not suffer common Words to pass in their general Acceptation but will set such Bounds and Limits to the Sense of them as suit best with their own Speculations But is not this all one as to talk of the Knowledge of Believing For what Reason Knowledge and Faith are too distinct things the one relates to Evidence and the other to Testimony but Certainty is common to them both unless you think it impossible to be certain upon any Testimony whatsoever You tell us in your Postscript which I hope may be brought hither without Offence that it is a shame among Christians to raise such a Doubt of this Whether an infinitely powerfull and wise Being be veracious or no. Then I suppose the Veracity of God is a certain and undoubted Principle and if there be sufficient Means to assure us of Divine Revelation as I doubt not but you yield there are what should hinder one that believes upon such Grounds as are sufficient to convince him from attaining to a Certainty of Faith But you take Certainty as belonging only to Knowledge So do the Papists as belonging only to Infallibility and say there can be no Certainty of Faith where there is not an Infallible Proponent but neither you nor they are to impose upon the Understandings of Mankind who know how to distinguish the Grounds of Certainty both from Knowledge and Infallibility You allow such a thing as Assurance of Faith
be this from your own words 1. That the Identity of living Creatures depends not on a Mass of the same Particles but on something else for in them the variation of great Parcels of Matter alters not the Identity for which you instance in the growth of an Oak and a Horse 2. That the Identity of a Man consists in nothing but a Participation of the same continued Life by constantly fleeting Particles of Matter in Succession vitally united to the same Organized Body 3. That Personal Identity i. e. the sameness of a Rational Being lies in Self-consciousness and in that alone whether it be annexed only to one Individual Substance or can be continued in a Succession of several Substances 4. That those who place Thought in a purely material animal Constitution void of Spirit do place Personal Identity in something else that Identity of Substance as Animal Identity is preserved in Identity of Life and not of Substance 5. That it matters not to this point of being the same self whether this present self be made up of the same or other Substances 6. That in this Personal Identity of Self-consciousness is founded all the Right and Iustice of Reward and Punishment Happiness and Misery being that for which every one is concerned for himself not mattering what becomes of any Substance not joined to or affected with that Consciousness 7. That the Sentence at the Day of Iudgment will be justified by the Consciousness all Persons shall have that they themselves in what Bodies soever they appear or what Substances soever that Consciousness adheres to are the same that committed those Actions and deserve that Punishment for them This I suppose to be a true and just Account of your Sense of this Matter and so the Article of the Resurrection is Resolved into your Idea of Personal Identity And the Question between us now is Whether your Certainty of this Matter from your Idea have no influence on the Belief of this Article of Faith For the main of your Defence lies upon this Point Whether your Method of Certainty by Ideas doth at all shake or in the least concern the Assurance of Faith which you absolutely deny and affirm That Faith stands upon its own Basis and is not at all altered by your Method of Certainty and every Article of that has just the same unmoved Foundation and the very same Credibility that it had before Now I take this Article of the Resurrection of the Dead to be an Article of Faith and we are to consider whether if your Method of Certainty by Ideas do hold in this Matter it continues as firm and in the same Credibility it had before I shall not urge you with the Sense of our own or other Christian Churches in this Point of the Sameness of the Body in the Resurrection of the Dead But I shall continue my self to the Scripture as the Foundation and Rule of our Faith and the main Point is Whether according to that it be not necessary for the same Substance which was united to the Body to be raised up at the last Day I do not say the same individual Particles of Matter which were united at the Point of Death for there must be a great Alteration in them in a lingring Disease as if a Fat Man falls into a Consumption I do not say the same Particles which the Sinner had at the very time of commission of his Sins for then a long Sinner must have a vast Body considering the continual spending of Particles by Perspiration but that which I suppose is implyed in it is that it must be the same Material Substance which was vitally united to the Soul here You mention the Hypothesis of those who place Thought in a purely Material Animal Constitution void of Spirit but you agree that the more probable Opinion is that this Consciousness is annexed to the Affection of one Individual Immaterial Substance It is very well that it is allowed to be the more probable Opinion but it seems without any Certainty as to the Truth of it For you have told us what the Effect of Probability is viz. That it is enough to induce the Mind to judge the Proposition true or false rather than the contrary and that it is conversant about things whereof we have no Certainty but only some Inducements to receive it for true Thence I cannot but observe that we have no Certainty upon your Grounds that Self-consciousness depends upon an individual immaterial Substance and consequently that a Material Substance may according to your Principles have Self-consciousness in it at least that you are not certain of the contrary Now I pray consider whether this doth not a little affect the whole Article of the Resurrection For if it may be only a Material Substance in us that thinks then this Substance which consists in the Life of an Organiz'd Body must cease by Death for how can that which consisted in Life be preserved afterwards And if the Personal Identity consists in a Self-consciousness depending on such a Substance as cannot be preserved without an Organiz'd Body then there is no Subsistence of it separate from the Body and the Resurrection must be giving a new Life To whom To a Material Substance which wholly lost its Personal Identity by Death So that here can be no Personal Identity at all unless you say the very same Life which was long since at an end can be Reproduced Which I suppose you will not assert But let us take the more probable Opinion which I think certain viz. That Self-consciousness depends upon an Immaterial Principle in us and then the Question is How far the Scripture determines the sameness of the Body at the Resurrection i. e. of that Material Substance which was vitally united with that Immaterial Substance in this Life The Doctrine delivered by our Saviour is that All that are in the Graves shall hear his voice and shall come forth they that have done good unto the Resurrection of Life and they that have done evil to the Resurrection of Damnation What is the meaning of all that are in their Graves Doth this relate to any other Substance than that which was united to the Soul in Life Can a different Substance be said to be in the Graves and to come out of them Is it not material as you say whether the present Self be made up of the same or other Substances If it be not so to your Idea of Identity it is as to the Sense of our Saviour's Words unless you can make it out that a Substance which never was in the Grave may come out of it But it may be said That if these Words be taken strictly they confine the Resurrection to those Particles of Matter only which were in the Grave if not then they may extend to another Substance I answer that by comparing this with other places we find that the
sown in Corruption and Weakness and Dishonour Either therefore he must speak of the same Body or his meaning cannot be comprehended For what doth all this relate to a Conscious Principle The Apostle speaks plainly of that Body which was once quickened and afterwards falls to Corruption and is to be restored with more noble Qualities For this Corruptible must put on Incorruption and this Mortal must put on Immortality I do not see how he could more expressly affirm the Identity of this Corruptible Body with that after the Resurrection and that without any Respect to the Principle of Self-consciousness and so if the Scripture be the sole Foundation of our Faith this is an Article of it and so it hath been always understood by the Christian Church And your Idea of Personal Identity is inconsistent with it for it makes the same Body which was here united to the Soul not to be necessary to the Doctrine of the Resurrection but any Material Substance being united to the same Principle of Consciousness makes the same Body The Dispute is not how far Personal Identity in it self may consist in the very same Material Substance for we allow the Notion of Personal Identity to belong to the same Man under several changes of Matter but whether it doth not depend upon a Vital Vnion between the Soul and Body and the Life which is consequent upon it and therefore in the Resurrection the same Material Substance must be reunited or else it cannot be called a Resurrection but a Renovation i. e. it may be a New Life but not a raising the Body from the Dead 2. The next Articles of Faith which your Notion of Ideas is inconsistent with are no less than those of the Trinity and of the Incarnation of our Saviour The former by the first Article of our Church is expressed by three Persons in the Vnity of the Divine Nature the latter is said Art 2. to be by the Vnion of the Divine and Humane Nature in one Person Let us now see whether your Ideas of Nature and Person can consist with these But before I come to that I must endeavour to set this Matter right as to the Dispute about the Notion of Nature and Person which you have endeavour'd with all your Art to perplex and confound and have brought in several Interlocutors to make it look more like an Entertainment Of which afterwards The Original Question was whether we could come to any Certainty about the Distinction of Nature and Person in the Way of Ideas and my business was to prove that we could not because we had no simple Ideas by Sensation or Reflection without which you affirm that our Vnderstanding seems to you not to have the least Glimmering of Ideas and that we have nothing in our Minds which did not come in one of these two Ways These are your own Words And then I undertook to shew that it was not possible for us to have any simple Ideas of Nature and Person by Sensation or Reflection and that whether we consider'd Nature as taken for Essential Properties or for that Substance wherein that Property lies whether we consider it in distinct Individuals or abstractly still my Design was to shew that in your Way of Ideas you could come to no Certainty about them And as to Person I shew'd that the Distinction of Individuals is not founded meerly on what occurs to our Senses but upon a different manner of Subsistence which is in one Individual and is not communicable to another And as to this I said that we may find within our selves an intelligent Substance by inward Perception but whether that make a Person or not must be understood some other way for if the meer intelligent Substance make a Person then there cannot be the Union of two such Natures but there must be two Persons Which is repugnant to the Article of the Incarnation of our Saviour That this was the true State of the Question will appear to any one that will vouchsafe to look into it But what said you in your first Letter in Answer to it As to Nature you say That it is a Collection of several Ideas combined into one complex abstract Idea which when they are found united in any Individual existing though joyned in that Existence with several other Ideas that individual or particular Being is truly said to have the Nature of a Man or the Nature of a Man to be in him forasmuch as these simple Ideas are found united in him which answer the â—omplex abstract Idea to which the specifick Name is given by any one which abstract specifick Idea he keeps the same when he applies the specifick Name standing for it to distinct Individuals And as to Person in the way of Ideas you say that the Word Person in it self signifies nothing and so no Idea belonging to it nothing can be said to be the true Idea of it But as soon as the common Vse of any Language has appropriated it to any Idea then that is the true Idea of a Person and so of Nature Against this I objected in my Answer to that Letter that if these Terms really signifie nothing in themselves but are only abstract and complex Ideas which the common Use of Language hath appropriated to be the signs of two Ideas then it is plain that they are only Notions of the Mind as all abstracted and complex Ideas are and so one Nature and three Persons can be no more To this you answer in your second Letter That your Notion of the Terms Nature and Person is that they are two sounds that naturally signifie not one thing more than another nor in themselves signifie any thing at all but have the signification which they have barely by Imposition Whoever imagined that Words signifie any otherwise than by Imposition But the Question is whether these be meer Words and Names or not Or whether there be not a real Foundation in things for such a Distinction between Nature and Person Of which I gave this evident Proof that if it were not the same Nature in different Individuals every Individual must make a different Kind And what Answer do you give to this plain Reason Nothing particular that I can find But in the general you say that all that you can find that I except against in your Notion of Nature and Person is nothing but this viz. that these are two sounds which in themselves signifie nothing And is this all indeed Did not I tell you in these Words which I am forced to repeat on this occasion although I am very unwilling to fill Pages with Repetitions The Question now between us comes to this whether the common Nature or Essence of things lies only in an abstract Idea or a general Name and the real Essence consists only in particular Beings from which that Nature is abstracted The Question is not whether in forming
Ideas to go upon very different Grounds but when a Proposition is offered you out of Scripture to be believed and you doubt about the Sense of it Is not Recourse to be made to your Ideas As in the present Case whether there can be three Persons in one Nature or two Natures and one Person what Resolution can you come to upon your Principles but in the Way of Ideas You may possibly say That where Ideas are clear and distinct there you are to judge of Revelation by them and this is what you assert in your Essay That in Propositions whose Certainty is built on clear and perfect Ideas and evident Deductions of Reason there no Proposition can be received for Divine Revelation which contradicts them from hence you conclude it impossible for the same Body to be in two Places at once And yet there is a Person who hath lately told the World that there is one certain secret Way how by Divine Power the same Body but not the same Person may be in very distant Places at once but he is advised to keep it up as a Secret which was good friendly Advice But till it be discovered there is no judging of it Here I observe that you require clear and distinct Ideas and yet we find if a Man's Word may be taken these clear and distinct Ideas do not prove the thing impossible But what is to be said when the Ideas are not clear and distinct You say Your Method of Certainty is by the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas where they are not in all their Parts perfectly clear and distinct And this is your Secret about Certainty which I think had been better kept up too For I pray in the Case now before us Are your Ideas of Nature and Person clear and distinct or not if they are then it is plain from your own Doctrine that if Revelation be pretended you are to reject it How then comes the Certainty of Faith to be preserved firm and immoveable although the Grounds of Certainty be disputed But suppose they are not clear and distinct What is to be done in a Matter of Revelation contrary to your Ideas Are you to submit to the Revelation or not Whatever God hath Revealed is most certainly true no doubt can be made of it This is the proper Object of Faith but whether it be a Divine Revelation or no you say Reason must judge Yes Reason proceeding upon clear and distinct Ideas But suppose you have Ideas sufficient for Certainty in your Way but not clear and distinct what is to be done then In things that are above Reason you say when they are Revealed they are proper Matters of Faith What is here being above Reason Either above the Discovery of Reason as the Fall of Angels the Resurrection of the Body c. and about these you say Reason hath nothing to do What not if there be an Idea of Identity as to the Body Or such as are above the Comprehension of Reason when discovered And they are either such as we have no Natural Ideas of and then you grant that they are pure Matters of Faith or they are such as you have certain Ideas of but not clear and distinct Now here lies the pinching Difficulty as to your Way of Ideas You say indeed That Revelation must carry it against meer Probabilities to the contrary because the Mind not being certain of the Truth of that it doth not evidently know but is only probably convinced of is bound to give up its Assent to such a Testimony which it is satisfied comes from one who cannot err and will not deceive I pray observe your own Words you here positively say That the Mind not being certain of the Truth of that it doth not evidently know So that it is plain here that you place Certainty only in Evident Knowledge or in clear and distinct Ideas and yet your great Complaint of Me was that I charged this upon you and now I find it in your own Words which I observed before But let us allow you all you desire viz. That there may be Certainty by Ideas where they are not clear and distinct and let us now suppose that you are to judge of a Proposition delivered as a Matter of Faith where you have a Certainty by Reason from your Ideas such as they are Can you assent to this as a Matter of Faith when you are already certain by your Ideas of the contrary How is this possible Can you believe that to be true which you are certain is not true Suppose it be that there are two Natures in one Person the Question is Whether you can Assent to this as a Matter of Faith If you had said there had been only Probabilities on the other side I grant that you then say Revelation is to prevail but when you say you have Certainty by Ideas to the contrary I do not see how it is possible for you to Assent to a Matter of Faith as true when you are certain from your Ideas that it is not true For how can you Believe against Certainty The Evidence is not so great as when the Ideas are clear and distinct but the Bar against Assent is as strong because the Mind is actually determined by Certainty And so your Notion of Certainty by Ideas must overthrow the Credibility of a Matter of Faith in all such Propositions which are offered to be believed on the account of Divine Revelation I shall now summ up the Force of what I have said about this Matter Your Answer is That your Method of Certainty by Ideas shakes not at all nor in the least concerns the Assurance of Faith Against this I have pleaded 1. That your Method of Certainty shakes the Belief of Revelation in general 2. That it shakes the Belief of Particular Propositions or Articles of Faith which depend upon the Sense of Words contained in Scripture Because you do not say that we are to believe all that we find there expressed but in case we have any clear and distinct Ideas which limit the Sense another way than the words seem to carry it we are to judge that to be the true Sense But in case our Ideas are not clear and distinct yet you affirm as your proper Doctrine That we may come to Certainty by Ideas although not in all Respects perfectly clear and distinct From whence I infer That where you have attained to a Certainty by your imperfect Ideas you must judge of a Matter of Faith by those Ideas and consequently if the Union of two Natures and one Person or three Persons in one Nature be repugnant to your Ideas as I have shewed that they are you must by virtue of your own Principles reject these from being Matters of Faith And thus I hope I have proved what I undertook viz. That your Notion of Certainty by Ideas is inconsistent with these Articles of the Christian Faith But you have this
Comfort left that you are not the first Person who hath run himself into insuperable Difficulties as to Matters of Faith by this way of Ideas For Des Cartes himself did so in a remarkable manner He was a Person of a great Reach and Capacity and spent many Thoughts in laying the Foundations of Certainty from Ideas both as to Incorporeal and Corporeal Substances and yet was miserably foiled as to both of them His Demonstrations from his Ideas in his Metaphysical Meditations did not meet with the Entertainment he promised himself from the Inquisitive part of Mankind for his Objective Reality from his Idea gave no Satisfaction and his other Argument was thought to have no Force unless it were taken off from the Idea and placed upon the Necessity of Existence in the Nature of the Thing As to Corporeal Substances his fundamental mistake was in a wrong Idea of Matter which he made to be the same with Extension and upon this he built his Systeme of Nature But against this first false step many things were objected by his Adversaries as may be seen by the late Disputes in France about his Principles they objected that his Notion or Idea of Matter made it necessary and impossible for God to Annihilate it and his Defenders are driven to such shifts as to God's Will and Power that an indifferent Person might thereby see how dangerous it is to take up with Ideas as to the Ground of Certainty although neither himself nor his Followers pretend to place it in any thing but clear and distinct Ideas But when they came to reconcile their Ideas with Matters of Faith they were so plunged that they could see no way to get through their Difficulties For as Monsieur Huet observes Although Des Cartes professes great submission to Divine Revelation yet when it came to the Trial he judged his Opinions could not be repugnant to it because he was certain of the Truth of them which shews that he judged of Revelation by his Rules of Certainty and whatever he pretended he did not take his Measures of Truth from Revelation A late Defender of Des Cartes in answer to this produces the Words used by him in his Principles wherein he owns That in case of Divine Revelation if God declares any thing concerning himself or others which exceed our Capacity as the Mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation he would not refuse to believe them although he could not clearly understand them This Monsieur Huet denies not viz. That he made such a general Profession of Submission to Revelation and owning the Mysteries of Faith but saith he when it comes to particular Points then Ideas are to be the Standard by which we are to judge of Revelation Monsieur Regis in his Reply saith That Matters of Faith and Philosophical Truths are of different kinds and that there can be no Contrariety but between things of the same kind Which makes him run into that great Absurdity that although in a Philosophical Sense God cannot do things repugnant to Reason yet in the Way of Faith he may and all this to preserve the Certainty by Ideas when nothing can be more repugnant to all kinds of Certainty than such a Supposition But another great Admirer of Des Cartes thinks this way unreasonable But Des Cartes he saith hath shewn the right Method of Certainty by clear and distinct Ideas and therefore he calls it no less than a Divine Certainty and he adds that Truth cannot be contrary to it self and he laughs at the Distinction of Philosophical and Theological Truths or the two ways of Certainty by Knowledge and Faith For Truth is always one and the same and changes not its Countenance and if Truth be an Agreement of Words with Things how can the same Words agree in one Book and differ in another for the same God is the Author of Truth where-ever it is and therefore he calls it A most absurd Opinion of those who say that God who is immutable should teach that as Truth in Philosophy which is false in Divinity But I return to you You seem to be not a little concerned that I say That as you have stated your Notion of Ideas it may be of dangerous Consequence to that Article of the Christian Faith which I had endeavoured to defend Such an Accusation you say brought into any Court in England would be thought to shew a great Inclination to have the Accused be suspected rather than any Evidence of being guilty of any thing and so would immediately be dismissed without hearing any Plea to it But you must give me leave to say that you have quite mistaken my Design which was not to accuse you but to shew my own Dissatisfaction as to the Way you had taken to clear your self I hoped you would have said so much for your own Vindication as would have satisfied the World that your Notion of Ideas was far from any Tendency that way to which it was carried by him who made use of your Expressions But instead of that you explained it in such a manner as made it far more suspicious that he had not perverted your meaning And that made me to say That as you had stated it it may be of dangerous Consequence It may be say you this is no Evidence but only an Inclination to accuse you So far from it that it shewed an Inclination to favour you when I only said it may be for now you see that I think it is of such dangerous Consequence and I must think so till you have cleared it better But the Notion of Ideas as you have stated it relates to your whole Book Why should you carry it farther than I intended it The stating of it I mentioned was in your first Letter where you told us what you meant by Nature and Person But you have found out two Particulars wherein it may be of dangerous Consequence first in making so much use of the word Ideas and your placing Certainty in Ideas As to the Term of Ideas I have no Objection to the use of the word it self provided it be used in a common Sense and no Weight be laid upon it more than it can bear for I am for no new affected Terms which are apt to carry Mens Minds out of the way they are like Ignes fatui which seem to give Light but lead those that follow them into Bogs Like Fontanges which seem to set Peoples Heads that wear them higher but their Understandings are just what they were before I always dislik'd the Stoical Improvements by New Words or giving New Senses to Old ones But I told you I should never have mention'd this Way of Ideas but for the ill use I found made of them and you might have enjoy'd the Satisfaction you had in them long enough unless I had found them imploy'd in doing Mischief Which as you humbly conceive amounts to thus much and no more that I fear
not the Point whether when we consider them with respect to Place there can be such a thing as Identity of Place to two different Bodies But whether we cannot consider two several Individuals of Mankind without particular Regard to Place Which I say we may and for this Reason because Relation to Place is an external Difference but the real Distinction of Individuals doth not relate to any Accident of the Body because the Individual consists of the Union of Soul and Body and you cannot judge of the Existence of the Soul by the Place of the Body You say that when we see any thing to be in any place in any instant of Time we are sure be it what it will that it is that very thing and not another which at that Time exists in another Place how like and undistinguishing soever it may be in all other Respects And in this consists Identity But I think the Identity of Man depends neither upon the Notion of Place for his Body nor upon the Soul consider'd by it self but upon both these as actually united and making one Person Which to me seems so clear and intelligible that I can imagine no Objection against it I am certain you produce none My next Words are And here lies the true Idea of a Person which arises from that Manner of Subsistence which is in one Individual and is not communicable to another In your Answer to this I pass over the trifling Exceptions about the Dissyllable Person and the true Idea and Signification of the articulate Sound and about here and herein c. being resolved to keep to what appears material And the only thing of that kind is that according to my Sense of Person it will as well agree to Bucephalus as to Alexander and the Difference will be as great between Bucephalus and Podargus as between Alexander and Hector all being several Individuals in the same common Nature but for your Part you cannot understand that Bucephalus and Podargus are Persons in the true signification of the Word Person in the English Tongue And whoever desired you should For I expresly say that a Person is a compleat intelligent Substance with a peculiar Manner of Subsistence And again For a Person relates to something which doth distinguish it from another intelligent Substance in the same Nature So that it is impossible to apply my Notion of Person to any irrational Creatures although they be Bucephalus and Podargus And I think a Man must strain hard to make such Objections so directly against that Idea of a Person which I set down And it is very easie to understand the Difference between a Distinction of Individuals as such and of intelligent Individuals and that Manner of Subsistence in them which makes them distinct Persons But you say that I affirm that an individual intelligent Substance is rather supposed to the making of a Person than the proper Definition of it and yet afterwards I make it to be the Definition of a Person that it is a compleat intelligent Substance To this I answer That in the former Place I give an Account of the Reason of Personality which I say lies in the Manner of Subsistence and not in the intelligent individual Substance which is rather supposed to the making of a Person For that which critically distinguishes the Person is the Reason of Personality but when we come to give a common Definition of it there is no such Necessity of insisting upon the Reason of the Difference but upon the common Acception of it Person And upon that Account I call it a complete intelligent Substance because although the Soul be so in it self yet we take Person with Relation to Soul and Body united together And so the Identity of Person must take in both not only here but at the Resurrection And thus I have gone through all that I could find that seem'd material in the Dialogue between you and your Friends as to this Subject and I assure you I have omitted nothing which I apprehended had any Appearance of Difficulty in it And I find not the least Reason to be unsatisfied in the Account I had given of the Difference of Nature and Person but I still think that it doth tend very much to the right Apprehension of the Doctrine of the Trinity as I hope doth farther appear by the foregoing Discourse And now to come to a Conclusion of this whole Debate For I intend not to draw this Saw any longer having done as much as I think sitting for my self to do I saw no Necessity of writing again for my own Vindication as to your first Charge which I was contended to leave to the Reader 's Judgment But in the Conclusion of my former Answer I had said That as you had stated your Notion of Ideas it may be of dangerous Consequence to that Article of the Christian Faith which I endeavour'd to defend This you call a new Charge against your Book and you complain that I do not specifie the Particulars wherein I apprehend it may be of such dangerous Consequence and you blame me for this saying without shewing that it is so and that all the Reason I give is that it is made use of by ill Men to do mischief that when I say it may be it shews only an Inclination to accuse and proves nothing that Danger may be apprehended where no Danger is that if any thing must be laid aside because it may be ill used you do not know what will be innocent enough to be kept and lastly that the Imputation of a Tendency to Scepticism and to the overthrowing any Article of the Christian Faith are no small Charge and that you cannot see any Argument I have brought that your Notion of Ideas tends to Scepticism These things laid together made me think it necessary to do that which I was unwilling 〈◊〉 do till you had driven me to it which was to shew the Reasons I had why I look'd on your Notion of Ideas and of Certainty by them as inconsistent with it self and with some important Articles of the Christian Faith What I have now done I thought it my Duty to do not with respect to my self but to some of the Mysteries of our Faith which I do not charge you with opposing but with laying such Foundations as do tend to the Overthrow of them of which we have had too much Experience already and may have more if your Way of Certainty by Ideas should obtain Which I cannot think it will among such as are capable and willing to judge impartially I have now done with this Matter And as some may think it the first Part of Wisdom not to begin in such Disputes and I am of their Mind if they did not touch the Christian Faith so they cannot but judge it the next as I do to know when to make an End I am Sir Your