a revelation for what he did And the answer to this had been only pertinent and satisfactory So that he might have no reason to question it although he did not believe any thing more then common fidelity in his Fathers testimony For God never when revelations were most common thought it necessary to multiply revelations so far as to make one necessary to attest another but that revelation which was communicated to one was obligatory to all concerned in it though they could have nothing but Moral certainty for it By this it appears that when we now speak of the resolution of Faith though the utmost reason of our assent is that Infallibility which is supposed in Divine Testimony yet the nearest and most proper resolution of it is into the grounds inducing us to believe that such a Testimony is truly Divine and the resolution of this cannot be into any Divine Testimony without a process in infinitum 2. That when we speak of the resolution of Faith by Faith we understand a rational and discursive act of the mind For Faith being an assent upon evidence or reason inducing the mind to assent it must be a rational and discursive act and such a one that one may be able to give an account of to another And this account which men are able to give why they do believe or on what ground they do it is that which we call resolving Faith And by this it appears that whatever resolves Faith into its efficient cause which some improperly call the Testimony of the spirit though it may be true yet comes not home to the question For if by the Testimony of the spirit be meant that operation of the spirit whereby saving Faith is wrought in us then it gives no account from the thing to be believed why we assent to it but only shews how Faith is wrought in us by way of efficiency which is rather resolving the question about the necessity of Grace than the grounds of Faith Our question is not then concerning the necessity of infused habits of Grace but of those rational inducements which do incline the mind to a firm assent For Faith in us however it is wrought being a perswasion of the mind it is not conceivable how there should be any discursive act of the mind without some reason causing the mind to assent to what is propounded to it For without this Faith would be an unaccountable thing and the spirit of revelation would not be the spirit of wisdom and Religion would be exposed to the contempt of all unbelievers if we were able to give no other account of Faith then that it is wrought in us by the Spirit of God When we speak therefore of the resolving Faith we mean what are the rational inducements to believe or what evidence there is in the object propounded to make us firmly assent to it 3. According to the different acts of Faith there must be assigned a different resolution of Faith For every act being rational and discursive must have its proper grounds belonging to it unless we suppose that act elicited without any reason for it which is incongruous with the nature of the humane understanding There are then in the question of resolution of Faith these three questions to be resolved First Why I believe those things to be true which are contained in the Book called the Scripture 2. Why I believe the Doctrine contained in that Book to be Divine 3. Why I believe the Books themselves to be of Divine revelation Now every one of these questions admits of a different way of resolution as will appear by the handling each of them distinctly 1. If I be asked On what grounds I believe the things to be true which are contained in Scripture my answer must be From the greatest evidence of truth which things of that nature are capable of If therefore the persons who are supposed to have writ these things were such who were fully acquainted with what they writ of if they were such persons who cannot be suspected of any design to deceive men by their writings and if I be certain that these which go under the name of their writings are undoubtedly theirs I must have sufficient grounds to believe the truth of them Now that the writers of these things cannot be suspected of ignorance appears by the time and age they writ in when the story of these things was new and such multitudes were willing enough to have contradicted it if any thing had beeen amiss besides some of the writers had been intimately conversant with the person and actions of him whom they writ most of That they could have no intent to deceive appears from the simplicity and candour both of their actions and writings from their contempt of the world and exposing themselves to the greatest hazards to bear witness to them That these are the very same writings appears by all the evidence can be desired For we have as great if not much greater reason to believe them to be the Authors of the Books under their Names than any other writers of any Books whatsoever both because the matters are of greater moment and therefore men might be supposed more inquisitive about them and that they have been unanimously received for 〈◊〉 from the very time of their being first written except some very few which upon strict examination were admitted too and we find these very Books cited by the learned Christians under these Names in that time when it had been no difficulty to have found out several of the Original Copy's themselves When therefore they were universally received by Christians never doubted of by Jews or Heathen Philosophers we have as great evidence for this first act of Faith as it is capable of And he is unreasonable who desires more 2. If I be asked why I believe the Doctrine contained in these Books to be Divine I must give in two things for answer 1. That in the Age when the Doctrine was delivered there was sufficient reason to believe it Divine 2. That if there was sufficient reason then we have sufficient reason now 1. That in the Age when the Doctrine was delivered there was sufficient reason to believe it Divine Supposing then that we already believe upon the former answer that all the matters of fact be true I answer that if Christ did such unparalleâ—d miracles and rose from the dead they who heard his Doctrine had reason to believe it to be of God and this I suppose the greatest Infidel would not deny if himself had been one of the witnesses of his actions and resurection 2. That if they had reason then we have so now because tradition to us doth only supply the want of our senses as to what Christ did and spake i. e. That tradition is a kind of derivative and perpetuated sensation to us it being of the same use to us now which our eyes and ears had been if we had been
that the matters to be believed are not so clear to us as demonstrations I will not gainsay it but if you mean obscurity or want of evidence as to the reason inducing me to believe I utterly deny any such obscurity to belong to Faith or to be consistent with it For God doth not require us to believe any thing without sufficient grounds for our believing it and those grounds do bear a proportionable evidence to the nature of that assent which he requires If he requires an Infallible assent he gives Infallible grounds if he requires a firm and certain assent he gives firm and certain grounds if he requires only a probable assent he gives only probable evidence But still such as the nature of the assent is such is the evidence he gives for it To make this plainer by an Instance That Christ was the true Messias he requires an assent built upon Infallible grounds and therefore God gave such Infallible evidence of it by the Miracles which he wrought That these Miracles were once really done he requires our firm assent and therefore gives certain evidence by an Universal and uncontrouled tradition but whether St. Paul or any other Apostolical person were Authour of the Epistle to the Hebrews he requires only an assent built on the most probable grounds and therefore he hath given us no more for it But still as the assent is so the evidence must be For Faith being an act of the mind whose nature is to judge according to reason we cannot suppose any act of it to proceed in a brutish manner by a meer impulse of the will I deny not but the will may be said to have some kind of influence upon the understanding both in furthering and hindering assent but it is not by any command it hath over the mind in its acts but as it can divert the mind from or incline it to the searching into the evidence of the things Therefore when we commonly say Facile credimus quae volumus and so on the contrary it is not because of the wills immediate power upon the understanding but as the desire of a thing makes us inquisitive after it so the dislike of it makes us unwilling to hear the reasons for it and ready to entertain any pretence against it Thus I grant the will may have power upon the mind as to the eliciting the act of Faith not that I can assent to a thing as true because I desire it to be true but this inclination of the will removes those impediments which would obstruct my discovery of the evidence which is in it You havs certainly a mind of another mould then others have that can believe thing which do not appear credible to you yet such a kind of Faith as this is very necessary for your Churches Infallibility and for that your discourse of believing by the impulse of the will is very proper and seasonable But other persons may think it an Imperfection in their minds that they cannot believe any thing any further than it appears credible that is that they can go no further than they have legs nor see when their eyes are shut or the room dark But it may be you will tell me All this discourse proceeds on supposition that Faith were a natural act of the mind but you speak of a supernatural Faith It may be so but I hope you speak not of an irrational Faith which must believe things beyond the evidence of their Credibility Faith whether natural or supernatural acquired or infused is still an act of the mind and let it have but what belongs to it as such and call it what you will I deny not a peculiar Operation of Grace in the eliciting the Act of Divine Faith but still I say The manner whereby it is wrought must be agreeable to the nature of the Vnderstanding and by discovering the Credibility which is in the Objects of Faith If you say The Assent is infused I must say The Evidence is first infused for as Christ when he healed the blind did not make them see Objects which did not appear visible so neither doth the Spirit of God in planting Faith make men discern Objects which do not appear credible and the stronger the Assent is the greater is the Evidence and Credibility of the Object And can you call then that any free inevident Assent which goes no further than the Object appears credible It cannot be then any Act of the Will but meerly of the Mind which yields assent to any Object propounded as credible to it So that in what way and manner Assent is required in that same manner doth God give proportionable evidence I deny not but that Assent is required to Objects inevident to sense and reason but then I say The Assent is not required to what is obscure and inevident but to what is evident to us and therefore credible In the Incarnation of the Son of God the manner of the Hypostatical Vnion is to us inevident but then God doth not require our Assent to the Manner but to the Truth of the thing it self Where-ever God requires us to believe any thing as True he gives us evidence that it is so where-ever it appears the thing is inevident we may lawfully suspend our Assent and for all that I know it is our duty so to do But yet you have not done with this profound discourse For you very learnedly distinguish a double proceeding in probations the one is per principia intrinseca which you very well English by intrinsecal Principles i. e. such as have a necessary natural connexion with the things proved and do manifest and lay open the objects themselves the other is per principia extrinseca by extrinsecal Principles that is such as have no natural or necessary connexion with nor do produce any such evident manifestation of the things proved but their efficacy viz. whereby they determine the understanding to assent doth wholly depend on the worth and vertue of that external Principle whereby such probations are made This you apply to Knowledge and Faith that as Knowledge proceeds in the former way so Faith doth in the latter which depends purely upon extrinsecal Principles viz. the Authority Veracity Goodness and Knowledge of God affirming it which was immediately known to the Prophets and Apostles but mediately to us which howâ—ver must be infallibly conveyed to us which can only be by the testimony of the Church This is the substance of your third Section to which I answer 1. That all Certainty in the acts of the Mind whether in Knowledge or Faith must equally suppose the Truth of some extrinsecal Principles viz. the veracity and goodness of God for otherwise we cannot certainly judge of those you call Principia intrinseca to know what things have necessary and natural connexion with the things proved For unless I suppose that God is so True and Good as not to suffer me to be deceived in
is roving and uncertain 2. That notwithstanding his brags he must have recourse to a private spirit himself 3. That though the Bishop would seem to deny it diverse eminent Protestants do resolve their Faith into the private spirit This being the substance of what you say I shall return a particular Answer to each of them For the first you tell us He delivers himself in such a roving way of discourse as signifies nothing in effect as to what he would drive at No that is strange when that which his Lordship drives at is to shew how far this opinion is to be allowed and how far not which he is so far from roving in that he clearly and distinctly propounds the state of the question and the resolution of it which in short is this If by the testimony of the spirit be meant any special revelation of a new object of Faith then he denies the truth of it at least in an ordinary way both because God never sends us to look for such a testimony and because it would expose men to the danger of Enthusiasms but if by the testimony of the Spirit be meant the habit or the act of Divine infused Faith by vertue of which they believe the object which appears credible then he grants the truth but denyes the pertinency of it because it is quite out of the state of the question which inquires only after a sufficient means to make this object credible against all impeachment of folly and temerity in believing whether men do actually believe or not And withal adds that the question is of such outward and evident means as other men may take notice of as well as our selves Judge you now whether this may be called roving if it be so I can freely excuse you from it in all the discourses I have met with in your Book who abhorre nothing more then a true stating and methodical handling any question But yet say you the Bishop cannot free himself from that imputation of recurring to the private Spirit against any that should press the business home Sure you refer us here to some one else who is able to press a business home for you never attempt it your self and instead of that only produce a large testimony out of A. C. That he did not acquit the Bishop wholly of this Whether he did or no is to little purpose and yet those very words which his Lordship cites are in your testimony produced out of him Only what you add more from him that he must be driven to it that his Lordship denies and neither A. C. or you have been able to prove it But though the Bishop seems not only to deny any such private revelation himself but will not confess that any Protestants hold it yet you say there can be no doubt in this since Calvin and Whitaker do both so expresly own it But according to those principles laid down before both these testimonies are easily answered For 1. Neither of them doth imply any private revelation of any new object but only a particular application of the evidence appearing in Scripture to the conscience of every Believer 2. That these testimonies do not speak of the external evidence which others are capable of but of the internal satisfaction of every ones conscience Therefore Calvin saith Si conscientiis optimè consultum volumus c. if we will satisfie our own consciences not If we will undertake to give a sufficient reason to others of our Faith So Whitaker Esse enim dicimus certius illustrius testimonium quo nobis persuadeatur hos libros esse sacros c. There is a more certain and noble testimony by which we may be perswaded that these Books are sacred viz. that of the Holy Ghost 3. Neither of these testimonies affirm any more than the more judicious Writers among your selves do Your Canus asserts the necessity of an internal efficient cause by special assistance of the Spirit moving us to believe besides and beyond all humane authorities and motives which of themselves are not sufficient to beget Faith and this a little after he calls Divinum quoddam lume◠incitans ad credendum A divine light moving us to believe and again Interius lumen infusum à Spirit◠Sancto An inward light infused by the Spirit of God There is nothing in the sayings of the most rigid Protestants is more hard to explain or vindicate from a private revelation then this is if as you say one would press it home Nay hath not your own Stapleton Calvins very phrase of the necessity of the secret testimony of the Spirit that one believe the testimony and judgement of the Church concerning Scripture And is there not then as much danger of Enthusiasm in believing the Testimony of your Church as in believing the Scriptures Nay doth not your Gregory de Valentiâ rather go higher then the testimonies by you produced out of Calvin and Whitaker on this very subject in the beginning of his discourse of the resolution of Faith It is God himself saith he in the first place which must convince and perswade the minds of men of the truth of the Christian Doctrine and consequently of the Sacred Scriptures by some inward instinct and impulse as it appears from Scripture it self is fully explained by Prosper If you will then undertake to clear this inward instinct and impulse upon the minds of men whereby they are perswaded of the truth of Christianity and Scripture from Enthusiasm and a private spirit you may as easily do it for the utmost which is said by Calvin or Whitaker or any other Protestant Divine This therefore is only an argument of your desire to cavil and as such I will pass it over For what concerns the influence which the Spirit hath in the resolution of Faith it will be enquired into afterwards The last way mentioned in order to the resolution of Faith is that of Reason which his Lordship saith cannot be denyed to have some place to come in and prove what it can According to which he tells us no man can be hindred from weighing the tradition of the Church the inward motives in Scripture it self all testimonies within which seem to bear witness to it and in all this saith he there is no harm the danger is when a man will use no other scale but reason or prefer reason before any other scale Reason then can give no supernatural ground into which a man may resolve his Faith that the Scripture is the word of God infallibly yet Reason can go so high as it can prove that Christian Religion which rests upon the authority of this Book stands upon surer grounds of nature reason common equity and justice then any thing in the world which any Infidel or meer naturalist hath done doth or can adhere unto against it in that which he makes accounts or assumes as Religion to himself This
absolute Command can by any means whatsoever afterwards become necessary 3. Whether the Church hath power by any Proposition or Definition to make any thing become necessary to Salvation and to be believed as such which was not so before These three I suppose you cannot deny but will take in all that is considerable in this Controversie Which I shall with the more care examine because nothing tends more to the peace of the Christian World than a through and clear discussion of it and nothing causeth more the Schisms and Divisions of it than the want of a right and due conception of it 1. What the Grounds are on which any thing doth become necessary to Salvation For our better understanding of which we must consider two things 1. What things are necessary to the Salvation of men as such or considered in their single and private capacities 2. What things are necessary to be owned in order to Salvation by Christian Societies or as the bonds and conditions of Ecclesiastical Communion The want of understanding this distinction of the necessity of things hath caused most of the perplexities and confusion in this Controversie of Fundamentals 1. What those things are which are necessary to the Salvation of particular persons But that we make all as clear as possible in a matter of so great intricacy two things again must be inquired into 1. What the Ground is why any thing becomes necessary to be believed in order to Salvation 2. What the Measure and Extent is of those things which are to be believed by particular persons as necessary to Salvation 1. What the Ground or Foundation is on which things become necessary to be believed by particular persons And that which is the true ground of the necessity why any thing is to be believed is the proper ratio of a Fundamental Article For I suppose it a much clearer notion of Fundamentals to understand them not as Principles from whence Deductions may be drawn of Theological Truths but in regard of that immediate respect which they have to mens Salvation Those things therefore which are necessary to be explicitly believed by particular persons are Fundamentals in order to their Salvation Now all belief in this case supposing Divine Revelation nothing can be imagined to be necessary to be believed but what may be certainly known to be of Divine Revelation But when we consider that besides the general reason of believing what God hath revealed we must either suppose that all things are of equal necessity which are revealed in order to the general end of this Revelation or that some things therein contained are expresly necessary to the end and other things to be believed on the general account of Faith so far as they are known to be of Divine Revelation Now from hence ariseth a twofold necessity of things to be believed the first more general and large the second more particular and absolute The first depends upon the formal reason of Faith the second on the particular end of Divine Revelation That which depends on the formal reason of that Assent we call Faith is that which supposeth Divine Veracity or the impossibility of Gods deceiving us in any thing revealed by Him now this extends to all things whatsoever which are supposed by men to be of Divine Revelation For though men may mistake in the matter yet the reason of Assent holding under that mistake they are bound necessarily to believe whatever is supposed by them to be Divine Revelation Here lyes no difficulty in the ground of Faith but all the care is to be used in the search into the matters which are to be believed on the account of this Revelation But here we are to consider that the only thing which is in general and absolutely necessary to Salvation is the general act of Faith viz. Believing whatever God reveals to be true else God's Veracity would be call'd in question but particular objects cannot be said on this account to be absolutely and universally necessary but only so far as there are sufficient convictions that those particulars are of Divine Revelation And the more general and extensive the means of conviction are the more large and universal is the obligation to Faith As that the Scriptures contain in them the Word of God is a matter of more universal obligation than particular things therein revealed because the belief of the one depends upon the acknowledgement of the other And withall supposing it believed that the matters contained in Scripture are of Divine Revelation yet all things are not equally clear to all capacities that they are therein contained Which is a sufficient ground for us to say It was not God's intention that all things contained in his Word should be believed with the same degree of necessity by all persons And therefore though the general reason of Faith depends on Gods Veracity yet the particular obligation to the belief of particular things as revealed by God depends on the means whereby we may be assured that such things are revealed by him which means admitting of so great Variety as to the circumstances and capacities of particular persons there can be no general Rule set down what things are necessary to be believed by all particular persons For those who have greater means of knowledge a larger capacity and clearer proposal are bound to believe more things explicitly than those who want all these or have a lower degree of them In which case it is an unreasonable thing to say that such a one who dis-believes any thing propounded to him as a matter of Faith doth presently call in question God's Veracity for he may as firmly believe that as any in general and yet may have ground to question whether God's Veracity be at all concerned in that which is propounded to him as a matter of Faith because he sees no reason to believe that this was ever revealed by God And by this a clear answer is given to that Question which you propose Whether all those Truths which are sufficiently proposed to any Christian as defined by the Church for matter of Faith can be dis-believed by such a Christian without mortal and damnable sin which unrepented destroyes Salvation To which the answer is easie upon the grounds here assigned for this question concerning particular persons and particular objects of Faith the resolution of it doth depend upon the sufficiency of the means to convince such a person that whatever is propounded as Defined by the Church for a matter of Faith is certainly and truly so For to instance in any one of those new Articles of Faith Transubstantiation or the Pope's Supremacy c. you tell me These are necessary to be believed or at least cannot be dis-believed without sin which is all one in this case supposing clear conviction for then what cannot be dis-believed without sin must be explicitly believed I desire to know the grounds why they may not you tell me These
judgement or not sufficiently versed in the Scriptures as at present to make them acknowledge the places are not so clear as they imagined them to be yet they being alwaies otherwise interpreted by the Catholick Church or the Christian Societies of all ages layes this potent prejudice against all such attempts as not to believe such interpretations true till they give a just account why if the belief of these Doctrines were not necessary the Christians of all ages from the Apostles times did so unanimously agree in them that when any began first to oppose them they were declared and condemned for Hereticks for their pains So that the Church of England doth very piously declare her consent with the Ancient Catholick Church in not admitting any thing to be delivered as the sense of Scripture which is contrary to the consent of the Catholick Church in the four first ages Not as though the sense of the Catholick Church were pretended to be any infallible Rule of interpreting Scripture in all things which concern the Rule of Faith but that it is a sufficient Prescription against any thing which can be alledged out of Scripture that if it appear contrary to the sense of the Catholick Church from the beginning it ought not to be looked on as the true meaning of the Scripture All this security is built upon this strong presumption that nothing contrary to the necessary Articles of Faith should he held by the Catholick Church whose very being depends upon the belief of those things which are necessary to Salvation As long therefore as the Church might appear to be truly Catholick by those correspondencies which were maintained between the several parts of it that what was refused by one was so by all so long this unanimous and uncontradicted sense of the Catholick Church ought to have a great sway upon the minds of such who yet profess themselves members of the Catholick Church From whence it follows that such Doctrines may well be judged destructive to the Rule of Faith which were so unanimously condemned by the Catholick Church within that time And thus much may suffice for the first Inquiry viz. What things are to be esteemed necessary either in order to Salvation or in order to Ecclesiastical Communion 2. Whether any thing which was not necessary to Salvation may by any means whatsoever afterwards become necessary so that the not believing it becomes damnable and unrepented destroyes Salvation We suppose the Question to proceed on such things as could not antecedently to such an act whereby they now become necessary be esteemed to be so either from the matter or from any express command For you in terms assert a necessity of believing distinct from the matter and absolute command and hath the Churches Definition for its formal object which makes the necessity of our Faith continually to depend upon the Churches Definition but this strange kind of Ambulatory Faith I shall now shew to be repugnant to the design of Christ and his Apostles in making known Christian Religion and to all evidence of Reason and directly contrary to the plain and uncontradicted sense of the Primitive and Catholick Church 1. It is contrary to the design of Christ and his Apostles in making known the Christian Religion to the world For if the design of Christ was to declare whatever was necessary to the Salvation of mankind if the Apostles were sent abroad for this very end then either they were very unfaithful in discharge of their trust or else they taught all things necessary for their Salvation and if they did so how can any thing become necessary which they did never teach Was it not the great Promise concerning the Messias that at his coming the Earth should be full of the Knowledge of the Lord as the Waters cover the Sea that then they shall all be taught of God Was not this the just expectation of the people concerning him That when he came he would tell them all things Doth not he tell his Disciples That all things I have heard of my Father I have made known unto you And for all this is there something still remaining necessary to Salvation which neither he nor his Disciples did ever make known to the world Doth not he promise Life and Salvation to all such as believe and obey his Doctrine And can any thing be necessary for eternal life which he never declared or did he only promise it to the men of that Age and Generation and leave others to the mercy of the Churches Definitions If this be so we have sad cause to lament our condition upon whom these heavy loyns of the Church are fallen how happy had we been if we had lived in Christs or the Apostles times for then we might have been saved though we had never believed the Pope's Supremacy or Transubstantiation or Invocation of Saints or Worshipping Images but now the case is altered these Milstones are now hung about our necks and how we shall swim to Heaven with them who knows How strangely mistaken was our Saviour when he said Blessed are they that have not seen and yet have believed For much more blessed certainly were they who did see him and believe in him for then he would undertake for their Salvation but now it seems we are out of his reach and turned over to the Merciless Infallibility of the present Church When Christ told his Disciples His yoke was easie and burden light he little thought what Power he had left in the Church to lay on so much load as might cripple mens belief were it not for a good reserve in a corner call'd Implicit Faith When he sent the Apostles to teach all that he commanded them he must be understood so that the Church hath power to teach more if she pleases and though the Apostles poor men were bound up by this commission and S. Peter himself too yet his Infallible Successors have a Paramount Priviledge beyond them all Though the Spirit was promised to the Apostles to lead them into all Truth yet there must be no incongruity in saying They understood not some necessary Truths for how should they when never revealed as Transubstantiation Supremacy c. Because though they never dreamt of such things yet the Infallible Church hath done it since for them and to say truth though the Apostles names were put into the promise yet they were but Feoffees in trust for the Church and the benefit comes to the Church by them For they were only Tutors to the Church in its minority teaching it some poor Rudiments of Christ and Heaven of Faith and Obedience c. But the great and Divine Mysteries of the seven Sacraments Indulgences Worship of Images Sacrifice of the Mass c. were not fit to be made known till the Church were at age her self and knew how to declare her own mind When S. Paul speaks so much of the great Mysteries hidden from Ages and Generations but
them To which you answer 1. It is not credible that Bellarmine who writ so much of Controversie should not have read that Council nor can there be any suspicion of his conâ—ealing the matter had he found it there c. and therefore you suspend your Assent till the Council's words be produced 2. You tell us That it is not enough to prove that Pelagianism was condemned by a General Council because some who were Pelagians were but say you They were condemned not for Pelagianism but Nestorianism and therefore his Lordship shoots wide of the mark Your Argument from Bellarmine will have no great force with them who see no reason to admire his fidelity and they who enquire into the matter of fact in the present debate will have cause to suspect it The short account whereof is this After that Julianus Florus Orontius Fabius and others had been deposed and banished in the Western Churches for the Pelagian Heresie they fly to Constantinople and shroud themselves under the protection of Nestorius the Patriarch there who secretly favoured them and writ several Letters to Pope Celestine in behalf of them who is supposed to have received his Doctrine of the person of Christ from the Pelagians But when he saw that no good was to be done by these Letters but by the daily spreading of Nestorianism the Emperour was forced to summon a Council at Ephesus A. D. 431. The Pelagians accompany Nestorius thither and joyn with Johannes Antiochenus and his party in opposition to the Synod But the Council understanding the proceedings which had been in the Western Churches against the Pelagians ratifies and confirms their deposition as appears by the Synodal Epistle of the Council to Pope Celestine which is extant in the Acts of the Ephesine Council and in the Epistles of Cyril of Alexandria And besides this some of the Canons of that Council do equally concern Celestius and Nestorius the first Canon decreeing as well the favourers of Celestius as Nestorius to be excommunicate and the fourth dereeing the Deposition of all such who should embrace either of them And therefore it is truly said by Jansenius that the Pelagian Heresie and the Bishops who favoured it were again condemned by an Oecumenical Council And thence Prosper in the Epitaph of the Nestorian and Pelagian Heresies as he makes the Nestorian only an Off-spring of the Pelagian so he makes both of them to fall and be condemned together From whence it appears that the Pelagians were not condemned in the Ephesine Council meerly for Nestorianism but for their proper and peculiar sentiments the former deposition of them being ratified by the Council and a new Canon made to that purpose for the future And now let the Reader judge whether his Lordship or Bellarmine were herein the more mistaken His Lordship adds If this Heresie were condemned only by a National Council then the full Authority of the Church here is no more than the full Authority of this Church of Africk And I hope saith he That Authority doth doth not make all Points defined by it to be Fundamental You will say Yes if that Council be confirmed by the Pope And then I must ever wonder why S. Augustine should say The full Authority of the Church and not bestow one word upon the Pope by whose Authority only that Council as all other have their fulness of Authority in your judgement An inexpiable Omission if this Doctrine concerning the Pope were true To this you answer That there was no need of any special mention of the Pope in speaking of the Authority of the Church because his Authority is alwaies chiefly supposed as being Head of the whole Church But by whom was this supposed by you or by S. Augustine Can you prove that S. Austin or any of the African Fathers did ever suppose any such thing that the Pope being Head of the Church his Authority is chiefly supposed in the Acts of National Councils Where was the supposal of this Authority in the Dispute between the African Fathers and the Popes in the case of Appeals These are suppositions only to be obtruded upon ignorant Novices and such who look no further into Antiquity than the Implicit Faith in their Priests will give them leave But what a stranger to all true Antiquity this supposition of the Pope's being Head of the Church is we shall see abundantly when we come to the Controversie of the Pope's Authority Yet granting the Supposition true than which nothing can be more false when the main strength lyes not in the bare Definition of a National Council which you grant of it self hath not full Authority but in the confirmation of that Decision by the Pope which makes that Authority full which was not so before Was it not necessary to declare that the Pope did concurr to the giving it full Authority which without it could not be had You do not say That all National Councils have this full Authority not being confirmed by the Pope if therefore S. Augustine designed to shew that Council to have full Authority the only way to prove it was to produce the Pope's Confirmation of it which cannot therefore be otherwise looked on than as an inexpiable Omission if your Doctrine be true for he left out that which was only pertinent and material to the business Your parallel between S. Austin and your self which is a very worthy one in leaving out the mention of the Pope's Authority when it is understood will then hold when you produce as great evidence that S. Austin was a Jesuit as we have from your principles that you are When you give as manifest proof that the Pope's Power is necessary to all Definitions of Councils as there is in our Laws for our Kings assenting to Acts of Parliament we may give you leave to parallel the Omission of the express mention of one with the other If the Definitions of Ancient Councils did run in the name of Pope and Council as our Acts of Parliament in the name of the King and both Houses we might easily say the Authority of them came from the Pope as of these from the King but there is nothing of that nature but much of the contrary as will appear in due time When you therefore prove that the Pope's Power is implied though it be not mentioned you must prove it by some evident Confession that no Authority of a Council was full unless the Pope concurred with it else you may as well say That the great Mogul hath no full Authority to decree any thing without the Pope's consent for I dare say There is no denial of it in any of his Laws And yet that is more than can be said here for we have sufficient testimony from the records of that age That the Pope's Authority was not supposed necessary to Councils from his being Head of the Church What follows p. 34. n. 5 6. depends wholly upon the
have had Antiquity Vniversality and Consent which had not so such as the business of not rebaptizing Hereticks and the observation of Easter which you instance in And withall we add though nothing is to be admitted for matter of Faith which wants those three marks yet some things may have all three of them and yet be no matters of Faith at all and therefore not at all pertinent to this question Such as those things are which you insist on as deposita dogmata which doubtless is a rare way of probation viz. to shew that by dogmata deposita Vincentius means some articles of Faith which are not Fundamental in the matter of them and for that make choice of such instances which are no matters of faith at all but either ritual traditions or matters of order such as the form and matter of Sacraments the Hierarchy of the Church Paedobaptism not rebaptizing Hereticks the perpetual virginity of the Virgin Mary For that of the Canon of Scripture it will be elsewhere considered as likewise those other Church-traditions How the Church should still keep hoc idem quod antea as you confess she ought and yet make some things necessary to be believed by all which before her declaration were not so is somewhat hard to conceive and yet both these you assert together Is that which is necessary to be believed by all the same with that which was not necessary to be so believed if the same measure of Faith will not serve after which would have done before is there not an alteration made Yes you grant as to our believing but not as to the thing for that is the same it was But do you in the mean time consider what kind of thing that is which you speak of which is a thing propounded to be believed and considered in no other respect but as it is revealed by God in order to our believing it now when the same thing which was required only to be believed implicitely i. e. not at all necessarily is now propounded to be believed expresly and necessarily the Fundamental nature of it as an object of Faith is altered For that which you call implicite Faith doth really imply as to all those things to be believed implicitely that there is an indifferency whether they be believed or no nothing being necessary to be believed but what is propounded to be expresly believed Which being so Can it be imagined there should be a greater alteration in a matter of Faith then from its being indifferent whether it were believed or no to become necessary to be expresly believed by all in order to Salvation And where there is such an alteration as this in the thing to be believed who can without the help of a very commodious implicite Faith believe that still this is hoc idem quod antea the very same as a matter of Faith which it was before Though the Church were careful to preserve every Iota and tittle of Sacred Doctrines yet I hope it follows not that every Iota and tittle is of as much consequence and as necessary to be believed as the main substance of Christian Doctrine Although when any Doctrine was violently opposed in the Church she might declare her owning it by some overt act yet thence it doth not follow that the internal assent to every thing so declared is as necessary as to that proposition that Jesus is the Son of God the belief of which the Scripture tells us was the main design of the writing of Scripture That General Councils rightly proceeding may be great helps to the Faith of Christians I know none that deny but that by vertue of their definitions any thing becomes necessary to be believed which was not so before remains yet to be proved You much wonder his Lordship should father that saying on Vincentius That If new Doctrines be added to the old the Church which is Sacrarium veritatis the repository of verity may be changed in Lupanar errorum which his Lordship saith he is loth to English for you tell us That Vincentius is so far from entertaining the least thought of it that he presently adds Deus avertat God forbid it should be so A stout Inference Just as if one should say The Church of Rome may be in time overspread with the Mahumetan Religion but God forbid it should be so Were he not an excellent Disputer who should hence inferr it impossible ever to be so What you add out of Vincentius only proves that he did not believe it was so in his time but doth not in the least prove that he believed it impossible that ever it should be so afterwards but notwithstanding all that you say it is evident enough that Vincentius believed it a very supposable Case by that question he puts elsewhere What if any new contagion doth not only endeavour to defile a part only but the whole Church in which he saith we are to adhere to antiquity If you answer he speaks only of an endeavour it is soon replyed That he speaks of such an endeavour as puts men to dispute a question what they are to do in such a Case and he resolves at that time they are not to adhere to the judgement of the present Church but to that of Antiquity which is all we desire in that Case viz. That the present Church may so far add to matters of Faith that we can in no reason be obliged to rely only upon her judgement Wherein we are to consider the Question is not of that you call the diffusive but the representative Church all which may be overspread and yet but a part of the other but yet if that Church whose judgement you say only is to be relyed on may be so infected it is all one as to those who are to be guided by her judgement whether the other be or no. For here eadem est ratio non entis non apparentis because it is not the reality but the manifestation which is the ground of mens relying on the Churches judgement So that if as to all outward appearance and all judicial acts of the Church she may recede from the ancient Faith and add novitia veteribus whether all particular persons in it do so or no all ground of relying on the judgement of that Church is thereby taken away Whether it be the Church her self or Hereticks in the Church which make these additions is very little material if these Hereticks who add these new articles of Faith may carry themselves so cunningly as to get to themselves the reputation of the Catholick Church and so that which ought to have been Sacrarium veritatis may become impiorum turpium errorum Lupanar which your Church is concerned not to have Englished but by the help of Rider and other good Authours of yours it is no hard matter to come to understand it And thus we see how much you have abused his Lordship
the liberty it indulgeth them in sin here and yet the hopes it gives them of heaven hereafter Our doctrine requires indispensable obedience to all the precepts of Christ Yours tells them those which are the most strict and severe are not precepts but counsels of perfection Ours That there is no hope of Salvation without hearty amendment of life Yours That Pennance is requisite and external satisfaction to the Church and for internals that Contrition is very commendable but if there be not that Attrition will serve the turn Ours Charges men to look to their Salvation in this life because when life is ended their estate is irrecoverable Yours That though men dye in their sins yet they may be relieved by the prayers of the living and that there is hope they may get through Purgatory to Heaven at last So that supposing any persons to own Christianity to be true it is hard to conceive there should be more Artifices imagined to reconcile the Love of the pleasures of sin here with the hopes of Heaven at last than are used by those of your Profession So that if I should suppose my self a Heathen Philosopher and any of your Profession should come and tell me These were the Precepts and these the Promises of Christian Religion but I could believe none of them but by the Infallible proposition of your Church and that I was to know your Church Infallible by that Sanctity of life which was in it when I had throughly considered not only the impieties committed by the great ones of your Religion even in Rome in the first place but the Artifices used to enervate all the Precepts of real Sanctity and so plainly to see what interest and design is carried on under all these disguises I should be insuperably assaulted with the thoughts that those of your Religion who were the Authours of these things were so far from believing your Church Infallible that they really believed neither Christian nor any other Religion in the world So much for that Sanctity of life which is in your Chuch As for your other motives of Vnity Succession Antiquity and the name of Catholick c. they have so little affinity with any pretence of Infallibility and do equally agree to those Churches as the Greek and Abyssine which you are so far from acknowledging Infallible that you will not grant them to be true Churches notwithstanding these Motives that I cannot easily imagine to what end you produced them unless to let us see you had the gift of saying something though nothing to the purpose When you have thus apparently failed in producing any shadow of proof for your Churches Infallibility by these motives of credibility we now come to see how good you are at the defensive part who have been so unhappy in your Attempts Therefore we must consider what arts you use in putting by the force of those arguments which are produced against you by his Lordship After he had urged that question against you How it may appear that your Church is infallibly governed by the Holy Ghost to which we have seen how impossible it is for you to give any satisfactory answer he proceeds to another Argument which lies in these words Besides this is an inviolable ground of reason That the principles of any conclusion must be of more credit then the conclusion it self Therefore if the Articles of Faith the Trinity the Resurrection and the rest be the conclusions and the Principles by which they are proved be only Ecclesiastical Tradition it must needs follow that the tradition of the Church is more infallible then the Articles of Faith if the Faith which we have of the Articles should be finally resolved into the veracity of the Churches Testimony To this your Answer is very considerable 1. You tell us That the ground of all this discourse is the authority of Aristotle cited in the Margent which you repeat after him But I pray Whence learn'd you that this was all the ground of his discourse For his Lordship doth not say that Aristotle saith so and therefore it is so but saies That it is an inviolable ground of reason which words you prudently left out that there might appear some shadow for such a cavil and cites only the concurrent testimony of Aristotle with that evidence of reason which is in it And will you deny this to be an undoubted principle in reason that That which is assumed as the ground and reason why I assent to any thing must be more certain and evident then that is which I assent to on that ground Certainly you must have an art above all other men to make the superstructure stronger then the foundation the particular Problems in Mathematicks more evident then the Postulata the conclusion surer then the Premisses But you think to come off this absurdity 2. By distinguishing between Science and Faith or as you express it between the proceeding of the understanding when it works naturally and necessarily by and from the evidence and clearness of its object and when it works supernaturally and produceth supernatural and free acts meerly or at least principally from the impulse and inclination of the will for in such cases the Maxim holds not viz. That the principles of a Conclusion must be of more credit then the conclusion it self Now the act of believing is such an act that is which the understanding elicites rather by a voluntary and free inclination and consent of the will then from any evident certainty in the object whereto it assents A most judicious and profound discourse to which I know not whether ever I can perswade my will but I am sure I never shall my understanding Lest you should think it is only some impulse of my will which hinders my assent I shall fairly lay down the Reasons which keep me from it 1. That all assent of the understanding is grounded upon evidence 2. That however that evidence proceeds yet the Foundation of assent must be more evident then the thing assented to And these two I suppose will fully reach the scope of your Answer by shewing that your distinction of acts natural and supernatural is both untrue and impertinent 1. That all assent is grounded upon evidence i. e. that no man can assent to any thing meerly because he will but there must be sufficient reason inducing and perswading to that assent You acknowledge this to be true in acts of Knowledge but not of Faith but What do you make to be the genus in your definition of Faith I suppose you will say it is an assent of the mind If it be so the mind cannot be supposed to elicite an act of the same nature in so repugnant a manner to it self that it should assent to any thing without evidence I know what discourses those of your party have concerning the obscurity which is necessary to Faith If you mean obscurity as to the object believed i. e.
the proper actings of my Faculties I may judge such things to have connexions and depâ—ndencies one upon another which really have nothing so And therefore so far your distinction concerning Science and Faith will not hold But 2. If the meaning of this distinction be only this That there is a different proceeding in a demonstration from what there is in an act of Faith I deny it not but suppose it nothing to your purpose For though the evidence be discovered in a different way yet there is in both proportionable evidence to the nature of the Assent When I assent because I know that the thing is true the evidence of the thing it self is the ground of that Assent but when I assent upon the Authority of any person the Credibility of his Testimony is the evidence on which that Assent is grounded Though this latter evidence be of another kind yet it is sufficient for that act of the mind which is built upon it and that Testimony which I establish a firm Assent upon must be as evident in its kind i. e. of Credibility as the evidence of a thing demonstrable in the nature of a Demonstration 3. The main strength of your Answer seems to lye in this That in such an Assent as is built upon Authority as in the case of Faith when we do not immediately hear God speaking but it is conveyed to us by the Testimony of others it is necessary that this Testimony be infallible But good Sir this is not our present Question Whether it be necessary that this Testimony be infallibly conveyed to us but supposing such an infallible Conveyance Whether that infallible Testimony must not be more credible than the matters which are believed upon it But as though never any such thing had been started You give us a long discourse of the different proceeding of Science and Faith but never offer to apply it to the business in hand I must therefore ingenuously commend you for an excellent Art of gliding insensibly away from a business you cannot answer and casting out a great many words not to the purpose that you may seem to touch the matter when you are far enough from it And therefore I say Secondly That however the evidence proceeds in matters of Faith yet whatever is the Foundation of Assent must be more evident than the thing assented to Especially where you suppose the Assent to be infallible and the Testimony infallible which must ascertain it to us This will be plainer by an instance If I ask you Why you believe the Resurrection of the dead your Answer is because of the Authority of him that reveals it The next Question then is Why you believe that God hath revealed it your Answer is Because the Testimony of the Church is infallible which delivers it Whereby it is plain That though your first Answer be from God's Authority yet the last resolution of your Faith is the Infallibility of your Churches Testimony and that being the last resolution that Infallibility must be the Principle on which the belief of the rest depends For according to your Principles though God had revealed it yet if this Revelation were not attested by the infallible Testimony of your Church we should not have sufficient ground to believe it And if without that we can have no sufficient ground to believe then this Principle The Church is infallible must be more credible than the Resurrection of the dead Which was the Absurdity his Lordship charged upon you and you are far from being able to quit your self of The next thing which you busie your self much in answering of is That according to these Principles of resolution of Faith you make the Churches Testimony the formal Object of Faith which you acknowledge your self to be a great Absurdity and therefore make use of many shifts to avoid I shall reduce the substance of your verbose and immethodical Answer into as narrow a compass as I can without defalking any thing of the strength of it You tell us then That our Faith is resolved into God's Revelations whether written or unwritten as its Formal Object and our Infallible Assurance that the things we believe as God's Revelations are revealed from him is resolved into the Infallibility of the Churches Definitions teaching us that they are his Revelations And that the Formal Cause of our Assent in Divine Faith is God's Revelation delivered to the Church without writing but because that is as it were at distance from us it is approximated or immediately applied to us by the infallible Declaration of the present Church Hence it appears our Faith rests only upon God's Revelation as its Formal Object though the Churches Voice be a condition so necessary for its resting thereon that it can never attain that Formal Object without it And lastly you tell us The Churches Authority then being more known to us than the Scriptures may well be some reason of our admitting them yet the Scriptures still retain their prerogative above the Church and thence you distinguish of the certainty of the Object and Subject from all which you conclude That the Churches Definition is not the Formal Object of Faith but that our Faith relyes upon it as an Infallible Witness both of the written and unwritten Word of God which is the Formal Object This is the substance in your long Answer of what hath the face of reason and pertinency Which I come to a close and particular examination of And that you may not say I pass over this important Controversie without a through discussion of it I shall first prove that it necessarily follows from your Principles That the Churches Infallible Testimony must be the Formal Object of Faith And 2. That the Answers you give are far from being satisfactory that it is not 1. That it necessarily follows from your Principles That the Churches Infallible Testimony must be the Formal Object of Faith In order to which we must consider what the scope and design of this Discourse is concerning the Resolution of Faith The Question started by Mr. Fisher in the Conference was How his Lordship knew Scripture to be Scripture or How the Divine Authority of the Scriptures was to be proved To this his Lordship returns a large Answer to which you attempt a Reply in this Chapter and mention this to be the main Question How Scriptures may be known to be the Word of God To this you tell us No satisfactory Answer can be given but from the infallible Testimony of the Church and the great reason given by you in all your discourse is this That this is an Article to be believed with Divine Faith and Divine Faith must be built on an Infallible Testimony The Question then resulting hence is Whether on these Principles you do not make the Infallible Testimony of the Church the Formal Object of Faith You deny and we affirm it but before I come to the particular Evidences of the Cause
answer that when you say It is necessary we must believe the Scriptures to be the VVord of God with Divine Faith this Divine Faith must be taken in one of these three senses either first that Faith may be said to be Divine which hath a Divine Revelation for its Material Object as that Faith may be said to be a Humane Faith which is conversant about natural causes and the effects of them And in this sense it cannot but be a Divine Faith which is conversant about the Scripture because it is a Divine Revelation Or secondly a Faith may be said to be Divine in regard of its Testimony or Formal Object and so that is called a Divine Faith which is built on a Divine Testimony and that a Humane Faith which is built on a Humane Testimony Thus I assert all that Faith which respects particular Objects of Faith supposing the belief of the Scriptures is in this sense Divine because it is built on a properly Divine Testimony but the Question is Whether that Act of Faith which hath the whole Scripture as its Material Object be in that sense Divine or no. Thirdly Faith may be said to be Divine in regard of the Divine Effects it hath upon the soul of man as it is said in Scripture to purifie the heart overcome the world resist Satan and his Temptations receive Christ c. And this is properly a Divine Faith and there is no Question but every Christian ought to have this Divine Faith in his soul without which the other sorts of Divine Faith will never bring men to Heaven But it is apparent that all who heartily profess to believe the Scriptures to be the VVord of God have not this sort of Divine Faith though they have so firm an assent to the Truth and Authority of it that they durst lay down their lives for it The Assent therefore we see may be firm where the effects are not saving The Question now is Whether this may be called a Divine Faith in the second sense that is Whether it must be built on a Testimony infallible For clearing which we must further consider the meaning of this Question How we know Scripture to be Scripture which may import two things How we know that all these Books contain God's VVord in them Or secondly How we know the Doctrine contained in these Books to be Divine If you then ask me Whether it be necessary that I believe with such a Faith as is built on Divine Testimony that these Books called the Scripture contain the principles of the Jewish and Christian Religion in them which we call God's VVord I deny it and shall do so till you shew me some further necessity of it than you have done yet and my reason is because I may have sufficient ground for such an Assent without any Divine Testimony But if you ask me On what ground I believe the Doctrine to be Divine which is contained in those Books I then answer affirmatively On a Divine Testimony because God hath given abundant evidence that this Doctrine was of Divine Revelation Thus you see what little reason you have to triumph in your Argument from Divine Faith inferring the necessity of an unwritten VVord of God But the further explication of these things must be reserved till I come to the positive part of our way of resolution of Faith I now return Having after your way that is very unsatisfactorily attempted the vindicating your resolution of Faith from the Objections which were offered against it by his Lordship you come now to consider the second way propounded by him for the resolving Faith which is That Scripture should be fully and sufficiently known as by divine and infallible Testimony by the resplendency of that light which it hath in it self only and by the witness it can so give to it self against which he gives such evident reasons that you acknowledge the Relator himself hath sufficiently confuted it and you agree with him in the Confutation Yet herein you grow very angry with him for saying That this Doctrine may agree well enough with your grounds in regard you hold that Tradition may be known for God's VVord by its own light and consequently the like may be said of Scripture This you call aspersing you and obtruding falshoods upon you Whether it be so or no must appear upon examination Two Testimonies are cited from A. C. to this purpose the first is Tradition of the Church is of a Company which by its own light shews it self to be infallibly assisted Your Answer is That the word which must properly relate to the preceding word Company and not to the more remote word Tradition But what of all this Doth any thing the less follow which the Bishop charged A. C. with For it being granted by you That there can be no knowing an Apostolical Tradition but for the Infallibility of the present Church the same light which discovers the Infallibility of that Company doth likewise discover the Truth of Tradition If therefore your Church doth appear infallible by its own light which is your own confession May not the Scripture as well appear infallible by its own light For is there not as great self-evidence at least that the Scripture is infallible as that your Church is infallible And therefore that way you take to shift the Objection makes it return upon you with greater force For I pray tell me how any Company can appear by its own Light to be assisted by the Holy Ghost and not much more the Holy Scripture to be divine Especially seeing you must at last be forced to derive this Infallibility from the Scriptures For you pretend to no other Infallibility than what comes by a promise of the immediate assistance of the Holy Ghost How then can any Company appear by its own Light to be thus infallibly assisted unless it first appear by its own Light that there was such a Promise and how can that unless it antecedently appear by its own Light that the Scripture in which the Promise is written is the VVord of God You tell us A. C ' s. intention is only to affirm That the Church is known by her Motives of Credibility which ever accompany her and may very properly be called her own Light How well you are acquainted with A. C ' s. intention I know not neither is it much matter for granting this to have been his intention may not the Scripture be known by her Motives of Credibility as well as the Church and do not these accompany her as much as the Church and may they not be called her Light as properly as those of the Church It is plain then by all the senses and meanings you can find out in the very same that you say the Church may be known by her own Light the Scripture may much more and therefore you have no reason to quarrel with his Lordship or affirming it The second Testimony
this tedious Controversie But this containing very little new in it and therefore deserves not to be handled apart will on that account admit of a quicker dispatch In which the first Section begins with S. Austin's Testimony which should have been considered before and now it comes out with the same Answer attending it which was given so lately concerning primary and infallible and secondary and probable Motives of Faith the vanity of which is sufficiently discovered Whereas in your Margent you bring an example of such a probable Motive viz. when S. Austin saith to Faustus That as constant Tradition was sufficient for him to believe that that Epistle was Manichaeus his which went under his name so the same Tradition was sufficient to him to prove the Gospel was S. Matthew 's which was so universally received for his ever since the writing of it I am so far from thinking this a meer probable Motive that it is the highest evidence the matter is capable of and so S. Austin thought Your paralleling the saying of Waldensis That if the Church should speak any thing contrary to Scripture he would not believe her with another which you pretend to be S. Austin's If the Scripture should speak any thing contrary to the Church we could not believe that neither and then saying that both proceed on an impossible supposition must imply that it is an equal impossibility for the Church to deliver any thing contrary to the Doctrine of Scripture as for the Scripture to contradict it self for to say The Scripture should contradict the Church signifies nothing because the Being of the Church is founded on the Doctrine of Scripture All that S. Austin saith in the place you referr us to comes to no more than this If the Church were found deceived in the Writings of Scripture then there could be no ground of any firm assent to them And is this I pray a fit parallel for that speech of Waldensis Is this to say If the Scripture speak any thing against the Church it is not to be believed In your next Sect. N. 2 3. you fall from Parallels to Circles and Semicircles as you call them in which you only shew us your faculty of mumbling the same things over and over concerning his Lordships mistating the Question about Infallible and Divine Faith Apostolical Tradition the formal Object of Faith which I must out of charity to the Readers patience beg him to look back for the several Answers if he thinks any thing needs it for I am now quite tired with these Repetitions there being not one word added here but what hath been answered already But lest thâ—se should not enough tire us the next Sect. N. 4. consists of the old puff-paste of ultimate Motive and formal Object of the Infallibility which is not simply Divine and others of a like nature whose vanity hath been detected in the very entrance into this Controversie It seems you had a great mind to give the Bishop a blow when you reach as far as from p. 103 to p. 115. to do it and yet fall short of it at last for though you charge him with a false citation of S. Austin for these words fidei ultima resolutio est in Deum illuminantem yet in that Chapter though not the words yet the sense is there extant when he gives that account of Christian Faith That it comes not by the authority of men but from God himself confirming and inlightening our mind Is not here a plain resolution of Faith in Deum illuminantem And therefore your charge of false citation and your confident denial That there is any such Text to be found either there or any where else in all S. Augustine argue you are not careful what you say so you may but throw dirt in your adversaries face though we may easily know from whence it comes by the foulness of your fingers And for your other challenge of producing any Testimony of the Fathers which saith That we must resolve our Faith of Scripture into the Light of Scriptures I hope the Testimonies I have in this Chapter mentioned may teach you a little more modesty and for the other part of it That we cannot believe the Scripture infallibly for the Churches authority as far as a Negative can be proved I dare appeal to the judgement of any one Whether it be possible to believe that the Fathers judged the Certainty much less Infallibility of Christian Faith did depend on the Churches Infallible Testimony and yet never upon the most just occasion do so much as mention it but rather speak very much to the contrary His Lordship having thus at large delivered his mind in this important Controversie to make what he had said the more portable summs up the substance of it in several Considerations Which being only a recapitulation of what hath been fully discussed already will need the shorter Vindication in some brief strictures where you unjustly quarrel with them To his 1. That it seems reasonable that since all Sciences suppose Principles Theology should be allowed some too the chiefest of which is That the Scriptures are of Divine Authority your Answer is considerable viz. that he confounds Theology a discoursive Science with Faith which is an act of the Vnderstanding produced by an Impulse of the Will c. But not to examine what hath been already handled of the power of the Will in the act of Faith it is plain when his Lordship speaks of Theology he means Theology and not Faith and the intent of this Consideration was to shew the unreasonableness of starting this Question in a Theological Dispute about the Church In your Answer to the second you say That Fallible Motives cannot produce Certainty which if you would prove you would do more to the purpose than you have done yet and by this argument I could not be certain whether you had done it or no unless you brought some Infallible Motives to prove it The third you pass over The fourth you grant though not very consistently with what you elsewhere say As to what you say in answer to the fifth concerning Miracles I agree with you in it having elsewhere sufficiently declared my self as to them For the sixth you referr to your former Answer and so do I to the reply to it In the seventh his Lordship proves the necessity of some revelation from God rationally and strongly and thence inferrs That either there never was any such Revelation or that the Scripture is that Revelation and that 's it we Christians labour to make good against all Atheism Prophaneness and Infidelity To which you have two Exceptions 1. That this cannot be proved by the meer Light of Scripture which His Lordship never pretended to 2. That he leaves out the Word only which was the cause of the whole Controversie What between Christians and Atheists For of that Controversie he there speaks but since
Cyprian The second Authority is out of St. Hierome whose words are The Roman Faith commended by the Apostle admits not such praestigiae deceits and delusions into it though an Angel should Preach it otherwise than it was Preached at first being armed and fenced by St. Pauls Authority it cannot be changed Here you tell us You willingly agree with his Lordship that by Romanam fidem St. Hierom understands the Catholick Faith of Christ and so you concur with him against Bellarmine that it cannot be understood of the particular Church of Rome But by the way you charge your Adversaries with great inconsequence that in this place they make Roman and Catholick to be the same and yet usually condemn you for joyning as Synonyma 's Roman and Catholick together A wonderful want of judgement as though the Roman Faith might not be the Catholick Faith then and yet the Catholick Faith not be the Roman Faith now The former speech only affirms that the Faith at Rome was truly Catholick the latter implyes that no Faith can be Catholick but what agrees with Rome and think you there is no difference between these two But you say further That this Catholick Faith must not here be taken abstractly that so it cannot be changed for Ruffinus was not ignorant of that but that it must be understood of the immutable Faith of the See Apostolick so highly commended by the Apostle and St. Hierom which is founded upon such a rock that even an Angel himself is not able to shake it But St. Hierom speaking this with a reference to that Faith he supposeth the Apostle commended in them although the Apostle doth not so much commend the Catholickness or soundness of their Faith as the act of believing in them and therefore whatever is drawn from thence whether by St. Hierome or any else can have no force in it for if he should infeâ— the immutability of the Faith of the Church of Rome from so apparently weak a foundation there can be no greater strength in his testimony than there is in the ground on which it is built and if there be any force in this Argument the Church of Thessalonica will be as Infallible as Rome for her Faith is commended rather in a more ample manner by the Apostle then that of Rome is St. Hierome I say referring to that Faith he supposes the Apostle commended in them must only be understood of the unchangeableness of that first Faith which appears by the mention of an Angel from Heaven Preaching otherwise Which certainly cannot with any tolerable sense be meant thus that St. Hierome supposed it beyond the power of an Angel from Heaven to alter the Faith of the Roman Church For in the very same Apology he expresseth his great fears lest the Faith of the Romans should be corrupted by the Books of Ruffinus But say you What is this then to Ruffinus who knew as well as St. Hierom that Faith could not change its essence However though St. Hierome should here speak of the Primitive and Apostolical Faith which was then received at Rome that this could receive no alteration yet this was very pertinent to be told Ruffinus because St. Hierome charges him with an endeavour to subvert the Faith not meerly at Rome but in all other places by publishing the Books of Origen with an Encomiastick Preface to them and therefore the telling him The Catholick Faith would admit of no alteration which was received at Rome as elsewhere might be an Argument to discourage him from any attempts of that nature And the main charge against Ruffinus is not an endeavour to subvert meerly the people of Rome but the Latin Church by his translation and therefore these words ought to be taken in their greatest latitude and so imply not at all any Infallibility in the Roman See The remaining Testimonies of Gregory Nazianzene Cyril and Ruffinus as appears to any one who reads them only import that the Roman Church had to their time preserved the Catholick Faith but they do not assert it impossible it should ever do otherwise or that she is an Infallible preserver of it and none of their Testimonies are so proper to the Church of Rome but they would equally hold for any other Apostolical Churches at that time Gregory Nazianzene indeed sayes That it would become the Church of Rome to hold the entire Faith alwayes and would it not become any other Church to do so to doth this import that she shall Infallibly do it or rather that it is her duty to do it And if these then be such pregnant Authorities with you it is a sign there is little or nothing to be found in Antiquity for your purpose But before we end this Chapter we are called to a new task on occasion of a Testimony of St. Cyril produced by his Lordship in stead of that in Bellarmin which appeared not in that Chapter where his Name is mentioned In which he asserts That the foundation and firmness which the Church of Christ hath is placed not in or upon the person much less the Successour of St. Peter but upon the Faith which by Gods Spirit in him he so firmly professed which saith his Lordship is the common received opinion both of the ancient Fathers and of the Protestants Vpon this Rock that is upon this Faith will I build my Church On which occasion you run presently out into that large common place concerning Tu es Petrus and super hanc Petram and although I should grant all that you so earnestly contend for viz. That these words are not spoken of St. Peters Confession but of his Person I know no advantage which will accrue to your cause by it For although very many of the Fathers understand this place of St. Peters Confession as containing in it the ground and Foundation of Christian Religion Thou art Christ the Son of the Living God which therefore may well be said to be the Rock on which Christ would build his Church and although it were no matter of difficulty to defend this interpretation from all exceptions yet because I think it not improbable the words running by way of address to St. Peter that something peculiar to him is contained in them I shall not contend with you about that But then if you say that the meaning of St. Peters being the Rock is The constant Infallibility in Faith which was derived from St. Peter to the Church of Rome as you seem to suggest you must remember you have a new task to make good and it is not saying That St. Peter was meant by the Rock will come within some leagues of doing it I pass therefore by that discourse as a thing we are not much concerned in for it is brought in by his Lordship as the last thing out of that testimony of Cyril but you were contented to let go the other more material Observations that you might more
in the safe-conduct he had granted Thus we see how on all hands it appears from Husse's fears and desires the Emperours power the nature of safe-conducts the Emperours own sense of it and the Councils decree that this first Answer hath no ground at all viz. that the safe conduct was granted jure communi and that it was only to hinder unjust violence and not the execution of Justice But besides you say John Husse was justly burnt for two reasons The first is For being obstinate in his Heresie the second For having fled which the Emperour had prohibited in his safe-conduct under pain of death I answer It is not Whether a man obstinate in Heresie may be burnt which is now the Question although that may justly bear a dispute too But Whether one suspected for Heresie and coming to a Council with safe-conduct for coming and returning may be burnt without violation of Faith your first reason then is nothing to the purpose and your second as little First Because there is no certain evidence at all of Husse's flying it not being objected against him by the Emperour who only upbraided him with his obstinacy in his Heresie as the cause of his execution and withall if Husse had fled and had suffered death for that as you say he ought to have done he would not have suffered the death proper to Heresie and not to flying nor been accounted as by all your own Authours he is a sufferer on the account of Heresie But this being a groundless Calumny it needs no further confutation But before we come to your second Answer the case of Hierom of Prague must be discussed so far as it is distinct from that of John Husse who it seems was trepanned by a pretended safe-conduct granted him by the Council and not by the Emperour wherein you tell us that express clause of salvâ semper justitiâ was inserted which is another argument that the safe-conduct of the Emperour to Husse was of another nature because it ran in general terms without any such clause but poor Hierom who it seems was not acquainted with the arts and subtilties of his enemies but thought them as honest as himself ventures to Constance upon this safe-conduct but when he came thither and began to understand the jugglings of his enemies he thought to shift for himself by flight but being taken was burnt So that Hierom suffered through his honest simplicity and credulity not considering what that salvâ justitiâ would mean in his case which as they interpreted it was such another safe-conduct as known Malefactors have to the place of Justice but to call it a safe-conduct in the sense which Hierom apprehended it in is as proper as to say A man that is to be executed shall have a Salvo for his life This was therefore intended as appears by the event as a meer trick to bring him within their power and so all such safe-conducts granted with those clauses by such persons who are to interpret them themselves are and nothing else For they are the sole Judges what this Justice shall be Neither can you say then That Faith was kept with Hierom of Prague for no such thing as a safe-conduct truly so called was intended him and when the Emperour was sollicited to grant him one he utterly denied it because of the bad success he had in that of John Husse and some of the Council being then present with the Emperour offered to give him a safe-conduct but they very honestly explained themselves that it was a safe-conduct for coming thither but not for going thence again And so it proved So that Faith was well given to Hierom of Prague and as well kept to John Husse But say you Had the Protestants gone to the Council of Trent upon the safe-conduct granted them by that Council jure speciali in the second manner they could not at all have been punished under any pretence of Heresie without manifest breach of Faith which all Catholicks hold to be unlawful The like may be said of the safe-conduct offered them for going to Rome But you must better satisfie us that you look upon this as a breach of Faith than as yet you have done For so are your ambiguities in your expressions of this nature that men who know your arts can hardly tell when they have your right meaning For you may look on all breach of Faith as unlawful and yet not look on your acting contrary to your express words in safe-conducts offered to Hereticks to be a breach of Faith For you may say Faith is there only broken where men are bound to keep it but you are not bound to keep it with Hereticks and that because your obligation to the Church is greater than it can be to Hereticks when therefore you have Hereticks in your power it is an easie matter for you to say that were it in any thing else but in a matter so nearly concerning the Interest of your Holy Mother the Church you could not but observe it but your obligation to that is so great as destroies all other which are contrary to it and the obligation being destroyed there is no breach of Faith at all and therefore you may hold all breach of Faith unlawful and yet you may proceed against those whom you account Hereticks contrary to all engagements whatsoever and then say This is no breach of Faith And the truth is by your Doctrines of aequivocations and mental reservations you have made all manner of converse in the world so lubricous and uncertain that he who hath to deal with you especially in matters where the interest of your Church is concerned had need be wary and remember to distrust or else he may repent it afterwards If you therefore account the Protestants crafty Foxes in not coming to Rome or the Council of Trent it was because they would not venture too near the Lions Den but if you will not account them wise men for refusing so fair an offer you will give us leave to think them so till they see better reason to trust your offers And the Council of Trent did very well to tell them in their form of safe-conduct they would not do by them as the Council of Constance did for therein they shew how much the Faith of Councils was sunk by that so that if that were not particularly excepted no trust would ever be given to them more But supposing the safe-conduct of the Council of Trent to have been never so free from suspicion the Protestants had sufficient reasons not to appear there as will be manifested afterwards We come therefore now to your second Answer in vindication of the Council of Constance which is this That by that decree the Council declares that no Secular Power how soveraign soever can hinder the proceedings of the Ecclesiastical Tribunal in causes of Heresie for which there is great reason and consequently if the Emperour or any other Secular Prince
Synodical Epistle by which I shall prove it impossible that either the Letters of Pope Damasus did concern the calling of the Oecumenical Council or that the sitting of the Council at Rome and the General one at Constantinople could be at the same time The first is from the date of those Letters which is thus expressed there that they met together at Constantinople having received the Letters which were sent the year before from them to the Emperour Theodosius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 after the Synod at Aquileia Now the Synod at Aquileia by Baronius his computation was held the same year A. D. 381. in which the Oecumenical Council at Constantinople was held and much later in the year too for this was held in the Nones of September and the other in May and so much is likewise confessed by Binius in his notes on that Council Now let me demand of you Whether is it impossible that Damasus should by his Letters summon the Oecumenical Council when the date of those Letters to Theodosius is so long after the sitting of it But besides this these Eastern Bishops in that Council which sate after these Letters of Damasus clearly distinguished themselves from the Oecumenical Council of the year foregoing for after they had given a brief account of their Faith they referr the Pope and Western Council to that declaration of Faith which had been made the year before by the Oecumenical Council assembled at Constantinople 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Is it possible then any thing should be more evident than that this Council assembled upon the Letters of Damasus to Theodosius and sitting with the Council at Rome is clearly distinct from the Oecumenical Council of Constantinople And thus I hope I have dispelled those mists which you would cast before the Readers eyes by confounding these two Councils and thereby offering to prove that the Pope had some kind of very remote Presidency in the second General Council Which is so far from being true that there is not any intimation in any of the ancient Historians Theodoret Socrates or Sozomen that the Pope or any of the Western Bishops had any thing at all to do in it But you will ask How comes it then to be accounted an Oecumenical Council For this indeed Baronius would fain find out some hand that Damasus had in it or else he cannot conceive how it should become Oecumenical but all the proof he produceth is Because in the Acts of the sixth Council it is said that Theodosius and Damasus opposed Macedonius and so I hope he might do by declaring his consent to the Doctrine decreed in this Council not that thereby his approbation made it Oecumenical And as that Doctrine was received and that Confession of Faith embraced all over the world so that Council became Oecumenical For I cannot see but that if Damasus had stood up for Macedonius if the Decrees against him had been received by the Catholick Church it had been never the less Oecumenical in the sense of Antiquity That testimony which Baronius brings out of his own Library and a Copy of the Vatican expressing that Damasus did summon the Council at Constantinople is not to be taken against the consent of the ancient Church-Historians it being well known what Interess those Roman Copies have a long time driven on I deny not therefore but that the Council of Constantinople was assented to by Damasus and the Western Bishops in the matters of Faith there decided but I utterly deny that Damasus had any thing to do in the Presidency over that Council So that we find a Council alwaies acknowledged to be Oecumenical in which the Pope had no Presidency at all and this very Instance sufficiently refutes your Hypothesis viz. that the Popes Presidency is necessary to a General Council In the third General Council held at Ephesus A. D. 431. it is agreed on both sides that S. Cyril Patriarch of Alexandria was the President of it but the Question is In what capacity he sate there whether in his own or as Legat of Celestine Bishop of Rome All the proof you produce for the latter is That it appears by a Letter written to him by the Pope long before he sent any other Legats to that Council in which Letter he gives S. Cyril charge to supply his place as is testified by Evagâ—ius Prosper Photius and divers other Authours But here again you offer to confound two things which are of a distinct nature for you would have your Reader believe that this Letter was sent by Coelestine to Cyril in order to his Presidentship in the Council whereas this Letter was sent the year before without any relation to the Council as appears by the series of the story which is briefly this the differences in the Eastern Churches increasing about the Opinions broached by Nestorius S. Cyril of Alexandria chiefly appearing in opposition to them they both write much about the same time to Pope Coelestine impeaching each other of Heresie But before Coelestine had read the Letters from Nestorius in vindication of himself Possidonius a Deacon of Alexandria comes with several dispatches from S. Cyril wherein a large account is given of the heresie and actions of Nestorius upon which the Pope calls a Council at Rome and therein examines the allegations on both sides which being done the Council condemns Nestorius and passeth this sentence on him That ten daies should be allowed him after notice given for his repentance and in case of obstinacy he should be declared excommunicate And for executing this sentence Coelestine commits his power to Cyril not as though it belonged to the Pope only to do it but that by this means there might appear the Consent of the Western with the Eastern Bishops in putting Nestorius out of the communion of the Catholick Church S. Cyril having received these Letters by the return of Possidonius dated the third of the Ides of August as appears by the Letters extant in Baronius calls a Council at Alexandria in which four Legats are decreed to be sent to Constantinople in pursuance of the sentence against Nestorius they deliver the Letters of Coelestine and Cyril to him he returns them no answer at all but addresses himself to the Emperour Theodosius and complains of the persecutions of Cyril which occasioned a very sharp Letter of the Emperour to him charging him with disturbing the Churches Peace But this was not all for Cyril having with the Synodical Epistle of the Council of Alexandria sent twelve Anathematisms to be subscribed by Nestorius he was so far from it that he charges Cyril with the heresie of Apollinaris in them and sends them to Johannes Antiochenus who with the Syrian Bishops of his Diocese joyn with Nestorius in the impeachment of Cyril So that by this means the sentence against Nestorius could not be put in execution because of the dissent of the Eastern Bishops and that S. Cyril stood
Can any thing be more ridiculous than for you to deny that the Scriptures are to be believed for themselves and to assert that the Pope and Council are to be believed for themselves If the Pope and Council then should declare their Decrees Infallible On what account are we bound to believe them to be so You have found it then an excellent way for ending all other Controversies that are so far to seek for ending this which you cannot possibly do without renouncing some of your principles or an apparent contradiction But besides this 2. Your very manner of asserting the Infallibility of General Councils destroyes all certainty of Faith concerning it For you say That Councils are not Infallible unless they be confirmed by the Pope which to the apprehension of any reasonable man is that they are not in and of themselves Infallible but by vertue of the Popes confirmation And therefore to say that Councils are Infallible and then make that Infallibility depend upon the Popes Confirmation is meerly delusory for you may as well say that the Pope and Provincial Councils are Infallible For Doth the Decree receive any Infallibility from the Council or not If it doth then the Decree is Infallible whether the Pope confirm it or no If it doth not then the Infallibility is wholly in the Pope And he may as well make a Provincial Council Infallible as a General But suppose it be some promise which helps the Pope in a General Council which doth not in a lesser though there be no reason for that for he is Head of the Church in one as well as in the other yet you cannot have any certainty of Faith that the Council is Infallible For you say The Popes Confirmation is necessary to make it Infallible but that the Pope may infallibly confirm the Council is no matter of Faith and therefore the Infallibility of the Council can be none For if the Councils Infallibility depend on the Popes Confirmation you can have no greater certainty of the Councils Infallibility then you have that the Pope will infallibly confirm it But you can have no certainty of Faith that the Pope will infallibly confirm the Council therefore neither can you have any of the Councils Infallibility The assumption depends upon this that you acknowledge you can have no certainty of Faith that the Pope is Infallible but when he decrees in a General Council i. e. that the Decrees by Pope and Council are Infallible But you can have no certainty that the Pope in the Act of confirming them is Infallible for if so you might assert it de fide that the Pope without a Council is Infallible For his Act of Confirmation is distinct from that Infallibility which lyes in the Decrees which have passed both Pope and Council So that if the Infallibility of Councils lyes wholly in the Popes Confirmation and you can have no certainty of Faith of the Popes Infallibility you can have no certainty of Faith of the Infallibility of General Councils But suppose we should grant that you might in general be certain of the Infallibility of General Councils when we come to instance in any one of them you can have no certainty of Faith as to the Infallibility of the Decrees of it For you can have no such certainty that this was a lawful General Council that it passed such Decrees that it proceeded lawfully in passing them and that this is the certain meaning of them and yet all these are necessary in order to the believing those Decrees to be Infallible with such a Faith as you call Divine 1. You can have no certainty of Faith that this was a lawful General Council for that depends upon such things which you cannot say are de fide as that the Bishops in the Council are lawful Bishops that the Pope who confirms them is a lawful Pope for by your own explication afterwards of your Doctrine concerning the intention of the Priest you say it can be but a moral certainty and that you contend elsewhere can be no ground for a Divine Faith Besides you can have no more certainty that is a lawful Council whose Decrees you assent to than you have that those Bishops who are excluded are Hereticks or Schismaticks but Can you be certain of that with Divine Faith and Whereon is that Faith built 2. You can have no such kind of certainty of what Decrees were passed by them and whether those Decrees were at all confirmed by the Pope or no For Bellarmin confesseth No other certainty can be had of that than that whereby we believe there were such persons as Cicero or Julius Caesar and condemns Vega for saying The certainty of it depends upon the definitions of the Council it self Now this at the best being but a humane or moral certainty you must contradict your self if you say That a Divine Faith may be built upon it 3. What certainty can you have that may be a ground for Faith that the Council hath proceeded lawfully for in case he doth not your own Authours say It may not be Infallible For so Bellarmin answers in the case of the Council of Chalcedon Concilium legitimum posse errare in his quae non legitimè agit that a lawful Council may erre in case it doth not proceed lawfully Now Who can assure one that there have been no practices at all used to bring off some men to give their Votes with them It is hard to conceive such a body of men wherein some few do not sway and govern all the rest and in that case Can any one say that it was the Spirit of God which governed the Council Especially if one Preside in the Council who hath authority and power above all the rest and that others in the Council have any dependence on him Who can then expect that freedom which is requisite to a General Council The Councils of Ariminum and Seleucia are condemned because though there were a very great number of Bishops yet some out-witted all the rest and by their subtilty brought them to subscribe that confession of Faith which Pope Liberius afterwards confirmed by his own subscription And if so great a Council as this must be reprobated on that account Why not all others where there are suspicions of the same arts and subtilties Nay How can a man be sure there have not been such arts used in Councils for it is not to be expected that such things should be much known to the world they being privately managed with the greatest secrecy that may be And yet it is in this case necessary to know that the Council proceeded with all simplicity and plainness for otherwise their determinations may not be Infallible In order to which nothing is more requisite than that there be no one which hath any great Authority over them For if the second Council of Ephesus lawfully summoned and the Popes Legats being present be therefore rejected because Dioscorus
as immediate a revelation as the first discovery of it As is clear in the Council of the Apostles for I hope you will not deny but the non-obligation of the ceremonial Law was in some manner revealed to them before and yet I hope you will not say but the Apostles had an immediate revelation as to what they decreed in that Council It is very plain therefore that when you say General Councils neither have erred nor can err in their definitions they usurp as great a priviledge thereby as ever the Apostles had and in order to it must have as immediate an inspiration For never was there any such Infallibility either in the Prophets or Apostles as did suppose an absolute impossibility of errour but it was wholly hypothetical in case of Divine assistance which hindred them from any capacity of erring so long as that continued with them and no longer For inspiration was no permanent habit but a transient act in them and that being removed they were lyable to errours as well as others from whence it follows that where revelations were most immediate they did no more then what you assume to your Church viz. preserve them from actual errour in declaring Gods will So that nothing can be more evident then that you challenge as great an Infallibility and as immediate assistance of Gods Spirit in Councils as ever the Prophets and Apostles had And therefore that Divine was in the right of whom Canus speaks who asserted That since General Councils were Infallible their definitions ought to be equalled with the Scriptures themselves And although Canus and others dislike this it is rather because of the odium which would follow it than for any just reason they give why it should not follow For they not only suppose as great a Certainty or Infallibility in the Decrees of both but an equal obligation to internal assent in those to whom they are declared Which doth further prove that the revelation must be immediate for if by vertue of those definitions we are obliged to assent to the Doctrines contained in them as Infallibly true there must be an immediate Divine Authority which must command our Assent For nothing short of that can oblige us to believe any thing as of Divine revelation now Councils require that we must believe their definitions to be Divine truths though men were not obliged to believe them to be so before those definitions For that is your express Doctrine That though the matters decreed in Councils were in some manner revealed before yet not so as to oblige all men with an explicite assent to believe them but after the definitions of Councils they are bound to do it So that though there be not an object newly revealed yet there ariseth a new obligation to internal assent which obligation cannot come but from immediate Divine Authority If you say The obligation comes not simply by vertue of the Councils definitions but by a command extant in Scripture whereby all are bound to give this assent to the decrees of Councils I then say we must be excused from it till you have discharged this new obligation upon your self by producing some express testimony of Scripture to that purpose which is I think sufficient to keep our minds at liberty from this internal assent to the definitions of General Councils by vertue of any Infallibility in them And thus having more at large considered the nature of this Infallibility which you challenge to General Councils and having shewed that it implyes as immediate a revelation as the Apostles had the second thing is sufficiently demonstrated That this Infallibility cannot suppose discursiveness with fallibility in the use of the means because these two are repugnant to each other The next thing to be considered is Stapletons argument why Councils must be Prophetical in the conclusion because that which is determined by the Church is matter of Faith and not of knowledge and the assent required else would not be an assent of Faith but an habit of knowledge To which his Lordship Answers That he sees no inconvenience in it if it be granted for one and the same conclusion may be Faith to the believer that cannot prove and knowledge to the learned that can Which he further explains thus Some supernatural principles which reason cannot demonstrate simply must be supposed in order to Faith but these principles being owned reason being thereby inlightned that may serve to convert or convince Philosophers and the great men of reason in the very point of Faith where it is at the highest This he brings down to the business of Councils as to which he saith that the first immediate fundamental points of Faith as they cannot be proved simply by reason so neither need they be determined by any Council nor ever were they attempted they are so plain set down in Scripture If about the sense and true meaning of these or necessary deduction out of the prime Articles of Faith General Councils determine any thing as they have done at Nice and the rest there is no inconvenience that one and the same Canon of the Council should be believed as it reflects upon the Articles and grounds indemonstrable and yet known to the learned by the means and proof by which that deduction is vouched and made good And again the conclusion of a Council suppose that in Nice about the consubstantiality of Christ with the Father in it self considered is indemonstrable by reason there saith he I believe and assent in Faith but the same conclusion if you give me the ground of Scripture and the Creed for somewhat must be supposed in all whether Faith or knowledge is demonstrable by natural reason against any Arrian in the world So that he concludes The weaker sort of Christians may assent by Faith where the more learned may build it on reason the principles of Faith being supposed This is the substance of his Lordships Discourse In Answer to which you tell us That the Bishop seems to broach a new Doctrine that the assent of Faith may be an habit of knowledge But surely say you Divine Faith is according to the Apostle Heb. 11. an Argument of things which do not appear viz. by the same means by which we give this assent of Faith otherwise our Faith would not be free and meritorious An Answer I must needs say hugely suitable to your principles who are most concerned of all men to set reason at a distance from Faith and so you do sufficiently in this Discourse of it For it is no easie matter to understand what you mean but that is not to be wondered at since you make obscurity so necessary to Faith Divine Faith is you say an Argument of things which do not appear viz. by the same means by which we give this assent of Faith Do you mean that the objects of Faith do not appear or that the reason of believing doth not If only the former