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A60070 A Short discourse upon the designs, practices, & counsels of France in a letter to a friend. 1677 (1677) Wing S3589; ESTC R10678 14,260 16

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motions and emproving all Advantages against them Thirdly In this posture of Affairs the Confederates must never expect to do any great Matter upon the French in these Provinces unless they do very much out-number them And it is likewise to be considered that these troubles falling out in the Minority of his Catholique Majesty the distractions of that Government the Revolt of Sicily and great disorders upon the Frontiers of Spain the Netherlands have been much neglected till the Elevation of his Highness Don Joan of Austria to the dignity of Prime Minister And that it is not possible for him by reason of the many Exigencies of that Crown nearer home to send any Considerable succour to the Low Countries otherwise than by supplies of Mony So that by that time the Imperialists and the Hollanders are got into their Winter-Quarters or at least before they take the Field again the French from time to time will be ready with Fresh Troops out of their Garrisons to prosecute their Conquests which by degrees must needs break the hearts of the Poor Inhabitants when they find that neither their Faith nor their Courage is able any longer to protect them And when that day comes what by their Armies and what by other Influences the French will have as good as Subjected two thirds of Europe And there will also occur these farther difficulties First no body knows where the French will begin their Attaque which will oblige the Spaniard and Hollander to strengthen all their Garrisons as far as their Men will reach Secondly when the Spanish and Holland Troops shall be so dispers'd wheresoever the French sit down they must then give themselves for lost for want of an Army to relieve them beside their furious and obstinate manner of Assault for they care not how many men they lose so they carry the place And then most of the Men too are made Prisoners of War Nor is the season of the year any discouragement to them neither witness their first Irruption into Burgundy and the restless Activity of their Troops even at this Instant So soon as their Work in Flanders is over which only England under Heaven is able to Prevent or Check the French will have an Army of at least 50000 Men about Lorain Luxemburg and Burgundy to face the Imperialists and at the same time with as many more perhaps they will seize upon the Dutchy of Juliers and of Cleves and from thence pass the Rhine to countenance those that are of the French Caball on the side of Westphalia and so in due time several other Princes of the Empire It is remarkable that in three years War against the Confederates his most Christian Majesty has not only stood his ground without losing so much as one Inch of his Ancient Patrimony but actually and almost without opposition taken several Towns and some entire Provinces from the Principals of the Confederacy And made himself almost as Considerable at Sea as he is at Land Not only in the Mediterranean and upon the Coasts of Spain and Italy but in America too where he has laid a Foundation of great mischief both to England and Holland in the point of Commerce if not timely prevented And he does little less by his mony than by his Arms for he pays all and with French mony under pretext of Neutrality maintains considerable Armies in the very heart of the Empire which 't is feared will be ready enough upon any disaster to joyn with the Common Enemy It is the French Court that manages the Counsels of Poland and they govern the Swisse no less who by the Conquest of the Franche County are made little better than slaves And yet by a fatal blindness that Republique still furnishes the French with the best of their Soldiers and helps forward the destruction of Europe never dreaming that they themselves are to be undone too at last But it is no great matter you 'l say to impose upon the Swisse which are a heavy and Phlegmatick people but the French charms have bewitcht even Italy it self though a Nation the most Clear-sighted and suspicious of all others For their Republiques lie as quiet as if they were asleep though the Fire is already kindled in Sicily and the danger brought home to their own doors It is a wonder that they lay things no more to heart considering first the Passages that the French have to favour their Entry Secondly that they are many and small States weak and easily to be corrupted if not so already Thirdly That though they have been formerly very brave and many Particulars remain so still yet in the generality they are soft and Effeminate And Fourthly That the French is there the Master of the Seas These Reflections methinks might convince any man of the condition they are in And certainly they that were not able to defend themselves against Charles the Eighth will be much less able to encounter Lewis the 14th Or if he gets in to drive him out again as they did the Other For they must do it wholly upon their own Strength having only the Turk in condition to help them For Germany and Spain are sunk already And the Swisse will neither dare to venture upon 't nor are they able to do it if they had a mind to 't As for Spain it is neither Populous nor fortifi'd and perhaps want of Provisions may keep it from an Invasion And yet for all that with a Body of Thirty or Forty thousand Men by the way of Fontaraby and as many by Catalonia the French may if they please in two Campania's make themselves Masters of Navarre Arragon Catalonia and Valentia and then it is but sortifying the Frontiers and making his Catholique Majesty a Tributary in Castile Who must content himself to take what they please to give him over and above in consideration of his Dominions in Italy and the Spanish Indies A Possibility that England and Holland shall do well to think of For when he has the Mines in his Power and Europe under his Feet there will be no contending After this they have only the Swisse or the English to fall upon next For the Former they are neither fortify'd nor united in Affections or Religion As for England They are a People not naturally addicted to the French Sensible of their Honour and of their Interest and the whole World is convinced of their Courage They are United under the Government of a Gracious Prince and their Concerns are at this Instant lodged in the hands of the Most Loyal and Publique-spirited Representatives that ever acted in that Station beside the strength of the Island by Situation So that the French would find it a hard matter either to make a Conquest here or if they should surprize it to keep it But yet they have finer ways to Victory than by force of Arms and their Gold has done them better service than their Iron What have we now to do then but
King with men and monies for an Army of fifty thousand Men and no better Souldiers in Europe Thirdly what will become of the Duke of Brandenburg if the French shall fall into Cleves and Mark with a matter of forty or fifty thousand Men more and from thence into Pomeren and Prussia Fourthly the whole Patrimony of the Empire from the Rhine to the Frontiers of France fall by an inevitable Consequence into the hands of the French as they have already swallowed the three Bishopricks of Metz Toul and Verdun So that the Imperial Army will be forc'd over the Rhine and there probably kept in play and upon the bare defensive by the Princes of the French Interest while in the mean time the Princes of Westphalia will be reduc'd to an absolute necessity of ranging themselves under the French Protection and Changing their party And what can then be expected from Holland after what they have suffer'd already and under their present despairs but to content themselves with such Conditions as France will give them For after the loss of Cleves and Flanders their Case is wholly desperate unless England should vigorously interpose to their Relief And the State of the Empire is neither better nor worse than that of their Neighbours for they must all submit their Necks to the same Yoak When matters are brought to this Pass they have before them England Spain and Italy the Cloud is gathered already and it is wholly at their Choice where it shall break There are a great many people I know that promise themselves mighty things from the Event of another Campania for want I fear of Consulting the Chart and the almost insuperable difficulties that lie in the way The means they propose are either by carrying the War into France by way of Revulsion or by forcing the French upon a Capital Battel The former Proposition seems first very impracticable and secondly of little or no advantage if it could be effected It must be considered that beyond Mentz Coblents and Treves the Imperalists have no Magazine at all beside that betwixt Treves and France a part of Luxenburg excepted is absolutely in the Enemies Power Now how should an Army subsist there that must over and above pass through a Country of about twenty Leagues that is wholly laid wast and in Ashes and without any Cattle in it or any other sort of Necessary provision Put the Case now that the Imperialists should break through all these difficulties and carry an Army even into the Lorain it self the Country of Metzin or Burgundy which would take them up the best part of a Summer too all the strong holds are in the hands of the French and the Country laid so desolate that there 's no living for an Army there When 't is come to this they must resolve either upon a Battle or Siege If the former The French are at liberty whether they will fight or no and there 's no compelling of them for they are among their strong holds and all 's their own both behind them and on each side and the Country either burnt or deserted But carry it father yet and suppose the French forc'd upon the Risque of a Battle First The Imperialists are not sure to get the better of it And Secondly What if they should Nay to the degree of an entire Victory All that would be expected more for that year would be only to take in some considerable Post and make good the ground they had gotten for the next Campaign For it would be a madness to pursue their Victory into the heart of an Enemies Country and leave so many strong Garrisons upon their Backs which would undoubtedly cut off all their Convoys and starve them But this is still the supposing of a Thing not to be supposed for the French in this Case would stand upon the Defensive and not to come to a Battle Or in case they should and be worsted they have men enough in Garrison for Recruits that would immediatly reinforce them Now on the other side what if the Imperialists should chance to be routed The Garrisons which the French hold in Lorain Burgundy and Alsatia would in such Case totally destroy that broken Army and cut out such work in Germany as has not been known in the Empire for many Ages In this extremity let us suppose that the Empire should yet bring another Army into the Field and try the issue of a Second Battle and miscarry And that the disaffected Princes of the Empire should declare themselves for the Enemy all that part of Germany that lies within two or three days journy of the Rhine would be irrecoverably lost a great part of it being so harrased already that 't is not able so much as to furnish an Army upon a March much less for a Winter quarter Now to the Business of a Siege the French have taught us by Philipsburg and Mastricht that they want neither Skill to fortifie a place nor Courage to defend it So that without a great loss of Time and Men it cannot be expected that the Imperialists should make themselves Masters of any considerable place And when they shall have carried it what will a Town in Lorain or Burgundy signifie to the saving of the Spanish Netherlands which if once lost are hardly ever to be retriv'd Now taking this for granted if England does not step in with all the speed and vigor imaginable see what will be the end on 't First That the French being Masters of all the Posts Passes and strong-holds in Lorain and Burgundy may dodge and trifle the Imperialists at pleasure and make them spend out the year without any Advantage to the Netherlands The way would have been for the Imperialists to have prest with an Army of 50000 men directly into the body of France and the Confederate Troops in the Low Countries to have made another Inrode by the way of Picardy or Bologne but since the taking of Valenciennes Cambray and St. Omer there 's no possibility of piercing France that way So that a very small Army now upon the Spanish Netherlands with the help of the French Garrisons is sufficient to amuse and tire out the whole force of Spain and Holland upon that Quarter Secondly France being thus secur'd on that side will unquestionably fall in with all their Power upon the Empire unless diverted by the Alarm they have now receiv'd from England Now admitting this to be the Condition of France let any man of sense judge what good the Imperial Army can do to the Netherlands upon which single point depends the Fortune of Christendom What if they should march up to the Borders of France with 50000 men Will not the French encounter them there with as many or more And with this odds too that the Imperialists suffer a thousand Incommodities in their March through a ruin'd Country whereas the French have good Quarters and plenty of all things at hand watching the Others