Nation in point of Strength yet whilst the Tenures are preserv'd such as were formerly in England the Prince had a stricter Tye upon the People than when having relinquish'd them he hath no other Obligation upon them than his Parchment Right of Power and if you please their Oaths of Allegiance both which are cancell'd in a Moment while the Lands remain eternally in the People Trav. I have already told you That publick Right of Government or if you will the Right of publick Government doth not in the least depend upon Tenures for they are only particular Services and Royalties which Princes have sometimes thought good to reserve to themselves more or less according as they alone have thought fit and may be alter'd or relinquish'd without diminishing their Publick Right of Government over the Nation they being such as regard rather the private Person of the King as Lord of a Mannor than his Politick Capacity as Supreme Magistrate or Governour of the State And indeed many of these Services and Tenures were rather very inconvenient and burthensome to the People than beneficial to the Government Many such were anciently known in England and Scotland as well as France Amongst others what was more inhumane than that the Lord should have a Right to lye with his Tenants Wife the first Night they married which in France they call Droit de Jambage Some Services were very ridiculous and some extravagant So I have heard of a Tenure in France by which the Tenant is oblig'd at certain Times to drive a Cart with twelve Oxen round the Court of the Mannor House In which time if any of the Oxen happen to dung in the Court the Cart with the twelve Oxen was forfeited to the Lord of the Mannor but if none of the Oxen should dung untill they were driven out of the Court then the Lord was to receive only one Egg. Now how do these and many other such Services relate to a Right of Government So many Mannors were held of the King to accompany him in his Wars in England or in France or elsewhere some were obliged to carry his Spear some his Sword others his Helmet and such like which are all merely private Obligations and which any private Man might reserve upon consideration of Lands given It is true the King had then a stronger Tye upon particular Persons than since he hath released them But this I say hath no influence upon his Publick Right of Power for the Supreme Magistrate is always notwithstanding any such Release Master both of our Estates and Persons as far as they are necessary for the Preservation of the Government So you see Care is taken that all Lands shall pay their Quotas towards Horses and Footmen which is in use at this day which Forces so paid we call the Militia His Majesty may press Souldiers and by the Consent of his great Council the Parliament charge our Estates and Persons with such Sums as shall be thought expedient for the Occasion And this brings me to the third Point which is That all Sovereign Princes have a Right of Power over the Lands notwithstanding the Property be divided amongst the People And this proceeds from the Dominium Supereminens which is eternally in all Supreme Magistrates or Magistrate whatsoever whose Duty it is to look after and by all means secure the Preservation of the Whole in which every particular is involv'd Nor is it a sufficient Objection to say That Laws or Impositions may lye very heavy upon particular Men if such an Arbitrary Power should rest in any Government for Laws cannot be always made so easie but that Occasions may happen which may make them seem very hard to some Id modò quoeritur si majori parti in summo prosint Hence Grotius from Thucydides remarks an excellent Passage of Pericles to this purpose Sic existimo saith he etiam singulis hominibus plus eam prodesse civitatem quoe tota rectè se habeat quam si privatis floreat utilitatibus ipsa autem universim laboret Qui enim domesticas fortunas bene collocatas habet patria tamen eversa pereat ipse necesse est c. All which Livy thus briefly expresses Respublica incolumis privatas res salvas facile proestat Publica prodendo tua nequicquam serves That whilst the Commonwealth is safe in general our particular Concerns may be also easily secur'd But by deserting the publick Interest of the Nation we do thereby no ways preserve our own Nothing therefore seems more reasonable and indeed necessary than that the Government should have always a Power to compell every particular Subject who standing upon their private Rights and Properties would thereby suffer the Whole to be destroy'd For though naturally every Man hath a Right to maintain what is his own and by consequence might oppose whosoever would endeavour to take his Property from him yet Grotius tells us That Government which is instituted for the publick Tranquillity of the Whole or Tranquillitas publica in qua singulorum continetur acquires thereby a more Sovereign Right even â—ver our Persons as well as Possessions than we our selves can pretend to that is as far as shall be necessary for obtaining that great end of publick Preservation Civili societate ad tuendam Tranquillitatem instituta statim civitati jus quoddam majus in nos nostra nascitur quatenus ad finem illum id necessarium est Whence Seneca observes That the Power of all is ever in the Supreme Magistrate but the Property remains nevertheless in the Hands of particular Subjects Ad Reges Potestas omnium pertinet ad singulos Proprietas And so as hath been said the King in Parliament hath a Right to dispose of our Estates and Persons as shall be thought necessary for our publick Security And where Sovereign Princes act without Parliaments they have in themselves the same Authority I have spoke already of the Power which the Government hath over our Estates and for our Persons Grotius hath furnish'd us with a Case very strong to shew the great Extent of Sovereign Authority He puts a Question Whether an innocent Citizen may be abandoned ad Exitium even to Destruction for the Common Good Without doubt says he such an innocent Citizen may be so abandon'd Dubium non est quin deseri potest And going still on how far such a Citizen is oblig'd to deliver himself he concludes That he may be forc'd to it and sacrific'd too to prevent an imminent Mischief both against his Will and entirely innocent Quare in nostra controversia verius videtur cogi posse civem for saith he Though one Citizen cannot compell another to any thing more than what is strictly just according to Law yet the Superiour hath a lawful Authority as Superiour to force an innocent Man to suffer for the Common Good Par parem cogere non potest nisi ad id quod jure debetur strictè dicto
Soveraign power in the house of Lords either conjunctim or divisim joyntly or separately without the King therefore the Soveraign right of power can be no where but in the King right of council is in the Lords and Commons in Parliament duly assembled but right of command is in the King For he both calls the Parliament and dissolves it One Soveraign power cannot dissolve another Soveraign power could they be supposed together except by force But the Kings of England have ever called and dissolved Parliaments not by force but by right of power and command which belongs to them by inherent birthright and lawful and undoubted Succession A Bill which shall have regularly past both Houses and brought even to the Royal assent is no Act nor hath it any manner of force as such without the Kings will Le Roy le veult doth solely and necessarily transform a Bill into a Statute and is the essential constituent part of it His Will doth alone give life and being to that which is no more than a dead insignificant letter without it Nay though a Bill should pass both Houses with the unanimous consent and approbation of every individual Member yet the King may refuse it and it is indisputably the right of our Kings so to do if they shall so think sitting which prove evidently amongst other things that the Soveraign Power is solely in our Kings Merch. But Sir Plato Red. insinuates very strongly p. 123. that It is a violation of right and infringment of the Kings Coronation Oath to frustrate the counsels of a Parliament by his negative voice and that in his opinion the King is bound confirmare consuetudines or pass such laws as the people shall choose Trav. The Delphick Oracle did never impose Laws more peremptorily to the Greeks than Plato Red. would arrogantly obtrude his private opinions upon us for notwithstanding all the Laws are against him yet he alone would pretend to devest the King of this his undoubted Prerogative But Sir there is a difference between new modelling a Government and maintaining it according to its ancient institution If Plato designs the first he may as well pretend it is inconvenient that the Imperial Crown of England should be Hereditary and Successive and endeavour to make it Elective for the right of a negative voice in Parliament is as certainly the Prerogative of the Kings of England as their right of Inheritance or Succession is But having no design to dâ—…te so much at this time what â—lteration might be convenient for us as â—o maintain what the Kings Right â—â— and ever hath been according to the â—â—cient as well as present Consâ—…tion of the Government I must 〈…〉 do averr That the King enjoyinâ— â—â—reditarily and undeniably this Nâ—…tive voice in Parliament hath himself the Supreme power of England And this the English Gentleman and his Doctor seem to acknowledge p. 105. Besides If the Soveraign power of England were not solely in the King then when there is no Parliament there could be no Soveraign power in England which is ridiculous and absurd For there is no Free and independent Kingdom or Commonwealth upon earth in which there is not at all times a Soveraign power in being If the Soveraign power ceaseth for a moment the power which remains becomes dependent and at the same instant a higher power must appear But the Imperial Crown of England depends upon none but God Omnis sub Rege ipse sub nullo nisi tantum Deo says Bracton an ancient and a Learned Author and again Rex non habet superiorem nisi Deum The King has no Superiour but God Or as it was express'd under H. 4. The Regality of the Crown of England is immediately subject to God and to none other Mer. But since the King can neither make any Laws nor levy any Taxes without the consent of both Houses it shews sure that at least some of the Soveraign power resides in them Trav. I perceive Cousin you have forgot your Grotius for he tells you that you must distinguish between the Empire and the manner of holding the Empire or the Jus ab usu Juris Aliud enim est Imperium aliud habendi modus So that although the Kings of England do generally promise or swear not to alter the Government nor to make Laws or levy impositions but according to the ancient Constitutions of the Kingdom yet nevertheless this takes not from him his Soveraign right of power for that he hath in him by Birthright and Inheritance and according to the Original Institution of the Kingdom and which is antecedent and Superiour also to any Oaths or Obligations I 'll give you Grotius his own words as you will find them l. 1. c. 3. s 16. Non definit summum esse Imperium etiamsi is qui imperaturm est promittat aliqua subditis etiam talia quae ad imperandi rationem pertineant But he confesseth indeed that such a Constitution is a little limitation to the Supreme power Fatendum tamen arctius quodammodo reddi Imperium But it doth not follow from thence that there is any authority Superiour to his own Non inde tamen sequitur ita promittenti Superiorem dari aliquem And he gives you the example of the Persian Monarchs who though they were as absolute as any Kings could be yet when they enter'd upon the Government they sware to observe certain Laws which they could not alter Apud Persas Rex summo cum Imperio erat tamen jurabat cum regnum adiret leges certa quadam forma latas mutare illi nefas erat So also that the Egyptian Kings were bound to the observance of several Customs and Constitutions Aegyptiorum Reges quos tameâ— ut alios Reges Orientis summo imperio usos non est dubium ad multarum rerum observationem oblig abantur Mer. Very well Sir but pray why may not the Soveraign power remain still in the people especially if all be true which our Author boldly affirms p. 119. viz. That our Prince hath no authority of his own but what was first entrusted in him by the Government of which he is head Trav. Here Plato plays the Villain egregiously is a Traitor incognito and carries Treason in a dark lanthorn which he thinks to discover or conceal according to the success of Rebellion which he evidently promotes But we shall unmask this Republican Faux And first our King whom he calls Prince not understanding it may be the difference between Regnum and Principaâ—us hath no authority saith he but what was first intrusted by the Government Here Government is a word of an amphibious nature and can as well subsist under a Monarchy as a Commonwealth For if Rebellion doth not prosper then Government in this place signifies the Law of the Land and indeed the King's authority over us is establish'd by the Law that is to say the consent and acknowledgment of the People in due form That
the King hath inherently antecedently and by Birth-right a Soveraign authority over all his people and this is confirm'd to him both by Statute Common Law and Custom according to that of 19. H. 6. 62. The Law is the inheritance of the King and people by which they are rul'd King and people But if the Commonwealths men gain their point if the Association and its brat bloody murder had taken its damnable effect then Government had most plainly signified the People and that is truly our Authors meaning for the words which immediately follow are these Nor is it to be imagin'd that they would give him more power than what was necessary to govern them What can be the antecedent to They and Them but the word Subjects which precedes in the beginning of the Sentence This is the true Presbyterian or Phanatick way of speaking their most mischievous Treasons which like a Bizzare with a little turn of the hand represents ether the Pope or the Devil But since we are so plainly assured of his meaning I 'll take the liberty for once to put it plainly into words and I think it will then run thus That our King having neither by birthright nor by a long undoubted Succession of above six hundred years any Authority of his own but only that which the people have intrusted in him for they would give him no more than what was just necessary to govern them p. 119. the people in whom the Soveraign power resides may call this their minister otherwise called King to an account for the administration of this his trust and in case he should not acquit himself according to their expectation the Soveraign Subject might punish this their Subject King turn him out of his office as all Supreme governours may their subordinate officers nay and set up any other form of Government whatsoever without doing any manner of injustice to their King This is our Authors doctrine as appears not only by inevitable consequences drawn from this mâ—tuated or fide-commissary power which he hath placed in the King but from the whole context and course of his Libel Now though Hell it self could not have invented a proposition more notoriously false though the whole Association could not have asserted a more Traiterous principle though the Supreme power or Soveraign right of Government hath been fixed to the imperial Crown of England ever since the beginning of History or Kings amongst us or the memorial of any time though more than twenty Parliaments which are the wisdom and Representatives of the whole Nation have by several explanatory Acts and Statutes confessed declared and affirmed that this Soveraign Authority or power of England is solely in the King and his laâ—â—ul Heirs and Successors in exclusion to all other mortal power whatsoever Rex habet potestatem jurisdictionem super omnes qui in regno suo sunt Nay although all the Power Priviledges Liberties and even the Estates of the people proceeded originally from the meer bounty of our Kings as both ancient and modern Authors and Histories have evidently made it appear And after all notwithstanding our Author hath not produced one single authority or one little peice of an Act Statute or Law to prove that the Soveraign power is in the people or that the King held his authority only in trust from them as he plainly affirms or when they entrusted him with it or had it in themselves to grant yet by an unparallelled piece of impudence and vanity he dares to bring his own private opinion in competition with the wisdom learning practice decrees and justice of the whole Nation condemn our Ancestors as betrayers of the peoples rights and priviledges and by a single ipse dixit prove himself the only true Physician learned Statesman and except some who in most Ages have been Executed for their most horrid Treasons the only worthy Patriot of his Countrey and Defender of its rights Now lest some of our ignorant and infatuated multitude like the Children of Hamel should dance after our Authors popular and Northern Bagpipe until he precipitates them all into inevitable ruin and destruction I am resolved not to insist at present upon his Majesties Hereditary and undoubted Soveraign right of power which he now possesses not only by prescription and a Succession of more than eight hundred years but by all the Laâ—s of the Land as hath been already declared and the universal consent of all his good Subjects confirmed by their Oaths of Allegeance from which none but Rebels and perjured men can depart I will not I say at present urge those arguments which are sufficient to convince opiniastrete and wilful ignorance it self but will attack him in his strongest Gothick â—orts and the rational part upon which he seems most to value himself And first for these Goths I cannot find in any History when it was they came over into England nay I am confident that all Learned men will agree that there is no probable conjecture from any Author that they ever have been here or crost our Seas or came nearer us than Normandy one argument amongst others is the flourishing condition of our Island above France where the Goths and Vandalls had made some ravage in point of Learning and Sciences insomuch that Alcuinus an Englishman and Scholar to the Venerable Bede was sent unto Charles the Great to whom he became Doctor or Professor in Divinity Astronomy and Philosophy and by his direction erected the University of Paris But to return to our Goths it is certain that at first they travelled South-East which is very different from South-West such as iâ— our situation from theirs And yet our politick Author tells us positively according to his usual method that they establish'd their government in these parts after their conquest p. 93. And endeavouring to prove in p. 46. and 97. that according to their institution the people had an influence upon the Government he tells us that the Governments of France Spain and England by name and other countries where these people setled were fram'd accordingly Here we see our Country conquer'd and an excellent form of Government establish'd by the Goths so good and admirably just that we in this age must quit our happy Monarchy which hath subsisted most gloriously many Hundreds of years only to run a wool-gathering after these precarious Gothick Princes and yet no man could ever tell us when this conquest happen d nor by whom nor what became of them nor indeed any thing more than what the extravagant fancy of our Author hath imagin'd As for the Romans who conquer'd us sure they were neither Goths nor Northern people and so nothing can be pretended from that Conquest nor are the Saxons who next invaded us to be called Northern people by us at least who lye so much North to them our selves But forgiving Plato all his absurdities and incongruities the rather that we may find out the Truth and confound him with
great Power and Trust in so few hands was look'd upon as a great Obligation to those Lords and a great Security to that King so long as their Interests stood united in their new Conquest yet in the next Age when the heat of that Action was over their Interests divided and the Obligation forgotten it proved to the succeeding Kings so great a Curb and Restraint to Sovereignty that nothing fell more intimately into their Care than how to retrench as much as they durst the Power of that Nobility which they began to suspect and was like in time to mate even Monarchy it self Though others foresaw the mischief in time yet none attempted the Remedy untill King John who no sooner began to reign in his own Right for by the way he practis'd a little in his Brother's time and by that Experience found Mat. Paris his Words true of the Barons viz. Quot Domini tot Tyranni But he bethought himself to frame his Counsel of such a Constitution as he might have Credit and Influence upon it To be short he was the first that durst restrain the tumultuary access of the Barons to Council he was the first that would admit of none but such as he should summon and would summon none but such as he thought fitting and besides he would send out Summons to several of the Commons or lesser Tenants mixing them with the Nobles and engaging them thereby to his Interest and whereas before the Council consisted of the Nobility and Clergy he erected a third Estate a Body of the Commons or lesser Tenants which might in some measure equal the rest and be faithful to him All which appears in the Clause Rolls and Patent Rolls of the sixth Year of this King and in vain before that time shall any Man seek either for Summons or Advice of the Commons in any of these great Councils King John having put this Cheque upon the Councils considers next how to ballance the unequal power of the unruly Barons and first he tampers with the Bishops and Clergy sain he would have drawn them into his Party at least to his Dependency but that Tryal cost him dear In the next place therefore that he might create new Dependances and new Strength to himself he becomes a great Patron and Founder or at least Benefactor to many considerable Corporations as Newcastle Yarmouth Lynn and others insomuch that he is taken notice of by Speed and other of our Chroniclers and stiled particularly the Patron of Corporations Thus you see not only when but for what Reason the Institution of the House of Commons was first thought upon and indeed according to their old or first Constitution their Attendance in Parliament or as we say their serving in Parliament was look'd upon rather as an easier Service due to the King than otherwise as a Priviledge granted to the People as may be seen not only in the Case of the Burgesses of St. Albans in temp Ed. 2. recited by the Worthy Dr. Brady against Petit but also by many other good Authorities too long for this place But begging your Pardon for this long Story I now proceed to the second Parenthesis in which he makes no Scruple to accuse his present Majejesty and his late Sacred Father of breaking the Law in adjourning proroguing and dissolving Parliaments Indeed Cousin I know nothing that reflects more truly upon the Constitution of our Government than that it suffers such pestilent seditious Men as our Author seems to be to live under it For nothing sure is more evident in the whole or any part of the Law whether Statute common or customary than that the Kings of England ever since the first Parliament that ever was call'd have had and exercis'd the same Power in adjourning proroguing and dissolving them as his present Majesty or his Father of Blessed Memory ever did And that you may have Plato's own Authority against himself I must anticipate so much of his Discourse as to inform you That in p. 105. you will find these very Words That which is undoubtedly the King 's Right or Prerogative is to Call and Dissolve Parliaments Nay more so great was the Authority and Prerogative of our Kings over the House of Commons according to their old Constitution That they have in their Writs of Summons named and appointed the particular Persons all over England who were to be returned to their Parliaments sometimes have order'd that only one Knight for the Shire and one Burgess for a Corporation should be sent to their Parliaments and those also named to the Sheriffs and sometimes more as may be seen by the very Writs of Edw. 2. and Edw. 3. fully recited by the aforesaid Dr. Brady from p. 243. to p. 252. Besides Sir what is more reasonable and equitable than that our Kings should enjoy the Power of Adjourning Proroguing and Dissolving that their Council or Parliament when and as often as they please since our Kings alone in Exclusion to all other mortal Power in England whatsoever enjoy â—olely the Prerogative of Calling or Assembling these their Parliaments when and where they alone shall think convenient Mer. I confess we generally say That it is a great Weakness in a cunning Man to raise a Spirit which afterwards he cannot lay and that in such case the Spirit tears him in pieces first who rais'd him And I think we have had the Misfortune to see somewhat very tragical of this kind in the beginning of our late Troubles if it were not possibly the great Cause of his late Majesty's fatal Catastrophe But truly excepting that case I never heard the King's Authority in proroguing or dissolving Parliaments question'd before Trav. Well Sir go forward to the twenty fifth Page for all between is nothing but quacking and ridiculous Complements or Matter as little worth our notice Mer. He tells us there that it remains undiscovered how the first Regulation of Mankind began that Necessity made the first Government that every Man by the Law of Nature had like Beasts in a Pasture Right to every thing That every Individual if he were stronger might seise whatever any other had possessed himself of before Trav. Hold a little Sir that we may not have too much Work upon our Hands at once I think he said before at Page 22. That he would not take upon him so much as to conjecture how and when Government began in the World c. This Cousin I cannot pass by because it seems to be the only piece of Modesty which I observe in his whole Treatise And I should commend him for it much but that I have great reason to suspect that he pretends Ignorance only to cover his Knavery and thereby leave room to introduce several other most false and pernicious Principles which we shall endeavour to refute First therefore I shall take the Liberty not only to conjecture but to tell him plainly when and where Covernment began and how also it continued
Jure proprietatis or In patrimonio imperantis that is properly or in Property or in chief or how else you please to render these Words in English Which Grotius in the same Chapter explains by a Jus regendi non aliunde pendens A Right of Government not depending upon any other humane Authority whatsoever Mer. But Sir since you have founded Empire upon a Supreme Right of Government or Power over Men how comes it to pass that we find a Right of Power and Priviledges and Government too so founded in the Possession of several Lands that the Possession of those Lands alone gives a Man several Rights and Prerogatives For example amongst us 't is said That whosoever hath the Right and Possession of the Barony of Burgaveny besides some others becomes thereby a Baron of England and enjoys those Priviledges which belong to it In France I have heard say That nothing is more common than for Men to receive their Titles according to their Lands whether Count Baron Marquess and so forth Is it not plain then That the Right of Command or Power which is Empire may be founded upon Property according to our Author's Interpretation that is the Possession of Lands Trav. I agree to what you have urg'd that is to say That several Priviledges and Right of Power are annexed to several Lordships or Terres Nobles that they have thereby haute basse Justice and their Jurisdiction extends to Life and Death Nay more in several parts of Italy and particularly in Lombardy there are several Imperial Feuds which Grotius seems to call Regna Feudalia which have almost as great Prerogatives as some other Kingdoms have They make Laws raise Taxes and mint Money as other greater Kingdoms do And yet all this makes little for our Author's Aphorism as by him interpreted Mer. The Reason if you please Trav. Because all those little Lordships or Principalities whether they were instituted at first by the Goths and Vandals or Lombards or granted afterwards by several later Emperours and Kings or both as is most probable yet they did and still do at this day depend upon a Superiour Power and pay Homage and Fealty for those Priviledges which they enjoy which is much different from Empire or a Sovereign Right of Power And yet even in this Case this subordinate Power is so far from being founded upon the Possession of all the Land belonging to the Feud which is our Author's Proposition that very often their Liberties depend only upon the old Walls of a ruinated Castie and a very inconsiderable Number of Acres which represent the whole Feud or Mannor the rest of the Land having been sold away and become the Property of others some small Rent only or Acknowledgment being reserv'd And after this manner the Supreme Power may as well tye Priviledges to a Post and grant the Possessor of that Post such Royalties as the Proprietor of such a Castle or Land Which is very far from proving that the Possession of Lands doth thereby originally create a Sovereign Right of Power Mer. Cousin I have heard and read too I think that the Sea hath formerly eaten up a considerable part of your ancient Patrimony and from thence it may be you are no Friend to Lands But for my part I will stand up for Land as long as I can and must therefore ask you Why those Rents or Acknowledgments were reserv'd if not to testifie that they came originally from the Lord and that thereby he still keeps up a kind of Sovereign Right to the Lands themselves knowing well enough that his Power according to our Author is founded upon them Trav. This yet signifies nothing for although the Reservation of these Rents or Services do preserve the Memory of the Benefactor and continue the Respect due from the Tenant yet this is personal only and hath no Relation to the publick Right of Power or Government For when this Rent was not reserv'd yet whosoever lives within the Jurisdiction of such a Fewd or Mannor is always subject to him who enjoys the Lordship So in England Services and Quit-Rents have been generally receiv'd and paid untill the late King and his present Majesty were pleas'd to dispose of them But to believe that this hath lessened his Sovereign Right of Government is a Fancy that sure cannot enter into the Head of any sober Man But let us put a plain Case Suppose the Kingdom of England were at any time obtain'd by absolute Conquest as I conceive it was more than once and that such Conquest gives the Conquerour a Sovereign Right not only to our real and personal Estates which we find to have been wholly in the hands of some of our Kings but also over our Liberties and Lives as may be fully seen in Grotius de Jur. B. P. Now Sir supposing a People in this Condition and having nothing of their own submit themselves and all they have to the Mercy of the Conquerour as the Carthaginians did to the Romans you will grant I imagine that this Conquerour is an Emperour to all Intents having an absolute Right of Power over the People and their Land also Mer. Yes certainly as long as he keeps himself and People in that Condition there cannot want any thing to make him an absolute Monarch Trav. But we will farther suppose That our Conquerour being of a more noble and more humane Temper than it may be our Author would have been orders diligent Inquisition to be made into the Value of his conquer'd Lands Which being done and enter'd into a Register such as we call Doomsday Book the Conquerour divides most of these Lands between the Conquerours and the Conquered some he returns to their former Owners upon certain Conditions or Services others he changeth To his Noblemen and Favourites he grants great Titles and Priviledges to the Gentry less and to the vulgar or common sort some small Possessions which with a little Labour and Diligence will enable them to live easily and peaceably the rest of their days All these become an Inheritance to themselves and their Heirs according to their several Tenures which the Conquerours have generally created and which we call Property These Sir being thus established and the Lands of the Kingdom setled after this manner the Conquerour or King himself reserves it may be a small part which we call Crown Lands and in Consideration of his Right of Conquest and those Benefits which he hath bestowed upon his People in granting them their Liberties Lives and Lands he continueth to himself the Power of making and abolishing Laws according as he shall think most fit and proper for the Peace Honour and Safety of his Government He creates Magistrates for the due Execution of these Laws who in his stead and by his Authority have a Power to judge between his Subjects and in some Cases between his Subjects and himself or his Attorney Besides these he retains the sole Power of making Peace and War of
it we will suppose that by his Goths and Northern people he means the Saxons for the Danes were but a very little while I think not thirty years masters of England and so what may be gather'd in favour of his popular Government from them if any thing could would not be much material We will imagine then that our Saxons were of the race of the Goths and that retaining their customs They introduc'd many of them amongst us such as might be the division of the lands into several Feuds which they called Thane lands and were like our Mannors or Lordships under certain Tenures or Services Many also they might have found amongst the Britains and retain'd them under their own Government for it is certain the Britains held lands by several Tenures but whether they were originally of their own Institution or the remains of the Roman Clientela's and Praeda militaria I will not determine I have already told you that the Goths upon their first Transplantation and after they were setled in their new possessions were govern'd by Kings whose power encreas'd despotically according as the people grew secure and civiliz'd and so they continued above a thousand years nor do I find that the people in all this time pretended to any other share in the government than to meet in General Councils when the affairs of the Kingdom oblig'd their King to assemble them And truly I ever thought such National Assemblies when well regulated very conducible to the security and happy subsistence of all Governments and such our antient Monarchs have thought fit to make use of and have transmitted the custom of convoking such Councils which we not call Parliaments even to our days But that these Counsellors should have any right of command is so contrary to the design of their Institution that as this must needs be dangerous to the Government it self so they make their good Institution useless by rendring themselves suspected to the King who alone hath the right to assemble them For what wise Magistrate would by his own authority raise a power which he apprehends might shock his own The sad effects of this we have seen of late days among our selves when our Commoners in Parliament who were meer Counsellors and no more or Representatives with a power to consent have arrogated to themselves a Soveraign authority and under that pretence have forceably and violently subverted our antient Government and destroyed our Lawful and Natural Governour himself and have besides of late spent so much time in unnecessary new disputes concerning their own rights and prerogatives which really do not much concern us that they have totally neglected those main ends of their meeting which are the Security of our Government under our Lawful Soveraign and the peace and happiness of his people and which are the only blessings and benefits which we desire of them Nay they have been so far from procuring those advantages for us to which purposes they have been solely entrusted by us that their disputes concerning the Succession to the Crown of England which is indisputable The Right which the King hath to borrow money upon good Security which was never taken from the poorest of his Subjects shewing mercy upon unfortunate offenders which is his Nature as well as undoubted Prerogative and several such other irregular Heats and Animosities are the most apparent causes of our present horrid Conspiracies troubles and distractions But to return to our Goths I have told you that after their division those that spread toward the West and Southern parts of Europe were in a continual state of war and so their King was but their General whom sometimes they did depose or continue according as they found him capable of that great employment upon whose conduct in their dangerous circumstances their Lives and Fortunes did chiefly depend and such in some respects was the case of our Saxons under their Heptarchy here in England All the world knows that they invaded us without any pretence of title being only call'd in as friends by Vortigern the British King to assist him against the Scots and by degrees encroaching upon the Britains they erected several Kingdoms until at length the Native Inhabitants were totally over-power'd But this made very little alteration in their affairs for wanting a common enemy they were always quarrelling amongst themselves usurping upon one another untill their several little Governments were united under one Soveraign Monarch who was Egbert as some write or Alfred the eighteenth King of the West-Saxons ` T is true that during Vide Chron. Sir R Baker their Heptarchy they chose one amongst themselves who was the Supreme head of the rest and was call'd King of Engle-lond And it is recorded that eight of the Mercian Kings in a continued succession kept the Imperial Crown of the Heptarchy But it was rather a titular honour than a Soveraign right of Government and I do not find but that every particular King in his own Province did generally exercise those two great Regalities of making Laws and levying Taxes by vertue of his own authority But whether they did or not it is little to our purpose since we have no reason to follow the examples of those petty Kings and Vsurpers especially when we consider their circumstances But if we must lay aside the form of Government since the Norman conquest from whence our Aera begins and concerning which our Histories are more certain and Authentick let us then rather consult the Administration of those West-Saxons who solely and Soveraignly enjoy'd the Crown of England And not to be too tedious we will six upon King Edward the Confessor the last except Harold of our English Saxon Kings I shall not trouble you with much neither concerning him because you may find at large whatever can be said of him in our own English Histories I shall only therefore make this remark that we have had no Kings since William the Conqueror nor was he himself more absolute than King Edward the Confessor was I remember nothing of his impositions but rather believe there might have been none during his reign because I find that he remitted to his people the yearly Tribute of 40000 l. that had been gathered by the name of Danegelt But for Laws which now are made by Act of Parliament I observe no such Parliamentary way of proceedings in his days It is true that he called a Councel or Wittena Gemote which some call very improperly a Parliament especially as it is now understood in the second year of his Reign but the Commoners were so far from having any right of power that their presence was not really necessary Minores laici non sammoneri debent sed si eorum praesentia necessaria fuerit c. Which shews plainly that they might be omitted Nay although they were summoned and did not appear nevertheless the Parliament was taken to be full without them Which is a sufficient proof that the Commons
were not so much as an essential part of the Parliament and it is certain that Edward the Confessor took the same course about his Laws as the Greeks and Romans formerly had done the first fetching their institutions from the Aegyptians and the latter from the Greeks So King Edward having gathered together the Laws of the Mercians West Saxons Danes and Northumbrians he selected the best and compiled them into one body which being approved in Councilâ— by his own authority he commanded they should be observed and they were the fountain of those which we call at this day the Common Law Canutus the Danish Vsurpeâ— called also a Council or Parliament at Oxford in which he made several good Laws but I do not find that the Commoners pretended any right in the Supreme authority at that time any more than afterwards But however I cannot believe that their example is any argument for us to forsake the present constitution of our English Monarchy to hunt after the polity of an Invader who with his Successors enjoyed not the Crown of England the fiftieth part so long as the Norman Line hath done Now Cousin you see what is become of those great expectations which we might have had from the noise and bustle which our Author makes of the Northern polities and their exact rules of Government but so it falls out that in our days mountains are no less apt to bring forth mice than formerly And that when there is a great cry there is not always the more wooll For in this case contrary to his undeniable Aphorism though it may possibly be true that the Saxons made some division of the Lands amongst the people for our present division of Lands and Tenures also were generally made and instituted by the Normans yet they retained the Soveraign authority themselves Merch. Sir I am obliged to you for remembring me of what I had read before but could not apply it so well to our present purpose as you have done But believing that you are clearly in the right I shall not trouble you any farther concerning those Northern polities but desire that you would proceed and let me know what you mean by the rational part Trav. By the rational part I mean this that granting all to be true which our Author hath affirmed concerning those Goths and Northern people and that in the original constitution of our Government the people had a share in the Supreme Authority and that the prerogative which our King at present lawfully possesses hath been by degrees gained from the people All which is so notoriously false that on the contrary the people have lately encroached upon the prerogative yet I say at this time and as our present circumstances stand it is more rational that all honest and sober men who laying aside ambition and malice consider impartially the just rights and liberties of the people together with the preservation of our Government and the general happiness of the Nation should rather endeavour by all lawful means to increase the power of his present Majesty than diminish it And supposing we were at liberty to choose what form of Government we pleased rather continue it a Monarchy as it is than set up such a Democratical form or phantastical model as our Author having stoln it in a great measure from the propositions of the Rebels sent to the late King in the Isle of Wight and the transactions of Forty Eight hath proposed to us Merch. The performance of this Sir will be such a full satisfaction to us all that nothing will remain farther for our consideration but to contrive a means how we may better secure our present Government and by enacting farther good Laws if necessary with a strict execution of them reduce our pestilent Republican disturbers of our peace unto a due obediencâ— to their Natural and Lawful Prince One thing more I must beg of you by the way which is to let me know why you suppose all along that ouâ— Author would set up a Common-wealth since he tells us plainly p. 209. That he abhorrs the thoughts of wishing a Democracy much less endeavouring any such thing during these circumstances we are now in that is under Oaths of obedience to a Lawful King Trav. I thank you Sir for putting me in mind of it but indeed I thought you had by this time sufficiently understood how to distinguish a Presbyterian or otherwise Phanatical Commonwealth man's publick declaration from his more private meaning I must therefore mind you of this observation by the way that I never yet met with any of those Authors who was not demonstrably a wilful malicious Knave in his writings But truly in this case I think our Author is frank and plain enough I shall therefore mind you of some passages which I shall leave to your own Interpretation He tells us p. 182. That our present estate inclines to popularity and I do not find but that he inclines as much to comply with our estate as they could wish but let us come to his declaration against it where he protests that he hates the thoughts of wishing a Commonwealth but yet insinuates from the story of Themistocles his firing the Grecian ships That nothing could be more advantagious and profitable for us which surely shews his good inclinations plain enough But I am fully perswaded that our Governours have taken no less care to secure us against the literal than the metaphorical sence of his â—ine tale and will as well preserve our Navy as our Government from his Diabolical designs But now he gives us the reason why he cannot think of a Common-wealth because conscientious good man he is loth to break his oath of obedience to a Lawful King But for this Lawful King himself it is no matter if he be perjur'd to the very bottom of destruction who having no less sworn and that solemnly too to maintain the antient Monarchical Government as at present by Law confirmed and establish'd with all the rights and prerogatives belonging to the Imperial Crown of England may break all betray his poor Subjects their rights and liberties abandon them to the mercy of unmerciful Tyrants and be damn'd if he pleases Nay our Author kindly advises him to it and rather than his cursed project should fail he perswades him it is the best thing he can do Whereas it is plain That the power of the Kings of England is restrained or limited as we may say in nothing more considerable than this viz. That they cannot by their own Grant sever their Prerogatives from the Crown nor communicate any part thereof to any one no not to the Princes their eldest Sons as may be seen more at large in Sir J. Davies upon Impositions cap. 29. besides many other good Authors Nay more he tells us there That neither the Kings Acts nor any Act of Parliament can give away his Prerogative and farther that no Act of Parliament in the Negative can take
away the Kings Prerogative in the Affirmative Yet notwithstanding this and ten times more that may be said to this purpose our King is advised and perswaded nay almost necessitated as our Author would have it not only to quit some One of his Prerogatives but to make short work to release and give them up all at once In the next place let us consider Plato's excellent new model it self and here like a wise Politician he hath made Three co-ordinate powers in being at the same time that is to say King Lords and Commons I confess for the King he says little of him and with great reason for indeed he signifies nothing more than a Cypher which as in Arithmetick is only to make the Commons more valuable But to do our Author right he hath yet a farther use to make of this his otherwise useless Prince that is to say whilest neither his own Right nor his Power nor our Laws can secure himself his Name nevertheless is to preserve these his Masters With that they hope to prevent all opposition and civil wars at home For should they forceably depose him they justly apprehend that his Loyal Subjects in England would endeavour to revenge such an insupportable wrong Nor can they believe that the Kingdoms of Scotland and Ireland would again tamely submit their Necks to the servile yoke of a few ambitious English Commoners or that foreign Princes themselves would even for their own securities sake quietly and unconcern'd countenance this horrid injustice and outrage done to the sacred dignity of Kings But if they can perswade his Majesty willingly to depose himself and at the same time disinherit his Heirs and Successors they imagine that none can pretend to disapprove much less blame or impute to them the volunry act of a King For as Volenti non fit injuria and by consequence no offence in them so they will certainly reserve to themselves the honour of punishing in the King as their master-piece and last act of justice the Treason which he shall have committed against himself To facilitate all this our Author hath taken from his Majesty his Militia and his Revenue that is men and monâ—y which are the strength and sinews of Power and in the Commoners he hath plac'd the Royal authority of Calling Proroguing and Dissolving themselves And left the King in this miserable condition should have yet any hopes left even of securing his own Person he hath taken from him the power of making his own Officers and bestowing those imployments which have always depended upon the Regal authority Nay the Lords themselves are no more to receive their Honours from the Fountain of all Honour but must lick the dust from the shooes of their once obsequious vassals So our poor Master having nothing now to give must lose the hopes even of a grateful friend who in his extremity might at least wish him well and speak a good word for him to his insolent Governours Mer. But Sir our Author leaves most of these things in the disposition of the Parliament by which he tells us that he ever understood the King Lords and Commons so that neither his Militia nor Revenue can be said to be so absolutely taken from himself as granted to the Parliament in general of which he is still to be the head Trav. Ah Cousin there is deadly poison in this his varnished treacherous Cup and you will easily perceive it when you consider Plato cares not so much that the Militia should be in the power of the Commons as out of the King For whilest the King cannot dispose of it without the consent of his Lower House judge you whether they will ever agree to the raising any force which they shall not themselves command If then any difference arise upon that or any other point which unavoidably and designedly will happen then are the Commoners become immediately masters of all For what can the King do though joyn'd with the House of Lords without a right of command or force against a multitude and that so unequal too that if the House of Commons in Parliament represent the whole Nation as they pretend they do then are they at least ten thousand men against one though all the Nobility be included with the King The necessary consequence of all this must be that if on the one hand the King and Lords agree with the Commons in all things then the Commons govern more absolutely than if there were neither the one nor the other because there is no pretence against them On the other hand if they in any thing differ from the Commons then undoubtedly the disagreeing Lords as formerly shall be turned out of doors the King set aside and the Votes made by the House of Commons Jan. 4. 1648 revived and confirmed which being very short but plain I shall here repeat First That the people under God are the original of all just power Secondly That the Commons of England assembled in Parliament being chosen by and representing the people have the Supreme Authority of this Nation Thirdly That whatever is enacted and declared for Law by the Commons of England assembled in Parliament hath the force of a Law Fourthly That all the people of this Nation are included thereby although the consent and concurrence of the King and House of Peers be not had thereunto What think you now Cousin of these four Votes even whilst the King and Lords were yet in being Do they not look as if they designed a Commonwealth or rather to establish an arbitrary Tyrannical power in the House of Commons and yet their propositions all along to the King were the same which Plato hath again offered us that is leaving the Militia the publick revenue nomination of officers and such like to the Parliament by which was always meant King Lords and Commons This is the politick web which our Author pretends to have spun out of his own shallow brains and indeed it is so very wondrous thin that if our present Statesmen could not with half an eye see through it I should be apt to agree with our Author p. 22. that they ought in conscience to excuse themselves from that sublime imployment and betake themselves to callings more suitable to their capacities as Shoomakers Tailors and such other mechanick professions Merch. Sir the Sun at noon day is never more clear than that he designs at best a Commonwealth And indeed where three co-ordinate powers are in being at the same time it is impossible they should continue long in that state but some one or two must certainly in time over balance and get the advantage of the other I think Lucan confirmed this long ago when he said Nulla fides regni sociis omnisque potestas Impatiens consortis erit And the King having neither power strength money nor officers it is ten thousand to one as you observe on the Commons side who are actually possessed of all Pray therefore proceed
Fourth of Edward the Third and the words of it are these It is accorded that a Parliament shall be holden every year once and more often if need be Now Sir you must observe that this Act was made whilst the King was but Nineteen years of age and both himself and Kingdom under the care of Twelve Governours His Mother Queen Isabel and Roger Mortimer very powerful the Governours of the Pupil King divided amongst themselves and many other pressing affairs of the Nation oblig'd most people to propose that expedient of frequent Parliaments as the most probable means to secure the peace and prosperity of the Kingdom at least until the King should come of riper years and thereby many differences be reconciled After this in the Thirty sixth year of his Reign he called a Parliament and wanting money as generally he did the Parliament would grant nothing until an Act passed for maintenance of former Articles and Statutes there expressed And that for redress of divers mischiefs and grievances which daily happen a Parliament shall be holden every year as another time was ordained by Statute These are the two Statutes intended by our Author when he tells us that the Statute of Edward the first was confirmed by that glorious Prince Edward the third Whereas in truth they were both made by the same King and both in a great measure revoked in his own time Having declared after the making this last Act that he yielded to it only to serve his own turn This Sir is the matter of Fact upon which our Author builds his great pretensions to the old constitutions of Annual Parliaments The first Act was made whilst the King was very young the second when he wanted money and had Twenty six shillings and eight pence granted him upon every sack of wool transported for three years And both first and second Acts were broken by several intermissions before he died Besides we must make this remark that a Parliament seldom met without giving the King some money which might encourage those Kings to assemble them oftner than lately they have done But the truth is Annual Parliaments were lookt upon as so great a grievance to the Nation that we find that about the Tenth year of Richard the Second his Successor it was thought a great Prerogative in the King that he might call a Parliament once a year And both Houses appointed the Duke of Glocester and Thomas Arundell Bishop of Ely to acquaint the King that by an old Statute the King once a year might lawfully summon his Court of Parliament for reformation of corruptions and enormities within the Realm And if we consider with our selves we shall find that if yearly Parliaments were imposed upon us they would become grievances equally insupportable as to have no Parliaments at all For if the Knights Citizens and Burgesses be chosen out of the Countrey Gentlemen and Merchants inhabiting those Countries where they are elected as sure they ought to be what inconvenience if not ruin must it bring upon their affairs when they shall be forced to run every year a hundred or two hundred Miles from their particular domestick affairs to serve in a formal Parliament in which it may be the greatest business will be to make business for the next Indeed for idle persons who live about Town and have nothing to do but to scrible knavish politicks to the disturbance of honest men such a constitution might do well enough if they could get to be chosen members But we find from experience and History that in those days when Ambition and Faction were not so much in vogue as at present men were so far from making parties to get into the Parliament that many Commoners and Lords too have petitioned and been excused their attendance The King 's Queen's and Prince's Servants have stood upon their priviledge of exemption So James Barner was discharged by the King's command Quia erat de retinentia Regis 7. R. 2 and the Lord de Vessey in Edward the Fourths time obtained Licence not to serve in Parliament during his life Rex concessit Henrico Bromflet Dom. de Vessey quod ipse durante vita sit exoneratus de veniendo ad Parl. Besides the very Writ of Summons shews that in the original institution and design of Parliaments a frequent meeting could not be necessary For they were only to treat concilium impendere de magnis arduis negotiis Now God help us if every year should produce such magna ardua negotia such difficult and weighty affairs that the King with his Judges and â—rivy Council could not determine them without assembling his great Council the Parliament I confess in our Authors Chimerical model I am perswaded our circumstances would be bad enough but I thank God we are not gotten there yet Thus you see Sir that this grievance in not having annual Parliaments is become no grievance at all Mer. I begin Cousin to lose all manner of respect for this mistaken Mountebank For I perceive notwithstanding his great words and pretences all is but wind emptinâ—ss and cheat Having therefore fully satisfieâ— me concerning our liberties properties and Parliaments pray forget not to say somewhat of our Religion Trav. Sir I shall not presume to meddle with the Doctrinal part of any Religion that being none of my Province Nor shall I say much concerning the Ceremonial part or discipline of our own that is to say the Church of England It is sufficient to mind you that both the Doctrine and Discipline in Church Government have been established and confirm'd by several Acts of Parliament and Statutes Which Parliaments being the most Soveraign power that our Author himself pretends to set up amongst us we ought all to acquiesce in and be concluded by what they have done until an equal authority shall repeal those Acts or otherwise determine concerning us Mer. There is no objection can be made against this answer But Sir since the difference in our Religion seems manifestly to occasion most of our troubles why may not the King by his own authority dispence with the penal part of these Laws or grant a toleration especially to Protestant Dissenters or encourage an Act of Parliament for uniting them into the Church of England or else why might not the same Church release some part of the rigour of the Discipline and Ceremony since 't is agreed on all hands that the observance or non-observance of them are not points necessary or absolutely conducing to Salvation Trav. Cousin I shall answer you all these questions as plain as I can And first I shall never believe that true and unfeigned Religion especially amongst men where the Doctrine agrees is ever the real cause of any troubles disturbance or disobedience to lawful authority such as is that which produces an Act of Parliament even in our Authors sence being so contrary to the Doctrine and Principles of Christian Religion that I may confidently affirm where
I have made some other few remarks as the impertinent comparison which Plato hath made of a Bayliff Attorney or Referrâ—e as they relate to the choosing the Speaker of the House of Commons all which is directly against himself his magisterial definition of Prerogative and many other arrogances and follies all which I hope I shall be able to answer my self without giving you any farther trouble Trav. Sir I do not in the least quâ—stâ—on it however if any thing hath been omitted in which I may be able to give you farther satisfaction I shall â—vâ—r be ready to obey your Commands Coelum ipsum pâ—timus stultitiâ— neque Per nostâ—um pâ—â—imâ—â— scelâ—â— Iracunda Jovem ponere fulmina Horaâ— â—arm l. 1. THE CONTENTS DISCOURSE I. OF the Graâ—iâ—n Commonwealtâ—â— compâ—red wâ—â—h England Page â—4 â—5 Of Plato Lycurgus Sparta and Athens p. 26. 27. sequent The original of the Graecian Governments p. 34. seq Of Solon p. 37. Of Athens p. 41. Of Sparta p. 47. The Ephori p. 48. DISCOURSE II. Division of Government p. 59. Of the House of Commons p. 65. their Institution p. 68. Of the House of Lords p. 66. 67. Of the Kings prerogative in Adjourning Proroguing and Dissolving Parliaments p. 7â— The beginning of Government before the Flood p. 76. After the Flood 7â— Of Ogyges Sithuthrus Deucalian Noe p. 79. Of Natâ—â—e p. 8â— First Kingdoms afâ—… the Flood instituted by fathers of Famâ—lies p. 87. 802. No right of Power nor Liberty originally in the People p. 89 Commonwealths founded upon Vsurpaâ—â—on c. p. 90. Of the Creâ—tion of the World and Mankind according to â—â—cretius and some other Heathen Philoâ—oâ—â—ers p. 91. seq Of Moses â—â—d â—â—â— History p. 97. seq Abraham hâ—d Regal Authority p. 107 Saulâ— â—â—t chosen by the people nor depended â—poâ— them p. 109. Empire not founded oâ— Property p. 113. upon â—â—at it is foundâ—â— p. 125. 127. Not reasonâ—ble thâ—â— the People who have the greatest interest in the Property should have any right of power in the Governmeent except what is subordinate p. 14â— Of Power â—48 God governs humanâ— affairs p. 154. Of force p. 156. That the people by â—â—ving an interest in the Property have â—ot â—â—ereâ—â—â— greater power force or streâ—gtâ— than if they hâ—d it â—oâ— p. 1â—2 Of â—…es p. 169. All Soveraign Priâ—â—â—s â—â—vâ—â—â—ighâ— of â—oâ—er â—veâ— tâ—e 〈…〉 the properâ—y be diviâ—… the people p â—71 Moâ—â—rchs who hâ—ve â—â—joâ—eâ— the Sâ—pâ—eâ—e Aâ—thority hâ—ve yet left the property to the people Of the Scythians p. 178. Of the Assyrianâ— Medes and Persians p. 180. Of the Aegyptian Kings p. 182. Of the Romans p. 185. Of the Brittish Kings p. 192. Of the Kings of Israel â—r of the Jews p. 193. Definition of an â—bsolute Monarch p. 196 197. David â—â—â—bsolute Monarch p. 199. Of Zedâ—kiaâ— and Jeremiah p. 204. Of the â—aâ—hedrim p. 209. Of the Goths â— 212. Of the Lombards p. 216. Of the Vandalls p. 221. Of Clâ—â—mâ—â—â—s King of Sparta p. 225. The death of the last Christian Greek Emperour and loss of Constantinople p. 226. DISCOURSE III. Moses Theseus and Romulus â—ot Founders of Demoâ—râ—ciâ—s aâ— Plato Red averrs p. 242. Of the Gracchi and Agrarian Lâ—w p. 25â— â—53 Of Agis â—nâ— Clâ—â—mâ—neâ— p. 260. Punishmeâ—t of Sedition anâ— Calâ—mniâ—â—ors of the Government in Venice 26â— Of the French Gentry Frâ—emen and Râ—â—â—â—â—â—rs their â—…res p. 27â— Vindiâ—â—tion of 〈…〉 Clergy and Ecclestastical Government against the malicious reflections of Plato Red. p. 274. 277. Soveraign right of power solely in the King p. 279. 284. Of the Kings negative voice in Parliament p. 281. The Kings of England depend not upon the people nor received their right of power from them p. 285. seq 288. The Goths not in England p. 291. Of the Saxons and their Tenures p. 293. 297. Of our late Parliament p. 295. Of K. Edward the Confessor p. 298. Plato Red. designs to set up a Commonwealth p. 304. Of the Kingâ— prerogative p. 306. Of our Liberties p. 315. Of Calumniators p. 317. Of our Properties p. 322. Of Annual Parl. p. 325. Of Religion p. 333. Of Dissenters p. 335. Of Popish Recusants 340. Of Toleration 342. Of the Popes Supremacy 350. 355. Dissenters Doctrine of Deposing Princes 357. A Commonwealth not to be promoted in this present conjuncture of affairs 361. 367. Of Arbitrary power in the King 365. Of Liberty of Conscience 369. ERRATA IN the Preface Line 1. for Inquity read Iniquity p. 66. l. 17. put out But. p. 80. for pâ—rsonatus r. persâ—â—â—tatuâ— l. 12. for Abydnuâ— r. Abydenuâ— p. 86 l. 11. for Government r. faith p. 143. l ult for Vital heat r. Animal â—pirits p 144. l. 1. for Veins r. Nerves p. 185 255 256 294 for Praeda r. praedia p. 186. for lientiam r. licentiam