taken in the largest sence but rather contra-distinct and indeed opposite to it and destructive of it Sir Henry Spelman at last takes leave of this great Officer and of his Court by shewing what a mighty encrease came flowing in from that ill Weed the Invention of Uses or Trusts which are still the same But to this point there are plenty of far greater Authorities and Authors for whose Testimony herein I shall reserve it Another thing to be premised is that as the King had no such Power himself singly and in his own Person only to decide Causes of Equity and therefore could not Delegate it to any one Man as 't is pretended he might so and upon the same ground and reason the King by our Law could not by his Commission Erect any Court of Equity It can be grouned and warranted only upon a Prescription or an Act of Parliament neither of which can be pretended to in the matter in hand it was so adjudged 26 Eliz. in the King's-Bench Sir Edw. Coke 4 Instit. fol. 87 97. That a Court of Equity cannot be Erected but only by Act of Parliament or Prescription And the like in the Lord Hob. Rep. 63. Resolv'd also in Langdale's Ca. 12. Rep. 52. That the King cannot raise a Court of Equity the reason is because a Court of Equity proceeds by the Rules of the Civil Law and not by the Common Law 6 Rep. 11. b. and 2 Instit 71. The King may appoint a new Court and new Judges but cannot change the Law Hill 8. H. 4. fol. 79. by Gascoign That the King by his Charter cannot out the People of their Inheritance which they have in the Common Law So note the Common Law is the People's Inheritance In the next place Let us proceed to examine about what time and upon what occasion this Court of Equity exerted its Power which hath in part fallen in among our former Enquiries For the time and occasion too Mr. Lambert in his Archeion pag. 75. refers it to the time of King Henry IV. and the occasion was taken from Feoffments to Uses For remedy in which Cases the Chancery was fled unto With this agrees Sir Henry Spelman in his Glossary pag. 107. at the lower end Doctor and Student fol. 98. Sir John Davy's Rep. in his Preface Mr. Hunt's Argument for the Bishop's Right c. pag. 144. And to prevent mistakes herein it must be observ'd That the word Equity hath been very anciently used long before this Jurisdiction began in Chancery but not in a Contradiction or in Opposition to the Common Law of the Land as now it is but either in a mild and merciful Expounding of the Law by the known and sworn Judges of the Law or as synonimous and signifying the same thing as Law Justice and Right For the Laws of England were not looked upon then as being like the Laws of Draco Sanguinary and Cruel and Rigorous but merciful and equitable in themselves and so expounded and administred by the Judges of the Common Law Mulcaster the Translator of the Chancellour Fortescue being a Student of the Common Laws of England in the Reign of King H. VIII could readily observe to his Reader from his Study of those Laws and from the Arguments used by his Author the Excellent Sir John Fortescue Easdem nostras Leges non solum Romanorum Caesarum sed omnium aliarum Nationum Constitutiones multis parasangis prudentiâ Justitia equitate praecellere facilè perspicias See his Preface Non quod principi placet Legis vigorem habet non quicquid de voluntate Regis tho his Will be not Arbitrary neither but guided by Discretion and tho he define secundum aequum bonum sed quod Magnatum suorum Concilio Regiâ authoritate praestante habita super hoc deliberatione tractatu rectè fuerit definitum So writes Bracton Lib. 3. Cap. 9. fol. 107. and so Britton Sir Gilbert Thorneton Ch. Justice in the time of King E. I. and Sir John Fortescue Chief Justice and afterwards Chancellor These invincibly prove the Nature of our Laws The Kings of England were from the first Foundation of the Government Sworn to observe the old known Laws of the Realm which were called Usus Consuetudines Regni and that they would not suffer any Innovasion which was often attempted by the Pope and his Clergy who endeavoured to introduce into this Realm the Civil and Canon Laws King Henry I. writing to the Pope upon such an occasion tells the Pope stoutly Notum habe at Sanctitas vestra quod me vivente Usus Regni Angliae non imminuentur Et si ego in tanta medejectione ponerem Optimates mei totus Angliae populus id nullo modo paterentur And all the Nobles of England by Consent of the Commons wrote to Pope Boniface upon the same occasion Non permittemus tam insolita tam indebita Dominum nostrum Regem etiamsi vellet facere seu quo-modo-libet attemptare The Lord Chancellor and Lord Keeper is also Sworn to do Right to all after the Laws and Usages of this Realm not secundum aequum bonum nor other Rules of Equity 2 E. 3. fol. 20. It is said in that Book by the Chancellor sitting in the Chancery and speaking of that Court This says he is a place of Equity where we grant a Writ to every one that Sues for his Inheritance So that to issue out Writs as Officina Brevium is by the Chancellor's own acknowledgment a proper work of Equity It seems to be the only use of the word Equity at that time 2 Instit. 53. The Civilian Vinius in his Comment upon Justinian's Institutes pag. 20. Nomen Aequitatis says he duplicitèr accipitur vel in genere pro aequo quod cum omni jure conjunctum est vel in specie pro eo quod est à Jure Civili diversum Omnibus Legibus aequitas inesse creditur Nomenque juris non meretur quod ab omni Aequitate destitutum est He mentions no Equity contrary to Law or to Controul the Law nor any other than what was to be exercised by the very Judges of the Law themselves in all Cases that came before them Plowd Comment 466 467. In the Case of Eyston and Studde it is said No Makers of Law can forsee all things that may happen and therefore it is convenient that the fault be reform'd by Equity This the Chancery-men will catch at as making much for their practise of relieving in such unforeseen Cases where the Law looks severe and rigorous But the Case cited proceeds further and makes not at all for the Chancery if it be heard out And the Sages of our Law have deserved great Commendation says that Case in using Equity in Cases of Rigour in the words of a Law for by that they have mollified severe Texts and have made the Law tolerable Who are meant generally in our Law-Books and Arguments by the
Law I desire that both these Authorities last cited may be compared together viz. Sir Cotton's Abr. and Sir Coke's 2 Instit. 553. the one gives light to the other Juncta juvant This Instructs us in the method of Proceedings in Equity used in the time of King R. II. and most likely in the times preceding Not to the Chancellor alone but to the King himself to be referr'd to the Councel And the Case of Sir Richard le Scrope was in a matter where there was remedy at Law so that they were out of their way in Petitioning to the King in it and therefore the Decree was revers'd by the Lords in Parliament before whom the Appeal did properly lye nor would the Lords themselves determine it upon the Merits of the Cause viz. who had the right but referred the Parties to the Common Law to the right course and yet it was a Decree made by the Submission of all Parties to the Arbitration So ready were the Lords at that time to do right to the Common Law Sir Edward Coke says this was the first Decree made by the Chancellor in the Chancery who did as it seems in limine titubare stumble at the very Threshold which some say is ominous The Proceedings in this Case of Sir Richard le Scrope was as I find when Thomas Arundel Bishop of Ely and afterwards Archbishop of Canterbury was Chancellor who no doubt did much influence the King and Council in making the Decree They have been Churchmen and divers of them of the highest rank Cardinals who are upon good ground supposed to be the first Setters up and promoters of this absolute Power in Chancery the Chancellors generally in those elder times being of the Order of the Clergy And they began as is usual in beginnings with great modesty and to exercise their Power in some few Cases which failed of ordinary help and when Parliaments were not so frequent as formerly to whom recourse should have been and who would have censured such assuming of new Jurisdictions as they afterwards very frequently did And the Setters up of this new Jurisdiction would not at first adventure to do it by One single Person alone tho never so high but with the Concurrence of the Judges and they too not sent for into the Chancery to attend and assist the Chancellor but those new Cases of Equity were sent into the Exchequer Chamber where the Chancellor himself resorted to the Judges with their Causes in Equity and these are many of them reported in our Year-Books of those times And those Causes were constantly determin'd by the opinion of the Judges and this method took off the Judges whose Superiour the Chancellor was in Dignity and Grandeur from opposing that new Jurisdiction by granting Prohibitions to stop the Proceedings of the Chancery in such Cases as it was their Duty to have done See Mr. Selden's Notes upon Fleta How the Clergy who anciently had their Sole dependence upon the Bishop of Rome and held themselves not Subject to the Temporal Power still promoted and endeavoured to introduce the Civil Law into this Realm but yet were still withstood by the Lords and Commons who were always hearty Friends to the Common Law Sir Coke's 2 Instit. fol. 626. at the end of that folio it is said in the Indictment against Cardinal Wolsey and charged upon him that he intended Antiquissimas Angliae Leges penitùs subvertere enervare Universumque hoc Regnum Angliae ejusdem regni populum Legibus Imperialibus vulgò dictis Legibus Civilibus earundem Legum canonibus imperpetuum Subjugare subducere c. Cardinal Wolsey's being in the height of Favour and Authority with King Henry VIII hated both Parliaments and the Common Laws and he was the means that but one Parliament was holden in Fourteen Years The Common Law was the true Natural and Original Law of England used ever since the departure of the Romans and brought in by the English Saxons again Qui suis tantummodò quas secum è Germanià whether they had transplanted them attulerant Moribus usi sunt only their ancient Customs and no other Caesarei Juris says learned Selden usus plane reperitur Nullus per Annos amplius Septingentos more than 700 years There was no Chancery-Law to determine matters of fact much less titles of Freehold by Depositions of Witnesses only or by an Absolute or Arbitrary Power in all that time of 700 years No Man was suffer'd to have a Civil Law Book in his keeping King Stephen by his Edict did forbid it The Saxons Danes and Normans owned no other Law than that Law which Anglorum Commune vocitamus says the famous Selden in his Dissertatio ad Fletam pag. 502 503 505 506 508. And Johannes Balaeus tells us that Theobaldus Cantuariensis Archiepiscopus quasdam Leges in Angliam attulerat sed eas ut Reipublicae nocivas Rex Stephanus perpetuo Parliamenti Decreto damnavit delevit incendi fecit The Common Law was in King Stephen's time and before says Selden the Study of Men that were otherwise Learned too Sed Moribus Majorum tantum patrioque utebantur illi Jure qùod ante ad nostra usque tempora Angliae Commune vocitatur and their Studies were furnished with the Presidents of Judgments and Copies of Reports of Law-Proceedings like those of our Year-Books and no other were cited in their Courts And the Students and Residents at the Inns of Courts who afterwards were the Countors or Pleaders were not Clerks or Sollicitors as many now adays are to the declining of that Noble Profession But the Sons of Noble Men and of the best of the Gentry as we read in Sir John Fortesâ—…ue in his Treatise De Laudibus Legum Angliae Juris Anglicani says Excellent Selden ut Supra 537. quod Commune vocitamus quae Gentis hujus Genio ab intimâ Antiquitate adaptatum fuit Singularis aestimatio atque inde non immeritò in eodem adhaesio constans sane pertinax In that great question says Selden in his Dissertation ib. 539. concerning the right of Succession to the Crown of Scotland referred by all Parties and Pretenders to the Decision of our King Edward I. Anno Regni 19. Anno Dom. 1292. about which they met at Norham in the Bishoprick of Durham It was Debated as a Praeliminary whether it should be judged and decided by the Law of England or of Scotland or the Caesarean or Civil Law as being the Jus Gentium see Riley's Placita Parliamentaria 143. in the middle of that Page our King Edward I being the Soveraign or Superiour Lord of Scotland It was concluded before Roger de Brabazon a Judge of the King's-Bench Sir Edw. Coke says Ch. Justice 2 Instit. 554. the King 's Delegate or Substitute for that Great and Noble Occasion That the Caesarean or Civil Law should by no means be allowed of Nè inde Majestatis Anglicanae Juri
Statutes were made but to no very great purpose for means were found out to evade them At last came forth the Stat. of 27 H. 8. cap. 10. and this undertook and plainly so intended to pluck up this unwholsome Weed by the Roots Which good Law first reciting the excellent quiet and repose that Men's Estates had by the wholsome Rules of the Common Law but cunning Men had sought out new Inventions by fraudulent Feofments and Conveyances craftily made to secret Uses and Trusts to the utter subversion of the ancient Common Laws of this Realm as the Preamble speaks for the utter EXTIRPATING and EXTINGUISHMENT of all such subtil practis'd Feofments Abuses and Errors It is Enacted That the Possession of the Land shall be in him that hath the Use and that he shall have the like Estate in the Land as he had in the Use. How strangely hath all this good Intention Pains and Care been made of little or no effect and the mischiefs still continued by a distinction invested between Trusts and Uses directly against the often repeated Clauses and manifest plain meaning and express words of this good Act For thô the Judges of the Common Law were now by this Act to judge of Uses which before was the work of the Chancery they being now converted by this Act into Estates at Law Yet some Men perfectly to elude this good Act have confidently maintain'd asserted and allow'd a distinction between an Use and a Trust. And thô they are content because they cannot help it that the Judges of the Common Law may determine of Uses the Courts of Equity shall hold a Jurisdiction in matters of Trust. And most of the great Estates in England have by colour of this fallen under their determination and controulment and now have a dependence upon a Jurisdiction of Equity Whereas Were there the least colour left by that Act of 27. H. 8. for any distinction between an Use and a Trust as most certainly and plainly there is none yet as certainly and clearly that Act of Parliament meant to extirpate those Trusts as well as Uses as any ordinary Capacity well perusing that Statute to this purpose may easily perceive I humbly and heartily beg that favour of every Lord to read over deliberately this Stat. of 27 H. 8. cap. 10. for this very purpose for it will plainly discover this gross abuse As to the length of time wherein such a Power and Jurisdiction of Equity hath been exercised in the Chancery yet it plainly appears not to be grounded upon Prescription the Original being known and not so very ancient neither and modest too and moderate at first as most such are in the beginning and having from the first starting of it been hunted and pursued with full Cry and upon a fresh Scent and in view and having hardly any Colour of an Act of Parliament That length of time were it much longer would be no Plea for it See Dr. Barrow in his Treatise of the Pope's Supremacy pag. 154. He that has no right says he to the thing that he possesses cannot plead any length of time to make his possession lawful King Henry VIII by Acts of Parliament restored the Regal Ecclesiastical Sovereignty after it had been usurp'd upon by the Popes and their Prelates near 400 years that is from the time of William the Conquerour For then began their Encroachment And the Act of Parliament of 1 E. 6. C. 2. Sect. 3. calls it a power that had been Usurp'd by the Bishop of Rome contrary to the Form and Order of the Common Law used in this Realm in high derogation to the King 's Royal Prerogative from whence we may observe That Usurping upon the Common Law and Usurping upon the King's Prerogative go together The Bishops Courts here in England took their Original from a Charter of William the Conquerour so that this Jurisdiction was a great Limb lopp'd off from the Primitive Common Law of England For before that Charter of King William Ecclesiastical Causes were determin'd in the Hundred Court and not by Witnesses only and not by the Canon Law but by the Law of the Countrey But this Charter was made by advice of the Arch-Bishops Bishops Abbots Princes and Temporal Lords See Fox his Acts and Monuments Vol. 〈◊〉 Lib. 4. pag. 2â—… says Mr. Pâ—…inn in his first Tome of his Vindication of the Supream Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction of our English Kings The Charter it self says he recites that it was done Communi Concilio for which he cites Seldeni ad Eadmerum Notae pag. 167 168. So that still the old Common Law of England hath been upon the losing hand The Civilians hold that Possessor malae fidei ullo tempore non praescribit yet I heartily concur with that Reverend Chief Justice Sir Edw. Coke a most true and hearty lover of his Countrey and an high honour to and honourer of the Profession of the Common Law in his 4 Instit. 246. at the end of that folio in Respect says that Good and Great Man that this Court of Equity hath had some continuance and many Decrees made by it it were worthy of the Wisdom of a Parliament for some Establishment to be had therein and to this intent have I chiefly used this freedom for I never loved Quiet a movere but in order to a better Security And for that end I chuse to make this Humble Address to the House of Lords It is the House of Lords who are theSupreme Court of Justice that can set the true and legal Bounds and Limits to the Jurisdiction of Inferiour Courts and can say to the biggest of them Hitherto shalt thou come and no further and here shall thy proud waves be stayed And such their Judicial Declarations are not to be controul'd by any but the Legislative Power Almighty God gave a strict charge to his own chosen People of Israel to observe those Ordinances and Laws which he gave them by Moses which were very particular and wherein nothing was left to the Discretion of the Magistrate nor had the Magistrate any Latitude whereby he could depart from the plain and common sence and Judge Secundum Aequum Bonum Arbitrarily But they were commanded Deut. 4. 2. Yee shall put nothing to the word which I command you says God by Moses neither shall ye take ought therefrom and the 12 Deut. the last verse in Cases of Difficulty that might arise upon the Construction of those Ordinances and Laws a Provision is made by Almighty God that in such Cases resort should be had to the Priest and to the Judge who should declare the Sentence of Judgment This seems to refer to some special Revelation of the mind of God in such difficult Cases which God made known to the Priest that stood before the Lord to minister 17 Deut. 8 â—…2 verses but here was nothing entrusted with the Priest or Judge of relieving against the pretended rigour or extremity of the Law in
AN ENQUIRY INTO THE JURISDICTION OF THE CHANCERY IN Causes of Equity I. Upon what Ground and Foundation that Jurisdiction is Built II. At what time the Chancery began to Exercise that Jurisdiction and upon what Occasion III. How Modest and Moderate the Exercise of it was at first IV. How wonderfully it is Grown and Enlarged And V. What is the best Remedy for Restoring and Maintaining the Common Law Humbly submitted to the Consideration of the House of Lords to whom it belongeth to keep the Inferiour Courts within their Bounds By Sir ROBERT ATKYNS Knight of the Honourable Order of the BATH To which is added The CASE of the said Sir Robert Atkyns upon his Appeal against a Decree obtained by Mrs. Elizabeth Took and others Plaintiffs in Chancery about a separate Maintenance of 200 l. per Annum c. London Printed in the Year 1695. TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE LORDS Spiritual and Temporal IN Parliament Assembled My Lords THE following Treatise together with the state of the Case annex'd to it is Humbly Presented to your Lordships to whom it properly belongs the Subject matter of both relating to that Supream Jurisdiction in Cases of Appeals from Courts of Equity which is exercis'd by your Lordships as being the last Resort Your Lordships being also the true and just Moderators in all Disputes between other Courts in points of Jurisdiction you having the Coercive and Directive Power of keeping the rest of the Courts within their due Bounds set them by the Law and Constitution of the Nation that they do not Overflow their Banks nor Usurp nor Encroach one upon another Your Lordships besides have a more peculiar Right and Title to the Service of the Composer of this Treatise who hath had the Honour to serve your Lordships for some Years and in several Parliaments in an Eminent Station and with a large Testimony and favourable Acceptance from your Lordships as appears by that hearty and kind Address which your Lordships made on his behalf besides his ordinary Attendance and Assistance as one of the Judges which he began about Four and twenty years since If what he hath written seem too free and plain he hopes he is excuseable the Necessity and Importance of the Case so requires And he may be allowed a more than common Zeal for the Common Law he having sat so many Years as a Judge in several of the Courts in Westminster-Hall he himself and his Three immediate Ancestors having been of the Profession for near Two hundred Years and in Judicial places and through the Blessing of Almighty God have Prospered by it His Great Grandfather living in the time of King Henry VII and they all have in their several turns undergone the Charge and Labour of Readers of Lincolns-Inn And your Lordships and your Noble Ancestors have always and upon many great Occasions constantly Testified a true and hearty Zeal for the Common Law of England as will largely be manifested by this Treatise and the Conclusion of the stated Case annexed to it The only Design of this Treatise being meerly to Assist and Serve your Lordships in your Discharge of that Mighty Trust reposed in your Lordships to whom the Treatise and Case is entirely submitted by My Lords Your Lordship 's most Humble And Faithful Servant Robert Atkyns AN ENQUIRY INTO THE Jurisdiction of the CHANCERY IN Causes of Equity c. IT cannot nor as to the present Occasion and Enquiry it need not be denied but that the Names of Chancellor and Chancery are very Ancient not only in Foreign Countries but even in this Nation both in the times of the Saxons and continued from thence down to our times But our proper business at present is to Enquire what those Great and High Names did at first import and signifie and what Change hath been introduced in their signification by process of time derived down to this present Age. Sir Henry Spelman that Learned Antiquary in his Glossary printed in the year 1687. pag. 109. gives us a Series of the Chancellors in this Nation and begins with Turketulus Chancellor to Edward the Elder as he is called in our History of the Saxon times in the year of our Lord 924. near 800 years since Rembaldus was Chancellor to Edward the Confessor Roll. Abr. Tit. Chancellor 1 part 384. Sir Francis Bacon sometime Lord Chancellor of England in his Resusâ—…itatio at the end of that Book sets down a Catalogue of our Chancellors beginning with Mauritius in the time of our William the First Anno 1067. And Dugdale in his Origines Juridiciales gives the same See Sir Edw. Cooke 4 Inâ—…tit 78. in the Chapter of the Chancery are the Names of several Chancellors n ancient times This shews the Antiquity of the Names but our business is to learn the Nature of them and what their Business and Employment was at first and when and how it changed Nomen ab Officio We may learn what the latter the Officium is from the Name so that the Nomen may be a true Notamen of the thing as it ought to be The Name of an Office or Employment generally imports the most eminent and noted part of the Employment though it consists of divers parts Cowel in his Interpreter upon the word Chancellor deduces it from Cancellare id est Literas vel scriptum line â per medium deductâ damnare Which as the word now in use with us is to Cancel or make void and it is performed by drawing cross Lines over the Letters Patents or other Writings to signifie they are made void and are to be of no farther use And this 't is likely was borrowed from the Lettices of Wood or Iron laid Croswise one over another to divide or enclose one part of a Room from the rest of that Room so that a Man might see through them within which Inclosure the Judge or Officer sate so as to be seen and spoken with but yet defended from the press of those that resorted to them As it is used in Churches where the Chancel is divided from the Body of the Church and the Clergy from the People in the first design of that partition And this rather relates to the place called the Chancery than to the Chancellor But from the resemblance of this partition the word is also applied to the Office or Duty of the Chancellor which was Cancellare to draw cross Lines over a Writing that is to Cancel it From hence it may be collected that at first the Chancellors principal Imployment was to Cancel Writings for he had his Name from it And Cowel cites Lupanus as testifying the same That the Name of Cancellarius was belonging to every Register who also was styled Grapharius a Scribe a writer of Writs or Actuary a Register of the Acts and Proceeding of a Court not a Judge but an Officer attending upon Judges Qui conscribendis Judicum actis dat operam It appears by Sir
what might be the Discretion and Judgment of One great Person and thereby have fenced against it I must not only be defeated of my Right disappointed of a Provision for my Family for which I had long been labouring but beyond all expectation after a tedious and chargeable waiting for the Event and Issue of a Chancery-Suit I shall be doom'd to pay Two or Three hundred pounds by the Name of Costs because I could not Prognosticate what would be the Opinion or Judgment of One single Person upon my Case who is not so tied to Rules as the Judges are This wonderfully enriches the Men of the Chancery Leges humanae says that good Chancellor Fortescue in his commendation of the Laws of England pag. 11. on the b. side of the Page non aliud sunt quam Regulae quibus perfectè justitia Edocetur as they are Leges à ligando so they are Regulae à dirigendo Regulando And id pag. 25. b. 31. b. says the Chancellor still Non potest Rex Angliae ad Libitum suum Leges mutare regni sui This Excellent Chancellor Fortescue lived in the time of King Hen. VI. and was Ch. Justice of the King's-Bench Anno 20 H. 6. as appears by Dugdale's Origines Juridiciales pag. 58 62. yet has not a word to say in Commendation of this Equitable Jurisdiction thô it then began to spring up and he himself were Chancellor as he stiles himself but rather seems utterly to condemn it by so highly commending the Trials of matters of Fact by Twelve Men and preferring it infinitely before that of the Civil Law which the Chancery follows by the Testimony of Witnesses only and by as much extolling the certainty of our Common Law administred by the Judges of it Could he possibly have forgotten to mention that Jurisdiction he himself being Chancellor had he approv'd of it It is excellent advice in the Preface to Sir Coke's 7 Rep. fol. 2. b. Quoad fieri possit quam plurima Legibus ipsis definiantur quam paucissima verò Judicis Arbitrio relinquantur Now let us take Notice of the ill Effects that have arisen from the Exercise of this Equitable Jurisdiction which in general words were taken notice of by a Bill that lately passed One or both Houses of Parliament take these Instances First The Common Law of England which is the birth-right of every English Man and which is so agreeable to the Genius of this Nation and a Law of their chusing is by this new Jurisdiction Subverted and the Civil Law which hath been so vigorously oppos'd by the Lords and Commons from the beginning and in all Ages is introduc'd which brings our Rights and Estates to be determined ad aliud Examen to a Decision by Depositions of Witnesses only and in such a manner examin'd as is observ'd by that incomparable Treatise of the Chancellor Sir John Fortescue De Laudibus Legum Angliae in a private Room before an Officer call'd An Examiner not before the Judge of the Court and many times upon leading Interrogatories Whereas the Truth is best discovered when Witnesses are produced in the face of the Court and Examined by the Judge of the Court in the presence of the Parties to the Suit and their Council and Witnesses brought to confront one another There is many times much in the Countenance and Carriage of a Witness to help to the manifestation of the Truth or Falshood of his Evidence and by Questions suddenly asked him Tacitus in his Annals in his Second Book Chap. 8. tells us that the ancient custom of Rome was That even the Vestal Virgins that in all other Cases were recluse and vailed yet upon occasion for their Testimony they were examined as Witnesses in the common place of Pleadings and Judgment Secondly The Judgment and Determination of Causes in Chancery depend upon the sole Opinion and Conscience of one single Person whose Power therein as some of our Books and Modern Authors presume to affirm is Absolute and Arbitrary Sir John Davys in his Preface to his Reports fol. 11. b. says The Chancellor hath Potestatem absolutam in binding and loosing the Proceedings of the Law and in deciding of Causes by the Rules of his own Conscience and that the King trusts him with his own Conscience Tr. 9. E. 4. fol. 14. Pasc. 22. E. 4. Fitzh Sub-Paena placit 16. by Hussey The Chancellor's Judgment is not guided always by certain and known Rules so that no foresight can sence and provide against it We are not fore-warn'd and therefore cannot be fore-arm'd and all this by a Jurisdiction at the first assum'd but not legally granted The first Chancellor in this Exercise of this Power not at all asking that material Question Quis me constituit Judicem as our Blessed Saviour himself did in the like Case And how expensive and dilatory in Proceedings we have been already told by the several Books and Authorities cited and it shall be yet further observ'd We may read in the Lord Coke in his Magna Charta 29th Chap. in his Exposition fol. 51. of the words per Legem Terrae What mischiefs and horrible vexations did arise when this ancient and fundamental Law this Lex Terrae was laid aside in divers Cases by the Act of 11 H. 7. Cap. 3. and a Liberty given to proceed without any finding and presentment by the Verdict of Twelve Men upon a bare information for the King altho' the Justices of Assize and Justices of the Peace were entrusted in it to proceed according to their Discretions upon bare proof by Witnesses whereby the Judges and Justices who might best be trusted with such a dangerous Power if it might be allow'd to any were not only Judges of the Law as the Judges of the Common Law Courts at Westminster-Hall are but also in the place of a Jury to judge and determine of Fact too as the Equity side of the Chancery too often doth and yet this Liberty was given by an Act of Parliament which cannot be said of the Jurisdiction we are treating of yet the Nation could not bear it but was restless till that intolerable Act of 11 H. 7. Cap. 3. was Repeal'd by the Act of 1 H. 8. C. 6. and the Tryals by Juries thereby restor'd again The Lord Coke in the same Chap. fol. 54. further declares That if any Man by colour of any Authority where he hath not any in that particular Case Arrest or Imprison any Man or cause him to be Arrested or Imprisoned this is against this Act of Magna Charta and it is most hateful says he when it is done by Countenance of Justice and I take it to be worse if done by a Countenance of Equity and by colour of a new invented Writ first devis'd By John de Waltham Mr. Lambard in his fore-cited Archaion fol. 84. speaks thus If the Chancery have no certain Rules and Limits of Equity if it be not known before-hand in what Cases
the Chancellor will relieve and where not then neither the Subject can be assur'd how or when he may possess his own in peace nor the Practiser in Law be able to inform his Client what may become of his Suit Misera est Servitus ubi jus est vagum Cancellarius Angliae says Sir Hen. Spel. non aliter tenetur Decretis suae Curiae vel sui ipsius quin elucente novà ratione Recognoscat i. e. he reviews quae voluerit mutet deleat prout suae videbitur Prudentiae A certain late Author in his Preface to his Book entituled The happy future State of England Printed 1688. cites Leo Afer who tells us That the Inhabitants of the Mountain Magnan on the Frontiers of Fez have not any settled Judicature nor certain Law but for deciding of Controversies when they happen they stop some Travellers passing that way to give Judgment in them and they desray the charges of their stay This is speedy and cheap but very uncertain in the Decision they might as well determine by casting Lots But we in England have contrary Laws as some do imagine so that we serve two Masters that are divided in their Commands and command contrary things and the one undoes what the other does These are like divers Weights and Measures which are an Abomination to the Lord Prov. 20. 10. In one Court they measure Men's Actions and Rights by one Rule in another Court the same Actions again by contrary Rules as if there were Two contrary first Principles and Deities in Nature as the Marcionites and Manichees held the one benign kind and indulgent the other rigorous and destructive to Mankind The People of England have a Right to be Govern'd and their Lives and Estates Subjected to no other Laws but such as are of their own chusing to which they consent according to that most excellent Preamble to the Stat. of the 25. H. 8. Cap. 21. The Laws of England as the Preamble tells us have been taken by the People of England at their free Liberty by their own Consent to be used among them as the Customs and Ancient Laws Originally Established and not otherwise Sir Francis Bacon in his Resuscitatio pag. 65. in his Speech upon taking his place of Chancellor tells us that the Roman Praetors whose Office had the greatest Affinity with the Jurisdiction claim'd in the Chancery used to set down at their Entrance how they would use their Jurisdiction and he acquaints us with the Excellent charge given him by King James I. at the delivery of the Seal to him viz. To contain that Jurisdiction in its due limits without swelling or excess The excess or tumor says Sir Fr. arises ist from that Courts embracing Causes meerly determinable and fit for the Common Law For the Chancery is ordain'd says he to supply the Law not to subvert it Tho' by his favour the supplying of a Law is the proper work of a Parliament 2. The Tumor arises says Sir Fr. from neglect of the Assistance of the Judges in Cases of Difficulty especially if they touch upon Law The Power says he in his advancement of Learning of moderating Laws little differs from the power of making them Vinius the Civilian sets forth the true Office of the Roman Praetor pag. 16. Neque praetor aliud quam Magistratus fuit Juridicundo non Condendo Custos Juris non Arbiter and again pag. 12. Neque ante Lex vi suâ constat Civesque ad Observationem vel paenam obligat quam populo innotescere potuerit quod sine promulgatione sive publicatione aliquâ fieri non potest To every good Law of Man it is requisite that it be manifest among other Properties says Dr. and Student 4 Chap. pag. 7. b. Now How is that Law manifest that depends upon the sudden Opinion and Judgment of One Person who guides that Opinion and Judgment not by any positive certain and particular Rule or Law clearly defin'd but according to that large and indefinite Rule Secundum Aequum Bonum which is directly contrary to the temper and mind of the Common Law of England which delights in certainty Sir Fr. Bacon in his Advancement of Learning pag. 436. The first Dignity of Law says he is That they be certain Certainty is so Essential to a Law as without it a Law cannot be just and pag. 444. That is the best Law which gives the least Liberty to the Arbitrage of the Judge and he is the best Judge that takes the least Liberty yet afterwards this Grave Chancellor is not steddy to himself but is for allowing to Praetorian Courts of Equity Power of supplying the defects of Law which as I said before does belong to the Parliament only and herein he seems under favour not to be so consistent with what he himself writes in his other Treatise It is very well observ'd by Dr. Barrow in his Treatise of the Pope's Supremacy pag. 255. The means and methods by which Power and Jurisdiction from small and modest Beginnings arrive at last to a strange Height and Exorbitancy The Patriarchate Power says he of the Pope can no otherwise be claimed but by his Invasion and Assumption ibid. 256. The Pope's universal Sovereignty and Jurisdiction hath no real Foundation either in Scripture or elsewhere and pag. 257. he shews by what means so groundless a Claim and Pretence gained Belief and Submission to it Eminency of any kind in Might in Place c. does easily pass into advantages of real Power and Command over those that are inferiour c. Any small Power is apt to grow says he and spread it self into a Flame c. and pag. 261. All Power is attended by dependencies of Persons enjoying subordinate Advantages under it which do grow proportionably by its encrease enjoying Wealth excessive Fees Credit Support Privileges and Immunities thereby Let us look into the beginning of that late Jurisdiction of the President and Council in the North. In the Annals of Queen Eliz. Printed 1630. Lib. 2. pag. 68. in the Reign of King H. 8. says that nameless Author when the Rebellion in the North about suppressing the Abbies was pacified whilst the Duke of Norfolk stayed in those parts many Complaints were brought unto him of Wrongs done in the Rebellion Some of them he compounded himself and some of them he committed to Men of Wisdom under his Seal to be by them Compounded which when the King understood he sent him a peculiar Seal to use in these Causes and the same Seal he committed after the Duke was called back to Tunstall Bishop of Duresme and appointed to him Assistants with Authority to hear and determine the complaints of the poor He was then first of all named President and the Authority of his Successors hath ever since encreased very much This Presidentship says the Annals which is now full of Honour hath from a poor beginning grown up in a short time to this Greatness See Sir
the Parties to such Judgment be in Peace A Peace with a witness to be involv'd again with a new tedious expensive Chancery-Suit so uncertain in the Event and tied to no certain Rules When the Plaintiff at Law flatter'd himself and was glad that he had arriv'd at his desired Haven Post varios casus post tot discrimina He is wonderfully deceived he must set out to Sea again to another long East-India Voyage But what Authorities Law-Books or Resolutions of Judges or Courts of Justice have the Chancery had for the expounding of the Statute of 4 to Henry IV. in this sense which utterly makes that Statute of no Effect besides those of itheir own Chancellors and besides the Privy-Seal of King James I. upon consulting only with his own Council at Law A very strange way of Proceedng The Great Seal and the Privy Seal are on their side 't is true if these in such Case must be submitted to what then becomes of the Stat. of 2 E. 3. cap. 8. whereby it is accorded and established That it shall not be commanded by the Great nor the little Seal to disturb or delay common Right and tho such Commandments do come the Justices shall not therefore cease to do right in any point the Stat. of 14 E. 3. c. 14. is fully to the same effect The complaint against the late Court of Star-chamber which yet was established by Law was that by experience it was found to be an intolerable burthen to the Subject and the means to introduce an Arbitrary Power and therefore that Court was taken away by the Act of 16 Car. 1. Cap. 10. I shall now on the other side endeavour to make it clear to the Honourable the Lords that such Proceedings of the Chancery of Relieving after Judgment at Law upon any pretence of Equity whatsoever is not only against the express words and meaning of that Act of 4 H. 4 but against the Ancient and Fundamental Common Law of England and this I doubt not to make out by all sorts of Authorities and Resolutions Ancient and Modern and in the Reigns of several Kings and Queens of this Nation and that not one authentick Legal Authority can be produced to the contrary I shall begin with the most ancient Authority and that is in 6 E. 1. in the Case of the Earl of Cornwall cited in Sir Coke's 3 Instit. in the Chapter of Praemunire fol. 123. Judgment was there given before the Justices of Oier and Terminer against the Bishop of Exeter and his Tenants The Arch-Bishop of Canterbury Excommunicated all Persons that dealt in those Proceedings against the Bishop of Exeter and his Tenants before those Justices The Record says That the Judgments given in the King's Court ought not to be Impeach'd in any other Court This appears by that Record to be the Antient Law The Stat. of 4 H. 4. now treated of is in effect a Declaration of the Common Law for it recites in the Preamble as was before observed that such Proceeding was in Subversion of the Common Law of the Land which proves it to be done against the Common Law In the Case of Cobb and Nore Pasc. 5. E. 4. Coram Rege cited by Sir Edw. Coke in the same third Instit. fol. 123. A Judgment was obtain'd by Covin and Practise against all Equity and Conscience in the King's-Bench For the Plaintiff in the Judgment retained by Collusion an Attorney for the Defendant without the knowledge of the Defendant then being beyond Sea the Defendant's Attorney confesseth the Action whereupon Judgment was given The Defendant sought his Remedy by Parliament and by Authority of Parliament Power was given to the Lord Chancellor by advice of Two of the Judges to hear and order the Case according to Equity If the Chancellor had any such Power before what need was there of resorting to the Parliament Non recurritur ad extra-ordinarium nisi cessat ordinarium And why was it not referred to the Chancellor alone without Associates if it did of Right belong to him before Such a Case in these days would be held in Chancery to be a most proper Case for the Relief of that Court. And Note further That one Person alone thô a Lord Chancellor was not to be entrusted with a Judicial Power but others were joined with him In the 22 E. 4. fol. 37. It is said by Hussey Ch. Justice If after Judgment the Chancellor grant an Injunction and commit the Plaintiff at Law to the Fleet the King's-Bench will by Habeas Corpus discharge him In the 21th year of K. H. VIII Articles were Signed by Sir Tho. Moor the Chancellor himself and by Fitz-James Ch Justice and Justice Fitzherbert against Cardinal Wolsey One was for Examining matters in Chancery after Judgment at the Common Law in Sir Edw. Cok. 3. Instit. fol. 124. in Subversion of the Laws See the 2 Instit. fol. 626. at the end of that folio before cited more of Cardinal Wolsey and the Indictment against him In Crompton's Jurisdiction of Courts fol. 67 69. and 57. about the time of 13 Eliz. a Man was Condemn'd in Debt in the Common Pleas that is had Judgment entred against him and he Exhibited a Bill in Whitehall and had an Injunction to stay Execution and the Plaintiff that had the Judgment at Law moved in the Common Pleas to have Execution and it was granted notwithstanding the Injunction afterwards the Chancery committed the Plaintiff at Law to the Fleet for Suing out Execution and the Lord Dier Chief Justice and the whole Court of Common Pleas deliver'd him out of the Fleet by Hab. Corpus In the Case of Sir Moile Finch and Throgmorton Mich. 39. 40. Eliz. Throgmorton Exhibited a Bill in Chancery against Sir Moile Finch and shewed clear matter in Equity to be Relieved against a Forfeiture of a Lease for years pretended by Sir Moile for Breach of a Condition where there was no default in the Plaintiff Throgmorton To which Bill the Defendant in Chancery Sir Moile Finch Pleaded That he had obtained Judgment in the Exchequer in an Ejectment in the Name of his Lessee against Throgmorton the Plaintiff in Chancery and that Judgment had been affirm'd in Error and demanded the Judgment of the Chancery if after Judgment given at the Common Law he should be drawn to answer in Equity Egerton would not allow the Plea but over-ruled it Note He did not Plead the Statute of 4 H. 4. but grounded his Plea at the Common Law Queen Elizabeth referr'd the Consideration of this Plea and Demurrer to all the Judges of England not to her own Council Learned in the Law for the Twelve Judges are the proper Judges of this Question tho it concern'd their own Jurisdiction After hearing Council and the intent of the Lord Chancellor being said to be not to Impeach the Judgment but to Relieve upon collateral Matter in Equity Upon great Deliberation it was Resolved by all the Judges of England That
the Plea of the Defendant in Chancery was good And that the Lord Chancellor ought not to Examine the matter in Equity after the Judgment at the Common Law For thô he would not Examine the Judgment yet he would by Decree take away the Effect of the Judgment And it is there said That the Precedents produced in the times of H. 8. and E. 6. were grounded upon the sole Opinion of the Lord Chancellor and passed Sub Silentio And that no Precedent nor Prescription could prevail against the Statutes of the Realm Thereupon this being certified to the Queen the Plea stood for a good Plea Note The Twelve Judges are the most proper Expounders of Statutes see the 2 Instit. fol. 611. in the answer to the 16th Objection made by the Bishops and Clergy where all the Judges do affirm That they never heard it excepted to before the time of King James I. that any Statute should be expounded by any other than by the Judges of the Law and fol. 618. in the answer of the Judges to the last Objection of the Bishops it is truly said by all the Judges of that time also That if the Twelve Judges Err in Judgment it cannot otherwise be reformed not by the Chancellor nor by the Bishops but Judicially by the Parliament the Superiour Court not by the Council Table neither They further resolv'd That the Interpretation of all Statutes that concern the Clergy being parcel of the Laws of the Realm do belong to the Judges of the Common Law yet this was a Contest about Jurisdiction P. 11. Jac. in the King's-Bench Crok Jac fol. 343. Courtney versus Glanvil The Plaintiff had a Decree against the Defendant Glanvil after Glanvil had obtain'd a Judgment at the Common Law by Confession and Glanvil was imprison'd by the Chancery for not obeying the Decree It is said by Cok. Ch. Just. That the Decree and Imprisonment was Unlawful being after Judgment and that the King's-Bench upon an Habeas Corpus ought to Relieve Glanvil The same Case is reported by Sergeant Rolles in his 1 st Rep. Mich. 12. Jac. fol. 111. and Coke said While I have this Coif on my Head I will not allow it Hill 11. Crok Jac. fol. 335. in the K. B. Heath and Ridley's Case It is said by the Court That by the Statutes of 27 E. 3. cap. 1. 4 H 4. cap. 23. After Judgment given in Curia Domini Regis be it in Plea Real not Royal or Personal it ought not to be avoided but by Errour or Attaint And in the same term it was delivered for a general Maxim in Law That if any Court of Equity doth intermeddle with any Matters properly Triable at the Common Law or which concern Freehold they are to be Prohibited Mich. 12. Jac. in the K. B. Roll. 1 Rep. fol. 71. Wright versus Fowler It was order'd by that Court That Cause should be shown why a Prohibition should not be granted to the Dutchy-Court for Proceeding upon a Bill in Equity after Judgment thereupon the Plaintiff in Equity relinquish'd his Bill Mich. â—…13 Jac. K. B. Rolles 1 Rep. fo 252. Coats and Suckerman against Sir Hen. Warner George Crook prayed a Prohibition to the Dutchy for Examining a matter after Judgment in the King's-Bench by Coke Crook Doderidge and Haughton It is said We are resolved that no Court of Equity may meddle after Judgment and a Prohibition was granted It is further said That a Prohibition may be granted by the King's-Bench to the Common Pleas or Exchequer and so of all the Courts of Westminster-Hall if they hold Plea against an Act of Parliament or against the Common Law Mich. 16. Car. 〈◊〉 in the K. B. Crok Car. 1. fol. 595. Calmadies Case A Prohibition was granted against the Court of Requests for proceeding in Equity after a Judgment given in the King's-Bench And the Court Resolv'd That so they would always do whenever any Exhibited Bills there after Verdict and Judgment And the Case of Austin versus Brereton is there cited which was 40 Eliz Austin obtained Judgment in the King's-Bench the Defendant Brereton Sued in the Court of Requests to be Relieved and the Plaintiff at Law was Committed by the Court of Requests and was Bail'd by the King's-Bench and Sir Tho. Gawdy one of the Judges was convened before the Queen for it yet it was held good and Brereton was enforced to satisfie the Judgment Mich. 7. Car. 2. 1655. in the Exchequer Sir Tho. Hardres Rep. fol. 23. Morel versus Douglas The Bill in Equity was to be Relieved against a Judgment by Nihil dicit upon a Bond for the Money was paid There was a Demurrer to the Bill upon the Stat. of 4 H. 4. and the Court allowed the Demurrer There the Case of Langham and Limbrey is cited where the same point was Ruled by the House of Lords by advice of all the Judges the Judgment was for no less than 18000 l. in an Action of Covenant Trin. 1658. In the Exchequer Sir Hardres's Rep. fol. 121. Harris versus Colliton The Defendant had Judgment at Law against the Plaintiff in Equity for Rent of an House The Plaintiff in Equity Harris Exhibited a Bill in Equity to be Reliev'd against that Judgment Suggesting that the House was Demolish'd in the War so that he could make no Profit The Defendant in Equity Colliton sets forth the Stat. of 4 H. 4. and Demur'd to the Bill Finch afterwards Lord Chancellor argued for the Defendant Colliton to maintain the Demurrer As to the Precedents he answers That a 1000 of them will not change the Law and many of them passed Sub silentio or upon the sole Opinion of the Chancellor who is willing to enlarge his own Jurisdiction this was plainly and stoutly said He further held That there were no regular Proceedings in Equity till of late times for Parliaments ought to have been once or twice a year to redress such Grievances Stephens who argued for the Plaintiff in Equity held That the Statute of 4 H. 4. did not extend to the Chancery because the Jurisdiction in Equity of the Chancery was not in being at the making of that Statute and therefore it could not be restrained by it Bigland for the Defendant That the Statute of 27 E. 3. cap. 1. of Praemunire did not extend to a Suit in Chancery because the Chancery was not a Court of Equity at the making of that Stat. and Lambert who was a Master of the Chancery in his time is cited to prove it And 't is there said That the Chancellor TOOK NtOT UPON HIM ex Officio to determine matters in Equiâ—…y till Edw. IVth's time Saunders afterwards Chief Justice of the King's-Bench of Council for the Plaintiff at Law grants it to be true that at the making of the Statute of 27 E. 3. there were no Proceedings in Equity in Chancery but that the words or in any other Court will extend to any Courts that then were