Selected quad for the lemma: england_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
england_n	henry_n	king_n	normandy_n	8,654	5	11.5816	5	true

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ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A42237	The most excellent Hugo Grotius, his three books treating of the rights of war & peace in the first is handled, whether any war be just : in the second is shewed, the causes of war, both just and unjust : in the third is declared, what in war is lawful, that is, unpunishable : with the annotations digested into the body of every chapter / translated into English by William Evats ...; De jure belli et pacis. English	Grotius, Hugo, 1583-1645.; Evats, William.	1682 (1682)	Wing G2126; ESTC R8527	890,585	490

Succession Another Question is this Whether a King may so abdicate his Kingdom as to deprive his Son of his Right to succeed which is resolved by the same distinction For in Kingdoms meerly hereditary he that renounceth his Kingdom cannot transfer it to his Son But in lineal descents the Fathers act cannot null his Sons Right that is born For as soon as the children begin to exist the law makes provision for them yea and for those that are to be born so because that right which by the peoples consent is entailed upon them must in due time descend upon them Neither doth that which I have already said concerning transmission contradict this For that transmission is Necessary as to the Parents and not Voluntary But yet a difference there is between those Children that are born before the Renunciation and those born after For they that are already born have by the Law a full Right to the Kingdom though they that are not permitted to enjoy that Right during the life of their Parent but to those not born there cannot as yet be any Right acquired and therefore it may be taken away by the will of the people if the Parents also to whom it belongs to transfer that Right unto them be willing to release it And to this purpose is that we have already said concerning dereliction XXVII Whether the King or the People only have a Right to judge of the Succession Another Question doth sometimes arise namely who shall be judge of the Right of Succession to a Kingdom Whethet the King then reigning or the people by themselves or by such Judges as they shall appoint If the Question be put of such a Judgement as is Authoritative neither of them have any Right to judge For Jurisdiction there cannot be but in a superiour who should have respect not barely to the person but to the matter also which is to be poised with its due circumstances But the case of Succession is not properly under the jurisdiction of the present King because he cannot of himself by any Law bind his Successor For the Succession to the Empire lies not under the jurisdiction of the Empire but remains in the state of Nature wherein there was no jurisdiction at all But yet notwithstanding if the Right of Succession be controverted the pretenders unto it will do very piously and justly if they can agree between themselves upon some indifferent persons to whose arbitrement they can be contented to refer themselves whereof we shall discourse hereafter But the people have transferred all their Jurisdiction from themselves into the King and the Royal Family during which they cannot challenge to themselves any reliques of it This I mean of a true Kingdom and not of every Principality But yet if in the discussing of this Right any question do arise concerning the primary will and intention of the people at the first institution of the Kingdom it were not amiss to take the advice of the people in present that is of all the three States I mean of the Nobles Clergy and Commons in Parliament assembled as is usual in England and Scotland as Camden testifies in his History of Queen Elizabeth 1571 1572. For the people in present may be judged to be the same they anciently were Or by Delegates purposely chosen as in the Kingdom of Arragon unless it do sufficiently appear That the people then were clearly of another will and that thereupon the Right of Empire was obtained Plut. de fratrum amore Paus lib. 4. Justin lib. 2. Thus did King Euphaes suffer the Messenians diligently to enquire which of the Royal stock of the Aepytidae had most Right to the Kingdom But the contest between Xerxes and Artabazanes was determined by their Uncle Artaphernes to whom it was amicably referr'd as to a Domestick Judge XXVIII The Son born before his Father was King to be preferred before him that was postnate But let us proceed to other cases It hath been often controverted which of the two Sons hath the best Right to the Succession He that was born before the Father gained the Kingdom or he that was born after Whereunto the most Rational Answer is That he that was first born shall first succeed if the Kingdom be indivisible which holds true in every kind of Succession Yet did Henry the First youngest Brother to Rufus assume the Crown of England whilest his elder Brother Robert was in the Holy Land upon this pretence That he was born to his Father after he was Crowned King of England whereas his Brother Robert was born whilest his Father was Duke of Normandy only yet was Henry justly branded as an Usurper of his Brothers Right by Mat. Parisiensis But in case the Kingdom be divisible without doubt the latter shall have his share as well in this as in other goods concerning which it matters not when they were got Now if he that of a divisible Estate may have his share and in that which is indivisible is preferred by the priviledge of his birth Surely even the Inheritance must follow that Son which was born before his Fathers first Investiture But even in a Lineal Succession a Kingdom is no sooner got but the Children which are antenate do immediately conceive an hopes of Succession For admit that there are none born after surely no man will say That those before born are to be excluded But in this kind of Succession an hope once conceived begets a Right Neither doth it by any post fact determine unless it be in a Cognatical Succession where it may be for a while suspended by reason of the priviledge of Sex Thus was the case decided in Persia between Cyrus and Artaxerxes in Judaea between Antipater the Son of Herod the Great and his Brethren In Hungary when Geissa began his reign and in Germany though not without Blood between Otto the first Mariana l. 24. and Henry and in Turky between Bajazet the antenate and Gemes the postnate to the Empire And though haply it may be true that the choice of the Kings of Persia did much depend upon the suffrages of the people yet were those suffrages always limited to the Royal Family Lib. 23. For thus much doth Mariana testifie of the Arsacidae who being Parthians reigned in Persia And the like doth Zonaras in Justin of those Persians that succeeded those Parthians XXIX Unless otherwise provided by some Law But that it was otherwise in Sparta we attribute to the Laws proper to them only which gave the Sons that were postnate the Preheminence for their more Heroick Education The like may also happen by some peculiar Law made upon the first Investiture If a Soveraign Lord shall give unto his Vassal and to those that shall be born of him an Empire to be held of him in Fee upon the strength of which Argument Lewis in the contest that arose between him and his Brother Galeatius for the Dutchy of Millain did

his gains but if the thing taken away do perish then the value of it not to the highest rate nor to the lowest but moderated Among these we may also rank such as defraud Princes of their lawful Customs and Contributions In like manner are they bound to reparation that have wronged others by either their unjust sentence or unjust accusation or by their false Testimony XVII In him that by fear or fraud causeth a Promise As also he that shall either by fraud force or unjust fear urge a Contract or a Promise from any man is bound to make reparation to the full For hereby he robs the man he deals with of a double Right First By the nature of Contracts he had this Right That he ought not to be deceived And then by the natural liberty that every man should have He ought not to be enforced or unjustly affrighted And among these we may likewise range those that will not perform what by their Office they are bound to do without Bribes XVIII What if the fear be naturally just But he that hath given just cause why he ought to be by force or fear compelled hath reason to blame himself For an involuntary act arising from a voluntary is naturally reckoned for a voluntary XIX What if the fear be held by the Law of Nations for just But as by the consent of Nations all Wars made and denounced by the Supream power on both sides are reputed just as to to the external effects whereof we shall speak more anon so is the fear of such a War so far reputed just That whatsoever is obtained thereby cannot be required back In which sense that distinction of Cicero's may be admitted which he makes between an Enemy with whom we enjoy by the consent of Nations many common Rights and a Thief or Pirate For if these extort any thing from us by fear we may require it back unless we are bound by Oath not to do it But so we cannot do from an Enemy Wherefore what Polybius writes concerning the Second Punick War namely that the Carthaginians had just cause to make it because the Romans by denouncing War against them whilst they were engaged in another War against their Seditious Mercenaries had enforced them from the Island of Sardinia and a great sum of money hath indeed some shew of Equity but is not agreeable with the Common Right of Nations as we shall elsewhere prove XX. How far the Civil power is bound by Damages done by their Subjects Kings and Magistrates are obliged to reparation if they do not make use of such remedies against Thieves and Pirates to suppress them as they may and ought to do For which neglect the Scyrians were condemned by the Amphictyones I remember that this case was once proposed amongst us when our Estates having granted Letters of Mart against our Enemies some of those to whom these Letters were granted abusing themselves and us had robbed our friends and leaving our Country betook themselves to the Seas and though recalled would not return whence arose this question Whether our States were bound to repair the damages by reason of Letters of Mart granted them either because they made use of such wicked instruments or because they did not require from them sufficient caution that they should not transgress their Commissions Whereunto I gave this answer That they were obliged to no more than to punish them being found or to deliver them up And besides to take care that reparation should be made out of the Goods of the Delinquents A judged case For that the States were not the causes of the depredations nor did they participate of them that they had forbidden them by severe Laws to wrong their friends but to require Caution from them they were not by any Law obliged seeing that they might empower all their Subjects without any Codicils to make what spoil they could of whatsoever was their Enemies as had been anciently done Neither was this permission the true cause of the wrongs done unto their friends seeing that private men might arm their Ships and put out to Sea even without permission Neither could they foresee that these men would prove wicked Nor could they altogether avoid the making use of wicked men for then it was not possible for them to raise an Army Neither if their Souldiers either by Sea or Land did injure their friends contrary to the Command of the Supream Magistrate were they obliged to reparation as might easily be proved by the Testimonies of France and England Yet in a League between Francis de Valois King of France and Henry the Eighth of England Herbert's Henry the 8. page 54. it was agreed the better to prevent Depredations by Sea that no Merchant of either Nation should depart out of their Ports without giving Caution to their respective Admirals that no wrong or molestation should be done by Sea to either of their Subjects But that any man should be bound to repair the Damages which his Servants shall without his fault and against his command do unto others belongs not to the Law of Nations by which this cause ought properly to be judged but to the Civil Law and yet not in the general but as it is introduced for some particular reasons against Mariners and some others And thus hath this case been determined by the Judges of the Supreme Assembly against certain Pomeranians and that according to Precedents of things of the like nature two ages before XXI The owner of a Ship or Beast that hurts his Neighbour not bound by the Law of Nature This also is worthy our observation that it proceeds from the Civil Law and not from the Law of Nature That we deliver up our Beast or Bond-slaves to punishment which have endamaged our Neighbour For the owner of them being innocent is naturally bound to nothing as neither is he whose Ship without his fault falls foul and hurts another though by the Law of diverse Nations as well as ours such Damages are usually divided between both because it is very difficult to be proved XXII The Damage against a mans honour how to be tepaired But the wounds we receive in our Honour or Fame as by Stripes Reproaches Curses and such like must have their proper cures And in these no less than in Theft and other Crimes the hainousness of the fact is discerned by the effect For as in those our reparation consists in the punishment of the Thief so in this The Damage we sustain is repaired by confession of the fault and by exhibiting all due Honour to him who is wronged and the publick Testimony given both of his innocency and our own repentance and such like means Although the offender in this kind may be punished in his purse if the injured person desire it because money is the Common Standard whereby all things tending to profit are measured CHAP. XVIII Of the Rights of Embassages I. There are some