Selected quad for the lemma: england_n
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A57483
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Maxims of state written by Sir Walter Raleigh ; whereunto is added his Instructions to his sonne, and The son's advice to his aged father.; Prince
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Raleigh, Walter, Sir, 1552?-1618.
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1650
(1650)
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Wing R174; ESTC R9131
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26,462
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87
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discovered and put to flight if the multitude affect their Prince But the Common people being once offended hath cause to fear every moving both at home and abroad This may be effected by the Prince if he use means and art of getting the favour of the people and avoid those things that breed hatred contempt viz. if he seem as a Tutor or a Father to love the people and to protect them if he maintain the peace of his Kingdom For that nothing is more popular nor more pleasing to the people than is peace 4. If he shew himself oftentimes graciously yet with State and Majesty to his people and receive complaints of his suppliants and such like 5. If he sit himself sometimes in open Courts and place of Iusticâ— that he may seem to have a care of justice among his people If he bestow many benefits and graces upon that City which he maketh the seat of his Empire and so make it sure and faithfull unto him which is fit to be in the middle of his Kingdom as the hearâ— in the middle of the body or the Sun in the middle of Heaven both to divide himself more easily into all the parts of his Dominions and least the furthest partsâ— at one end move whilest the Prince is in the other Iâ— he go in progress many times to see his Provinces especially those that are remote 6. If he gratifie his Courtiers and Attâ—nâ—ants in that â—ort and by such means as that he may seem not to pleasure them with the hurt and injury of his people as with Monopolies and such like 7. If he commit the handling of such things as procure envy or seem grievous to his Ministers but reserve those things which are gratefull and well pleasing to himself as the French Kings who for thâ—t purpose as may seem have erected their Court at Paris which acquitteh the Prince from grudge and â—nvy both with the Nobles and the Pâ—ople 8. If he borrows sometimes sums of money of his people though he have no need and pay the same justly without defalcaâ—ion of any part by his Exchequer or other Officer 9. If he avoid all such things as may breed â—atred or contempt of his person which may be done if he shew himself not too light inconstant hard cruel â—sfeminate fearfull and dastardly c. But contrarywise Religious Grave Iust Valiant c. Whereby appeareth the false doctrine of the Machiavilian Policie with far the betmeans to keep the people in obedience than love and reverence of the people towards the Prince 10 If the Prince be well furnished with Warlike provision which is to be rumoured and made known abroad if it be known that he is reverenced and obeyed by his peoples at home 11. If he provide so much as lyeth in him that his neighbour Kingdoms grow not over much in power and Dominion which if it happen he is to joyn speedily with other Princes which are in like danger to abate that greatness and to strengthen himself and the rest against it An oversight of the Christian Princes towards the King of Spain 12. If he get him Intelligencers by Reward or other means to detect or hinder the designs of that Prince with whom he hath differences if any thing be intended against his State Or at least have some of his own Lydging abroad about that Princes Court under colour of Embassage or some other pâ—etence which must be men of skill and Dexterity to serve for that turn 13. To observe the Laws of his Countrey and not to encounter them with his Prâ—rogative nor to use it at all where there is a Law for that it maketh a secret and just grudge in the peoples hearts especially if it tender to take from them â—â—â—ir commodities and to bestow them upon other of his COURTIERS and Ministers 14. To provide especially That that part which favoureth the State as it standeth be more potent than the other which favoureth it not or desireth a change 15. To make special choice of good and sound men to bear the place of Magistrates especially of such as assist the Prince in his Counsels and Policies and not to lean over much to his own advise contrarie to the rule of Machiavil who teacheth That a Prince can have no good counsel except it be in himself his reason because if he use the counsel of some one he is in danger to be over-wrought and supplanted by him if he counsel with more Then he shall be distracted with the differences in opinions As if a Prince of great or mean wisdom could not take the Iudgement of all his Counsellorurs in any point of Policie or of so many as the himself thinketh good and to take it either by word or in writing and himself then in private peruse them all and so after good and mature deliberation make choice of the best without any distraction or binding himself to the direction of one For the Proverb is true that two eyes see more than one and therefore the advises and Consultations of a Senatory State is compared by some to a Feast or dinner where many contribute towards the shot by which means they have more variety of dishes and so better fare and yet every man may make choice of that dish that serveth him best â—or his health and appetiâ—e 16. The Prince himself is to sit sometimes in place of publique justice and to give an experiment of his wisdom and equity whereby great reverence and estimation is gotten as in the example of Solomon which may seem the reason why our Kings of England had their Kings Bench in place of publick Justice after the manner of the ancient Kings that â—ate in the Gate where for better performing of this Princely duty some special causes may be selected which may throughly be debaâ—ed and considered upon by the Prince in private with the help and advise of his learned Councel and so be decided publickly as before is said by the Prince himself At least the Prince is to â—ake accompâ— of every Minister of publick Justice that it may be known that he hath a care of Justice and doing right to his people which makes the Justicâ—rs also to â—e more â—â—reful in performing of their duties 17. To be moderate in his Taxes and impositions and when need doth require to use the Subjects purse â—o do it by Parliaments and with their consents making the cause apparent unto them and shewing his unwillingness in charging them Finally so to use it that it may seem rather an offer from his Subjects than an exaction by him 18. To stop small beginnings unto â—his end to compound the dissentions â—hat arise amongst the Nobles with caution that such as are free be not drawn into parts whereby many times the Prince is endangered and the whole Common-wealth set in a combustion as in the example of the Barons Wars and the late Wars of France which grew from a quarrel betwixt the