Selected quad for the lemma: england_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
england_n	emperor_n	king_n	league_n	3,609	5	9.4892	5	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A87137	The prerogative of popular government. A politicall discourse in two books. The former containing the first præliminary of Oceana, inlarged, interpreted, and vindicated from all such mistakes or slanders as have been alledged against it under the notion of objections. The second concerning ordination, against Dr. H. Hamond, Dr. L. Seaman, and the authors they follow. In which two books is contained the whole commonwealth of the Hebrews, or of Israel, senate, people, and magistracy, both as it stood in the institution by Moses, and as it came to be formed after the captivity. As also the different policies introduced into the Church of Christ, during the time of the Apostles. By James Harrington.	Harrington, James, 1611-1677.	1657 (1657)	Wing H820; Thomason E929_7; ESTC R202382	184,546	252

then the Prince These things considered and in them the Nature Constitution or Disease of Monarchy by Arms we may consult the more rationally with the Considerer upon the Applications or remedies by him offer'd which are three First that the Guards of the Kings person be not increased beyond the necessity of security But of what security that of his Person or of his Empire or of both for speaking of a Monarchy by Arms in this later sense only it is true and if so then this singular Maxime of State Frustra fit per plura quod fieri potest per pauciora might have been spared Celais'en va sans le dire come les heures de nostre curè Secondly that they be not suffered to stagnate at Court but be by a perpetual circulation drawn out upon service for if there be not perpetual service it should seem Men might be apt to think that Government was instituted for peace as well as War I add no more then is imply'd in his words which as to this of Turkey have chanced well where not the Stagnation of the Janizaries only but of the Court it self which by the institution should always be in exercise of Arms is the cause of that present decay so perceivable in this Empire But the Prince sitting still or stagnating to what the Circulation of the Janizaries whose alienation from the Government or intelligence with the Timariots must needs be of dangerous consequence could tend should have been thought on otherwise to expose the Empire to danger for the safety of the Prince is no cure of the Government But his chief remedy remains this Court Militia must not consist of one intire body united under the same head but be divided under several Colonels Captains Parties Brigades and distributed unto several Quarters As if this were a Cure there were any Army that could be mutinous but where he saies not united under the same head he intimates perhaps divers Generals and divers Armies Now such are the Turkish Beglerbegs and the Provinces under their Governments That these therefore be kept divided so that not any two of them can lay their heads together without having them cut off nor any Son succeed the Father in Government requires that there be always a sufficient force distinct from the interest of the Timariots and Beglerbegs united and still ready upon occasion of this service and the Janizaries with the Spahi's or Court horse being united are no more then sufficient for this service wherefore if these also were so divided as thereby to be weakened they could not be sufficient for this service and their division except such as might weaken them would be of no security to the Prince That the Provinces under this awe are lesse apt to Rebel then the Court guards to Mutiny is no wonder but the Court-guards being cured by the prescription of this Physitian of possibility of Mutiny which without weakening them is impossible the Provinces if Liberty or Riches or Power be desirable would never indure the yoak of this Government Wherefore it being inavoidable in the Empire that either the Janizaries or the Timariots may doe what they list in regard that whether of them be able to give law unto the other must at the same time be able to give law unto the Prince and to bring them unto an equal ballance were to make a Civil war or at least to sow the seed of it the Native wound of Monarchy by Arms remains uncured and uncurable What more may be done for Monarchy founded upon a Nobility comes next to be tried In this the Considerer gives his word that there never riseth any danger unto the Crown but when either a great part of the Soveraign power is put into the hands of the Nobility as in Germany and Poland where it should seem by him that the Electors and the Gentry do not put power into the hands of the Emperor or King but the Emperor or King puts power into the hands of the Electors or Gentry or when some Person or Family is suffered to overtop the rest in Riches Commands and Dependance as the Princes of the bloud and Lorrain not long since in France and of old the Montforts and Nevi●s in England The first of these he declareth to be a vicious government and a Monarchy only in Name the second he undertakes shall easily admit of this remedy That the great ones be reduced decimo sexto to a lesser volume and levelled into an Equality with the rest of their Order His put-pin is pretty the Emperor puts power into the hand of the Electors and the King of Poland puts power into the hands of the Gentlemen which Governments therefore and all such like as when the King of England put power into the hands of the Barons at such time as he was no longer able to keep it out of their fingers by which means the Antient and late Government of King Lords and Commons was restored are vicious Constitutions and Monarchies only in Name such as he will not meddle with and therefore let them go Well but where is the Patient then if these be not Monarchies by Nobility what do we mean by that thing or what Government is it that we are to Cure why such an One where some Person or Family is suffered to overtop the rest in Riches Commands and Dependance as the Princes of the bloud and Lorrain not long since in France and of old the Montfords and the Nevils in England So then the same again for these are no other upon recollection are those that admit of this Easie cure Let the great Ones be reduced to a lesser volume and levell'd with the rest of their Order But how if they be the weaker party they are not the great ones and if they be the stronger party how will he reduce them Put the case a Man have the Gout his Physitian does not bid him reduce his overtopping toes unto the volume of the other foot nor to levell them unto Equality with the rest of their Order but prescribes his remedies and institutes the Method that should do this feat What is the Method of our Aesculapius Point de Novelle or where are we to find it e'en where you please The Princes of the bloud and of Lorrain in France the Montforts and the Nevils in England overtopped not their Order by their own riches or power but by that of the party which for their fidelity courage or conduct intrusted them with the managing of their Arms or affairs So the Prince that would have levelled them must have levelled their party which in case the controversie be upon the right or pretended right of the Nobility in the Government which commonly makes them hang together may come to the whole Order what then Why then says he the Prince must preserve his Nobility weighty enough to keep the People under and yet not tall enough in any particular person to measure

administration of it can be no otherwise then contrary unto the national ballance That this may be admitted without Opposition the Considerer is inclining to allow Always provided that he be satisfied in this demand whether distinct ballances under the same Head or Governour as those of Castile and Aragon the power of the King I presume he means by the ballance of a Nobility being greater in the One and that of the People in the other may not so poise one the other as to produce a new ballance To which I answer that no One government whatsoever hath any more then one of two ballances that except in the Cases excepted of Land which is National or that of Armes which is Provincial Wherefore if the King of Spain by his war against the Commons alter'd the Ballance of Aragon it must have been one of two ways either by strengthning the ballance of the Nobility and governing the Aragonian People by them in which case their ballance though alter'd remained yet National or by holding both Nobility and People by a Provincial Governour and an Army in which Case his Empire in that Kingdome is Provincial There is no Third way nor putting the Case that the ballance of Castile be National and that of Aragon Provincial doth this any more create in the Monarchy of Spain a Third ballance of Empire then did the Multiplication of Associations and Provinces diverse for their ballances in the Commonwealth of Rome England and Scotland being united in one Prince made if it had been rightly used an increase of strength but not a Third ballance nor do the Kingdoms in Spain Whether a Soveraignty have many Territories and Provinces in subjection or in League it is all one as to this point the stronger Union or League will give the stronger ballance and the Case of the present Soveraignties in Europe being no other the more nice then wise Speculation of the Considerer who hath not been able to discern the ballance of a League from that of Empire is a Mares nest CHAP. V. Whether there be any Common right or interest of Mankind distinct from the parts taken severally and how by the Orders of a Commonwealth it may best be distinguisht from private interest IN the next place the Prevaricator does not go about to play the man but the unlucky boy Where I say that the soul of man is Mistress of two potent rivals Reason and Passion he doth not stand to weigh the truth of the thing or the fitness of the comparison either of which had been fair but tumbles Dick upon Sis the Logick upon the Rhetorick the sense upon the figure and scuds away in this manner If I could be perswaded Mr. Harrington were so far in earnest as to expect any man should be convinced by the metaphorical use of two or three words some farther consideration might be proposed This is to use his Readers as the Fox doth the Dogs when having pissed upon his tail and flapped it in their eyes he gets away Doth not his Book deserve to be guilded and carry'd in Statesmens pockets Alasse mine are nothing Quis leget haec vel duo vel nemo they break the Stationer And yet let me comfort my self Whose are better the prevaricator seems to set every whit as light by those of Hooker and Grotius at least where they favour me The opinions of Grotius saies he cannot oblige us beyond the reasons whereon they are founded and what are those he will dispute against that which he dares not repeat that his Comment may take you by the Nose he hath left out the Text. The words of Grotius are of this sense Though it be truly said that the creatures are naturally carried forth unto their proper utility this ought not to be taken in too general a sense seeing diverse of them abstain from their own profit either in regard of those of the same kind or at least of their young Which words saith the Prevaricator carry a great restriction in them and the way of producing actions in beasts is so different from the emanation of humane reason mark the Impostor the Author is speaking of natural affection and he wipes out that and puts in humane reason that the inferences from the natural affection of the one to the degree of reason which is in the other must needs be very weak Excellent doth it therefore follow that the eminent degree of reason wherewith all God hath endued man must in him deface that natural affection and desertion in some cases of private for common good which is apparent even in beasts What do reverend Divines mean to cry up this Infidel Nay is not he worse then an infidel that provideth not for his own family A Commonwealth is but a great family and a family is a little Commonwealth Even Beasts in sparing out of their own mouths and exposing themselves unto danger for their young provide for their families and in providing for their families provide for their whole Commonwealth that is forsake in some things their private good and safety for the good of the publick or of the kind In this case it is that even stones or heavy things saies Hooker forsake their ordinary wont or center and fly upwards to relieve the distress of nature in common Wretch that he is shall a stone upon this occasion fly upwards and will he have a man to go downwards Yes Mr. Hooker ' s expression saith he is altogether figurative and it is easier to prove from thence that things wanting sense make discourses and act by election then that there is such a thing as a common interest of mankind This is like the rest Hooker speaketh of the necessity that is in nature and this Gentleman translateth that sense into the word election So because a stone is necessitated to comply with the common interest of nature without Discourse or Election therefore it rather follows from hence that things wanting sense make discourses and act by election then that there is such a thing as a common interest of mankind His old trick I do not say that because it is so with the creatures therefore it must be so with man but as we see it is with the creatures in this part so we find it to be with man And that so and more then so we find it to be with man who though he le evil gives good things unto his children will work hard lay up deny himself venture his life for his little Commonwealth is thus farther demonstrated All civil Laws acknowledge that there is a common interest of mankind and all civil laws proceed from the nature of man therefore it is in the nature of man to acknowledge that there is a common interest of mankind Upon this acknowledgement of mankind a man that steals is put to death which certainly is none of his private interest nor is a man put to death for any other mans private interest